About the Report
This report serves as a primer toward understanding security sector reform (SSR) in societies emerging from conflict—a rapidly expanding field of urgent importance. The report provides background on SSR today. It is based on statements by panelists at a public forum held at the United States Institute of Peace on May 22, 2008, and on interviews conducted by the author with government agencies, commercial contract firms, international organizations, and host governments that participate in the SSR programs.

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Securing the Future
A Primer on Security Sector Reform in Conflict Countries

Summary
- Since security is a precondition of sustainable development, security sector reform (SSR) is essential in the transition from war to peace in conflict-affected countries.
- SSR is the complex task of transforming the “security sector”—those organizations and institutions that safeguard the state and its citizens from security threats—into professional, effective, legitimate, apolitical, and accountable actors.
- SSR remains an unmet challenge for the United Nations and the international community, despite the growing demand for it in peacekeeping missions around the world. This lack of reform has perpetuated the cycle of violence and prolonged costly peacekeeping missions.
- Work on SSR remains in its early stages, with most organizations still focusing on common definitions and fundamental concepts and on “mainstreaming” their ideas within the larger international community.
- There is no U.S. government doctrine, best practices, or even common terminology concerning SSR. This is primarily due to SSR’s recent conceptual development, the inherent difficulty in implementing SSR programs, and the lack of an official interagency policy coordinating committee within the current administration.
- A comprehensive approach to SSR is needed if the United States plans to effectively support good governance programs in states emerging from hostilities. The United States also needs a formal interagency structure for managing SSR programs.
- SSR can be an effective instrument for conflict prevention and conflict management in changing threat environments. This report, however, focuses on the post-conflict application of SSR, since this is when comprehensive SSR is most often attempted.
**What Is SSR?**

SSR is a highly political process that must be accomplished in partnership with the country undergoing the reform. International organizations or bilateral partners that attempt to implement it in a purely unilateral and technical manner will not succeed. SSR is the complex task of transforming the institutions and organizations that deal directly with security threats to the state and its citizens. At a minimum, the security sector includes actors directly involved in protecting civilians and the state from violent harm (e.g., police and military forces and internal intelligence agencies), institutions that govern these actors (e.g., ministries of interior, defense, and justice; and national security councils), and oversight bodies. The objective of SSR is to institutionalize a professional security sector that is effective, legitimate, apolitical, and accountable to the citizens it is sworn to protect.

SSR can be an effective means of strengthening transitional or fragile states that verge on instability. In such situations, where long-term political violence has not occurred but remains a palpable threat, SSR can serve to buttress good governance and improve security sector performance. SSR may also be used in developed countries as a means of optimizing the security sector—making it more effective and efficient—by building on an already strong professional foundation.

But SSR is most likely to occur in conflict countries that are the subject of peace and stability operations. The challenges in such countries are often severe, since the security sector often has been destroyed, fragmented, or discredited during the conflict and must be reconstructed by an international intervention force. This generally involves training and professionalizing personnel, transforming security institutions, and demobilizing non-statutory forces and creating oversight mechanisms. This “worst-case scenario” serves as the focus of this report.

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**Sample SSR Definitions**

**UK**

“SSR is a broad concept that covers a wide spectrum of disciplines, actors, and activities. In its simplest form, SSR addresses security-related policy, legislation, structural and oversight issues, all set within recognized democratic norms and principles.”

**United Nations, Secretary-General**

“[SSR is] a process of assessment, review, and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law.”

**Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC)**

“(SSR) seeks to increase partner countries’ ability to meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance, transparency and the Rule of Law. SSR includes, but extends well beyond, the narrower focus of more traditional security assistance on defense, intelligence and policing.”

**Netherlands Institute of International Relations (“Clingendael”)**

“SSR is defined as the process to establish modern, effective, professional, and democratically controlled security structures. Security actors are the bodies authorized to use force, civil management and oversight bodies, judicial and public service bodies, non-state security force institutions, and civil society bodies.”
century. Another challenge is discerning the exact nature of the “security sector” and its relationship to rule of law (ROL) and other aspects of governance. In 2004, the United States, along with other member states, endorsed the definition of SSR adopted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Some but not all U.S. government departments and agencies have used this definition. However, there has been no official U.S. government definition or statement of policy on SSR, which remains under consideration.

Relationship between SSR and ROL

Increasingly, SSR is seen within the context of overarching efforts to establish ROL and a safe and secure environment. Like SSR, ROL is a broad concept that resists common or comprehensive definition. There have been numerous attempts to define ROL or at least identify the principal elements that constitute the concept. The UN secretary-general has defined ROL in these terms: ROL “refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards.”

Within the overall context of efforts to establish a safe and secure environment and the rule of law, programs aimed at reforming the security sector and the justice sector (JSR) are interdependent and buttress one another, especially in conflict countries. However, they are not synonymous, since, for example, the reformation of a country’s laws, addressing past human rights abuses and crimes against humanity, and the integration of traditional and religious systems of justice should not be part of an SSR program. Similarly, justice sector reform should not manage the transformation of the defense sector. The recruitment and vetting of military forces, the training and equipping of those forces, the creation of intelligence and border control services and creation of an integrated national security strategy to respond to security threats, and the professionalization of defense-related ministries and resource management should be left to SSR experts.

Where SSR and JSR primarily intersect is in the development of criminal justice institutions and personnel. A JSR program operating without a commensurate SSR effort will likely fail, since criminal justice systems require effective institutions, along with professional and accountable personnel, for effective implementation. Similarly, an SSR program operating without a corresponding justice reform program will likely doom the security sector, since it will be judged in part by the legitimacy of the laws it is tasked to uphold and by the fairness of the judiciary and penal institutions. In this way, SSR and JSR overlap and are interdependent yet remain distinct.

Why SSR Matters

SSR is vital to global peace and security, especially in post-conflict states and nation building. In fragile states, the construction or reconstruction of the security sector is a precondition for development, since no other reform—political, economic, or social—can take root without security. Additionally, helping failed states recover is critical to global security, since they can constitute a chronic international problem; induce regional instability; result in humanitarian tragedy; provide safe havens, training grounds, and bases of operation for global terrorists; and abet international criminal organizations that traffic in narcotics, people, small arms, terrorist skills, weapons of mass destruction, and other illicit products and services. Finally, a competent indigenous security sector is essential for the exit strategy from costly peacekeeping missions.
Despite SSR’s importance, a comprehensive and systematic approach to it in peace-building and stability operations has been slow to emerge. There is a lack of fundamental doctrine, best practices, or even common terminology. The results are needlessly tragic as the international community and the U.S. government perpetually waste precious resources reinventing the wheel in post-conflict settings while lives are being lost. Recent examples of peacebuilding sabotaged by inept, partisan, corrupt, and abusive indigenous security forces include Iraq, Afghanistan, Timor-Leste, and Democratic Republic of the Congo. An effort to institutionalize SSR practices, capacity, tools, and intellectual capital is urgently warranted.

