NGOs and Conflict Management

Pamela R. Aall
## CONTENTS

Key Points

Preface

1 Reframing the Issues

2 The Changing Nature of NGOs

3 New Roles for NGOs

4 The Challenge of Coordination

5 NGOs as Conflict Managers

Contributors

Managing Chaos Conference Agenda

About the Author

About the Institute
Reframing the Issues

- The nature of conflict has changed substantially in the post–Cold War era. Instead of wars among nation-states, conflict most often appears now as struggles for power and dominance within states, pitting ethnic group against ethnic group, religion against religion, and neighbor against neighbor.

- This type of virulent subnational conflict typically results in waves of refugees who fall prey to a deadly combination of starvation, epidemics, and despair that spirals out of control since governments and the services they provide are on the verge of collapse during such crises. Moreover, these refugee crises typically draw neighboring countries into the conflict as well, and threaten to turn a subnational conflict into a regional and international conflagration. The international community finds itself responding to more and more of these “complex emergencies”—such as those in Rwanda, Somalia, and Bosnia—in the post–Cold War era.

- Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) play a critical part in the international response to such crises, offering many different skills and approaches outside of military intervention, including humanitarian relief, preventive action and conflict resolution, development assistance, and institution-building.

- Because of the nature of their basic mission, humanitarian relief NGOs are often the first to arrive on the scene of complex emergencies. Consequently, they are often trapped in the midst of these conflicts as they attempt to carry out their relief operations. Accordingly, this type of NGO has had to broaden its traditional role to include ensuring political stability and fulfilling basic governmental functions in states plagued with severe crisis.

- The changing nature of both conflict and humanitarian relief has sparked an examination within the NGO community as well as among officials of the United Nations and its member governments of the roles that NGOs should play in preventing, managing, and resolving conflict.

The Changing Nature of NGOs

- United by a commitment to improving conditions around the world, NGOs otherwise represent a great diversity of objectives, functions, and organizational structures. The numbers of NGOs have increased dramatically in recent years, bringing more resources to more areas afflicted with crisis. Their activities fall into two broad categories: direct operations, or “operational” NGOs (including humanitarian relief and conflict resolution NGOs), and advocacy NGOs.

- NGOs that focus on humanitarian relief have traditionally maintained a strict policy of neutrality in their activities, providing aid to the destitute or services to antagonists regardless of their political, ethnic, or religious affiliation.

- As they find themselves serving expanded roles during complex emergencies, many NGOs are reconsidering the circumstances under which they can and should adhere to such strict neutrality. In these crisis situations,
NGOs find themselves having to work closely with governments to carry out their role of providing assistance.

The fundamental change in the demands of today’s humanitarian crises may lead NGOs to consider an equally fundamental change in their program development—redirecting contributions and other sources of funding from relief programs alone to those that address the interdependence of relief, development, and conflict resolution.

**New Roles for NGOs**

While NGOs cannot be expected to solve all the problems associated with humanitarian crises, the new environment in which these organizations operate suggests the following four fundamental roles: early warning functions, human rights monitoring, relief and rehabilitation, and conflict resolution activities. Yet it may be detrimental for NGOs to assume all these roles simultaneously.

Of these four roles, the early warning and conflict resolution functions typically engender the most debate, not only because of their relative newness in the repertoire of NGO capabilities, but also because both of these roles subsume many other increasingly important—and, some would argue, controversial—tasks NGOs must consider in carrying out their primary missions during complex emergencies.

Because of their close involvement with local communities, NGOs are in an excellent position to serve an early warning function, alerting the international community to potential breakdowns in a distressed country’s government or in relations among the country’s major domestic groups. In such a way, NGOs can serve as the first step in preventive action to avert future complex emergencies.

Some in the NGO community argue that NGOs should use their early warning vantage point to advocate specific policies to their respective governments aimed at stemming brewing conflicts. Yet the fact remains: Governments must find the political will and leadership necessary to translate early warning into effective interventions.

In addition, many in the NGO community believe that NGOs and the international community at large should concentrate on techniques that link crisis management and humanitarian relief activities to the longer-term goals of conflict resolution and sustainable development (peacebuilding). Relying on grass-roots and mid-level approaches that sustain the process of peacebuilding through the use of indigenous resources and technologies, rather than the traditional top-down policy of providing development aid, is a way to ensure that the conflict accompanying complex emergencies does not recur once outside actors leave the country.

**The Challenge of Coordination**

With so many actors at different levels of the international system available to intervene in complex emergencies, coordination is essential to avoid overlapping, and often counter-productive, responses that result in wasted resources and inefficient operations.

While the many different types of NGOs arrive on the scene with a variety of skills and techniques to address different aspects of complex emergencies, there is little coordination among them to manage these emergencies in an integrated way.

One way of ensuring an effective international response calls for the NGO community to coordinate its members’ separate responses to complex emergencies, aiming for a comprehensive strategy that allows major actors to participate in an integrated fashion. The ultimate challenge to governments and international organizations is to construct a system that can respond to a complex emergency in a comprehensive, unified, integrated way, combining diplomatic skill, military power, and NGO field experience under a UN mandate.

Coordination is required not only for the overall response, but also at each level of the response as well. The United States government
may want to consider reforming both the way it deals with the UN and its own fragmented decision-making apparatus for humanitarian crises. Such reform would include creating a single entity responsible for all relief, with one senior official in charge.

While NGOs do not share the full degree of accountability that circumscribes the range of actions undertaken by states and international organizations during complex-emergency interventions, NGOs do not operate entirely independently during these types of crises. In fact, in any complex emergency, powerful states usually provide the kind of leadership and determination to put an end to mass suffering and internecine conflicts, and NGOs typically perform their functions within such a context.

**NGOs as Conflict Managers**

While NGOs are fast becoming powerful new actors in complex emergencies by managing conflict and taking on certain functions of imperiled governments, the question arises: Are NGOs fully equipped to handle all the dimensions of complex emergencies, including violent conflict?

Different types of NGOs possess distinct skills and approaches, and their role as conflict manager is appropriate if the role remains part of a larger, coordinated effort of relief, helping to re-establish civil society, and providing a framework for sustainable development.
If the beginning of an era is marked by monumental events, the post–Cold War era certainly can be said to have begun with the series of subnational conflicts whose complexities escaped the familiar order of superpower proxy wars. The conflicts in Rwanda, Somalia, and Bosnia all share the horrid manifestations of post–Cold War conflict: the unleashing of historical hatreds, genocide, unspeakable atrocities, the breakdown of governments and the vital services they provide, and refugee crises that typically transform subnational conflicts into regional and international conflagrations.

The post–Cold War era has also come to be defined by the emergence of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as relatively new international actors that have now joined states and international organizations in the effort to manage these new “complex emergencies.”

More than other types of NGOs (e.g., those devoted to human rights, democracy-building, economic development, and conflict resolution) humanitarian relief NGOs have been drawn into the complex emergencies that have come to define the disorder of the post–Cold War world. Cases such as Rwanda, Somalia, and now Bosnia present formidable new challenges to relief organizations as they attempt to perform their fundamental mission of providing aid in the midst of violent internal conflict and while international political and military interventions are under way. NGOs created to provide food, shelter, and medical supplies during humanitarian crises find themselves increasingly pressed to provide other vital services during these crisis-ridden societies—including the provision of basic governmental functions in the case of failed states.

