Peace Operations and Common Sense
Replacing Rhetoric with Realism

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The shortcomings of several recent peace operations have led many people to conclude that the whole concept is flawed and has little bearing on U.S. interests. The record, however, suggests that peace operations have not only reduced instability in many parts of the globe but have also been something of a minor boon to U.S. foreign policy. It is necessary to confront this strange gulf between Washington perceptions and reality.

Since 1948 peacekeeping techniques have been steadily developed and tested in many trouble-spots. As a consequence, today the international community can choose from a broad spectrum of multilateral activities designed to forestall, diminish, or end outbreaks of violence around the world. What are here termed peace operations run the gamut through six more or less distinct types of civilian, civilian-military, or just plain military programs: from peacemaking and peacekeeping, through reconstruction and protective engagement or containment, to deterrence and peace enforcement. Peace operations are no panacea for the problems of the planet, but they do offer flexible, low-key, low-cost options for the pursuit of national security and foreign policy interests.

Peace operations provide military means in support of diplomatic ends. Success or failure, however, will depend on the character of the political, not the military, commitment. The starting point for any mission should be a widely shared sense of collective political responsibility. Once that is present, the aims and objectives of the mission must be clearly defined so that the military and financial dispositions necessary to accomplish the agreed goals can be made.

With the ending of the era of global superpower confrontation, new questions arise about the management of violence at the local level. The aim is still to promote stability and prevent local problems from spreading. But when and in what circumstances is multilateral intervention justified? What level of force should the international community authorize its troops to employ? Who should take the lead in orchestrating action? And who should contribute what to which operations?

Policymakers need to revamp thinking about the way that peace operations are conducted and regarded. What is it that national military forces should and should not be called to do in pursuit of international solutions to multinational problems? Agreed international operational procedures must be established and rehearsed. This will call for integrated training, agreed doctrine, and common rules of engagement. No less important are changes in the way that peace operations are perceived.

What Is and What Ain’t So

Complaints about peace operations and about U.S. involvement in them have been based on several common misapprehensions.

- “Peace operations are at best marginal to U.S. interests.” In fact, they reflect the traditional U.S. preference for collective action and have demonstrably served U.S. interests well.

- “U.S. interests are best advanced by clear-cut unilateral action, not muddled multilateral efforts.” Obviously, the United States can project force around the world if it so determines. But national interests may often be better served by sharing the burdens of action and by piloting international coalitions.

- “Peace operations are expensive and militarily inefficient.” Peace operations are unique
military arrangements. Despite sharp increases in costs in recent years, the sums involved are still very small when seen against national defense expenditures. Carefully defined, smaller operations have been efficiently conducted for the most part; some of the larger, “expanded” operations have lacked the military means necessary to fulfill their mandates.

- “The United States does too much in peace operations and U.S. casualties are too high.” After being largely absent during the Cold War, U.S. forces do now figure more prominently in peace operations, but the roles are widely shared with other nations. U.S. forces rarely come under direct UN command. Losses sustained in peacetime training accidents are far higher than casualties during peace operations.

- “Peace operations are not a job for highly trained military people.” The military skills required for peace operations may not be high-tech, but they are of the very essence of soldiering: discipline, effective command and control, good communications, and restraint in the use of force.

- “Resources allocated to peace operations will detract from the overall readiness of the U.S. armed forces.” U.S. capabilities to project power around the world are a global strategic asset and should not be compromised. At the same time, many military people maintain that active engagement with a real-life set of problems in peace operations is invaluable training in itself. The key is to make peace operations and overall force development mutually supportive.

- “Because peace operations can’t punish the aggressors or restore order they are not worth undertaking.” The question is one of will. When the international community wishes to respond to aggression, it can and will do so, especially if there is decisive leadership—as Desert Storm demonstrated. Most times the only feasible response will be to launch a peace operation intended to foster a solution without the aggressive use of force.

- “The United Nations is ineffective, wasteful, hostile to U.S. interests, and a challenge to U.S. sovereignty.” This complaint is strenuously made but poorly supported by realistic analysis. The United Nations is a small organization by U.S. standards; its many bureaucratic weaknesses are not signs of a unique inadequacy or venality. The United States has ample opportunity to lead, given its position as the dominant actor in the Security Council.

Fixing What’s Broke

Several recent peace operations have been marred by conspicuous failures and shortcomings. Fixing what’s broken will call for leadership and a new sense of realism about the art of the possible in international intervention. Six requirements stand out.

- To learn the lessons of Somalia and Bosnia. Clear-sighted and unequivocal political commitment is the essential underpinning to military effectiveness. Only rarely will the international community wish to make war to solve a problem. Where there is a lesser level of commitment, the military limitations must be seen and accepted.

- To continue with reforms already under way. Restructuring of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, codification of peacekeeping doctrine, and elaboration of new logistics procedures have introduced a new purposefulness. Efforts in this direction should be stepped up.

- To establish a UN Military Coordination Committee. International military advice needs to be more closely coordinated and better communicated to the Security Council.

- To face the problem of the “Mogadishu line.” Where hostile, well-armed opposition may try to obstruct a peace operation, its forces must be so equipped and authorized as to be able to defend themselves and their mandate.
- To further an international division of labor in peace operations. The best use must be made of the capabilities of the largest number of countries.

- To reallocate financial responsibilities. For the U.S. share of UN peacekeeping costs to be scaled back to the more realistic and appropriate level of 25 percent, as Congress intends, it is necessary to adjust levies across the board in conformity with new levels of national wealth.

A Question of Leadership

The chance exists to demonstrate—to the satisfaction of politicians and public alike—that peace operations can be both a subtle and a cost-effective national security option. By building in procedures for a graduated response to violence, peace operations can be made more effective than in the past. The United States cannot and should not be expected to police the world. The United States can, however, be expected to provide the necessary leadership and impetus to shape peace operations into an increasingly useful international instrument. Multilateral peace operations can only deal with a part of the plague of terrorism, violence, and
At times during the past year it has seemed that peace operations are more at risk in Washington than in the field. “Peacekeeping” is widely dismissed as a broken reed: ineffective and with little bearing on U.S. interests. The record, in fact, suggests otherwise. The progressive development of the concept of peace operations has been something of a minor boon to U.S. foreign policy. The strange gulf between Washington perceptions and reality is examined in this study.

Where do peace operations fit on the national security canvas? It is suggested here that, far from being marginal to U.S. concerns, peace operations—representing pragmatic, casualty-averse, controlled responses to seemingly endemic violence in the world—have the potential to become the primary institutional vehicle for collective security initiatives. At a time of widespread fragmentation, it is well to ponder the inherent risks if political support for collective action is lost.

Clearly, some recent peace operations have come badly unstuck; equally plainly, intervention under UN direction and control is fraught with difficulty. Why, then, bother to participate in peace operations? What, bluntly, is in it for us? Peace operations, to be sure, will not solve the great strategic issues of the day. They will always stand much closer to the benign than the cataclysmic end of the spectrum of national security options.

By any calculus of lives saved, humanitarian relief supplies delivered, democracy fostered, or peace processes advanced, peace operations score well. That, though, is only part of the story. There are also good pragmatic national security reasons for making use of the peace operations concept—for instance, stopping lesser regional challenges from erupting into major challenges to global stability and order, and heading off conflicts that would be a considerable drain on U.S. resources. With budgets overstretched and agendas overloaded, the possibilities for burden sharing and constructive collective engagement offer significant economic and political advantages.

Peace operations start at the “ounce-of-prevention” end of the scale of conflict resolution; a relatively modest, timely, collective effort can accomplish much and avoid the need for a much more demanding unilateral “pound of cure” later.

In energizing the Bosnian peace process and giving new scope to NATO in its enforcement role,
the United States has in effect begun to use its authority, military and political, to give new purpose to the whole concept of peace operations. Recognition of the need to be able to confront violence has injected a new note of military realism. The need now is for the United States to go further—to take charge, to use its unique resources, abilities, and status to direct and coordinate collective training and the further refinement of the complex military techniques involved. Such action would open up the way to the establishment of effective international procedures for meeting threats to the peace in the twenty-first century. The burdens could truly be spread. The thankless lot of the global policeman would give place to a true leadership role. This study starts from the presumption that peace operations can be turned into a valid and valuable instrument of foreign and security policy. One can already discern, amid the shambles of Somalia and Bosnia, the outlines of new civilian and military arrangements—whether by way of ad hoc coalitions, UN action, or NATO engagement—that substantially rewrite the doctrine of collective security. The commitment required to fashion these arrangements into an effective, coordinated system may not yet exist, but new concepts are at least emerging. New energy and thought are now re-
rector of the Jennings Randolph Program, and to have the opportunity of a continuing dialogue with the other fellows. I am also grateful to program officer Sally Blair, for her exacting analysis and patience in teasing out the issues involved in this study, and to Nigel Quinney, a most tolerant and clear-sighted editor.

Although the views expressed here are mine, I should like to think that this contribution to an important debate will further the Institute’s mandate to strengthen U.S. capabilities for managing international conflict short of going to war.

I acknowledge with gratitude the support and encouragement I have received from the United States Institute of Peace. As a distinguished fellow in the Institute’s Jennings Randolph Program for International Peace in 1994–95, I was given a unique opportunity to follow the debate about peacekeeping in Washington and to study the evolution of the concept at a critical time. I am especially appreciative of the advice and support of Chester Crocker, the chairman of the board of the Institute, and Dick Solomon, the president. It was a privilege to work with Joe Klaits, the director of the Jennings Randolph Program, and to have the opportunity of a continuing dialogue with the other fellows. I am also grateful to program officer Sally Blair, for her exacting analysis and patience in teasing out the issues involved in this study, and to Nigel Quinney, a most tolerant and clear-sighted editor.

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INTRODUCTION

United Nations peacekeeping efforts in the former Yugoslavia came up against the realities of war. Thwarted and bypassed or, worse, manipulated and humbled by the contending parties; derided by the very people they were sent to help; their equipment stolen and lives endangered; the soldiers serving with the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) were left in the end with little more than a tattered mandate and battered self-respect. UNPROFOR’s travails not only threw the tragedy of the Balkans into stark relief but also exposed troubling evidence that international intervention can all too easily become part of a local problem rather than the path to its solution. UNPROFOR exposed too the fragility of the high-minded “classical” concept of the “thin blue line” in a violent, anarchic era. Peacekeepers must always patrol that uncomfortable border between peaceable and forceful settlement of disputes. In Bosnia, the boundaries of that no-man’s land between peace and war have become dangerously blurred.

