National Third Place Winner
Olga A. Korostelina
W. T. Woodson High School
Fairfax, Virginia
Coordinator: Catherine R. Horowitz
A country with rich natural resources is both blessed and cursed. It can enjoy peace and prosperity or may suffer from the “resource curse”: countries that should be wealthy, thanks to large resource reserves, in fact experience dire poverty, deterioration, and conflict.1 In many cases, disputes over rights to control the resources, denial of indigenous land rights, or the export of a primary commodity reshape ethnic or religious divides and lead to civil wars and the dominance of one group;2 natural resources fuel conflicts by providing revenue to cover the cost of war3 and producing an environmental crisis.4 The comparative analysis of conflict settlement in Indonesia and Angola shows that fair, successful processes require an holistic multifaceted approach that involves and benefits local communities.
Violent conflicts over land and forest began in Indonesia in the late 1990s when communities began to claim the land taken by the authoritarian Suharto regime. These conflicts led to instability and hostility, including the burning and destruction of houses and crops, numerous arrests, and killings. The conflict was worsened by the growth of forest destruction and ecological insecurity (an estimated 2 million hectares of forest are lost each year to deforestation).5 Illegal logging accounts for two-thirds of the annual harvest and leads to losses of $1.4 billion a year.6
The United Kingdom supported the Multistakeholder Forestry Programme (2000–2006) that aimed to manage conflict in the countryside and help bring peace and prosperity to rural Indonesia through the change of people’s attitudes and behavior, encouragement of government policy reforms, and help in building a democratic state in Indonesia.7 Around 80 percent of grants were given to non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the private sector, and individuals. Seventy new state regulations, resulting from public consultations, promoted active participation of communities in forest management, cooperation between villagers and forest officers, and opportunities for local families to work on state land.8 Another MFP activity aimed to improve the economic welfare of communities by encouraging dialogue between stakeholders (government departments, academia, NGOs, and local communities) and supporting training and shared learning projects. These initiatives not only improved security in local communities and lifted them out of poverty, but also empowered stakeholders and encouraged constructive national dialogue. Similar projects were led by the U.S. Agency for International Development,9 the U.S. Department of Agriculture Forest Service, the Nature Conservancy and the World Wide Fund for Nature,10 and the Tropical Forest Foundation.11
To deter illegal logging, the laws on logging were set out clearly by the Memorandum of Understanding and enforced by the Consortium of Anti-Illegal Logging. International contracts that used illegal stock from Indonesia were cancelled. To prevent the use of illegal timber, the Timber Trade Action Plan12 and GDA Timber Certification13 were developed. Home Depot, the largest buyer and distributor of Indonesian plywood, agreed to support legal logging.14
The second example is Angola, sub-Saharan Africa's second largest producer of oil and the fifth world producer of diamonds, which has faced nearly thirty years of civil war. When Angola gained its independence in 1975, the two primary Angolan factions, the communist MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, in English) and the anti-communist UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) began to fight for control over power and rich resources. To buy weapons, the government used money that came from international oil companies15 while rebel UNITA sold diamonds from captured mines in Lunda Sul and Lunda Norte Provinces.16
In 1998, to prevent further purchase of weapons, the United Nations facilitated political isolation of the rebel movement and imposed sanctions on the sale of UNITA diamonds that were broadly supported by the Non-Aligned Movement, Organization of African Unity, Southern African Development Community, Belgian government, and Diamond High Council.17 The process of implementation of sanctions resulted in the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), a voluntary system that was adopted on November 5, 2002 and insures that diamonds do not come from conflict areas. De Beers, the largest buyer of UNITA diamonds, signed the KPCS, which also led to the end of civil war in 2002.18 Despite current national control over mining, the national diamond industry still is beset by “murders, beatings, arbitrary detentions, and other human rights violations,” claims Angola's prominent journalist and civil rights campaigner Rafael Marques.19
In April 2000, Angola signed an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to set up a Staff Monitored Program (SMP) to identify and implement broad economic reforms that included a monitoring system of the revenues received, improvement of management of revenues, greater transparency in public accounting, and completion of an audit of the oil sector. Oil companies had to publish what they pay the government, and the government had to disclose what it receives. Other important programs were established to increase regional economic growth and stability in Angola. For example, USAID focused on several areas, including food security, democracy, and economic reform.20 In 2007, IMF reported about the improving economy and increasing oil sector transparency and put the emphasis on the development of the non-oil sector.21 Nevertheless, the economy is still characterized by “the Dutch Disease”: investments are concentrated in the oil industry (90 percent), resulting in a failure to diversify the economy.22