The fall 1994 conference of the United States Institute of Peace, “Managing Chaos: Coping with International Conflict into the Twenty-First Century,” provided a timely forum for numerous discussions regarding the changing character of international conflict, the new institutions of conflict resolution, and the new diplomacy and tools for conflict management. While the conference focused on the most important foreign affairs issues of our time, it gave special attention to the changing—and expanding—role of NGOs in managing international conflict. Leading figures of American humanitarian relief, advocacy, and conflict resolution NGOs were in attendance, as were the government and international organization officials who work with them.

The question that was foremost on the minds of all participants was whether these expanded functions are appropriate for all operational NGOs, which in many cases lack the requisite skills and resources to handle these new functions. There are many different types of NGOs, each possessing unique skills and resources that can be used to manage different components of complex emergencies. The problem is that there is no single entity to coordinate the separate efforts of these NGOs with each other and with other intervening actors.

Moreover, NGOs also lack the kind of accountability that circumscribes the actions of states and international organizations. This concern is heightened as NGOs find it increasingly difficult to maintain their traditional doctrine of impartiality when trying to deliver relief to all parties affected by complex emergencies, even to those who are determined to perpetuate conflict.

The staff of the Institute has gone through the voluminous proceedings of the conference to distill the views expressed by NGO representatives and others on the emerging role of NGOs in managing international conflict. To our mind, some of the most interesting and significant thinking of the conference focused on the new challenges facing
humanitarian relief NGOs (sometimes called “op-
erational” NGOs to distinguish them from advocacy groups) during a time when humanitarian crises and natural disasters are both perpetuated and made more complex by the animus of subnational and regional conflict.

This report is being published as the international community under U.S. leadership begins to take up the task of implementing peace in Bosnia. While NATO troops work to prevent new violence there, nongovernmental organizations will bear the complicated burden of reconstruction and reconciliations. All actors involved in this precarious undertaking—NGOs, states, and international organizations alike—would be well served by studying the experience of nongovernmental organizations in other post–Cold War complex emergencies in order to prepare themselves for the challenge of peacemaking in Bosnia. We believe this report provides a good beginning for the sort of reflection that is necessary.

This the third—and final—installment in the Institute’s Peaceworks series highlighting the proceedings of the “Managing Chaos” conference. The first in the series (Peaceworks No. 3) contained the keynote addresses of Les Aspin on the challenges to values-based military intervention, and Ted Koppel on the global information revolution and TV news. The second (Peaceworks No. 4) summarized several views on new and enduring sources of international conflict, which was one of the principal themes of the conference. G. M. Tamás and Samuel P. Huntington addressed political identity and conflict, and Robert Kaplan and Jessica Tuchman Mathews provided their analysis of threats to the nation-state.

The “Managing Chaos” conference is only part of the activity the United States Institute of Peace has devoted to the issues surrounding NGOs and complex emergencies. In September 1995, it sponsored a one-day conference on “Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict in Africa.” The Institute has also developed a post-conflict Bosnia initiative focusing on humanitarian, conflict resolution, and democracy-building NGOs that are sending field workers to the country to assist in its reconstruction and reconciliation. In addition, the Institute is working with the U.S. Army War College’s Peacekeeping Institute on a project that will examine NGO-military relations. The Institute’s Education and Training program is also developing conflict resolution training seminars geared specifically to the needs of the NGO community, in addition to its current practice of including representatives from major international NGOs in its International Conflict Resolution Skills Training (ICREST) programs.

The Institute wishes to thank the men and women whose reflections are captured here, as well as many others from the NGO and policy communities who have provided their helpful comments in the period since the “Managing Chaos” conference to clarify and refine the myriad issues surrounding NGOs and conflict management. Special recognition is due to Institute program officer Pamela Aall for drafting this report and to editor Peter Pavlinis for rounding it into shape.

Harriet Hentges
Executive Vice President
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) involved in humanitarian relief missions know all too well the devastating effects of conflict. Fear of violence and retribution produces floods of refugees who fall prey to starvation and disease. Agricultural systems and infrastructures are destroyed, causing grave short-term hardships and vanquishing hopes for long-term economic development. At times, attempts to deliver relief to victims of the conflict inadvertently provide aid to their persecutors. The end of violent conflict brings its own challenges, as refugees seek safe passage to their villages, and former combatants need help reintegrating into a society that may be vastly different from the one they knew before the conflict.

Although many NGOs have had to deal with these circumstances in the course of their work over the decades, their exposure to violent conflict has increased dramatically in the last several years. While there may be a divergence of opinion on the fundamental causes of conflict in the post–Cold War world (see Peaceworks No. 4, August 1995), it is clear that the nature of conflict has changed, shifting from confrontations between states to struggles for power and dominance within states. These internal struggles often pit ethnic group against ethnic group, religion against religion, and neighbor against neighbor, with intensified impact on selected areas of the country or region. Moreover, refugee crises typically draw neighboring countries into the conflict as well, and threaten to turn a subnational conflict into a regional and international conflagration.

Not only do NGOs respond to the humanitarian crises these internal conflicts produce, but as a function of their long-term relief and development work, they are often trapped in the midst of the violence. Increasingly, too, humanitarian crises occur in failed states or in states with only rudimentary governance. In these situations, the humanitarian relief that NGOs provide usually serves as a vital supplement to governmental functions, playing a crucial role in the re-establishment of civil society. The changing nature of both conflict and humanitarian relief has sparked an examination within the NGO community as well as among officials of the United Nations and its member governments of the roles that NGOs can serve in preventing, managing, and resolving conflict.

This topic was a major theme of a conference sponsored by the United States Institute of Peace on “Managing Chaos: Coping with International Conflict into the Twenty-First Century.” This conference brought together representatives of the United Nations and regional organizations, the United States government, and NGOs engaged in relief work and advocacy to discuss the changing nature of conflict and humanitarian crises and the capabilities of the international community to respond to these crises.

A key element of an effective response to these changes, according to several conference participants, lies in the reframing of issues and in the way members of the international community view conflict and conflict resolution. Traditionally, NGOs devoted to humanitarian relief operations have not considered their activities as contributing to the amelioration or aggravation of conflict. Yet it has become apparent that their interventions do indeed influence the course of a conflict, and that in making the decision to aid a country in crisis, NGOs are assuming roles that may go far beyond their original mission.

In a separate session on the new post–Cold War diplomacy, Chester A. Crocker, distinguished research professor of diplomacy at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and
chairman of the Institute’s board of directors, set the stage for the examination of NGO roles by emphasizing the need to both reconsider the concept of intervention and widen its definition beyond the sphere of military action. “The choices are many: Intervention can be physical, spiritual, bilateral, multilateral, direct action, skills transfer, institution building. We should recognize that those who are managing chaos have the potential to manage a full-service bank.” The recognition that NGOs are major players in this expanded menu of intervention strategies lies at the heart of the discussion on their role as conflict managers.