Emergence of SSR as a Concept

SSR is a recent idea that stems from the evolution of the security-development discourse following the end of the Cold War. As the international community found itself increasingly entrenched in complex peacekeeping missions, the focus on international security shifted from “fighting and winning wars” (e.g., defeating the Soviet army at Germany’s Fulda Gap) to stabilizing fragile states, which can facilitate regional instability, humanitarian tragedy, international criminal organizations, and safe havens for terrorists. In a stark reversal of Cold War thinking, the United States’ National Security Strategy in 2002 asserted, “America is now threatened less by conquering states than . . . by failing ones.”

These experiences have caused the concepts of “threat” and “security” to shift from an interstate to an intrastate focus. Often the root causes of conflict and insecurity in fragile states derive from internal rather than external factors. For example, Liberia’s security is threatened less by a Sierra Leonian blitzkrieg than by the failures of development: social injustice, absence of rule of law, disproportionate distribution of wealth, political exclusion of groups, economic hardship, ethnic violence, inadequate public security, and failure of democracy. Such failures of development give rise to public grievances that may be exploited by militias, terrorist groups, and other internal combatants who seek to justify their use of violence for political gain. In a world threatened by globalized terrorism, this has made intrastate conflict in some fragile states a national security interest for the U.S. government. From a development perspective, research conducted by the World Bank’s Voices of the Poor project highlights the necessity of physical security in reducing poverty. This finding implies the need for accountable and effective security services—which helped hatch the concept of SSR. Because of this correlation, the development and security communities have become increasingly intertwined.

One outcome of this mixed marriage is a fundamental rethinking of “security,” going beyond traditional military definitions and encompassing ideas from development. Beginning in the early 1990s, the focus of security began to shift from the state to the individual, encapsulated in the 1994 UN Development Program (UNDP) report, which termed this new paradigm “human security.” This controversial concept holds that state security

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“A Problem Not Easily Undone”

Failure to conduct competent SSR often leads to a relapse of conflict and violence. For example, Iraq’s national police force has degraded into a sectarian instrument of terror, killing civilians, sabotaging peacebuilding efforts, and fomenting sectarian strife. The situation became so grim that in 2007 Congress appointed a high-level independent commission, headed by retired general James Jones, the former top U.S. commander in Europe, to assess the situation. The commission’s recommendation: “we should start over.” But as an earlier inspector general report on the same topic observed, a corrupt security force that has lost public trust and legitimacy is “a problem not easily undone.”

Despite SSR’s importance, a comprehensive and systematic approach to it in peace-building and stability operations has been slow to emerge. There is a lack of fundamental doctrine, best practices, or even common terminology. The results are needlessly tragic as the international community and the U.S. government perpetually waste precious resources reinventing the wheel in post-conflict settings while lives are being lost. Recent examples of peacebuilding sabotaged by inept, partisan, corrupt, and abusive indigenous security forces include Iraq, Afghanistan, Timor-Leste, and Democratic Republic of the Congo. An effort to institutionalize SSR practices, capacity, tools, and intellectual capital is urgently warranted.
can be achieved only when individuals are secure from “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear,” which are principally accomplished through the instruments of development rather than military means.\textsuperscript{10}

But achieving such a broad mandate remains an ambitious task. It is more than just training and equipping security forces; it is SSR: the transformation of the state’s security actors, institutions, and oversight mechanisms as needed to meet threats to that state and its population. Such comprehensive reform requires a whole-of-government approach to stabilizing fragile states, and the search for holistic modalities for SSR within and between donor governments remains a principal challenge today.

Another influence was work surrounding the transition of Eastern European countries in the mid-1990s. NATO and European Union (EU) membership require the adherence to civil-military relations consistent with the principles of democracy (e.g., civilian control of the military), providing incentives for Eastern European countries to transform their security sectors. In the developing world, donor countries played a lead role, whereas in transitional countries domestic political and security actors largely drove SSR.\textsuperscript{11} By the end of the 1990s, SSR was a legitimate subject of discourse for development donors, but the concept remains embryonic in practice.

\section*{Why SSR Has Been Challenging to Implement}

Great strides have been made in recent years in developing discrete SSR capabilities and capacities; however, a comprehensive, systematic, whole-of-government approach is still generally lacking. There are several reasons for this. The first is that comprehensive SSR is a fairly recent concept, emerging after the end of the Cold War. Before then, SSR was viewed mostly as training and equipping foreign forces, which is not comprehensive SSR. Interventions of training and equipment alone do not create professional institutions, government oversight, the appropriate civil-military relationship, and so forth, which are the objectives of SSR. Consequently, few practical models for SSR have emerged. Scholarship has grown substantially since the late 1990s, and though it helped to pioneer the topic, it remains highly theoretical.\textsuperscript{12} Comprehensive practical models are lacking. Some countries, notably the UK and the Netherlands, have engaged in policy initiatives to create a systematic SSR capacity, and the United Nations has begun a similar process. Also, the OECD has recently published a practitioner-oriented handbook on SSR.\textsuperscript{13} Notwithstanding significant SSR activities in Iraq, Afghanistan, Liberia, Sudan, Sierra Leone, and Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United States and the United Nations have only recently begun to develop generic SSR guidance.

The second reason for the lack of a comprehensive international approach to SSR is that SSR is difficult. Restructuring a state’s security sector is treacherous, especially in post-conflict environments, where instability and violence are never far beneath the surface and where the SSR process can easily cause dangerous ripples. In fragile or failed states, the security forces are often the de facto dominant institution—and sometimes a major contributing factor to the state’s demise. Attempts at reform can result in violent reprisals against staff and supporters of reform. Also, rebuilding a security sector that was complicit in atrocities might be an unwelcome development for traumatized populations and might possibly rekindle violence over unaddressed wrongs.

