## Contents

**Summary** 5  

**Acknowledgments** 7  

1. Introduction: Coercive Prevention 9  
2. The Realism of Conflict Prevention 11  
3. Coercive Prevention: Argument and Evidence 15  
4. Normative Dilemma: Sovereignty as Rights versus Sovereignty as Responsibility 18  
5. The Dilemma of Political Will: How Fixed, How Malleable the Domestic Constraints? 24  
6. Policy Dilemmas: Constituting Credible Coercive Threats and Wielding Effective Preventive Force 31  
7. Conclusion: Difficult, but Possible 36  

**Notes** 37  

**About the Author** 43  

**About the Institute** 45
For all that has been proclaimed about the importance of preventive diplomacy, the reality of international action falls far short. While the first decade of the post–Cold War era did have some preventive successes, it was more marked (or marred) by missed opportunities. Even in such “success” cases as Kosovo and East Timor, whatever may have been achieved was achieved only after mass killings, only after scores of villages were ravaged, only after hundreds of thousands were left as refugees. Yes, these conflicts were stopped from getting worse—but they already were humanitarian tragedies.

Is this the best we can do? I think not. To be sure, the difficulties must not be underestimated, as the preventive agenda is a formidable one. It requires doing much more to develop viable strategies; even more fundamentally, it requires breaking out of the misconceptions by which we define the realm of the doable. But for reasons of both interests and values, and from both a U.S. perspective and a more broadly international one, it is an agenda that must be tackled.

In this paper I focus on one particular aspect of this agenda, namely, the need to take a harder look at “coercive prevention,” and particularly at the threat or use of military force as frequently necessary parts of overall preventive strategies. This is a very different approach from versions of preventive diplomacy that make its noncoercive nature a defining parameter and the use of coercion at best a last resort. Yet one of the key lessons of the first decade of the post–Cold War era, based on my own work and that of others, is that while coercion rarely is sufficient for prevention, it often is necessary.

To make this argument requires working through three fundamental dilemmas: a normative one concerning the legitimacy of coercive prevention with regard to classical conceptions of state sovereignty; a political one of whether domestic constraints can be sufficiently overcome so as to mobilize the necessary political will; and a policy one of devising strategies for constituting credible coercive threats and wielding military force preventively but effectively. Unless these core dilemmas can be mitigated, coercive prevention will continue to lack the normative, political, and policy bases it needs—and at best we will continue to do too little too late to prevent ethnic wars and other deadly conflicts.

The second and third sections of the paper provide the broad context for what I call the “realism” of conflict prevention. The usual argument from classical geopolitical strategists is that much of the 1990s agenda, however morally commendable, fails the basic realist calculus of interests (too low), costs (too high), and options (too few). Yet this argument is shown to be flawed on its own terms. It underestimates the interests at stake; it overestimates the costs of acting early compared with acting late; it miscalculates options that narrow rather than stay open over time.

The third section lays out the arguments and evidence for coercive prevention. Much of the work on post–Cold War preventive diplomacy focuses on noncoercive strategies and positive inducements to the exclusion or at least minimization of coercive ones. But
the importance of coercive strategies for conflict prevention is supported by three types of evidence: its own strategic logic, the importance of coercive measures in cases in which conflict prevention was successful, and the inadequacy of coercive measures as a key factor is explaining cases of failure.

The fourth section addresses the key normative issues. One of the main problems for coercive prevention, given the intrastate nature of the vast majority of post–Cold War conflicts, is the persistent prevalence of the norm of sovereignty as rights over the norm of sovereignty as responsibility. However, this conception of sovereignty as rights has been neither as absolute nor as fixed as is widely believed. This is shown historically as well as with reference to the United Nations Charter, which while strongly affirming the sovereign rights of states also provides normative legitimacy and legal basis for the competing conception of sovereignty as responsibility.

The fifth section, on political dilemmas, assesses the domestic constraints on U.S. policy. Almost every study of conflict prevention concludes that when all is said and done, the main obstacle is the lack of political will. As an explanatory statement this is largely true. The United States and other governments have not acted because they have not had the political will to do so. If the domestic constraints that make this so are unchangeable and fixed, then that would be the end of the story. Prevention would continue to be sporadic and mostly too little too late. There is reason to argue, though, that the domestic constraints are not necessarily all that fixed, that they have greater potential malleability than typically is presumed. Extensive data and analysis are presented, including for the Kosovo case, refuting the ostensible “casualty phobia” of public opinion. The role of the media and the CNN effect are also examined, as is the role of Congress.

The sixth section focuses on policy strategies for operationalizing coercive prevention. Three main strategies are discussed: coercive threat, intended for deterrence, compellence, and reassurance, and how their distinct requisites compare with more conventional contexts; preventive peacekeeping deployments, as exemplified by the UN force sent in 1993 to Macedonia; and uses of force, delineating a conception of fair-but-firm strategies and adding early resort to the usual terms of debate between first resort and last resort.

This paper seeks above all to make the case for the realism of conflict prevention. To do so requires bearing in mind both the gains to be made from success and the losses risked from failure. We currently suffer from being too often caught in the middle. We seek to do as little as we can, or at least avoid squarely facing up to the issues until they press themselves upon us so intensely as to be undeniable. We then end up with commitments that last much longer, cost much more, and accomplish much less than promised. No wonder that not just isolationists but serious strategic thinkers counsel doing less. Yet as argued from the outset, the interests at stake and the costs of inaction are too great for those arguments to stand up to analysis.

This means continuing to focus on the normative, policy, and political dilemmas identified herein. They pose formidable but not insurmountable requisites to success. Even if just one or two of the next wave of Bosnias, Rwandas, Kosovos, and East Timors can be prevented, that would be a major contribution to making the second decade of the post–Cold War era more peaceful and principled than the first. And perhaps we can do even better than that.
The author wishes to express his thanks and gratitude to the United States Institute of Peace for providing such a stimulating and supportive environment for my year as a senior fellow in 1999: in particular, I wish to thank Sally Blair, Joe Klaits, Patrick Cronin, Dick Solomon, and my fellow Fellows. Thanks also to Sara Johnson for her able research assistance, and to Nigel Quinney for his skilled editing. I remain indebted intellectually and personally, to David Hamburg and Alexander George for their vision and leadership in advancing post-Cold War conflict prevention studies and policy debates.
For all that has been proclaimed about the importance of preventive diplomacy, the reality of international action falls far short. While the first decade of the post-Cold War era did have some preventive successes, it was more marked (or marred) by missed opportunities. Even in such “success” cases as Kosovo and East Timor, whatever may have been achieved was achieved only after mass killings, only after scores of villages were ravaged, only after hundreds of thousands were left as refugees. Yes, these conflicts were stopped from getting worse—but they already were humanitarian tragedies.

Is this the best we can do? I think not. To be sure, one can never be certain that policy X would have worked in this situation or policy Y in that situation. But nor should one simply accept assertions that nothing else could have been done, that nothing more or different was viable than the policies as pursued. Although such know-our-limits thinking often goes under the guise of realism, we must ask what is so realistic about trying to put societies back together after they have been devastated? Where is the strategic wisdom in continually doing so little for so long that the “realistic” choices end up being between a bad option and a worse one?

Conflict prevention may well be akin to what Winston Churchill said about democracy—that it is the worst alternative except for all the others. To be sure, the difficulties must not be underestimated, the potential not “oversold.” Indeed, the preventive agenda is a formidable one. It requires doing much more to develop viable strategies; and even more fundamentally, it requires breaking out of the misconceptions by which we define the realm of the doable. But for reasons of both interests and values, and from both a U.S. perspective and a more broadly international one, it is an agenda that must be tackled.

In this paper I focus on one particular aspect of this agenda, namely, the need to take a harder look at “coercive prevention,” and particularly at the threat or use of military force as frequently necessary parts of overall preventive strategies. (While this paper focuses principally on issues involving military force, the book that I am working on will take a broader view of coercive prevention that includes economic sanctions, diplomatic instruments, and other coercive measures.) This is a very different approach from versions of preventive diplomacy that make its noncoercive nature a defining parameter and the use of coercion at best a last resort. Yet one of the key lessons of the first decade of the post-Cold War era, based on my own work and that of others, is that while coercion rarely is sufficient for prevention, it often is necessary.

To make this argument requires working through three fundamental dilemmas: a normative one concerning the legitimacy of coercive prevention with regard to classical conceptions of state sovereignty; a political one of whether domestic constraints can be
sufficiently overcome so as to mobilize the necessary political will; and a policy one of de- 
vising strategies for constituting credible coercive threats and wielding military force pre-
ventively but effectively. Unless these core dilemmas can be mitigated, coercive prevention 
will continue to lack the normative, political, and policy bases it needs—and at best we 
will continue to do too little too late to prevent ethnic wars and other deadly conflicts.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to address all aspects of these dilemmas. My intent 
herein is to lay the bases for such fuller treatment. In this respect the paper is more con-
ceptual than operational, more an effort to develop a framework than to fill it out. That 
will follow in the book noted above.