During the conference, many participants noted that in the crisis situations occurring almost daily across the globe, there is a close relationship between NGOs, governments, and international organizations. Phyllis Oakley, assistant secretary of state for population, refugees, and migration, asserted that in these crises the U.S. government and NGOs depend on each other to fulfill their respective functions. Jan Eliasson, Swedish undersecretary of state for foreign affairs and former UN undersecretary-general for humanitarian affairs, also pointed out that as the chief response to such crises has expanded beyond the security functions of peacekeeping—once the sole province of military forces—into the realm of peacebuilding, including reconciliation, development, and humanitarian action, NGOs are coming to play an increasingly crucial role.

Peacebuilding activities entail an entirely new set of complex relations among NGOs, international organizations, and national governments. The examination of NGOs and peacebuilding, and how these international actors coordinate their activities, were subjects of intense discussion and analysis during the two-day conference.

Andrew Natsios, executive director of World Vision Relief and Development, a major humanitarian relief NGO, agreed that the world is going through a turbulent period that has witnessed a dramatic rise in the number of “complex emergencies”—the devastating combination of subnational conflict, refugee crises, and breakdown of governmental systems whose intensity and mass suffering have reached alarming enough proportions to attract international attention. Yet he took issue with the notion that such emergencies may be a permanent feature of the new post–Cold War international system. He noted that at the end of both world wars, the ensuing peace conferences and new international institutions created a diplomatic setting for dealing with issues arising from their aftermath. The post–Cold War period has not yet seen the establishment of similar institutions to structure the contemporary international environment. He predicted, however, that a decade of global instability would be followed by a period of equilibrium following the establishment of new international institutions to manage the types of complex emergencies that have characterized the immediate post–Cold War period.

This environment has been rendered more complex and chaotic by a fundamental change in the nature of conflict. Natsios noted that racial, religious, ethnic, and tribal rivalries have replaced the Cold War’s ideological clashes as the principal sources of current conflicts. These rivalries are often rooted in past atrocities and recur from generation to generation, each new conflict building on the last. As such, the nature of post–Cold War conflict has not only resisted traditional diplomatic methods for its resolution, but has raised many challenging theological and psychological questions that are difficult for NGOs and other international institutions to address. Until these questions are resolved, Natsios observed, the cycle of atrocities will continue.
In his analysis of current foreign policy attitudes, Les Aspin, former U.S. secretary of defense, cited two schools of thought on the issues of intervention for peacekeeping, the prevention of ethnic cleansing, and the alleviation of starvation (see Peaceworks No. 3, February 1995). The isolationist school is reluctant to support intervention except for national security purposes. The internationalist school, on the other hand, supports intervention on the basis of morality and the defense of humanitarian values. Julia Taft, president of InterAction, took up this theme, asserting that NGOs embody the internationalist/moralist approach, with a strong commitment to empowerment, peace, prosperity, and economic and social justice.

United as they are by their commitment to these values, NGOs otherwise represent a great diversity of objectives, functions, and organizational structures. They also differ substantially in their attitudes toward governments and international organizations: Some NGOs are comfortable working with official institutions to achieve their ends, while others, dedicated to strengthening the grassroots level, find working with national and international bureaucracies inimical to their objectives.

Operational NGOs serve in the field, mobilizing resources and technical expertise and working directly with the recipients of humanitarian aid and economic development projects. Some operational NGOs focus on humanitarian relief, some on economic development, while more and more of them are beginning to focus on both of these missions.

NGOs dedicated to humanitarian relief operations have attempted to maintain a policy of strict neutrality in situations of conflict, defining their role as providers of aid to those in need without regard to political, ethnic, or religious affiliation. Even within this group, however, there are growing differences regarding the appropriateness of this stance. Some members of the NGO community are now challenging the neutrality policy, pointing to circumstances in Somalia and Rwanda, in which relief organizations unintentionally aided individuals and groups who were perpetuating the conflict.

NGOs engaged in human rights monitoring and advocacy, on the other hand, achieve their objective of changing conditions in various countries through disseminating information and bringing issues to the attention of both the general public and policymakers. Unlike operational NGOs, they are far from neutral, and adopt principled and often adversarial positions with regard to both official institutions and the parties engaged in a conflict.

NGOs that focus specifically on conflict resolution may work with individuals, community groups, or official representatives. Like humanitarian relief NGOs, they avoid taking sides in a dispute in order to pursue their goals of promoting dialogue and establishing common ground between antagonists.

Most of the major humanitarian relief and development NGOs, such as World Vision, Catholic Relief Services, OXFAM, CARE, and Save the Children Fund, were founded decades ago in response to very specific circumstances. These organizations provided the model for the thousands of NGOs that have been established since. The NGO community has witnessed tremendous growth in its resources over the years—CARE USA has an annual budget of $346 million, while World Vision has a budget of over $140 million. The 160 NGOs within InterAction have combined annual revenues of $2.3 billion, five-sixths of which comes from private donations. The sheer growth in the
number of NGOs in recent years has also been dramatic. Currently, there are approximately fifteen hundred NGOs registered as observers with the United Nations—and this figure consists primarily of NGOs with international missions and does not reflect the vast growth of indigenous NGOs.

The rapid rise in the number of NGOs has resulted in many more institutions that are able to mobilize resources for humanitarian crises in hitherto inaccessible and neglected parts of the world. Yet it has also complicated relief efforts by creating “an extraordinarily complex system which makes medieval Europe look centralized and ordered by comparison,” in the words of John Paul Lederach, director of both the International Conciliation Service of the Mennonite Central Committee and the Conflict Analysis and Transformation Program at Eastern Mennonite University. It is a “very diffuse system,” Lederach said, whose diversity makes it difficult to develop a comprehensive strategy, especially during complex emergencies, when there is little time for consensus-building.

The exigencies of complex emergencies have brought NGOs to the realization that their relief missions involve both peacemaking and peace-building activities. Accordingly, they are forced to examine closely the issue of whether, under what conditions, and how they will work with international organizations, governments, and military units engaged in humanitarian relief efforts. This realization, however, has not necessarily produced a consensus within individual NGOs on these new priorities. Lederach noted that it was easy for an NGO to fund, for example, a well-digging project in Kenya, since that particular budget line-item falls easily within its developmental mission and thus will find broad acceptance by the NGO’s executive staff. On the other hand, that same staff could easily find itself divided over the issue of the NGO’s field workers’ managing disputes that might arise over access to the well water, since this is not an activity that easily fits into current NGO funding categories or program priorities.

Yet such conflict resolution and conflict management skills are essential to maintaining peace during complex emergencies, according to Lederach. The change will require a growing awareness on the part of NGOs that a portion of the money flowing into their budgets for relief activity alone should now be redirected to the development of programs that recognize the interdependent nature of conflict resolution, relief, and development. “Like it or not, you may think you’re there to do development, but you’re actually doing conflict resolution,” Lederach said, addressing the conference’s NGO representatives. “It would be wise to develop the skills to do it more effectively.”
A consequence of both their growing numbers and resources and the variety of functions they fulfill, NGOs are fast becoming a vital component in the international response mechanism to humanitarian crises, especially in situations of conflict. Operational NGOs are going beyond their traditional relief objectives of providing food, water, sanitation, and emergency health measures, to serving as a substitute for local government, encouraging the growth of civil society, and using mediation and negotiation skills to bring antagonists together as part of a relief mission.

