Potential Flashpoints Covered by a Mechanism

Most crisis communications mechanisms cover potential conflict between ground forces near the line of actual control (LAC). To note, the LAC does not reflect borders claimed by each country, but instead divides Indian-controlled territory from Chinese-controlled territory. Certain mechanisms, such as the foreign minister hotline agreed upon in 2021, could also be used during naval conflicts, likely in the Indian ocean, or in air conflicts.

Existing Crisis Communications Mechanisms

• Commander-level military hotlines: To date, six military hotlines have been established between ground commanders along the LAC. As of 2021, there are two hotlines each in Ladakh, Arunachal Pradesh, and Sikkim. A spokesperson for the Indian Army said, “These hotlines in various sectors go a long way in enhancing [the communication between ground level commanders] and maintaining peace and tranquility at the border.” The most recent hotline, which was established in 2021, was inaugurated with a “message of friendship and harmony” exchanged between ground commanders.
  
  Status: Notionally active. No reported uses since a test in 2021.


• High-level military hotline: A hotline between India’s director general of military operations and China’s Western Theatre Command was notionally agreed upon in 2020. India’s army chief announced that the proposal for such a hotline had been accepted and that it would soon become operational. However, that was before the skirmishes at Galwan in 2020.
  
  Status: Likely unestablished. No reported use since announcement.


• Foreign minister hotline: In 2021, the Indian minister of external affairs released a statement that India and China had agreed to establish a hotline between foreign ministers. The hotline is meant to assist in reducing tensions along the disputed border.
  
  Status: Notionally active. No reported use since establishment.


• Border Personnel Meetings (BPMs): These meetings have occurred at several locations between military officers or delegations since 2013. At present, there are five reported BPM points: two in Ladakh, two in Arunachal Pradesh, and one in Sikkim. Certain meetings are purely ceremonial, while others serve as a conflict resolution and information-sharing mechanism.
  
  Status: Active. 19th round of corps commander-level meeting was held in August 2023.


• India-China Corps Commander Level Meetings (CCLMs): These meetings have taken place near the LAC since June 2020 to ease ongoing border tensions. The talks were a direct response to clashes in the Galwan Valley in May 2020. Despite the first talks on June 6, 2020, another violent clash broke out on June 16, 2020, leading to the first casualties along the LAC since 1975. CCLMs typically include military leaders from both sides and periodically have included the inspector general of India’s Indo-Tibetan Border Police. Past CCLMs have been led by India’s 14th Corp commander and China’s South Xinjiang Military District chief, among others. These meetings are seen as an opportunity to exchange perspectives and keep communication open during the ongoing disputes.
  
  Status: Active. 19th round of corps commander-level meeting was held in August 2023.


• Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on China-India border affairs (WMCC): This mechanism was established in 2012 by joint agreement. The WMCC aims to “deal with important border affairs related to maintaining peace and tranquility in the India-China border areas.” It is headed by a joint secretary-level official from India’s Ministry of External Affairs and a director general-level official from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and is composed of diplomatic and military officials from both sides. The WMCC specifically does not discuss the resolution of the boundary question, but instead focuses on the “communication of timely information,” “appropriately handling border incidents,” and “undertaking other cooperation activities in the India-China border areas.” In accordance with the joint agreement, the mechanism holds consultations once or twice every year alternately in India and China, as well as on an ad hoc basis during emergencies with the agreement of both sides.
  
  Status: Active. 26th meeting was held in February 2023.

Potential Weaknesses of Existing Mechanisms

Most existing mechanisms are specific to border disputes near the LAC. While they may be responsive to melee clashes along the border, they do not cover other military crises such as ship or aircraft collisions. Some sort of agreement on incidents at sea, for example, is desperately needed. Furthermore, both the CCLM and WMCC are convened mechanisms which are not conducive for rapid information sharing in the immediate aftermath of a crisis. While a number of hotlines remain notionally active, little information is available regarding their use during actual crises. China’s disregard of existing U.S.-China hotlines, most recently during U.S. Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in 2022 and the high-altitude balloon incident in 2023, paint an unhopeful picture for similar China-India mechanisms. Beijing also ignored calls from Manila during the Second Thomas Shoal standoff in August 2023 when vessels from the China Coast Guard used water cannons to prevent the resupply of the BRP Sierra Madre by the Philippine Navy and Coast Guard.

