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U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE FUTURE OF GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS

- The contentious relations between Greece and Turkey have always been a concern to the United States. The two countries have long been at odds over the boundaries of the Aegean Sea’s territorial waters, ownership of certain small islands, and control over Aegean airspace. The fact that Greece and Turkey almost went to war recently over rival claims to an Aegean islet indicates the level of tension simmering just below the surface.

- However, the Cyprus question is the most divisive issue between Greece and Turkey. After several outbreaks of violence, the Turkish and Greek communities on the island have been forcibly separated since 1974, with little hope for a settlement in sight, despite recent heightened attention from the United States.

- In Turkey’s view, the fundamental source of the tension is Greece’s conviction that the Aegean Sea is Greek. Greece’s current determination to expand the limit of territorial waters from six to twelve miles would diminish the Turkish and international share to an unacceptably low level, as would Greece’s claim to a ten-mile national airspace limit. The Turks believe they are seeking only to ensure Turkey’s freedom of access to the high seas and international airspace.

- Greece claims that several international treaties have provided an acceptable territorial regime in the Aegean and that Turkish actions in the 1970s challenged this status quo by claiming additional airspace and seabed rights. The January 1996 crisis over the islet of Imia/Kardak intensified Greek apprehensions about Turkey’s aims to undermine the territorial integrity of Greece. The Greeks believe that all the Aegean issues are legal matters that can best be arbitrated in international courts; the Turks insist on viewing them as political matters requiring bilateral negotiations.

- Regarding Cyprus, the three main issues in the UN-sponsored negotiation process have been the nature of a federated settlement, security arrangements, and territorial adjustments. Turkey claims to seek a bicommunal, bizonal, federal settlement based on the sovereign equality of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities. Though the Greek Cypriots have long resisted the idea of a federation, there is growing sentiment among them that separation may not be so unacceptable, especially in view of the Greek side’s greater economic prosperity.

- To address security concerns, the number of Turkish troops should be reduced and matched with the same number of Greek troops. New arms purchasing by the Greek Cypriots, however, is resulting in a lethal spiral of arms spending by both sides. Regarding territory, the Turkish side would likely agree to scale back its portion to 28 or 29 percent; however, the Greek Cypriots would have to accept that Cyprus can never be a “completely Hellenic” island.

- Greeks remain suspicious of Turkey’s commitment to a bicomunal, federal Cypriot republic, not least because the Turkish settlers on Cyprus have little interest in supporting a federal system. In addition, Greeks contend that Turkish troops are present as the result of a well-planned invasion of the island, and the troops’ presence continues to be a significant source of tension. The Turks cite the threat of forced enosis (union with
Greece) of the island as justification for the troops’ presence. Yet Greeks maintain that the era has long since passed when Greek Cypriots sought enosis, since few Greeks on the island would give up their sovereignty to become part of Greece.

- Three fundamental issues must be overcome before progress can be made on the Cyprus issue: The Turkish government must rescind its recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus; the Greeks must accept that they can never control the entire island; and Greece must refrain from using the international community and other actors, particularly the European Union (EU), as weapons against the Turks.

- The United Nations is the only institution that can aid in a Cyprus solution. However, it must be given the authority by the permanent members of the Security Council to facilitate and implement a negotiated settlement between the two communities. For the past twenty years, the United Nations has not had the authority to carry out a serious peacekeeping operation on Cyprus.

- Bilateral negotiations with third-party mediation would be a primary path to reconciliation on most issues that separate Greece and Turkey. Any proposal should be accompanied by a joint Greek-Turkish agreement, possibly guaranteed by NATO, to proscribe the threat or use of force. A formula for a Cyprus settlement involves the creation of a federal, bicomunal, bizonal entity in accordance with agreements reached between leaders of the two Cypriot communities in the late 1970s. The United States must play a principal role in helping to bring about any settlement, because the Turks view few other players as impartial, particularly the European Union.

- Any and all Track Two diplomacy efforts should be encouraged. The multilateral approach of the Middle East peace process may contain some useful lessons; numerous desirable regional plans and projects (in media, tourism, business) were agreed on that could be implemented only after a peace agreement was signed. Though there is no easy solution to the problem separating Greece and Turkey, their disputes are not irremediable, and both sides would see political gains were their differences resolved.

- The main stumbling block may be not the disputes themselves, but the way they are used by politicians in both countries for domestic political gain. For any solution to be possible, political leaders in both Turkey and Greece must be willing to promote and defend a settlement to citizens long accustomed to hostile and confrontational rhetoric.

**CYPRUS IN THE POST–COLD WAR ERA: MOVING TOWARD A SETTLEMENT?**

- A series of incidents that claimed five lives during the summer and fall of 1996 in Cyprus have highlighted the underlying tensions as well as the potential for greater violence on the island. The end of the Cold War has brought about changes that have had a substantial impact on Cyprus’s external environment, yet much remains the same on the island.

- In spite of the scaling down of the UN Force in Cyprus, there has been a recent flurry of diplomatic activity designed to achieve a political breakthrough on the island. President Clinton has stated that the United States will make a special effort to bring about a Cyprus settlement; the EU has also been active in this regard. In part, this level of engagement can be explained by the desire of the United States and the EU, as well as the United Nations, to claim success in resolving a notable case of protracted ethnic conflict.

- One of the perennial impediments third parties typically encounter in their attempts to mediate the conflict has been securing the simultaneous backing of Greece and Turkey to find a Cyprus breakthrough. Indeed, profound changes in the post–Cold War security environment of these traditional adversaries have brought new possibilities for disagreement and mutual suspicion—the geographic bounds of Greek-Turkish rivalry are expanding.

- Even without the Balkans and Cyprus complicating their relations, Greece and Turkey have had—and continue to have—much to argue about. The
January 1996 crisis over an Aegean islet was a reminder of how incendiary Greek-Turkish relations can be in certain areas. To be sure, the demarcation of the Aegean Sea under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea probably serves as the most contentious issue-area between the two littoral states, involving the continental shelf, the territorial sea, and the sovereign airspace above.

- Thus far, Greek and Turkish Cypriot negotiators have agreed that a new settlement should provide for a bicomunal, bizonal federation in a reunited Cyprus and should also affirm the political equality of the two communities. The Greek Cypriot definition of a federal Cyprus would extend the authority of the central government over the entire island. The Turkish Cypriot plan is comparable to the French Canadian nationalist idea of “sovereignty association” that has enjoyed considerable support in Quebec.

- Even after years of failed third-party attempts to find a settlement, the international community has not given up on Cyprus. Certainly, the potential rewards of a breakthrough are alluring. A Cyprus settlement will no doubt help improve relations between Greece and Turkey and enhance the prospects for the management of their Aegean differences. A settlement would also facilitate an uncontentious Cypriot accession to the EU.

PROSPECTS FOR GREEK-TURKISH RECONCILIATION IN A CHANGING INTERNATIONAL SETTING

- Realizing that developments at the national level (Greece and Turkey in this case) are deeply affected by alternative futures at the regional (European and Mediterranean in this case) and global levels of analysis, three models of post–Cold War developments—“Tolerable,” “Undesirable,” and “Catastrophic”—are applied to specific scenarios in Greek-Turkish relations. These scenarios, in turn, are assessed for their implications for regional security and stability.

- Current trends seem to rule out a Catastrophic scenario (“clash of civilizations”) unfolding in the eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans; the area’s future is more likely to remain within the Tolerable range. However, the risk of an Undesirable scenario is still present, given that some negative economic trends (for example, unemployment, inflation, low productivity), especially in the post-communist Balkans and in Turkey, can produce instability if left unattended.

- With respect to Greek-Turkish relations, the global and regional settings present a complicated situation that nonetheless permits tension reduction and even gradual reconciliation. Should the Undesirable or Catastrophic scenario materialize, it would produce a highly competitive atmosphere and most likely result in more hardened and nationalistic policies. There would be significantly less maneuvering room for the governments of Greece and Turkey to pursue policies aimed at fostering reconciliation.

- The ingredients of a lasting settlement can be based only on the assumption that Turkey, in addition to Greece, solidifies its West European orientation. Since 1974, Greece has developed durable and tested democratic institutions and has become a member of the EU. Turkey is currently at the crossroads of the great choice between a European and a non-European orientation. Like post–World War II France and Germany, Turkey and Greece can bury the geopolitical divisions of the past, accept and respect the territorial status quo that emerged after World War II, and resolve to proscribe the use of force in their bilateral relations.

- A comprehensive Greek-Turkish settlement most likely will not be achieved without a just and mutually acceptable solution to the Cyprus problem. Cyprus has long been at the center of Greek-Turkish issues and still remains so, especially in light of the tragic events of the summer of 1996. As long as the present situation in Cyprus continues, whereby Turkish armed forces occupy 37 percent of the island’s territory, Greek-Turkish relations will remain tense, and a solution to the Cyprus question is unlikely.

- Following an agreement of the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, the new “Federal Republic of Cyprus” would have an
excellent chance to survive and prosper if it were to become simultaneously a member of the EU and NATO. EU membership, together with genuine collective guarantees, demilitarization, and a multinational implementation force (until mutual confidence is securely established) under UN or NATO command, would allow the troubled Cypriots to construct an enduring unity based on all the rights, duties, and freedoms that democracy provides.

- Finally, the authors outline a strategy that would encourage a comprehensive settlement of Greek-Turkish disputes, assuming a just and mutually acceptable settlement of the Cyprus question as well as adherence to two fundamental principles: renunciation of use of force, possibly in a nonaggression pact, and adherence to peaceful means of resolving the Aegean Sea issues, such as bilateral negotiations.
Judging by its size, the tiny Aegean island of Imia/Kardak does not seem like much to fight over. But in January 1996, two of the most heavily armed militaries in southern Europe nearly did just that—echoing similar near-clashes in 1976 and 1987. Without quick and effective intervention from the United States, the incident might well have escalated to full-scale war between Greece and Turkey.

There were serious issues at stake, of course, since the issue of the uninhabited islet was intertwined with other components—among them, the delimitation of the Aegean Sea and the Cyprus question—of one of the most complicated and intractable conflicts facing the international community today. On Cyprus, Greek and Turkish communities have been locked in a stalemate since 1974; and while UN troops have been largely successful in separating the two sides, the situation on the island has recently become ominous with a massive arms buildup on both sides of the United Nations’ Green Line. This development and other contentious issues have created a tangible threat of war between Greece and Turkey, and the situation has worsened of late because of each country’s vehement popular mobilization against the other. The two NATO partners had ample reasons to keep their bilateral tensions under control during the Cold War, but the disappearance of the Soviet threat seems to have encouraged a recent marked deterioration in the regional stability of the eastern Mediterranean.

Shortly after the January brinkmanship in the Aegean, President Clinton dispatched veteran mediator Richard Holbrooke, fresh from negotiating the Dayton Accords, to assess the prospects for shuttle diplomacy in the region. These efforts have not come to fruition, but in the spirit of continuing discussion about policy options in the region, the United States Institute of Peace convened a workshop in Washington in summer 1996 that brought together Institute senior fellows, policy-oriented academics, and government officials responsible for various aspects of U.S. policy in the region.

The goals of the workshop were decidedly forward looking. As with many protracted conflicts, the parties’ search for recognition of their grievances and their right to present them to the international community must be acknowledged as the first step in a constructive dialogue. In consultation with senior fellows Theodore A. Couloumbis and Tozun Bahcheli, Institute staff in the Jennings Randolph Fellowship Program and the Research and Studies Program selected participants who could best identify possible areas of cooperation and collaboration and specific strategies of de-escalation, reconciliation, and resolution that might serve as the basis for a new era in Greek-Turkish relations. The insights and creative proposals of the participants are summarized in the following report, written by Patricia Carley, program officer in the Institute’s Research and Studies Program. Earlier versions of the papers by Professors Bahcheli and Couloumbis served as a stimulus for discussion during the workshop. Their special expertise on the Aegean and Cyprus disputes serves as a valuable counterpoint to the general review of Greek-Turkish relations summarized in the report.

Complementing the policy focus of this workshop was a strong element of facilitation. Scholars from Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, many of whom were meeting for the first time, made presentations and discussed tough issues candidly and cooperatively. Over the past few years, the United States Institute of Peace has conducted many such facilitation sessions—notably on the Sudan and Kashmir conflicts—and has earned a solid reputation as a disinterested, authoritative convener of such conflict resolution encounters. This work continues in the Institute’s current effort on Bosnia, which includes two especially relevant projects: first, an interfaith dialogue process through a working group of religious scholars and intellectuals from the three religious communities of the former Yugoslavia who will address the role of religion in
rebuilding Bosnia and, second, a roundtable on justice and reconciliation regarding war crimes, made up of senior government officials from the three Bosnian ethnic groups who will consult with experts from other postconflict situations to identify policies that can address justice and maximize reconciliation instead of retribution.

The conflicts straining Greek-Turkish relations demanded no less a multidimensional approach from this gathering of experts. The issues that separate the two countries, and those dividing the communities on Cyprus, are indeed complex and interrelated. Both Greece and Turkey are permanently embedded in the politics of Europe because of their membership in NATO and their relationship to the European Union (Greece is a member, Turkey and Cyprus’s Greek community strongly desire to join). Both Greece and Turkey also have ethnic and religious ties to the former Yugoslavia, and the specter of open warfare in the Balkans casts a pall over the Aegean and Cyprus.

But the geopolitics of this conflict extend deeper and further, a point that has been demonstrated consistently in the Institute’s previous work on Turkey. In June 1994, “Turkey’s Role in the Middle East,” a conference organized by program officer Patricia Carley, analyzed Turkey’s pivotal position at the crossroads—geographically and culturally—between East and West. Turkey is inextricably linked to the Middle East through its Muslim heritage, its Ottoman history, and its recent expansion of foreign economic and political ties to the rest of the Islamic world. (A report of the Turkey conference was published by the Institute as Peaceworks No. 1, and the papers were published by the Institute’s Press as a book, *Reluctant Neighbor: Turkey’s Role in the Middle East*, edited by Henri Barkey.) Similarly, Greece is thoroughly entrenched in the volatile politics of the Balkans as a regional power broker, and important immigrant communities in the United States ensure continued attention to Greek concerns—and add another dimension to U.S. policy.

In the Institute’s effort to act constructively as a facilitating convener, a special word of thanks should be extended to Theodore Couloumbis and Tozun Bahcheli, whose projects demonstrate one of the strongest contributions that the Institute’s fellowship program can make in Washington. While in residence at the Institute during 1995–96, the two fellows frequently lent their expertise to key Washington policy discussions. Their often successful efforts at identifying significant common ground between Greek and Turkish perspectives were object lessons to policymakers on the encouraging potential for improving the two countries’ bilateral relations.

The Institute’s Jennings Randolph Fellowship Program, directed by Joseph Klaits, took the lead in bringing Professors Bahcheli and Couloumbis to the Institute. Their efforts, together with those of John Crist, program officer in the fellowship program, and Patricia Carley, program officer in the Institute’s Research and Studies Program and author of the conference report, enabled the Institute to bring together some of the most influential scholars and policymakers on the region. Thanks also to Burcu Akan for her help with the workshop and for research assistance to Professor Bahcheli; to Lou Klarevas, who worked with Professor Couloumbis in drafting the paper published here; and to Sara Simon, Amina Khaalis, and Colleen Dowd for their invaluable logistical skill and support in planning and staffing the workshop.

Richard H. Solomon
President
Relations between Greece and Turkey have always been a significant priority for U.S. foreign policy. Though both have long been American allies, these two Aegean countries have been locked in a posture of mutual hostility for much of their histories. Both Greeks and Turks are convinced of the other’s unjustifiable behavior and ill will, and their national pride encourages them to counter and outdo any action or statement of the other. More than their own futures, however, is bound up in the conflicts dividing them; the peace and security of the entire southern periphery of Europe is also affected.

The fact that even today, in 1996, Greece and Turkey almost went to war in the Aegean underscores the importance of taking active steps to resolve the differences between them. With the sense of new possibilities, and in keeping with the mandate of the United States Institute of Peace to promote peaceful resolution of international conflict, the Institute held a seminar on June 12, 1996, to examine the future of Greek-Turkish relations and steps toward resolution. The meeting was chaired by Chester A. Crocker, chairman of the Institute’s Board of Directors, former assistant secretary of state, and research professor of diplomacy at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. The focus was threefold: examination of bilateral relations and issues first from a Turkish and then from a Greek perspective, prospects for reconciliation on specifically the Aegean and Cyprus issues, and ways in which U.S. policy can promote the resolution of the disputes between these two technically allied countries.

GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Greece and Turkey have rarely enjoyed good relations, and current tensions are fueled by historical grievances. Nevertheless, there was a brief period of cooperation between World Wars I and II. After the consolidation of Turkey’s independence, Greece under President Venizelos and Turkey under Atatürk negotiated population transfers and property issues in an agreement that was further solidified with the signing of the Friendship Treaty in 1930. The treaty guaranteed the inviolability of their borders, marking what is considered the high point in Greek-Turkish relations. The situation soured at the time of World War II, however, when Greece became angered over Turkey’s refusal to enter the conflict on the allied side, opting instead to remain neutral. Relations went downhill from there and have yet to recover.

Of the many issues that currently divide the two countries, the two most antagonistic and intractable are the Cyprus and Aegean disputes. Regarding the latter, Turkey and Greece share the same continental shelf; Greece claims that its islands have their own shelf, whereas Turkey insists that because that shelf is shared with its mainland, the Aegean islands should have their own special characteristics. The boundaries of territorial waters are also under contention, and the discovery of oil in the Aegean in 1973 exacerbated the dispute. The matter flared up to the brink of war when the Turks began oil exploration a few years later, though the situation calmed when it became clear that neither side actually wished to go to war. The issue seethed yet again in early 1996, when the two countries almost came to blows because of a territorial dispute over an Aegean islet that the Greeks call Imia and the Turks Kardak. Though each country determinedly displayed its military strength, the United States managed to diffuse the tensions between them through frantic diplomacy. Nevertheless, Imia/Kardak is only one of many disputed islets in the Aegean. Control over Aegean airspace is also disputed, though the matter of civil aviation flights seems to have been resolved. Military flights, however, continue to cause friction.
Cyprus remains equally contentious. The matter was not of great consequence, though, as long as the island continued to be administered by the British. When, in the general period of decolonization after World War II, Greek Cypriots began to agitate for independence from Great Britain, the British appealed to the Turkish population in an effort to pit one population against the other, setting the stage for many of the animosities that exist still.

In 1959, a settlement was reached by Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain proclaiming the independence of the Republic of Cyprus. The settlement, known as the London-Zurich agreements and signed in 1960, called for a “partnership government” with a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot vice-president. The agreements also allowed for Greece or Turkey to send troops to the island if either felt its population on Cyprus was threatened. The London-Zurich Agreements did not last long, and tensions continued to mount. Fighting broke out in 1963, some of it brutal, with each side accusing the other of unprovoked killings.

In March 1964, when it became clear that open warfare was again likely, the first UN troops arrived in Cyprus, forming the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Fighting continued intermittently in the ensuing years, particularly in late 1967, though most of it was contained by the UN troops. The Greek Cypriots refused to return to the partnership agreements, which was insisted upon by the Turks on the island.

In July 1974, the military government in Athens instituted a coup against Greek Cypriot leader Makarios that seemed to ensure the realization of enosis (union with Greece). Seeing a threat to Cyprus’s Turkish population, Turkish troops invaded the island, leading to the hostile stalemate that has lasted to this day. Turkey claimed that, as a guarantor of the agreements that established the island’s independence, it was within its rights to send troops to protect the Cypriot Turks, who constituted approximately 20 percent of the population. Turkish troops, however, occupied upwards of 36 percent of the island’s territory, establishing the Green Line of demarcation between the two communities. These events were followed by forced expulsions of both populations, with thousands of Greek Cypriots expelled to the south and a number of Turkish Cypriots forced to go north. The two communities since that time have had little contact with each other.

In February 1975, the Turkish region declared itself to be the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, which declared full independence as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983 (recognized only by Turkey). More than twenty years after the events of 1974, an entire generation of Cypriots has grown up believing that this hostile separation is the normal state of affairs.

Although the status quo on Cyprus has become familiar to U.S. policymakers, in the early 1990s, and particularly after the Gulf War, the U.S. began to give greater attention to Cyprus and the other disputes between these two members of NATO, with the hope that some solutions could be found. One of the main obstacles comes not from either of the Cypriot communities, but from the way the Cyprus dispute and other issues have been used by politicians in both Greece and Turkey for domestic political gain. A series of relatively weak governments in Turkey since the early 1990s (including the current unstable coalition government of the Refah and True Path Parties) and the absence of forceful political leadership since the death of Turgut Özal in 1993 have put that country in no position to appear even marginally conciliatory toward Greece. Similarly, relations with Turkey are always on the front burner in Athens, and a Greek government of any stripe would be unwilling to appear to be soft on Turkey in any way. A further obstacle has been the difference in approach to negotiations. On both the Cyprus and Aegean conflicts, Turkey has preferred bilateral negotiations, while Greece has pressed for internationalization of the disputes out of fear of being overwhelmed by its much larger neighbor. In early 1996, Turkey for the first time expressed its willingness to engage in third-party negotiations, suggesting that real progress through negotiations may now be possible.

ISSUES OF CONFLICT IN CONTEMPORARY GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS

The View from Turkey

Though Turks and Greeks have shared the same geography for a millennium, their regional coexistence has not resulted in positive common experiences, observed Ahmet Evin of Bilkent University in Ankara. To the contrary, a deep feeling of adversity has persisted that permeates their relationship, an adversity that in-
tensified with the nineteenth-century development of their distinctive national, ethnic, and religious identities. The long period of geographic contiguity has resulted in mutual suspicion and mistrust that continues to affect the foreign and domestic policies of both countries. This “obsessive lack of confidence between the parties,” Evin said, continues to constrain the formulation and conduct of a coherent foreign policy. As a result, bilateral relations take on an overriding urgency and exist as an independent variable within—sometimes even contradicting—the broader foreign policy objectives of each country.

Four issues constitute the main sources of friction between Turkey and Greece, Evin said. The two most crucial are the Aegean and Cyprus disputes. Less important but still highly contentious are the status of minorities (there are populations of Turks in Greece and Greeks in Turkey) and official actions of the Greek government in the European Union (EU); these two issues are not as “dangerous,” but they definitely add to the tensions between the two countries. A resolution of the two primary disputes would likely render the other issues less significant.

The Aegean Dispute. The Turkish position, according to Evin, claims that the fundamental source of tension between Greece and Turkey is the Greek determination to regard the entire Aegean as a Greek sea, totally disregarding Turkey’s rights and interests as one of the coastal states. Based on the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty, it is Ankara’s understanding that the Turkish-Greek relationship in the Aegean must be based on the fact that the Aegean is a common sea between the two countries; therefore, the high seas and airspace above should be enjoyed by both (and other) countries unimpeded, and any acquisition of new maritime areas should be equitable and based on mutual consent. The Lausanne Treaty, according to Ankara, grants the coastal states limited areas of maritime jurisdiction and leaves the remaining parts of the Aegean to the common benefit of both countries.

Although the concept of delimiting the continental shelf had not been foreseen in 1923, Evin continued, the treaty, by establishing a political balance between Greece and Turkey, nonetheless provides an appropriate guideline for establishing an overall equilibrium of rights and interests in the Aegean Sea. Turkey believes that an equitable delimitation agreement between the two parties should be reached by means of dialogue and negotiation, thereby satisfying the security and economic interests of both. As further legal support for its position, Turkey points to the 1982 decision of the International Court of Justice that delimitation is to be effected in accordance with equitable principles, taking into account all relevant circumstances.

The other two major issues concerning the Aegean dispute are territorial waters and airspace. Under the six-mile limit, Evin said, the Greek share of territorial waters is approximately 43.5 percent. Turkey argues that were a twelve-mile limit to be implemented, the Greek share of territorial waters would increase to 71.5 percent, and the international waters would diminish to 19.7 percent, a situation impossible for Turkey to accept. Regarding airspace, Turkey objects to what it views as the persistent abuse by Greece of its Flight Information Region (FIR) responsibility by limiting the freedom of Turkish military flights in the international space over the Aegean. Turkey claims that Greece’s continued insistence on the submission of flight plans by military aircraft contravenes the 1944 Chicago Convention, which states that only civil aircraft should be required to file such plans, and not official state aircraft. Moreover, Turkey argues, Greece’s claim to a ten-mile national airspace, also in contravention of the Chicago Convention, which stipulates that the breadth of national airspace must correspond to the breadth of territorial waters, forms part of a deliberate policy to extend Greek sovereign rights at Turkey’s expense by reducing, in this case, the international airspace over the Aegean by half. Finally, Evin said, Turkey objects to Greece’s refusal to respect the demilitarized status of the Aegean islands, in contravention of its legal and contractual obligations as stipulated in Article 14 of the 1947 Paris Treaty.

According to Evin, the principal aim of Turkish foreign policy in the Aegean is to ensure Turkey’s freedom of access to the high seas and international airspace and to prevent any future constraints on its ability to take full advantage of its position as a coastal state. To that end, Evin said, Turkey appears to be justified in basing its position on a set of international agreements, which, it argues, provide a balanced and equitable way of protecting the sovereign rights of both countries and preserve a balance between their economic and security interests on the high seas. In other words, the Turkish position essentially derives its justification from the letter and spirit of existing international agreements.
Cyprus. Turkey’s stated objective on the island of Cyprus is a bicomunal, bizonal, federal settlement based on the sovereign equality of the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities, Evin said. Such a settlement should be submitted to the two peoples in separate referendums to enable them to determine their status freely. Turkey believes that a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus question could be achieved through intercommunal negotiations, yet both Greece and Turkey have made the issue into a highly charged domestic one. However, Turkey also feels that it has internationally recognized rights and obligations on Cyprus under the 1959–60 London-Zurich Agreements governing the status of the island. Any attempt, Ankara believes, to amend the London-Zurich Agreements would not only complicate the negotiating process, but also seriously affect the Greek-Turkish balance in the eastern Mediterranean.

The centrality of these treaties to Turkey’s Cyprus policy is clear once again in relation to negotiations over Cyprus’s membership in the EU, which can be taken up only when a final political settlement is reached. As stipulated in the agreements, Cyprus cannot join international political and economic unions to which both Turkey and Greece are not parties. According to Ankara, only when such fundamental issues as sovereign equality are resolved through intercommunal talks could the separate topic of EU membership for Cyprus be discussed. Turkey’s position is that federal Cyprus could join the EU after a political settlement is reached, but only with Turkey’s simultaneous accession. To that end, Turkey supports the Turkish Cypriot initiation of preparations that will facilitate harmonization with the EU, with a view to implementing them gradually.

Finally, Evin contended, Turkey also sees the “joint” defense doctrine involving cooperation between Greeks and Greek Cypriots as a major source of tension on the island and between the two countries. In fact, Ankara views the implementation of this doctrine as tantamount to a rearmament campaign that undermines efforts for a negotiated settlement and for developing peace and stability in the region.

Other Issues. Unlike the Aegean and Cyprus disputes, which carry the danger of escalating into conflict, the minorities issue largely perpetuates and reinforces the suspicion and lack of confidence between the two sides. The official Turkish position, according to Evin, is that Greece has two policy objectives regarding the Turkish ethnic minority in western Thrace: forced assimilation and pressure to emigrate. In addition, the Greek veto of the EU’s binational protocols and the resulting wedge driven between the EU and Turkey are viewed by Ankara as not only typically self-serving Greek policies but shortsighted maneuvers that carry the danger of destabilizing regional balances in Europe’s whole southeastern frontier.

Fears of Irredentism. A major factor affecting policymaking is each side’s conviction that the other has irredentist ambitions. Turkish foreign-policy makers, Evin said, see Greek policy in the Aegean and Cyprus as driven by the express aim of gaining control of maritime areas that should be equitably shared.

According to Evin, if Greece’s collective historical memory is obsessed with Turkish occupation and rule in the former Byzantine territories, Turkish psychology is equally obsessed with the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. In this context, the Greek occupation of western Anatolia after World War I is remembered with particular vividness by Turks, since it was ultimately against those occupying Greek forces that the Turkish national war of independence was waged. In light of these memories, current Greek policy of encircling Turkey’s maritime and air connections to the Mediterranean is seen as a deliberate form of imprisonment and strangulation, Evin said. The dispassionate observer may question whether Greek policies are motivated by Greece’s own perception of Turkish threats or by a policy of containment of Turkey. To the Turks, however, there is no such ambiguity: Greek policy is one of incremental expansion at Turkey’s expense. This official Turkish interpretation finds broad resonance across public opinion in Turkey, especially since Greece brought its bilateral relations with Turkey into the EU in an attempt to demonstrate its diplomatic superiority.

How Greeks View Turkey. Turkish policymakers and the Turkish public are concerned, but not alarmed, about Greece’s moves. Even in times of tension, Evin asserted, there is notable calm in Turkey; this difference in attitude has proved helpful during especially strained moments. However, the difference reflects fundamentally different scales of challenges that Greece and Turkey face in their foreign relations. After the collapse of communism, Turkey became Greece’s unequivocal chief foreign policy aim. Turkey, on the other hand, continues to exist in a generally hostile environment, leaving Greece to occupy perhaps one-sixth of Turkey’s foreign policy problems. Under these circumstances, Evin suggested, it is nor-
normal to expect Turkey to demonstrate a more “balanced approach” to Greek-Turkish relations. Moreover, the fact that the strategic balance between the two countries shifted in Turkey’s favor with the Lausanne Peace Treaty might help explain a more relaxed Turkish attitude toward Greece. This should not be seen as a wholly positive factor, however, since it tends to increase frustrations on the Greek side.

The Greek attitude toward Turkey remains inflexible and monolithic, Evin asserted. Although there have been a number of initiatives over the past two decades to promote mutual understanding, the fact remains that whenever there is a specific case of tension, nongovernmental actors in Greece are more likely than their Turkish counterparts to follow their government’s chauvinistic line.

**Turkish Attitudes and Domestic Factors.** Though the countries demonstrate different levels of engagement and concern when mobilized, Evin continued, public opinion in both Greece and Turkey is easily manipulated by populist slogans. Bilateral issues are often used by politicians on both sides for short-term political gain and, even more important, by the media, which seek benefit in arousing public emotion. A telling example of irresponsible behavior was the case last winter involving the Turkish newspaper *Hurriyet*. By having its reporters hoist a Turkish flag on Imia/Kardak, the newspaper escalated tensions between Greece and Turkey almost to the point of war over this tiny Aegean islet. The tendency to give populist appeal precedence over professionalism—an unfortunate characteristic displayed by both Greek and Turkish media—is also reflected in the European editions of several key Turkish newspapers, which exaggerate what they see as cases of discrimination against the Turkish community in Germany.

Furthermore, the absence of any real political authority in Turkey in recent years must be taken into account. Though Turkish foreign policy has not been subject to significant turns with changes in government, certain political factors nonetheless are significant. First, Evin contended, Turkish-Greek issues are not likely to be settled without political will on both sides, and in Turkey there is a lack of political will as well as a lack of political authority because of the succession of unstable coalition governments. Under these conditions, any number of actors, from the media to the military, are able to take actions that influence Turkey’s relations with Greece, either directly or indirectly. Second is the growing isolationism in Turkey’s political arena, which stands in direct contrast to the increasing globalization of Turkish business. “Isolationism versus cosmopolitanism” now constitutes the main axis of Turkish politics, Evin said, rather than the more traditional right-left divide. Isolationist sentiments are found among religious supporters of the Islamist Refah Party, some ultranationalists in the Motherland Party (ANAP), and some “die-hard statists” in the Democratic Left Party (DSP).

Thus the country’s political axis does not necessarily divide various political parties, but cuts across them; in most parties, globalists are in the minority. Furthermore, this lack of political authority, resulting possibly in domestic instability in Turkey, would not work to Greece’s advantage in the end. A politically weak Turkey, Evin suggested, is more likely to take preemptive strategic action.

For various and often contradictory reasons, hardliners in these different parties share a suspicion of Europe and the West. Greece’s strategy of blocking the EU’s financial protocols with Turkey, Evin said, lends credit to the isolationists’ arguments that Europe is, after all, ready to accommodate Greece in that “Christian club,” while it will never show the same degree of cooperation and collegiality to Turkey. Yet Turkey’s alienation from the European camp ultimately will not benefit Greece, Evin contended. Including Turkey in a common European space, with its history of bargaining to settle disputes, will be a better way of reaching accommodation with Turkey than isolating it to look after itself in a hostile environment.
The View from Greece

The adverse mutual perceptions of Greece and Turkey are made even sharper in the new dynamics of the post–Cold War environment, said Alexis Alexandris of the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy Issues (ELIAMEP). On every dispute, each side is armed with legal or political justifications for its arguments. The key to solving the differences between them is to reduce the threat the Greeks feel from their larger neighbor and to convince the Turks that they are not encircled by Greeks in the Aegean. Referring those differences to international arbitration may provide the magic formula that leads to a comprehensive and permanent solution to the problems between Greece and Turkey.

Nevertheless, some observers of the two countries proclaim that Greeks and Turks are essentially condemned to conflict and confrontation, declared Theodore Couloubis, a professor at the University of Athens and a fellow at the United States Institute of Peace. Couloubis added, however, that throughout history there have been break points at which even seemingly immutable currents can change. Western Europe after World War II was one such break point, and some observers believe that Greece and Turkey have now come to a potential break point in their relations.