While NGOs cannot be expected to solve all the problems associated with humanitarian crises, Andrew Natsios identified four fundamental roles NGOs could perform during these types of crises:

1. a preventive function through early warning;
2. human rights monitoring;
3. the relief and rehabilitation functions normally associated with NGOs; and
4. conflict resolution activities, such as mediation and reconciliation.

These distinct functions require different sets of disciplines and skills, some of which already exist in the NGO community and some of which do not.

Natsios stressed the importance of keeping these functions separate. “We shouldn’t mix the roles,” he cautioned. “In a conflict setting, NGOs that are doing relief and development work should not also engage in human rights monitoring—that’s a good way to get your people shot. They need to be separate functions performed by separate organizations.” Similarly, organizations involved in advocacy should not attempt mediation and reconciliation, and those engaged in relief work should not be involved in security operations. Making these distinctions and assigning different functions is an important component of ensuring effective action in conflict situations.

Of the four roles that Natsios outlined, the early warning and conflict resolution functions generated the most debate during the conference. The intense discussions surrounding these two NGO roles reflected not only their relative newness in the repertoire of NGO capabilities, but also the fact that both of these roles subsume many other increasingly important—and, some would argue, controversial—tasks NGOs must consider in carrying out their primary missions during complex emergencies.

**Early warning.** A recurrent theme during the conference was the role NGOs could play in early warning and preventive action, alerting the international community to potential breakdowns in a distressed country’s governance or in relations among the country’s major domestic groups. Since many NGOs have deep roots in local communities, their relief and development workers in the field have a unique vantage point to identify deteriorating conditions that might lead to conflict.

Jan Eliasson detailed a number of steps, including fact-finding missions, that NGOs and the international community could undertake in order to provide early warning for looming conflicts. These actions would precede more formal approaches, such as peacekeeping operations and peacemaking. According to Eliasson, NGOs can play a key role in information gathering, early warning, and peacebuilding, and can help the international community to move from simply responding to crises to preventing their occurrence. In Eliasson’s metaphor, such activity among NGOs moves the international community from merely extinguishing
fires, to finding the arsonist before the fire breaks out, to identifying conditions that lead to arson.

Vivian Lowery Derryck, president of the African-American Institute, argued that NGOs should use their early warning capabilities to advocate governmental policies aimed at stemming the outbreak of further violence during complex emergencies. In her view, the executive leaderships of operational NGOs should serve as advocates to the U.S. government, since their organizations could combine on-the-ground experience with access to policymakers. In carrying out their primary missions, operational NGOs grapple with difficult issues that give them a unique insight into the dimensions of complex emergencies. These insights can offer crucial information to policymakers in governments and international organizations.

In the case of Rwanda, such an advocacy role for operational NGOs would have meant urging early U.S. involvement and requesting that the military stay long enough to complete the job. It also would have meant sharing with the U.S. administration their views on issues such as disarmament in the refugee camps and the forcible relocation of Hutu soldiers. In dealing with questions of whether to pull out of the refugee camps in the face of de facto Hutu militia control, or remain and attempt to aid the starving majority, NGOs gathered information that could have determined policy in a way that promoted conflict management more decisively.

Derryck stressed that the responsibility of operational NGOs to act as advocates in governmental policymaking is crucial, and that failing to fulfill such a responsibility could result in governments’ loss of political will, failure to intervene in a timely fashion, and reluctance to provide the appropriate resources to meet the needs of the crisis situation.

Many at the conference, however, asserted that the lack of early warning was not the central problem in preventive action. The key—and often missing—element in prevention is developing the political will to act on early warning signals. Here, too, NGOs play a central role as advocates for action. Lionel Rosenblatt, president of Refugees International, pointed to recent events in Bosnia as a tragic example of the international system’s failure to deal with conflict. Agreeing that “early action saves lives and it saves resources,” he stressed that the inability to detect a conflict’s early warning signals was not the main impediment to preventive action. In the cases of Bosnia and Rwanda, the challenge was to find the political will and leadership necessary to translate early warning into effective intervention. The failures inherent in those conflicts demonstrate the need to create a new international mechanism that promotes early action—a system involving NGOs, governments, and the United Nations.

To move toward that goal, Rosenblatt identified six policy initiatives that could make a significant difference in marshaling resources for early action in humanitarian crises:

1. The international community should focus on the need for early response, including the restructuring of intelligence agencies and diplomatic reporting, to meet the contingencies arising in the post–Cold War world.
2. Agencies operating closest to potential conflicts should hone their tools of prevention. NGOs should work with the UN in building direct, hands-on partnerships that capitalize on opportunities for negotiation training, reconciliation, and the implementation of other conflict resolution techniques.
3. The United Nations should be given a mandate to form an international rapid deployment force under its control. Rosenblatt recalled the political problems—including public protests over deaths and casualties in the ranks of peacekeeping forces—that arise in the current system of nations’ contributing troops to UN peacekeeping missions. Providing the UN with the authority and the forces necessary for quick deployment in areas of crisis would eliminate political

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wrangling and costly indecision. All too often, waiting for donor nations to provide troops in such situations is tantamount to waiting for another round of genocide to happen, said Rosenblatt.

The international community must develop counterterrorism capabilities that seek to minimize the problems of mass violence and assassination of political officials. Serious thought should be devoted to ways in which NGOs, states, and the UN could intervene in situations where a distressed country’s government is incapable of coping with terrorism.

The international community must develop an organizational capacity to deal not just with refugees but with internally displaced people as well. In many complex emergencies, the internally displaced remain invisible amid waves of refugees and are typically denied the resources necessary for their own survival. Recognizing the needs of internally displaced people would involve new roles for the military, NGOs, and the UN.

The international community needs to develop a capacity to reintegrate people displaced by crisis into their societies, Rosenblatt explained, adding that successful reintegration means much more than simply returning refugees to their villages. Are their homes intact and unoccupied? Do their jobs or farms remain for them to resume their livelihood?

Conflict resolution, relief, and sustainable development. John Paul Lederach focused his remarks on the challenges posed to NGOs by the new types of conflict that have become commonplace in the post–Cold War era. These challenges clarified the need for a more comprehensive framework for conflict resolution and conciliation activities on the part of NGOs. Based on both his field experience in conflict situations and his work as a practitioner developing conflict resolution programs to accompany the relief activities sponsored by the Mennonite Central Committee, Lederach offered some general observations about the changing nature of the international response to crisis.

In Lederach’s view, the NGO community and the international community at large should concentrate on techniques that link crisis management and humanitarian relief activities to the longer-term goals of conflict resolution and sustainable development. “We need to develop our capacity to think in decades instead of months to a year,” he said, “and to develop ways in which our crisis management activities are imbedded within, and linked to, a broader set of activities which lead to sustainable development.” However, the context in which these needs emerge almost always involves settings of protracted, divisive, and deep-seated generational conflict. To move beyond the management of an immediate crisis, according to Lederach, NGOs must change their planning timeframes to a long-term perspective. The initial emergency relief response should be linked to a set of activities that leads to the transformation of those conflicts in a way that promotes sustained and comprehensive reconciliation among the warring parties.