Problems Affecting China-India Crisis Communications Negotiations and Implementation

• Historical legacies: Border disputes have existed since before the foundation of the Republic of India in 1947 and the People’s Republic of China in 1949. Positions on both sides have hardened over time in light of violence on the border, rising nationalism in both countries, and great power competition.
• Reassurance over resolution: Both China and India ostensibly want to avoid conflict over their border to focus on cooperation in areas that are mutually beneficial. However, this has led to a stasis of reassuring behavior instead of meaningful attempts to resolve the disputes once and for all. Moreover, there is an asymmetry in stakes and commitments for the two sides.

Potential Flashpoints Covered by a Mechanism

Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, Taiwan and Okinawan Islands (in the event of a military incident involving China and Taiwan, the nearby islands of Japan’s Okinawa Prefecture could be affected). 

Past Crisis Communications Mechanism

Agreed to by Jiang Zemin and Keizo Obuchi in 1998 during a leader-level meeting, a leader-level hotline existed between China and Taiwan from 2000-2010. Launched in 2000 but unutilized due to political tensions, the hotline was terminated in 2010. 

Existing Crisis Communication Mechanism

Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism (MACM) consisting of three parts: craft to craft communication, meetings and defense hotlines.

• Craft to craft communication: Launched in 2018, the two counties have established direct communication channels between military vessels and aircraft in English using agreed common frequencies in line with the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea and the Convention on International Civil Aviation, to which both are party.
• Meetings: Launched in 2018, the two sides hold annual meetings between defense authorities.
• Defense authorities’ hotline: In May 2023, the Chinese and Japanese defense ministers inaugurated a hotline between them with a 20 minute phone conversation. The Japanese ministry of defense press release noted that the two sides “confirmed that the hotline will be operated appropriately and reliably.”

Maritime Air and Communication Mechanism
Component	Focus	Status
Craft-to-Craft	Enables direct communication between military vessels and aircraft in English and agrees common frequencies.	Launched in 2018
Meetings	Annual meetings between defense authorities and experts.	Launched in 2018
Defense Hotline	Hotline between defense authorities.	Launched in 2023

Potential Weaknesses of the MACM

The MACM only applies to the Chinese and Japanese militaries and does not include their coast guards and non-military vessels that most frequently interact around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, leaving an important gap. The MACM also regulates communications but not conduct, meaning it does not help reduce risky behavior by frontline craft.  

Problems Affecting China-Japan Crisis Communication Negotiations and Implementation

• Crises and political tensions: Negotiations of the MACM were derailed twice due to crises — once after a 2010 incident between a Chinese fishing boat and Japanese coastguard vessels and again after the Japanese government’s 2012 purchase of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands from their private owner. Freezes and thaws in political tensions in the overall China-Japan relationship have also affected negotiations.   
• Perceptions: Chinese and Japanese perceptions about the goals and purposes of crisis communications negotiations appear to differ and have been evolving, which has contributed to the difficulty in achieving agreed outcomes.  
• Structure: There is a mismatch between the Chinese and Japanese political systems in several aspects. This includes the differences between Japan’s parliamentary system and China’s CCP-led regime. The Japanese prime minister heads the executive branch and is the commander in chief of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF). However, the authority of China’s premier is subordinate to that of the country’s president and CCP general secretary, who also is China’s top military leader as chairman of the Central Military Commission.  
• Mistrust: Lack of use of the previous leader-level hotline during the 2010 Senkaku/Diaoyu crisis leaves open the question of whether anyone will actually pick up a hotline call. The Japanese have also worried that the Chinese would try to use the inclusion of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the mechanism to undermine Japan’s control of the islands or limit a Japanese response to a serious Chinese incursion. The Chinese, meanwhile, have worried that the Japanese would use the exclusion of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands from the mechanism to strengthen their sovereignty claim. As a result, the geographic scope of the mechanism has not been specified.
• Backchannels: In the absence of a formal mechanism, backchannels can be used to communicate information in a prolonged crisis, with varying effects. According to Japanese experts, these include high-level emissaries not contemporaneously serving in the Japanese government. The utility of backchannels is directly related to the availability of trusted emissaries, which has fluctuated over time.

Potential Flashpoints Covered by a Mechanism

All crisis communications mechanisms between China and the Philippines cover potential conflict in the South China Sea. Disputes between the two countries are driven by competing claims to maritime features — primarily the Spratly islands and Scarborough Shoal — and the entitlements they generate. 