These cases illustrate two different approaches to the settlement of resource-based conflict. The conflict around timber and land use in Indonesia was resolved through profound legal reforms and law enforcement as well as through dialogue and cooperation among stakeholders, increased democratic participation, and education; the key players were international organizations and local NGOs. Thus, as a result of the conflict settlement, the illegal logging and environmental mismanagement significantly decreased; local communities either own the land and forest or have rights to work with resources and benefit from their development.23 Still, corruption and poor governance in Indonesia are responsible for “considerable environmental degradation, significantly reduced rural livelihoods, a poor investment climate, and diverted public development funds.”24
The resolution of conflict in Angola was based on legal sanctions imposed by international organizations, economic reforms, and requirements for transparency in the oil sector. While the settlement was successful in ending violence, such factors as profound corruption and mismanagement undermined the accomplishments of projects. Despite the transparency requirements, the Angolan government does not adequately disclose how it spends funds and does not share revenue with communities;25 instead it arrests anticorruption activists26 and forcibly evicts thousands of poor residents from their houses.27
These differences in effectiveness can be explained by several factors including divergence in the level of development of civic society, the number of people involved in hostilities and the level of violence, the duration of conflict, and the place that particular natural resources had in the national economy. But the most important factor is that the conflict settlement in Indonesia was complex and multifaceted while the process in Angola involved activities and measures in only several areas and did not include local communities as agents and beneficiaries of reforms. Thus, the fair, peaceful, and effective use of natural resources after a conflict must involve and benefit multiple stakeholders, including local communities and the poorest people. It requires a multifaceted approach that must target different sectors of the economy and society. I propose the Triple A Model: Actors, Areas, and Actions.
Actors are the key players that should participate in the conflict settlement process. That includes all levels of stakeholders: local communities, NGOs, academics, businesses, local governments, state governments, international business associations, and other international institutions.
Areas are the most important sectors of economic, social, and political life that play an important role in resolving conflict issues and promoting sustainable development. The first tier of important areas is comprised of economic growth, reduction of poverty, financial stability, balanced economy, democratic governance, shared power, and rule of law. The second tier includes a developed civic society, ecological security, education, land and indigenous rights, and peaceful multiethnic and inter-religious coexistence and cooperation.
Actions involve different activities and interventions that can be implemented in each of the areas, including sanctions, reforms and regulations, investments, international cooperation, anticorruption actions and transparent law enforcement, tracking, legality verification and certification of resources, negotiations, dialogues and public consultations, educational activities, and ecological management.
These three components compose a three-dimensional matrix where every element can be characterized by three aspects: what Action, in which Area, by which key Actor. For example, one MFP project in Indonesia is characterized by dialogue (action) on ecological security and forest management (areas) between local communities and NGOs (actors). UN involvement in conflict settlement in Angola exemplifies economic and political (areas) sanctions (actions) supported by international institutions, governments, business associations, and private businesses (actors). Thus, the Triple A Model provides an opportunity for systemic design and planning where configuration of three dimensions—actors, areas, and actions—presents numerous possible elements of successful conflict settlement. The model can help insure that local communities will be active participants of the conflict settlement and will benefit from it.
Endnotes
1. M. L. Ross, “The Natural Resource Curse: How Wealth Can Make You Poor,” in Ian Bannon and Paul Collier, eds., Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2003), pp. 17–42.
2. M. L. Ross, “What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?” Journal of Peace Research 3 (2004): 337–356.
3. Paul Collier. “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy,” in C. A. Crocker, F. O. Hampson, and P. Aall, eds., Leashing the Dogs of War (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press), 2007.
4. M. G. Manwaring, Environmental Security and Global Stability (Lanham, MD: Lexington), 2002.
5. “A Brighter Future for Indonesia’s Forests,” Department for International Development, United Kingdom, May 22, 2007, accessed December 6, 2007.; “Timber Trade Action Plan,” Department for International Development, United Kingdom, May 22, 2007, accessed December 6, 2007.