Developing an infrastructure that sustains peacebuilding within a given conflict is of paramount importance, according to Lederach. In looking at a situation of long-term conflict and war, agencies from outside the country, including NGOs, should recognize that there are many levels of activity as well as many actors and functions necessary for peacebuilding. Most peace operations tend to rely on a top-down approach to peacebuilding, in which the country’s political leaders and high-level officials from international organizations make decisions that are supposed to be implemented throughout the rest of the country. In many cases, however, relying solely on a top-down approach to peacebuilding results in failure and frustration.

Lederach recommended focusing instead on the middle and grass-roots levels of societies in crisis, since NGOs are particularly effective working with both a country’s mid-level officials and the recipients of aid at the community level. Because of their familiarity with the country and its decision makers, NGO representatives have a keen understanding of the realities on the ground that allows them to reach across their counterparts from other agencies into a web of indigenous officials and resources in order to build and maintain a sustainable infrastructure that has a better chance of ameliorating not just the manifestations but also the causes of conflict.

Building such infrastructures will require the international community to develop another set of
lenses that allow it to recognize and identify local resources and technologies to be used in the resolution of conflict. Lederach noted that in most crisis situations relief agencies rely on outside resources and view the people in the midst of such conflict settings simply as recipients of the external donor’s goodwill. He suggested that indigenous people should be viewed as primary resources for conflict resolution and encouraged to take up the task of building peace themselves in their own locales. Within any given society, said Lederach, many valuable resources are available for use in the process of peacebuilding. Yet most of these indigenous resources are either overlooked or denied official sanction for use in the peacebuilding effort. “We have to look for the cultural resources that exist for building peace,” Lederach concluded. “This assumes that we see culture as a seedbed and as a resource. It assumes that we see people as a resource and that we are willing to take the time to develop respectful relationships.”

In this vein, Vivian Lowery Derryck observed that an essential component of NGO operations revolves around expanding their constituencies and bringing new actors into their domain of activities. She used the example of women’s groups in Africa, noting that in numerous recent conflicts, women served neither as primary decision makers nor as active combatants. Rather, they were interested in participating in the peace process. In one noteworthy example, women in Uganda began forming a peace network with women in Rwanda. Lederach cited as another example the involvement of Somali women’s associations that were able to play a vital role in establishing communication between the fighting factions, since women are linked across clans by marriage and are able to move from one sub-clan back to their clan of origin without fear of retribution. As part of a concerted campaign to develop indigenous resources for peace, both Lederach and Derryck urged the NGO community to start thinking about specific ways in which women can become involved in the process of conflict resolution and conflict management.

Yet while the use of indigenous resources should be encouraged, the use of outside resources, such as food shipments, in peacemaking interventions is often unavoidable and, in many situations, essential. In these cases, according to Andrew Natsios, the international community should realize that putting valuable resources into a conflict setting can have unintended consequences. If, for instance, NGOs respond to humanitarian crises such as the relief effort for Rwandan refugees in Goma, they need the support of the military. Without adequate security, it is almost guaranteed that the food will be used for purposes it was not intended for—to buy weapons, to control populations, or to buy support from various political factions in a conflict. Natsios further explained that when resources like food are introduced into a conflict, the political dynamic is altered, and the presence of these resources could intensify the violence. Too often it is naively assumed that relief will generate goodwill. The international community should be prepared to deal with the fact that people fight over the control of valuable resources.
Another major topic of the conference was the lack of coordination among the many actors that typically intervene in humanitarian crises. While many believed that the United Nations, international NGOs, regional organizations, and individual governments have integrated and reinforcing roles to play, almost all the conference participants acknowledged that the effectiveness of these roles was diminished by the disjointed nature of the response.

John Paul Lederach discussed some of the problems of collective responses to complex emergencies caused by the lack of coordination both within the NGO community and across the various levels of intervention in the international system. He remarked that in a crisis situation, so many different things occur simultaneously that one actor often does not know what the others are doing. People operating at the grass-roots level are often considered unimportant or peripheral by those operating at higher levels. A successful intervention, nonetheless, calls for the ability to understand and connect the different levels of activity.

Addressing issues of cooperation in one specific realm, Vivian Lowery Derryck emphasized that undertaking technical assistance projects in conflict situations requires a new working relationship between NGOs and the military. Traditionally, NGOs and the military have perceived their roles to be distinctly different and separate. NGOs have felt uneasy working with military forces, either from their own countries or from the country receiving assistance, particularly when the latter are employed in the service of dictators with unsavory human rights records. Military leaders, on the other hand, tend to regard NGOs as undisciplined and their operations as uncoordinated and disjointed. The experiences in Somalia and Rwanda showed that closer working relationships between NGOs and the military could successfully meet the goal of delivering humanitarian assistance in situations of conflict.

These new kinds of interventions make it clear that NGOs must find the means for establishing improved working relationships with the military, including better and more rapid communications and a clear comprehension of the mission’s overall objectives. This last point is crucial. While they enjoyed a high level of cooperation in the Rwanda and Somalia operations, the military and NGOs were motivated by different goals. The military’s concern with “mission creep” resulted in a desire to go in, provide emergency technical assistance, and get out quickly. Conversely, the NGO perspective during these crises was long term, aimed at nation-building and developing education skills. While it is unlikely that these divergent goals will change, an appreciation of the other’s perspective and an agreement on immediate objectives is essential for cooperative action.

Lionel Rosenblatt argued that humanitarian operations should form a key part of training for the armed forces. Contrary to the belief that humanitarian work erodes military readiness, he suggested, “the deployment of troops for peacekeeping and humanitarian work is good for our military. This is far better training in preparedness for post–Cold War realities than training at Fort Bragg.”

Once a humanitarian crisis is apparent, food, water, and other life-saving resources need to be introduced efficiently, cheaply, and quickly. In Rosenblatt’s opinion, this requires getting away from the administrative routines of governments and militaries and fostering a greater degree of cooperation among the relevant actors. In addition, he recommended the international community establish a chain of command through which all relevant actors—peacekeepers and humanitarian-aid providers—report their efforts. Given the current
practice of disparate groups involved in crisis management reporting to different leaderships, these complex emergencies desperately demand a single emergency coordinator.

The case of Somalia demonstrated that achieving such coordination would be a difficult task indeed. Andrew Natsios suggested that one of the problems in Somalia was a kind of role reversal among external actors, with NGOs running security operations, which they were not trained to do, and the military delivering relief and aiding in development. Lacking a proper understanding of these unfamiliar roles, both actors were bound to make inappropriate decisions. Natsios gave as an example the U.S. military’s decision to send in its own engineers and support troops to rebuild roads and infrastructure at a time when Somali males desperately needed jobs. The military was not interested in hiring the Somalis, Natsios explained, because they wanted to get the roads built quickly. The military officers in charge believed that if they let untrained “locals” or NGOs do the job, it would take longer than a few months. Thus the potential for encouraging indigenous development was lost, keeping thousands of Somali males idle and frustrated.

One reason for the lack of coordination lies in the fact that the actors in humanitarian crises are very different organizations. International organizations and governments deal with crises at the national level; NGOs operate mainly at the local level. Military forces assigned to support humanitarian missions receive their instructions from their governments; NGOs are answerable to their boards and to the thousands of donors who support their efforts. In Julia Taft’s words, this difference in organizational character traditionally relegated NGOs to the status of eccentric relatives whose invitation to the policymaking party never arrived. This situation has changed, she said: NGOs are now included at the policymaking table and are recognized as key actors in the design and delivery of humanitarian relief.

