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ACHIEVING POST-SETTLEMENT PEACE IN MOZAMBIQUE: THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Executive Summary

The civil war in Mozambique has left hundreds of thousands dead and caused five million Mozambicans to flee their homes, about one third of whom found refuge in neighboring countries. This carnage and devastation was inflicted on a nation that was already desperately poor. Most observers doubted that a peace agreement could be reached with the unpredictable rebels. When the fifty page agreement was signed seven months ago, most Mozambicans and international experts doubted that the ceasefire would hold.

Almost miraculously, the guns on both sides fell silent and the ceasefire has been faithfully observed. But few of the other provisions of the agreement have yet been implemented and the whole agreement could collapse. There are grounds for concern that without action by the UN and key international actors, the failed peace process in Angola could be tragically repeated in Mozambique.

Forty-five experts on Mozambique who participated in a recent symposium held at the United States Institute of Peace concluded that the international community needs to take measures to strengthen the peace process in Mozambique.

Steps need to be taken:

(1) to renegotiate the overall timetable for implementation of the agreement;

(2) to implement a comprehensive scheme of military demobilization and the reintegration of former combatants into the civilian economy and society;

(3) to resettle the many displaced persons and refugees;

(5) to build a more tolerant and participatory society, capitalizing on the stated commitments of both the government and Renamo to the principle of democratic pluralism;

(6) to consider electoral systems and transitional forms of government which will promote conflict resolution;

(5) to rehabilitate Mozambique's economy;

(6) to draw appropriate positive and negative lessons for Mozambique from experiences of other states like Angola and Namibia which have undergone similar transitions.
Introduction

On April 21, 1993 the U.S. Institute of Peace organized a symposium on Mozambique which was attended by 45 specialists on Mozambique. The meeting was organized cooperatively with the St. Egidio Community, which played a central role in facilitating the Mozambique peace agreement. The purpose of the meeting was to consider how the international community could strengthen the peace process in Mozambique.

Presentations were made by:
• Andrea Bartoli, St. Egidio Community, "Mozambique and the International Community"
• William D. Jackson, State Department, "The Current Situation in Mozambique"
• Dr. Chester Crocker, Georgetown University and Chairman of the Board, U.S. Institute of Peace, "Lessons Relating to Mozambique"
• Professor Allen Isaacman, University of Minnesota, "Reconstruction in Mozambique"
• Dr. Witney Schneidman, Samuels International, "Military Demobilization and Integration"
• Hisham Omayad, Office of the UN Under Secretary General for Political Affairs, "The UN Perspective and Plans"
• Dr. David R. Smock, U.S. Institute of Peace, moderator and rapporteur.

This report is a synthesis of the presentations and the discussion which followed.

The Current State of the Peace Process in Mozambique

Seven months after the signing of the peace accord, implementation is far behind schedule. The withdrawal of foreign troops, primarily Zimbabwean, which was to have taken place last November, only got underway in April. The demobilization of combatants and their reformation into a new integrated national army has yet to begin. The elections may have to be delayed by as much as 12 months.

There are several reasons for these delays. First, the original timetable was unrealistic. Second, Mozambique has suffered serious drought, the enormous problem of handling its displaced population, and the serious decay and disrepair of its infrastructure. In addition, the UN has been slow in meeting its commitments. The slowness of the UN is due in part to the unprecedented number of peacekeeping operations for which it is responsible in various parts of the world, and the difficulty of securing troop commitments from contributing states. The UN has also faced particularly difficult logistical problems in Mozambique.

Renamo has also been reluctant to come out of the bush and fully participate in the peace commissions and in the political process. Renamo did set up political offices in Maputo in February, 1993 and it has begun to appoint members to some of the peace commissions, but it has not yet named representatives to such key commissions as the Commission on the Police, the Commission on Security Services, and the National Elections Commission. Renamo claims that it does not have sufficient resources to meet its commitments. It has been particularly eager to have more housing made available for its leadership in Maputo.

There has also been some ambivalence on the part of the Mozambique's Frelimo government toward the UN peacekeeping operation. The government and the UN have yet to settle on a status of forces agreement for UN forces in Mozambique. As a consequence, misunderstandings have arisen between the UN and the government
about tariffs, customs, and access of the UN forces to areas where they need to be deployed.

Additionally, the government and Renamo disagree about details of the demobilization process and monitoring of the ceasefire.