The second and third sections of the paper provide the broad context for what I call the 
“realism” of conflict prevention, to be juxtaposed against traditional realists on one side 
who question the value and viability of conflict prevention and against conflict prevention 
proponents on the other side who stress its noncoercive nature. The fourth section ad-
dresses the normative issues and makes the case for the legitimacy of coercive prevention 
as consistent with conceptions of sovereignty that stress the responsibilities of states over 
their rights. The section on political dilemmas assesses the domestic constraints on U.S. 
policy, focusing particularly on public opinion and its ostensible “casualty phobia.” It also 
examines the role of the media and the so-called CNN effect, as well as the role of Con-
gress. The last section focuses on policy strategies for preventive military force, recogniz-
ing the difficult requisites to be met and offering initial ideas and initiatives for doing so.
The Realism of Conflict Prevention

The two defining elements of coercive prevention are its focus (the early stages of a conflict cycle) and its emphasis (coercive instruments). In its focus, coercive prevention is a variant of preventive diplomacy, but, as noted earlier, one that emphasizes coercive over noncoercive instruments. It is similar to the conception of “coercive inducement” as developed by Donald Daniel, Bradd Hayes, and Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, but differs in concentrating principally on prevention whereas their conceptualization extends across the conflict cycle, including the middle stages of conflict containment and the latter stages of conflict resolution. It is also important to note that this conception of coercive prevention has elements of both deterrence—preventing certain actions from occurring—and compellence—reversing actions already taken. As such it draws on the work of Alexander George, Thomas Schelling, and others.

Before we address whether coercive prevention is doable, we have to confront the question—at least from a U.S. perspective—of whether it is worth doing. This is the realist critique, that much of the 1990s’ agenda has been “social work” or other such internationalist idealism that, however morally commendable, fails the basic realist calculus of interests (too low), costs (too high), and options (too few). Yet for all its self-styled “realism,” this argument is flawed even on its own terms. It underestimates the interests at stake; it overestimates the costs of acting early compared with acting late; it miscalculates options that narrow rather than stay open over time. (Although I focus here on the United States, the arguments have implications for other international actors as well).

Interests Underestimated

It is agreed that few if any of the ethnic and other intrastate conflicts of the past decade have implicated U.S. “vital interests.” War between major powers has not been a major risk. An attack on the homeland has not been threatened. Oil or other economically strategic resources have not been at stake. What the former U.S. ambassador to Somalia said about that country, that it just was “not a critical piece of real estate for anybody in the post-Cold War world,” has applied elsewhere as well. Kosovo could be argued to have partly and indirectly impinged on vital interests such as European security, but it was a stretch to call Kosovo a vital interest.

However, this assessment tends to undervalue the interests at stake in such cases in three respects. First, such an assessment is too static. Although it may be true that many of these issues and places have limited intrinsic importance, the more the conflicts intensify the more important the issues and places often become. Initial assessments of intrinsic interests at stake often fail to account for the dynamics of spread and escalation by which the risks to the interests of outside parties become greater. Spread and escalation occur
through various combinations of direct “contagion” caused by physical movement of refugees and weapons to other countries in the region, demonstration effects that even without direct contact activate and escalate other conflicts, and other modes of conflict diffusion. Some recognition of this dynamic is evident in such recent U.S. policy documents as the Pentagon’s FY 2000 Annual Report: “These events can threaten U.S. interests because they may spread beyond the parties initially involved, incur intervention by outside powers, or put at risk the safety and well-being of American citizens in the region.” Former assistant secretary of state for Africa Chester Crocker makes the point even more strongly, arguing that it simply “is not possible to compartmentalize the globe and wall off the strategic slums. Regional crises exist; they worsen when left unattended, and they have a way of imposing themselves on the Western agenda.” Thus the paradox is that even though many of these conflicts do not start out involving inherently strategic locales, the damage to major power and other international interests often proves greater than anticipated because the assessment of the conflict’s limited importance results in inaction or inadequate action. This is not to reverse totally the assessment of interests as limited in such cases, but rather to open up the question for analysis rather than assumption.

Second is that the policy decision must be based not just on how important interests are in an absolute sense, but on the proportionality of the commitment involved relative to the importance of the interests. Thus a stronger case may be made when the interests at stake are of limited importance but the intervention requires only a proportionally limited-scale commitment to be effective, than when a medium-importance interest is at stake but a disproportionately large commitment is required. It is more important whether ends and means match than what the absolute value of the ends are.

Third, the realists’ insistence that interests but not values must be the basis for policy decisions creates a false dichotomy. “The distinction between interests and values,” as Stanley Hoffmann argues, “is largely fallacious... a great power has an ‘interest’ in world order that goes beyond strict national security concerns and its definition of world order is largely shaped by its values.” Such thinking cannot go so far as to become “a universalist humanitarian impulse,” which, as Richard Haass notes, “would surely qualify as a case of what Paul Kennedy defines as ‘imperial overstretch.’” But as Haass acknowledges, “not acting entails real costs, not only for the innocent people who lose their homes or lives or both, but also for America’s image in the world.” As for those who then raise the question of values inconsistency, and ask why preventive strategies are attempted here but not there, the answer is that to bring values in is not to knock interests out, that relative assessments still need to be made so as to strike a balance and avoid omni-interventionism. How interests and values aggregate is thus an assessment to be made, not an assumption to be set.

**Costs Overestimated**

In a sense policymakers are no different from most people in putting greater weight on immediate costs than on anticipated ones. It always seems easier to pay tomorrow rather than today—thus the success of credit cards, thus the failures of conflict prevention. There is the added probability calculus that perhaps the costs won’t have to be paid, the bill won’t come due, if the issue peters out or at least self-limits. But the bills have been
coming due, and when they have it has been with the equivalent of exorbitant interest and late fees. One study estimated that the costs of conflict prevention to outside powers in the Bosnia case would have been $33.3 billion, compared with the estimated $53.7 billion that the peacekeeping and postconflict peacebuilding actually cost. Similar disproportions were extrapolated for other cases: for example, $5 billion costs for the Haiti conflict compared with the $2.3 billion estimate for conflict prevention; $7.3 billion compared with $1.5 billion for Somalia; and in a case of successful prevention, Macedonia, $0.3 billion costs for prevention compared with $15 billion had the conflict even reached intermediate intensity let alone higher levels.15 Time and again, the costs of waiting proved to be much greater than expected, and almost certainly more than those for preventive action would have been.

The less quantifiable aspect of costs involves the credibility of major powers and international institutions. Credibility is not just about resolve but also about judgment and the capacity to discern when major interests are at stake and when they are not. When international actors appear to lack the judgment to discern that their interests are at stake and/or the will to act when they are, the credibility of the actors suffers.

**Options Narrowed**

A former Croatian militiaman reflected on his own killing of seventy-two civilians and command of a death camp. “The most difficult thing is to ignite a house or kill a man for the first time,” he stated, “but afterwards even this becomes routine.”16 The addition of revenge and retribution to other sources of tension plunges a conflict down to a fundamentally different and more difficult depth. Certain international strategies that may have been effective at lower levels of conflict are less likely to be so amid intensified violence. When that happens a Rubicon is crossed, the other side of which resolution and even limitation of the conflict become much more difficult.

Part of this is the classic problem for statecraft that the more extensive the objectives, the greater and usually more coercive are the strategies needed to achieve them. Preventing a conflict from escalating to violence is a more limited objective than ending violence once it has begun.17 Another aspect is that the capacity of domestic leaders to build “conflict constituencies” is that much greater when they have retribution and revenge to invoke.18

Options thus do not necessarily stay open over time; the problem often gets harder down that road to where it has been kicked. In some respects it is no wonder that the Bosnia peacekeeping force has had to be so large for so long. The Kosovo peacekeeping force likewise is unlikely to be withdrawn anytime soon (other than in failure). So when we then turn around and find military readiness problems for the U.S. Army as a consequence of these large-scale drawn-out deployments, the key implication is not that the commitments should not have been made in the first place but rather that earlier action should have been taken when the options were greater. Nor should it be a surprise that the political and civic aspects also have taken longer, cost more, and succeeded less than promised. Putting these societies back together is, as Bill Zartman has put it, like “putting humpty-dumpty together again.”19
Here, too, I do not want to take the argument too far—especially if coercive measures are to be imposed, there does need to be sufficient basis for claiming legitimacy and establishing threat. Yet the claim that the situation has to get so bad as to be a humanitarian crisis or even casus belli is another of the conventional wisdoms to be challenged. Furthermore, in considering their options, international actors need to realize that while they may profess neutrality, by limiting their involvement to humanitarian rescue or simply staying out, there is no “non-position” in the sense of no impact one way or the other. If one party to the conflict assesses that it has the advantage in military power and other means of violence, so long as the other side cannot count on international assistance to balance and buttress, it should be no surprise that war becomes the option of choice. In other instances, the choice of war is at least in part a preemptive one. War is less a consequence of outright aggressive intentions than a manifestation of the “security dilemma” in which warfare breaks out from mutual insecurities and fears of vulnerabilities that credible international action could have assuaged. In these and other ways, the parties to the conflict take into account what action international actors are likely to take.

In sum, even on its own terms, the realist critique of conflict prevention does not hold up. The interests at stake are greater than asserted; it is the costs of waiting, more than the costs of acting early, that are so high; and the available options narrow over time. It is conflict prevention, not inaction, that is the more realistic strategy.
Three
Coercive Prevention
Argument and Evidence

In making the argument for the importance of coercion as part of conflict prevention, I am reminded of the critique of Cold War-era deterrence strategy made by Alexander George and Richard Smoke, that one of deterrence’s fundamental flaws was its “preoccupation with threats of punishment” to the exclusion of a broader approach “that encompasses the utility of positive inducements as well as, or in lieu of, threats of negative sanctions.”20 Much of the work on post–Cold War preventive diplomacy makes the mirror-image error, focusing on noncoercive strategies and positive inducements to the exclusion or at least minimization of coercive ones. The importance of coercive strategies for conflict prevention is supported by three types of evidence: strategic logic, coercive prevention success, and preventive failures and the inadequacy of coercive measures.

