NGOs in Conflict

NGO-Military Coordination

Traditionally, NGOs and the military have perceived their roles to be distinctly different and separate. NGOs have felt uneasy working with military forces, whether from their own country or from the country receiving assistance. NGOs are conscious of the need to preserve their impartiality because of the protection that affords them. Military leaders have tended to regard NGOs as undisciplined and their operations as uncoordinated and disjointed. Yet NGO staff working in complex emergencies often need the help of the military for protection, logistics, and even evacuation. Attitudes on both sides have begun to change. Exposure to each other's strengths and capabilities has increased the military's respect for the innovation and dedication of NGOs and fostered an appreciation among NGOs for the unsurpassed logistical capacity of the military.

In recent years, militaries have sought to improve their relationship with NGOs by creating Civil-Military Operations Centers (CMOCs) that allow military, NGO, and IO personnel to meet and work together to advance mutual goals. These centers allow the three groups to share information and views and provide a venue for practical matters, such as briefings by the military on land mines or security conditions. They do not, however, serve as coordinating mechanisms, and they have not always been able to bring the three communities together. NGOs have not always been willing to be engaged with CMOCs, fearing the consequences of the appearance of a too-close association with the military.

In Afghanistan, the involvement of U.S. military-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams in reconstruction provoked extensive and, at times, bitter criticism from NGOs. The United States was a combatant and its forces were engaged in ongoing military operations. NGOs argued that the aura of neutrality that relief workers relied on for their personal safety would be compromised if local people were unable to differentiate between foreign civilian and military actors. If military personnel engaged in relief and reconstruction activities, the boundary between civilian and military efforts would be blurred, if not erased altogether. PRTs were accused of contributing to this ambiguity when troops wearing the same uniforms were seen both fighting insurgents and building clinics.

NGO representatives argued that soldiers were not experts in development and that CA projects often reflected a lack of expertise. Economic development involved more than simply constructing buildings, especially if construction was undertaken in an uncoordinated manner. PRT development projects often competed or conflicted with NGO projects, undermining relationships developed with Afghan communities. Relations with NGOs became strained, and many NGOs refused to have direct contact with PRTs, fearing retaliation from insurgents. Some NGOs argued that PRTs should concentrate on the military's primary duty, which was establishing a safe and secure environment. Over time, the PRTs adjusted their operations in response to these criticisms, increased coordination with NGOs, and concentrated their efforts in areas where it was too dangerous or difficult for NGOs to operate.

The military's initial objective is to achieve stabilization and provide security first for its own forces and then for others; its end-state includes an exit strategy and a defined—and limited—mission. The objective of NGOs is to address the humanitarian needs brought on by the conflict, and their end-state is open-ended. NGOs will seek to continue their activities until the humanitarian crisis is contained and longer-term development work can resume. The military's concern to avoid "mission creep" accentuates the soldiers' previously ingrained desire to go in, fix the problem, and get out quickly. Conversely, the NGOs' perspective during such crises is long term, aimed as much at addressing the root causes of the crisis as at delivering relief. These different goals and parameters inevitably produce different plans, expectations, and timelines.

The recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have called into question the initial planning assumptions of the military. The ongoing conflicts placed the concept of a clear exit strategy with a responsible handover to NGOs and local institutions out of reach. It was clear that the military was unprepared to meet public expectations following the end of major combat operations and that the military's understanding of the roles of the relief community was insufficient.

There are at least two differences in communications between the military and the NGO communities. The first concerns technology. Although international NGOs have access to the Internet and mobile phones, they lack the sophisticated information-gathering and dissemination equipment of the military. This difference is only one indication of the disparity in size and resources between militaries and NGOs. The second concerns information. NGOs that have long-standing relationships with the local community are an excellent source of information, valuable to both the United Nations and peacekeeping forces. For example, they can provide information on such subjects as how best to set up a distribution system within a particular area and the relative dependability of various local groups and individuals. However, NGOs are sensitive about sharing information. They see their long-term success and physical security as dependent on good and open relationships with the indigenous population and are consequently wary of compromising the trust they have established by providing information to the military. They may even be reluctant to be seen with military personnel. One challenge for cooperative action is to find a way for the military and the NGOs to communicate and share information while respecting such inhibitions on full disclosure.

The Defense Department's Directive on Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (Department of Defense 2006), established peace and stability operations as core missions for the U.S. Defense Department and the U.S. military. To implement this mission, the directive states that the military should be prepared to engage in planning and operations with a range of civilian agencies, international organizations, and NGOs. The directive makes clear that coordination should begin before NGOs and the military first interact on the ground. In light of the directive, both groups are gaining a greater understanding of their respective roles, motivations, and responsibilities. They pay increasing attention to joint briefings, participation in training exercises, and the distribution of information such as that in this guide.

Continue to NGO/Military Guidelines