6. “Tackling Illegal Logging in Indonesia,” Department for International Development, United Kingdom, May 22, 2007, accessed December 6, 2007.
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/casestudies/files/asia/indonesia-forestry-conflict.asp
7. Multistakeholder Forestry Programme (MFP), December 10, 2007.
http://www.mfp.or.id
8. “Turning Old Enemies into New Allies,” Department for International Development, United Kingdom, May 22, 2007, accessed December 6, 2007.
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/casestudies/files/asia/indonesia-forestry-conflict.asp
9. USAID Indonesia, December 11, 2007.
http://indonesia.usaid.gov/en/Activity.178.aspx
10. The Nature Conservancy and the World Wide Fund for Nature, December 10, 2007.
http://www.nature.org/wherewework/asiapacific/indonesia/strategies/index.html
11. The Tropical Forest Foundation (TFF), December 10, 2007.
http://www.tropicalforestfoundation.org/indo1.html
12. “Timber Trade Action Plan,” December 10, 2007.
http://www.timbertradeactionplan.info
13. USAID Indonesia.
http://indonesia.usaid.gov/en/Activity.178.aspx
14. “TFF Initiates Public/Private Partnership in Indonesia, the Tropical Forest Foundation,” December 10, 2007.
http://www.tropicalforestfoundation.org/indo2.html
15. “Oil Firms 'Funding' Angolan Conflict,” BBC News, December 5, 1999.
16. Ross, “The Natural Resource Curse,” pp. 17–42.
17. P. Le Billon, “Getting It Done,” in Ian Bannon and Paul Collier, eds., Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2003), pp. 215–286.
18. “As Peace Comes to Angola, So Do the Diamond Chasers,” Boston Globe, February 9, 2006.
19. “Angola to Double Diamond Production in 2006,” Afrol News, December 15, 2007.
http://www.afrol.com/articles/15888
20. USAID Sub-Saharan Africa, December 15, 2007.
http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/countries/angola/
21. “Angola: 2007 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report,” International Monetary Fund, December 19, 2007.
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr07354.pdf
22. “End to Conflict,” Washington Post, December 19, 2007.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-adv/specialsales/spotlight/angola/article3.html
23. “Turning Old Enemies into New Allies,” May 22, 2007. Department for International Development, United Kingdom, accessed December 6, 2007.
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/casestudies/files/asia/indonesia-forestry-conflict.asp
24. “New World Bank Report On Indonesia's Forests,” Center for International Forestry Research, December 17, 2007.
http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/Publications/Corporate/NewsOnline/NewsOnline42/indonesia.htm
25. P. Swanson, M. Oldgard, and L. Lunde, “Who Gets the Money? Reporting Resource Revenues,” in Ian Bannon and Paul Collier, eds., Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2003), pp. 43–96; “Angola: Oil—Curse or Cure-All?” Global Policy Forum, December 12, 2003, accessed December 16, 2006.
http://globalpolicy.igc.org/security/natres/oil/2003/1212curse.htm
26. “Angola: New OPEC Member Should Tackle Corruption not Critics,” Human Rights Watch, December 15, 2006, accessed December 15, 2007.
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/12/15/angola14859.htm
27. “Angola: Thousands Forcibly Evicted in Postwar Boom,” Human Rights Watch, May 15, 2007, accessed December 16, 2006.
http://www.hrw.org/doc/?t=africa&c=angola
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http://globalpolicy.igc.org/security/natres/oil/2003/1212curse.htm
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http://www.afrol.com/articles/15888
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http://www.dfid.gov.uk/casestudies/files/asia/indonesia-forestry-conflict.asp.
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http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-adv/specialsales/spotlight/angola/article3.html
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http://www.mfp.or.id
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http://www.nature.org/wherewework/asiapacific/indonesia/strategies/index.html
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http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/Publications/Corporate/NewsOnline/NewsOnline42/indonesia.htm
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http://www.dfid.gov.uk/casestudies/files/asia/indonesia-forestry-conflict.asp
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http://www.tropicalforestfoundation.org/indo2.html
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http://www.tropicalforestfoundation.org/indo1.html
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http://www.dfid.gov.uk/casestudies/files/asia/indonesia-forestry-conflict.asp
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http://indonesia.usaid.gov/en/Activity.178.aspx
USAID Sub-Saharan Africa, December 15, 2007.
http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/countries/angola/