Strategic Logic
First is coercive prevention’s broad strategic logic in two respects. One is that most of these conflicts are fundamentally internal in their dynamics, between and among ethnic and other groups within what is or recently was constituted as a state. As numerous studies show, and if we look at history, such conflicts are inherently more difficult to settle through negotiations than are conflicts between states. Paul Pillar’s 1983 study found negotiations successful in only 29 percent of intrastate wars compared with 55 percent of interstate ones. Roy Licklider’s study of civil wars in the 1945–93 period found that only fourteen of ninety-one cases successfully ended through negotiations.21 These data support the point made earlier: not that coercion is sufficient or even always necessary, but rather that noncoercive methods often do not suffice and that coercion is more necessary than many are willing to acknowledge.

The second part of coercive prevention’s strategic logic involves recognition that most of the conflicts that plague the post–Cold War world are not just some primordialist playing out of history but rather the result of deliberate and conscious choices made by leaders and groups to pursue their interests through war and other violent means.22 These conflicts are historically shaped but not historically determined; their dominant dynamic not historical inevitability but rather the consequences of calculations by parties to the conflict of the purposes served by political violence. It is in seeking to influence this calculus that coercive prevention has its potential viability.

These are brutal leaders, but they are not madmen. They make calculations and as such have to be seen as rational in the instrumental sense of the term. They follow the same basic calculus as stated broadly by Robert Gilpin that “the benefits sought by a group and the
price it is willing to pay depend ultimately on the perceived interests of the ruling elite and coalitions in a society. Yet as Gilpin also stresses, there have been numerous cases historically “in which states have foregone apparent opportunities to increase their power because they judged the costs to be too high.” The key questions thus become how to influence the nature of the goals sought by such leaders—for example, by dampening the extent and degree of ethnic domination sought—and how to influence the choice of strategies for achieving them—for example, by shifting away from strategies involving mass violence and toward more peaceful ones. Noncoercive strategies face problems both with lowering the expected achievability of the goals and with raising the anticipated costs. As Robert Jervis argues more generally, “although the instruments of diplomacy are adequate for realizing some degree of cooperation, they are fragile and leave the world full of conflict unless they produce or are accompanied by deeper changes in what the actors want and how they conceive of their interests.” Coercive strategies must be a part of overcoming such fragility and achieving such adequacy.

Coercive Prevention Successes

The case of the 1993 UN preventive military deployment in Macedonia is an important example of successful coercive prevention. First as a division of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR, as already deployed in Croatia and Bosnia) and then with its own mandate and moniker as the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP), the deployment put troops on the ground at a very early stage in the conflict cycle. The peacekeeping force’s size and mission were limited, but its presence was felt. The Nordic countries and Canada took on the bulk of the burden for this operation, but the U.S. troops, despite being small in number and confined to low-risk duties, were disproportionately important as “a signal to all those who want to destabilize the region,” as stressed by President Kiro Gligorov of Macedonia.

To be sure, as in all cases, the generalizability of the Macedonian preventive deployment must be conditional. Different situations have to be assessed differently according to whether preventive military action or the threat thereof is likely to have positive deterrent and/or reassurance effects or whether it will exacerbate the conflict.

Preventive Failures and the Inadequacy of Coercive Measures

A third type of evidence is based on cases in which prevention failed and a key reason was the inadequacy of coercive measures. Rwanda is a telling example. A strong argument can be made that a more credible and robust military strategy could have contained the conflict and prevented the violence from reaching genocidal scale. There is no denying the deep historical roots of the Hutu-Tutsi conflict, but in Rwanda as elsewhere historical disposition is not to be equated with historical determinism. This was “planned, encouraged and systematic genocide,” as Scott Feil writes in his report based on a conference convened by the Carnegie Commission. “The violence began as the result of choice, and such choices can be influenced.” More specifically, “forces appropriately trained, equipped, and commanded, and introduced in a timely manner, could have stemmed the violence in and around the capital, prevented its spread to the countryside, and created conditions conducive to the cessation of the civil war.”
There are three distinct components to this argument. First is the failure to effectively deter the Hutu extremists because of the weaknesses of the United Nations Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) from the start. Astri Suhrke and Bruce Jones see the formation and deployment of UNAMIR as a “critical juncture” that was not taken advantage of; and instead, because of its small size, inadequate equipment, narrow mission, and highly circumscribed mandate, UNAMIR became counterproductive. This not only left it in a very poor position to do anything once the genocide was unleashed on April 6, but it made for a very weak deterrent against the planning in the preceding months. “A more decisive and robust demonstration of international force at that time [UNAMIR’s initial formation],” Suhrke and Jones contend, “might have restrained the extremist forces directly, and at any rate sent signals to the effect that the international community was fully behind the peace accords.”

Second is the failure to act on the warning picked up by UNAMIR in January 1994 from a Hutu informant. Not only was the information borne out by later events, but the level of detail and other aspects of the information made it highly credible at the time. UNAMIR commander General Romeo Dallaire passed it back to UN Headquarters in a coded cable and asked for authorization to take preventive steps, including searching for and confiscating the arms caches revealed by the informant (who even provided precise locations for many). But UN Headquarters turned him down: Dallaire repeated his requests the next month but again was turned down. The rationale, that UNAMIR’s mandate permitted only joint action with the Rwandan army or gendarmerie, epitomized the core fallacy in the internal logic of the mission. This could not but have further weakened the credibility of UNAMIR and the United Nations in the eyes of those planning the genocide.

Third is the response to the April 1994 crisis. Again requests for strengthening UNAMIR came from General Dallaire, but again they were rebuffed, with the blame shared by key UN officials and the United States and other Security Council members. A study by the Carnegie Commission dates the closing of the window of opportunity for an emergency intervention short of massive force to the last week of April, by which time mass violence had spread to the countryside. Yet one of the reasons that the Hutu “crisis committee” decided to expand violence to the countryside was “the failure of the international community to respond forcefully to the initial killings in Kigali and other regions.” Choices and calculations were being made, violence was not spreading just by its own momentum; the evidence of divisions within the Hutu military as cited by Suhrke and Jones suggests that “a more determined international response against the extremists would have found allies within.” Moreover, there was a negative synergy in the interaction of these flaws, as “weakness on the ground, in turn, became a major argument for withdrawing the entire force once widespread violence erupted.”

In sum, there is a broad strategic logic to coercive prevention, as well as case evidence that when prevention has succeeded forceful measures were a key part of the success, and that when prevention has failed a key reason was the lack or inadequacy of coercive measures.
The importance of norms in international affairs is too often underestimated. Although they “do not determine action,” as Martha Finnemore argues, they “create permissive conditions for action.” Norms provide an internationally recognized standard against which policies are measured and to which behavior is held. They legitimize international action against states or other offenders whose actions violate those standards. Although this always has been true to some extent, it is especially true in our current era. Questions of legitimacy seem to be more prevalent than during the Cold War when so much came down to the dynamics of superpower dominance and competition. Being able to claim the rightness of an action does not just affirm ideals; it also bears upon power and influence.

In this respect, one of the main problems for coercive prevention, given the intrastate nature of the vast majority of post-Cold War conflicts, is the persistent prevalence of the norm of sovereignty as rights over the norm of sovereignty as responsibility.

The traditional conception of sovereignty as rights attributes to states jurisdicitional exclusivity within their own borders and grants very limited and narrowly construed bases of legitimacy for other actors, whether another state or an international institution, to intervene in any form in what in their territorial locus are considered domestic affairs. “No agency exists above the individual states,” as Robert Art and Robert Jervis write, “with authority and power to make laws and settle disputes.” The strong emphasis is on the rights that come with sovereignty, “the complete autonomy of the state to act as it chooses,” as Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes put it. More particularly, in a classic dictum from Max Weber, “the state is a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.” Not only is this very much an absolute conception, it also is seen as fixed historically, a natural and unchanging state of affairs. “The logic of sovereignty is inherent in the nature of the state,” wrote the eminent British scholar F. H. Hinsley, “and it has become and is likely to remain the defining principle in the political organization of the world.”

This conception of sovereignty as rights has been neither as absolute nor as fixed as is widely believed, however. In fact, its legitimacy has been both functionalist and relative. Going back to the seventeenth century and the Treaty of Westphalia, we see that while not a historical accident it was also not a historical certainty or inevitability that state sovereignty would emerge as the organizing basis for the international system. Work by
Hendrik Spruyt and others shows that there were “competitors” to the sovereign state, and that it prevailed less because of any inherent normative superiority than because of its functionality; that is, it better served the political interests and economic and social conditions of the day.36

A historical perspective also shows how the prevailing conception of sovereignty changed over time, as with the post–World War I Wilsonian mix of self-determination and collective security. National self-determination, which gives precedence to the nationality of peoples over existing state boundaries as drawn by governments (at least in much of Europe), represented an altered conception of how the composition and boundaries of state sovereignty were determined. Nor was there anything given or naturally ordained about this new organizing principle—it was promulgated by the powers that were victorious in the war (the Allied powers) and embodied in the particular international institution that was their creation (the League of Nations).