Other challenges abound. Local ownership is essential for SSR sustainability, yet it can be difficult to secure. This is especially true where it is needed most, particularly if the security forces are a part of the problem or if SSR has the potential to change existing power relationships. Also, SSR is resource intensive, especially in terms of funding and human capital. Successful SSR demands cooperation from a wide range of actors who may have conflicting perspectives, priorities, and objectives, resulting in uncoordinated and ad hoc implementation. Additionally, the lengthy time horizon for SSR to produce noticeable change may deter donors. Finally, the lack of a coherent framework, common definitions,
and technical expertise hampers current efforts, making it difficult for donor countries to see the potential of SSR, especially in post-conflict situations.

Beyond these general challenges, SSR presents special problems for the United States. For the U.S. government, the myriad structural challenges, interagency issues, and imbalances between military resourcing and civilian authorities significantly hamper SSR efforts along with many other aspects of U.S. foreign policy.14 SSR suffers especially, since it straddles the security-development nexus, getting lost in the gaps between the Department of Defense (DOD), the State Department, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). If there is a single lesson to be learned from U.S. expeditions in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is that achieving sustainable development depends first on achieving sustainable security.15 Security as a precondition for development should play a central role in formulating a comprehensive approach to SSR.

Unfortunately, in the U.S. government, security institutions and development institutions have been divorced from one another in terms of perspective, priorities, and outcomes. Some within foreign policy circles even quip, referring to the inherently different cultures, training, and perspectives, that the State Department and USAID are from Venus while DOD is from Mars.16 Part of this schism lies in the fact that USAID has been prohibited by legislation from supporting defense-oriented reform in foreign countries. Although this prohibition is now being relaxed, it created an institutional firewall between USAID and DOD that in some cases resulted in a strained U.S. toleration of corrupt police forces and abusive militaries, which tended to spoil the fruits of development.

For the Pentagon, SSR was not a strategic priority during the Cold War, which was a threat environment defined by the danger of superpower warfare between blocs of states led by the United States and the USSR. Today, however, the threat environment is largely characterized by intrastate dangers: insurgencies, global terrorism, and other nonstate threats. DOD has adapted to this new environment by recognizing the importance of building the security capacity of partner nations. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in March 2008, “In my view, building partner capacity is a vital and enduring military requirement, irrespective of the capacity of other departments, and its authorities and funding mechanisms should reflect that reality.”17

Historically, the State Department, not DOD, had the leading responsibility for foreign military assistance programs, such as Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education and Training, and the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program, which trains and equips African militaries in support of peacekeeping operations and humanitarian relief. Similarly, State administered the U.S. commitment for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), a multilateral program agreed upon by the G-8 meeting in 2004, which plans to train 75,000 peacekeepers, mostly in Africa. Despite the military nature of these programs, State administered them to ensure that they met foreign policy objectives.

A serious imbalance has developed between military resources and civilian authorities due to sustained operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, especially in the provision of “nontraditional” security assistance, such as SSR.18 One example to right this imbalance is the 1206 program, named after Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2006.19 This program gave DOD the authority to spend up to $200 million to train and equip foreign militaries to undertake counterterrorism or stability operations. Currently, 1206 funds are supporting over fifty “train and equip” programs throughout the world. This funding mechanism has proved more readily available than traditional Foreign Military Financing. The National Defense Authorization Act of 2007 increased the annual funding authority from $200 million to $300 million and extended the program for an additional year until the end of fiscal year 2008. It also delegated approval authority from the president to the secretary of defense, with the secretary of state’s concurrence. However, some members of Congress believe that this program should be funded in the foreign affairs budget, which is administered by State, to ensure that the secretary of state has the authority to manage foreign policy decisions and bilateral relationships.20
Structural challenges remain within the U.S. government, and the bureaucratic organizations, authorities, and resourcing need to be examined and, potentially, reorganized—no small undertaking.

Current SSR Initiatives

Over the past decade, several SSR initiatives have emerged, mainly within the governments of donor countries and multinational organizations. In general, SSR remains in its early stages, with most organizations still focusing on common definitions and fundamental concepts and on “mainstreaming” their ideas within the larger international community. Below is a description of leading SSR efforts. It is not exhaustive.

OECD

The OECD, with its Development Assistance Committee (DAC), has emerged as a leader in the policy field. OECD came to SSR in the mid-1990s, noting the correlation between effective security and sustainable development. In April 2004, a DAC ministerial meeting endorsed a policy statement entitled Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice, which forms the foundation of OECD’s SSR strategy. Later it published a concise policy brief on SSR (www.oecd.org/dac/conflict/ssr). In brief, all DAC governments, including the United States, have signed on to a set of SSR guidelines; the DAC secretariat has produced a handbook to put these guidelines into operation; and the secretariat is currently conducting consultations with donors, partner countries, and DAC member countries.

OECD very broadly defines the security system (it prefers the term “system” over “sector”) as encompassing all state and nonstate entities that play some role in the security of the state and its people. This includes core security actors, management and oversight bodies, justice and rule of law, and nonstatutory security forces. SSR means transforming and integrating the security system to operate in a manner consistent with democratic norms and the tenets of good governance.

OECD believes that effective SSR must address four interrelated challenges that face all states. The first is developing a clear institutional framework for providing security that integrates security and development policy and includes all relevant actors. The second is strengthening the governance of security institutions. Third is building capable and professional security forces that are accountable to civil authorities. Fourth is sustainability of justice and security service delivery.

To achieve this, the thirty OECD member states have agreed on the following programming principles: (1) a whole-of-government approach is needed by both donors and developing countries; (2) local ownership is critical for program sustainability; (3) government commitment is required; (4) parliamentary oversight should be addressed; (5) civil management of the sector is essential; and (6) civil society should be encouraged to engage.

In 2007, OECD published a 250-page handbook that ambitiously attempts to translate these principles into practice. The purpose of the OECD-DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (SSR): Supporting Security and Justice is to close “the gap between policy and practice” so that donor support for SSR is effective and sustainable. It is the product of two years of research and consultations and is written in an accessible style addressed primarily to development, security, and diplomatic personnel of donor states.

The handbook comprises eight sections: (1) introduction; (2) fostering a supportive political environment; (3) undertaking security system reform assessments; (4) designing support programs for SSR processes; (5) strengthening national capacity; (6) developing an integrated approach to SSR in post-conflict contexts; (7) supporting the various sectors that make up the security system; and (8) managing international assistance programs. Of special value is a substantive chapter (112–234) on implementing SSR sector by sector.
including defense, intelligence and security services, border management, police, justice, and prisons.

