Lex Rieffel, contributor to USIP’s International Network for Economics and Conflict and Nonresident Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution and Raymond Gilpin, Associate Vice President, Sustainable Economies, USIP discuss the release of Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest in Myanmar/Burma.
Lex Rieffel, contributor to USIP’s International Network for Economics and Conflict and Nonresident Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution and Raymond Gilpin, Associate Vice President, Sustainable Economies, USIP discuss the release of Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest in Myanmar/Burma.
- Why has the army general who rules Burma—Than Shwe—decided to release Aung San Suu Kyi now?
- Does Aung San Suu Kyi’s release signal a softening of the ruling junta?
- Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest twice before—in 1995 and in 2002—only to be detained again shortly afterwards. Can we expect a different outcome this time?
- How did the people inside Burma react to Aung San Suu Kyi’s release from house arrest last week? Has the broad support she mobilized in the 1990 election been weakened by fatigue or fatalism or other factors?
- What are the implications for U.S. policy?
- How is USIP working to improve the situation in Burma?
Why has the army general who rules Burma—Than Shwe—decided to release Aung San Suu Kyi now?
We can only speculate on the reasons. The government of Burma is one of the least transparent in the world. General Than Shwe, who has been calling the shots in Burma since he came to power in 1992, has often acted whimsically. But Aung San Suu Kyi’s release from house arrest on November 13 had a legal basis: her well-publicized 18-month sentence expired on that day. General Than Shwe certainly had the power to release her earlier, or to find some pretext for extending her confinement, but chose not to.
The presumption among most analysts who follow Burma is that her release is part of Than Shwe’s plan for getting opponents of the military regime inside Burma and around the world to accept the results of the November 7 elections, despite being manipulated from the beginning to ensure a victory by the regime’s political party (the USDP). It is also possible that the margin of victory by the USDP on November 7 was deliberately arranged to be slightly better than the landslide by Aung San Suu Kyi’s party (the NLD) in the 1990 elections (and then immediately rejected by the military regime).
Does Aung San Suu Kyi’s release signal a softening of the ruling junta?
This is the third time she has been released from detention since her first imprisonment in July 1989. Like the other times, her release has been timed meticulously to benefit the junta. Her release has less to do with a softening of the junta and everything to do with their expectation that Aung San Suu Kyi’s release would help soften international and domestic opposition to their control. Two things are worth noting.
First, the junta is eager to sell Burma’s transition to a nominally civilian-led government to the international community. Aung San Suu Kyi’s release is a smoke-screen to divert international attention away from the deeply flawed political process that brought the junta-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party to power.
Second, the junta is calculating that the release will widen the rift between countries like China and India, who advocate a softer international stance, and the U.S., Europe and Japan, who call for tough sanctions.
Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest twice before—in 1995 and in 2002—only to be detained again shortly afterwards. Can we expect a different outcome this time?
No one should be surprised if Aung San Suu Kyi is once more confined to her house or otherwise prevented from speaking and moving about freely. Few if any analysts expect serious negotiations in the near term between Aung San Suu Kyi and Than Shwe about her role in the country going forward. To remain relatively free, she will have to be very careful about what she says and does. If she is careful enough, then she may be able to have a meaningful discussion with the new government that, according to the 2008 constitution (drafted by the military government and adopted in a seriously flawed referendum), must be put in place within 90 days of the election. The process of forming the new government will certainly be opaque and may simply consolidate the status quo. However, the election process over the past six months—forming parties and campaigning for seats in the national and regional assemblies—has given rise to some hope that the new government will pursue more economically and politically progressive policies.
How did the people inside Burma react to Aung San Suu Kyi’s release from house arrest last week? Has the broad support she mobilized in the 1990 election been weakened by fatigue or fatalism or other factors?
This is a critical question and there is no easy answer. Last weekend, there was much celebration and rejoicing over her release, partly reacting to the absence of any heavy-handed efforts by the military regime to discourage such expressions. At the same time, there is some evidence that support for Aung San Suu Kyi within Burma is not as strong as support for her in the United States and many other countries in the world. In the statements since her release, Aung San Suu Kyi has made the point that the people of Burma will have to work together to achieve democratic goals. (“I don’t want to do it alone. Doing it alone is not democracy.”) Reaching agreement on goals and means, however, even among the opposition parties, is likely to be extremely difficult given Burma’s history and ethnic diversity. Moreover, the ruling generals—even if they are a younger and more progressive group—can be expected to exploit divisions within the opposition to pursue their own objectives with minimal interference.
What are the implications for U.S. policy?
U.S. policy is in a box of its own making that will be extremely difficult to escape from. The only clear “win” for the United States is replacement of the military regime by a democratic government led by Aung San Suu Kyi. But 20 years of sanctions and megaphone diplomacy have failed to achieve any progress toward this goal, and it is not easy to see how the current policy of “pragmatic engagement” will produce a breakthrough in the near term. Progress from the U.S. perspective would require the military regime to grant Aung San Suu Kyi a meaningful political role and it is almost inconceivable that the ruling generals will do this in the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, Myanmar’s ASEAN partners and its major power neighbors (China and India), are viewing the November 7 election as a step in the direction of better governance and are gearing up to deepen their relations—especially economic—with Myanmar. The most likely result would seem to be a continuing stalemate internationally between the countries favoring more sanctions and the countries favoring more engagement, with the latter group gradually gaining ground and the United States increasingly marginalized on this issue.
How is USIP working to improve the situation in Burma?
In collaboration with organizations like the Asia Society, the US-ASEAN Business Council and Brookings Institution, USIP has hosted a number of events and workshops to analyze conflict dynamics in Burma and analyze recommendations that could put the country on a path to credible, effective and sustained reform. These discussions have included leading thinkers in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as representatives from Burma’s business sector and economics Nobel Prize laureate Joseph Stiglitz. We have paid particular attention to economic aspects, including: conflict-sensitive economic management, addressing the political economy of the illicit narcotics trade, the role of natural gas and prerequisites for inclusive, private sector-led economic reform. Recent publications include “The Economy of Burma/Myanmar on the Eve of the 2010 Elections,” a July 2010 Special Report by Lex Rieffel and “Can Economic Reform Open a Peaceful Path to Ending Burma’s Isolation?” a March 2010 Peace Brief by Lex Rieffel and Raymond Gilpin (both publications are available in English and Burmese). USIP will continue to follow developments, evaluate possible scenarios and analyze recommendations.