In today’s era of strategic competition between the United States and China, crises are more likely than ever in the Indo-Pacific region. Effective mechanisms are therefore needed to prevent such crises from escalating into armed conflict. To this end, USIP is examining crisis communication mechanisms and negotiations between China and its regional neighbors to identify common issues and themes across countries to provide lessons that can be learned and shared. The initial case studies under examination are China’s bilateral mechanisms and negotiations with India, Japan and Vietnam.
Crisis Communications Between China and its Regional Neighbors
Although China has engaged in numerous dialogues and negotiations on developing crisis communication mechanisms with other countries, few formal mechanisms have been implemented. Those that have been agreed to — such as the U.S.-China Defense Telephone Link established in 2008 — have proven unreliable. Similarly, where multilateral agreements to avert escalatory encounters are in place, like the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea, China has interpreted the agreement differently than its counterparts. The United States and its partners in the Indo-Pacific know that comprehensive crisis communication mechanisms are needed now as tensions in the region continue to build.
China-Japan Crisis Communications Mechanisms
Potential Flashpoints Covered by a Mechanism. Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, Taiwan and Okinawan Islands (in the event of a military incident involving China and Taiwan, the nearby islands of Japan’s Okinawa Prefecture could be affected).
Past Crisis Communications Mechanism. Agreed to by Jiang Zemin and Keizo Obuchi in 1998 during a leader-level meeting, a leader-level hotline existed between China and Taiwan from 2000-2010. Launched in 2000 but unutilized due to political tensions, the hotline was terminated in 2010.
Existing Crisis Communication Mechanism. Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism (MACM) consisting of three parts: craft to craft communication, meetings and defense hotlines. The MACM has been under negotiation since 2007, with some components launched:
- Craft to craft communication: Launched in 2018, the two counties have established direct communication channels between military vessels and aircraft in English using agreed common frequencies in line with the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea and the Convention on International Civil Aviation, to which both are party.
- Meetings: Launched in 2018, the two sides hold annual meetings between defense authorities.
- Defense authorities’ hotline: In December 2021, the Chinese and Japanese defense ministers reconfirmed the importance of establishing a hotline and launching it by the end of 2022.
| Maritime Air and Communication Mechanism | ||
|
Component |
Focus |
Status |
|
Craft-to-Craft |
Enables direct communication between military vessels and aircraft in English and agrees common frequencies. |
Launched in 2018 |
|
Meetings |
Annual meetings between defense authorities and experts. |
Launched in 2018 |
|
Defense Hotline |
One or more hotlines between defense authorities. |
Under discussion |
Potential Weaknesses of the MACM. The MACM only applies to the Chinese and Japanese militaries and does not include their coast guards and non-military vessels that most frequently interact around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, leaving an important gap. The MACM also regulates communications but not conduct, meaning it does not help reduce risky behavior by frontline craft.
Problems Affecting China-Japan Crisis Communication Negotiations and Implementation
- Crises and Political Tensions. Negotiations of the MACM were derailed twice due to crises — once after a 2010 incident between a Chinese fishing boat and Japanese coastguard vessels and again after the Japanese government’s 2012 purchase of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands from their private owner. Freezes and thaws in political tensions in the overall China-Japan relationship have also affected negotiations.
- Perceptions. Chinese and Japanese perceptions about the goals and purposes of crisis communications negotiations appear to differ and have been evolving, which has contributed to the difficulty in achieving agreed outcomes.
- Structure. There is a mismatch between the Chinese and Japanese political systems in several aspects. This includes the differences between Japan’s parliamentary system and China’s CCP-led regime. The Japanese prime minister heads the executive branch and is the commander in chief of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF). However, the authority of China’s premier is subordinate to that of the country’s president and CCP general secretary, who also is China’s top military leader as chairman of the Central Military Commission.
- Mistrust. Lack of use of the previous leader-level hotline during the 2010 Senkaku/Diaoyu crisis leaves open the question of whether anyone will actually pick up a hotline call should a hotline exist. The Japanese have also worried that the Chinese would try to use the inclusion of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the mechanism to undermine Japan’s control of the islands or limit a Japanese response to a serious Chinese incursion. The Chinese, meanwhile, have worried that the Japanese would use the exclusion of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands from the mechanism to strengthen their sovereignty claim. As a result, the geographic scope of the mechanism has not been specified.
Backchannels. In the absence of a formal mechanism, backchannels can be used to communicate information in a prolonged crisis, with varying effects. According to Japanese experts, these include high-level emissaries not contemporaneously serving in the Japanese government. The utility of backchannels is directly related to the availability of trusted emissaries, which has fluctuated over time.