The international response to the Hamas takeover of Gaza has largely focused on building support for Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, including announcements by the United States and the EU that the 15-month aid embargo was ending, with assistance to be channeled through the "emergency" government led by Salam Fayyad. But the Hamas takeover has also led to a variety of calls for greater international intervention in Gaza, well beyond the work of the UN and other aid agencies, the Egyptian mediation team, and the European Union monitoring force at the Rafah border crossing with Egypt.

President Abbas discussed the idea of an international force in Gaza with several leaders. Others have also weighed in with both vague and specific proposals. UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon suggested that the international community explore the idea of intervention; so too has EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was more specific, proposing an international force along the Gaza-Egypt border to stop rampant arms trafficking. The Israeli foreign minister said such a force should be willing to confront Hamas.

Behind these various calls for intervention lie divergent conceptions and competing agendas. This USIPeace Briefing examines the demands, options, and obstacles for international intervention and provides recommendations for the United States and the international community. Policy planners—in the region and in the international community—should be developing guidelines for possible intervention scenarios.

Setting

The immediate cause of instability in Gaza—the violent power struggle between Hamas and Fatah, including the competition for the loyalty of local clans—has been decided, at least for the time being. Therefore, the crisis in Gaza could stabilize on its own. Given Hamas' reputation for discipline and organization, and the fact that it has now consolidated its control, relative, short-term stability could emerge. Israel, after a short "wait-and-see" period, could conceivably relax the Gaza blockade and allow regular delivery of aid and limited civilian passage. Some aid providers already report an easier operating environment in Gaza given Hamas' consolidation of power.

But the situation is sufficiently fluid that Palestinian-on-Palestinian violence could resume, as could violence with Israel. Both could further fuel demands for outside intervention, on either security or humanitarian grounds. Moreover, over the long term, even if Hamas consolidates its grip on power in Gaza and provides short-term stability, the steady deterioration of the overall conflict suggests that the debate about intervention will grow, rather than recede.

The Demands

Hamas militants patrol along the border with Egypt near Rafah, in the southern Gaza Strip, on June 15, 2007. On its first day of full rule in Gaza, the Islamic militant movement Hamas granted amnesty to Fatah leaders, signaling that it seeks reconciliation with the defeated forces of moderate Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. (Photo Courtesy: AP)

Security is the most immediate factor behind calls for intervention. Israel, worried about continued rocket attacks on its southern towns, border incursions, wide scale arms trafficking from Egypt, and increasing jihadist activity, but wary of engaging in prolonged military operations, would prefer to see an outside force, particularly on the Gaza-Egypt border. Egypt is less interested in further intervention because it believes the parties can control the situation on their own and it worries that any international force will be viewed solely in terms of protecting Israel's interests. Both Israel and Egypt understand that modest, small-scale monitoring efforts, like the present EU-force at Rafah, may not be suitable given the new reality on the ground.

Abbas and the Fatah movement—atomized and in disarray—see international intervention as preferable to ceding all control to Hamas. Intervention could also be a potential source of pressure on Hamas and a way to restore some measure of Fatah's influence in Gaza, however indirect.

There are also regional strategic factors. The prospect of a radicalized Hamas-controlled Gaza, offering yet another outpost on the eastern Mediterranean for Iranian influence and al Qaeda-affiliated jihadist activity, poses a clear and growing threat to regional security. Hamas leaders in Gaza have been actively soliciting and receiving Iranian support, and renegade Gazan militant groups are reportedly probing for al-Qaeda backing. Although less vulnerable to these threats than Lebanon, due to Israel's overriding control of access in and out of Gaza, the strategic dimension cannot be ignored.

There is also a humanitarian dimension. Violence against civilians spiked during the factional fighting, with dozens killed over just a few days in mid-June. Food insecurity has been worsening steadily over the last 18 months, as documented in numerous United Nations and World Bank reports, with a million Gazans now dependent on international assistance. Aid delivery has slowed considerably, due to continuing international sanctions, Israeli closures and most recently the suspension of major programs due to Hamas-Fatah fighting. As vulnerability increases, aid delivery has slowed.

Given how fluid and combustible the situation remains, should there be a sudden, large-scale catastrophe, calls for intervention would rise. The Israeli security establishment has sought to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe in the past, and will likely continue to facilitate some level of assistance. But this could change, particularly if Israel is drawn into prolonged military action against Hamas forces in Gaza. The humanitarian situation in Gaza stands in stark contrast to the West Bank, where employment levels are higher, access—although severely constrained—is greater, and the Israeli occupation ensures a modicum of stability.

Who Intervenes?

President Bush, right, meets with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington on June 19, 2007. (Photo Courtesy: AP)

As is often the case, far more parties are calling for intervention than volunteering for it. Egypt is a likely candidate, given its longstanding ties to Gaza and on-going mediation efforts; but Egyptian leaders are extremely wary of having their security forces step into a volatile situation. "Nonsense," is how the Egyptian mediator for Gaza described talk of an international force. An Arab League force—perhaps drawn from the Arab Quartet (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Jordan and Egypt)—is another option, though there is almost as little precedent as there is political will. (The same could be said for the larger Muslim world, given comments by the head of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, who dismissed proposals for a force.)

The EU has several years of experience in Gaza with security mediators, aid delivery, and border monitoring. But these efforts have been extremely small-scale, and with limited results. Given the burdens of the enlarged international force in Lebanon, and ongoing commitments in Afghanistan, the Balkans, and Africa, political support in Europe for a Gaza intervention will likely be trumped by a lack of capacity. Non-neighboring and non-European countries could contribute to a UN-authorized force, though this would require decisive action by the Security Council, which seems unlikely at present. Since any intervention would require the consent of all sides, the interveners would need to have contact with Hamas.