Despite these severe difficulties and delays, the ceasefire continues to hold, which is a major accomplishment considering that this war has been underway for the last 15 years. Troops on both sides have maintained discipline, and in some places there is evidence of spontaneous reconciliation between government and Renamo forces in the countryside. There are signs that civilian life is beginning to normalize, with people moving from one region of the country to another in a manner that has not been possible for many years. More than 100,000 of the nation’s refugees have returned home on their own initiative. The government has committed itself to concluding negotiations with the UN on a status of forces agreement. Political parties have begun to emerge and a draft election law is being discussed and circulated.

Military Demobilization

In the Mozambique context demobilization will include encampment, disarmament, collection of arms, and the reintegration of soldiers back into civilian economic life, as well as the formation of an integrated military force composed of equal numbers of government and Renamo soldiers. In this process the Mozambique army is expected to shrink from its 1992 level of 80,000 to 120,000 down to the newly integrated force of 30,000 composed of 15,000 soldiers from the government and 15,000 from Renamo. The police force will also be restructured.

The peace accord provided for demobilization and the formation of the new army within six months, with the expectation that the process would have been completed by April 15, 1993. Although the arrival of UN forces has now started, the demobilization process has not yet started. Some spontaneous, voluntary, and unsupervised demobilization has occurred among both government and Renamo troops, but the formal process is still awaited.

Although a new timetable is necessary, demobilization and reintegration can not be abandoned. Moreover, the Angola experience demonstrates that demobilization must precede the holding of elections. Fortunately, both sides seem to retain their commitments to the pledge of demobilization.

Successful demobilization will require adequate funding to permit soldiers to resettle, to be retrained, and to find new work. Although the donor community initially estimated the cost of this program to be $9.4 million, it might more realistically be budgeted at $50 to $60 million. Along with a new timetable, a new set of plans needs to be devised which includes encampment, cash compensation, settling-in assistance, targeted training, and employment creation. Surveys indicate that about half of those currently in the army plan to return to farming. Both those interested in agriculture and other occupations could benefit from training.

An initial plan for demobilization was agreed to in October 1991 as part of the peace negotiations, but additional detailed planning is essential. The reintegration of former military personnel into society as economically productive citizens also requires much more planning, as does the creation of a new army.
It is not clear how the money for this process will be generated, and what role the donor community will play. Some donors including the U.S. Agency for International Development confront statutory constraints on the provision of humanitarian assistance to soldiers who have not yet been demobilized. But soldiers require assistance both before and after demobilization, in part to assure that they do not turn to banditry to meet their subsistence needs.

Renamo has raised objections to the redeployment of some government soldiers into the police force. This issue was not covered in the peace agreement, but it could generate conflict and needs to be handled with care and sensitivity.

Imaginative and expeditious implementation of the demobilization provisions of the peace accord is probably the most critical component in securing the peace in Mozambique.

United Nations Involvement

The UN has agreed to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire and to monitor and facilitate the demobilization process. In addition the UN is responsible for chairing the principal commissions, including the Supervision and Monitoring Commission, the Ceasefire Commission, and the Commission on the Reintegration of Demobilized Military Personnel. The UN is also responsible for providing technical assistance to the Electoral Commission and for monitoring the elections. It will also share responsibility for the repatriation of refugees and the resettlement of displaced persons.

By mid-April 1993 little progress had been made by the UN in fulfilling its mandate in Mozambique. Only 150 UN observers had been deployed. A very small budget of $9.4 million had been approved. The electoral process has been seriously delayed.

The pace of UN activity, however, is now accelerating. By the end of April the UN force had increased to 1,500, including a full battalion from Italy. Contingents of battalions from Botswana, Uruguay and other countries had also started to arrive. By the end of May the UN expects to have its full complement of five battalions composed of 6,000 blue-helmeted troops in place. Moreover, during May the UN expects to operationalize 12 military assembly points, out of an anticipated total of 49, to begin the demobilization process.

Once the electoral law is agreed upon and finalized the UN can invite technical assistance and financial support to aid the electoral process. The experience in Angola has demonstrated the need for adequate time to prepare for elections and to develop a reliable system of electoral verification. The UN has established a trust fund for elections and has invited the international community to contribute. Money from this trust fund will be used to assist political parties and to organize the elections.

The total UN budget for the Mozambique operation is $330 million. An advance of $140 million on this amount was approved by the General Assembly at the end of March. The UN views the $330 million budget as adequate for the UN to meet its political and military responsibilities. An additional $400 million was pledged for relief and rehabilitation at a donors' conference convened by the UN in December 1992. An additional $100 million will be solicited from donors for the resettlement and rehabilitation of refugees and displaced persons.
Many of the earlier problems regarding freedom of movement for UN forces have now been resolved with the Mozambique government, but a status of forces agreement still needs to be reached to permit full mobility.