With regard to the 1945–90 period, many point to Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter as the embodiment of sovereignty as rights: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.” To the extent that this was true for that period, it was because of the functionality of the sovereignty-as-rights interpretation. Especially in the context of anti-colonialism and the Cold War, sovereignty strict constructionism had a strong rationale as an organizing principle for maintaining international peace and for establishing the basic legal equality of states. Also in these contexts the affirmation of the rights of states was viewed as largely consistent with the rights of the individuals within those states to self-determination and to live free from external repression or worse.

The superpower interventionism of the Cold War exemplifies what Stephen Krasner calls the “organized hypocrisy” by which powerful states have generally abided by international legal sovereignty, meaning the juridical recognition of sovereign legal status and rights for all states, but have not let this stand in the way of their practice of real politik.37 Nevertheless, the difference remains between violations of sovereignty as manifestations of power politics but without a credible claim to principle, and interventions in which such a claim can be credibly made. Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev’s January 1961 “wars of national liberation” speech was dressed up in claims of the justice and legitimacy of international socialist action to free oppressed peoples from neocolonial domination, but in practice from the Warsaw Pact interventions to Afghanistan, the Soviets showed little regard for the sovereignty principle. As for the United States, both when it didn’t intervene (for instance, Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968) and when it did (for example, Vietnam, Iran in 1953, and Grenada in 1983), the driving dynamic was realpolitik; claims of principle were more cover than cause. Indeed the essence of the controversy over the Reagan Doctrine in the 1980s was its claim that there could be no higher calling than to rid the world of Marxist-Leninist regimes, a claim that caused concern even among Western allies because, as Robert Tucker wrote, it “risked subordinate[ing] the traditional bases of international order to a particular vision of legitimacy.”38 It is telling in this regard that in the case of Afghanistan, where the Soviets were the sovereignty violator, the United States had strong support at the United Nations, winning General Assembly approval of condemnatory resolutions by wide margins year after year, but in the case of
Nicaragua, where the United States was seen as the sovereignty violator, American policy was the subject of repeated condemnatory resolutions.

Thus, during the Cold War the international community could maintain some claim to the norm of sovereignty as rights even if the major powers acted differently. Yet even then there was a degree of relativity. For while strict constructionists are quick to cite Article 2 (7), numerous other portions of the UN Charter as well as other sources provide normative legitimacy and legal basis for the competing conception of “sovereignty as responsibility.”

This emphasis on the responsibilities that come with sovereignty is founded at the most fundamental level on a conception of the individual, not the state, as the “right and duty bearing unit in international society.” States have the responsibility “at the very least,” as Francis Deng, Bill Zartman, Don Rothchild, and colleagues argue, of “ensuring a certain level of protection for and providing the basic needs of the people.” It is to be stressed that the rights and responsibilities conceptions of sovereignty are not dichotomous, but rather mark out a continuum along which there are gradations and conditionals. Bruce Cronin provides some historical and theoretical perspective on this, showing that across a range of historical periods “the principle of non-intervention that is implied in the concept of sovereignty was conditioned on states adhering to specific standards of behavior.” He also delineates such diverse precedents as the Concert of Europe and the League of Nations, which each in their own way included in their conceptions of collective security “protection of specified populations, institutions or political communities within states.”

The UN Charter, as Secretary-General Kofi Annan has put it, “was issued in the name of ‘the peoples,’ not the governments of the United Nations. . . . The Charter protects the sovereignty of peoples. It was never meant as a license for governments to trample on human rights and human dignity. Sovereignty implies responsibility, not just power.” This also comes through in such other provisions of the UN Charter as Article 3, affirming that “everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person”; Article 55 that commits the United Nations to “promote . . . universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms”; and Article 56 that pledges all members “to take joint and separate action” toward this end. Even Article 2 (7) needs to be qualified, according to Secretary-General Annan, with “the important rider that this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII. In other words, even national sovereignty can be set aside if it stands in the way of the Security Council’s overriding duty to preserve international peace and security.”

Further affirmations of the responsibilities of sovereignty are manifest in the Genocide Convention, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and other international covenants that make no distinction on whether the offender is a foreign invader or one’s own government.

Thus as a matter of the rights of groups and individuals who constitute states, the functionality argument now works against a strict constructionist approach to states rights. The same holds true for the effect on international peace and security, for which the spread, contagion, and demonstration effects discussed earlier mean that intrastate more accurately characterizes the initial locus of these conflicts than it does the scope of their effects.
Even so, however expansive many of the peacekeeping and other interventions authorized in the 1990s by the UN Security Council have been, and however affirming of sovereignty as responsibility (for instance, in the cases of the Iraqi Kurds, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, East Timor) they have been more reactive than preventive, seeking to reduce or resolve a conflict that already has wreaked mass killings rather than proactively seeking to prevent a conflict from crossing the Rubicon to mass violence. The crucial issue in considering why more was not done earlier in cases such as Kosovo and East Timor is the legitimation of action not just to punish an aggressor or return refugees, but to prevent the aggression from occurring, to protect the people so that they do not become refugees or casualties.

One main issue that follows is state consent. In the depicting of sovereignty—sovereign responsibilities as a normative continuum rather than as a dichotomy, the question of whether state consent is a requirement for international intervention is the critical midpoint. This issue has been sidestepped in some cases when international actors have been invited in, as with UNPROFOR/UNPREDEP in Macedonia, for example. Iraq after the Gulf War was a case in which sovereignty was substantially abridged, both with the protection of the Kurds and with the inspection rights of the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), but Iraq’s significance as a precedent was limited by its uniqueness as a case. Even so, these and other cases have been part of the increasing use of Chapter VII authority under the UN Charter, with its greater mandate for the use of force and its lack of the requirement of state consent that comes with Chapter VI authorizations, and for intrastate interventions and not just interstate ones.

It is also interesting to note that as we survey a range of other policy areas involving sovereignty-abridging international action, we find a similar trend toward loosening the consent requirement. In arms control and nonproliferation, for example, the consent requirement is broached by the new practice of challenge inspections, in which the international authority can come in without national permission and apply extant treaty provisions and concomitant norms that are to govern state behavior on these issues. The International Criminal Court (ICC) has had civil wars brought under its jurisdiction; crimes against humanity can be punished even in the absence of war. The World Bank, traditionally constrained by its Articles of Agreement from interfering in the internal politics of its member states, began in 1997 to focus more on internal issues such as corruption and effective governance and to initiate and even impose efforts “to make the state more responsive to [its own] people’s needs.”

The “who” question of the degree of legitimacy different international actors can claim for intervening, especially militarily, also needs to be addressed. Secretary-General Annan has been careful to link his support for the sovereignty-as-responsibility norm to the role of the United Nations as the principal if not exclusive international actor to claim legitimacy for such interventions. In criticizing the U.S.-NATO action in Kosovo, he strongly asserted his view that the UN Security Council is “the sole source of legitimacy on the use of force.” Yet he also acknowledged the failings of the Security Council to act as it should in this crisis, noting that it failed to “unite around the aim of confronting massive human rights violations and crimes against humanity on the scale of Kosovo” and as such was risking “betray[ing] the very ideals that inspired the founding of the United Nations.”
The two aspects of this statement bring out both the strength and the weakness of answering “the UN and only the UN” to the question of who can intervene.

As the world’s only multilaterally universal political body, the United Nations possesses a unique role in providing collective legitimation. No other body or international actor can claim comparable legitimacy for establishing global norms and for authorizing action in their name. Yet by its very nature the United Nations also is often constrained from acting in ways that best serve those norms. It was not just in the Kosovo case that some UN members have invoked the sovereignty-as-rights norm as the articulated basis for opposing an intrastate interventionary action when in fact this position has been much more based on particularistic national interests. The unarticulated concern has been about precedents that might later be used to challenge other states’ practices that need to be protected by claims of the sanctity of sovereignty-as-rights because such practices are profoundly inconsistent with sovereignty-as-responsibility. This is altogether natural positioning for any self-interested state to take, but the garb of principle needs to be stripped away, especially when the state involved is a permanent member of the Security Council with veto power.

Regional multilateral organizations (RMOs) also have been staking increasing claims to normative legitimacy for intervention, albeit more political-diplomatic than military in nature. Because of its greater institutional strength relative to other RMOs and its having been confronted by the Yugoslavia conflicts and other ethnic conflicts, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has been particularly active. Its Charter for European Security as adopted in November 1999 affirms the commitment “to preventing the outbreak of violent conflicts wherever possible.” It builds on earlier measures both to affirm the normative basis for such OSCE action and to further develop the political instrumentalities for doing so. Similar, albeit more limited, manifestations have occurred in other regions, as with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and its initiative in 1993 of a “Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution.” While still working within significant qualifiers about “the respect of sovereignty” and “consent and cooperation of the parties to a conflict,” the regional security effects of conflicts traditionally considered domestic had reached the point that, as Edmond Keller puts it, African leaders felt it necessary “to seriously reconsider the norms of external intervention for the purpose of settling domestic disputes.” Although these and other RMOs have yet to fully complete these normative shifts in their actions, the point nevertheless is that the normative shifts are occurring.

