Is Serbia Moving Toward Europe?

Since the overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic in October 2000, Serbia has struggled to find its way. Is the country shifting toward the West or East? What will happen with Kosovo? Does Serbia need Europe? Does Europe need Serbia?

These issues were discussed at a May 7, 2007 event at USIP featuring James Lyon, special Balkans advisor for the International Crisis Group; Boris Stefanovic, deputy chief of mission at the Embassy of Serbia; and Martin Sletzinger, director of East European Studies at the Wilson Center for Scholars. Daniel Serwer, vice president for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations at USIP, moderated the discussion. This USIPeace Briefing summarizes the main views expressed by the panelists and participants. It does not represent the views of USIP, which does not take positions on policy issues.

Divided but all Democrats

Serbia today is divided. On one side, are "those that vote for parties that favor a more paternalistic approach to democracy, an approach less based on typical liberal democratic principles and more closely associated, emotionally and ideologically, with democracy development in Russia," Lyons noted. The other side "consists of parties who are clearly in favor of a pro-western form of government, and in favor of European integration."

Both sides of the political spectrum are "democratic." The nationalist, right-wing parties act according to basic democratic principles and rules of the game. Serbia chose after the fall of Milosevic in October 2000 not to "clean house." Stefanovic argued that doing so "would have pushed these forces underground," thereby raising the risk of civil war.

Kosovo Keeps the Nationalists Strong

Others emphasized that real progress elsewhere in the Balkans—especially in Croatia and Macedonia—has come about as the result of reform in nationalist parties, which purged themselves in the wake of electoral defeats and reemerged as moderate forces. This process has not been possible in Serbia because of the persistence of the so-called national issue, in the form of Kosovo’s uncertain status. This has guaranteed electoral success to nationalist forces. As Stefanovic argued, "Croatia is not losing Eastern Slavonia nor is Macedonia losing its western part, but Serbia is being told it is losing Kosovo." According to Sletzinger, "Serbia needs to come to grips not only with post-communism, but with a smaller self, and at times this is not that easy."

Serbia Needs Europe, but Brussels and Washington Need Serbia Too

Serbia today feels abandoned by the international community. According to Sletzinger, "Serbia under Tito was used to having special relations with the Western countries, in particular with the United States, Britain, and France." These relations gave former Yugoslavia advantages over the rest of the communist world. Milosevic not only lost Serbia these advantages, but also caused the 1999 NATO bombing. The entrance of Bulgaria and Romania into the European Union made Serbs acutely aware of their country’s backwardness and doubtful about whether Serbia will ever make it into the EU.

Sletzinger noted that in the long term "Serbia has no alternative but Europe." But Europe needs Serbia as well, said Sletzinger. According to him, the Europeans "want them in not only for positive reasons but for negative as well." Serbia is the largest country in the Balkans and has the ability to make things difficult for the entire region. For Europe, it makes more sense to have Serbia inside the tent than outside.

The effort to get Serbia to reform in order to meet the EU’s conditions for candidacy and eventual membership is not working well. Both Brussels and Washington need to change their approach. The EU promise must be made more concrete, and the West has to provide more support to those inside Serbia who are willing to undertake the necessary reforms.

Serbia Wants to Hold on to Territory in Kosovo, but Without the Use of Force

Serbia remains adamant that Kosovo remain under its sovereignty, but, according to Lyon, "there are no indications of a military reaction in Serbia, and the Serbian army has no stomach to fight NATO again." Belgrade recently arrested a group of veterans who announced a paramilitary effort to hold on to Kosovo. According to Stefanovic, "Serbia has a position that Kosovo is part of Serbia, and any unilateral declaration and recognition of Kosovo would create a big mess that cannot be containable to Serbia alone." Stefanovic argued that "today’s Serbia should not be punished for something Milosevic did."

Lyon also spoke on the regional consequences of an independent Kosovo, citing the situation of Serbia in Presevo valley. According to him, "the situation in Presevo will likely mirror the treatment of Kosovo Serbs in the aftermath of Kosovo’s independence."

The Destination is Clear, So it is Time to Get Moving

Despite its current flirtation with Russia to ensure support on the Kosovo issue in the Security Council, Belgrade’s future clearly lies with the Euro-Atlantic integration. The United States and the EU countries are investing in Serbia and, said Ivan Vejvoda, "[Serbia] knows that the money that makes Serbia survive comes from the West, that China will not replace the EU investment, and Russian troops will not replace NATO in Kosovo."

The settlement of Kosovo’s status is what stands between Serbia and its inevitable European future. While many in Belgrade would prefer delay, prolonging the current agony is unlikely to improve the outcome. Serbia would be wise to choose a definitive solution for Kosovo this year.

 

This USIPeace Briefing was written by Yll Bajraktari, program specialist in the Center of Innovation on Media and Conflict, and Greg Maly, a senior program assistant in the Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations at the U.S. Institute of Peace. The views expressed here are not necessarily those of the Institute, which does not advocate specific policies.

 

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent international conflicts, promote post-conflict stability and development, and increase conflict management capacity, tools, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by directly engaging in peacebuilding efforts around the globe.


The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s).

PUBLICATION TYPE: Peace Brief