Some critics reacted to events in Bosnia, as they did to the bloody encounter in Somalia in October 1993, by insisting that peacekeeping be restricted to the traditional—and safer—role of monitoring agreed cease-fire lines. Others would write the whole thing off as a brave but failed experiment. This is to run at the first whiff of grapeshot. It is to suggest that solemn commitments to international law and treaties regarding, for example, collective action against aggression and the prevention and punishment of genocide are not backed by resolve. It is to call into question the applicability of the principle of collective security in the untidy present and what seems certain to be an unruly future.

Understandable though such responses may be, they are nonetheless wrongheaded. Collective security—and, yes, peacekeeping itself—has served the world well in the past half century. Since 1948 peacekeeping techniques have been steadily developed and diligently applied in any number of trouble-spots around the world, and the results have

There must be no uncertainty in the public mind and among politicians about what peace operations are and what they can—and cannot—achieve.
benefited both international security and national interests, including those of the United States.

Now, a more expansive approach to peacekeeping has been launched in Bosnia, but the United Nations has been in effect sidelined. Unfortunately, American negativism about UN action is reinforced by far-fetched fixations on the extreme right about the organization and its supposed aspirations to become a world government. Within the Clinton administration, a period of strained personal relationships with the present UN secretary-general did not help matters. The doomsayers seem to have concluded that, because of these and other difficulties with the United Nations, peacekeeping itself should be thrown overboard. But why take such a drastic step? If peacekeeping is broke, why not fix it?

Peacekeeping is a good cause; many countries subscribe. What is more, the record now shows that UN operations are only one part of the spectrum of activities under the broad peacekeeping banner. Peacekeeping missions (or, to use the more exact term explained below, “peace operations”) offer flexible, low-key, low-cost, options for the pursuit of national security and foreign policy interests. They are hardly a panacea for the problems of the planet, but that does not make individual peace operations inconsequential or ineffectual. To the contrary, when it comes to ameliorating suffering, establishing order, promoting negotiations and reconciliation, and accomplishing sundry associated goals, peace operations can be among a policymaker’s most effective instruments.

If war, as Clausewitz famously declared, is a continuation of politics by other means, then peace operations represent a continuation of diplomacy by other means. One aim of diplomacy is to achieve balance in the international system short of war; the role of the military is to make effective use of force to achieve what the diplomats have failed to accomplish. The central notion behind peace operations is that military means can support diplomatic ends. The more efficient those means are made, therefore, the more likely it is that those ends will be achieved. Even so, the fundamental determinants of the success or failure of a peace operation are political, not military, in nature. No matter how impressive they might be, military capabilities cannot bring about a successful outcome in the absence of a widely shared sense of collective political responsibility. The starting point for any peace operation should be to define aims and objectives, and then to make the military dispositions necessary to accomplish those goals.

Peace operations made a significant contribution to international stability during the Cold War. Now, to be sure, the scene has changed. With the ending of the era of superpower confrontation, instability has become general and violence almost commonplace. Few would disagree with the historian Michael Howard that “the problems of the twenty-first century will not be those of traditional power confrontations. They are more likely to arise out of the integration, or disintegration, of states themselves, and affect all actors on the world scene irrespective of ideology.”

Long-standing questions will not go away: How can we promote a degree of stability and prevent local problems from spreading? Can or will the international community stand idly by when principles of international law and global moral sensibilities are being flouted and human suffering is widespread? New questions are also appearing as the international community tries to adjust to complex post–Cold War realities: How much can and should we expect peace operations to accomplish? What level of force should the international community authorize its troops to employ in pursuit of their mandates in an increasingly violent world? Who should take the lead in orchestrating international intervention? And who should contribute what to which operations?

Finding answers to these questions means making real changes in the way that peace operations are conducted and regarded. To begin with, policymakers need to revamp their thinking about the management of violence and what it is that the military can and cannot do. It is clearly irresponsible not to match the mandate of a peace operation with the military wherewithal to carry out the assigned task, as was the case with UNPROFOR. Peace operations may fit in at the low-cost, less combative, diplomatic end of the spectrum of national defense. But tough experience in Bosnia drives home the point that this is not a soft military option. Peace operations are plainly no substitute for the maintenance of effective war-fighting capabilities. Nevertheless, like any other military enterprise, collective peace operations can proceed effectively only if there are established, agreed, and rehearsed international operational procedures.
This will call for integrated training, agreed doctrine, and common rules of engagement. The commanders need to be assured of a level of protective fire power that will allow them to carry out their mandate from the international community without harassment or humiliation.

No less important are changes in the way that peace operations are perceived. Myths must be dispelled, hard truths confronted. Just as there must be no fuzziness about the use of force by peacekeepers, there must be no uncertainty in the public mind and among politicians about what peace operations are and what they can—and cannot—achieve. This report analyzes eight of these unhelpful misperceptions and unpalatable realities, in the process showing peace operations to be difficult and dangerous affairs but also flexible and rewarding options for the pursuit of national security and foreign policy interests. The report then moves on to assess what is being done, and what more might be done, to make peace operations more effective in advancing those interests.

The Spectrum of Peace Operations

Peace operations stand for a very important principle: that the international community can act as an intermediary between contending parties for the purpose of reducing violence and human suffering and reestablishing stability. This is far from being solely a military responsibility; civilian specialists are integral at almost all stages of a peace process. In the turbulent years since the ending of the Cold War, the number and types of peace operations have burgeoned. Critics tend not to discriminate among the variety of missions: very different operations are lumped together under the discredited category of “peacekeeping.” One result has been the popularity of such trite and unhelpful maxims as “peacekeeping only works when there is a peace to keep.” If we are not to perpetuate these convenient but uninstructional generalizations—uninstructive not least because the concept of peace is strictly relative in our times—we need to insist on a more precise terminology.

Here, then, we will use the term peace operations to cover the broad spectrum of multilateral engagements intended in one way or another to forestall, diminish, or end outbreaks of violence on the international scene. This term, increasingly used at the United Nations, is not so dissimilar from that blunt term now widely used by Western military establishments, “Operations Other than War”—a phrase that makes the important point that absence of war is not the same thing as absence of violence.

There is no agreement about the taxonomy of “peace operations.” Six more or less distinct types of civilian, civilian-military, or just plain military programs do, however, stand out. All are designed essentially to give peace a chance in varying circumstances of more or less violence across the broad front of conflict resolution. Each has defined goals and employs particular techniques. There is much scope for progression from one category to another and a good deal of interaction at each stage.

- **Peacemaking.** An activist role (military and/or civilian) involving use of diplomatic negotiations, conferences, early warning procedures, mediation, and conflict resolution and preventive diplomacy techniques to head off or resolve a conflict or initiate a peace process. Military attributes, by way of organizational skills, logistics, and communications capabilities are often extremely helpful. During the successful U.S.-run UNITAF phase in Somalia, much military effort was devoted to diplomatic peacemaking roles: establishing the ground rules for delivery of humanitarian supplies and achieving a modus operandi for work among the rival clans. UNPROFOR was likewise engaged on a daily basis in efforts of this kind.

- **Peacekeeping.** Use of international military personnel, either in units or as individual observers, as part of an agreed peace settlement or truce, to verify and monitor cease-fire lines. In many cases, these roles have been extended to provide for supervision of disarmament and cantonment of forces. Peacekeeping is usually defined in terms of caveats: deployment only with the consent of the parties; soldiers to be lightly armed or to carry no weapons at all; and use of force only if attacked and then as a last resort. This most “traditional” form of peace operations has been practiced in many
places and at many times throughout the past four decades.

- **Reconstruction** (generally, but incorrectly, called *peacebuilding*). Wide-ranging involvement, by civilian and/or military personnel, in rebuilding the infrastructure of society once war is over. The consent of the formerly warring parties is a sine qua non. The aim is to build and secure an environment in which representative institutions can take over the management of a society severely disrupted by civil war or state collapse. Humanitarian relief concerns are likely to be preeminent, and military roles will typically include working alongside aid organizations. Military logistics assistance may be needed to provide the necessary support services. In Somalia, UNITAF’s reconstruction activities included not only securing the delivery of humanitarian aid but also digging wells, clearing irrigation systems, opening roads, and building bridges and airfields. In Cambodia and Central America, reconstruction programs have been integral to securing a successful transition from protracted guerrilla warfare and civil strife to elected, representative government. (Reconstruction, it should be noted, is not the same as nation building. The latter is the responsibility of the duly elected government; the former involves the international community in helping to create the conditions necessary for a government to be elected and function effectively.)

- **Protective engagement or containment.** Insertion of peacekeepers to try to protect civilian populations, deliver humanitarian relief, and/or provide a platform for peace negotiations while strife continues. UNPROFOR’s experiences are a bitter reminder of the present limits of international effectiveness in such conditions. The intervening forces will likely be at risk and exposed to manipulation and harassment by the contending parties. Their roles may well conflict with the war aims of one or other of the warring parties—or all of them at once, as in Bosnia. Success will depend on a substantial commitment by the international community to the intervening forces and to the peace process. Forces must be capable, at the least, of determined action to guard weapons dumps and distribute supplies. The risks of forcible response by the contending parties must be recognized in drawing up the mandate for the mission, establishing the forces required, and arranging that they be protected by sufficient back-up capabilities. IFOR, the Intervention Force in Bosnia, has been organized on that basis. This NATO-led force extends protective engagement in the direction of peace enforcement, but it is not peace enforcement as such because it does not represent the will to impose a settlement by going to war.

- **Deterrence.** Deployment of military forces to dissuade a potential aggressor from pursuing a violent course. The forces involved need not be large, provided that the commitment to a much higher level of military engagement is clear and credible. The UN force deployed in Macedonia (which includes a two-company U.S. battalion), for example, is widely seen as a trip-wire that would trigger a decisive NATO response if attacked. Because Macedonia is so sensitive an element in the Balkans balance, the United Nations’ deterrent role helps stabilize the region as a whole.

