Interoperability and Civil-Military Coordination

Stability operations involve troops from several countries. In some instances, such as NATO operations in Afghanistan, the troop-contributing nations may share similar organizations and training. However, in UN operations, troops may come from very dissimilar countries. This fact presents significant problems of interoperability—that is, the melding or synchronization of operations among the various national forces. Not only may the troop-contributing nations differ politically and culturally, but their militaries will inevitably differ in such matters as leadership styles, management techniques, attitudes toward the media, customs and traditions, and the off-duty behavior of their personnel. All of these differences affect how these forces interact with one another and how they operate in the field.

Obviously, not all militaries have similar or even compatible weapons, communications, or supplies. Even alliances have differences in equipment, although many alliances, such as NATO, work hard at interoperability, both in weapons and communications.

Problems of interoperability can be exacerbated when the military works alongside civilian organizations. Military personnel have been trained to function as a team, to rely on one another, and to be able to predict, with relative certainty, what each member of the team will do. Soldiers find it difficult to rely on and predict the actions of civilian organizations with which they are unfamiliar.

One of the best mechanisms for overcoming this unfamiliarity and establishing a basis for effective interaction and coordination is a civil-military operations center (CMOC). In stability operations, the CMOC serves as a coordination hub for the NGOs, IOs, other government agencies, the host nation government, and the military. For instance, through the CMOC, NGOs can request assistance from military units operating in the same area. In turn, the military can learn where the NGOs are working and can provide security for their activities as well as coordinate support for the local population. NGOs may also offer information regarding the history of belligerent parties, the nature of the public mood, and other matters that may affect the conduct of operations.

In more specific terms, a CMOC helps coordinate IOs, NGOs, and U.S. government agencies within a theater of operations in which the Department of Defense has leadership. In instances where the Department of State or other organizations share responsibility, a CMOC coordinates military operations in support of the lead agency. The staff of a CMOC is composed largely of civil affairs specialists and may be augmented by liaison officers for the Department of Defense and other U.S. government agencies, such as the Department of State and USAID.

In joint operations, the CMOC is the nerve center for the joint force commander. The CMOC may be a sub element of a joint civil military operations task force (JCMOTF) and can be composed of representatives from all participating services. However, individual Army units at and above the brigade level normally have the capability to establish a CMOC in their area of operations. Regardless of the level at which a CMOC is organized, its functions are the same, even though it is flexible in terms of size and composition.

A CMOC may include or be augmented by military and/or civilian representatives of any organization that the commander considers necessary for effective civil-military operations within his or her area of responsibility. A CMOC can be managed in a variety of ways: by the U.S. commander and the multinational forces commander, by the U.S. commander alone, or by the U.S. commander and the head of the civilian agency engaged in the contingency operation. Military personnel, primarily from the Army and the Marines, staff the CMOC. In the U.S. Army these personnel are CA specialists, trained in administration and civil-military operations.

The increasingly complex and transnational nature of military involvement in stability operations has resulted in a corresponding increase in multinational or coalition responses to crisis. Despite the potential for interoperability problems resulting from language and intercultural communication issues, coalition militaries bring a wide range of skills, methodologies, and capabilities to the crisis. Contributing nations may impose restrictions or "caveats" on functions that their forces are allowed to perform. Caveats limit the ability of the military to perform effectively and efficiently. Interoperability, between the military and IOs and NGOs when desirable and possible, is subject to many of the same issues as in coalition military operations. The IO/NGO community also includes an extremely broad and diverse set of cultures, capabilities, and operational mandates that determine how it will operate.

The key to good coordination is knowing the right questions to ask. The following general questions should be asked of military personnel:

• What is your purpose for being here?
• What resources does your unit have?
• What are your rules of engagement?

Likewise, civilian organizations should be prepared to answer questions that will help the military help them to accomplish their goals and objectives.

More often than not, the IO/NGO community will have an existing presence within an area affected by disaster or conflict. In conflict or disaster-response scenarios, the injection of military forces into an environment where relationships and support structures are in place among the IO/NGO community, the host government, and the affected population has the potential to affect the delivery of critical services. If the military does not have a thorough understanding of the roles played by the IO/NGO community in such scenarios, it may duplicate efforts or inadvertently disrupt IO/NGO efforts to maintain vital services. To reduce the potential for duplication of effort between the military, the host nation, and the IO/NGO community, military commanders attempt to acquire visibility of all aspects of the civil environment through the civil information management (CIM) function inherent in U.S. CMOC operations. This capability helps military leaders at various levels understand and evaluate the complex social, cultural, and civil infrastructure dimensions of their place within the assigned area.

The combination of conflict and IO/NGO traditions of impartiality—a critical element of their mandates and of their established relationships within the affected country—often may result in situations where interoperability is undesirable or not possible. In such cases, the interaction between the military and the IO/NGO community may either be nonexistent or limited to an information exchange that stands well short of actual coordination. In some cases, the IO/NGO interest in communicating with the military may be limited to obtaining information regarding military assessments of the security of the environment. This information may then be combined with their own organization's information, or information shared internally within the IO/NGO community, so that each organization can establish its operational posture.

Continue to Other Coordination Mechanisms