KEY TAKEAWAYS
KEY TAKEAWAYS
Last week, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Washington marked the fourth meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and a foreign leader since the start of the new administration. Despite differences over tariffs, Modi’s trip signaled that U.S.-Indian relations will continue along the positive trajectory seen in recent years, particularly in defense and technology cooperation. Trump made clear that he sees value in India’s role as a counterweight to China, but that he also views Delhi as an important player and key partner outside the context of strategic rivalry.
USIP’s Asfandyar Mir, Daniel Markey, Vikram Singh and Sameer Lalwani, discuss what the visit indicates about the foreign policy priorities of the new Trump administration and what it may signal for U.S.-India bilateral cooperation in the years ahead.
Mir: Modi's trip marks an early and consequential foreign policy development for the Trump administration in four respects.
First, President Trump elevated India as a premier U.S. partner for his administration, notably hosting Modi before any European leader. This early, high-level engagement not only upgrades bilateral momentum but counters the narrative of Trump’s foreign policy approach being insufficiently attentive to alliances and partnerships. By prioritizing India over traditional allies and partners, he has signaled deep interest in and a clear focus on key partnerships of the future.
Second, Trump reset the tenor of U.S.-India engagement by prioritizing immediate U.S. interests in tandem with investments in long-term objectives. Trump elevated material U.S. concerns, such as an unfavorable trade balance due to Indian protectionist policies and illegal migration from India. This style of bargaining marks a clear break from previous approaches to India, which tended toward accepting strategic trade-offs for Indo-Pacific convergence. Trump’s instinct that centering American priorities proactively wouldn't compromise the relationship and instead improve it for U.S. interests was borne out — India offered preemptive tariff concessions, agreed to broader trade negotiations, announced intent to purchase U.S. energy and committed to aggressive action on illegal immigration. This defies a wisdom on U.S.-India relations held by some in Washington that the U.S. must be more accommodative of India to secure meaningful cooperation.
Third, the Trump administration has set a bold agenda committing to and expanding cooperation on trade, technology, infrastructure, energy, defense and people-to-people ties. The president has demanded more — like broader market access for American goods and services in India and an ambitious goal of growing bilateral trade to $500 billion by 2030 — but crucially, matched this with substantial offers to India, including support for the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) initiative, technology transfers, counterterrorism and law enforcement cooperation, and a path to fifth-generation fighter jets.
Finally, Trump’s perspective on India's role regarding China suggests a distinct approach to geopolitics that goes beyond traditional balance of power considerations without dismissing them. India’s value as a critical player in the Indo-Pacific region and counterweight to China remains important, but Trump appears to see India as a standalone, vital power in Asia and the globe, with whom the United States needs a strong, sustainable partnership anchored in equitable distribution of benefits, particularly economic ones. This view, combining commercial institutionalism, reciprocity and attention to relative American gains, departs from the strategic orthodoxy of recent U.S. administrations on ties with India, which centered on balance of power politics, and the imperative of India’s rise therein, and shared democratic values.
To be sure, this view also leaves space for balance of power cooperation and encourages investment in capacities of both countries to act collectively across strategic domains — but it seeks to lower the burden America must shoulder in bilateral ties. If institutionalized, such an approach can be more realistic and resilient than those built on elusive ideological principles, which create a mismatch of expectations or approaches that primarily respond to variable U.S.-China and India-China dynamics.
Markey: Modi’s visit comes at a time of significant flux in how Washington approaches its relationships with top allies and adversaries alike. Despite the dizzying pace of change, India looks reasonably well-positioned to capitalize.
On Russia, Trump’s Wednesday call with Vladimir Putin and announcement of new negotiations to end the war in Ukraine were undoubtedly music to India’s ears. Modi’s India has retained good ties with Russia despite criticism from the West, continuing to import Russian weapons and even massively ramping up its purchase of discounted Russian oil since 2022. Now Modi’s familiar talking point that India is not neutral, per se, but sides with peace, and his pointed suggestion to Putin that “this is not the era of war,” place Modi comfortably in Trump’s camp.