The growing awareness that both public and private organizations are essential to the success of any humanitarian venture, however, has not yet resulted in improved coordination, a fact noted in the many calls for more cooperative action. One such appeal came from Mohamed Sahnoun, former special representative of the UN secretary-general in Somalia, and former deputy secretary-general of the Organization of African Unity in charge of political affairs and crisis situations. Sahnoun proposed the creation of a new international institution for conflict management that would coordinate humanitarian action and foster ties between organizations and agencies from the international down to the local level. Such an institution would be an essential contributor to Sahnoun’s vision of establishing a global framework for conflict management and peacebuilding by coordinating efforts while simultaneously decentralizing them—creating, in essence, a synergy between the regional and international levels. This proposed institution would mobilize all approaches to conflict resolution and increase communications and networks among different communities in local conflict areas through the integrated efforts of NGOs and the UN.

Accountability and leadership issues. Amid the calls for establishing new means to coordinate international responses to these situations, however, a few voices raised concern over issues of accountability and leadership. John Paul Lederach noted that in situations of crisis, NGOs assumed responsibilities far exceeding their intended missions. Two clear examples are Rwanda and Somalia, where the collapse of central authority resulted in a political vacuum that was immediately filled by chaos and internecine warfare. NGOs moved into these “stateless” situations and took on many of the services typically provided by the failed governments. “In many ways,” he said, “the NGO ac-
tivity can be seen as replacing the state. This raises a crucial question for us all: To whom are the NGOs accountable?"

The issue of accountability extends to governments that take on a large share of the responsibilities in responding to complex emergencies. In Rosenblatt’s view, the United States government should reform both the way it deals with the UN and the way it responds to humanitarian crises in general, including the integration of humanitarian assistance functions presently scattered throughout its various agencies—the Agency for International Development, the State Department, and the Department of Defense among them. He urged the U.S. government to encompass all these various divisions of responsibility within a single entity with one senior official in charge. Such a reorganization would improve not only the U.S. response to complex emergencies but the UN’s role in them as well. After all, as Rosenblatt observed, the U.S. cannot demand a higher level of accountability at the UN than it is willing to ensure in its own government.

The issue of which institutions should provide the necessary leadership for a coordinated effort led Andrew Natsios to remark that NGOs could not fulfill the functions of world powers in these situations. “There is no substitute for the influence and resources of the great powers in these conflicts. The NGO community cannot act like the United States government. It doesn’t mean the United States has to intervene all the time, but there are instances when a power with military forces and large budgets can intervene diplomatically to make people talk who might not want to talk,” Natsios observed. “Unless the great powers have the moral and diplomatic impulse to intervene, we are going to be unsuccessful in dealing with these conflicts.”
Should NGOs be involved in conflict prevention and resolution? If so, how extensive should their involvement be? Effective responses to post–Cold War humanitarian crises often means that many NGOs must go beyond their traditional mission of providing food, water, and medical assistance, into the realm of ensuring political stability and fulfilling governmental functions in failed states. Are such expanded roles appropriate for NGOs?

Vivian Lowery Derryck answered this question with a qualified yes, proposing certain conditions that must be present before NGOs engage in conflict management activities:

; the NGO knows the country and the regional institutions involved in the conflict resolution effort;
; the NGO has indigenous partners;
; the NGO staff has a good knowledge of conflict mediation skills; and
; the NGO’s field staff members fully understand the personal risks they are assuming.

John Paul Lederach agreed that NGOs could be very effective in managing conflict, noting that they bring several special qualities to peacebuilding, especially through their particular insights into different cultures, their relationships with local partners, and their understanding of the links between crisis management and long-term sustainable development. He recalled how NGO representatives often talk about their operations as comprising a continuum of relief efforts, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and sustainable development. All of these components are essential to the development of both new and more effective paradigms for peacebuilding and appropriate strategies to deal with specific conflicts.

Many of the conference participants acknowledged that NGOs of all varieties are seriously grappling with issues raised by working in situations of conflict. They also confirmed the need for more coordination among the different types of operational NGOs, and between the NGO community and other actors involved in complex-emergency interventions, in order to forge an effective role for NGOs as conflict managers. There was widespread recognition that NGOs might unwittingly become a party to conflict in the course of their humanitarian relief work; that their actions could be part of a concerted, coordinated effort involving governments, international and regional organizations, and private groups to avert or resolve conflict; that they had the ability to both provide early warning and shore up the political will of governments to act; and that they could give guidance to policymakers in their own countries and encourage community-building and the development of civil societies in countries decimated by war. In short, the work of NGOs forms an important part of the entire repertoire of intervention strategies for dealing with conflict in the post–Cold War era.
Chester A. Crocker is chairman of the board of directors of the United States Institute of Peace and distinguished research professor of diplomacy at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service in Washington, D.C. During his 1989–90 distinguished fellowship in the Institute’s Jennings Randolph Program for International Peace, Crocker worked on his book *High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood* (Norton, 1992), which focuses on the U.S. conflict resolution efforts in the region during the 1980s. From 1981 to 1989, Crocker was assistant secretary of state for African affairs, serving as the principal diplomatic architect and mediator in the prolonged negotiations among Angola, Cuba, and South Africa that led to the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces and election observers during Namibia’s transition to democratic governance and independence and to the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. He received the Presidential Citizen’s Medal in 1989. Before joining the Georgetown University faculty in 1972, Crocker was a member of the National Security Council staff. He has written numerous articles for foreign policy journals and is the coeditor (with David Smock) of the recently released *African Conflict Resolution: The U.S. Role in Peacemaking* (published by the United States Institute of Peace Press) and *South Africa in the 1980s*. Crocker holds a Ph.D. in international politics and African studies from Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies.

Vivian Lowery Derryck has been president of the African-American Institute (AAI) since June 1989. Derryck first went to Africa in 1965 with Operation Crossroads Africa, and has been working on African affairs since that time, having served in more than twenty-five countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Before going to AAI, she was vice president of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, executive director of the Washington International Center, and vice president of Meridian House International. Derryck served as a deputy assistant secretary of state in the Carter and Reagan administrations. Prior to this, she served as executive vice president of the National Council of Negro Women, where she was also director of its international division, supervising projects in Swaziland, Togo, Senegal, and Mauritania. Before leaving for Liberia in 1973, where she spent four years teaching at the University of Liberia and working with the country’s Ministry of Education, Derryck taught at New York City Community College.