The Aegean. Two specific treaties, Alexandris noted, provide for the territorial regime of the Aegean and guarantee the inviolability of the region’s frontiers: the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne (covering the northeastern and eastern Aegean islands) and the 1947 Treaty of Paris (covering the Dodecanese islands and islets). During the post-Lausanne era, both Greece and Turkey were considered status quo countries and found common ground that was solidified in the 1930 Friendship Treaty signed by Atatürk and Venizelos. This common position helped both countries stave off outside pressures, not least from revisionist powers like Mussolini’s Italy or the Soviet Union. In fact, Alexandris said, this state of affairs lasted almost half a century, until the early 1970s.

According to Alexandris, it was during 1973–75 that Ankara, for the first time since the 1920s, questioned the status quo in the Aegean by laying claim to the eastern half of Aegean airspace and seabed rights. Turkey now claims that the border between the two countries in the Aegean lies strictly between the two mainland coasts. Yet Greece, Alexandris contended, bases its position on legal norms and prescriptions, particularly on the 1958 UN Conventions on the Law of the Sea and the 1982 Law of the Sea Treaty. These international conventions stipulate the islands’ right to a continental shelf and give coastal states the right to extend their territorial waters to twelve miles. Arguing that the delineation of the Aegean continental shelf is a legal matter, Alexandris said that the Greeks invite the Turks to refer this issue to international arbitration. However, Turkey, which has not signed the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea, maintains that the Aegean question is a political matter and must be resolved through bilateral negotiations.

The January 1996 Crisis. Despite the generally good prospects for Greek-Turkish relations, Couloubis said, they have experienced a “step-level” decline since the end of January 1996, with the dispute over the ownership of two small uninhabited islands in the Aegean. Though the Western press trivialized the nature of the dispute, it nevertheless represented a marked change in bilateral relations: for the first time since 1923 and especially since the end of World War II, Turkey challenged the territorial status quo in the Aegean. If the status of the tiny islets can be questioned, then other islands can be disputed also, increasing the insecurity of both sides. According to Greek, Turkish, and American sources, the two countries were within five minutes of war at the height of the crisis. Intervention from the Clinton administration defused the conflict, leaving many to assume that the United States will always be present to play this kind of deus ex machina role. This reasoning was used as far back as 1974, Couloubis contended, when it was said that there was no need for concern about a Turkish invasion because the United States would not permit a war between Greece and Turkey. Yet to always rely on the United States to enter at the last moment and push the two countries apart is very dangerous, because it encourages both sides to irresponsibly escalate the rhetoric to the greatest extent possible.

According to Alexandris, the January crisis escalated the conflict in the eyes of the Greeks, leading them to fear that Turkey was about to embark on a revisionist program claiming Greek territory. The dispute over the Imia islets of the Dodecanese intensified Greek apprehensions about a Turkish threat against the territorial integrity of Greece. At the same time, he said, Athens believes that Turkey increasingly resorts to “bullying tactics” so that Greece will submit to the role of “little brother” and accept Turkey’s regional su-
priority. This is a recipe for instability, Alexandris claimed, as well as a breach of the Lausanne Treaty, which established an equilibrium between the two countries. It is imperative, according to Alexandris, that all diplomatic efforts, including those by the United States, concentrate on being faithful to the Lausanne Treaty.

Had war happened, it would have been catastrophic for both countries, Couloumbis maintained. After the first shots were fired, and regardless of the tactical advantage of either side, Greece and Turkey would inevitably have entered into a protracted cycle of revanchist conflicts along the lines of those plaguing India and Pakistan or Israel and the Arab countries. The less obvious cost of such a catastrophe would be the region’s classification as a war zone, resulting in a decline in domestic and foreign investment, trade, and economic performance. Such a conflict would also have been devastating for NATO, whose new role includes peace implementation and peacekeeping, in addition to its more traditional role of collective defense.

Greeks and Turks agree about the need to settle the Aegean issues peacefully. Neither side views war as an acceptable means of conflict resolution. Nevertheless, they disagree over the nature of the conflict and the methods that should be used to resolve it, Alexandris said. As noted earlier, for Greeks the problems are legal, and for Turks they are political. During the mid-1970s, it was agreed to refer the issue of the Aegean continental shelf to international arbitration. Turkish premier Süleyman Demirel agreed to resort to the International Court of Justice at the Hague, but soon changed his mind under pressure from his coalition partners, nationalist Alparslan Türkes and Islamist Necmettin Erbakan. Thus, the international court was not given the necessary competence to adjudicate the Aegean problem. Now, Alexandris said, after twenty years of refusing to accept international arbitration, the Turks feel that to resort to such a third party would seem like a step backward. In any case, there are no guarantees that the court would rule in Greece’s favor.

Without a doubt, domestic reactions to the Aegean issues play a role in increasing tensions, Alexandris conceded. In the mid-1970s, emotions ran high among some segments of the Greek public; there were even stamps issued proclaiming the Aegean to be Greek. However, the mainstream of Greek opinion does not believe that the Aegean is an exclusively Greek lake, nor does it wish to isolate the Aegean coast of Anatolia. The Turks, Alexandris said, choose to ignore the preponderance in the Aegean of the Greek island populations, whose presence dates to ancient times. Furthermore, the Turks all-too-blithely allow tensions to escalate into a war mode, even over relatively minor issues like the right of Greek fishermen to fish in international waters at the northeastern Aegean Sea. More serious is the Turkish tendency to threaten systematically with casus belli. In fact, Alexandris said, the Turks use the term at the drop of a hat: Prime Minister Tansu Çiller used “casus belli” seven times in her statements over a period of only twelve days. The term is simply overplayed, Alexandris said, and it only adds to the tension. The Greeks have consistently condemned the Turkish threats to use force, claiming that they contravene Articles 2 and 4 of the UN Charter and the basic principles of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

**Cyprus.** Couloumbis noted the oft-expressed sense of “colonial nostalgia” for the return to Cyprus of an outside third party—the British, for example, when the two communities lived together harmoniously; the present-day mood of historic recidivism offers no satisfying alternative. Nevertheless, some progress on resolving the Cyprus dispute would be the “ultimate confidence-building measure” for Greek-Turkish relations in the Aegean and in general. Despite this, Couloumbis said, the continued presence of Turkish forces on Cyprus indicates that Turkey is using its military capability to violate the basic rule of the agreement that established the state of Cyprus: neither taksim (partition) nor enosis (union with Greece), the maximalist objectives of Turkey and Greece, respectively; if there is evidence of either, there will be no progress on the Cyprus issue.

On one level, Alexandris said, Cyprus is both the cause and the victim of continued antagonism between Greece and Turkey. On another level, Cyprus is an international problem, the attempted settlement of which has involved the United Nations, NATO, and the EU. The Greeks believe that the introduction of Turkish troops in 1974 represented a well-planned invasion of Cyprus, a position backed by the numerous UN resolutions calling for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the island. The necessary ingredients for a solution to the Cyprus problem have been on the table since the late 1970s, Alexandris maintained, yet periodic, ostensible support from Turkey for a bicomunal, bizonal, federal republic lacks substance in the Greek view.
One obstacle to finding a resolution on Cyprus, Alexandris continued, is the obstinacy and longevity of the old guard of politicians, especially Rauf Denktash, who has monopolized the Turkish Cypriot leadership since the early 1960s. However, Alexandris said, younger politicians are emerging in Turkish Cyprus, and this is encouraging. Unfortunately, these nascent political leaders cannot impact Turkish Cypriot politics decisively, because the large number of settlers on Cyprus introduced by Turkey during the past twenty years have little interest in supporting a federal system for a united Cypriot republic. On the other hand, the era has long passed when the Greek Cypriots sought enosis; today, few have any interest in relinquishing their sovereignty to be part of just another Greek province. Currently, the Greek Cypriots enjoy a high standard of living, even by European standards, and a full-fledged democratic system. Thus, they seek membership in the EU, which would reinforce the historical European identity of the island. Since the per capita income of Greek Cyprus is almost five times that of Turkish Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots have every reason to join the economic boom under the auspices of a united and democratic Cyprus.

**Minorities.** There were once 120,000 Greek Orthodox living in Turkey following the signing of the Lausanne Treaty in 1923. Today, Alexandris said, there are fewer than 3,500, leaving very little to say on the issue of the status of Greeks in the Turkish republic. In Greek Thrace, by contrast, the Muslim minority has remained at approximately 120,000. Thus the numerical equilibrium of the respective minorities in Greece and Turkey established with Lausanne has been upset. Notwithstanding the 1955–75 Greek Orthodox exodus during the greatest tensions on Cyprus, Greece has been making a noteworthy effort to integrate its Muslim minority into the Greek body politic, Alexandris claimed.

Since the early 1990s, the Greek word “ethnikos” has come into use in Greece to denote a particular ethnic group, Alexandris continued. Now, the term “Turkic” can be used to describe the Muslim minority in Greek Thrace who are Turkish but are not nationals of the Turkish republic and have no loyalty to the Turkish state, as the term “Turkic” is used to describe those peoples in Central Asia and the Caucasus who are of Turkic ethnicity but are not Turkish nationals. This term distinguishes the Turkic Muslims living in Greece, as there are also Pomak and Gypsy Muslims who have no ethnic and linguistic relation to Anatolian Turks.

**Democratic Consolidation and Internal Politics.** Alexandris also noted that both countries have made great improvements in democratic behavior in recent decades. Since 1974, when the military junta was thrown out, Greece has been a “vibrant democracy.” Since 1983, when civilian control was returned under President Turgut Özal, Turkey has returned to a lively democratic system; the participation of the Islamist Refah Party is indicative of the rise of political pluralism in the country. However, the drawback to this increased openness is the greater frequency with which politicians use foreign affairs to draw attention away from domestic problems, negatively affecting bilateral relations. In Turkey, several institutions add to this problem, including the military. The foreign policy bureaucracy in both countries also contributes to the problem; and while modernizers in the Turkish foreign ministry are a welcome sign, nationalists still control the power structure within the ministerial hierarchy, Alexandris said.

Political parties also exacerbate Greek-Turkish bilateral tensions considerably. In Turkey, there is the growing strength of the Islamists, who are isolationist and take a hard stand on bilateral issues with Greece. Similarly, in Greece, one small, particularly nationalist party consistently accuses other parties of being soft on the Turks. The good news in Greece, Alexandris continued, is that a new generation of politicians is taking power, and Greek-Turkish issues are cutting across parties as never before. Today in Greece, parties are no longer either “modernist” or “isolationist.” Rather, within major parties such as the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Pasok) and New Democracy, there are both modernists and traditionalists. Progressive views on Greek-Turkish relations are also evident in Greek public opinion. After the Imia/Kardak crisis, an ELIAMEP survey showed that 65 to 70 percent of the people favored a less adversarial approach to Turkey.

**Other Views**

Each side in the Greek-Turkish rivalry is currently engaged in a classic “prisoner’s dilemma,” said Birol Yesilada from the University of Missouri–Columbia. Communication between them, especially on an informal level, is virtually nonexistent, or sporadic at best. The negative psychological “mirror images” resurface during even the smallest crisis, reinforcing...
the most radical policy actions on both sides. The result is an ongoing policy of tit for tat, a constant and sometimes dangerous game of one-upmanship.

**Domestic Politics in Turkey.** Turkey’s current political instability as a contributing factor in Greek-Turkish tensions cannot be ignored, Yesilada said. Although the Refah Party captured only 21.4 percent of votes in December 1995, the number increased to 32.5 percent in some regional municipal elections. The party’s growing popularity bodes ill for Greek-Turkish relations, given its isolationist, anti-NATO, anti-EU platform. Moreover, Refah expresses no interest in finding a solution to the Cyprus problem. Refah leader Necmettin Erbakan may be controlled to a certain extent by being a member of a coalition government, but the party’s rank and file are not so constrained—and that is where the threat lies, not with the elites. If the 9.25 percent of votes that went to the extreme nationalist Buyuk Birlik Party (BBP) are added to Refah’s 32.5 percent, Turkish foreign policy becomes even more of a concern. There is obviously considerable mistrust of Turkey’s traditional political leaders, and unless they undertake fundamental public change, it is increasingly likely that the Islamists and nationalists will only increase their share of votes even more. That Refah and the BBP are the two parties least likely ever to compromise on bilateral issues with Greece makes the scenario threatening to the security of the entire region.

On the other hand, it may be misleading to categorize Erbakan’s foreign policy as entirely isolationist, noted Ellen Laipson of the U.S. mission to the United Nations. It calls for isolation from the West, perhaps, but engagement with the Muslim world. In the face of such a foreign policy reorientation, Greece can say that it has “tactically won the battle,” that Turkey really is different from other European countries and really has no place in the EU. Conversely, such a scenario could be less antagonistic than the current zero-sum game, in which each side tries to outprove its “Western-ness” to the other. Perhaps such a reorientation of Turkey’s foreign policy will provide a brief lull in the usual rhetoric and permit the kind of “functional coexistence” between the states that exists already in many parts of their private sectors. Caught up in the current climate of divisive and mutually reinforcing rhetoric, though, the governments will most likely be the last to realize and admit that there is a certain degree of interdependence between the two countries. Nevertheless, Laipson said, Turkey does not realistically have the option of turning to the Muslim world only. Turkey is already deeply embedded in relationships with the West, and that is not going to change.

Evin agreed that Turkey’s relations with the EU, as well as Greece’s efforts to complicate these relations, would be less frustrating were Turkey’s top foreign policy priority not European integration. It is not realistic, however, to expect that tensions between Greece and Turkey would diminish if this policy priority were to change.

It may become even more difficult for Greece and Turkey to resolve their differences when Turkish society itself is becoming increasingly—and perhaps dangerously—polarized between a modernized, urban western region and the more rural, traditional east, suggested Irene Kyriakopoulos of the National Defense University. Turkish experts have noted that because Turkey itself is not a unified country, it cannot at this time hope to become integrated with Greece or any other country in the region. Turkey is splintering, its cohesion and unity are threatened, and some observers have noted that Turkey is, in fact, two countries—divided along social, ethnic, cultural, and, increasingly, political lines. To what extent, Kyriakopoulos asked, is this “double face of Turkey” an impediment to improving relations between Turkey and Greece?

**The Balkans Factor.** Susan Woodward of the Brookings Institution questioned whether U.S. policy toward Bosnia would be a factor in Greek-Turkish relations, since the American policy of isolating Serbia could also isolate Greece. This could have repercussions for Greece’s relations with the rest of the EU and, with Turkey’s involvement, for the wider militarization of the Balkans. As far as Turkey is concerned, Evin responded, current U.S. policy toward Bosnia will not have a great effect on bilateral issues with Greece. However, if the Dayton Accords collapse and Serbia becomes more aggressive, the situation could change. In Ankara, the problems in the Aegean and with Cyprus have a completely different focus than the broader issue of the Balkans. In any case, the U.S. role in Bosnia has not been nearly as frustrating for Turkey as the inability or unwillingness of the EU to develop a viable Balkans policy over the past three years.

Greece, Alexandris said, is a “double-headed eagle, with one head in Western Europe and the other the Balkans.” The Balkans weighs heavily on Greece, geographically, culturally, and religiously, since the Serbs, Bulgarians, and Romanians are “Orthodox brothers.”
of the Greeks. Especially at the beginning of the Yugoslav conflict, there was the feeling among Greeks that they should support the Serbs, owing to their religious and cultural affinity, as well as the friendship treaty between Greece and Yugoslavia. At the same time, there was Greece’s other “head”—NATO and the EU. Despite the rhetoric about the “Islamic arch” and the “Orthodox arch” with regard to Greek-Turkish relations, Alexandris said, the problems in Bosnia will not essentially affect bilateral relations.

**CYPRUS**

Cyprus has been on the agenda of the international community for decades, stated Tozun Bahcheli, a professor at the University of Western Ontario’s King’s College and a fellow at the United States Institute of Peace. It is also an item of priority for the United States and, increasingly, for the EU. In the aftermath of the Dayton Accords, former assistant secretary of state Richard Holbrooke proclaimed that 1996 would be the year of the Cyprus settlement. Then, “the Aegean rocks intervened,” and his initiative foundered. Holbrooke did not stop thinking about Cyprus, however. He said in a June 6, 1996, *Wall Street Journal* article that if these little rocks in the Aegean nearly brought the two countries to blows, then a serious island, with serious people and a “Berlin-type wall” running through it, presents a dangerous challenge indeed.