While the handbook is a singular achievement in the nascent SSR field, it is not universally embraced. In general, it is seen as a useful summary of the issue from the perspective of development donors. It has limitations, however. First, it is written for donors and not other stakeholders. Thus, and notwithstanding its rhetoric about local ownership, it portrays SSR as something that gets done to developing countries, not something that they decide to do—and drive and shape—in partnership with donors. This casts SSR in a potentially patronizing shadow for developing countries, which is especially problematic for countries with a troubled colonial past, such as those in Africa, where the majority of SSR programs will likely occur in the upcoming decade.

Second, the handbook is written from the perspective of development agencies. Conspicuously absent are the integrated perspectives of the military, law enforcement, justice, and other sectors vital to successful SSR. This is quite a problem, given the handbook’s continual call for a whole-of-government approach.

Third, despite the handbook’s mandate to close the policy-practice gap, much of its guidance remains in the realm of policy. It lacks the operational specificity found, for instance, in military field manuals that explain in granular detail how to conduct an operation from start to finish. Some essential elements of SSR are even omitted altogether. For example, the handbook does not explain how to vet candidates for the new security sector—a principal component of any SSR program—other than asserting the unexamined requirement of “establishing a transparent system of vetting for members of the security and justice system” (104). Yet how is this to be achieved in a post-conflict environment, where few if any credible public records exist for background checks? Vetting is the constant bane of SSR programs because it is so difficult to accomplish.

Other obvious omissions in the handbook include methods for sticky issues such as leadership selection, balancing ethnicity in the ranks, and using amnesty in recruitment. Also overlooked is the difficult problem of sensitizing the public to gain support for the program, especially if security forces in the past abused power, committed atrocities against civilians, and contributed to the state’s demise. In this environment, reconstituting the security sector will hardly be a welcome activity. These are some of the many practical rocks on which SSR can founder, yet that are overlooked in the handbook.

In sum, the OECD is one of the foremost leaders in SSR thought and has enormous potential to develop a comprehensive and “mainstream” approach, but fundamental issues remain unaddressed.

United Nations

SSR is an important and expanding area of engagement for the United Nations, which is increasingly engaging in SSR. Currently, many missions are mandated to conduct SSR or SSR-related activities and to provide support to national authorities in this crucial area. But as member states and UN staff themselves have recognized, in many contexts in recent years, the United Nations has been an ad hoc partner for national actors undertaking SSR. Field missions often lack capacity and resources to implement SSR-related mandates and continue to request technical advice and support on SSR from UN Headquarters. But in many situations, UN Headquarters has not been able to provide sufficient support to field missions mandated to undertake SSR.

In 2007, shortcomings in the United Nations’ engagement in SSR were acknowledged by member states in the Security Council and the General Assembly (more specifically, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, referred to as the C-34). Member states recognized the importance of enhancing the United Nations’ approach to SSR. In its 2007 Presidential Statement, the Security Council acknowledged the need for a comprehensive report of the secretary-general on UN approaches to SSR. In its 2007 report, the C-34 recognized the need for a holistic and coherent approach to SSR within the UN system and
recommended the need for an overall strategy to identify and clarify the main elements of the concept of SSR. It also requested the secretary-general to prepare a comprehensive report on UN approaches to SSR. In response, the United Nations established the interagency SSR Task Force, cochaired by the United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and UNDP, to meet this request and to work toward developing a common UN approach to SSR.

In January 2008, the secretary-general released a report entitled “Securing Peace and Development: The Role of the United Nations in Supporting Security Sector Reform.” This report is significant in that it is the organization’s first clear articulation of a UN definition of the security sector and the objectives of security sector reform. It was prepared by DPKO and UNDP but under the overall guidance of the interagency SSR Task Force and after broad consultation with member states, regional organizations, research centers, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), UN field missions, and other stakeholder groups.

The report outlines that the United Nations has assumed a broad or comprehensive approach to security, which focuses on security of states and peoples and whose goal is to support the maintenance of international peace and security and to help governments and peoples build a world where freedom from fear and want is a reality for all. It acknowledges that effective and accountable security institutions are essential for sustainable peace and development. With this understanding in mind, the report proposes a broad and inclusive definition of the security sector. The report notes that the “security sector” is a broad term often used to describe the structures, institutions, and personnel responsible for the management, provision, and oversight of security in a country.

According to the report, security sector reform describes a process of assessment, review, and implementation, as well as monitoring and evaluation, led by national authorities, which has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the state and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law. It is founded on a number of core principles:

- SSR will be undertaken only on the basis of a national decision, a Security Council mandate, or a General Assembly resolution;
- SSR must be anchored in national ownership;
- The United Nations’ approach to SSR must be flexible and tailored to each specific context; and
- The United Nations’ role in SSR will remain modest, while member states and their organizations will remain the leading providers of assistance in this area.

Over the past year, the United Nations has made steady progress in putting forward its plans for support to national SSR actors, but much more remains to be done. In mid-March 2008, DPKO briefed the C-34 on the secretary-general’s report, and in mid-May the Security Council discussed the report and the United Nations’ emerging approach to SSR. On the basis of the C-34’s 2008 report and the Security Council’s Presidential Statement on SSR, the United Nations is moving forward in a number of priority areas identified in the secretary-general’s report and by an interagency program plan agreed by the SSR Task Force. These priority areas aim to build UN systemwide capacities to better support national authorities undertaking SSR.

The United Nations’ SSR program plan will be managed by the SSR team, which is located in the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions in DPKO. This SSR team will continue to expand to a full staff of eight to ten members. The future direction of the United Nations’ emerging approach to SSR will be implemented under the overall guidance of the interagency SSR Task Force. Over the coming months, the United Nations will become more operationally focused by seeking to deliver tangible support to the field, while continuing to build a community of SSR practice across the organization.
The [World] Bank has viewed its central contribution to SSR as professionalizing public financial management: helping partner countries fight corruption, creating transparent and accountable budgets, and creating instruments for resource management.

**World Bank**

Despite its early role in recognizing the linkages between security and development, the World Bank has been reluctant to engage in SSR activities, especially where they concern militaries. It has interpreted the restrictions on political activities in its Articles of Agreement as constraining involvement in security-related issues. However, since the late 1990s, it has increasingly realized that effective security is critical to reducing poverty and achieving economic growth, which are core Bank objectives. The 1997 World Development Report renewed attention to the central role of the state in providing core public goods, including security and rule of law.