Additional Requirements for Securing the Peace

The continuing problem of land mines could threaten the ceasefire and is delaying the return to normal civilian economic activity and social life. Training of Mozambique demining teams will probably be necessary, along with the provision of financial support for these operations.

As already mentioned, donor nations have pledged significant levels of funding to aid the peace process, but additional sums are still required to meet all the peacemaking and humanitarian needs. Mozambique has been heavily subsidized by foreign aid for many years, with per capita assistance running at $47 per year in Mozambique compared to $27 per year per capita for the Africa as a whole. "Donor fatigue" could develop in relation to Mozambique. But the international donors ought to applaud and reward the success that Mozambique has had in maintaining the ceasefire. The commitment to peace seems to be genuine. Donor assistance to secure the peace will be much less costly to the international community than allowing the peace to be undermined by a lack of donor support. A return to warfare and the additional suffering and deprivation that this would generate would only increase the financial requirements imposed on the donor community.

Both Mozambicans and outsiders involved in the Mozambique peace process could usefully devote more attention to electoral alternatives. Several options regarding electoral systems and transitional forms of government ought to be considered. The Angola peace process failed in large part because the election was based on a winner-take-all system. It became a zero-sum contest. The election had the consequence of exacerbating the conflict rather than contributing to conflict resolution.

The adoption of an electoral system is not simply a technical issue, but is critical to a successful transition. The selection of a suitable electoral system can help avoid making one party to the conflict so dissatisfied with the outcome of the election that it resorts to violence again.

One provision which could usefully be adopted in the electoral law is for agreement to be reached and declared on the fairness of the election prior to the announcement of the election results. This would help avoid allowing the unsuccessful party to declare the elections to be fraudulent merely because it lost the election.

Beyond the electoral system it might also be advisable to consider a transitional regime or coalition to assure that for an interim period neither of the parties is totally excluded from power. Both Namibia and South Africa provide examples of transitional arrangements which avoid total exclusion. Power sharing can permit both the winners and the losers to remain committed to the system.

One problem is that no provision is made for these sorts of arrangements in the Mozambique peace accord. Both the government and Renamo are reluctant to raise major new issues that were not covered in the agreement. The agreement is so detailed and it took so long to negotiate that both parties want to avoid reopening negotiations.
Moreover, any proposals for power-sharing or for proportional representation must reflect Mozambican realities, including the fact that several parties and not merely two will most likely contest the elections. In addition, it would be most unfortunate if a transitional power-sharing system were adopted that paralyzed the state. Such arrangements must also be freely adopted and embraced by Mozambicans and not imposed from outside. Those vying for power in the Mozambique electoral process could nevertheless be encouraged to devise confidence-building measures to assure an outcome broadly acceptable to all those contesting the elections.

In general, thought needs to be given to how tolerance can be encouraged on the part of the electoral victors and how the losers can more readily accept defeat. Problems of this kind have undermined the success of several recent elections in Africa.

One over-arching principle should probably guide international actors wishing to assist Mozambique. Support by the international community for the peace process in Mozambique requires even-handedness. Emphasis should be placed on strengthening the peace process rather than securing a particular outcome. Excessive partisanship on the part of international actors could weaken the process.

**Societal and Economic Reconstruction**

Mozambique's problems and requirements go well beyond the implementation of the provisions of the peace agreement. Although Mozambique has a few highly trained and talented people, the overall pool of trained personnel is very small. The illiteracy rate is over 90 percent. Both because the colonizing power, Portugal, was poor and because of the wars that both preceded and followed independence, the country's infrastructure is seriously underdeveloped. Because of the country's poverty, infrastructural deficiencies, and educational deficit, Mozambique is a very weak state which is practically overwhelmed by the developmental tasks it confronts.

The process of nation-building in Mozambique is far from complete. Its borders are artificial constructs which divide ethnic groups between Mozambique and surrounding countries. Because of the ethnic divisions within Mozambique, the loyalty of a Mozambique citizen is divided. The divisions of Mozambique into thirteen or more ethnic/language groups also generates language difficulties. While Portuguese is the national language, it is the first language of only a tiny portion of the total population.

Mozambique's economy has suffered from its lack of development prior to independence as well as from the devastating impact of warfare. On the other hand, its economic potential is great, since the country possesses enormous mineral deposits, rich farmland, and good ports.

Agriculture holds considerable potential for growth. Some foreign investors are investing in both agriculture and industry. There are reserves of natural gas that can be developed and huge hydro-power capacity that can be productively exploited. When the ports are rebuilt, the income to Mozambique from providing transit corridors to its landlocked neighbors will be considerable. Foreign investors are also showing interest in the development of Mozambique's mineral deposits, but transport and other components of the infrastructure will need to be improved before these investments will be attractive.