When major powers claim to be the legitimate “who,” a concern is raised by many in the international community that normative claims are being used as guises for power politics. While concerns about manipulation and precedents need to be addressed, so too do consequentialist concerns about achieving action capable of defending valued international norms. In the Kosovo case, while UN authorization would have been a preferable source of legitimacy, it was highly unlikely to have been forthcoming at all, and surely not expeditiously. There was a tension here between process and efficacy, and from a consequentialist perspective considerations of efficacy have their own legitimizing weight so long as actions taken have genuine consistency with the norms in whose name the action
is being taken. This does run risks of relativity, which need further analysis and development. I pose the argument here in that spirit.

In sum, however the who question is worked out, given the intrastate nature in whole or in part of the vast majority of major post–Cold War conflicts, the central point is the need for a conception of sovereignty that also reflects the responsibilities that come with the rights. The scope of a state’s right to sovereign authority is not unconditional or normatively superior to the right to security of the polity. Until and unless this conception of sovereignty as responsibility gains greater international legitimacy, international conflict prevention strategies will continue more often than not to be too little, too late.50
The Dilemma of Political Will

How Fixed, How Malleable the Domestic Constraints?

Almost every study of conflict prevention concludes that when all is said and done, the main obstacle is the lack of political will. As an explanatory statement this is largely true. The United States and other governments have not acted because they have not had the political will to do so. If the domestic constraints that make this so are unchangeable and fixed, then that would be the end of the story. Prevention would continue to be sporadic and mostly too little, too late. There is reason to argue, though, that the domestic constraints are not necessarily all that fixed, that they have greater potential malleability than typically is presumed. I focus on the U.S. case, focusing particularly on public opinion and its ostensible “casualty phobia,” with some analysis also of the role of the media and the CNN effect as well as the role of Congress.

The “Pretty Prudent Public”: Questioning the Conventional Wisdom about Casualty Phobia

It is conventional wisdom that the American public will not support commitments that risk casualties, and that even if initial support exists it will collapse under the weight of the first casualties incurred. This is attributed to the continuing hangover of the “Vietnam trauma” as reinforced by the “Somalia trauma.” Key decisions made in numerous cases in the 1990s (for example, Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, East Timor) on whether or not to use U.S. military force, and if so what strategy that action should follow, took the American public’s casualty aversion as a hard and fast premise. Although no belief is more ingrained these days, it is a highly simplistic and inaccurate one.

We need to start with a clear understanding of the “Vietnam trauma” from which the American public has been said to have suffered for so long. From the late 1940s to the late 1960s the Cold War consensus largely defined American public opinion. Internationalism prevailed over isolationism—65 percent to 8 percent in a typical poll. Support for NATO was 80 percent. Containment was ranked number two among all national objectives, domestic policy included. And when the United States first sent troops to Vietnam in 1965, only 24 percent considered this a mistake. The experience in Vietnam dramatically changed this pattern. By 1971, 61 percent considered the Vietnam War a mistake. More generally, the public had become much less internationalist and much more isolationist. Its ranking of the importance of containment as a national objective dropped from second to seventh. The percentage of people willing to use American troops to defend Western Europe—a solemn commitment we made in signing the NATO treaty—plummeted
from 80 percent to 39 percent. Support for troops to fight a communist revolution in our own hemisphere was even lower, down from 73 percent to 31 percent.

The term “trauma” implies severe reaction, even clinically so. Although this characterization was true in certain ways, it was misleading in two respects. First, it hardly was irrational or precipitous for the American public to stop supporting a war that was going as badly as Vietnam, and about which its leaders from both parties and over more than one administration had been so duplicitous and dishonest. “It was difficult to fault the American people,” as one American military officer later wrote, “when, after that long a period of active engagement, the Joint Chiefs of Staff could only offer more of the same for an indefinite period with no assurance of eventual success.”

Second, although the sense of trauma did last for some years immediately after Vietnam, by the early 1980s it was beginning to wear off. Opinion poll data show the beginning of a “post-post-Vietnam” period and the emergence of what elsewhere I have called the “pretty prudent public,” a pattern in public opinion of supporting some uses of force but opposing others, neither as trigger-happy as some would have liked nor as gun-shy as some feared. The pattern was based on a distinction between two types of principal policy objectives for which force was being used: restraining aggression and remaking governments. To the extent that the American people perceived the principal objective of coercion as restraining aggressors who were threatening the United States, its interests, or its allies, they were more likely to support the use of force than when the principal objective was to engineer internal political change, as in many Third World interventions during the Cold War. The underlying albeit usually unarticulated logic was that the antiaggression objective both had a greater sense of international legitimacy and was one for which military force was more likely to be efficacious.

It was not that casualties ever were taken lightly but that the willingness to accept casualties varied with the principal objective for which force was being used. This differentiated pattern held true for a number of limited-force cases in the 1980s, and was especially strong for the 1990-91 Gulf War. Nor was support for the Gulf War strictly a function of the low casualties actually incurred. Initial support at 78 percent was higher than support for Vietnam ever was (that is, pre-body bag levels) and despite what were very grave concerns about the risks of sending two hundred thousand troops to such a volatile region as the Middle East and against an enemy such as Saddam Hussein. Yet one poll on the eve of the ground war showed support being sustained at very high levels even in anticipation of as many as five thousand casualties.

A follow-on study I did of 1990s cases, now including humanitarian intervention cases as well, showed the public to be “still pretty prudent.” Humanitarian interventions actually started with extraordinarily high levels of support, as seen in the early stages of the Somalia case. Although these interventions fell precipitously because of the Somalia debacle, as with Vietnam, there was nothing irrational or unstably reactive about not supporting a policy when it appeared that the nation’s leaders lacked a strategy. Some studies argue that had President Clinton responded to the Mogadishu debacle with a firm and determined retaliatory strategy, public support would have been there. But that as it may be, we did see in ensuing cases such as Rwanda that while never rising back to the 70 percent-plus levels accorded to the early Somalia mission, support did rebound somewhat from its
Figure 1. U.S. Public Support for Air Strikes in Kosovo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1999 Polls</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Oppose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gallup, 3/25</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallup, 3/30</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABC/Washington Post, 4/5</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABC/Washington Post, 4/6</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBS/New York Times, 4/6</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallup, 4/7</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABC/Washington Post, 4/8</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harris, 4/8</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallup, 4/13</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallup, 4/16</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallup, 4/26</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABC/Washington Post, 5/16</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1. U.S. Public Support for Ground Troops in Kosovo**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions Asked of Respondents</th>
<th>1999 Polls</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Oppose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is the war worth the loss of some American soldiers' lives to help bring peace to Kosovo?</td>
<td>ABC/Washington Post, 4/5-6</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is it worth having a few American casualties in a limited military action?</td>
<td>Gallup, 4/6</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is it worth risking American soldiers' lives to bring peace to Kosovo?</td>
<td>Harris, 4/8</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is it worth risking American soldiers' lives to demonstrate that Serbia should not get away with killing and forcing people from their homes?</td>
<td>Los Angeles Times, late March</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If there was a ground war and up to 250 Americans were killed, would the war still be a right decision?</td>
<td>PIPA, 6/13-17</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2. U.S. Public Concern over Casualties in Kosovo**
Somalia—trauma lows as the public wrestled with the implications of inaction in the face of genocide. In a poll taken shortly after the eighteen U.S. soldiers were killed in Mogadishu, 90 percent of respondents agreed that “we can never hope to solve the Somalis’ political problems for them and so should ‘bring our boys home.’” Yet in the Rwanda crisis, just six months later, while still reluctant to make a troop commitment, 56 percent favored finding a way to do something.

Around the same time the crisis with North Korea over its development of nuclear weapons was coming dangerously close to war. If casualty phobia was as chronic as it is so often said to be, and given memories of the Korean War and images of the North Korean leadership, public opinion should have been even less supportive of military action than in Somalia and Rwanda. But polls showed an average plurality supportive of the use of force (47 to 45 percent). Forty-seven percent is not all that high in absolute terms, but it was achieved even though President Clinton never explicitly advocated taking military action and thus lacked the 5–10 percent “bump” that usually comes from presidential cues and the rally-round-the-flag effect. The key was that this case very much fit the objective of restraining aggression.

In the case of Bosnia, support fluctuated greatly. Support for air strikes averaged 45 to 50 percent in early 1993 but declined over time, in part because of fallout from Somalia and in part because of the dissensus in Washington as to whether the mission was doable or even in the U.S. interest. Even then there were some spikes in support in response to events, as after the February 1994 Sarajevo market massacre. Some fluctuation also was a function of how polling questions were phrased. This Bosnia case was very mixed in that all three types of objectives—restraining aggression, promoting internal political change, and rendering humanitarian assistance—were involved. One of the interesting subpatterns was that questions that cast the use of force in terms of humanitarian objectives received higher support (56 percent) than those that linked the use of force to internal political change (34 percent). Part of the problem in the Bosnia case was that policymakers could not separate these objectives. Thus the Bosnia case, while not as strictly reactive and phobic as the casualty-aversion thesis depicts, does speak to the constraints that are there.