Cyprus has a bicomunal as well as a regional dimension, though it has largely been the regional implications of the dispute that have propelled the interests of the United States and the international community. In part, Bahcheli continued, the Cyprus issue is about the difficulties for two largely separate ethnic groups that have lived side by side for more than four centuries under the roof of a joint single state. The Cyprus dispute is also partly an arena in which broader Greek and Turkish nationalisms have operated and clashed. Both of the mainlands have been extremely involved in the politics of the island and, indeed, a special role for them was formalized by international treaties making them guarantors of the island, along with the British, with the right to station a modest number of troops. At numerous times, the two mainlands have exerted their influence on Cyprus, sometimes with good intentions and other times with the purpose of gaining an advantage over the other, Bahcheli contended. An example of the former was the two countries’ negotiations that led to the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960. An example of the latter was in 1974, when the Greek military regime engineered a coup against Greek Cypriot president Makarios, and Turkey responded by dividing the island in two.

A decade before that intervention, the Greek Cypriots had the military advantage in the aftermath of the 1963 civil war leading to the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force. It was in this period, Bahcheli maintained, that the Turkish Cypriots were badly misrepresented. In place of the partnership government that had been created by the 1959 independence agreements, the Greek Cypriot leadership tried to create a new order in which Turkish Cypriots would have equal individual rights, but not the communal political rights they previously enjoyed. Then, in 1974, “the tables turned,” Bahcheli said, and the Turkish Cypriots, supported by Turkish troops, tried to dictate the terms of a new settlement that called for a federation. Bolstered by the presence of the Turkish military, the main bargaining chip in this effort has been territory, since the Turkish Cypriots’ 20 percent of the population currently holds 36 percent of the island’s territory. After the 1983 declaration of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), recognized only by Turkey, the rest of the international community continued to recognize the Greek Cypriot government as the legitimate rulers of the island, even though it does not represent the Turkish community.

**Fundamental Points of Contention**

Though repeated UN negotiation efforts have reduced some of the differences between the two sides, wide gaps on fundamental issues remain. According to Bahcheli, deep mutual mistrust continues to separate the two Cypriot communities. Turkish Cypriots fear that a settlement calling for a reunified island will result in their eventual domination by the more numerous and wealthier Greek Cypriots. Greek Cypriots do not fear the Turkish Cypriots, whom they outnumber four to one, but they do fear the continued presence of the Turkish military.

The three main issues in the UN-sponsored negotiation process have been the nature of the federation, the security arrangements, and territorial adjustments. Regarding a federation, Turkish Cypriots want to be self-governing, though they are willing to be part of a loose federation with Greek Cypriots. The latter, Bahcheli said, have long resisted the idea of a federa-
tion, though their leaders have supported the notion, provided the federal government’s authority extends to the entire island so that Greek Cypriots can move freely, settle, and purchase land wherever they want.

Paradoxically, however, there has been a growing sentiment among Greek Cypriots that the existing separation between the two communities is perhaps not such a bad idea after all. A reunited federation, Bahcheli explained, would undoubtedly involve some redistribution of power and wealth, a prospect the island’s much wealthier Greek inhabitants find unpalatable. As it stands now, they do not have to consult with the Turkish Cypriots about anything. The sentiment that federations do not always work well, though increasingly prevalent among Greek Cypriots, is not yet reflected in the position of their leaders and political parties. It can, however, be harnessed to bring about the kind of virtually self-governing entity the Turkish Cypriot community desires.

Regarding the security issue, Bahcheli continued, the problem is finding a security arrangement that satisfies both sides. While the Turkish troops provide the Turkish Cypriots with the guarantee of security, they make Greek Cypriots feel insecure. The ideal solution for now would involve a reduced number of Turkish troops with a matching number of Greek troops, a plan that was envisaged in the 1992 set of agreements. Unfortunately, the Greek Cypriots have recently implemented a new arms-purchasing program, acquiring one to two million dollars’ worth daily. This has resulted in a potentially lethal spiral as the Turks match the Greek purchases by deploying more troops and equipment and continually updating their existing stocks on the island. This is not only dangerous, Bahcheli said, but a monumental waste of money, making the need to find a settlement even more urgent. Despite the Greek Cypriots’ insecurity about the Turkish military presence, Greek Cypriot leaders display a certain “bravado,” claiming they can inflict considerable damage on the Turkish troops and even hit targets in southern Turkey. Even if such talk is largely bluster, it is alarming nevertheless.

**Territory and Population.** The territory issue should be the easiest of the three to tackle, Bahcheli said, in spite of the intransigence of Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash. The 1992 agreements call for the Turkish portion of the island to be scaled back to 28.2 percent; Denktash has agreed to 29 percent—less than 1 percentage point different. While Ankara may have to provide a “push” to settle the matter, a similar pressure will have to come from the Greek Cypriots, who have not yet accepted the idea that they must make space for Turkish Cypriots on what many still firmly believe to be a Hellenic island. Alexandris asserted that, while Turkish Cypriots are going to have their own “space” within a federal Cyprus, Greek Cypriot refugees must have the right to their property and the choice, in principle, to return to their homes. It is quite unlikely that a great many Greek Cypriots would choose to reside in a Turkish Cypriot zone of a federal Cyprus, but a small percentage of them would do so if for no other reason than to maintain the Greek churches there. Such an arrangement might alleviate Greek Cypriot indignation over the current situation.

Bahcheli did not disagree, but noted that Greek Cypriots have unrealistically insisted for many years that all of the island’s inhabitants be allowed to return to their homes. Nelson C. Ledsky, currently head of democracy development programs for the former Soviet Union at the National Democratic Institute, concurred and noted that Greek Cypriots were unwise to support refugee groups from northern Cyprus so strongly. As a result, the Greek Cypriot electoral system gives Greek Cypriots an incentive to stubbornly maintain their identity as refugees from the north, and these refugee groups operate as a bloc that has obtained considerable political power. By maintaining their status as refugees, Greek Cypriot political elites have diminished the chances for wider reconciliation, Ledsky said.

**Had war happened, it would have been catastrophic for both countries,** Couloumbis maintained.

**The View from the Mainlands.** According to Bahcheli, Greece would like to see the removal of all, or at least most, of the Turkish troops on Cyprus and a reunification of what it believes is truly a Hellenic is-
land. Removal of the Turkish troops would “soothe Greek pride” and reduce the danger of a southward movement of those troops under some pretext. Although it is unlikely that Turkish troops would ever encroach on more of the island’s territory, Greeks view the Turkish military occupation as the shape of things to come in the Aegean as well. The fundamental Greek fear is that Turkey would attempt to undertake a strategy of partition in the Aegean similar to what unfolded in Cyprus.

Turkey’s most important goal for Cyprus is to retain its status as guarantor of Turkish Cypriots’ rights. The surest way of realizing this goal, Bahcheli continued, is to maintain a sufficient military presence on Cyprus. Turks acknowledge that a future settlement would require a reduction in the number of Turkish troops, but that a small contingent would have to be retained for the protection of the Turkish Cypriot community. The Turks also support self-rule for the Turkish Cypriots, though they are not necessarily adamant about an independent Turkish Cypriot state. What they wish may be impossible, but they still advocate a self-governing entity that is part of a bizonal federation.

The Greeks say that without a Cyprus settlement there can be no improvement in Greek-Turkish relations, Bahcheli said. Turks, for their part, do not believe that a settlement will necessarily lead to an improvement in their bilateral relations with Greece. However, without a settlement on Cyprus, the Turks’ prospects for developing closer relations with the EU will be frustrated. In the end, this fact may be what motivates Ankara to play a more active role in the search for a definitive Cyprus settlement.

**A Negotiator’s Perspective**

Ambassador Nelson Ledsky, who served for three years as the U.S. special coordinator for Cyprus, compared Greek-Turkish disputes in the Aegean with the Cyprus conflict. Unlike the Aegean disputes, in which Greece and Turkey are the primary players and have the capacity to make decisions that will either resolve or exacerbate the problems, Cyprus is different. Cyprus is a “dog where the tail is in charge, and the tail is made up of the two communities in Cyprus who have spent the last forty years wagging the big dogs in Athens and Ankara,” Ledsky observed. Those who assume that the two capitals can easily deal with the “tail” are quite mistaken. Though Cyprus is the most difficult dispute between Greece and Turkey, it is one in which the two countries are “second-rung” actors. Ignoring that fact, Ledsky said, has led to many of the failures to find a resolution to the conflict.

Cyprus, said Ledsky, “is the issue that ignites the populations of the two mainlands” and must be addressed if their bilateral relations are going to improve in the long term. It is not necessary to resolve the Aegean issues before the Cyprus dispute can be tackled. At the very least, he said, Cyprus should enter the realm of negotiations at the same time and on the same level as Aegean issues.

Ledsky contended that a Cyprus settlement will be reached in one of two ways: Either the two communities themselves will reach an understanding, or the international community will devise and impose a solution. The latter has been tried before—in the 1959 and 1960 London-Zurich Agreements, of which Greece and Turkey were a part. This solution did not last; but if all else fails, Ledsky said, the international community will have to make another attempt. The issue is the manner in which the attempt is made.

**Missed Opportunities.** There have been three occasions over the past two decades when there were good prospects for an understanding on Cyprus. The first time, Ledsky said, was in 1977–78, when President Carter’s special envoy indirectly gained an acceptance from Greek Cypriot leader Archbishop Makarios for a bizonal, bicommunal settlement. Unfortunately, Makarios was willing to allow the Turks only 20 percent of the island, which they never would have accepted. Nonetheless, it was a beginning.

High-level agreements reached in 1978–79 would have provided a settlement for Cyprus had Makarios not died. His successor, Spyros Kyprianou, regretfully called a halt to all negotiations going on at the time. It was not until 1985–86 that he engaged in a serious round of negotiations at the United Nations with Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash, during which the two Cypriot leaders essentially reached the basic outline for an agreement but vacillated when it was time to initial the document. Unfortunately, Ledsky said, “there was no one in Washington or the United Nations who insisted that these two men throw away their airplane tickets and reach an agreement before they went home.”

A similar situation came in 1992, when a set of ideas was negotiated between the Turkish government and the United Nations, with support from President Vassiliou of Cyprus. The ideas were endorsed by the UN Security Council and were published together with a map of a territorial com-
promise. At an August 1992 meeting in New York between the two Cypriot leaders, Denktash was reminded of his own statement that he would accept a settlement giving Turkish Cypriots approximately 29 percent of the island’s territory. Yet Denktash rejected the various plans showing how the 29 percent could be arranged and returned to Cyprus without any agreement, thus ending the third, most serious attempt at a resolution.

Since then, the issue has been given greater attention than ever before. The United States has two or three Cyprus coordinators, the Commonwealth and the EU each have one, and the United Nations has a special representative to the Cyprus dispute. Daily meetings, including Track Two diplomacy efforts, produce a plethora of ideas for confidence-building measures (CBMs), yet since 1992 there has been no progress on finding a settlement.

**The Main Issues.** Three fundamental problems must be overcome before there can be progress on the Cyprus issue, Ledsky said.

First, the Turkish government must withdraw its recognition of the TRNC. “There can be no settlement on Cyprus as long as Turkey maintains that Northern Cyprus can have an independent identity as a separate state,” Ledsky contended. There simply cannot be an independent Turkish Cypriot state. The attitude of the mainland Turks—that Turkish Cyprus has been separate, and thus de facto independent, for thirty years—is a position the Turkish government must abandon.

On the Greek side, the problems are twofold. First, the Greeks must accept that they cannot have the whole island—they must give up something in return for a settlement, Ledsky said. There must be some portion of the island where the Turks feel secure and free, not least from Greek Cypriots buying up the land. This may sound like apartheid, Ledsky said, and many will not be happy with this reality, but the Turks must know that a part of the island is theirs. “As long as the Cyprus dispute is categorized as a moral issue of right and wrong, or black and white, the Turks will not sign a document calling for a federated state,” Ledsky contended. A settlement must contain some recognition of Turkish Cypriot separateness, and the Turkish Cypriots must have control over some part of the island.

Second, unhappy as they may be to hear this, the Greeks must stop using the international community and other actors—including the American lobby, the EU, the OSCE, and the United Nations—as weapons against the Turks in the hope of bringing about a maximalist solution. Consequently, the United States must be careful in pushing for an agreement. Ledsky said that in many Turks’ minds, the United States, regardless of which party occupies the White House, is seen as an agent of the Greek lobby (and thus the Greek government), which pushes for a Cyprus settlement only for domestic political reasons. This is particularly the case in an election year. Paradoxically, the United States is also the only country in the world that the Turks view as a potential friend; thus, it can play the role of mediator, but only with some understanding of Turks’ suspicions.

Similarly, Turks will never consider the Europeans to be honest brokers, especially not as long as Greece is a member of the EU and Turkey is not. Therefore, EU membership for Cyprus will not help bring the two sides together but will continue to divide them.

**The Role of the United Nations.** According to Ledsky, there is only one institution that can help find a resolution: the United Nations. Though this institution is routinely disparaged and derided and has its own very serious problems, it is the “only institution that can deliver the goods over the long run.” All that is required is for the five permanent members of the UN Security Council to work together to empower the United Nations to do for Cyprus what it has not done for thirty years—facilitate a negotiated settlement between the two Cypriot communities. Up to now, Ledsky said, the United Nations has had its troops in Cyprus “walking the Green Line,” living off the benevolence of the Greek Cypriot community. As soon as the UNFICYP commander suggests that one side actually do something to relieve tensions and settle problems, he is sent away and a new commander arrives on the island with instructions that he do and say very little. The reality is that, until now, the UN has not had the authority from the Security Council to carry out a serious peacekeeping operation on Cyprus.

In addition, Ledsky continued, the UN Security Council resolutions must be enforced. All of the documents endorsed by the full Security Council must be examined and finally carried out, step by step, with the agreement of both sides—which will be possible. At the same time, it is of no use to develop a series of CBMs separate from the UN negotiations. There have been discussions about reopening the Nicosia airport since 1974, an old idea passed off as a new CBM. All CBMs must be connected with the UN negotiating process that puts together a bicommmunal, bizonal
state, Ledsky said. The required documents and agreements for a settlement have been concluded, including the demilitarization agreements that were part of the 1992 settlement calling for a gradual reduction of troops and supervision of forces under UN control. “The notion of new initiatives, new documents, new negotiations, is nonsense,” Ledsky said. The UN must now be given the authority to begin to enforce the settlements already reached.

UNFICYP was given a mandate in 1963 only to separate the two communities, a mandate that has been renewed every six months for thirty-three years. After the Turkish invasion in 1974, Ledsky explained, the mandate was altered slightly, unintentionally enabling the “ethnic cleansing” and shifting of populations on the island. Thus, the peacekeeping force can only walk a fine line between the two communities, preventing potentially violent incidents but doing little more. UNFICYP’s commander cannot encourage negotiations, which have been on the initiative of the UN secretary general or his special diplomatic representative. That UNFICYP cannot even propose a solution to problems that develop on the ground underscores the need for the UN force to be given the same “intrusive” mandate on Cyprus that other UN contingents have in dealing with other conflicts around the world.

Moreover, the Security Council must give the secretary general and his designated representatives the mandate to implement any of the dozens of resolutions on Cyprus the council itself has already approved since 1977. The days of the Cold War rift that prevented a Security Council consensus on an issue like Cyprus are over. A five-power agreement on Cyprus in the Security Council is relatively easy, Ledsky said, and a fifteen-nation agreement is also possible. Such an agreement, though, would require a change in the way the U.S. government views the UN role in Cyprus, a subject of debate among U.S. policymakers for over a decade. Some want to see the UN troops removed. Others want them to stay, supplemented by special coordinators, envoys, and negotiators from the United States.

The sticking points in any agreement, Ledsky said, can be resolved at a special meeting that includes only the Greeks, the Turks, the two Cypriot communities, and the UN Security Council, with no one allowed to leave until all parties sign.

**Denktash and Turkey.** Yesilada pointed out that concluding a settlement in such a way will not be as Ledsky suggests; Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash will refuse, as he has repeatedly done. Moreover, Denktash has supporters in Turkish political circles, including Bulent Ecevit, head of a smaller but pivotal party in Turkey, and in the Turkish military. In short, Denktash cannot be ignored. Bahcheli agreed, but pointed out that successive governments in Ankara have not always seen eye to eye with Denktash—for example, when Ankara supported the CBMs in 1993 and Denktash did not. Nevertheless, Denktash has developed a certain “privileged relationship” with various important political figures and members of the Turkish media and military on whom he can count for support. Not only does this make him somewhat of a political figure in Turkey, but, Bahcheli said, he is somewhat of a hero in the country and is able to capitalize on his popularity to defy Ankara time and again. Currently, the Turkish government does not find the Greek Cypriot position acceptable, so it gives Denktash its unqualified support. Carol Migdalowitz of the Library of Congress noted that the majority of Turkey’s political parties currently support Denktash’s point of view, making any major initiatives, not to mention concessions, unlikely.