The Bank has viewed its central contribution to SSR as professionalizing public financial management: helping partner countries fight corruption, creating transparent and accountable budgets, and creating instruments for resource management. Additionally, the Bank helps reintegrate ex-combatants back into civilian life, but this may or may not be a component of an SSR program. In 2004, the Bank conducted a sectoral study of public financial management in Afghanistan. In 2007, several initiatives increased the Bank’s involvement in SSR: an emergency response policy and associated legal opinion widened the Bank’s scope of engagement in security-related issues of conflict-affected countries; the Governance and Anticorruption Strategy approved by the board put governance issues, including security, squarely on the Bank’s agenda; and an Issues paper was drafted on poverty reduction strategies and the security sector. Despite its reluctance to engage in security-related activities, the Bank is recognizing the importance of SSR to its mission and is developing ways of supporting SSR chiefly through public finance management reform.

**Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)**

Another leader in SSR thinking is DCAF, a Swiss government initiative established in 2000. DCAF’s mission is to promote good governance and SSR in accordance with democratic norms. It conducts research on best practices, encourages the development of standards at the national and international levels, makes policy recommendations, and provides in-country advice and assistance programs. DCAF is an international foundation comprising fifty member states, including the United States.23

The Working Group on SSR supports the conceptual development of the idea and brings together experts from national and international governmental organizations as well as NGOs to discuss SSR best practice. Like OECD-DAC, DCAF tends to conduct legalistic and donor-oriented research, focusing on standards and norms as they pertain to SSR rather than developing concrete methods or strategies for conducting SSR. Examples of recent projects and publications include Handbook on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Armed Forces Personnel, The Security Sector Legislation of the Palestinian National Authority, and Security Sector Reform and Gender.24 DCAF also plays a role in supporting the conceptual development of SSR for international organizations such as the United Nations, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the European Parliament.

In 2008, DCAF introduced its International Security System Advisory Team, which “brings together policy and operational security sector reform (SSR) expertise, from the developmental, security, defense and diplomatic domains, in order to provide donors and the international community with comprehensive advice both on the technical and the process aspects of supporting SSR.”25 Its objectives are to undertake and coordinate SSR assessments, provide guidance on program design, monitor and evaluate SSR programs, develop training and capacity, and provide other support services, such as developing a roster of experts, country monitoring, and sharing lessons learned. Now the four-person team’s activities are limited to short workshops on SSR capacity building, on parliamentary oversight and policy recommendations, on the role of gender in SSR, and on adherence to the principles outlined in the OECD-DAC handbook.

Like OECD-DAC, DCAF tends to conduct legalistic and donor-oriented research, focusing on standards and norms as they pertain to SSR rather than developing concrete methods or strategies.
Other Multinational Organizations

Other multinational and development institutions are just beginning to address SSR. Examples include the normative frameworks of the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States, the Organization of American States, and defense sector governance (NATO). Their efforts are thus far embryonic.

EU

Though the EU has not to date developed a robust SSR or ROL program or policy, the Council of the European Union initiated two programs related to strengthening ROL in post-conflict countries. Both missions claim to be integrated member operations, with fifteen participating EU countries, focused on ROL training. These programs, run by the EU’s European Security and Defense Policy, focus on the criminal justice sector and address police, prosecutors, judges, and prison managers in a comprehensive fashion. The EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST-LEX) currently deploys in Iraq, while a separate mission, the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo), deploys in Kosovo. EUJUST-LEX in Iraq responded to an invitation by the Iraqi prime minister to offer training activities in 2005 for the ROL sector, while EULEX Kosovo was launched by the EU Council in 2008 to help the Kosovar security sector.

Though EULEX activities claim to give priority to indigenous community involvement, the majority of EUJUST-LEX activities take place inside the EU rather than in the field. Headquarters are located in Brussels, though each mission maintains small field liaison offices that are charged with host-country coordination. Indigenous professionals with ROL mandates receive training and development courses in EU countries. EUJUST-LEX also offers “work experience secondments,” in which program participants shadow and work alongside their EU counterparts to gain on-the-job training. This program claims to have trained 1,654 Iraqi senior criminal justice officials since its inauguration in July 2005.

UK

The UK was an early pioneer in SSR, and one of the first major donor states to recognize its potential. The Labour party’s election victory in 1997 ushered in significant changes to the UK’s approach to security and development. This included promoting its development agency to full departmental status, with a cabinet-level position, and renaming it the Department for International Development (DFID). Its first secretary, Clare Short, gave a speech in 1998 articulating a new initiative to tackle security issues from a developmental perspective using “security sector reform.” Since then, the UK has emerged as one of the “market leaders” in SSR, employing a strategic approach to programming, promoting joint approaches, influencing partner governments and other members of the international community, and seeking to coordinate international SSR efforts.

Because of SSR’s complex nature, the UK government has taken a collaborative approach, creating two conflict prevention pools, one for Africa and one for the rest of the world. In March 2001, it established the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP), a joint effort of the Ministry of Defense (MOD), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and DFID (arguably the dominant agency regarding SSR). GCPP’s objective is to integrate the expertise of the UK’s security and development agencies in order to reduce the number of violent conflicts worldwide. This includes the formulation of SSR strategy, which entails four functions: (1) analysis and research for policy development, (2) effective institutional reform through advice and technical assistance to partner countries, (3) capacity building through networking and strengthening partner country and multilateral agency capabilities, and (4) mainstreaming SSR into multilateral institutions and other donors and informing those organizations’ policies and activities.

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The second group is the African Security Sector Network (ASSN), a small Internet-based community of African scholars and practitioners (www.africansecuritynetwork.org.) Established in 2003, it grew out of locally owned efforts to develop subregional networks and then integrate them in an effort to harmonize the various African organizations involved in SSR. ASSN’s strategic objectives are to support and facilitate SSR in Africa, help build capacity within the security sector in Africa, enhance security sector literacy in Africa, support security sector policy development through applied research, and serve as a continental information repository. To date, however, ASSN’s activities have been limited.

In addition to its work in strategy formulation, the GCPP funds two important programs in support of SSR. The first is the Security Sector Development Advisory Team, which provides in-country technical advice on SSR to countries that request it, in accordance with UK strategic priorities. The second is the creation of a community of experts through the Global Facilitation Network on SSR (GFN-SSR). This initiative is managed by the University of Birmingham and is largely an Internet-based community. The GFN-SSR Web site (www.ssrnetwork.net) serves as a virtual colloquium for exchanging ideas on SSR and also publishes papers such as “A Beginner’s Guide to Security Sector Reform.”