Jan Eliasson is Sweden’s undersecretary of state for foreign affairs. Before assuming this position in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he was a visiting professor at Uppsala University and ambassador to the Minsk Conference on Nagorno-Karabakh, which he also served as chairman. From 1992 to 1994, Eliasson served as undersecretary-general for humanitarian affairs at the United Nations, where he was Sweden’s permanent representative from 1988 to 1992. During a diplomatic career that began in 1965, Eliasson served in Paris, Bonn, Washington, and Zimbabwe. He also served as director of the Press and Information Division of the Foreign Ministry; deputy undersecretary for Asian and African affairs; undersecretary for political affairs; and diplomatic adviser in the prime minister’s office. At the UN, Eliasson served in the mission to the Iran-Iraq conflict during 1980–86; personal representative of the secretary-general on Iran-Iraq matters during 1988–92; vice president of the Economic and Social Council (1988–92); and chairman of the General Assembly’s working group on emergency relief in 1991. He has also served as director of the board of both the Institute for East-West Security Studies in New York (1988–93) and the International Peace Academy from 1988. The author of numerous books, lectures, and articles on foreign policy, diplomacy, and humanitarian action, Eliasson has been decorated by the governments of France, the Netherlands, Germany, Yugoslavia, Egypt, Brazil, Portugal, Luxembourg, Denmark, and Estonia.

Harriet Hentges is executive vice president of the United States Institute of Peace, where she oversees the Institute’s interprogram initiative on nongovernmental organizations. She has over
fifteen years of senior management experience in key positions in business, government, and non-profit organizations. Prior to coming to the Institute, Hentges was chief operating officer and managing partner at the Clifton Investment Group. From 1986 to 1988, she was chief operating officer at the Baskin Financial Corporation. She also served as the executive director of the League of Women Voters of the United States for five years, and as an international economist on the policy planning staff at the U.S. Department of State. Hentges received a Ph.D. in international economics from Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies.

**John Paul Lederach** is director of the Conflict Analysis and Transformation Program and the Institute for Conflict Studies and Peacebuilding at Eastern Mennonite University in Harrisonburg, Virginia. He is also director of the International Conciliation Service of the Mennonite Central Committee. He has extensive experience in inter-communal and organizational conflict and has provided consultation and direct mediation in a variety of conflicts, including the Miskito-Sandinista negotiations and peacebuilding efforts in Somalia and the Basque region of Spain. Lederach is the author of nine books in addition to numerous academic articles on peace education, conflict transformation, and mediation training. He has also developed training materials and manuals in Spanish that are used throughout Latin America on peace education and conflict resolution and mediation. Lederach holds a B.A. in history and peace studies from Bethel College and a Ph.D. in sociology from the University of Colorado.

**Andrew Natsios** is vice president of the Washington, D.C.–based relief organization World Vision U.S., and executive director of World Vision Relief and Development, the technical arm of World Vision U.S. During 1991–93, he was assistant administrator in the Bureau of Food and Humanitarian Assistance at the U.S. Agency for International Development, where he managed U.S. foreign disaster assistance. Natsios was a lecturer at Boston College from 1987 to 1989. Prior to that, he was a representative in the Massachusetts House of Representatives from 1975. He has published numerous articles on humanitarian intervention and disaster relief. Natsios holds a B.A. from Georgetown University and an M.P.A. from Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government.

**Phyllis Oakley** is assistant secretary of the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. A career foreign service officer, she became senior deputy assistant secretary in the bureau in September 1993. She was deputy assistant secretary for regional analysis in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research from 1991 to 1993, and served as the State Department’s deputy spokesman from November 1986 to January 1989. From 1989 to mid-1991, she was on loan to the U.S. Agency for International Development, working with the Afghanistan Cross-Border Humanitarian Assistance Program in Islamabad, Pakistan. She was the State Department’s Afghanistan desk officer from 1982 to 1985. Oakley is a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of Northwestern University and holds a master’s degree from Tufts University’s Fletcher School of International Law and Diplomacy. She has taught American history at Centenary College in Shreveport, Louisiana, and served as a consultant in international affairs to the national board of the YWCA in New York City.

**Lionel Rosenblatt** has been president of Refugees International, an advocacy organization for refugees worldwide, since 1990. Rosenblatt has also served in the U.S. Foreign Service in various posts, including Sri Lanka, Vietnam, and Thailand. While at the U.S. embassy in Bangkok, he was chief of the Refugee Section (1975–76) and later served as refugee coordinator and director of the Khmer Emergency Group during the region’s 1978–81 refugee crisis. He also served as director of the Office of Special Concerns, Interagency Task Force for Indochinese Refugees at the U.S. Department of State.

**Mohamed Sahnoun** is a Pearson fellow at the International Development Research Centre in Ottawa, Canada. He was a visiting fellow at the United States Institute of Peace in 1993, where he examined the case of Somalia to determine how the United Nations can best fulfill its expanded role in promoting stability and providing humanitarian relief. His project culminated in the
publication of the book *Somalia: The Missed Opportunities* (United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994). Sahnoun served as special representative of the UN secretary-general in Somalia during March–October 1992. Sahnoun has also served in a variety of posts in the Algerian foreign service, including presidential counselor on foreign affairs; ambassador to the United States, Morocco, Germany, and France; and permanent representative of Algeria to the UN. He also served as deputy secretary-general of the Organization of African Unity in charge of political affairs and crisis situations (1964–73) and as deputy secretary-general of the League of Arab States.

**Julia Taft** is president of InterAction, the American Council for Voluntary International Action. Taft has served as director of U.S. foreign disaster assistance at the U.S. Agency for International Development; director of refugee programs and acting refugee coordinator at the U.S. Department of State; and deputy assistant secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. In addition, she has been a consultant on refugee and migration affairs and humanitarian aid to the Ford Foundation, the World Bank, and various U.S. agencies and organizations in both the public and private sectors. Taft has received the World Hunger Award, the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Distinguished Service Award, the USSR Supreme Soviet Award for Personal Courage in Armenia, and a White House fellowship. She is currently a member of the board of both the National Endowment for Democracy and the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid.
The Changing Character of International Conflict

NOVEMBER 30, MORNING

Welcoming Address

Chester A. Crocker, Chairman, Board of Directors, United States Institute of Peace

Session 1
The Character of Twenty-First Century Conflict

Moderator

Paul D. Wolfowitz, SAIS, The Johns Hopkins University

Speakers

Samuel P. Huntington, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University

Robert D. Kaplan, author of “The Coming Anarchy” and Balkan Ghosts

A conceptual assessment of the changing character of international conflict designed to advance today’s awareness of change and the breakdown of institutions created in the Cold War era.

Session 2
A New Look at Key Sources of Conflict

Robert D. Kaplan, author of “The Coming Anarchy” and Balkan Ghosts

A focus on known and anticipated sources of conflict in the coming decades, including the resurgence of ethno-religious nationalism; environmental and related threats; and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the persistent threat posed by certain closed societies.
**November 30, Luncheon**

**Challenges to the U.S. Military in Post–Cold War Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Interventions**

*Speaker*

Les Aspin, Former Secretary of Defense and Congressman

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**November 30, Afternoon**

**New Institutions of Conflict Resolution**

*Session 3*

*NGOs: The New Conflict Managers?*

An examination of the changing roles of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) across the broad spectrum of conflict-related activity. The evolving relationships among NGOs, governments, and international organizations in managing international conflict will also be addressed.