Ledsky acknowledged that while Denktash will not easily agree to a settlement, the Turkish government can force him to accept one if certain demands are met. This is why, Ledsky said, there must be a larger international conference at which all sides are present, including and especially the Turks. Once an agreement is signed, Ledsky maintained, Denktash will implement it. Turkey has a compelling reason to accept a bizonal, bicommunal settlement for Cyprus: an improved relationship with the United States, especially the U.S. Congress. As long as the Cyprus issue remains contentious, Turkey’s relations with Congress and with the Greek community in the United States will be bad. The Turks have a strong desire to see that improved. Once the Cyprus issue is settled, the way is clear for Turkey to open a new relationship with the United States; after all, it is the Cyprus issue that unites the Greek community in the United States. Ledsky stated that the U.S. government has on numerous occasions made it very clear to Denktash that it would never recognize the TRNC and that the only acceptable solution would be a federated state. The Turkish Cypriots would have to be protected, but they would be part of one bizonal state.

**The Need for Security.** The reason why the Cyprus problem has not been resolved all these years, according to Kyriakos Markides of the University of Maine, is that no one has been able to find the formula that
would reassure each side that it does not have to fear the other. Despite what many now believe, Greeks and Turks lived together peacefully on Cyprus for centuries, mainly because they were not competing with each other for power. From 1878 to 1960, Great Britain was the third party ruling the island, and when British rule was coming to an end in the late 1950s, the island’s Greek and Turkish communities began to fight each other. This is why, Markides said, the 1960 agreements and constitution fell apart; as a result, both sides began to arm themselves to deal with their insecurity. A federation may be good on paper, but in reality it must address the central issue of security.

Unfortunately, Ledsky said, the security issue will likely never be resolved fully. The best solution would be along the lines laid out in the 1992 documents, in which both sides agreed to a gradual reduction in forces to an agreed level and the maintenance of a demarcation line between the two zones, or two parts of the federation, that cannot be crossed by either side. An external force on the island is not necessarily going to make people feel more secure, and, in any case, a part of their freedom would be lost as a result.

It is clear, Ledsky concluded, that both sides will not yet accept the notion of a federation, but the path to such mutual acceptance has been laid down. Unlike the problems in the Middle East and Bosnia, two other seemingly intractable and frustrating conflicts, the Cyprus dispute does not involve deep enmity between the two sides. The 1960 agreement fell apart because it was a bad agreement, Ledsky said, not because the two sides were not prepared to live and work together. Track Two diplomacy has worked in the past and can do more in the future, because when Greeks and Turks are together, Ledsky said, they can and do get along.

OPTIONS FOR PROMOTING RECONCILIATION

**Negotiations**

In some protracted conflicts, only a crisis can move enemies to reconciliation, though this need not be the case with Greece and Turkey. Former Turkish prime minister Yılmaz’s suggestions for proceeding with bilateral negotiations and bringing in third-party mediation, arbitration, or adjudication where disagreements are greatest deserve serious consideration, Couloumbis said, and should be followed up. Moreover, he said, for any negotiations to be successful, both sides must resist the temptation to define interests in territorial (revisionist) terms. The goal should be not territorial aggrandizement, but economic interdependence.

**The Aegean.** Two basic principles should be underscored, and the acceptance of the first by Greece presupposes the simultaneous acceptance of the second by Turkey, Couloumbis said. The first principle is that the Aegean will not be transformed into a Greek lake. One way to secure Turkey’s acceptance would be to stipulate that the territorial waters and airspace for both Greece and Turkey are to extend six miles for the Aegean islands and twelve miles for the mainland (including Crete and other islands close to the mainland of Greece). The main aim is to keep the Aegean open. With respect to the continental shelf, negotiations would be necessary for a *compromis d’arbitrage,* turning these types of disputes over to the International Court of Justice. The negotiations would satisfy Turkey, Couloumbis contended, and the *compromis* and adjudication by the international court would satisfy Greece. According to Couloumbis, this would also take care of the territorial airspace question (Greece has observed a ten-nautical-mile limit since 1931). The International Civil Aviation Organization deals with airspace issues, and the current status quo should be accepted as a minimum. These proposals are not suggested as a point of departure for negotiation but, rather, as a mutually acceptable end state or strategic compromise that will allow the two countries to normalize their relations.

The second principle, according to Couloumbis, is to ensure that the Aegean will not become divided or delimited so that the Greek islands of the eastern Aegean and the Dodecanese are enclosed in a Turkish zone of functional responsibility. This is important, Couloumbis said, because the Turkish position often describes the Aegean as a river with west and east banks and nothing in between. Yet there is quite a bit in between, Couloumbis noted: three thousand islands and islets forming an archipelago that is part of Greece’s territory and that contains, if Crete and the Ionian islands are added, close to one-fourth of Greece’s population. The Aegean Sea simply cannot be partitioned down the middle as if there were nothing between the two countries, Couloumbis argued, whether for military command and control or any other purpose.

Since there is unfortunately not much reason to expect agreement on these issues in the immediate future, the Aegean dispute should simply be “frozen”
for thirty to forty years, Couloumbis suggested. This “Antarctica approach” should be accompanied by a joint Greek-Turkish agreement to proscribe the threat or use of force by either side; such an agreement could be guaranteed by NATO. The treaty on Antarctica is a good model for postponing disagreements indefinitely; neither side gives up its claims in the hope that some of the players responsible for the intransigence eventually will disappear from the scene. Bahcheli agreed with a freeze on the current status quo and contended that the Turks would also support such a proposal. “It is very much in Turkey’s interest to maintain the status quo in the Aegean,” he said.

Cyprus: A Role for NATO. Monteagle Stearns, former U.S. ambassador to Greece, noted that the sense of insecurity between the two Cypriot communities is reflected in the way that Turkey and Greece view each other. Cyprus is now an “armed camp,” and it is unlikely that the United Nations, after more than thirty years on the job, is in a position to restore security. NATO is the only organization with the strength and credibility to secure peace and create security, especially now that it is being transformed into more of a peacekeeping organization. And while Stearns said the time is not right for Cyprus to become a NATO member, at some point a NATO force could replace the thirty thousand Turkish troops as they slowly withdraw. There is simply no other organization in a position to do this, Stearns said.

As the situation now stands, Couloumbis said, the formula for a Cyprus settlement involves the creation of a federal, bizonal, bicomunal entity in accordance with the Makarios-Denktash agreement of 1977 and the Kyprianou-Denktash agreement of 1979. In the post–Cold War milieu, it makes sense that a settlement package should be accompanied by a simultaneous accession of Cyprus to the EU and NATO. As Stearns suggested, NATO would then provide the security mechanism necessary for the Turkish Cypriot community to feel that Turkish forces, as part of NATO, will also be part of that implementation force. This will have an enormous psychological impact for Turkish Cypriots.

Yesilada disagreed with the idea of introducing a NATO force on Cyprus, noting that in most surveys Cypriot citizens find the presence of NATO troops unacceptable; moreover, virtually all of the major political players and parties would object. Alexandris was also skeptical about the character of a NATO force, claiming that the majority of the Greek Cypriot population would not feel more secure with NATO forces on the island. By maintaining Turkish and Greek contingents on the island, even under NATO auspices, the two communities will only become more polarized. A better solution would be demilitarization coupled with an international police force that could bring a sense of security through policing. The NATO idea is a “nonstarter,” agreed Bahcheli, since it is not clear exactly what a NATO force would enforce. Yet instead of an international police force, a more realistic notion is the presence on Cyprus of a modest Turkish force, under Turkish command, to protect the Turkish Cypriot community and an equivalent Greek force for the Greek Cypriots. A NATO observer force is a possibility, Bahcheli said, but NATO troops would be extremely reluctant to get involved as full-fledged enforcers.

A Wider Role for NATO and the United States. Bahcheli emphasized that, despite concerns about the role of NATO troops, the United States is the principal outside player that can help to bring about a settlement on Cyprus, because, unlike others, it has a credible relationship with all four sides. One of the most difficult challenges for the United States will be to ensure through skillful coordination that all four sides will support any agreement that is reached. Currently, given the absence of a clear authority in Ankara, Turkey is at least one side that will find it difficult to accept any concessions at all. In that regard, the prospect of EU membership may open a window of opportunity, and the United States should capitalize on it.

A wider role for the United States should be precrisis prevention through NATO, Couloumbis said, with the aim of keeping any disagreement from escalating to the level of the January 1996 Imia/Kardak crisis. Such precrisis techniques should be institutionalized so that they can be implemented before both countries move close to the brink of war. More institutionalization of such conflict-prevention procedures and more multilateralism in the foreign policies of Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus will lower the threshold of cooperation. Moreover, the time is ripe for the establishment of an intra-NATO dispute settlement mechanism, since the organization cannot withstand much longer the anomaly of its increasing role as a force for peace while two or more of its own members are mired in a protracted conflict. If nothing else, its legitimacy would be called into question.

The European Union. Membership in the EU is the only viable approach to a Cyprus solution, said Yesi-
lada. Turkey’s potential membership in the EU, Turkey’s participation in the EU’s customs union, and the Cyprus problem are all linked. However, elites on the Greek Cypriot side who benefit from the status quo do not want to see a solution through the European Union. Turkish Cypriots would acquire economic benefits in EU membership, but the territorial problem—freedom of movement and settlement, property rights, etc.—would remain. No member of the EU is exempt from its rules, and Turkish Cypriots simply are not ready for them. In fact, few Turkish Cypriots even know much about the EU. Moreover, said Yesilada, it is extremely unlikely that the EU will accept the membership of only half the island, since it does not want to inherit the problem. In any case, the trump card for the Turks is that Cyprus cannot join any organization in which any one of the three guarantor powers (Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey) is not a member.

Greek Cypriots, Bahcheli pointed out, are very anxious to get into the EU, so anxious that the Turkish Cypriots have become suspicious. The Greek Cypriots desire membership not so much for its economic benefits, but for the political and security advantages, and they are willing to join the EU even without the Turkish Cypriot northern part of the island. “Turkish Cypriots,” according to Bahcheli, “believe there is a trap here.” Despite the lure of economic benefits, EU membership may not help with a Cyprus settlement, and suspicions remain among Turkish Cypriots, said Bahcheli. It is likely that the Turkish Cypriots will continue to play a “waiting game” until they obtain some political concessions from the EU, such as direct negotiations. This does not mean they are angling for recognition, which they know they will not get, but they are seeking acknowledgment of their separate identity through being allowed to sit at the negotiating table as representatives of the Turkish Cypriot community. Alan Makovsky of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy suggested that EU membership for Turkey may be the one “carrot” that would compel Turkey to pressure Denktash into accepting a settlement on Cyprus. Owing to Denktash’s popularity in Turkey, it is unlikely that any Turkish politician would see any benefit in pressuring him into an agreement.

Once the accession talks between the Republic of Cyprus and the EU begin, Couloumbis said, the question will be, Does Cyprus enter the EU as an entity, or does the part of Cyprus not under Turkish military control enter the EU by itself, with an “empty chair” for the rest of Cyprus? In other words, is Cyprus a “hostage” of a settlement in which one of the two sides has a longtime leader who refuses to opt for the dozens of alternative arrangements, preventing Cyprus from entering the EU? Accession to the EU may work as an impediment, but it may also work as a lever to move the two communities toward a settle-

Despite the lure of economic benefits, EU membership may not help with a Cyprus settlement, and suspicions remain among Turkish Cypriots, said Bahcheli.
on Cyprus is illegal. However, if persuasion is necessary to obtain Turkish approval for an agreement, the remark was inappropriate. In short, Bahcheli said, the EU cannot play an impartial role in Cyprus because Greece is a member of the body and Turkey is not.

**Track Two Diplomacy**

Evin suggested the need for low-key initiatives that are explicitly not meant to be “showcase” projects or interstate-level negotiations. Rather, he pointed to the need to establish a group of stakeholders, including academics, former policymakers, and others, to devise and construct ways to deal with Greek-Turkish bilateral issues. This group, whose efforts would have to somehow avoid the possible derailing effects of media sensationalism, would attempt to build common ground between the two countries.

Yesilada and Alexandris agreed with the idea of Track Two measures, bringing the opposing sides—particularly the two Cypriot communities—together because they simply do not know each other. Among members of Cyprus’s younger generations, there has been virtually no contact. One important type of initiative, according to Sabri Sayari of the Institute for Turkish Studies, is to change each country’s perception of the other, beginning with children’s education. For example, history textbooks used in Turkey frequently portray the Greeks as the enemy. By adulthood, citizens in both countries are thoroughly socialized into thinking of the other country as the enemy, which makes other conflict-resolution initiatives difficult. Frankly, said Sayari, each country needs to rewrite its official history. Theophanis Stavrou of the University of Minnesota concurred, emphasizing that much of the vocabulary of the past must be done away with. For example, few Greek Cypriots, Stavrou said, seriously consider enosis possible or even desirable, making it meaningless and even harmful to continue using the term.

Makovsky suggested that the multilateral-track approach of the Middle East peace process may hold some useful lessons on how Greek-Turkish peace can be fostered at the official level (as opposed to nonofficial Track Two efforts) without either party having to compromise on its political positions.

The little publicized multilateral track began shortly after the 1991 Middle East peace conference in Madrid. Thirteen Arab states, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and Israel, as well as interested outsiders such as the United States, the EU, and Japan, held negotiations on regional issues like economic development, water management, and regional security. Because most of the Arab states did not formally recognize Israel, Makovsky said, multilateral efforts focused on developing regional plans and projects that would be implemented only after Israel and its immediate neighbors achieved peace.

In the course of those negotiations, two unanticipated dynamics developed: Israeli and Arab technical experts came to develop close working relationships, and the two sides made progress toward improved relations and implementation of CBMs. Although the Arab-Israeli and Greek-Turkish disputes are not entirely analogous, Makovsky continued, Greek-Turkish negotiations on areas of potential bilateral cooperation—with deferred implementation, if necessary, until certain bilateral political disputes are resolved—could be useful in forming a vision of the practical benefits of peace, building incentives for peace, and developing a constituency of peace on both sides.

While Alexandris agreed that such multilateral efforts were possible, he also noted that Greek-Turkish relations, bad as they may be, have never involved the degree of enmity that has characterized Arab-Israeli relations. There have been no wars between the two countries in recent decades and government ministers do talk to each other frequently. On a personal level, in fact, Greek-Turkish relations can be quite good.

**Media, Tourism, and Business.** Another need, according to Evin, is the creation of reasonable media to promote regional stability rather than unilateral advantage in the arena of public opinion. In addition, efforts should encourage informed coverage of bilateral issues in at least one of the main dailies in both countries, paralleled by television commentary (which is fairly easy in Turkey, since press barons tend to own both newspapers and private television channels).

Evin said the United States could also provide incentives for small joint commercial ventures in Turkey and Greece, particularly those that involve close collaboration between the two countries.

Yesilada also noted the importance of economic interdependence. Who would have thought soon after World War II, he asked, that France and Germany would be as economically intertwined as they are today? This should be a model for Greece and Turkey.

Bahcheli expressed skepticism about exactly how the economies of Greece and Turkey, or even Greek
and Turkish industries, could be integrated. In any case, it is not clear, Bahcheli said, how that would necessarily make a difference in the pursuit of their national interests in Cyprus and the Aegean. Moreover, Couloumbis said, it would help to have examples of the kinds of industries under discussion, given that both countries have small industrial sectors, while the service industry is big in both Turkey and Greece. Evin acknowledged that economic and business integration could not be considered a primary step toward the harmonization of Greek-Turkish relations, as the goal is very long term. However, the EU is frequently mentioned as a model of how economic integration can promote political stability.

**CONCLUSION**

There is no easy or quick solution to the problems separating Greece and Turkey. Centuries of suspicion and rivalry followed by decades of bitter disputes will not unravel upon the dispatch of an envoy or the passing of a resolution. Until both countries are able to acknowledge at least that the other side has a legitimate point of view, many disputes between these two countries will go unresolved.

The disputes between Turkey and Greece are not, however, irremediable, and there are some political incentives on both sides to see them resolved. Greece would gain a great measure of stability in the region and a reprieve on arms spending. The incentives are perhaps greater for Turkey, which would see not only a measure of calm in the Aegean region but also a marked improvement in its relationship with the United States—and especially Europe. Moreover, despite the mutual suspicion that exists at the state level, there is a measure of goodwill among individuals that is not usually found in similar long-term conflicts.

Three organizations were suggested as potential players in negotiating and maintaining a settlement on a number of regional questions, particularly on Cyprus: the United Nations, the EU, and NATO. The EU, however, will be unlikely to take a lead in such efforts, since it is viewed by the Turks as hopelessly partial toward Greece. Though NATO has the advantage of being considered a more trustworthy organization by both sides, its active participation in resolving regional disputes—such as deploying troops in Cyprus—would probably not be effective, since many Cypriots will resent the presence of troops, who would, in any case, be reluctant to become actively engaged. That leaves the United Nations, which has the stigma of having been part of the stalemate on the island for over thirty years. Nevertheless, a redefinition of the UN role and mission, backed up by the Security Council, may enable that organization to become something more than a caretaker of the current standoff.