While the disputes go back decades, tensions have been more pronounced since the mid-1990s, when China occupied the Philippine-claimed Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands. Since then, several incidents have occurred involving military, coast guard and commercial fishing vessels, including but not limited to:

• A standoff at Scarborough Shoal between a Philippine Navy vessel and two Chinese maritime surveillance ships (2012)
• A diplomatic incident after more than 200 Chinese fishing vessels moored for several weeks at Whitsun Reef, which is part of the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (2021)
• A Chinese Coast Guard vessel directing a “military-grade laser” at a Philippine Coast Guard vessel, reportedly affecting the vision of crew members on the bridge (2023)
• A Chinese Coast Guard vessel firing water cannons at Philippine Coast Guard and Naval vessels trying to resupply the BRP Sierra Madre at Second Thomas Shoal (2023) 
• Five Chinese Coast Guard vessels acted aggressively upon approaching Philippine Navy-operated supply vessels and one Philippine Coast Guard vessel, side-swiping a Philippine patrol vessel and firing water cannons on one of the Philippine supply vessels (2024)

In 2013, the Philippines initiated a case regarding China’s claims and activities in the South China Sea under Annex VII of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Three years later, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) issued a ruling in favor of the Philippines on several counts, including, for example, that China’s claim to historic rights within its nine-dash line was inconsistent with UNCLOS. Immediately after the court’s award was issued, China declared it “null and void.”

Despite former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s downplaying of the award in an attempt to improve ties with Beijing, the disputes remain a potential flashpoint, especially in the context of rising tensions between the United States and China and the U.S.-Philippines mutual defense treaty. 

The United States considers Second Thomas Shoal to be well within the Philippine EEZ and on the Philippine continental shelf. In October 2023, a U.S. Department of State spokesperson asserted that  the  PRC’s territorial claims to Second Thomas Shoal are “unfounded,” referencing the  PCA July 2016 decision that “there exists no legal basis for any entitlement by China to maritime zones in the area of Second Thomas Shoal.”  

On March 5, 2024, immediately following Chinese Coast Guard incursions in Philippines territory and aggression against Philippine Navy ships, the U.S. Department of State underscored that the United States “stands with our ally the Philippines following the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) provocative actions against lawful Philippine maritime operations in the South China Sea on March 5.” The statement both reiterated the PCA conclusion from 2016 and reaffirmed that Article IV of the 1951 U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty “extends to armed attacks on Philippine armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft — including those of its Coast Guard — anywhere in the South China Sea.” 
 

Existing Crisis Communications Mechanisms

• Communication mechanism on maritime issues: In January 2023, Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. agreed to establish a direct communication mechanism between Chinese Foreign Ministry’s Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs and the Philippines Foreign Ministry’s Maritime and Ocean Affairs Office.
  
  Status: Inactive. China did not respond to Philippines’ outreach after Sierra Madre 2023 incident.


• Bilateral Consultative Mechanism on the South China Sea (BCM): Xi Jinping and then-President Rodrigo Duterte initially discussed a bilateral consultation mechanism during the latter’s state visit to China in 2016. The next year, the BCM held its first meeting as a platform to promote the peaceful management of conflicts in the South China Sea through consultation. Its meetings comprise equivalent officials from the two nations’ respective foreign ministries and maritime affairs agencies and meets alternately in China and the Philippines every six months.
  
  Status: Active. The eighth meeting was held in January 2024.


• Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES): Both China and the Philippines are party to the non-binding CUES agreement which standardizes safety protocols and communications at sea for military ships and aircraft.
  
  Status: Active but non-binding. Many countries, including China, have been accused of using CUES selectively.


• Declaration on the Conduct of parties in the South China Sea (DOC): In 2002, China and the member states of ASEAN signed an aspirational Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. The non-binding agreement was intended as a first step toward a durable resolution to the perineal disputes in the South China Sea. The parties agreed to resolve their disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, and to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that could escalate disputes. Additionally, the parties affirmed the need to adopt a binding code of conduct to promote peace and stability in the South China Sea. However, more than 20 years later, a code of conduct appears unlikely to be finalized anytime soon.
  
  Status: DOC signed in 2002. ASEAN and China are still working on binding code of conduct.

