United States Institute of Peace

Lai visited three of the 12 remaining countries that officially recognize Taiwan as a state: the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Tuvalu and Palau. The visit underscored Taiwan's commitment to strengthening ties with its allies and partners in the face of mounting pressure from Beijing.

Lai also transited through Hawaii and the U.S. territory of Guam. In Honolulu, Lai reaffirmed his commitment to peace in the Taiwan Strait and reminded his audience that “war has no winners.” In Guam, Lai became the first Taiwanese president to deliver a speech to the Guam legislature. Lai refrained from meeting high-ranking U.S. government officials during the stopovers. Instead, he held phone and video discussions with U.S. congressional leaders from both parties.

USIP’s Camilla Pohle, Naiyu Kuo, Dan Spinelli and Jennifer Staats explain why the Pacific Islands are important to China and Taiwan, how China reacted to Lai’s trip, and what this tells us about cross-Strait relations moving forward.

What importance do the Pacific Islands, particularly the three countries that Lai visited, have to Taiwan and China?

Pohle: China and Taiwan have been competing for diplomatic recognition from Pacific Island countries for decades. China is seeking partners willing to support it in the United Nations and other international fora, and Taiwan is seeking the legitimacy afforded by diplomatic recognition. In this zero-sum game, China views countries recognizing Taiwan as a threat to its sovereignty, and Taiwan views any loss of a diplomatic partner as a blow to its own international status.

While visiting Taipei’s remaining diplomatic partners in the Pacific Islands — the Marshall Islands, Palau and Tuvalu — Lai praised the cultural ties and shared democratic values between Taiwan and the three countries, thanked them for their support and announced new projects. Taiwan will provide funding for the Marshall Islands’ national airline, give Palau cybersecurity equipment and an electronic voting system, and contribute to the construction of a submarine cable in Tuvalu.

Lai’s visit aimed to strengthen Taiwan’s ties with its Pacific partners after losing half in five years. Solomon Islands and Kiribati switched recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 2019, followed by Nauru in 2024. Tuvalu and Palau have only ever recognized Taiwan, and the Marshall Islands has recognized it since 1998, when it de-recognized China. The three countries have maintained ties with Taiwan because of shared values, their need for economic assistance and wariness of Beijing. The United States prefers the status quo because China’s influence is partly hindered by its lack of formal diplomatic presence in these countries.

Marshall Islands President Hilda Heine, who began her second term in January, and Palau President Surangel Whipps Jr., who will begin his second term next year, have consistently supported Taiwan. Tuvalu Prime Minister Feleti Teo dismissed concerns about his country switching recognition after his election in February. The three countries’ ties to Taiwan appear strong for now, but switches in recognition can happen with little warning. A sudden vote of no confidence, if successful, could be a sign that ties with Taipei are in jeopardy.

China is probably most interested in expanding its influence in the Marshall Islands and Palau, which both host a U.S. military presence. Whipps said this year that China’s efforts to persuade Palau to switch recognition are “constant,” and Heine warned in the past of China’s efforts to unseat her. Besides undermining Taipei, Beijing has many reasons for engaging with Pacific Island countries, including pursuing its economic and strategic interests and competing with the United States.

How did China react to the trip?

Spinelli and Kuo: Predictably, Beijing strongly condemned Lai’s stopovers in Hawaii and Guam before and after they took place. Two weeks ahead of Lai’s travel, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian openly urged the U.S. not to allow Lai’s transit and stop “sending any wrong signals to the ‘Taiwan independence’ forces.’” On the last day of Lai’s trip, Lin lodged strong protests with the United States for allowing the stopovers. Continuing a trend in official Chinese statements by directly condemning Lai and the ruling Democratic Progressive Party by name, a Taiwan Affairs Office spokesperson on December 11 criticized Taiwan’s president for transiting the United States “under the guise of democracy” to “promote Taiwan independence,” and pursue independence through “foreign support” and “military means.”

Four days after Lai returned to Taipei, Taiwanese officials said China deployed “nearly 90 naval and coast guard” ships from the southern Japanese Islands all the way down to the South China Sea and opened seven “reserved airspace zones” east of Zhejiang and Fujian province from December 9 to 11 in a show of force that took months of preparation. A Taiwanese security official noted that China's current naval and coast guard deployment is larger than in the previous Joint Sword exercises, conducted in May and October, and asserted that China is targeting the entire first island chain with the goal of “achieving total military intimidation.” Notably, China has neither formally announced a military exercise nor commented on its aggressive deployment.

As of December 16, Beijing has not released any information about the military exercises or naval deployment targeting Taiwan. Key Chinese official media outlets have not published high-profile critiques or commentary on Lai's trip, which is considered a key indicator preceding previous exercises targeting Taiwan. The first official response to the military deployment was when Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson deflected a question about it in a regular press conference on December 9 by stating, “Taiwan has no defense ministry,” followed by Beijing’s self-serving claim that “Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory.” A spokesperson from China’s defense ministry later maintained this ambiguity on December 13 by stating that “whether and when to hold military exercises are decided based on our own needs and the situation of struggle.”

What does this tell us about cross-Strait relations in the year ahead?

Kuo and Staats: There are three takeaways from this past week:

1. Lai is balancing complicated and conflicting pressures to be tough but not provocative. He faces challenges at home from a domestic political opposition that accuses him of exaggerating the Chinese threat, while he must simultaneously defend Taiwan’s international space, reassure wary policymakers in the United States, and avoid unnecessarily provoking Beijing. His decision to transit through Hawaii and Guam and schedule calls with congressional leaders signals a continued willingness to work with Washington, while electing to forego high-profile meetings with senior U.S. officials and nix a rumored stopover in Los Angeles reflects a degree of restraint to avoid further provoking Beijing.
2. Without complete information and effective communication, it is difficult to understand signals and intent. In this case, the United States and Taiwan have drawn different conclusions about both the cause and the scale of China’s military moves. No other public sources have confirmed the record high numbers of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) planes and vessels reported by the Taiwan government. And while Taiwan claims that these maritime operations are the largest in nearly three decades, an anonymous U.S. official offered a more measured assessment, acknowledging that the naval deployments are elevated but “generally align with past large exercises.” Similarly, although Taiwan predicted ahead of Lai’s trip that the PLA would likely respond with a military show of force, the American Institute in Taiwan spokesperson judged that China’s behavior after the trip is consistent with recent trends and not a response to Lai's transit.
   
   For its part, China has made no attempts to explain its actions and has refrained from formally announcing a military exercise. That lack of clarity might be by design: a ploy to maximize psychological pressure on Taiwan, a strategy to avoid provoking a response from the United States, or an indirect way of acknowledging Lai’s restraint in foregoing a higher-profile and more provocative stopover in the continental United States, but it heightens the risk that misinterpretation and misunderstanding could lead to escalation.
3. Chinese pressure on Taiwan will continue. Whether or not China’s military maneuvers were a response to Lai’s diplomatic trip, Beijing will likely continue to exploit every opportunity to normalize elevated military coercion, advance its claims over Taiwan, and limit Taiwan’s international space. At the same time, China is extending this campaign of pressure and intimidation beyond Taiwan. Beijing sanctioned 13 U.S. firms and six individuals in response to the recent announcement of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, and its latest show of military force deployed ships throughout the first island chain, likely an attempt to intimidate Japan, the Philippines and others from stepping out of line. Yet these efforts could backfire and make leaders in these countries even more wary of an increasingly assertive Beijing.