Unfortunately, there remain considerable domestic political incentives for politicians in both Greece and Turkey to continue to posture and grandstand on their differences, making compromise extremely difficult. This leads to the question of whether Turkish and Greek politicians can resist the easy temptation to manipulate national pride and agitated emotions for short-term political gain. Such is the atmosphere that must be overcome to make progress on resolving the region’s simmering conflicts.

Further discussion on Greek-Turkish relations should start with an understanding of these realities. Neither side can “win,” and both must be prepared to give up some demands. The next stage would be an assessment of precisely which points each side could yield on and live with, a process that could be pursued through bilateral negotiations or through the
A series of incidents that claimed five lives during the summer and fall of 1996 in Cyprus has highlighted the underlying tensions as well as the potential for greater violence on the island. The end of the Cold War has brought about changes that have had a substantial impact not only on the external environment of Cyprus but also on the external parties—particularly Greece and Turkey—that have been deeply involved for years in the island's politics. The effect on the internal equation in Cyprus, however, has been minimal.

In spite of the impact of the Cold War's end, much remains the same in Cyprus, even though the island is acutely susceptible to influences beyond its shores.

With Cyprus still struggling to manage and ultimately settle its forty-year-old conflict, the end of the Cold War has ushered in political fragmentation and a proliferation of ethnic disputes that have created havoc in the island's vicinity and virtually everywhere else. The world has witnessed the terrible consequences of ethnic disputes in the former Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia. In the Caucasus, too, ethnic rivalries and disputed borders are at the heart of several ongoing minor and major conflicts. For example, the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh, located in Azerbaijan, have asserted their independence and have joined ranks with Armenian nationals to occupy a large swath of Azerbaijan's territory. Turkey is waging an increasingly difficult struggle against Kurdish separatists in its southeastern provinces.

To be sure, there exists a strong bias against secessionist movements in the international community. This is understandable, given the threat of ethnic separatism faced by the majority of the world's states. Nonetheless, recent experiences of the former Yugoslavia and the Soviet successor states, as well as the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia, suggest that the international taboo against secession has weakened. This change may be encouraging to the Turkish Cypriot leadership, which has sought, unsuccessfully, to win recognition for the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) from states other than just Turkey.

Needless to say, the international community takes a dim view of borders created by force of arms. But at the same time, the world’s leading powers have shown a tendency to acquiesce in the separation of warring ethnic groups for the sake of preserving regional peace: The Bosnia agreement, reached under U.S. auspices at Dayton, Ohio, in November 1995, is a case in point. Its potential relevance to Cyprus was cited by former U.S. assistant secretary of state Richard Holbrooke, who helped negotiate the Dayton Accords. Holbrooke spoke of applying the “Bosnia model” to the island, but his plan to tackle the Cyprus issue in February 1996 was abandoned because of the Greek-Turkish confrontation in the Aegean just before the Cyprus initiative was scheduled to begin.

UN FATIGUE IN CYPRUS

How the international management of the region’s other ethnic disputes will affect Cyprus is unclear at this point. Yet Cyprus is already feeling the effects of a strained UN budget as an increasing number of ethnic conflicts around the world have stretched the resources of the international organization.

The United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) has been reduced and currently stands at just over a thousand troops; further disengagement, and even total withdrawal, cannot be ruled out. After all, it has been over thirty years since UNFICYP was dispatched to the island in April 1964, and many observers have argued that by instilling a modicum of stability on the island, the peacekeeping force has diminished the urgency of a settlement between the island’s two major communities.

Clearly, though, both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaderships continue to see some utility in the continued presence of UNFICYP, although not for the
same reasons. For the Turkish Cypriots, protected by Turkish troops since 1974, the UN force serves only a limited purpose: it is useful insofar as it maintains some stability along the Green Line buffer zone that separates the two communities. UNFICYP diminishes the likelihood that a small incident along the Green Line would quickly escalate into serious hostilities. Both the Turkish Cypriot and Turkish leaderships would prefer avoiding a new crisis on Cyprus, in spite of Turkey’s huge military presence and proximity to the island. The current territorial division is as favorable to the Turkish Cypriots as it is unacceptable to the Greek Cypriots. It is the Turkish forces, not UNFICYP, that provide the effective deterrent to the Greek Cypriots, who would prefer the opportunity to alter the post-1974 territorial status quo.

The relative stability maintained by UNFICYP also serves the interests of Greek Cypriots, whose forces are weaker than those of Turkey that are stationed on the island. However, for the Greek Cypriot leadership, the greater utility of the UN force lies in securing the continued involvement of the world body (and specifically the Security Council, which authorized UNFICYP) in the Cyprus issue. This is consistent with the Greek Cypriot policy of internationalizing the conflict as a means of exerting pressure on the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey. Greek Cypriot leaders have been concerned enough about the end of UNFICYP’s mandate that they have campaigned to ensure its continuation, even paying (along with the Greek government) nearly half of its expenses since June 1993.

In any case, the international community has had to respond to more pressing and bloodier crises of the type that have raged in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. UN officials have repeatedly complained about the financial burden of UNFICYP, which has cost the organization over $2 billion since its initial deployment. In November 1992, after the ‘set of ideas’ formulated by UN secretary general Boutros-Ghali failed to achieve progress in the New York summit talks between the island’s Greek and Turkish leaders, Canadian minister of external affairs Barbara McDougall warned, “We have been there for 28 years. We do not intend to stay there longer,” referring to Canada’s contingent in UNFICYP. The Canadians did, in fact, withdraw by the end of 1993.

In spite of the scaling down of the UN’s physical presence on the island, one cannot help but be impressed with the recent flurry of diplomatic activity designed to achieve a political breakthrough on the island. President Clinton has stated that the United States will make a special effort to bring about a Cyprus settlement. The European Union (EU) has also been active—more than ever before—in working toward a settlement. In part, this level of engagement can be explained by the desire of the United States and the EU, as well as the United Nations, to claim success in resolving a notable case of protracted ethnic conflict in the world. It would certainly be a welcome boost for the United Nations to secure a settlement in Cyprus at a time when the organization’s credibility has been undermined by failures in such missions as Bosnia, Rwanda, and Somalia. Yet it is uncertain whether the Greek Cypriot leadership will be able to sustain the interest of the world body and the leading powers for many more years. As Joe Clark, the UN secretary general’s former envoy to Cyprus, bluntly stated in a December 1993 interview, “‘the United Nations will walk away’ if no progress was made with the package of confidence-building measures that was promoted by the UN Secretariat. Clark was further reported as saying that “it is essential for Cypriots of both ethnic communities to realize that they are extremely fortunate to have so many world leaders—Bill Clinton, John Major, Helmut Kohl—lobbying Greece and Turkey to exert their influence on communal leaders in Cyprus. This has been a priority matter, well beyond what one might say its merits were; that is not lost on anybody.”

The Cypriot communities have continued to participate in UN-sponsored negotiations, not necessarily because of any realistic expectation of a favorable outcome, but because of the uncertainties that would arise with the termination of UN involvement. The external parties with a stake in managing the conflict—namely, the United States and the United Kingdom, and the EU as a whole—also support the continued involvement of the United Nations, at least for the foreseeable future.

**A NEW FACTOR: EUROPEAN UNION INVOLVEMENT**

Realizing the limitations of the UN framework, the Greek Cypriot government (with strong backing from Greece) has vigorously pursued Cyprus’s membership in the EU for some time now and has been greatly encouraged by the June 1994 Corfu statement in support of this effort. Subsequently, Greece received a promise that the EU would open
negotiations on Cypriot membership within six months of the conclusion of the 1996 EU Intergovernmental Conference.

Greek Cyprus’s Clerides government (like the Vasiliou government before it) has vigorously promoted EU accession for its political and security benefits more than its economic ones. The Greek Cypriots hope that EU pressure will be more effective than UN efforts in facilitating the reunification of the island in a manner broadly consistent with Greek Cypriot objectives—that is, the creation of a federal, bizonal republic under a single sovereignty, quite different from the federation of two sovereign states sought by the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

As an EU member, the Greek Cypriot–controlled Republic of Cyprus would presumably enjoy greater security vis-à-vis Turkey. But Greek Cypriot leaders also hope that international diplomacy (particularly EU initiatives) will facilitate the incorporation of the island’s ethnic Turkish region; in this connection, some parallels have been drawn with the German experience in reunification. Furthermore, Greek Cypriots in the island’s southern part expect that EU membership will strengthen their political hand in dealing with some key issues, namely, that the restrictions on settlement and property ownership that Turkish Cypriots want to exercise in their proposed federated state in the north could not be sustained under EU rules.

Cyprus’s accession to the EU has emerged as a major, divisive issue in the island’s intercommunal politics. The Turkish Cypriot leadership has strenuously objected to the EU application mainly because it was submitted by the Greek Cypriot–controlled Republic of Cyprus. Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash is upset at the Greek Cypriot leadership for making the application unilaterally and has bitterly complained to the EU for accepting it from a government that represents only Greek Cypriots. Denktash has rejected EU membership for Cyprus without the achievement of a political settlement as a precondition. He and other nationalists in the Turkish community have even charged that Greek Cyprus is seeking to bring about enosis (union with Greece) by other means, since Cyprus would integrate with Greece and other European countries through the EU’s institutional machinery. Furthermore, Denktash has threatened to “integrate” the TRNC with Turkey should the EU accept the Republic of Cyprus as a member prior to a mutually acceptable settlement. Turkey has backed the Turkish Cypriot position on this issue and has warned the EU states to wait for a resolution of the Cyprus issue before proceeding with the island’s membership.

Contrary to the wishes of the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, the EU appears poised to play a larger role in the search for a Cyprus settlement. However, whether the European organization can overcome the serious perception of bias held by Turkish Cypriots and Turkey (Greece is a member of the union, but Turkey is not) and contribute to a settlement is uncertain. As much as the EU has shown itself to be more amenable to Greek and Greek Cypriot influences, it will be resistant to inheriting Cyprus’s explosive problems by admitting the Greek Cypriot–controlled area prior to a settlement. This has given Turkish Cypriots an implicit veto over Cyprus’s EU membership, at least temporarily.

On the other hand, EU officials have warned Turkish Cypriot authorities not to expect that the lack of a settlement would necessarily prevent Cyprus’s membership. In a March 16, 1996, statement, EU external affairs commissioner Hans Van Den Broek insisted that “the division of Cyprus would not be an obstacle to the island’s future membership of the bloc.” In a warning aimed at Turkish Cypriots as well as Ankara, Van Den Broek said the EU “could not indefinitely ignore the aspirations of the majority of the population to be an EU member” and that he “did not put much credibility in remarks by anonymous Commission officials that the political problems on the island may prove to be a stumbling block in accession talks.”

In a move intended to address Turkish Cypriot concerns, the EU Council of Ministers decided in 1995 to take steps to have the EU representative on the island disseminate information on the implications of membership, particularly the economic benefits that the poorer Turkish Cypriots would be eligible to receive as EU citizens. The U.S. government has encouraged the EU to engage the Turkish community directly without being hampered by the fact that, in keeping with international practice, the union has recognized the Greek Cypriot–controlled Republic of Cyprus as the only legitimate government on the island. Turkish Cypriots are particularly anxious that they might become an impoverished minority in their federated state if the richer Greek Cypriots (who outnumber them four to one) could freely buy land and settle in the north. Ultimately, if a suitable formula can be found to enable Turkish Cypriots to negotiate
the terms of their membership in the EU as part of a federated bizonal Cyprus, they will seek temporary and long-term derogations from EU rules that would ensure their majority status in the proposed federated state in the north and protect their landownership.

ATHENS AND ANKARA: NEW SUSPICIONS AND OLD PROBLEMS

One of the perennial impediments third parties typically encounter in their attempts to mediate the conflict has been securing the simultaneous backing of Greece and Turkey for efforts to find a Cyprus breakthrough. Indeed, profound changes in the post–Cold War security environment of these traditional adversaries have brought new possibilities for disagreement and mutual suspicion—the geographic bounds of Greek-Turkish rivalry are expanding. These developments will have an indirect effect on Cyprus because Greece and Turkey have a strong influence on the island’s respective communities.

More so than Greece, Turkey emerged with higher hopes of an enhanced strategic value to NATO in the wake of the remarkable changes of 1989–91. It no longer shares a border with Soviet republics controlled by Russia, which historically has been the major threat to Turkey’s security. Furthermore, with the emergence of the newly independent Turkic/Muslim states of Central Asia, as well as, especially, Azerbaijan, Turkey can pursue close political and economic relationships and acquire new influence in this region. In the Middle East, Turkey’s role in the 1990–91 Gulf War emphasized its strategic value to the West, which relied on Turkey to help maintain pressure on Saddam Hussein’s Iraq; this gave Ankara new leverage. The emergence of a new coalition government in Turkey during the summer of 1996—dominated by the Islamist Welfare Party of Necmettin Erbakan—has not altered the basic elements of the U.S.-Turkish strategic relationship.

For Greece, the new opportunities for the advancement of Turkey’s foreign policy goals have been worrisome, owing to the prospect of the Greek-Turkish strategic balance changing in Turkey’s favor and, more immediately, Ankara’s growing role in the Balkans. Much to Greece’s chagrin, Turkey was among the first countries to recognize and assist the newly independent Macedonia. Ankara also provided assistance to and established close relations with Albania, with which Greece has had strained relations over the treatment of the Greek community in that country and the influx of Albanian refugees to Greece. In addition, the Turkish government has provided training for the Albanian and Macedonian armed forces.

Of all the developments in the Balkans, the war in Bosnia has caused the greatest aggravation for Athens and Ankara. While Greece supported Serbia and helped Belgrade to skirt international sanctions, Turkey provided diplomatic and covert military assistance to the Muslim-led Bosnian government and was the strongest advocate (within NATO) of lifting the arms embargo against the militarily disadvantaged former Yugoslav republic; a Turkish contingent has served with both the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and the Implementation Force (IFOR). In the aftermath of the Dayton Accords, Ankara has positioned itself—with U.S. support—to play a major role in the training of the Bosnian army so that it can keep the Bosnian Serb forces at bay once IFOR is withdrawn.

Even without the Balkans and Cyprus complicating their relations, Greece and Turkey have had—and continue to have—much to argue about. The January 1996 crisis over an Aegean islet was a reminder of how incendiary Greek-Turkish relations can be in certain areas. To be sure, the demarcation of the Aegean Sea under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea probably serves as the most contentious issue-area between the two littoral states, involving the continental shelf, the territorial sea, and the sovereign airspace above. From the early 1970s, Greece and Turkey have been unable to narrow their differences on these issues. On three occasions (in 1976, 1987, and 1996) they came to the brink of war over the Aegean.

Cyprus and the Aegean Sea outrank all other Greek-Turkish disagreements; still, other issues cause additional aggravations. Turkey sees Greece as impeding its efforts to develop closer ties with the West, particularly on the issue of Turkey’s admission to the EU. Greece has often employed its EU veto either to block benefits for Turkey supported by other EU states or to wring concessions from Turkey and the EU in exchange for lifting its veto. In the aftermath of the January 1996 Aegean crisis, for example, Athens retaliated against Turkey’s actions by putting a hold on disbursement of EU funds to Ankara that were pledged under the terms of a 1995 customs union agreement.

In addition, Turkish officials—particularly, the Turkish military establishment—have become
convinced that Greece has actively assisted the separatist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in various ways, including helping to ensure their passage from Greece to Syria, which serves as a base for attacks on Turkey. Greek officials have denied providing any help. Moreover, Ankara has claimed that a reported Greek-Syrian military cooperation agreement is aimed at Turkey. For its part, Turkey signed a military cooperation agreement with Israel in February 1996, but it can safely be assumed that Israelis will not take sides in Greek-Turkish disputes.

Other perennial irritants concerning the treatment of each other’s ethnic minorities have added to the list of Greek-Turkish disputes. Turkey has been unhappy with the treatment of the Turkish minority in western Thrace, while Greece has had equally strong grievances concerning Turkey’s treatment of the much-reduced Greek community in Istanbul. In addition, Greece has periodically complained of harassment and excessive curbs on the activities of the Greek Orthodox patriarch in Istanbul.

By keeping alive and even exacerbating their mutual suspicions, Greece and Turkey make a rapprochement over the Cyprus issue all the more problematic when other issues crop up. In theory, Greek and Turkish Cypriots can reach a political settlement; in reality, it is difficult to envision such an outcome without the supportive involvement of Athens and Ankara.

Clearly, Greece and Turkey have their own set of reasons for resolving the Cyprus issue, but thus far they have not been able to reconcile their conflicting interests. The alternative to an agreed-upon settlement is a permanent Turkish presence in northern Cyprus and either the integration of northern Cyprus with Turkey or the consolidation of the Turkish Cypriot mini-state; both of these outcomes are unpalatable to Greeks as well as Greek Cypriots.