The challenges confronting the UK’s efforts are emblematic of SSR challenges in general. The multifaceted nature of SSR demands innovative strategies for interagency synergy, something that evolves over time. Even after ten years of discussion, there is no clear consensus on the definition of “security,” what should and should not be included in the security sector, and exactly who provides security and justice. Recent efforts by the UK government, especially DFID, include playing a major role in the OECD’s development and adoption of a comprehensive SSR policy, in an effort to mainstream SSR thinking. Despite this, the UK, surprisingly, lacks a formal SSR policy on how the British government as a whole intends to advance an SSR agenda and how the different institutional actors can help achieve government objectives in this area.

**Netherlands**

The Netherlands has aspirations to become a major SSR participant. This interest has grown, in part, from an emphasis within Dutch Development Cooperation programs in fragile states, particularly Afghanistan, Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Palestine, Pakistan, Guatemala, and Colombia. Of these, the first four are seen as priorities for SSR engagement, and in June 2008 the government held a four-day workshop at The Hague for Burundian stakeholders.

The Netherlands lacks a formal SSR policy but maintains a working document on SSR, drafted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the MOD. Also, a steering group on security cooperation and reconstruction has been established with representation from MFA (including Development Cooperation), MOD, Interior (including police), Justice, Finance, and Economic Affairs. The group participates in SSR decision making and may commission a policy or strategy paper outlining key issues and the roles of governmental actors.

Also, the Netherlands Institute of International Relations, known as “Clingendael,” conducts research at the request of the Netherlands Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Clingendael’s work on preventing and managing intrastate conflict led it to SSR as a potential solution in the late 1990s. Since then, it has advised the government on management, control, and oversight of security forces. Clingendael also facilitates security sector reviews, development of institutions, management best practices, developing strategies for change, and training civilian defense, military, police, and intelligence staff.

The Dutch have also recognized that their SSR interventions to date have been too discrete, nonstrategic, and unsustainable to achieve their SSR objectives. One foray into this effort was a 2007 Clingendael publication entitled *From Project to Program: Effective Programming for Security and Justice*, which offers practicable guidelines for SSR planners.
Drawing on lessons learned from other SSR programs, the publication discusses four factors that underpin the environment for effective programming in fragile and post-conflict countries (section II). It suggests ways to balance immediate justice and security needs with designing and implementing a long-term strategic program (sections III–VI). This multilayered approach posits methods of supporting state and nonstate justice and security providers and concludes by discussing some of the management requirements of their approach (section VII).

A major theme throughout the Netherlands’ approach is that justice and security development is a highly political endeavor requiring transformations in service delivery, organizational structures, and institutional arrangements that produce sustainable improvements in performance.

**U.S. Government**

In recent years, the U.S. government has made important advances in SSR capabilities and capacities, but these advances are limited to discrete SSR functions. U.S. military forces have engaged in training and equipping foreign military forces in partner countries. The State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) and the Justice Department’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program train and equip police in peace operations and in emerging democracies. An integrated, coordinated, and comprehensive interagency approach to SSR, however, is still wanting. Such a full-spectrum approach is urgently needed, since SSR is at the heart of the United States’ nation-building strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan. In fact, little planning was done for SSR in advance of the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan; this resulted in ad hoc efforts with disappointing results that have prolonged both wars.

In Afghanistan, U.S. efforts to train and equip the new Afghanistan Army have made progress. But efforts to establish an Afghan National Police (ANP) have been hampered by an uncoordinated multinational endeavor by donor countries, resulting in confusion about the role and mission of the police, ineffective training programs, inappropriate staffing and problems with corruption, lack of funding for police salaries, and critical equipment shortfalls. Since 2005, the DOD, with State Department support, has directed U.S. efforts to develop the ANP into a force capable of enforcing the rule of law and supporting actions to defeat insurgency. In 2008, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that although the ANP has reportedly grown in number since 2005, after an investment of more than $6 billion, no Afghan police unit (0 of 433) is assessed by DOD as fully capable of performing its mission, and over three-fourths of units (334 of 433) are assessed at the lowest capability rating. While the ANP has reportedly grown in number to nearly 80,000 personnel, the Afghan Interior Ministry remains corrupt, dysfunctional, and incapable of managing a national police organization.

The situation in Iraq is not much better. Belated U.S. efforts to train Iraqi security forces began only after the insurgency was under way. The United States has made some progress in creating the new Iraqi military, but after five years, Iraqi forces are still dependent on embedded U.S. advisers and the U.S. military for logistics, transport, and air and fire support. A 2008 GAO report found that only 10 percent of Iraqi forces were able to perform operations without U.S. assistance. Iraqi police forces have been infiltrated by militia groups and have been responsible for sectarian violence and death squad activities. As of May 2008, the Iraq Interior Ministry, which supervised the police and border control services, remained corrupt and dysfunctional; only nine of eighteen provinces had made the transition to Iraqi control, and the other nine remained under the control and protection of U.S. forces. This is disappointing after five years, $20 billion, and thousands of American lives expended for Iraq’s reconstruction.

Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S. efforts at SSR are fragmented and stovepiped within the bureaucracy, with large portions outsourced to the private sector. Responsibility for U.S. police, judicial, and corrections assistance programs in post-conflict interventions rests with the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement

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Affairs. In turn, INL has relied on DynCorp International and other firms to provide contractors to staff U.S. police contingents in UN police forces. In Central America, Haiti, and the Balkans, INL relied on the U.S. Justice Department to direct training programs for local police.

For Iraq and Afghanistan, however, President Bush issued a presidential directive assigning responsibility for police, judicial, and corrections assistance programs to the Defense Department and the U.S. military training commands in both countries. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military has used a mix of soldiers, military police, and civilian contract personnel hired through the State Department to train and advise local police and judicial personnel. Putting the military in charge of the civilian components of SSR has been highly disappointing. Defense would like to return this responsibility to State, but it is not clear that the State Department could handle these multibillion-dollar programs, given its lack of personnel and material resources and the difficulties of operating in conflicted environments.

The lack of SSR preparation for the post-conflict phase of U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan stems, in part, from the military's focus on combat operations rather than conflict prevention or post-conflict transition. The military has generally eschewed non-combat missions, preferring to prioritize fighting and winning wars, its traditional mission. However, this is changing. The situations in Iraq and Afghanistan have made it patently evident that lethal force alone is no longer the decisive variable in military campaigns. To this end, in 2005 the White House issued National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, which recognizes the primacy of reconstruction and stabilization operations.

That same year, the Pentagon released DOD Directive 3000.05, which defines post-conflict stability operations as a “core U.S. military mission” that “shall be given priority comparable to combat operations.” This new focus represents a seismic shift in military thought, as it prioritizes noncombat functions equal to traditional warfighting missions in the pursuit of durable security.