- **Peace enforcement.** The coercive use of military power to impose a solution to a dispute, punish aggression, or reverse its consequences. Peace enforcement requires the deployment of integrated, all-arms units equipped and trained to take on a clearly defined opposing force. Although Article 42 of the UN Charter envisages forcible responses short of actual use of force—demonstrations and blockades—these too must, if they are to be credible, be backed by formidable military capabilities. The international community is rarely ready to commit the level of resources required for peace enforcement operations. Only following the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950 and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 has aggression been met with the kind of concerted response spelled out in Chapter VII of the Charter. Firm U.S. leadership and an unusual convergence of major
strategic interests were needed to catalyze action in both cases.

With these definitions in mind, let us now turn to the business of sorting out fact from fiction regarding the character and conduct of peace operations. In doing so, it is important to remember that the classical 1950s model of peacekeeping was amplified and extended by a Security Council beguiled by the ending of the Cold War into trying out new forms of international security collaboration. Large-scale operations involving combinations of peacekeeping, reconstruction, and protective engagement were attempted under the banner of “expanded peacekeeping.” The focus in this report is on the issues raised by the prevalence of violence and the use of force, especially in the context of operations attempting reconstruction and protective engagement. (This is not to undervalue the importance of those peace operations concerned with preventive diplomacy, mediation, and so forth. If peace operations are less costly than war, then effort at this negotiating end of the scale is plainly the least costly of all.) Deterrence, too, is discussed, as is enforcement and the need for its narrower definition.

The peace operations concept adds to, rather than takes away from, the sum of national security options.
Concerns in the United States about the United Nations in general and peace operations in particular proceed from understandable preoccupations about national roles and responsibilities in the aftermath of the Cold War. Unfortunately, a number of misconceptions and misperceptions have muddied the debate about the nature of peace operations and the value of U.S. involvement in them. What follows is an attempt to put some of the more specious misapprehensions into perspective.2

1. “Peace operations are at best marginal to U.S. interests.”

The record shows that this proposition plainly ain’t so. As an extension of the traditional U.S. preference for collective action, successive peace operations of all kinds in many places around the globe have served U.S. interests well.3

For over forty-five years, upholding the security of Israel has been a prime strategic concern of American foreign policy. A range of traditional UN peace operations (UNTSO, UNEF I and II, UNIFIL, UNDOF) with strong U.S. diplomatic endorsement, but until very recently with few U.S. military personnel, has provided one of the means for achieving this goal. In addition, the Multilateral Force and Observers (MFO) operation was created under the Camp David Accords to provide the necessary assurances that the Sinai peninsula would remain demilitarized. A U.S. presence has been deemed fundamental and is provided by an 800-strong U.S. Army battalion stationed at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba.

Sometimes UN peace operations have served to mitigate the effects of embarrassing actions on the part of U.S. allies: following the Suez crisis in 1956 (when UNEF I was established); Belgium’s Congo meltdown in 1960 (which led to the first UN protective engagement operation); and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 (where, twenty-two years later, UN peacekeepers still stand between two NATO partners).

Sometimes various combinations of peacemaking, peacekeeping, and reconstruction operations have helped advance U.S. interests much closer to home. In Nicaragua and El Salvador, for instance, peace processes have succeeded in overcoming much of the enmity born of decades of civil strife.
The United States is closely involved in this region for one of the oldest and most basic of foreign policy interests: to ensure stability around its borders. The question therefore is not whether the United States will be engaged, but rather what are the relative costs and consequences of the various means available to promote its national security and political interests in Central America. Plainly, covert operations in support of the anticommunist faction in Nicaragua and the right-wing regime in El Salvador incurred high political, military, and financial costs to the United States during the 1980s. One estimate claims that the largely covert support for anticommunist forces in Central America cost $8 billion. The official figure for arms transfers to the government of El Salvador alone is $590 million for the 1982–91 period. (In the same years, the Soviet Union is estimated to have provided the Sandinista government with arms worth $2.8 billion.) As for U.S. support for the Nicaraguan Contras, quite apart from the financial burden, the political consequences were clearly damaging to the United States, at home and abroad.

The expense of sustaining one side in a civil war stands in stark contrast to the relatively modest expenditure required to mount a constructive, well-prepared peace operation to end one. ONUCA, the pragmatic, modest UN peace operation that oversaw the transition from civil war to representative government in Nicaragua, cost $87 million. ONUSAL, a similarly low-key operation established in May 1991 to monitor a cease-fire and verify adherence to the terms of a peace treaty among the factions in El Salvador, cost around $30 million annually until it was phased out in April 1995. On the basis of a 30 percent share of the peacekeeping levy on UN member states, the United States would have paid approximately $29 million toward the costs of ONUCA and $50 million for ONUSAL. Both operations oversaw a successful electoral process, the reconstitution of the national police and army, and the establishment of procedures to deal with persistent and flagrant abuses of human rights. By any standards their work represents good value when seen against the dark past of corruption and repression in these countries.

The problems of Haiti, which directly impinge on a variety of U.S. national interests, have been addressed by a combination of active multilateral diplomacy—channeled through the United Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS)—and the deployment of a two-phased peace operation. In August 1994, after three years of inconclusive negotiations, the Security Council authorized member states to form a multinational force “under unified command and control . . . to use all necessary means” to facilitate the departure of the military junta that had seized power in September 1991. This gave the United States a clear green light to go ahead with an invasion under its own command to restore the legitimate government of Haiti. In other words, the United Nations, taking its authority from Chapter VII of the UN Charter, legitimized forcible action of a kind that the United States was clearly ready to take. As a consequence, the United States was able to steer clear of unilateralism and its attendant dangers (witness the international reaction to the Russian action in Chechnya); the burdens of intervention were shared by forming a multinational force; and effective provision was made for a hand-over to a second-phase UN peace operation, which has permitted a sharp reduction in the number of U.S. forces engaged. The peace operations concept has worked well in Haiti.

Somewhat further afield, UN peacemaking, peacekeeping, and reconstruction activities in southern Africa (Namibia, Angola, and Mozambique) have been scarcely less important to the United States, given the extent of U.S. interests in ending South African isolation and developing a coordinated solution to the problems of Southern Africa as a whole. In Southeast Asia, a region in which the United States has invested so much blood and treasure, negotiations toward a settlement in Cambodia were spearheaded by the United States. But it was the United Nations, working in close consultation with major powers (including Japan and China), that presided over the resultant successful and broadly based peace process and reconstruction effort, overseeing elections and opening the way to Cambodia’s first experiment with representative democracy.

In the Persian Gulf, a region of prime strategic concern to the United States, successive peace operations have served to dampen confrontation and to provide a vehicle for effective international sanctions against Iraq. For example, when the protracted Iran-Iraq war ended in 1988, a UN truce-monitoring force was quickly put into place to verify the cease-fire and monitor troop with-
drawals. The UN Observation and Monitoring Force in Kuwait (UNIKOM) is a current example of a conspicuously useful, low-cost monitoring operation. The presence of UNIKOM, like the operations of the other UN programs established to monitor Iraq in the aftermath of the Gulf War, permits U.S. disengagement from day-to-day supervision of affairs along Kuwait’s border with Iraq. UNIKOM helps stop small incidents from blowing up into large crises and thus stabilizes what would otherwise be a very fragile truce. The way in which the peacekeeping concept was enlarged after the Gulf War—to provide for intrusive inspections and demolition of weapons of mass destruction and their manufacturing capabilities inside Iraq, and to create weapons exclusion zones and protected areas for the Kurdish population—was very much in line with U.S. interests and policies. The cost of UNIKOM in 1994 was $68.6 million, two-thirds of which was paid by the government of Kuwait; the U.S. share would have been around $6 million to $8 million.

With the example of Bosnia before us, it would be rash to claim that all peace operations are practicable, effective, and invariably supportive of U.S. interests, or indeed of the interests of the international community at large. Indeed, not all conflicts are amenable to nonviolent management or solution—not, at least, until contestants have exhausted their resources and resolve in combat. What is clear is that without peace operations the United States would have had either to be more directly engaged across the globe (like the forces of the British Empire during the almost unbroken succession of “Queen Victoria’s little wars” in the latter half of the nineteenth century) or to have accepted spreading unrest and its detrimental effects on U.S. national interests and the broader international balance. Peace operations have allowed many of the aims of U.S. foreign policy to be advanced by the community of nations at minimal cost to the United States.

2. “U.S. interests are best advanced by clear-cut unilateral action, not muddled multilateral efforts.”

As the sole remaining superpower, the United States can project force around the world if it so determines. Few great powers in history have willingly forsworn such capacity for unilateral action or accepted any obligation to trammel their power by working with others. Nor should the United States. Peace operations are not about ultimate national security; they are aimed at the promotion of stability rather than the exercise of raw power. The peace operations concept adds to, rather than takes away from, the sum of national security options.

The United States can act on its own account in pursuit of limited peacekeeping objectives—and has done so in Grenada and Panama, for example—or it can join with others. The United States gave decisive leadership to a specially formed international coalition in the Gulf War and was the prime mover in peace operations carried out under broad UN auspices in the UNITAF phase in Somalia and the first stage of the Haiti operation. Now, in Bosnia, the United States has once more taken the lead, this time for an apparently well-rehearsed and comprehensively planned NATO mission.

Coalition building of this latter kind can translate into concrete benefits. At the same time it is well to recall that failures of coordination between U.S. and international forces—as in Lebanon in the 1980s and in Somalia when the UNITAF operation gave way to UNOSOM—led to grievous military misfortune. These examples remind us that the act of putting together a successful multinational peace operation calls for intensive, interactive diplomacy at many levels, integrated military planning and training, and the development of agreed command and control arrangements. Development of the concept of operations for IFOR in Bosnia has given the United States ample scope for taking charge and piloting the process along. With its hand thus on the tiller, the United States can turn peace operations into a vehicle to give new and more purposeful leadership to elements of the international community or, depending on circumstances, to the United Nations. (The last section of this report will argue that the exercise of
such leadership is important to maintaining and enhancing the authority of the United States in the world.) Peace operations serve U.S. national interests in ways that unilateral action could not.