Potential Weaknesses of Existing Mechanisms

The BCM is a convening mechanism which, while valuable for communicating intent and establishing safety protocols, is not conducive for rapid information sharing in the immediate aftermath of a crisis. Furthermore, CUES and the newly established foreign ministry hotline are excellent in theory, but China’s selective use of these mechanisms with other countries, especially the United States, warrant concern that they will also be used selectively with the Philippines. Finally, while a binding code of conduct could certainly go a long way to preventing conflict or unnecessary escalation in the South China Sea, China and the Philippines likely have intractably different positions, making substantial progress unlikely in the near future. 

Problems Affecting Negotiations and Implementation of China-Philippines Crisis Communications

• Anti-China sentiment in the Philippines: A significant portion of Philippine citizens harbor anti-China sentiment due to China’s aggressive actions in the South China Sea, leading to previous pushback against certain mechanisms. For example, while there is a case that the BCM has increased stability in the South China Sea, the meeting received strong public criticism because of the perception that Manila had bowed to Beijing and that China would control the agenda. And although the more hawkish Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has thus far allowed the BCM to continue meeting, it may fall out of favor as his administration seeks to combat Chinese aggression and coercion.
• The Philippines’ security relationship with the United States: As a result of its history and geography, Manila often seeks a middle ground between Beijing and Washington that maximizes its security. However, the United States is by far the most important security partner for the Philippines and its only treaty ally. The alliance relationship is closer today than at any point in decades. As Manila and Washington continue to increase their security cooperation, Beijing may become less willing to establish new mechanisms or operate existing mechanisms with the Philippines. 
• Chinese maritime militia and commercial fishermen: China boasts the world’s largest fishing fleet, a portion of which is registered in the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM). The PAFMM is essentially a mass organization of mariners working in the civilian economy that can be mobilized to protect China’s maritime interests and support the military in wartime. In recent years, China has increasingly employed militia vessels to defend its maritime claims in the South China Sea, including in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, as was the case during the 2021 incident at Whitsun Reef. By utilizing the PAFMM to assert its maritime claims, Beijing retains plausible deniability for responsibility, which may change its assessment of what is and is not a crisis, thereby affecting its willingness to leverage existing mechanisms. China has similarly started using its coast guard to assert sovereignty in recent years. 
• Other claimants: The territorial disputes in the South China Sea do not just involve the Philippines and China. Other claimants — including Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan and Vietnam — conduct their own activities in the South China Sea. They also establish their own bilateral and multilateral crisis communications mechanisms with each other and the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia have taken steps to resolve differences and build confidence. This complex web of actors and the relationships between them can obstruct the implementation of bilateral mechanisms between China and the Philippines while also being a barrier to the adoption of multilateral mechanisms between all claimants and stakeholders. 

Potential Flashpoints Covered by a Mechanism

The most significant flashpoint between China and Vietnam is the South China Sea (“East Sea” in Vietnamese), where both countries claim the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands. These disputes are driven by competing claims to maritime features and the entitlements they generate — as well as by China's "9-dash line,” which includes large portions of Vietnam's 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Malaysia, the Philippines and Taiwan are also party to disputes between China and Vietnam in the South China Sea.

Vietnam’s claims are recorded in several white papers on the South China Sea published as early as 1975. According to Hanoi, and contrary to Beijing’s own narrative, Vietnamese dynasties were the first to exercise sovereignty over both archipelagos in the 17th century. China and Vietnam have clashed over their competing maritime claims on numerous occasions since the 1970’s, including but not limited to:

• A naval battle over the Paracel Islands which resulted in China gaining complete control over the archipelago, taking the lives of 75 Vietnamese and 18 Chinese (1974).
• A naval altercation over Johnson South Reef in the Spratly Islands which claimed the lives of more than 60 Vietnamese (1988).
• A standoff of naval and coast guard vessels after a Chinese state-owned corporation moved its Hai Yang Shi You 981 oil platform to waters near the Paracel Islands (2014).

Vietnam’s contemporary South China Sea policy opposes the use of force and seeks a long-term peaceful solution to disputes in accordance with international law. In 2011, Beijing and Hanoi signed an agreement on the “basic principles guiding the settlement of sea-related issues,” which states the two sides will use friendly talks and negotiations to resolve maritime disputes. The agreement also laid the groundwork for “periodical meetings” and “hotline mechanisms” to help manage disputes.