Just as significant, the military is also focusing increasingly on conflict prevention, which underscores the requirement for SSR. Strategic thinkers have introduced a new concept called “Phase Zero” into campaign planning. Phase Zero encompasses all activities that the military can do to avert conflicts from developing in the first place, such as utilizing SSR to professionalize foreign militaries to uphold the rule of law. Most significantly, DOD has made defense and security sector reform an explicit mission as one of the eight primary security cooperation focus areas in its new Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF). The GEF is the primary DOD operational guidance and planning document and supersedes the former “Contingency Planning Guidance and Security Cooperation Guidance” documents.

Consistent with these new strategic mandates, the new U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) aspires to provide SSR support as a means of helping stabilize fragile states in Africa. AFRICOM’s mission is to coordinate and manage all DOD programs in Africa (except Egypt, because of its relationship with the Middle East). The principal objective of AFRICOM is to secure Africa by helping Africans through “security cooperation,” which will entail a major focus on defense reform. DOD regional centers such as the Africa Center for Strategic Studies also play an important role in advancing SSR development. The blueprints for AFRICOM were in part drawn from U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), which manages DOD programs in Central and South America. SOUTHCOM has linked regional security and development in its programs and has engaged in limited SSR in Colombia.

Concerning the development of SSR doctrine, in 2008, the U.S. Army will release an updated version of Army Field Manual FM 3-07, Stability Operations, which will feature SSR in chapter 6. A draft of this chapter reveals substantial improvements over previous versions, which lacked serious mention of SSR. This draft stresses a whole-of-government approach, offers definitions and terms, discusses the military’s role in SSR, and provides planning considerations for SSR. It should be noted that these definitions and concepts represent the perspective only of the U.S. Army, not of the U.S. government, which cur-
rently lacks a definition or policy. The chapter also offers stabilization and reconstruc-
tion guidance for justice and rule of law reform, such as in police and prisons—which
some observers may deem an inappropriate role for the military in SSR. Finally, it quickly
outlines the military’s role in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, which is
often linked to SSR in post-conflict settings but may not necessarily be embedded in an
SSR program. This chapter represents a notable beginning, not an end, in the quest for
SSR “military doctrine.” SSR deserves its own field manual. To effect a true whole-of-
government approach, civilian actors, such as the State Department and USAID, also need
to develop commensurate “civilian doctrine.” This notwithstanding, FM 3-07 is the most
advanced articulation of SSR in the U.S. government to date.

USAID has also investigated the potentiality of SSR but is hobbled by decades of
legislation forbidding it from security-related activities. This has resulted in a dearth
of security expertise within the agency, limiting SSR analytical capability and program
capacity. To help formulate an approach, USAID commissioned papers on SSR and
met with representatives from DFID. In general, USAID’s perspective closely mirrors
those of DFID and OECD-DAC: development focused, donor oriented, with a whole-of-
government approach.

Since early 2006, an informal U.S. government interagency SSR working group has
convened in Washington, D.C., about once each quarter. This group is composed of a
dozen or so representatives from USAID, State, DOD, and the Department of Justice and
is led by three cochair, from State, USAID, and DOD. The working group has drafted a
“3D” policy paper on SSR, which is undergoing interagency review and clearance. Perhaps
in the next administration, the working group hopes to be designated by a presidential
decision directive as part of the interagency process and to include representatives from
all relevant agencies and offices.

Within the State Department, the Bureau of African Affairs has acquired significant
experience in SSR with programs in Liberia, Sudan, Burundi, Democratic Republic of the
Congo, and elsewhere. The Joint U.S.-Liberia Security Sector Reform program is perhaps
the most advanced SSR effort being conducted by the U.S. government today. Since 2004,
the State Department has worked in partnership with the Liberian government to fully
demobilize and then reconstitute de novo the Armed Forces of Liberia and the Ministry of
Defense. This is noteworthy because the armed forces were complicit in human rights
abuses during the fourteen years of civil war, one of the most egregious conflicts in Afri-
can post-colonial history. The State Department is conducting this program, somewhat
controversially, by outsourcing the task to DynCorp International and Lockheed Martin.
The program’s many achievements include completely demobilizing the legacy armed
forces, 13,770 soldiers, without significant incident—a feat almost unprecedented in
Africa. For comparison, in 2002, an attempted coup d’etat was triggered in neighboring
Côte d’Ivoire when the government attempted to demobilize 750 soldiers, causing France
to intervene with soldiers to help quell the violence.

The Joint U.S.-Liberia SSR program also devised numerous innovations: a compre-
hensive recruiting and selection system; a pioneering human rights vetting method for
post-conflict environments; wide-ranging training for all members of the military force
and defense ministry, including civics and human rights education (later excised for cost
reasons); a new force structure and table of organization and equipment; the refurbish-
ment of military bases; the wholesale replacement of equipment and arms; and fielding
the force in a sensitive post-conflict setting. The end state will be a two-thousand-person
professional army that is modeled on U.S. military doctrine and supports the national
objectives of the Liberian government by September 2010. The program has suffered time
and cost overruns for several reasons, including the challenging operational environment,
the unique nature of the task, erratic program funding by the United States, and compli-
cations due to outsourcing the program to private companies.

The lack of U.S. government SSR capability and capacity has led to the outsourcing of
most operational aspects of SSR programs to private security companies (PSCs). Com-

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panies such as DynCorp International, MPRI, and Pacific Architects and Engineers (PA&E) have conducted SSR activities in Iraq, Afghanistan, Liberia, Nigeria, Colombia, and Sudan. Furthermore, until recently, the State Department outsourced the GPOI program entirely to PSCs. In 2006, the State Department awarded a contract collectively to MPRI, Blackwater, and Northrop Grumman, with a ceiling of $500 million through 2011, to support GPOI. However, this contract was canceled in 2008, and the State Department did not disburse any money to these companies.

The use of PSCs is controversial, and a full analysis of this complex topic is beyond the scope of this paper. In general, PSCs are seen as an economy of resources because they can provide efficient solutions to challenging problems such as battlefield logistics, post-conflict reconstruction, and SSR. But there are problems with this unregulated multibillion-dollar industry vested in conflict. These problems include normative issues regarding legitimacy and the erosion of the state’s monopoly of force; economic issues such as fostering an industry vested in conflict in conflict-prone areas; oversight issues such as the dearth of meaningful regulation; legal issues such as the PSCs’ ambiguous status in conflict zones; policy ramifications due to the growing codependence between the government and industry regarding policy planning and implementation; and potentially irreconcilable differences between profit motives and public policy. With a few notable exceptions, there has yet to be a serious discussion within the U.S. government about appropriate spheres of activity for this burgeoning multibillion-dollar industry; its effective regulation and oversight; and its impact on foreign policy articulation, implementation, and outcomes.