*Moderator*

Allen Weinstein, Board of Directors, United States Institute of Peace, and Center for Democracy

*Speakers*

Phyllis E. Oakley, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration

Jan Eliasson, Permanent Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Sweden

Julia Taft, InterAction

Vesna Pesic, Visiting Fellow, United States Institute of Peace, and Center for Anti-War Action, Belgrade

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*Session 4*

*NGO Burdens and Needs as Conflict Managers*

This session will ask leaders from various parts of the NGO community to assess the increasing burdens upon—and opportunities for—NGOs in managing international conflict directly. The speakers will discuss the extent to which—and how and why—NGOs with other
mandates and expectations have been called upon to be direct conflict managers. Finally, speakers will survey their evolving needs as international actors, both under their traditional mandates and new ones.

**Moderator**

W. Scott Thompson, Board of Directors, United States Institute of Peace, and Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

**Speakers**

John Paul Lederach, Eastern Mennonite College

Lionel Rosenblatt, Refugees International

Andrew Natsios, World Vision

Vivian Lowery Derryck, African-American Institute

**December 1, Morning**

**Session 5**

**Key Challenges in International Conflict Management**

**Panel A**

**Averting Chaos: Preventive Diplomacy in Eurasia and Africa**

**Moderator**

Michael Lund, Senior Scholar, United States Institute of Peace

**Speakers**

John Marks, Search for Common Ground

John J. Maresca, former U.S. Ambassador to OSCE

Linda Perkin, Deputy Director for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, United Nations

Harold Fleming, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs

**Panel B**

**NGO Conflict Resolution, Relief, and Rebuilding Activity in Former Yugoslavia**

Drawing from preventive diplomacy efforts in East Europe, Asia, and Africa, this panel will explore the roles that the UN, the U.S. government, regional organizations such as the OSCE and OAU, and nongovernmental organizations are playing and can play in early warning and preventive action in potential crisis spots.

Michael Lund, Senior Scholar, United States Institute of Peace

John Marks, Search for Common Ground

John J. Maresca, former U.S. Ambassador to OSCE

Linda Perkin, Deputy Director for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, United Nations

Harold Fleming, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs

This breakout will examine NGO conflict resolution, relief, and rebuilding activity in former Yugoslavia, with a focus on Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia. Special attention will be given to the question of NGO, government, and international organization support for the Muslim-Croat agreement in Bosnia. Indigenous NGO activity will be discussed along with the activities of those from abroad.
Panel C
Bringing Peace to Sudan: The Roles of NGOs, Governments, and Regional Organizations

This panel will examine the full range of activity—including the roles of NGOs, governments, and regional organizations—that has been involved in efforts to bring peace to Sudan. The panel will also assess the prospects for coordinated activity in the future, including the relationships between internal actors and international actors. Among activities to be surveyed will be advocacy, mediation, Track II diplomacy, relief work, conflict resolution training, and support for mediation.

Moderator
David Smock, Director of the Grant Program, United States Institute of Peace

Speakers
Francis Deng, Brookings Institution
John Prendergast, Center of Concern

Session 5
The Future of Intervention in Violent Internal Conflicts

Part 2: Plenary Session
This session focuses on the recent experience of NGOs, governments, and international organizations in intervening in violent internal conflicts. Focusing on what has actually been done in humanitarian, political, and military efforts, the speakers will address the future prospects of such interventions.

Moderator
Denis McLean, Distinguished Fellow, United States Institute of Peace

Speakers
James Schear, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
J. Brian Atwood, Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development (remarks presented by Nan Borton, Director, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, USAID)
Joseph Kennedy, Africare
John J. Maresca, former U.S. Ambassador to OSCE
DECEMBER 1, LUNCHEON

An Interactive Forum on the Global Information Revolution

Speaker

Ted Koppel, Anchor and Managing Editor, ABC News

DECEMBER 1, AFTERNOON

The New Diplomacy and New Tools for Conflict Management

Session 6
“The New Diplomacy”

Presupposing the need for innovation and creativity in diplomacy, this session will examine the potential efficacy of new techniques and means while evaluating the continuing applicability of more traditional tools. The speakers will assess whether an international consensus is building, or can be built, regarding the future of national and multinational intervention in regional conflicts. They will also examine the possible utilization of the experience and techniques of the NGO and business communities by governments and international organizations.

Moderator

Chester Crocker, Chairman, Board of Directors, United States Institute of Peace, and School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University

Speakers

Chester Crocker
Robert Zoellick, Executive Vice President, Fannie Mae
Mohamed Sahnoun, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa
Thomas R. Getman, World Vision

Session 7
Conflict Management Tools

Panel A
International Conflict Resolution Skills Training (ICREST)

This panel will focus on the contribution negotiation training and conflict resolution skills training can make to better prepare international affairs professionals (from the diplomatic, military, or NGO sectors) to undertake complicated new assignments.

Moderator

Lawrence P. Taylor, Director, National Foreign Training Center, U.S. Department of State

Speakers

Hrach Gregorian, Director of Education and Training, United States Institute of Peace
Steve Pieczenik, Consultant, United States Institute of Peace
Panel B
Cross-Cultural Negotiation

Moderator
Richard H. Solomon, President, United States Institute of Peace

Speakers
John Graham, University of California, Irvine
Jean Freymond, Centre for Applied Studies in International Negotiations, Geneva
Chas. W. Freeman, Jr., Distinguished Fellow, United States Institute of Peace
Jerrold Schecter, Peace Fellow, United States Institute of Peace

This panel explores the impact that culture has upon international negotiation and how awareness and skills training in national negotiating styles can make negotiators more effective.

Panel C
Information and Data Management

Moderator
William Wood, Geographer, U.S. Department of State

Speakers
Lance Antrim, International Negotiating Systems
Chad McDaniel, Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland
John Davies, Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland

This panel will explore the current and potential use of various software programs, information and data-management systems, and the information highway during negotiations as aids to general policy analysis and as tools for early warning and preventive action.

DECEMBER 1, DINNER
Perspectives on Diplomacy in the Twenty–First Century

Speaker
Henry Kissinger, Former Secretary of State
**About the Author**

**Pamela R. Aall** is a program officer in the Education and Training Program of the United States Institute of Peace with primary responsibility for college- and university-level activities. She also chairs the Institute’s interprogram initiative on non-governmental organizations. Before joining the Institute, she was a consultant to the President’s Committee on the Arts and the Humanities and to the Institute of International Education. She held a number of positions in the international relations division of the Rockefeller Foundation and managed its International Relations Fellowship Program. In addition, she has worked for the European Cultural Foundation in Amsterdam and Brussels, the International Council for Educational Development, and the New York Botanical Garden. A graduate of Harvard University and Columbia University, she has also attended the London School of Economics, where her work focused on Scandinavia and European institutions.
The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan federal institution created by Congress to promote research, education, and training on the peaceful resolution of international conflicts. Established in 1984, the Institute meets its congressional mandate through an array of programs, including research grants, fellowships, professional training programs, conferences and workshops, library services, publications, and other educational activities. The Institute’s Board of Directors is appointed by the President of the United States and confirmed by the Senate.

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Richard H. Solomon, President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)
Also available from the *Managing Chaos* conference:

*Keynote Addresses by Les Aspin and Ted Koppel* (Peaceworks No. 3)
*Sources of Conflict: G. M. Tamás and Samuel Huntington on “Identity and Conflict,” and Robert Kaplan and Jessica Tuchman Mathews on “The Coming Anarchy’ and the Nation-State under Siege”* (Peaceworks No. 4)