The policy choice in Bosnia revolves around one question: how much time does the country have? If one believes that the country is reasonably stable, that another election will produce more cooperative leaders, and that Bosnia's "EU future" is assured, then the way forward is clear: cede international leadership in Bosnia from the U.S. to the European Union.
Introduction
This is the second of three papers (read the first and third papers) USIP will publish on Bosnia and Herzegovina, each with a different analytical perspective on what is happening in Bosnia and what needs to be done there to prevent a return to violence. We hope that these papers will generate a debate on options that might be pursued by the U.S. government (USG), Europe and Bosnians.
Summary
The policy choice in Bosnia revolves around one question: how much time does the country have?
If one believes that the country is reasonably stable, that another election will produce more cooperative leaders, and that Bosnia's "EU future" is assured, then the way forward is clear: cede international leadership in Bosnia from the U.S. to the European Union. Under this benign assessment, incremental work towards EU membership will address the country's outstanding issues, including eventual reform of the country's constitution.
This paper argues that, in fact, time is rapidly working against Bosnia. Elections are unlikely to transform the political landscape. Next year's poll will be the country's tenth. Few true moderates have attained elective office. Even if the parties never pick up arms again, Bosnia risks permanent stagnation, a plausible scenario that puts the substantial American investment -- and continuing American interests -- in Bosnia at risk. In the words of a former senior Bosnian official, without swift reform the country is doomed to become an "economic colony" of its neighbors, supplying cheap labor from its chronically underperforming economy. Instead of an inevitable EU member, Bosnia is more likely to remain an unwelcome, dysfunctional and divided country, with an aggrieved Bosniak (Muslim) plurality, a frustrated, increasingly defensive Serb entity, and an anxious, existentially threatened Croat population.
The standard prescription of gradual EU membership as the salve for Bosnia's ills vastly overstates the power of the EU accession model, and understates the need -- and difficulty -- of overhauling the country's constitution. It is the constitution that encapsulates the power relationship between the Serb entity and the central state. It is this unresolved relationship that helped bring the country into war -- and keeps it mired in polarization and acrimony. Only by changing key provisions of the constitution can the parties attain equilibrium and render the country functional. EU accession is too slow and ineffective a tool to reverse the dominant, downward trends.
This paper offers a clear alternative: accelerated NATO membership for Bosnia. The U.S. should galvanize a sharp evolution in Alliance policy, moving from the current, passive "open door" approach to an express, U.S.-backed offer of membership by the next summit, end-2010. To be sure, membership (and its precursor, a Membership Action Plan) will not be offered for free. Bosnians will have to come to terms on the constitution and remaining defense-related requirements to enter the Alliance. By putting membership "on the table" -- with a U.S.-backed target date -- NATO will change the zero-sum dynamic that has thwarted well-intentioned efforts at reform and supply the crucial leverage to produce fundamental compromise.
How this approach would work
Unlike EU accession, NATO membership is plausible in the near-term -- and it directly addresses each party's core security concerns. Traditionally, as in the Baltics, NATO offers the ultimate protection against external threats; in divided Balkan states like Bosnia (and Macedonia), NATO represents an implied guarantee of internal cohesion. This is as important for Serbs, whose over-riding objective is to preserve their entity, Republika Srpska (RS), as it is for Bosniaks, whose over-riding objective, shared by many Croats, is to preserve the integrity of the state. In short, NATO membership at once protects Republika Srpska and prevents it from seceding. Instead of "holding out for the next round" (of negotiation or confrontation), the parties will proceed from a platform of permanence. In the words of the leader of a prominent Bosnian party, "NATO membership takes fear out of the equation." By doing so, according to this leader, the prospects for reaching a compromise on difficult constitutional issues would be dramatically improved.
NATO membership has been the way-station to Brussels for every Eastern European member of the EU. Accelerating accession to NATO will boost Bosnia's EU prospects, spurring Brussels to energize its approach. And once Bosnia -- with Republika Srpska intact -- joins NATO, the nascent debate in Serbia on joining the Alliance will be transformed. No longer will virulent nationalists in Belgrade be able to sustain the argument that NATO membership and Serb security are incompatible. And as Serbia moves closer to both NATO and the EU, rapprochement with Kosovo is inevitable.
The main obstacle to embracing a NATO-centered policy for Bosnia is skepticism. Many observers simply assume that the Bosnian Serbs have no interest in joining NATO because the Alliance bombed Republika Srpska in 1995 and Serbia in 1999, culminating in Kosovo's independence last year. Recent meetings with four leading Serb figures in Banja Luka, including RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik, suggest otherwise. Indeed, these leaders proffered their own reasons why NATO served RS interests.
Skeptics cite Dodik's recent call for Serb troops to pull out from Bosnia's participation in NATO exercises in Georgia as proof that Banja Luka has no serious interest in joining the Alliance. Not so. Dodik's ploy was a grave blow -- against the authority of the state of Bosnia much more than against NATO. Other political figures in the RS derided the move, pointing out its inconsistency with the stated RS position to join NATO. The Serb member of the Presidency Nebojsa Radmanovic, a senior member of Dodik's party, did not defend his position on the Georgia exercise. Speaking to the author in Banja Luka on 22 May, Dodik insisted that he told Vice President Biden directly that he would be ready to sign up for NATO membership "today."
More than anything, the flap over the Georgia exercises is a reminder of how inadequate is the incremental approach to Bosnia. Rather than expect EU supervision and the possibility of eventual EU membership to produce evolution in attitudes, it is imperative to present the parties with a serious choice now: NATO membership and a secure, normal country headed towards the EU -- or permanent dysfunction and insecurity. Should Dodik reject the offer, which the author believes is unlikely, it will at least elicit clarity about the true intentions of the Serb leader.
This paper explains why accelerated NATO membership for Bosnia is plausible and does not challenge NATO standards, intra-Alliance relations, or relations with Russia. It is more likely that Moscow will refrain from playing a negative role if it is afforded its requisite "seat at the table." Giving the OSCE Mission to Bosnia the job of coordinating the crucial talks on constitutional reform -- a suggested condition for NATO membership -- will ensure that the Russian voice is at the locus of decisionmaking. A Russian diplomat already serves as the deputy head of Mission.
More importantly, President Medvedev has expressed an interest in a "new security architecture" for Europe. Given the fact that Russia has no strategic interest in Bosnia, cooperating under OSCE auspices to help Serbs reach a fundamental compromise with their neighbors would be a low-cost way for Moscow to show its interest in a wider dialogue that includes far more important security matters.
In sum, Bosnia needs a game-changer -- not threats nor the distant promise of EU membership, but a tangible, transformational reward to incentivize its three parties to finally resolve their most fundamental differences. NATO membership is that gamechanger. A concrete offer of membership, with a U.S.-backed target date for entry, can be the catalyst for reform. In turn, accelerated NATO membership will advance Bosnia's eventual accession to the European Union. Only the U.S. can galvanize the Alliance into making this offer concrete and viable, ideally by the June ministerial. What follows is the support for this proposition.
This USIPeace Briefing was written by Edward P. Joseph, a visiting fellow at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies who spent ten years working in the Balkans. The views expressed here are not necessarily those of USIP, which does not advocate specific policies.
The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent international conflicts, promote post-conflict stability and development, and increase conflict management capacity, tools, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by directly engaging in peacebuilding efforts around the globe.