The data from Kosovo are especially interesting in this regard. While by no means prepared to give overwhelming support to intervention in Kosovo, the public was much more inclined to support the use of force, including ground troops and despite possible casualties, than the Clinton administration assumed. Figure 1 shows that support for air strikes averaged about 57 percent and stayed fairly steady despite the ups and downs of the war effort and the media coverage. Even as far back as October 1998, an NBC/Wall Street Journal poll found 47 percent in favor of air strikes compared with 40 percent opposed. It also is important to note that although air strikes pose fewer risks to U.S. military personnel than do ground campaigns, the public expected some U.S. casualties; for example, the same April 6 CBS/New York Times poll that found 58 percent support for air strikes also found 84 percent of respondents expecting casualties.
Table 1 shows more ambivalence for ground troops, but in my view the extent of support is what is most significant. Initial support is low (March 25, 30) then increases fairly quickly (April 5–13), then declines (April 16, 26) before going back up (May 16). It should be no surprise that initial support was so low given that President Clinton was telling the American people that ground troops were not necessary and indeed not even “on the table.” The fact that support increased as much as it did in early to mid-April thus seems significant. Not only was there no presidential cue effect to provide a bump up in approval, but the president was actually advancing a different option. We then see some bouncing around in late April and into mid-May, reflecting uncertainty and concern but still at levels of support that would have been a base on which to build had the administration decided to send ground troops. We also see a slight plurality in favor of ground troops in the overall average.

In addition to the noncasuality phobia that can be inferred from the ground troops data, Table 2 presents answers to some questions that asked directly about this issue. Here too my expectation is that the relative significance of these numbers is greater than their absolute levels. To be sure, they do not show levels of support as high as those during the Gulf War, but this is to be expected since even the strongest supporters of the Kosovo war would not compare its stakes to those of the Gulf War. Still, we see more support for the use of ground troops than opposition to it in four of the five polls.

This is not to say that the U.S. public will ever be eager to use force and risk casualties. But it is to say that there is no enduring Somalia syndrome among the public. Indeed, public opinion is more deliberative and less reactive than often depicted. Despite the low levels of information the public has, and despite the low levels of attention it pays to foreign affairs, the American public comes across as “pretty prudent” in its judgments about when, where, and why to use military force.

The CNN Effect: Overrated

A related misconception is the attribution of exaggerated power over public opinion and political context to the news media, as most often represented by the Cable News Network (CNN) and its real-time all-the-time global capacity to put breaking events on television. Reference often is made to the CNN effect whereby television coverage initially raises public awareness of a crisis so as to bring such great pressure on officials that they precipitate military intervention too quickly and with too little fleshing out of strategy. On the back end, negative coverage of casualties or other major policy disaster can fuel a steep enough drop in public support to make the political pressure too much to bear without a withdrawal or other major policy shift even if premature or unwise. However, although the effect of CNN and other new telecommunications technologies is not to be denied, it also is not to be exaggerated.
Warren Strobel, a journalist, provides one of the most insightful analyses of this dynamic. Strobel’s main point is that the power of the media is inversely related to how well grounded the policy itself is.

It is true that U.S. government policies and actions regarding international conflict are subject to more open public review than previously in history. But policymakers retain great power to frame events and solicit public support—indeed, CNN at times increases this power. Put another way, if officials do not have a firm and well-considered policy or have failed to communicate their views in such a way as to garner the support of the American people, the news media will fill this vacuum (often by giving greater time and attention to the criticisms or policy preferences of its opponents).59

Strobel bases his argument on two of the cases so often cited as prima facie evidence for the CNN effect, Somalia and Bosnia. His research included over one hundred interviews with senior policymakers from the Bush and Clinton administrations, military officers and spokespersons, journalists, and others. He acknowledges that “CNN and its brethren have made leadership more difficult,” and that it is television’s inherent nature as a visual medium to “feed on conflict, whether political or physical, emphasizing the challenge to policy.” But his emphasis is clear and well supported: “When policy is well grounded, it is less likely that the media will be able to shift officials’ focus. When policy is clear, reasonably constant, and well communicated, the news media follow officials rather than lead them.”60

**Congress: Formidable, but Not Fixed, Constraints**

There is no doubt about the formidability of the constraints imposed by Congress when it comes to most uses of force. But these constraints should not be taken, as they so often are, to be so fixed as to be largely prohibitive of strategies such as coercive prevention. Three points are key in this regard.

First is that on issues of use of force Congress often stops short of going so far as to explicitly block the president from acting. It often criticizes the action, seeks to condition and limit it, condemns it rhetorically—but rarely does it try to flatly prohibit the president from using force when he has decided to do so. On Bosnia, for example, in December 1995, following the signing of the Dayton Accords, Congress imposed conditions and made extensive criticisms but stopped short of blocking U.S. troops from being part of the NATO deployment. So too on Kosovo, Congress has threatened to impose a withdrawal of U.S. troops but has not actually done so. This is not to say that such actions are insignificant, only that they are not prohibitive. Political capital is required to manage such politics, but they can be managed if a president is sufficiently determined.

Second is that, as the preceding analysis of public opinion and the CNN effect showed, the underlying politics also have some play in them. Public opinion is not as knee-jerk oppositional to uses of force, and the CNN effect is less driving and determinative, than so often assumed. This is consistent with the study by Steve Kull and Mac Destler on how Congress has been “misreading” the public in many respects on foreign policy since the end of the Cold War.61 Moreover, two types of groups that often are pro-intervention have
become more assertive players in pressure group politics. One type is nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), which at a minimum are forces against inaction and inattention to humanitarian concerns. The other type is made up of ethnic, religious, and racial groups, which, as manifestations of the increasing diversity of the American people, trace their roots to parts of the world in which many of these conflicts are occurring.

Third is the continuing impact that strong presidential leadership can have. For all that has occurred in U.S. foreign policy over the last three decades, it remains the case that Americans look to their presidents first and foremost for leadership on international affairs. Congress has its role, politically and constitutionally, and indeed is often looked to for leadership when presidents fail or otherwise fall short. But determined presidents often are the difference between fixed and unyielding domestic constraints and those that while formidable can be made somewhat less constraining.
Policy Dilemmas

Constituting Credible Coercive Threats and Wielding Effective Preventive Force

Given then that there is a normative basis for coercive prevention and that the political constraints are somewhat malleable, the next question concerns the policy requisites. There should be no doubt that these are difficult requisites to meet, and that threats or uses of force that do not meet them risk incurring major costs of a number of kinds.

U.S. policy has begun to address this dilemma more over the past few years, albeit still not sufficiently systematically. The Pentagon’s 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) included “smaller-scale contingency operations” in its “full spectrum of crises.” Smaller-scale contingency operations were defined as:

operations [that] encompass the full range of joint military operations beyond peace-time engagement but short of major theater warfare, and include show-of-force operations, interventions, limited strikes, noncombatant evacuation operations, no-fly zone enforcement, peace enforcement, maritime sanctions enforcement, counterterrorism operations, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

Follow-on Pentagon reports have built somewhat on the QDR, but still not nearly to the extent that doctrine and strategy have been developed at the conventional and strategic levels. So too on the interagency and civilian sides, as, for example, with PDD-56 (“Managing Complex Contingency Operations”), which while substantially improving capacities for humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping, stops well short of strategies of comparable coordination for coercive and other early-action preventive strategies.

To be sure, these are not just issues for U.S. policy. They also bear on the United Nations, on NATO, on the European Union’s security and defense initiatives, and on other regions (for example, Africa and the Africa Crisis Response Initiative). My intent herein is general analytic, not actor-specific; it is to identify and to begin to delineate the three major forms that preventive military strategies take: coercive threats, preventive peacekeeping deployments, and early uses of force.

Coercive Threats

Threats to use military force may have one or more of the following objectives: deterring the target from taking certain proscribed actions, compelling the target to cease further such actions, reassuring the target that taking such actions is not necessary, and/or inducing the target to take other prescribed actions. Only threats that carry the credibility that
they will be acted on (will) and that they will impose sufficient costs to tip the target’s calculus (capabilities) have any chance of having coercive impact. This involves both “standing” credibility in terms of the sender’s general reputation for possessing the will and capacity to deliver on its threats, and “situational” credibility regarding the particular case at hand.

One of the debates in the Kosovo case has been whether more credible threats could have prevented the war from occurring. Counterfactual questions such as this are of course impossible to answer unequivocally, although as we show in our Carnegie Commission study, well-substantiated highly plausible arguments can be made. In the Kosovo case the argument traces back long before March 1999 or even the October 1998 Rambouillet process, all the way back to the original threat made in December 1992 by President Bush, warning Milosevic that if he started doing in Kosovo what he already was doing in Bosnia, this time the United States and NATO would respond more quickly and more firmly. However, although restated a number of times during the Clinton administration, this warning was not effectively reinforced in practice. First to close the deal with Milosevic on the Dayton Accords and then as part of the bargaining with him at various stages of their implementation, pressure about Kosovo kept being sublimated to Dayton-Bosnia and other designated higher priorities. There was some validity to this trade-off, but only some. To have taken this approach as far as was done reversed the leverage in Milosevic’s favor, in effect letting him know that he could repeatedly play the Dayton-Bosnia card to protect himself on Kosovo. There is a basic tenet of proportionality that must be adhered to in seeking accommodation with aggressors, namely, to keep the terms of the deal balanced and not to be so fixated on the issue at hand to cede to them too much ground on other associated issues. That tenet was severely violated in this case.