3. “Peace operations are expensive and militarily inefficient.”

It is high time to introduce a sense of proportion into the debate about the efficiency and cost of peacekeeping in general and UN peace operations in particular. As exercises in diplomacy, the costs of peace operations should properly be set against the costs of war, which may follow if diplomacy fails. The UN peacekeeping budget has certainly risen sharply in the past five years as the concept of peace operations has been developed and applied. But the overall sums involved are still very small when seen against national defense expenditures (or the operations of other national—and even local—government agencies).

Whether the costs should fall on the foreign policy or the defense budgets is a perennial feature of interdepartmental wars everywhere. In fact, two separate costs are involved: the national costs of the global allocation to the UN special peacekeeping fund, and the costs to the national defense budget of making the necessary military efforts to support peacekeeping operations whether within or outside of UN programs. In the U.S. Congress, both the House and Senate have introduced legislation that would in effect subsume the two. This would not only eviscerate the U.S. national contribution to UN peacekeeping, it would also undermine the capacity of the United Nations to continue to operate in this field. As such it would be a gross disservice to the many other countries that maintain their commitments with expenditures under both headings.

UN peacekeeping has hardly been a model of efficiency. But the scale of recent operations, all authorized by the Security Council, has been large. For 1994 the UN peacekeeping budget was $3.5 billion, which went to support eighteen peace operations involving approximately 70,000 personnel in the field and their vehicles, communications, and logistic support. During 1994 major peace operations were already under way or were in the course of being established in the former Yugoslavia (39,000 personnel in Bosnia and Croatia); Haiti (about 6,000 troops, 250 civilians, and 600 police); Iraq-Kuwait (1,100 troops); Mozambique (4,000 troops plus 1,100 civilians and police); Rwanda (authorized strength 5,400 troops, about 140 military and civilian police); and Somalia (about 15,000 military and police). Meanwhile, monitoring, verification, and observer teams were deployed in Angola, Cyprus, El Salvador, Georgia, India/Pakistan, around the borders of Israel (three such operations), Liberia, Tajikistan, and Western Sahara. This extraordinarily wide-ranging effort cost a sum equal to about half the defense budget of Australia.

Some ideas are advanced later in this study about how better to provide for financing of peace operations (see “Securing the Necessary Financial Resources,” pp. 21–23). The starting point is the need to acknowledge that the “ounce-of-prevention-is-worth-a-pound-of-cure” proposition makes budgetary as well as national security sense. National security budgets could then be reordered to give due priority to expenditure aimed at abating problems rather than trying to solve them by force. On this basis—and as the threat of major interstate war recedes—peace operations can be seen for what they most patently are: the least expensive of national security options.

This is not to say that provision for peace operations should eclipse other necessary military expenditure. Such a suggestion would be absurd. In the first place, all countries, and major powers especially, will always seek to provide for all-round defense needs. In the second place, peace operations belong at the low-cost end of the scale of national defense budgets and are hardly likely to consume substantial proportions of those budgets. For example, just 1 percent of the annual U.S. defense budget (about $2.8 billion) would fund four-fifths of total UN annual expenditure on current peace operations.

As for military efficiency, one must avoid generalizations and bear in mind the purposes for which UN peace operations have been called into being and the cosmopolitan, hodgepodge character of the forces deployed. Clearly, UN peace operations as presently conceived are a military arrangement unlike any other. The purpose is different. The command structure is unique in being obliged to meet the separate national interests of the various contingents. The force components,
coming from different countries with markedly different military traditions and styles, cannot be expected to cohere in the same fashion as a national force or an intensively trained collective security formation like NATO. Furthermore, governments commit their forces to UN operations for widely differing rationales: some because of a genuine commitment to upholding international order and justice; many for altogether more narrowly material or mercenary considerations; most for foreign policy considerations and to maintain or consolidate a relationship with a major partner. Participation in peace operations is also widely perceived to bring useful military advantages as well as to demonstrate political commitment.

For the most part, the smaller-scale traditional peace operations (peacemaking and peacekeeping) have been well prepared, kept more or less to schedule, stayed generally within budget, and enjoyed reasonable success. Where objectives have been limited and clearly defined and the formerly warring parties have been in full agreement as to the presence of the force, differences among troop contributors have been relatively easy to accommodate or have not proved fatal to a mission’s success. In such situations, force commanders can make militarily sound judgments about the calibre of the units available and deploy them accordingly, secure in the knowledge that the unexpected is unlikely to happen.

The problems began to accumulate with the development of the concept of expanded peace operations, which imposed new, poorly conceived, demanding, and wide-ranging tasks on the forces involved. When the Security Council, emboldened by visions of a new world order and the experience of the Gulf War, ventured to put into effect the concept laid out in UN Charter (especially in Chapter VII) for keeping the peace—a concept that the secretary-general had lightly sketched out in his 1992 report, Agenda for Peace—it failed to come to terms with the issue of enforcement inherent in Chapter VII. More fundamentally, the member states failed to demonstrate the collective will necessary for success. UN forces were assembled for complex operations in confused, unsettled, and often violent circumstances in Namibia, Cambodia, Somalia, and Bosnia before it was possible to work through the issues. The problem came to a head in June 1993 on the streets of Mogadishu, when lightly armed Pakistani peacekeepers were attacked and twenty-nine were killed. The Security Council’s subsequent fateful decision to “go after” the man held responsible for the attack, General Mohamed Farah Aideed, in turn exposed further weaknesses in coordination (in that case between U.S. and UN commands) and highlighted the military inadequacies of traditional peacekeeping procedures in such conditions. Further tragedy followed with the deaths of eighteen U.S. Special Forces soldiers.

Expanded peace operations have raised issues of operational deployment, military planning, intelligence, logistics, and communications that the United Nations has had neither the administrative base, nor the experience, nor the military expertise to address satisfactorily. As is discussed below, much has been done recently to remedy these deficiencies (with the U.S. Department of Defense providing substantial help). Observers of the UN Secretariat have identified some of the problems as too many lackluster staff, overlaps in decision-making processes, unduly centralized control, and so forth. Endless recitals of such selective litanies of shortcomings have compounded the problem by undermining the organization itself—and U.S. commitment to it—while denying the constructive work done by many dedicated international civil servants. It is overlooked that many of the difficulties encountered go with the territory. For instance, much criticism has been leveled at the loss of money and supplies during the Somalia operations, yet the critics seem not to appreciate how complete was the civil breakdown in that country and how limited were the resources made available to the UN effort by the Security Council.4

Despite experiences in Somalia and more recently in Bosnia, the international community is evidently not ready seriously to entertain the idea of putting together comprehensive military capabilities to solve a problem by force—except in those rare cases where clear-cut and widely shared strategic interests are infringed, as they were by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. But nor is the international community willing to stand idly by while states collapse and civil strife threatens to engulf neighboring countries. Complex, Bosnia-type operations will presumably have to be attempted again. Thus the focus should be on working together to do things better at the levels of collective action
that are feasible. The opportunity exists to make peace operations not only more efficient in the administrative sense but also more militarily effective. The costs of doing so will be only a fraction of the price of forsaking early collective action and resorting to unilateral military action late in the day.

4. “The level of direct U.S. involvement in peace operations and the casualties incurred by participating U.S. forces have grown too high.”

While this argument is a matter of judgment, a few facts, some of them understandably sensitive in nature, need to be spelled out if the debate on U.S. participation is to reach a reasoned conclusion.

As critics of U.S. involvement often—and rightly—claim, U.S. forces do now figure more prominently in peace operations. During the Cold War, U.S. forces were, for very good reason, largely absent from peace operations conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. It was widely agreed that the superpowers should not participate. Apart from anything else, their proxies were more than likely to be involved in the fracas that any mission was sent to address; engagement of the superpowers could thus only have exacerbated Cold War confrontation. This changed in 1989. Since then, U.S. (and Russian) units and individual observers have become more heavily involved in peace operations.

Furthermore, that level of participation is higher than might seem to be the case at first glance. For example, the United States was generally reckoned not to be engaged in UNPROFOR—yet a U.S. infantry battalion was, and still is, deployed for deterrent purposes in Macedonia; U.S. medical personnel were in Croatia; and the U.S. Air Force had a major commitment to air-dropping humanitarian relief supplies inside Bosnia, monitoring the no-fly zone with AWACS aircraft, and flying up to half of the NATO attack aircraft available to support UN forces on the ground. The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps have also made extensive deployments to the Adriatic in support of activities in the region.

Contrary to public perceptions, U.S. forces rarely come under the direct command or control of UN officials. For instance, the USAF components active in the former Yugoslavia are operating under national and NATO command. In Somalia, the initial U.S. commitment, UNITAF, led an international coalition endorsed by the United Nations but masterminded and dominated by the United States. Beginning in March 1993, this force handed over to a specifically UN peace operation, UNOSOM II, under UN command. The United States then deployed a Joint Task Force, including a Quick Reaction Force, to operate in parallel with UNOSOM II. These troops eventually numbered 17,700. They were at all times under national, not UN, command. The operation in south Mogadishu on October 3, 1993, which, when it went astray, precipitated a torrent of criticism of the United Nations and of U.S. support for peace operations, in fact proceeded under U.S. command.

Although loss of life in the military is no more acceptable than in any other circumstances, it is inevitable. The United States has very large armed forces; the current strength is about 1.6 million. The official casualty figures demonstrate that total numbers killed on active service at home and abroad, including training accidents, have steadily declined over the past two decades. In 1980, 2,391 deaths were reported (equivalent to 117 per 100,000 active duty personnel); in 1994, the figure was 1,105 (69 per 100,000). Numbers killed in action or died of wounds should obviously not figure largely in peacetime. Even so, the proportion to total losses is very low. Nineteen U.S. personnel died as a result of hostile action (in Somalia) in FY 1994; 514 were killed in accidents, 217 committed suicide, 207 died from illness, and 80 were listed as homicides. In FY 1991, the year of the Gulf War, 143 were killed in action, 4 died of wounds, 932 died in accidents, 232 committed suicide, 322 died from illness, and 108 were homicides.