For Greece (and Greek Cypriots), the most important aspect of a future settlement is one that ensures the total—or, failing that, substantial—removal of Turkey’s military presence on the island. This will help soothe Greece’s national pride and reduce fears of further Turkish territorial advances on the island. Greek national sentiment over the Cyprus issue virtually precludes a Greek political leader’s concluding any meaningful negotiations on other Greek-Turkish issues unless there is significant progress on the Cyprus issue beforehand. This was articulated by former Greek prime minister Constantine Mitsotakis in a 1988 speech: “The Turks must be made to understand that it will be impossible to make progress in Greek-Turkish relations, as well as in Turkey’s attachment to the European Community if they do not solve the Cyprus issue first, and then address the Greek-Turkish differences.”

Turkey’s paramount interest, on the other hand, is to safeguard its guarantor status, support Turkish Cypriot self-government, and maintain a large enough force on the island to ensure Turkish Cypriot security.

To be sure, the terms of any Cyprus settlement have to be salable to public opinion in both Turkey and Greece, whose leaders must simultaneously avoid charges from opposition parties of “selling out” their respective Cypriot communities. When he became prime minister in April 1990, Mitsotakis availed himself of the opportunity to meet with Turkish leaders in the hopes of establishing a dialogue with his country’s main rival. In 1991, he met with then Turkish prime minister Süleyman Demirel three times. Nonetheless, when Mitsotakis appeared receptive to signing a friendship accord, he was obliged to retreat in the face of domestic opposition.

The Papandreou government that succeeded Mitsotakis adopted a harder line toward Ankara. Turkish officials have complained that before his resignation due to ill health, Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou revived some of the anti-Turkish rhetoric reminiscent of his first administration in the 1980s. More seriously, the late Greek leader provoked Turkish suspicions by declaring, in March 1994, a defense doctrine that has placed the Greek Cypriot–controlled part of Cyprus under Greece’s defense umbrella.

But Turkish leaders have not assigned a high priority to resolving the Cyprus issue; they would prefer the international community to turn its attention...
toward issues like Bosnia and conflicts in the Soviet successor states. Nonetheless, Turkey realizes that the Cyprus issue remains both an impediment to its aspirations to become a member of the EU and a complicating factor in its relations with Washington.

Most Turks believe that the Cyprus issue has already been settled. After all, virtually no Turkish Cypriots have lost their lives, and there has been no fighting on Cyprus since Turkey’s military intervention in 1974. Consequently, any new initiatives to settle the Cyprus issue are greeted with skepticism in the country, lest the Turkish gains of the past two decades be negotiated away. When former prime minister Çiller appeared to be receptive to calls from Washington and the EU for movement on the confidence-building measures in late 1993 and early 1994, the opposition instead supported Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash for resisting the measures. Çiller had to endure a barrage of criticism that she was “selling out” the Turkish Cypriots. More recently, the political uncertainty that has prevailed in Ankara since the inconclusive December 1995 elections will make it difficult for Ankara to support major territorial concessions and renounce the claim of separate statehood by Turkish Cypriots. Erbakan’s Welfare Party is adamantly opposed to any Turkish concessions on the island.

THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS AND DOMESTIC POLITICS IN CYPRUS

However discouraging domestic politics in Greece and Turkey might be for the Cyprus negotiations, it has been at the level of the two Cypriot communities that the most substantial and sustained negotiations have taken place, under UN auspices. Thus far, Greek and Turkish Cypriot negotiators have agreed that a new settlement should provide for a bicomunal, bizonal federation in a reunited Cyprus and should also affirm the political equality of the two communities.9

Still, that both sides have agreed Cyprus should have a bizonal, federal system has not proved decisive in bringing about a settlement. The reason is that neither side looks at federation as the ideal solution, and each thus seeks to define it as something as close as possible to its own concept of Cyprus. Hence, the Greek Cypriot definition of a federal Cyprus is one where the authority of the central government would extend over the entire island. Greek Cypriots are adamant that a new federal arrangement not create an exclusive Turkish Cypriot federated state in the north; hence, their emphasis on the “three freedoms”: the freedom of movement, the freedom to own property, and the freedom to settle anywhere on the island, although the Greek Cypriot leadership has agreed that the proposed federated state in the north would maintain a majority of Turkish Cypriots.

By contrast, most Turkish Cypriots would prefer to have a state of their own but will settle for a federal plan that creates two politically equal and loosely connected states. The Turkish Cypriot plan is comparable to the French Canadian nationalist idea of “sovereignty association” that has enjoyed considerable support in Quebec. Indeed, during the course of the 1990 summit meeting with Vasilious in New York, Denktash insisted that the Greek Cypriot leader acknowledge the right of Turkish Cypriots to self-determination. This was rejected by Vasilious and the talks failed to make any progress, prompting UN secretary general Perez de Cuéllar to blame Denktash for the talks’ impasse. After years of haggling, the gap between the two communities on the nature of a federation for the island has not been substantially narrowed.

In addition to this fundamental challenge, the territorial issue has been difficult to resolve, even though the post-1974 intercommunal negotiations have helped narrow the gap between the two sides. Turkish Cypriots occupy 36 percent of the island’s territory, but they have agreed to reduce the area under their administration to 29 percent in a future federation. Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, have insisted on larger territorial adjustments in order to enable as many of the 160,000 Greek Cypriot refugees as possible to return to their homes and properties. In particular, they have insisted on the return of the town of Morphou (with its valuable citrus groves) in addition to the unoccupied resort town of Varosha. The Turkish Cypriot leadership has been willing to return Varosha and dozens of other villages, but during the course of the 1992 “Set of Ideas” negotiations in New York, Denktash adamantly refused to consider returning Morphou.

Denktash has led Cyprus’s Turkish community for almost thirty years. He has been the intercommunal negotiator since 1968 and has won five consecutive presidential elections (as president of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus in 1976 and 1981, and as president of the TRNC in 1985, 1990, and 1995); since 1983, he has declared himself to be above party politics. His political longevity, strong nationalist credentials, and charisma invite comparisons with Archbishop Makarios, the late Greek Cypriot leader.
For over a decade, the Greek Cypriot party that has outpolled all others is the Democratic Rally (Desy), led by Glafcos Clerides, the veteran Greek Cypriot politician. Although Clerides has occupied a prominent position in Greek Cypriot politics since independence, his role was overshadowed by Makarios. Since the archbishop’s death in 1977, Clerides’s aspiration to become president remained unfulfilled until the 1993 elections, when he defeated Vasiliou (with support from Deko) by less than 1 percent of the popular vote. Owing to his pragmatic approach in past intercommunal negotiations, many Greek Cypriots view Clerides as a man of compromise. (This perception, however, is not shared by the vast majority of Turkish Cypriots.)

Clerides and other Greek Cypriot leaders who succeeded Makarios (that is, Kyprianou and Vasilious) cannot claim the level of support within their community that Denktash has enjoyed within the Turkish community. Unlike Denktash, they have had to struggle to maintain a national consensus. To help facilitate this, they have regularly consulted with the National Council, consisting of leaders who represent a broad cross-section of the Greek community. Since the council has included politicians who have been resistant to the concept of a bizonal federation, the reliance of the Greek Cypriot leaders on this body may preclude the type of painful compromises they might ultimately have to make for the sake of settlement.

On the other hand, as many Greek Cypriots would readily agree, a stronger mandate has not made Denktash any more amenable to reaching a settlement within the framework of the proposals advanced by the UN secretary general and his advisers.

Clearly, those diplomats who have been prodding the parties to move closer to reaching a settlement have been disheartened by the lack of a breakthrough. They have persisted in their efforts nonetheless. Soon after becoming secretary general in 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghali worked energetically to create a new momentum for a Cyprus settlement. He was encouraged in his efforts by diplomatic support he received from Ankara, Athens, and the United States, making 1992 a year of intense diplomatic activity to find a breakthrough on the Cyprus issue. The secretary general decided to take a more active part than his predecessors in bargaining with Vasilious and Denktash, whom he had invited to New York for a Cyprus summit. This move prompted one observer to say that he "had moved from a position of good offices to one of a mediator."
unsuccessfully concentrated much of his effort on winning territorial concessions from Denktash in the belief that substantial progress on that front would help reconcile differences on constitutional issues.

Discussions on other major issues, such as the nature of the federation and the return of refugees to their homes (a major Greek Cypriot demand) also failed to narrow differences of the two communities. On the question of external guarantees, too, there was no bridging the gap. On the positive side, however, both leaders affirmed the validity of the Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee, but Vasiliou repeated the familiar Greek Cypriot position that the Treaty of Guarantee does not confer the right of unilateral intervention on the guarantor powers (read Turkey).

With the failure of these talks, the secretary general focused on a series of confidence-building measures, the most important of which would reopen both Nicosia airport and the town of Varosha under UN administration. The reopening of Varosha would pave the way for the return of thousands of Greek Cypriot refugees and revive the tourist facilities there. On the other hand, the opening of Nicosia airport would primarily benefit the Turkish community by substantially undermining the Greek Cypriot economic embargo and allowing foreign tourists direct access to northern Cyprus. These practical measures would have yielded some contact between the communities and would have facilitated the building of trust and mutually beneficial cooperation between them. But no agreement even on these modest steps was possible, raising troubling doubts about prospects for a comprehensive settlement.

**WIDENING GAPS**

In the meantime, the growing asymmetry in the well-being of Greek and Turkish Cypriots might also pose a difficult challenge. With the German parallel in mind, what level of costs would Greek Cypriots be willing to incur for the reintegration of the two communities? Greek Cypriot per capita income has gone up from $1,489 in 1973 to an impressive $15,400 in 1996. The south has enjoyed sustained economic growth and low levels of unemployment. By contrast, the Turkish Cypriot per capita income is about a fifth of what it is in the south. Compared with pre-1974 levels, the economy in the north has registered significant growth, in spite of the economic embargo imposed by the Greek Cypriot government. However, economic growth has not been sustained. Even though Turkey channeled considerable aid (estimated at $300 million annually), the north’s economy has experienced major difficulties.

Since the early 1990s, high unemployment and an economic slowdown, along with perennially high inflation rates, have posed a major challenge to the Turkish Cypriot leadership. These economic difficulties have been blamed for the emigration of thousands of Turkish Cypriots.

Other major developments in the early and mid-1990s have highlighted the continuing mistrust between and entrenchment of the two communities. A case in point is the Athens-Nicosia defense agreement, which provides a Greek air and naval defense shield for Greek Cypriots. In addition, the Greek Cypriot government has embarked on an arms modernization program (estimated at about $1 million a day) and an expansion of the National Guard’s officer corps to operate the new weaponry. The objective, according to Greek Cypriots, is to deter Turkey from undertaking any aggressive move on the island.

There is no doubt that the continuing presence of large numbers of Turkish troops in the north poses a major security problem for Greek Cypriots and that the defense measures the latter have undertaken are aimed at alleviating their insecurity. Yet such measures have, in turn, made the Turkish Cypriots insecure by raising suspicions of offensive motives on the part of Greek Cypriots. The Turks have responded by increasing the size of their forces in northern Cyprus from twenty-five thousand to more than thirty thousand in addition to modernizing their tanks and other equipment. As a consequence, the island has become one of the most militarized areas in the eastern Mediterranean. This vicious circle of defense measures and countermeasures has contributed to heightened tensions.

In spite of these disheartening security developments—and partly because of them—there is no doubting the new resolve of third parties to broker a Cyprus settlement. On this score, the United States, much more than any other third party, can be particularly helpful, since it is the only power that has considerable influence over the four key players: the two Cypriot communities as well as Ankara and Athens. As a first step, even a partial agreement on security, providing for substantial arms and troop reductions (by the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sides, respectively), would boost efforts to resolve the difficult constitutional and territorial issues. In the past, third parties (and the Cypriot communities) were disposed
to tackle security matters only after reaching an understanding on the other major issues. Given the dangerous level of militarization on the island, reversing that sequence appears sensible.

The Greek Cypriot leadership has advocated the complete demilitarization of the island and the replacement of Turkish troops (and the smaller Greek forces) by an international force under UN or NATO command. This proposal has been rejected by the Turkish Cypriots, who insist that some Turkish troops remain to protect them even after an overall settlement is reached. However, it is not inconceivable that future security arrangements for the island would accommodate both approaches; that is, a modest number of Turkish and Greek troops stationed in the north and south, respectively, could be supplemented by international peacekeepers.

On the other key issues—namely, territory and the nature of the future federation on the island—the kind of trade-off that could move the parties closer to a settlement has been apparent for a long time. Turkish Cypriots would have to substantially improve their offer of territorial concessions to Greek Cypriots. In turn, this should make it more palatable for Greek Cypriots to accept a loose federation in a reunited island in which the Turkish Cypriots would enjoy self-government.

Even after years of failed third-party attempts to find a settlement, it seems that the international community has not given up on Cyprus. Certainly, the potential rewards of a breakthrough are alluring. A Cyprus settlement will no doubt help improve relations between Greece and Turkey and enhance the prospects for the management of their Aegean differences. A settlement would also facilitate an uncontentious Cypriot accession to the EU. Furthermore, a settlement would be a victory for the international community—in a world beset by ethnic conflicts, settling a protracted ethnic dispute would set a fine example. Above all, it would be a great prize for Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike, who deserve the sense of security and tranquillity that a settlement would bring them.
NOTES


3. Ibid.

4. The Greek Cypriot government is internationally recognized as the government of Cyprus even though its authority does not extend to northern Cyprus administered by the TRNC.

5. Reported by Reuters on March 16, 1996.

6. Ibid.


13. Ibid., 31.

14. For the per capita estimate for 1996, see The European, April 11–17, 1996, 8.


20. Ibid.
Following Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika, the world witnessed the momentous events that led to the reunification of Germany, the disaggregation of the former Soviet Union, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon, and the general collapse of the system of applied Marxism-Leninism on the European continent. These events, which served as the cornerstone for the end of the Cold War, ushered in a new era of international relations, which was immediately praised as a “new world order” offering hope for international security and cooperation. As a result, a plethora of optimistic forecasts of the world’s future appeared, one going so far as to proclaim the “end of history.”

At first, there were reasons for such optimism, marked by the trend toward settlement of some longstanding disputes and the international community’s eviction of Iraq from Kuwait. Yet despite such historic events as the peace breakthroughs in the Israeli-Palestinian and South African conflicts, George Bush’s optimistic vision of an emerging new world order of like-minded states was quickly challenged by a long chain of crises across the world, most notably in eastern and central Africa, the Balkans, and Russia’s so-called Near Abroad. This, in turn, has given rise to a number of pessimistic forecasts raising nightmarish images of “back to the future,” the “coming anarchy,” a world “out of control,” and so forth, with one analyst proclaiming that “we will soon miss the Cold War.”

Indeed, observers of international affairs in the post–Cold War era usually fall into schools of optimism and pessimism.

The optimists highlight global order; consensus among the powerful, permanent members of the UN Security Council; and collective action undertaken against violators of international law in places such as Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Haiti, as well as humanitarian assistance in Rwanda, Burundi, Bosnia, Bangladesh, and elsewhere. The optimists counsel the employment of diplomatic and economic leverage and place special emphasis on multilateral mechanisms, such as the United Nations, the European Union (EU), and NATO. The optimists draw heavily on multilateralism and functionalism, inspired by the philosophy of Jean Monnet, the “father of European integration.”

In contrast, the pessimists view the world as moving back into a state of multipolar anarchy, in which the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must. The pessimists emphasize the military dimension of politics and advocate temporary regional alliances and preemptive use of force in favorable but fleeting conditions to advance national interests. The pessimists could be labeled as unilateralists and nationalists who are still inspired by the teachings of the Prussian general and theoretician Karl von Clausewitz.

As post–Cold War international events unfold, it appears that reality is settling somewhere between these optimistic and pessimistic projections.

Employing a concentric-levels-of-analysis approach, this study is designed to focus on the prospects for tension reduction and, ultimately, reconciliation in the chronically adversarial relationship between Greece and Turkey. Realizing that developments at the national level (that is, Greece and Turkey) are deeply affected by alternative futures at the regional (that is, European and Mediterranean) and global levels of analysis, we present three models of post–Cold War developments along a spectrum ranging from cautious optimism to unqualified pessimism. The models are entitled “Tolerable,” “Undesirable,” and “Catastrophic.” We then apply these models to arrive at specific scenarios in Greek-Turkish relations, assessing the implications of each scenario for regional security and stability.

Our study concludes with a set of proposals regarding tension-reduction in Greek-Turkish relations that, we believe, have a good chance of materializing provided an approximation of the Tolerable model...
remains in place in the foreseeable future. Alternatively, we postulate that the chances of reconciliation between Greece and Turkey will be dramatically diminished if the world moves from the Tolerable to the Undesirable and, worst, the Catastrophic models.