Nor should we strictly accept the argument that Milosevic was inherently undeterable on Kosovo because of its cultural-historical symbolism, ideological utility, and different territorial status as part of Serbia proper. Again it is one thing to acknowledge constraints and pressures, but another to impute immutability to them. It was not that credible threats failed to budge Milosevic on Kosovo; it was that they were not genuinely tried. Threats that were made were not consistent or forceful enough to be credible. Again this was true well before Rambouillet. Milosevic had been stepping up his aggression and repression throughout 1998. The Contact Group had made tough demands on him in March only to water these down and stretch them out in the ensuing weeks and months. NATO did undertake some shows of force in its June air exercises over Albania and Macedonia and its August air-ground-sea exercises in Albania. But the processes of getting firm statements through the North Atlantic Council and getting NATO started on planning and mobilization were difficult and drawn out, undercutting the credibility of NATO’s overall posture. As for the United Nations, a resolution that finally passed the UN Security Council in October stated only that “action may be needed” and lacked the now-customary “all necessary steps” clause—even the milder “all appropriate steps” phrasing that had been in the draft resolution was deleted.

This was not for the lack of early warning or calls and plans for tougher action. In June and July 1998, for example, two special reports by the Balkans Working Group of the United States Institute of Peace delineated a series of steps “that draws on the full range of
political, economic and military instruments” in order “to get in front of the curve on Kosovo, rather than lagging behind as it has to date.”66 Even these reports were late as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) had emerged by then as the radicalization of the Kosovar Albanian cause, inflicting its own violence and repression. This was a classic case of waiting too long. Before the KLA gained this greater centrality in early 1998, more moderate and peaceful leaders such as Ibrahim Rugova had dominated the Kosovar Albanian side and posed less ambivalent choices for a Western policy based on preventing violence and upholding the rights of the Kosovar majority while protecting the rights of the Serb minority.

It thus should be little wonder that it took the actual initiation of air strikes—of war—for Milosevic to begin even to believe that the United States and NATO were serious. Too little had been done to create credible coercive threats in the months and years leading up to March 24, 1999.

**Preventive Peacekeeping Deployments**

A U.S. Army study defines preventive deployments as “the deployment of military forces to deter violence at the interface or zone of potential conflict where tension is rising among parties.”67 To be successful a deployment must be done in a way that has impact on the ground and conveys a determined message. Among the requisites for such an effect are that that the deployment be implemented quickly; that its mandate include the authority to use force if necessary, not just for the troops’ self-protection but consistent with the objectives being pursued and the reality of the conflict; that the number of troops be sufficiently large to make this mandate credible and doable; that the troops be adequately armed to fulfill their mandate; that there be a unified command; and that there be effective coordination with diplomatic and political actors and initiatives, including with NGOs.

Like the Macedonia case, the East Timor case is one in which a preventive deployment force could have made a huge difference. There was plenty of early warning. In April 1999, during negotiations between the United Nations and the Indonesian government over the independence referendum, local militias backed by the Indonesian army killed more than forty-five refugees seeking shelter in a church compound. Then, even once the agreement was signed, the anti-independence militias intensified their violence and other intimidation. And by the eve of the August 30 vote, about ten thousand militiamen, including two thousand heavily armed irregulars, had “flooded” East Timor.68

The main reason that the United Nations did not insist on a preventive deployment as part of the referendum agreement goes back to the sovereignty-as-rights norm. Yet the sovereign rights argument was even weaker in this case than in the Kosovo case, given that Indonesia had seized East Timor through military invasion and occupation. Moreover, facing a severe financial crisis and needing major assistance from the international community, Indonesia did not exactly enjoy strong leverage. It did have the leverage of the debtor in the global reverberations of its economic problems, and the leverage of the politically weak in the concern about not pushing temporary president B.J. Habibie too hard and too far. Still, there were plenty of strategies for pushing on this issue yet packaging it in ways to make a preventive deployment more politically acceptable within Indonesia.
A preventive deployment thus was doable but wasn’t done. The United Nations must carry some of the blame for this. Despite the hard lessons of Bosnia, Rwanda, and elsewhere, and notwithstanding Secretary-General Annan’s strong affirmations of the sovereignty-as-responsibility norm, too little weight was given to the risks of limited action and there was too much willingness to be “hopeful.” Responsibility also lies with the United States, which was immersed in Kosovo and neither provided the support within the United Nations that Annan needed nor asserted its leverage within its bilateral relationship with Indonesia.

Can we say definitively that a preventive deployment force would have ensured that the mass violence did not occur? Of course not. But a strong case can be made for the likelihood that it would have been effective. Had the force been deployed early enough (for instance, as part of the May 5 agreement on the referendum) and with a firm mandate, it would have carried substantial credibility and would have had sufficient time to put a strong presence in place on the ground. This could have had a deterrent effect on the militias and army forces planning the violence. And if deterrence failed, the force would have been prepositioned to respond quickly to the first outbreaks of violence. East Timor was not an undeterrable or nonpreventable situation. No doubt there would have been some violence but not likely on the scale that occurred while the international community dithered.

**Early Uses of Force**

Just as other conventional wisdoms have been challenged in this paper, so too should we question the contention that force be used only as a last resort. The argument also has been made by Jane Holl that “preserving force as a last resort implies a lockstep sequencing of the means to achieve foreign policy objectives that is unduly inflexible and relegates the use of force to in extremis efforts to salvage a faltering foreign policy.” Force rarely if ever should be a first resort, but at times it needs to be more of an early resort.

Part of the dilemma here is the need to adapt traditional notions of “impartiality.” Impartiality is relatively straightforward in genuinely humanitarian situations— as in responding to starvation, disease, and displacement caused by natural disasters— and in genuine peacekeeping situations— meaning those in which the parties have agreed that there is a peace to be kept and all parties need to be reassured that they will not be disadvantaged if they abide by the peace. But when the parties are still in conflict, what does it mean to be impartial? To apply the same strictures to both sides, even if these strictures leave one side with major military advantages over the other? To coerce neither side, irrespective of which one is doing more killing, seizing more territory, committing more war crimes? In such situations it is a “delusion,” as Richard Betts says, to think that absolute impartiality should be the standard. “In some cases,” as Adam Roberts also makes the point, “impartiality may mean not impartiality between the belligerents, but impartiality in carrying out UN Security Council decisions. . . . The UN may, and perhaps should, be tougher with one party than another or give more aid to one side than another.”

The guiding requisites for seeking this balance should be along the lines of what I call a “fair-but-firm strategy.” On the one hand, the parties to the conflict must have confidence in the fairness of international third parties, with fairness defined as a fundamental
commitment to a just resolution of the conflict rather than partisanship for or sponsorship of one or the other party to the conflict. But fairness is not necessarily to be equated with impartiality if the latter is defined as a refusal to act even if one side engages in gross and wanton acts of violence or violations of efforts to prevent the intensification or spread of the conflict. The parties to the conflict must know that cooperation has its benefits and that those benefits will be fully equitable; the parties also must know that noncooperation has its consequences and that the international parties are prepared to enforce those consequences differentially as warranted by who does and does not do what. In this regard, fairness and firmness go together symmetrically.

It is important to reiterate that this focus on the use of force is intended to get at this component of preventive strategy for analytic purposes, but does not imply that the use of force is the sole or even principal part of what needs to be a comprehensive and coherent strategy. Thus in the Croatia and Bosnia cases there is a point to be made by those such as Warren Zimmerman, the last U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia, who sees the failure of the United States and NATO to respond to the Serbian shelling of Dubrovnik in October 1991 as a crucial missed opportunity.

Not only would the damage to the city have been averted but the Serbs would have been taught a lesson about Western resolve that might have deterred at least some of the aggression in Bosnia. As it was, the Serbs learned another lesson . . . that there was no Western resolve, and that they could push as far as their power would take them.73

As Susan Woodward rightly stresses, such claims need to be held well short of establishing a sufficient condition, that other concomitant and follow-on commitments also were necessary and without which such action could have exacerbated the conflict.74 Overestimating the utility of early uses of force can even be worse than underestimating it. But underestimating it has consequences as well.

The Kosovo case also is relevant here with regard to the critique of the U.S.-NATO strategy as too limited a use of force. One element of the critique is that the air strikes moved too slowly to include certain strategic targets; another concerns ground troops having been so explicitly taken off the table at the outset. The shift in late May and early June back to threatening ground troops is widely considered to have been a crucial factor in forcing Milosevic to concede. Again, other factors such as the shift in Russian diplomacy also were crucial. Not having to face the threat of ground troops sooner both reduced the actual destructive threat Milosevic and his army faced on the ground and diluted the credibility of the message of resolve that was being sent to him.75

None of this means anything along the lines of “decisive force” as meant in the Powell Doctrine. The danger, though, of approaches that hone too closely to minimalist tactics of “not too much” or “just enough” is that the military capabilities provided will be insufficient in a material sense and that the message conveyed will undermine rather than enhance credibility. The accompanying statements may be tough, but if the actual military commitments made are minimalist, the perception is likely to be of a commitment made reluctantly and therefore with questionable will to see it through.
Seven

Conclusion

Difficult, but Possible

This paper seeks above all to make the case for the realism of conflict prevention. To do so requires bearing in mind both the gains to be made from success and the losses risked from failure. In my view, we currently suffer from being too often caught in the middle. We seek to do as little as we can, or at least avoid squarely facing up to the issues until they press themselves upon us so intensely as to be undeniable. We then end up with commitments that last much longer, cost much more, and accomplish much less than promised. No wonder that not just isolationists but serious strategic thinkers counsel doing less. Yet as argued from the outset, the interests at stake and the costs of inaction are too great for those arguments to stand up to analysis. Conflict prevention strategies of doing more and sooner truly are the best option — or the least bad option in the Churchillian sense.