Existing Crisis Communications Mechanisms

• Expert Working Group on Maritime Cooperation in Low-Sensitivity Areas: Since 2012, official delegations from China and Vietnam have met biannually to discuss maritime cooperation on less thorny topics, such as maritime environmental protection.
  
  Status: Active. The 16th round of consultations was held in Da Nang, Vietnam on August 2, 2023.


• Defense hotlines: The defense ministries of China and Vietnam established a direct line in 2015. Then, in 2021, the two navies agreed to set up a hotline to “proactively cope with emergencies.”
  
  Status: Inactive. No reported use of either hotline.


• Hotline(s) for emergencies in maritime fishery activities: In 2013, China’s Ministry of Agriculture and Vietnam’s Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development agreed to establish a hotline to handle emergencies related to maritime fishery activities. In 2023, the two sides reached another agreement to establish a hotline between Vietnam’s Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and the Chinese Coast Guard for handling unexpected incidents arising from fisheries activities in the South China Sea. The joint statement from Xi Jinping’s visit to Vietnam in December 2023 included a line “emphasizing the need to better control and actively resolve disagreements at sea.”
  
  Status: Notionally active or soon-to-be established. No reported use of either hotline.


• Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea: In 2002, China and the member states of ASEAN signed an aspirational Declaration on the Conduct (DOC) of Parties in the South China Sea. The non-binding agreement was intended as a first step toward a durable resolution to the perineal disputes in the South China Sea. The parties agreed to resolve their disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, and to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that could escalate disputes. Additionally, the parties affirmed the need to adopt a binding code of conduct to promote peace and stability in the South China Sea. However, more than 20 years later, a code of conduct appears unlikely to be finalized anytime soon.
  
  Status: DOC signed in 2002. ASEAN and China are still working on binding code of conduct.

Potential Weaknesses of Existing Mechanisms

First, the Expert Working Group on Maritime Cooperation in Low-Sensitivity Areas is a convened mechanism with little or no ability to respond quickly to crises as they are unfolding. The hotlines between defense ministries and navies would be much more effective for timely communication; however, China’s selective use of similar mechanisms with other countries warrant concern that they will also be used selectively with Vietnam. Finally, while a binding code of conduct could certainly go a long way to preventing conflict or unnecessary escalation in the South China Sea, substantial progress is unlikely in the near future.

Problems Affecting Negotiations and Implementation of China-Vietnam Crisis Communications

• Checkered history: Despite often hailing their ideological similarities, China and Vietnam have an uneasy history fraught with conflict and suspicion going back millennia. The two countries fought a brief land war in 1979 and experienced a number of deadly maritime skirmishes throughout the 1980s. While relations have warmed in recent decades, the history of violence has led to a lingering distrust, even as several differences, especially regarding the South China Sea, continue to cause trouble in the bilateral relationship.
• Impotence of legal mechanisms: Both Vietnam and China are parties to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Beijing’s decision to ignore the 2016 UNCLOS tribunal ruling on territorial disputes in the South China Sea brought forward by the Philippines has left Vietnam and other claimants jaded about the prospects of legal mechanisms helping to resolve issues or lower tensions in the region. 
• Maritime militia and commercial fishermen: China boasts the world’s largest fishing fleet, a portion of which is registered in the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM). The PAFMM is essentially a mass organization of mariners working in the civilian economy that can be mobilized to protect China’s maritime interests and support the military in wartime. Similarly, Vietnam has developed its own maritime militia force (VMM), though it remains inferior in terms of size and equipment to its Chinese counterpart. Both the PAFMM and VMM allow Beijing and Hanoi plausible deniability for any coercive or risky behavior, which may change their assessment of what is and is not a crisis, thereby affecting the willingness of both sides to leverage existing mechanisms. Their presence in disputed waters also raise the risk of an unintended collision or other incident,
• Other claimants: The territorial disputes in the South China Sea do not just involve Vietnam and China. Other claimants — including Brunei, Malaysia, and Taiwan — conduct their own activities in the South China Sea. They also establish their own bilateral and multilateral crisis communications mechanisms with each other. This complex web of actors and the relationships between them can obstruct the implementation of bilateral mechanisms between China and Vietnam while also being a barrier to the adoption of multilateral mechanisms between all claimants and stakeholders.