Set against these figures, the losses sustained in peace operations are relatively small. But are they nonetheless too high? A large part of the answer must depend on the degree to which peace operations are perceived to advance national interests. Other factors, such as the extent to which participation in peace operations enhances the capabilities of a nation’s armed forces, will also come into play. Clearly, judgments about acceptable losses will evolve with changing strategic and political circumstances.
As an index of the kinds of casualties likely to be sustained in peace operations, the following figures may be of use.6

- From December 1992 through December 1994, ONUMUZ (the recent but little known successful operation in Mozambique) suffered 18 fatalities out of a force of 5,063.

- From June 1974 through December 1994, UNDOF (the observer force on the Golan Heights) suffered 37 fatalities out of a force of 1,030; 17 of those killed were Austrian—a fact that illustrates just how widely shared peacekeeping burdens are.

- From 1948 through December 1994, UNTSO (the truce-supervising and monitoring force on Israel’s border) suffered 28 fatalities; 7 of those killed were Americans.

- From March 1992 through January 1996, UNPROFOR suffered 232 military fatalities; those killed were drawn from many different countries, including France, Great Britain, Spain, Russia, and Canada.7

- Between December 20, 1995, and April 28, 1996, 131 troops serving with IFOR were wounded and 21 were killed. Of those, 5 died in road accidents, 3 suffered heart attacks, 1 committed suicide, and 12 were killed by mines and unexploded ordnance.8 As of May 2, 1996, 17,793 U.S. personnel were serving with IFOR in Bosnia, 1,310 with IFOR in Croatia, and 3,700 were stationed in rim countries in support of the IFOR deployment.9 Two U.S. personnel serving directly with IFOR had died since its deployment.10

5. “Peace operations are not a job for highly trained military people.”

The evidence from Bosnia and Somalia is all the other way. The military manuals are clear on the matter: “Good soldiers make good peacekeepers.” Peace operations these days can be expected at least to brush up against the endemic modern problem of armed violence; in Bosnia, UNPROFOR became deeply enmeshed in it. The military skills required may not lie at the technological end of the spectrum of the profession of arms, but they are of the very essence of soldiering: discipline, effective command and control, good communications, and restraint in the use of force. No nation is likely to maintain troops solely for peace operations. Effective military training for war and to meet the requirements of national defense will, however, provide troops with the skills required for participation in peace operations. Equally, experience in peace operations can prove valuable preparation for war. For instance, the only active service the British forces sent to retake the Falkland Islands in 1982 had seen was in Northern Ireland.

Tasks such as active patrolling, de-mining, disarmament, separation of forces, supervision of cantonment of warring armies, guarding weapons depots, and securing passage of relief convoys through hostile territory are all directly relevant to active-duty soldiering. Often enough the peacekeepers will find themselves at risk. Worldwide proliferation of weaponry puts them up against heavily armed and, all too often, exceedingly ill-disciplined irregular as well as regular forces. This is, unquestionably, military territory. It is territory that lies unclearly between peace and war. From the soldier’s point of view, however, where there is no peace there is war, or something dangerously like it.

The key aim of peace operations is to bring order in chaotic circumstances with the minimum use of force. If force has to be used it must be applied in a limited way to avoid collateral damage and expansion of the conflict. In a world in which conflict between massed armies poses less of a threat than does terrorism, the failure of states, or the outbreak of civil, religious, clan, or ethnic warfare, peace operations challenge conventional military thinking. This is a challenge to which most military organizations, including those in the United States, have responded enthusiastically, embracing the need to define and develop the means to meet the new and specialized military requirements of the role. There is much to be said for making use of the military attributes of organization and discipline in a constructive and essentially nonviolent way; an aversion to casualties is
no bad thing. But military means are not thereby made ineffective.

At the same time, military personnel are not ideally suited to perform all the tasks that peace operations involve. Police officers, for example, with their specialized training in crowd control, community interaction, and surveillance of criminal activity have much to contribute, especially at the early stages of a deteriorating situation. Police training is, indeed, what is needed to defuse tensions early on. The responsibilities of the military in a riot, for example, should be very carefully circumscribed: to restore order and to turn responsibility back to the police. The military are not trained to arbitrate civil or political issues. The police and the military should complement one another, each playing the role for which its training best suits it. Ideally, a force should be sufficiently diverse to meet all eventualities while preserving its discipline and coherence.

In this regard it seems timely to review congressional restraints on training of foreign police officers in the United States. Many foreign police forces have evidently had less than admirable records in the past. Haiti is a case in point. The effort now being made in training Haitian police to work within constitutional constraints and to follow responsible operating procedures demonstrates the importance of the police role in the democratization process. The provision of sound police training is thus an investment in stability as well as in developing the capabilities of other countries to contribute to certain kinds of peace operations. Congressional restraints might be modified to permit, where consistent with U.S. laws and after consultation with Congress, exceptions in cases such as Haiti.

6. “Resources allocated to peace operations will detract from the overall readiness of the U.S. armed forces.”

The U.S. armed forces represent the ultimate sanction of power if there is to be anything approaching global stability. The United States alone has the military capabilities to tilt the balance in any part of the globe. This degree of military authority must be maintained.

The daily grind of peace operations—requiring negotiations, routine compromise, and even the readiness to turn the other cheek—may not be compatible with the exercise of this authority. It is important to the broader strategic balance that the U.S. armed forces not get locked into peace operations. On the other hand, it may be neither appropriate nor wise for the United States to stand idly by, making no productive use of its investment in military excellence, when it could make a decisive contribution to a peace operation that may head off more trouble in the longer run. When it comes to determining the nature and scope of U.S. involvement, then, balance and judgment—about the political as much as the military circumstances of a given operation—are vital.

In operational and training terms, peace operations are a mixed bag. On the positive side, active engagement with a real-life set of problems is likely to be more useful, for commanders and their subordinates alike (and across the armed forces as a whole), than participation in a large number of
Exercise scenarios can be made much more complex and demanding than routine surveillance patrols on a peace operation. It should be accepted that involvement in the usual run of peace operations is unlikely to enhance national capabilities to fight a major, high-tech war. But perhaps the military planners—in all countries—will have to look again at the relative improbability of involvement in such a war as against the likely need to take part in a continuing series of preventive peace operations.

Policymakers must learn to accept that military staff are right when they claim that a unit withdrawn from participation in a peace operation needs a period of retraining before it can be redeployed for its primary mission. Policymakers must also recognize that key support capabilities such as strategic lift aircraft, logistics personnel, and port and terminal services units may be seriously overstretched if assigned to maintain support for peace operations and for major battlefield tasks simultaneously. If they are to perform both these functions at the same time, extra resources are needed.

Experience elsewhere suggests it is not impossible to bring the two threads together in coherent training and exercising patterns. The British army, for example, has been obliged for almost three decades to combine wide and active engagement in peace operations in Northern Ireland with readiness to perform the higher-level skills demanded for its NATO role. The degree to which the British have succeeded in doing both calls for further study. The French too have clearly taken peacekeeping roles seriously, without apparently compromising capabilities at the highest technological and operational levels. It is noteworthy that the British army does not separate out its “second division” units for peacekeeping duties, and has instead rotated its first-line regiments through peacekeeping training schools and subsequent operational deployment; in due course, those regiments again take their place in the armored or assault infantry divisions in Europe.

The crux of the matter is to make peace operations and overall force development and programming mutually supportive, the experience gained in one being used to advantage in the performance of the other. Strong and effective coordination is essential to ensure that capabilities are available at both ends of the military spectrum. It might be tempting to continue to focus exclusively on preparing to fight the “big battle.” To do so, however, will be to risk having a magnificent U.S. military instrument rust in its scabbard. Since 1945 U.S. forces have been involved in three major conflicts, in Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf. But there have been any number of more limited clashes where it has clearly been in the broad international interest to use military skills and training to help contain a problem. General John Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, put it this way: “There are some in the Pentagon who’d be very happy if I put outside a sign that read, ‘We only do the big ones.’ The notion that we exist, first and foremost, to fight our nation’s wars I subscribe to. But I also say, ‘In this new world we cannot deny our government a very important tool to try to manage crises, bring stability to an area, deal with operations that overwhelm traditional humanitarian organizations.’ But you have to be selective—or you could fritter away resources and capabilities.”

7. “Because peace operations can’t punish the aggressors, as in Bosnia, or restore order, as in Somalia, they are not worth undertaking.”

It is difficult not to have some sympathy with such propositions, arising as they do out of frustration at the inability of the international community to
summon up the resolve to confront wrongdoers. But the failure to check or punish, say, the evils of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, should not be blamed on the UNPROFOR troops. If a significant part of the international community wishes to respond to aggression, it can and will do so, especially if there is decisive leadership—as Desert Storm demonstrated. Where the international will is weak and the strategic interests of the countries concerned less plain, a hesitant international community can hardly take decisive action. If there is the will to punish an aggressor, it must be expressed in tangible military terms.

Otherwise, the only feasible response may be to launch a peace operation intended to foster a solution without aggressive use of force. Such an operation will be more concerned to protect refugees, deliver supplies, or promote the peace process than to inflict punishment. Completing those tasks may indeed require the intervening force to be able to deter military pressures that could endanger its personnel and undermine its mandate, but that is a different matter from sending a punitive expedition on behalf of the international community.

It is important in this context to remember that the United Nations is its membership. NATO too is no more than the agency of its members. Such organizations can only do what their members have given them the resources or authority to do. Unwillingness on the part of the members to authorize full-scale enforcement missions does not mean, however, that agencies like the United Nations or NATO should, or can, do nothing at all.

8. “All this may be so, but the United Nations itself is ineffective, wasteful, hostile to U.S. interests, and a challenge to U.S. sovereignty.”

This kind of complaint against peace operations is strenuously made but poorly supported with facts, depending as it does on seeing the commonplace flaws of the United Nations as signs of a unique inadequacy or venality. Again, a sense of perspective is needed. There is no doubt that the United Nations has been, and in many sectors still is, administratively inefficient. The plain truth, however, is that in the matter of peacekeeping the Security Council (of which the United States is the leading member) has in recent years required of the United Nations that it undertake tasks for which it was not organized, for which the necessary numbers of trained troops have not been available, and for which funding has not been provided. In 1990–91, with firm leadership from the United States, the Security Council and the United Nations were able to act decisively and promptly to set in place the framework for a comprehensive international response to Iraqi aggression against Kuwait. The blame for a lackluster response in Bosnia since then should hardly be attributed entirely to the faults of the United Nations.