The millions of displaced peoples who need to return to their lands constitute one of the country's most pressing economic and social problems. Repatriated refugees and the
demobilized soldiers must become economically productive and self-supporting. They can not merely be taken to their villages and dropped. They will require at least six to nine months of support before they can make it on their own.

The sooner Mozambique can gain economic self-sufficiency, the sooner it can be weaned away from the heavy dependence upon foreign assistance which has characterized Mozambique for many years. Some Mozambicans prefer to stand in line to receive relief assistance rather than going to the field to plant their own crops. Foreign assistance needs to stimulate productive employment and self-sufficiency.

Financial assistance to implement a peace agreement is usually easier to obtain from the international community than assistance with economic reconstruction. This is likely to be true of Mozambique as well. And yet, without building a more economically prosperous and stable society, Mozambique could return to violence and turmoil.

Although the need for economic assistance is compelling, Mozambique will have difficulty absorbing and utilizing such assistance. The constraints imposed by the low educational levels and the underdevelopment of the nation’s infrastructure mean that Mozambique’s capacity for implementation is limited.

A tragic problem is the many thousands of children who have been traumatized by the war. Many were forced to commit horrific crimes and abuses against their enemy and as a consequence have been disowned by their own families. Children have been both victims and victimizers, and somehow they need to be rehabilitated and reintegrated into society.

Land problems have also arisen. South African and Zimbabwean farmers and foreign corporations have bought up large tracts of land and large numbers of farmers are being displaced. Those who fled their land will also now be returning, and may have difficulty reclaiming what they formerly controlled. The experience of the first wave of refugees and displaced persons returning to their land has been good and few have confronted land disputes, but as the numbers of returnees increase, land problems could multiply.

The building of democratic institutions and of a civil society goes far beyond holding a single election. Mozambique has no tradition of democracy, either under Portuguese colonialism or under the independent Frelimo government. Democratic impulses during the early independence period gave way to state control. The government is now committed to promoting democratic pluralism, but much work remains to make this a reality. One positive development in recent months has been the emergence of independent media. In addition, the court system is beginning to show signs of independence. There is a flurry of activity by a multitude of political parties. Independent trade unions have also been appearing to compete with the state-funded union.

Fundamental to all efforts to address Mozambique's many problems is the need to recognize Mozambican realities, including historical realities. These realities both impose constraints as well as open up possibilities. Moreover, outsiders need to realize that while they can offer advice and assistance, Mozambicans need to speak for themselves and decide for themselves how to shape the future of Mozambique.
Lessons Learned

It is noteworthy that as far back as 1982 the Mozambique government began to make moves toward seeking some kind of accommodation and moving away from the winner-take-all approach to the opposition. But it took from 1982 to 1992 to achieve a peace agreement. It took ten years for true "ripeness" to occur.

Why did it take so long? It took a long time to reach agreement even about what the issues were. And then agreement had to be reached about the appropriate sequence in which the issues would be considered. Then the intermediary parties to the discussions had to determine where the leverage lay. The leverage used to push the process forward represented a complex mix of the symbolic and the material. The right mechanism and setting for negotiations had to be settled, and the critical role played by St. Egidio made the Mozambique negotiations *sui generis*. St. Egidio, a Catholic lay society, was supported by the Mozambican churches as well as by the government of Italy, along with the United States, USSR/Russia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Kenya and various nongovernmental organizations.

The Mozambique peace process suggests that the process of negotiation needs to be cut to fit the particularities of a particular conflict. No standard cookbook exists for peacemaking.

We have also learned from other peace processes in southern Africa that getting signatures on a peace agreement is only one component of the process. A peace process involves several phases and extends over a period of time. It entails implementing mechanisms, guarantees, verification mechanisms, as well as reconstruction and development. Each phase of the process must be honored and treated seriously, or the whole process can fail.

Much skepticism has been expressed about the likelihood of a secure peace in Mozambique. But the peace process can only succeed if the key players believe in the process and have faith that the process will succeed. A culture of cynicism seriously inhibits progress.

A peace process is much more likely to succeed and UN peacekeeping is more likely to be effective when several conditions are met. First, the mandate must be comprehensible. Second, the mandate must be feasible, with clear steps specified about how to achieve the stated goals. Third, there needs to be sufficient leverage to keep the process on track. This leverage can include influence from neighboring states, from big powers, and from within the UN system.

Fourth, there have to be adequate resources to support the process. Included in this pool of resources are people, money, in-kind goods, and a variety of services. Fifth, there has to be the will and the power to enforce the agreement. Finally, the agreement has to be carried out and the peace process managed by competent and committed people.