This means continuing to focus on the normative, policy, and political dilemmas identified herein. They pose formidable but not insurmountable requisites to success. Even if just one or two of the next wave of Bosnias, Rwandas, Kosovos, and East Timors can be prevented, that would be a major contribution to making the second decade of the post-Cold War era more peaceful and principled than the first. And perhaps we can do even better than that.
Notes

1. That these were missed opportunities, and not just unpreventable occurrences, is strongly corroborated in the study I edited for the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post–Cold War World (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999).

2. This was the criticism of much of the early work on preventive diplomacy by Stephen John Stedman, “Alchemy for a New World Order: Overselling ‘Preventive Diplomacy,’” Foreign Affairs 74 (May-June 1995): 14–20.


17. Schelling, Arms and Influence; George and Simons, Limits of Coercive Diplomacy; George, Forceful Persuasion.


22. This point is stressed by the Carnegie Commission in Preventing Deadly Conflict; and in Jentleson, Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized.


26. Scott R. Feil, Preventing Genocide: How the Early Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Commission for Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1998). Among the evidence Feil cites is the view of senior American military officers on the ground in the summer of 1994 that “the sophisticated and prepared political infrastructure that orchestrated the violence in Rwanda is not to be underestimated” (note 5, p. 52).

27. Ibid., 3.

28. Astri Suhrke and Bruce Jones, “Preventive Diplomacy in Rwanda: Failure to Act or Failure of Actions?” in Jentleson, Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized, 247.


31. Feil, Preventing Genocide, 22.

32. Suhrke and Jones, “Preventive Diplomacy in Rwanda,” 259. See also Alison Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999). The viability of a late intervention is questioned by Alan J. Kuperman, “Rwanda in Retrospect,” Foreign Affairs 79 (January-February 2000): 94–118. Kuperman argues that even a force of 13,500 troops could have reduced the death toll by only 25 percent. Even if his analysis is accurate regarding what a late intervention could have achieved, the first two points made herein remain on the inadequacy of the earlier coercive measures; in this respect, Kuperman’s argument ends up further underscoring the importance of acting early and steadily.

33. Suhrke and Jones, “Preventive Diplomacy in Rwanda,” 250.


40. Ibid., 28.


44. Annan, “Intervention.”


50. For views that concur on some points and disagree on others with my discussion here, see the papers from the Pugwash Study Group on Intervention, Sovereignty, and International Security (Pugwash Meeting no. 252, December 1999), available at http://www.pugwash.org


53. Exceptions were cases such as Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989 in which the high support in polls taken after the invasions reflected the “halo effect” of success. No pre-polling was done for Grenada; for Panama pre-polls showed only 32 percent support.


57. Public opinion’s flexibility to framing is not infinitely elastic, however. President Ronald Reagan, his “Great Communicator” skills notwithstanding, tried this on Nicaragua but never could persuade the public to see the conflict as other than an internal political one, and so support stayed consistently low.

58. See also the findings in the study by the Triangle Institute for Security Studies (Duke-UNC Chapel Hill), as discussed in Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, “A Look at Casualty Aversion,” Washington Post, November 7, 1999, B3.


60. Ibid., 373-374.


63. For discussion of this kind of counterfactual methodology, see my first chapter in Jentleson, Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized; for examples, see many of the case studies.


69. Ibid.


74. An important part of Woodward’s argument also is that even 1991 was late for prevention, that more and different policies needed to have been pursued at least since the mid-1980s. Susan L. Woodward, “Costly Disinterest: Missed Opportunities for Preventive Diplomacy in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1985–1991,” in Jentleson, Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized, 169-172.

75. Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly.
About the Author

Bruce W. Jentleson is director of the Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy and professor of public policy and political science at Duke University. In 1993–94, Jentleson served on the State Department Policy Planning Staff as special assistant to the director. In 1987–88, while a Council on Foreign Relations international affairs fellow, he served as a foreign policy adviser to Senator Al Gore.

His publications include numerous articles as well as seven books, most recently American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the Twenty-first Century (W. W. Norton, 2000), and Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World, a project of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (Rowman and Littlefield, 1999).

Prior to going to Duke, Jentleson was professor of political science at the University of California–Davis, director of the UC Davis Washington Center, and Washington research director of the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC). He also has been a senior fellow in the Jennings Randolph fellowship program of the United States Institute of Peace, a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution, and the recipient of awards and fellowships from the National Science Foundation, the American Council of Learned Societies, and the Social Science Research Council.

He holds a Ph.D. from Cornell University, a master's degree from the London School of Economics and Political Science, and a bachelor's degree also from Cornell.
About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan federal institution created by Congress to promote research, education, and training on the peaceful management and resolution of international conflicts. Established in 1984, the Institute meets its congressional mandate through an array of programs, including research grants, fellowships, professional training, education programs from high school through graduate school, conferences and workshops, library services, and publications. The Institute’s Board of Directors is appointed by the President of the United States and confirmed by the Senate.

Chairman of the Board: Chester A. Crocker
Vice Chairman: Max M. Kampelman
President: Richard H. Solomon
Executive Vice President: Harriet Hentges

Board of Directors

Chester A. Crocker (Chairman), James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Max M. Kampelman, Esq. (Vice Chairman), Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver and Jacobson, Washington, D.C.
Dennis L. Bark, Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University
Stephen J. Hadley, Esq., Shea and Gardner, Washington, D.C.
Theodore M. Hesburgh, President Emeritus, University of Notre Dame
Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, Washington, D.C.
Seymour Martin Lipset, Hazel Professor of Public Policy, George Mason University
W. Scott Thompson, Professor of International Politics, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University
Allen Weinstein, President, Center for Democracy, Washington, D.C.
Harriet Zimmerman, Vice President, American Israel Public Affairs Committee, Washington, D.C.

Members ex officio
Paul G. Gaffney II, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy; President, National Defense University
J. Stapleton Roy, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research
Walter B. Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Richard H. Solomon, President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)
OF RELATED INTEREST

Many other publications from the United States Institute of Peace address issues of relevance to coercive prevention in particular and conflict prevention in general.

RECENT INSTITUTE REPORTS INCLUDE:

Building Security in Post–Cold War Eurasia: The OSCE and U.S. Foreign Policy, by P. Terrence Hopmann (Peaceworks No. 31, September 1999)

The Challenge of Regional Cooperation in Central Asia: Preventing Conflict in the Ferghana Valley, by Anara Tabyshalieva (Peaceworks No. 28, June 1999)

Montenegro— and More—at Risk (Special Report, January 1999)

Nagorno-Karabakh: Searching for a Solution, by Patricia Carley (Peaceworks No. 25, December 1998)

Kosovo: Escaping the Cul-de-Sac (Special Report, July 1998)

Kosovo Dialogue Too Little, Too Late (Special Report, July 1998)


To obtain an Institute report (available free of charge), write United States Institute of Peace, 1200 17th Street NW, Suite 200, Washington, DC 20036-3011; call (202) 429-3832; fax (202) 429-6063; or e-mail: usip-requests@usip.org.

RECENT BOOKS FROM USIP PRESS INCLUDE:


Coercive Inducement and the Containment of International Crises, by Donald C. F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes with Chantal de Jonge Oudraat (1999)


Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict, edited by Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamela Aall (1996)

Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War, by Alexander L. George (1995)

To order books, call 800-868-8064 (U.S. only) or 703-661-1590, or fax 703-661-1501.
OTHER TITLES IN THE PEACENOWKS SERIES

Women in War and Peace: Grassroots Peacebuilding, by Donna Ramsey Marshall (No. 34, August 2000)
Grappling with Peace Education in Serbia, by Ruzica Rozandic (No. 33, April 2000)
Three Dimensions of Peacebuilding in Bosnia: Findings from USIP-Sponsored Research and Field Projects, edited by Steven M. Riskin (No. 32, December 1999)
Building Security in Post-Cold War Eurasia: The OSCE and U.S. Foreign Policy, by P. Terrence Hopmann (No. 31, September 1999)
New Approaches to International Negotiation and Mediation: Findings from USIP-Sponsored Research, edited by Timothy D. Sisk (No. 30, August 1999)
Training to Promote Conflict Management: USIP-Assisted Training Projects, edited by David Smock (No. 29, July 1999)
The Challenge of Regional Cooperation in Central Asia: Preventing Conflict in the Ferghana Valley, by Anara Tabyshalieva (No. 28, June 1999)
Territorial Conflicts and Their Resolution: The Case of Ecuador and Peru, by Beth A. Simmons (No. 27, April 1999)
The Quest for Democratic Security: The Role of the Council of Europe and U.S. Foreign Policy, by Heinrich Klebes (No. 26, January 1999)
Nagorno-Karabakh: Searching for a Solution, by Patricia Carley (No. 25, December 1998)
Muddling toward Democracy: Political Change in Grassroots China, by Anne F. Thurston (No. 23, August 1998)
The China Challenge in the Twenty-First Century: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy, by Chen Jian (No. 21, June 1998)
Sovereignty after Empire: Self-Determination Movements in the Former Soviet Union, by Galina Starovoitova (No. 19, October 1997)
Greek-Turkish Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy: Cyprus, the Aegean, and Regional Stability, by Tozun Bahcheli, Theodore A. Coulombis, and Patricia Carley (No. 17, August 1997)
U.S. Responses to Self-Determination Movements: Strategies for Nonviolent Outcomes and Alternatives to Secession, by Patricia Carley (No. 16, July 1997)
Creative Approaches to Managing Conflict in Africa: Findings from USIP-Funded Projects, edited by David R. Smock (No. 15, April 1997)