Like many bureaucracies, the United Nations could do better. Encouragingly, far-reaching efforts are now being made to tighten up UN procedures—especially with regard to the planning, administration, and conduct of peace operations—thanks in no small part to U.S. assistance.

Waste, mismanagement, and fraud are, however, not unknown even within elements of the U.S. federal government and U.S. Congress. But that of course does not mean that the entire system is flawed. An altogether more reasonable response is to insist that the agency concerned change its way of doing business. The United States is currently doing just that in respect to the operations of the United Nations. Adopting such a targeted approach is the necessary and constructive way to achieve change. Furthermore, it seems that the American public wants to continue to make the successful functioning of the United Nations a priority of U.S. foreign policy.

In considering the United Nations, it is also important to get the scale right. The United Nations is a small organization by U.S. standards. The central agencies of the United Nations employ 56,000 people—fewer than half the number of civil servants working for the U.S. Department of Agri-
culture, for example, or slightly more than the permanent employees of the U.S. Congress. Even by the standards of much smaller countries, the United Nations is hardly gigantic. The central UN system has about the same number of employees as the government of New Zealand, and an annual budget (including peace operations) about one-quarter that of New Zealand.

The General Assembly of the United Nations will always be dominated by smaller countries, many of which did not share the foreign policy interests of the United States during the Cold War. But circumstances have changed. Ideological differences have less substance now. The pursuit of favorable relations with the United States (the sole remaining superpower) is a principal foreign policy aim for almost all countries, except for the handful of pariah states. Moreover, the Security Council, not the General Assembly, is the decisive agency for the conduct and authorization of peace operations, and the United States has all the opportunity it needs to be the dominant actor there.

The international system is plainly determined more by inconsistency and disunity than by their opposites. The rise of nationalism, and the profound difficulties of dealing with the ugly consequences of that phenomenon in the former Yugoslavia, is hardly consistent with ideas about a new agglomeration of international power that could in any way pose a threat to the sovereignty of the United States. Anyone deluded enough to suppose that there is an international order run by the United Nations has never come up against its inherent weaknesses, its disputatiousness, or its inefficiency when it comes to the business of trying to achieve consensus.
Peace operations are an imperfect but practicable and proven instrument for protecting and advancing a wide range of national and international interests. The faults of some operations should not blind us to the merits of many others. By the same token, however, we can hardly turn a blind eye to the faults that do exist: to do so would imperil the lives of peacekeepers and further endanger the reputation, and thus perhaps the very existence, of peace operations themselves.

Acknowledging the failures and shortcomings of recent missions (most notably, UNPROFOR) is easy enough. Correcting those weaknesses is an altogether more difficult task, but hardly an impossible one if tackled in a realistic, imaginative, and cooperative fashion. Fixing what’s broken with peace operations, it is argued here, requires a six-pronged approach:

- learning the lessons of Somalia and Bosnia—chief among them, that clear-sighted political commitment is essential, that peace enforcement is rarely a viable option, but that military effectiveness (including unified command) is nevertheless as vital to expanded peacekeeping operations as it is to enforcement actions;

- continuing with reforms already under way, such as the ongoing restructuring of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, codification of peacekeeping doctrine, establishment of headquarters structures prior to deployment, elaboration of new logistics procedures, and so forth;

- effecting much closer coordination of international effort through a newly established Military Coordination Committee;

- ensuring that forces are never again deployed where there may be hostile, well-armed opposition, unless they are so equipped and authorized as to be able to defend themselves and their mandate;

The international community . . . must accept that force must be met with force.
- introducing and developing an operational division of labor in the conduct of peace operations; and

- securing the financial resources to carry through the necessary reforms and continuing efforts to engage member states in an across-the-board reallocation of financial responsibilities for peacekeeping, so that the U.S. share of UN peacekeeping costs can be scaled back to the more realistic and appropriate level of 25 percent as Congress intends.

Learning the Lessons of Bosnia

The purgatory that is Bosnia has served brutally to offer some lessons for the international community. The first, and most fundamental, is that without clarity of aims, strength of purpose, and depth of commitment, any international effort is almost certain to flounder. In a war zone coherence and steadiness are indispensable; in the attitude of the international community toward Bosnia, neither has been conspicuous. What is it that the European Union, NATO, and the United Nations have been trying to achieve in the former Yugoslavia? To establish a peace process and stop the fighting? Certainly. To help the victims of the strife? That too. And much has been done in both these areas—not nearly enough to stop the madness, but a great deal more than would have been possible without UNPROFOR. At least initially it was assumed that the traditional peacekeeping concept backed by the standing of the United Nations would serve to ensure respect for UN Protected Areas; some people may even have entertained the idea that the peacekeeping forces could, by some military alchemy, transmute themselves into a peace enforcement army.

The logic of power and the ruthlessness of war, however, are not to be denied. Both have served to demonstrate the strength of purpose and solidarity of the intervening parties were never there.

It is necessary to be realistic. Sustained military operations for the purposes of peace enforcement plainly represent a degree of commitment to which the international community can aspire only in very special and rare circumstances. That commitment is not present in the case of the Balkans. NATO could no doubt provide the military means to impose a comprehensive military solution. But there is little to suggest that to do so would be wise or politically feasible (on either side of the Atlantic). Questions about the future role of NATO in Western European security and old dilemmas about the European balance of power (given the historical relationships among various European nations and the protagonists in the Balkans struggle) are not easily set aside. Nor is there any evidence that a peace enforcement strategy would actually solve anything.

If peace enforcement is unrealistic, what can be done at the next level down, where there is instability and violence, but where other factors suggest that intervention (but not for the purposes of imposing a military solution) can be productive? The answer is, to judge from recent years, quite a lot. Critics look to UNPROFOR in Bosnia or to UNOSOM II in Somalia and conclude that all, or almost all, peace operations are bound to fail. But, as this study has sought to demonstrate, the record is considerably brighter than the doomsayers suggest. The Security Council in recent years has found the unanimity of purpose to reach for Chapter VII as a basis for major interventions in some very unstable places: Cambodia, Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia. These have been not peace enforcement but expanded peacekeeping operations. Two have fared badly (although the operation in Somalia yielded good results early on and was remarkably effective in alleviating mass starvation); two have enjoyed significant success. Furthermore, in the case of Bosnia at least, the reasons for failure have had more to do with the intractability of the political problems and the military capabilities of the warring parties than with the shortcomings of the United Nations. For those who deride the performance of UNPROFOR there should be some food for thought in the facts: the major force contributors were militarily very capable allies of the United States—the United Kingdom, France, and
Canada; NATO aircraft flew air cover and patrolled the no-fly zones; and extensive communications and logistic support were available from NATO bases and U.S. and allied fleets in the Adriatic. UN-PROFOR’s failings can hardly be attributed exclusively to the supposed military incompetence of the United Nations. The United Nations has had some powerful allies.

There is, however, no escaping the fact that between Security Council decisions and the realities on the ground lie many fundamental military questions that policymakers have often failed to address. Although expanded peacekeeping is not peace enforcement, military effectiveness is still vital. The incremental, ad hoc approach was not so much useful as invaluable forty-odd years ago in getting the peacekeeping principle established as a UN technique for assisting with conflict resolution. Where contending parties had agreed to an intervention and the most important objective was to assemble a force of a conspicuously multinational character, the question of military purposefulness could take a back seat. No longer. In conditions that put the peacekeepers in harm’s way, effective controlled and coordinated forces simply cannot be put together from scratch.

Continuing with Reforms Already Under Way

It is encouraging to report that a good deal of practical attention is already being given to making peace operations more effective. A newly invigorated Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) at UN Headquarters in New York—under the leadership of the Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations Kofi Annan—has greatly extended its range and capacity to supervise operations in the field. A key concern has been to develop greater commonality in the conduct of peace operations. Separate national training programs, sharply differing military cultures and traditions, and wide divergence in operational experience have long stood in the way of effective performance of peacekeeping duties in the field. DPKO is seeking to coordinate training by the development of manuals and guidance for national instructors.

The secretary-general has actively pursued with member states a program under which they will signal what kinds of military capabilities, and in what strength, they may make available to peace operations. Forty-one countries have now formally signed on. The objective of this program is to improve operational planning and coordination of future operations by giving the United Nations the capability at least to develop preliminary planning and stand-by arrangements for future collective peace operations. A number of Western nations have been preparing in not dissimilar ways for new and more authoritative peace operational roles. Nordic countries, for instance, have begun work on building combined forces prepared and ready for operational deployment. The Netherlands is reported to be working on establishing a similar force from among its own resources.

DPKO is not a military headquarters as normally conceived; there is no operational line of military command and no independent political authority. Nevertheless, DPKO has begun to take on, albeit in stripped-down form, roles and responsibilities normally associated with a national defense headquarters: planning, controlling, and communicating with forces deployed overseas. And with anywhere between 50,000 and 70,000 blue helmet personnel in the field at any one time, the United Nations was for two or three years presumably second only to the United States in terms of number of military personnel on active duty abroad. In preparing for the resurrection of the Angola peace operation, DPKO developed a new concept involving the prior establishment of a deployable headquarters to enable a new field operation to get off to a good, quick start once authorized by the Security Council. With increased emphasis on logistical planning, prepositioning of equipment, financial management, and recruitment of staff with the necessary language skills, past weaknesses are being overcome.

The U.S. Department of Defense has made noteworthy contributions to enhancing the capabilities of DPKO, seconding U.S. officers to help introduce more effective operational planning and management procedures, especially in the areas of budgetary and logistic support of operations. A number of other nations have likewise sent specialists to assist the United Nations in establishing greater control over its field programs.

All of this represents important work in progress to bolster the concept of peace operations and deserves the continued support and encour-
agement of UN member states. More remains to be done, however.

A Military Coordination Committee?