The Options

Stepped-up international intervention on the ground (by parties other than Israel) could take many forms. Different options address different demands, be they strategic or humanitarian.

• Border force: In order to prevent a widening of the conflict and to halt the flow of weapons, an international force could be limited to an Egypt-Gaza border force. Such a force—much more robust than the present EU monitoring mission—would not penetrate into Gaza, and would have no mandate to maintain law and order. Israel favors this approach, but has said it expects such a force to be able to confront Hamas. If such a force could succeed, some Israelis have suggested that similar models could be used at the Gaza-Israel crossings, or in northeast Gaza to prevent rocket attacks.
• Other Options: Humanitarian concerns are less likely to lead to intervention in the short term, particularly given Israel's long-standing desire to avoid a serious humanitarian crisis. But should Hamas fail to establish order, or to reach informal understandings with Israel on assistance and access, or should Israel and other outside parties fail to ensure a minimum degree of human security for Gazans, other intervention scenarios—including safe havens, armed aid delivery, and ultimately some form of international trusteeship—could enter into the debate.

Obstacles to All Intervention Scenarios

All intervention scenarios face daunting obstacles, most notably the hostile, unpredictable environment on the ground and the refusal of key international actors to deal with Hamas, whose cooperation would be needed if an international force is deployed.

Fresh from victory and flush with newfound power, Hamas is in no mood to cede authority to outside parties. As long as they can maintain even a threadbare level of social services and food security (with European, Arab and Iranian aid), Hamas is likely to assert its autonomy and resist more outside involvement. In addition, potential interveners are wary of wading into a volatile situation and becoming targets for Palestinians, or being caught between warring Israeli and Palestinian forces.

At a minimum, any kind of intervention force would need to be rooted in a UN Security Council resolution, and would ideally be preceded by the deployment of "national" Palestinian forces (which may not exist), as was the case with UNSC 1701, the Lebanese army and UNIFIL II last summer. Given the dynamics in this case, a UNSC resolution could reduce, but not remove the threat of an outside force getting caught in the crossfire.

Given problems of access and Israel's longstanding desire to maintain control, interveners may be unable to negotiate adequate terms of access. In this respect, the case of the current EU force, which Israel can block at will, is instructive.

Last, and most important, to be an effective source for both stability and conflict resolution an international force (even one limited to the border) should be tied to a political process or a negotiated arrangement of some variety. Such a development is not on the horizon, and international mediation efforts have largely been absent since Hamas' election in 2006. An international force under present circumstances would have no exit strategy and could easily turn into an open-ended commitment that simply reinforces the status quo stalemate.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Despite growing interest, the obstacles to stepped-up international intervention in Gaza remain formidable. That said, given trends on the ground, the question is unlikely to soon disappear. Several recommendations can be drawn from the present situation.

• Signaling Hamas: Hamas' diplomatic and economic isolation from the United States and the international community reinforces the need to send clear signals. Hamas should be encouraged to establish order in Gaza and provide assurances to both the neighbors and aid providers. If Hamas can establish order inside Gaza, and prevent violence against Israel, such actions should be meaningfully acknowledged. Effective signaling could reduce the need for international intervention. Still, any attempt to signal Hamas on a limited set of issues (such as border security or humanitarian concerns) could be reciprocated by a desire to engage directly on a broader agenda, which outside parties are likely to reject.
• Quartet conditions: Rather than dropped altogether, the January 2006 Quartet conditions on economic assistance should be revised and a provision added about maintaining order and ensuring protection for aid workers and the delivery of assistance. International expectations should not only be limited to actions toward Israel. They should focus on both a commitment to accept previous agreements and stop violence against Israel, as well as good governance and a willingness by all factions to prevent the violent excesses on display last week.
  All Palestinian leaders—President Abbas, the Fayyad government and the Hamas leaders in Gaza—need to know that aid is tied to both effective governance and peaceful relations. These two goals remain deeply intertwined. An effective use of aid conditionality could also reduce the need for international intervention.
• Intervention, Policy Planning and A Political Process: Key outside parties—the UN, the United States, the EU and the neighbors—need to step-up policy and military planning on Gaza intervention scenarios, especially a possible international force on the Gaza-Egypt border. Rather than being caught off-guard, outside actors should have plans in hand. Ultimately, no intervention will be worthwhile unless it is accompanied by diplomatic initiative. A Gaza intervention is not a substitute for a renewed Israeli-Palestinian political process—whether that is a long-term, negotiated ceasefire, renewed negotiations over a two-state solution, or something in between.
• Arab and Muslim Mediation: The United States and the international community should provide further support and encouragement to Egyptian mediation efforts, and encourage other Arab and Muslim mediators to get involved on the ground. Pushing (and rewarding) these parties to step up mediation today is preferable to leaning on them later should the need grow for a large-scale intervention.
• Engage Israel: Israel is not a bystander, and its various levers of influence (financial and military) will play a critical role in determining whether the demands for international intervention grow. Outside parties like the United States and the Quartet should engage Israel about its growing interest in an international force and examine whether this could be leveraged to ease the "access-versus-security" dilemma that has stymied earlier efforts and left Gaza largely cut off from the world. Moreover, engagement with Israel is critical to ensure that it continues its generally forthcoming approach to humanitarian assistance.

This USIPeace Briefing was written by Scott Lasensky, a senior research associate in the Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention at the U.S. Institute of Peace. The views expressed here are not necessarily those of the Institute, which does not advocate specific policies.

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent international conflicts, promote post-conflict stability and development, and increase conflict management capacity, tools, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by directly engaging in peacebuilding efforts around the globe.