August 16, 2011

With the transition of the top U.S. military and civilian leadership in Kabul this summer, and President Barack Obama’s announcement in June that he will pull 10,000 American troops out of Afghanistan by December, a new focus is emerging on just how a peace settlement to end the war will take place – and when. But with the budding political discourse on reconciliation come misconceptions about the process, how it will unfold and who will get a seat at the table. Here are five myths about reconciliation:

THE TALIBAN ARE READY TO TALK – Unclear. Despite various media reports that peace talks are under way between the Karzai government and the Taliban, no tangible results appear to have emerged. That suggests that whatever negotiations may be in process, those talks are still very preliminary in nature. 

And it’s unclear that either side is really ready to come to the table anyway. Taliban commanders may or may not be feeling cornered militarily – that question is still very much in the air. If they are feeling military pressure, that may only serve to deepen their resolve to continue fighting – not lay down their arms to talk peace. In fact, some experts believe that to give the Taliban an incentive to talk, its leaders must believe they are coming to the table from a position of strength, not weakness, by creating positive incentives for them to talk, not negative ones to force them.

Of course it is likely some elements of the insurgency are ready to negotiate because they are “tired and looking for an exit,” as Minna Jarvenpaa concludes in the Special Report, “Making Peace in Afghanistan: The Missing Political Strategy.”

“It is also possible that part of the Quetta Shura [the Taliban leadership council] is interested in power sharing,” she adds. But even with the killing this spring of Osama bin Laden in a compound in Pakistan, there is still very much a wait-and-see attitude from many Taliban fighters.

THE U.S. IS READY TO TALK – Maybe, maybe not. For the Americans’ part, there has been little to go on publicly that suggests the U.S. is really ready to negotiate a peace settlement. Administration officials have oft-repeated the conditions for reconciliation: talks must be led by the Afghan government, that only those willing to break from al-Qaida can participate, and that those individuals must abandon violence and abide by the Afghan constitution.

But the U.S. has stuck to those familiar talking points and provided few specifics that some critics believe would propel the peace effort. While specific negotiations will ultimately occur in private, the lack of anything more than bland demands suggests the U.S. isn’t ready for serious negotiation.

“No one in Washington or Kabul has clarified the scope of a reconciliation policy, and where accountability for abuses committed during the conflict fits in,” writes former USIP fellow Patricia Grossman, in “Afghan High Peace Council Fails to Reflect Afghan Civil Society.”

“Most importantly, it is not clear what might be on the table in negotiations with the Taliban beyond the oft-stated demands of severing ties with al-Qaida, disarming, and accepting the current constitutional framework,” she writes.

THE HIGH PEACE COUNCIL IS DOOMED TO FAIL – Not necessarily. It is for now the one body, created by Afghan President Karzai, that has the potential to be a peace settlement driver. With more than 70 members, the Council was formed after the Peace Jirga in June 2010 in Kabul and was to be the face of Afghan reconciliation. Many see it as just another political enterprise for Karzai: its membership is Pashtun-weighted, and the presence of former Taliban on the Council diminishes its credibility in the eyes of active Taliban. 

Research conducted by reconciliation expert Hamish Nixon found that the Taliban itself questioned the integrity of the Council because of some of its members.

“Interestingly, it was not only the inclusion of the former enemies of the Taliban, but also for some the inclusion of ex-Taliban on the council that would hamper its ability to reach out to the insurgency. The ‘Taliban prefer their enemies than the former Taliban figures who are not with the Taliban movement anymore,’” Nixon writes in “Achieving Durable Peace: Afghan Perspectives on a Peace Process.” Nixon cited an Afghan individual interviewed about the Council.

However, it is still the only game in town when it comes to an “Afghan-led” peace settlement, and some members, including one senior Hezb-e-Islami council member, believe it can lay the groundwork for a settlement by sifting through the competing demands of the armed opposition and helping to determine what demands are legitimate and what ones aren’t.

“Whether the High Peace Council can play a useful role remains to be seen,” Nixon writes. “Were a concrete negotiation process to emerge, the council might potentially play an important Track II type role discussing and advising on issues of concern to the parties represented there.”

MILITARY OPERATIONS MUST STOP TO TALK PEACE – Not necessarily true. Many believe that the stability created by the international force is the one thing that will push reconciliation forward. Without that force, and without the operations they conduct, there is essentially no driver for creating a peace settlement, most agree. And no substantive talks will occur without the military creating the incentive. USIP’s Andrew Wilder calls it “talking while fighting,” and says it’s not a sequential thing: “we should do both simultaneously.”

Yet it’s unclear how much the military’s operations play into the reconciliation calculus. When President Obama announced he would pull 10,000 troops out of the country by the end of the year, critics of his policy saw it as a as a shot in the foot strategically, depriving the administration of a key bargaining chip by making its plans known.

But Nixon says in his June 2011 report on creating a durable peace in Afghanistan that the military presence itself can be used to dictate Taliban behavior. If clear links are drawn between “Taliban behavior” and specific military operations, then the military can be seen as a negotiation tool and the peace process could be seen as moving forward. 

“Ex-Taliban and Hezb-e-Islami leaders suggest that changes to operational patterns, ceasing aerial attacks, legal recognition and timetables for change to military posture could form part of a settlement,” writes Nixon.

So while some Taliban commanders have hinted they would stop fighting if NATO limited its operations in certain areas or against certain individuals, those commanders are baffled when they see the U.S. target their leaders. For example, NATO sometimes finds itself targeting key people that belong to the same insurgent group that it is attempting to negotiate with according to some reports.

“I wouldn’t really believe them when the military and head of ISAF is improving the operational pace and killing my key guys and not giving an opening to talk at all,” USIP’s Scott Worden says.

PAKISTAN WON’T MEDDLE IN TALKS – It most decidedly will. At the heart of reconciliation in Afghanistan is political reconciliation in and with Pakistan. As much as Pakistan would like to see a stable Afghanistan, it is far more concerned about the role its long-time nemesis, India, could have in the construction of a new central government in Kabul. Pakistan wants stability, but only a certain kind. If the Pakistani leadership does not see that it is having enough influence in a peace settlement, it will not only spurn it, but also attempt to sabotage it. That may come in the form of bolstering its alliance with the Taliban – in the hope of salvaging influence inside Afghanistan long after the U.S. is gone. 

Pakistan is so worried that its concerns will be ignored in any Afghan peace talks that it’s reacted decisively to telegraph a signal to Taliban leaders in Pakistan seen as being open to talks. Earlier this year, Pakistani forces and members of the ISI, the Pakistanis’ premier intelligence service, captured several individuals thought to be participating in preliminary peace talks or at least open to them.

“It sent a message to the Afghan government and the international community that Pakistan could play a spoiler role in talks and that they could play a significant role,” says USIP’s Worden. The arrests were in effect a reminder to the Taliban that it does “not have a free will in this process,” he says, and “to remember where your sanctuary is.”

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