The question of how best to develop international military capabilities sufficient to meet the demands of expanded peacekeeping has attracted a good deal of attention. Some intrepid analysts have canvassed the idea of earmarking national forces for UN service on an as-required basis; others, yet bolder, have proposed creating a standing volunteer UN force to serve under the direction and control of the secretary-general. These are pipe dreams in today’s political and financial climate. Quite apart from the problems of securing the large-scale funding necessary, the mere notion that the UN organization might acquire the means—not to mention the political standing—to operate as a quasi-independent international actor is sufficient to rattle the political dovecotes around the world.

More practicable would be the development of new provisions for ensuring adherence to common operational standards, interoperability, and commonality of equipment. The simplest way to orchestrate such efforts would be to create an international operational headquarters responsible either to the Security Council or to regional multilateral organizations. Such a headquarters could be charged with the establishment of operational requirements and standards and the oversight of the preparation of the various national contributions to perform roles appropriate to their capabilities. On this basis it could coordinate establishment of an overall force structure from which timely and effective deployments could be made, under command arrangements to be worked out according to the characteristics and requirements of each operation.

Reconstitution of the Military Staff Committee (MSC) under Article 47 of the UN Charter might seem to be a logical step to that end. It won’t happen. The vision of universal collective security governed by the five permanent members of the Security Council, marching in lock-step, faded long ago. Article 47 aims too high. The Permanent Five and other troop-contributing countries could hardly agree now that a reconstituted MSC “shall be responsible . . . for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council.” Nor is it conceivable that the major powers would cede the authority implicit in the provision that the committee “shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members . . . or their representatives.” Bosnia has in any case demonstrated that Chapter VII–type peace enforcement is, these days, sure to exceed the bounds of military and political reality. Yet UNPROFOR’s travails also ruthlessly exposed the weakness of an organization that sends forces into harm’s way without an adequate and integrated military advisory, training, and staffing process.

In military matters, UN headquarters is neither fish nor fowl. The organization has assumed large responsibilities in military operations. Yet the structure bears no discernible resemblance to the elements typically found among well-structured national defense establishments in democratic countries: a clear line of military command and control, unquestioned civilian political authority, and separate and well-defined roles for the military and civilian components. The organizational clarity these guidelines impose, however, must inevitably be absent from the United Nations. The United Nations has never had, and never will have, a supreme military commander with authority over troops under command; as a consequence, separating military from civilian roles and responsibilities is extremely difficult. In the absence of a Military Staff Committee, the United Nations has found it necessary to work out arrangements in DPKO that lump military planning and staffing functions with civilian policy and administrative responsibilities. The deputy secretary-general of DPKO reports to the secretary-general, who in turn is responsible to the Security Council. DPKO has moved mountains to meet the demands of expanded peace operations in the past few years, and has achieved impressive results. The pressures encountered in combining the administrative, financial, and military functions must, nevertheless, have been enormous.

What is missing is a forum in which experienced military officers are able—as in a national defense headquarters—to address the principal military issues and to convey their advice to the decision-making authority, in this case the Security Council. This deficiency could be overcome by bringing together military representatives from the Permanent Five, from the troop-contributing coun-
tries involved in the peace operations of the day, and military staff and other officers of DPKO. Chairmanship of what would become a “military coordination committee” could be rotated among the senior military advisers, as in the Security Council itself, or vested in the deputy secretary-general for peacekeeping operations. In due course it might be advisable to establish a military post of comparable status to that of the deputy secretary-general for peacekeeping operations; if so, that officer should chair the military coordination committee while assuming responsibility for the military planning at present carried out within DPKO.

The military coordination committee should be tasked with a close and continuing process of evaluation and analysis of current peace operations. One of its principal responsibilities should be to drive along the development of training procedures and programs that would foster integration and coordination of military performance in collective peace operations. In essence its role would be to inject military realism into the decision-making process. There would, of course, be no question of such a committee’s having powers of command and control. These must rest with the Security Council and the separate national military command authorities. The secretary-general, who already has a senior military adviser, is the council’s agent. His role in peace operations, as the senior civilian, should be limited to ensuring effective and economical management of the programs and fostering concerted political support from the troop-contributing countries and the rest of the international community for the forces in the field.

Military officers attached to the staffs of national permanent representatives in New York already meet informally with staff from DPKO. In this manner, informed military advice can be conveyed to the Secretariat. This arrangement is undoubtedly an improvement on previous ad hoc consultation on military matters. Nevertheless, the creation of a more formal structure through which authoritative, coordinated military opinion can be conveyed to the Security Council seems highly desirable. Where a peace operation is likely to be confronted by violent challenges to the execution of the mandate given it by the international community, the representatives of that community have the responsibility of satisfying themselves about the military facts of life before taking the decision to proceed.

The Permanent Five have voted for (or at least not opposed) all recent expanded peace operations in the Security Council. The permanent members have not, however, always demonstrated the same unanimity in making the military commitment necessary to conduct those operations. The obligation to underwrite the decisions of the Security Council with the requisite capabilities to do what has been decided is implicit in the role ascribed by the UN Charter to the Permanent Five. A military coordination committee with high-level representation from the Permanent Five would build in that obligation.

**Giving Peacekeepers the Means to Deal with Armed Opposition**

That part of the spectrum of peace operations that lies between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement—between peace and war—has grown significantly in recent years. As in the former Yugoslavia, the international community has authorized missions in which its forces must act as something less than belligerents but something more than neutral observers. Inevitably, those forces have met with opposition from groups—often extremely well armed, determined, and ruthless groups—who wish to wage their wars free from external interference. The results have been bloody and profoundly damaging to the conduct of specific missions and to the reputation of peace operations in general.

If the international community is to continue to authorize such interventions, it must accept that force must be met with force. There is no need for peacekeepers to act as belligerents and go looking for trouble, but they must be equipped with the weaponry and the rules of engagement that allow them to deal with trouble if and when they meet it. Acceptance of this grim reality has been a long time coming. In Bosnia, truly dreadful disregard by the Bosnian Serb army of the norms of civilized be-
behavior in the assault on Srebrenica in July 1995, combined with failures of liaison between the UN and NATO commanders and uncertainty about how to respond, helped turn an important corner in the history of peace operations. Understandable concerns about the risks to peacekeeping forces on the ground inherent in taking more forcible action were overcome. Earlier, British, Dutch, and French outrage that their peacekeepers had been taken hostage by the Bosnian Serbs had spurred the formation of a joint rapid reaction force to back up day-to-day peace operations with deployable infantry and artillery. This force was in position near Sarajevo in time to support NATO air operations against Bosnian Serb military targets following an inexcusable artillery attack on the city in late September. NATO air forces and the British-Dutch-French reaction force on the ground combined in deliberative, sustained, and damaging punitive action. Bosnian Serb forces withdrew. Coupled with other developments on the battlefields elsewhere in Bosnia, this display of military robustness was sufficient to open up the peace process.

The rule book will have been changed forever—and for the better—if the concept of a graduated military response to affronts to an international peacekeeping mission can be built in and consolidated. The extra dimension of military force was not delivered under UN command, but by forces under NATO command and control; the British-French-Dutch ready reaction force likewise operated under NATO command. UNPROFOR was in the event a passive partner in operations that plainly tilted the balance in Bosnia.

Critics of UN peacekeeping do not seem to have come to terms with the fundamental point (the lesson of the “Mogadishu line”)—namely, that active and sustained intervention of a peace enforcement kind equals war. To cross the Mogadishu line is to take forcible action, in the cause of peacekeeping, against installations or interests of importance to one or other of the protagonists in a quarrel. Armed opposition is almost inevitable. Without the military strength to achieve the required results it is best not to try. UNPROFOR never had either the resources or the mandate for such operations. NATO has the resources and—with the
behalf of the international community. But NATO air operations were limited; this was not an unconstrained attack, but rather a forcible attempt to impose a sense of reality and to propel the parties to the peace table.

What is important is that all concerned for the future of effective multinational peace operations take the opportunity to energize thinking about ways and means to build in a concept of what might be called “peacekeeping with teeth.”

Developing an Operational Division of Labor

Situations such as those in Bosnia call for heavily armed, highly trained soldiers able to act speedily and decisively. In situations toward the other, more peaceable end of the operational spectrum, however, the qualities and capabilities required of peacekeepers are very different. With so great a breadth (in types of mission) and variety (of skills and resources required), there is excellent reason to consider establishing a division of labor in peace operations.

The United States has unique capabilities for decisive action, but a marked antipathy to becoming entangled in what may be called the “long littleness” of peace operations. It also has very good geostrategic reasons for not allowing this to happen. The all-round military capabilities of the United States should not be frittered away. Nor should the political authority that goes with the status of “sole remaining superpower” be put on the line too often in causes in which major strategic interests are not at issue. This should not preclude arranging the U.S. Order of Battle to permit occasional calls on U.S. forces to capitalize on their unparalleled capacity to act swiftly and mount impressive demonstrations of military strength. Generally, though, U.S. resources should be conserved for the top-priority military tasks, with the responsibilities for most other peace operations being devolved to other nations.

A peace operational division of labor would require an effective, ready deployment capability to seize the initiative and then hand over to broadly based forces able to secure the situation for the long haul of reconstruction and development. The concept of a multinational “vanguard” capability has been developed in Europe with the NATO Rapid Deployment Force and the steps taken by the British, French, and Dutch during the summer of 1995 to create a rapid reaction force to assist UNPROFOR. Others have shown their willingness to contribute. What is needed is leadership and coordination. The first step should be to establish agreed rules of military procedure, common training doctrine, command and control arrangements, and so forth, and then to set up the necessary programs to put these systems into effect. The aim should be to recruit other nations to pick up their share of the burden, consistent with their capacities and equipment, and to ensure that they play their parts effectively. By making practicality and effectiveness the centerpiece of a collective strategy, the notion of burden-sharing can be given new relevance and the U.S. armed forces can, for the most part, be left to concentrate on their major operational roles.

The superbly organized and effective U.S. cover for the withdrawal of UN forces from Somalia demonstrated that well-trained, confident, and competent troops can readily conduct complex maneuvers in the face of ill-organized but threatening local forces (and do so with light casualties to the other side and none to its own). Similar conclusions can be drawn from the U.S.-led UNITAF phase in Somalia and the first phase in Haiti. In Somalia insufficient coordination and preparation
on the ground for the hand-over to the United Nations compromised UNOSOM II, which was in effect the third phase of the operation. Lacking the equipment and the operational back-up capabilities available to U.S. forces, the more disparate units assembled by the United Nations were challenged by the local warlords in south Mogadishu, with serious losses.