On China, many of the cooperative ventures announced during Modi’s visit only make sense within the context of continued geopolitical competition with Beijing. Beijing’s critical reaction to the trip shows it could easily read between the lines. Modi’s India can, for a time, breathe easier in understanding that Trump’s America has no plan for a “G-2” condominium with Beijing that would cede to China a sphere of influence in Asia as some Indian analysts have feared.
Even on Iran, where team Trump has reimposed a “maximum pressure” campaign that could obstruct India-Iran cooperation, India has effectively hedged its bets by enhancing its ties with Israel and Gulf Arab states. Expect the IMEC initiative to get an added boost from Trump's Washington as part of the effort to recover and rebuild after the Gaza War and to further isolate Iran.
Singh: The Modi government has been looking to nuclear power as an essential energy source for meeting the demands of India’s growing economy and seeks technology from the United States. The needs are substantial, with the Indian government announcing plans to build 100 gigawatts of nuclear capacity by 2047. The U.S. should be a natural partner in this effort. Civil nuclear cooperation was a foundation of the new strategic partnership starting 20 years ago when the Bush administration began a process to bring India into the global nuclear club even though New Delhi never signed the global Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Although the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement (also called a 123 agreement) was announced in 2005 and signed in October of 2008, no U.S.-origin nuclear reactors have yet been built in India due to commercial, legal and bureaucratic obstacles. One challenge was continued U.S. restrictions on working with some Indian nuclear entities. These constraints were lifted at the very end of the Biden administration. Another hurdle has been India’s nuclear liability rules, which were enacted in 2010. Nuclear suppliers believe India’s rules are out line with global norms and put them at unlimited risk in the event of an accident. The Indian government announced plans to revise its nuclear liability laws just as Modi embarked on his trip to France and the United States.
With that background, Trump and Modi re-focused U.S.-India energy cooperation toward pledges for India to purchase more American oil and gas and for the U.S. to share nuclear energy technology when India’s liability laws change. The leaders committed to old plans to build large nuclear reactors as well as possible cooperation on small modular reactors, with the joint statement including a commitment to “fully realize the U.S.-India 123 Civil Nuclear Agreement by moving forward with plans to work together to build U.S.-designed nuclear reactors in India through large-scale localization and possible technology transfer.”
Lalwani: On defense, we should expect a fair amount of continuity from the previous administrations as Trump and Modi recommitted to deepening defense technology collaboration and military operational cooperation over the next decade. Going forward, defense cooperation will likely remain the “load-bearing pillar” of the U.S.-India relationship.
While repackaging previous strategic technology collaborations into a new initiative, Transforming the Relationship Utilizing Strategic Technology (TRUST), the two leaders maintained a vision of codeveloping and coproducing critical and emerging technologies. The leaders reaffirmed the INDUS-X platform while modeling new INDUS acceleration initiatives off of it, including in space and energy.
The leaders also highlighted new efforts to strengthen collaborative deterrence. On a call the previous week between defense officials, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth suggested to his counterpart Defense Minister Rajnath Singh that the overarching purpose of U.S.-India defense industrial, technological and operational cooperation was “to deter aggression in the Indo-Pacific.” The joint leaders’ statement from the Modi visit reflects this sentiment with efforts to operationalize deterrence, including Indian leadership in the Combined Maritime Forces, new industrial partnerships to co-develop autonomous undersea surveillance, and a security role for the Quad (a grouping of Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S.) including maritime patrols.
Moreover, India committed to procure new capabilities to enhance Indian security burden sharing in the Indian Ocean, including additional P-8l maritime patrol aircraft. It also indicated plans to join the literal “arsenal of democracy” when it concludes agreements to buy and coproduce with U.S. defense firms “Stryker” infantry combat vehicles and Javelin anti-tank guided missile. Other announcements like the strategic minerals and undersea cables initiatives have a clear angle to counter China’s dominance and coercive leverage in these sectors.
Much has already been debated about Trump’s offer of F-35 stealth fighter aircraft, but even if this announcement never results in an actual sale, it remains an effective strategic move. It not only signals trust to India along with a willingness to review export control policies, but also counters influence by Russia, which had recently offered India fifth-generation fighter collaboration. Moreover, it forces an Indian reckoning with the incompatibility of higher quality Western systems and with poorly performing Russian systems, including S-400 air defenses capabilities that India has previously acquired.