Gaps in Implementation

The U.S. government has made significant strides in SSR, but fundamental gaps remain:

- **No commonly accepted SSR framework, strategy, common doctrine, or interoperability.** The current lack of an internationally accepted SSR framework has significantly hampered SSR outcomes. Common terminology does not yet exist, which demonstrates the slow pace of progress since the 1990s, when the concept of SSR was first articulated. The absence of an integrated, coordinated, and comprehensive approach to SSR has produced ad hoc programs with limited and, at times, counterproductive impacts. This has jeopardized the international community’s ability to achieve sustainable stability and development in societies emerging from conflict.

- **Lack of integrated training and lack of an SSR practitioner corps.** The lack of a comprehensive approach to SSR has resulted in the training of few bona fide SSR experts, trainers, and practitioners. While progress has been made in some areas, implementation continues to fall to individuals lacking a broad background in security sector transformation, resulting in well-meaning but less than successful SSR programs.

- **Policy-to-practice gap.** SSR is articulated in theoretical terms at headquarters but programmed at the field level. Missing is an implementation strategy at middle-management levels to translate abstract ideas into concrete reality. This is partly because SSR has been articulated mostly by academics, lawyers, bureaucrats, and others lacking SSR field experience. There has also been a failure by practitioners to relate their experience back from the field. An integrated perspective from those who design and enact SSR programs is needed to create implementable doctrine and effective programs.

- **Asynchronous interagency efforts.** SSR is multifaceted reform, requiring significant interagency cooperation and frustrated by conflicting bureaucratic perspectives, methods, cultures, and objectives. Experience has shown that if one agency dominates an SSR program, that agency’s interests and perspective will dominate the
agenda, to the exclusion of others. This produces a highly fragmented approach that can undermine the ultimate objectives of SSR. Also, it incites interagency recalcitrance to engage in SSR, which is an inherently whole-of-government effort.

- **Lack of management tools.** International institutions and donor governments need to develop SSR-tailored tools if they want to move from ad hoc efforts of limited impact to durable SSR outcomes. Performance metrics are required to monitor, review, and evaluate SSR programs. This should take into account citizens' perceptions as well as consider quantitative data.

- **Failure to engage host governments and their citizens.** Most of the work on SSR has been undertaken from the perspective of international providers, with little attention given to the potential reaction from host governments and local citizens. From the outset of an SSR reform effort, it is essential to engage those most affected and develop programs in partnership to incorporate their views and objectives into SSR programs.

**Recommendations**

1. **Achieve consensus on SSR definition.** Before attempting to build capacity in the U.S. government to conduct SSR programs, key policymakers and stakeholders need to agree on a common description for SSR goals and a terminology for SSR activities. The U.S. government's approach should take into account other definitions for SSR from allies such as the UK and the Netherlands, as well as international organizations such as the United Nations, the OECD, and the World Bank.

2. **Formalize U.S. government work on SSR.** The U.S. government needs to move from ad hoc SSR projects to a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach to SSR. This effort should begin with the formal establishment of a policy coordinating committee (interagency working group) chaired by a senior member of the National Security Council staff and including stakeholders from relevant agencies and departments. Responsibility for leadership for SSR programs should be vested in a single department of government, which can provide the secretariat for the interagency working group.

3. **Produce common civil-military-approved doctrine.** A comprehensive and institutionalized U.S. approach to SSR should include doctrine at the strategic level, implementation guidelines at the operational level, and specific programming tools at the tactical level. Because SSR falls within the security-development nexus, this doctrine should bridge civilian and military expertise and skills. It should also clarify the distinction between, and responsibility for, ROL and JSR activities and establish priorities for implementation. A common doctrine should also take into account the need for local ownership of SSR programs and for alignment with other activities, such as democracy and governance strengthening and economic growth.

4. **Engage with the United Nations and the international community on SSR issues.** In building its own SSR capacity, the United States should seek to integrate and incorporate the knowledge base and policy guidance from international organizations, such as the OECD, that have already made substantial progress in the SSR field. Engagement includes doctrine review, incorporation of best practices and lessons learned, creation of information-sharing mechanisms, and exchange programs with existing SSR programs in the field. Simultaneously, engagement should focus closely on policy harmonization to minimize future redundancies in programming and avoid undermining other SSR initiatives at the policy level and in practice in the field.

5. **Develop a U.S. and international corps of professionally trained and interoperable practitioners.** International and national security institutions are still designed

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to counter Cold War threats. Also, development practitioners and diplomats continue to work in stovepiped agencies with missions, reporting structures, and programs that lack the capacity for interoperability. The lack of SSR subject-matter experts can be addressed by creating educational opportunities and new positions at the national and international levels to work in the security-development nexus.

6. **Develop tools and flexible programming for SSR activities.** As donor countries continue to build a cadre of SSR professionals and allocate funding for SSR activities, planning for SSR should take into account the unique requirements of post-conflict scenarios. The type of support and level of commitment by intervening states should be tailored to specific conditions on the ground and thus requires a broad toolbox of programs, flexible types of assistance, and responsiveness to local concerns.
Notes

12. For more information, see Ball and Hendrickson, “Trends in Security Sector Reform.”
18. For more information, see Andrews, Kirk, Morrison, and Hicks, Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance.
22. OECD-DAC, The OECD-DAC Handbook on SSR.
23. The United States is represented by the Army and Defense Attaché, American Embassy, Bern.
24. For these and other DCAF publications, see www.dcaf.ch/publications/kms/index.cfm?nav1=5 (accessed July 21, 2008).
28. Ball, Scheye, and van de Goor, From Project to Program.


36. It should be noted that the United Nations and the United States agreed to share SSR responsibilities, with the UN Mission in Liberia agreeing to transform the Liberian National Police and other law enforcement while the United States transforms the military.


38. It should be noted that the author was a principal architect of the Joint U.S.-Liberia SSR program. For more information, see Mark Malan, Security Sector Reform in Liberia: Mixed Results from Humble Beginnings (Carlisle Barracks, Penn.: Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 2008).

39. The term “private military company” is also often used to describe this industry. For the purposes of this paper, the term “PSC” is assumed to be generic and all-encompassing.