By contrast, in Haiti the UN forces that took over from the U.S.-led vanguard operation had been trained and equipped before deployment to work in a coordinated and purposeful fashion. The United States had also committed a significant number of its troops to participate in the second, UN phase of the operation. Planning was commendably comprehensive in nature, with civilians as well as military units being deployed and careful attention being given to fostering the democratic political process and restructuring the military and police. Implementation on the ground has certainly stumbled against Haiti’s deeply embedded problems. Even so, the far-ranging successes of the Haiti peace operation—thus far—demonstrate what can be achieved by concerted action when the burdens are equitably spread and the various national contributions successfully integrated into a broad operation plan. Haiti shows that the international community is learning from its accumulated experience in the development of the peace operations concept.

Securing the Necessary Financial Resources

As the secretary-general observed four years ago in his Agenda for Peace, “A chasm has developed between the tasks entrusted to this organization and the financial means provided to it.” The near-calamitous state of the finances of the United Nations has been widely noted, most recently at the observances of the organization’s fiftieth anniversary. Yet little has been done to repair the situation. No long-term, coherent vision of a more financially secure future has been developed; no short-term plan for restructuring the UN bureaucracy in light of present financial realities has been accepted. The instinct to withhold dues as part of a campaign to improve the organization’s efficiency effectively stalemates wider attempts at reform.

In recent years the peacekeeping budget has come to dominate the finances of the United Nations as a whole. Although this may not always be the case—because enthusiasm for peace operations will surely ebb and flow—resolution of the United Nations’ financial crisis requires establishing a way of paying for peace operations that is fair and provides a solid foundation for planning. While this is easier said than done, a first step might be to sort out the national from the international interests at stake. It is suggested below that governments should consider establishing a single vote item for peace operations of whatever kind. This would provide the fund from which contributions to the United Nations and other international agencies, as well as actual expenditure on military and diplomatic roles, could be drawn. In turn, such national arrangements would enable governments to signal, from the outset, whether proposed operations could or could not be supported.

Congress has recently adopted legislation requiring reduction of the U.S. share of the UN peacekeeping budget from 30 to 25 percent. Understandably, many Americans have argued that the costs should be spread more evenly, especially by securing greater contributions from the oil-rich countries and the newly industrializing countries of East Asia. There is a broader perception that it is timely to secure a more equitable sharing of the costs of peace operations, that it is neither fair nor productive to have too large a part of the financial burden borne by the United States. At the same time most people would contend that changes have to be secured by agreement; unilateral adjustment is unfair to countries that have already incurred substantial costs for existing troop contributions. Critics maintain that the United States has lost a sense of propor-
tion about the costs of peace operations. At about $1 billion per annum, the current U.S. share of the UN peacekeeping budget represents 1/265th of the 1996 defense appropriation or about 1/8th of the defense budget of Australia, a country of only 17.5 million people. It is true that additional costs for logistic support of UN operations in the field have fallen heavily on the U.S. Department of Defense; without this U.S. support many operations would have been next to impossible. But most other troop-contributing countries likewise pay, in addition to the UN peacekeeping levy, logistic support costs for their own transport, equipment, and personnel. Only the United States has proposed debiting such costs against its own peacekeeping levy. It is also important to recall, as discussed elsewhere in this study, that peace operations provide useful and pragmatic experience under “live” conditions for many elements of participating forces.

As a first step toward securing the necessary finances for peace operations, the UN member states should build in multinational peacekeeping—in the widest sense—as a clearly defined component in their national security programs paid for out of defense budgets. This is hardly a new idea. A 1993 report by an independent advisory group of financiers recommended that “because peacekeeping is an investment in security, governments should consider financing its future cost from their national defense budgets.”12 Such an approach would provide a budgetary foundation for preparing national defense forces for peace operations, supporting them in the field, and making the necessary payments to the international agencies. Financing for peace operations thus becomes a matter of how best to accommodate the continuing need for national military capabilities with the requirements of a more interdependent world.

In this way too it would be possible to develop a more coordinated approach to peace operations in which the less potent countries assume responsibility for the routine work—mostly, but not always, under UN auspices—while NATO or major powers acting on behalf of the United Nations take on the more punitive roles (if necessary) and a part of the logistic support. This approach, which has in effect already been tried—under U.S. leadership—in Haiti, offers scope for more countries to share the burdens and responsibilities of peace operations.

A serious bureaucratic awkwardness nevertheless arises. If peace operations are largely diplomatic in purpose, and if many of the tasks involved are of marginal utility to the training of military forces, why should the defense vote take the full load? Rarely is any quarter given in budgetary battles. The government or administration must determine what priority is to be given to support for peace operations in the broadest sense, and where the money is to come from. A special vote item should be established, funded from the allocation to this purpose of a fixed percentage of the defense vote, with subventions from the other departments with a stake in these activities.

There is no way to assess the impact of such an approach across the board. National defense priorities change. UN programs are at present shrinking. The Security Council’s enthusiasm for peace operations has, to say the least, dimmed. Some countries may well find it fitting, in terms of their own strategic concerns and national inclinations, to allocate more money for peace operations; some may well decide to allocate less. A sense of proportion would suggest that each contributing country earmark a similar percentage of its defense budget. As mentioned earlier in this study, 1 percent of the current U.S. defense budget represents almost a year’s total UN expenditure on current peace operations. The same percentage of some other countries’ defense budgets would likewise go a long way toward meeting UN needs. For instance, 1 percent of the 1994 defense budget of France, a country that supports many peace operations, amounts to $0.36 billion, or approximately one-tenth of annual UN expenditure on peace operations. At the other end of the scale, 1 percent of the 1993 defense budget of New Zealand, a smaller country but also a strong supporter of collective peace operations, equals $6.8 million.

Clearly, it will also be necessary to look again at the management within the United Nations of the finances of peace operations. The independent advisory group of financiers suggested in its 1993 report that the present system of separate budgets for each operation, funded by special levy, should be scrapped in favor of a unified UN peacekeeping budget financed by a single annual assessment. To meet the evident need for more certainty in financial planning, the financial experts also recommended the creation of a revolving reserve fund for
peacekeeping set at $400 million, financed by the annual assessments.

Concepts of this kind obviously should not entail an automatic commitment to each and every multinational military enterprise. Once one accepts that the demand for peace operations is unlikely to go away, however, one needs to develop a means by which national military and budgetary planners can fit realistic assessments of possible future contributions into their forecasts. In turn, this approach would provide a framework at the international level for matching the scale of future peace operations to available resources. Without some such commitment on the part of national governments, the peace operations concept will lapse back into occasional and uncoordinated exercises in UN truce supervision and monitoring.

The aim in developing a more balanced international financial commitment to peace operations should be to provide the basis for a hard-headed evaluation of what is, and what is not, feasible. At one level, this is a matter of promoting cost efficiency by boosting operational effectiveness and military capabilities. In this way the limited resources available would be spread to best effect. At another level, the establishment of revised financial procedures at home as well as at the United Nations itself will impose the need to establish priorities, to recognize which international breakdowns are amenable to intervention by the international community, and which are not.
Three things stand out from this assessment of the past record, current status, and future prospects for peace operations. One is the need for more systematic preparation for the various roles that the United States and the international community will assign to a peace operation, so that responsibilities can be parceled out to deliver military effectiveness at least cost and without making disproportionate demands on any one country. Another is the extent to which national interests are served by effective collective action, and thus the fundamental importance of coherent political processes to give useful and appropriate guidance to the peacekeepers in the field. The third feature—and one worth underlining here—is the opportunity that exists for the United States, in its own interests, to take the lead in breathing new life into the collective security concept in order to meet the challenges of an international system in danger of fragmentation.

As we have seen, peace operations do serve national interests, including those of the United States. Yet, undeniably, such operations rarely address threats to U.S. security of an immediate and potentially catastrophic kind. In determining the need for and character of a peace operation, perceptions of wider international interest and long-term concerns may well loom larger than national and short-term preoccupations. Many critics have interpreted Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 of July 1994 as an effort to cast the policy options narrowly, to insist that only direct national interests be served. In fact, the directive makes it clear that among the “fundamental questions” to be asked before the United States commits itself to a particular peace operation will be “an assessment of the threat to international peace and security.” Nevertheless, the directive has raised questions about the strength of U.S. engagement in several grand and strategic concerns, among them: How to secure effective collective action in a dynamic world of nation-states, some of great potential weight, a number ideologically driven and hostile,
and many so ramshackle as to be a problem for that reason alone? How to define national interests when the canvas is so large? What is the level of involvement necessary to secure such interests? A firm international commitment to the peace operations principle, backed by leadership to secure domestic political support and international collective action to make the concept more effective, would help to answer these questions.

Putting together a coalition calls for intensive, interactive diplomacy at many levels, presenting a leading nation with the chance to take charge and galvanize and direct the process. Although decision making has to be shared, a great power that successfully forges a coalition of the willing can greatly extend the range and scope of its influence. The costs of launching an operation are, of course, higher in the short term than those of doing nothing at all, but that burden can be divided among the members of a coalition, and cost effectiveness can be enhanced by a division of labor that makes the most of the particular strengths of the participants. Many countries are willing to participate in such enterprises, but few, if any, aside from the United States, have the stature and the resources to take the lead.

For a smaller power, collective action offers important opportunities to project national interests and concerns, and demonstrates an instinct for constructive engagement that sends wider signals about that country’s role in the world. Smaller powers will always calculate whether a contribution to a collective undertaking will yield dividends in terms of their relations with their more powerful partners in the enterprise. There is nothing sorry or paltry about this sort of calculation. All countries like to have a decent conceit of themselves. Participation in peacekeeping sends a signal, to the domestic audience as well as to the world, that this is a decent country making a decent contribution. (In New Zealand, polling shows that the level of public support for an active role in peacekeeping rose by 5 percent to 75 percent following the deployment of an infantry contingent to Bosnia; those with a favorable or fairly favorable view of the importance of maintaining strong, effective armed forces in-
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