SECURITY MODELS AFFECTING THE FUTURE OF THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND THE BALKANS

One of the authors, in a paper presented several years ago, posited three models of global and regional security by century’s end. After reviewing and updating these models as well as focusing on the domestic sources of Greek and Turkish foreign policy, we assess the current situation in the Mediterranean and the Balkans and project what the future might hold for Greek-Turkish security relations given recent events at both the global and regional levels.

The “Tolerable” Model: A Global Concert of Powers

Security in the Tolerable model is defined comprehensively to cover not only its core elements (territorial defense of a state through military capabilities), but also economic variables (free trade and free markets) and political freedoms (human rights and democracy).

The Global Setting (Major Tenets):
(a) The permanent members of the UN Security Council maintain a consensual environment on security issues, such as peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace enforcement, designed, in part, to perpetuate stable power balances in various regional settings.

(b) The major centers of economic power (the United States, the EU, and Japan) do not permit economic competition to spill over into the political/security sphere.

(c) The international community adopts a grand strategy designed to reduce the gap between developed and developing states and to protect the global environment, based on fair and appropriate burden sharing.

(d) The international community adopts collective approaches to meet post–Cold War security threats, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, narcotics, and crime.

The Regional Setting of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans (Major Tenets):
(a) States in the region conform to the principle of the inviolability of borders.

(b) Peaceful methods for dispute settlement are emphasized and undertaken.

(c) Consolidated democratic systems of governance are cultivated.

(d) Economic interdependence is promoted.

(e) The human rights of minorities and other dual-identity groups (minority groups that have an allegiance to the state and to their ethnicity, which is different from the state’s dominant ethnic group) are protected.

(f) Racism and chauvinism, which at times lead to ethnic cleansing, are contained.

Consequences. In such a system, the security of individual Mediterranean and Balkan states is most likely to be enhanced. Regional and subregional disputes have a greater propensity to rely on third-party dispute settlement mechanisms, given the relative absence of great powers’ competitive spheres of influence in the region. Moreover, the structural constraints of such a system afford greater maneuvering room to states seeking unilateral, bilateral, or regional paths to tension reduction and conflict resolution.

The “Undesirable” Model: Renationalization of Great Power Policies

Security in the Undesirable model is defined narrowly, in traditional geopolitical fashion, in terms of territorial integrity and regime maintenance.

The Global Setting (Major Tenets):
(a) Major powers employ zero-sum logic in their relations with one another.

(b) The consensus among the permanent members of the UN Security Council is often disrupted.
(c) The number of UN peacekeeping operations declines as a result of the types of difficulties encountered in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia.

(d) The major centers of economic power (the United States, the EU, and Japan) permit economic competition to spill over into political/security antagonisms.

(e) Nationalist—rather than collective security—policies adopted by major powers and small and medium-sized states prevent the development of collective and comprehensive North-South and environmental protection strategies.

(f) Major regional institutions such as the EU and NATO undergo a loosening in cohesiveness and effectiveness.

The Regional Setting of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans (Major Tenets):

(a) International and internal, administrative borders are challenged or revised on the basis of “ethnic self-determination” in an attempt to develop ethnically homogeneous political entities.

(b) There is a return to policies of short-term, shifting regional alliances.

(c) There is growing solicitation of external patrons and great power interference in the bilateral and domestic affairs of regional states.

(d) There is a proliferation of “Bosnias” escalating into full-scale regional wars.

(e) Increasingly, populist and authoritarian leaders and regimes rise to power.

(f) There are pressures to reintroduce regional arms races, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

(g) Defeated or dissatisfied groups and regimes increasingly resort to terrorism or guerrilla warfare.

Consequences. In such a system, traditional, pre–World War II balance-of-power politics assumes a dominant role. Security becomes a product of single-country arrangements based on shifting regional alliances. The region’s governments and opposition groups tend to solicit external support and guarantees (in return for influence) from major powers. However, these external actors may be reluctant to assume the “burden” of exclusive spheres of influence of the pre–World War II or Cold War variety. From the standpoint of major powers, troubled regions are frequently viewed as “zones of indifference” and treated with benign neglect, if not outright negligence.

The “Catastrophic” Model: The Clash of Civilizations

Security in the Catastrophic model is understood in terms of solidarity within “common culture areas” (civilizations) as defined by Samuel Huntington in his controversial 1993 article.6

The Global Setting (Major Tenets):

(a) Conflict is expected to take place at the border areas (“fault lines”) separating incompatible civilizations (in terms of cultural values), which Huntington categorizes as Western, Slavic-Orthodox, Islamic, Confucian, Hindu, Japanese, Latin American, and, possibly, African.

(b) A progressive isolation of the advanced industrial democracies of the West from the rest of the world will, according to Huntington, culminate in global bipolarity (“the West versus the Rest”), where religion may serve as a substitute for ideology.

(c) Given the projected alienation among Western, Slavic-Orthodox, and Confucian-Islamic coalitions, consensual strategies (approved by the UN Security Council) regarding conflict management and prevention, economic development of the global South, and global environmental protection are no longer feasible.

(d) Centrifugal tendencies (ethnic, autonomist, and irredentist) grow in frequency and intensity within and between states throughout the globe.

(e) The influence of international organizations (such as the UN, NATO, EU, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) at the global and regional levels declines.
The Regional Setting of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans (Major Tenets):

(a) Nationalist (chauvinist/populist) elites rise to power in most regional states.

(b) Authoritarian regimes are established either to prevent or to capitalize on popular waves of nationalism/irredentism.

(c) New conflicts (for example, Kosovo or Vojvodina) erupt, escalating with the involvement of eastern Mediterranean and Balkan states, including Croatia, Hungary, Serbia, Albania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Bulgaria, Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey (in addition to long-suffering Bosnia).

(d) New and lasting alliances, created by the solicitation of external (great power) intervention, begin to develop as deeper and more dramatic lines are drawn separating Catholics from Orthodox Christians and both of these groups from Moslems in the region.

(e) Desperate/isolated movements and regimes begin engaging in economically damaging regional arms races and seeking weapons of mass destruction in their attempt to put in place deterrent or preemptive bargaining strategies.

(f) Fanatic and revanchist waves of terrorism or guerrilla warfare ravage the region.

Consequences. The Catastrophic model calls for an atavistic reversion to the climate of the Balkan Wars period (1912–13) and World War I and the renomination of the region as the “powder keg of Europe,” with parallel trends developing in the rest of the world, all of which will be unfolding in a nuclear environment. Such an international system will witness the rise to power of populist/chauvinist politicians (and their movements) who will be feeding the fires of epic and Manichaean confrontations pitting the forces of “good” against the forces of “evil.”

DOMESTIC SOURCES OF FOREIGN POLICY IN GREECE AND TURKEY: THREE SCENARIOS

Our ultimate purpose in this study is, first, to demonstrate that the global and regional models we have outlined above can influence or precipitate developments at the national level in both Greece and Turkey. Accordingly, we have constructed three counterpart scenarios (whose titles match their corresponding models) for Greece and three for Turkey (see Tables 1 and 2). Second, we advance the proposition that the chances of arriving at a Greek-Turkish reconciliation progressively diminish as reality moves from the Tolerable to the Undesirable all the way to the Catastrophic. Nevertheless, it is also our contention that the Tolerable scenario has the greatest probability of materializing, while the least likely to materialize is the Catastrophic scenario.

CURRENT INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL TRENDS: TOWARD A HYBRID SCENARIO

At present, it appears that global and regional trends are moving toward a security scenario positioned somewhere on the continuum between the Tolerable and Undesirable models, although significantly closer to the Tolerable than to the Undesirable. The present situation could be characterized as follows:

The Global Setting

(a) An implicit consensus is still in effect among the permanent members of the UN Security Council on issues of international security, although this consensus, which is evident in “hot spots” like Bosnia, could unravel if events such as the March 1996 crisis between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan continue to occur.

(b) Collective peace operations are still undertaken, despite the problems encountered in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia.

(c) The major economic powers have not allowed their competition to spill over into the political/security realm and cause diplomatic crises.

(d) North-South issues, including development and environmental questions, have not resulted in a hardening of blocs or nationalist policies per se, although a grand strategy to address the international community’s nontraditional, nongeopolitical problems has not been adopted either, leaving...
Table 1. Greece

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOLERABLE</th>
<th>UNDESIRABLE</th>
<th>CATASTROPHIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOCIETY</strong></td>
<td><strong>Cohesive:</strong> Moving toward “civil society”</td>
<td><strong>Polarizing:</strong> Modernists pitted against statist populists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Polarized:</strong> Rise of Orthodox fundamentalism and supranationalism with exclusivism, xenophobia, and racism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ECONOMY</strong></td>
<td><strong>Converging:</strong> Moving toward Maastricht criteria in terms of inflation, public debt, the budget deficit, and continued privatization of inefficient state-run enterprises</td>
<td><strong>Stagflationary:</strong> Increasing unemployment, state protectionism, and labor unrest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Statist:</strong> Clientelist and protectionalist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>POLITY</strong></td>
<td><strong>Consolidated:</strong> Pluralist democracy, alternating in power between center-left (Pasok) and center-right (New Democracy)</td>
<td><strong>Consolidated:</strong> Pluralist democracy in Italianization model, including party restructuring and fragmentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Polarized:</strong> Pluralist democracy in Italianization model, including party restructuring and fragmentation</td>
<td><strong>Praetorian:</strong> Return to high levels of instability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LEADERSHIP STYLE</strong></td>
<td><strong>Post-Charismatic:</strong> Managerial/“photogenic”</td>
<td><strong>Neo-Charismatic:</strong> Populist and nationalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Messianic:</strong> Crusading, apocalyptic, and fascist/totalitarian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MEDIA</strong></td>
<td><strong>Polyphony:</strong> Self-evaluative and self-restraining</td>
<td><strong>Cacophony:</strong> Contributing to polarization and disorientation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Monophony:</strong> Return to styles of nationalism and self-censorship/censorship</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FOREIGN POLICY PROFILE</strong></td>
<td><strong>Multilateralist:</strong> Status quo</td>
<td><strong>Unilateralist:</strong> Neo-irredentan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Orthodoxist:</strong> Anti-Western seeking solidarity with the so-called Orthodox axis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

this factor in a state where it can degenerate into the Undesirable scenario.

(e) The responses by major international and regional organizations to global threats and problems are still seen as vital and viable, although collective political will and the necessary financial resources have decreased somewhat recently.

The Regional Setting of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans

(a) States in the region, including the states that emerged from the former Yugoslavia, have adopted and are now following (sometimes reluctantly) the principle of the inviolability of borders.

(b) Peaceful processes for dispute settlement are emphasized and undertaken, although the recent past in Bosnia, the Aegean, Cyprus, and the Middle East shows that the countries of the region are capable of resorting to force.

(c) Democratic systems of governance are being promoted, with the successor states of the former Yugoslavia attempting to establish democratic institutions.

(d) Economic interdependence is gradually growing, although at a painfully slow rate.

(e) The human rights of minorities and other dual-identity groups are still not being protected in some areas, although conditions are improving, but again at a painfully slow rate.

(f) Racism and chauvinism, which at times lead to ethnic cleansing, are being contained to some extent, but they still pose a long-term threat to intrastate and regional stability and peace.

The Greek Setting

(a) Younger leaders, including Greece’s current prime minister, Costas Simitis, have ushered in a new era of Greek politics; to date, Prime Minister
Simitis has displayed a modernist position, emphasizing Greece’s Western orientation, promoting a factor in a state where it can degenerate into the Undesirable scenario.

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The Greek Setting

(a) Younger leaders, including Greece’s current prime minister, Costas Simitis, have ushered in a new era of Greek politics; to date, Prime Minister
be following the demise of the Soviet Union, and the current clash with the Kurds is taking a high toll on the Turkish military and economy.

(d) Turkey’s economy overall, while large and growing, is still developing and in need of major improvements on all fronts, including inflation, unemployment, productivity, and trade.

(e) The Turkish military, although formally out of politics for over a decade, is still highly influential in Turkish decision making and has not yet shed its praetorian garb.

(f) Turkish political culture seems to be sitting on a fence, poised to go either toward the West or toward the East, depending on where the leadership takes it.

Consequences. The long-term stability of the region is still open to question, although the current trends seem to rule out a “clash of civilizations” materializing in the eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans. In short, the area’s future is more likely to remain within the Tolerable range. However, the risk of an Undesirable scenario is still present, given that some negative economic trends (such as unemployment, inflation, and low productivity), especially in the post-Communist Balkans and Turkey, can produce instability if left unattended.

With respect to Greek-Turkish relations, the global and regional settings present a complicated situation that, however, permits tension reduction and even gradual reconciliation. Nevertheless, the current setting is still riddled with risks and offers no guarantees. It seems safe to say that should the Undesirable or Catastrophic scenarios materialize, the ensuing highly competitive atmosphere will most likely result in more hardened and nationalist policies. These changes will allow significantly less maneuvering room for the governments of Greece and Turkey to pursue policies aimed at fostering reconciliation. After all, it does not take much imagination to see how a clash of civilizations will pit Greece against Turkey, as opposed to furthering cooperation between the two countries.

With this assessment in mind, we will conclude our study by laying out one possible path that can be followed by both Greece and Turkey in their journey toward reconciling their differences and thus contributing to the maintenance of peace and stability in the eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans.

A PATH TOWARD GREEK-TURKISH RECONCILIATION

The points of friction between Greece and Turkey are numerous, and much ink has been spilled in the description and analysis of these problems as well as in the presentation of a variety of Greek-oriented, Turkish-oriented, and third-party perspectives. Regardless of the merits and demerits of each disputant’s case, the central question is whether Greece and Turkey, which have been involved in an undisguised Cold War since the mid-to-late 1950s, will be better off in a condition of protracted conflict or in a new phase of mutual and active engagement and even cooperation. Unequivocally, the answer is that both countries would be much better off if they were to reach a final reconciliation, a new historic compromise, reminiscent of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty and the 1930 Venizelos- Atatürk Friendship Treaty.

The Imia/Kardak islets and Cyprus crises of 1996 underscore the ease with which a state of protracted tension between the two countries may degenerate into organized violence and warfare. With any luck, leaders in both countries will have realized by now that a Greek-Turkish war is unthinkable, because it will isolate both belligerents from their Western institutional affiliations. Furthermore, even if Greece or Turkey were to secure some marginal territorial gains after some initial battles, a chain of revanchist conflicts would surely follow, classifying both countries as high-risk zones, with a devastating impact on their economies and societies.

The ingredients of a lasting settlement, given the current international setting between Tolerable and Undesirable (but significantly closer to Tolerable), can be based only on the assumption that Turkey, in addition to Greece, will solidify its West European orientation. Since 1974, Greece has developed durable and tested democratic institutions and has become a member of the EU. Turkey is currently at the crossroads of the great choice between a European and a non-European orientation. Like post–World War II France and Germany, Turkey and Greece can bury the geopolitical divisions of the past, accept and respect the territorial status quo that emerged after World War II, and resolve to proscribe the use of force in their bilateral relations.
A comprehensive Greek-Turkish settlement most likely will not be achieved without a just and mutually acceptable solution to the Cyprus problem. Cyprus has long been at the center of Greek-Turkish issues and still remains so, especially in light of the tragic events that occurred in the summer of 1996 at the UN Green Line that separates the two Cypriot communities. As long as the present situation in Cyprus continues, with Turkish armed forces occupying 36 percent of the island’s territory, Greek-Turkish relations will remain tense and a solution to the Cyprus question most likely will not be forthcoming.

A genuine settlement of the Cyprus problem, which is today ripe for a solution, would exclude enosis (the union of Cyprus with Greece) and taksim (the partition of Cyprus into separate, sovereign Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot states). The historic compromise, therefore, calls for independence of a federal, bizonal, and bicomunal state along the lines of the Makarios-Denktash (1977) and Kyprianou-Denktash (1979) agreements. Furthermore, Greece and Turkey cannot—and must not—attempt to impose a settlement on Cyprus. Reconciliation and peace in Cyprus are matters for the two Cypriot communities to agree upon.

The new state of Cyprus that will emerge, following an agreement of the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, will be given an excellent chance to survive and prosper if at the time of its new birth the “Federal Republic of Cyprus” will simultaneously become a member of the EU and NATO. EU membership, together with genuine collective guarantees, demilitarization (except for the British sovereign base areas), and a multinational implementation force (until mutual confidence is securely established) under UN or NATO command, will allow the troubled Cypriots to construct an enduring unity based on all the rights, duties, and freedoms that democracy provides.

A genuine settlement of the Cyprus problem, however, cannot rest on a premise equating the 80 percent of the Greek-Cypriot community with the 18 percent of the Turkish-Cypriot community in terms of shares of territory, gross national product, and federal parliametary and executive powers. In fact, all states and governments in the ethnically volatile Balkan and eastern Mediterranean regions must begin to abide by a simple and logical rule of behavior; otherwise, the chances of bringing peace to the region will be very slim. This rule could be articulated as follows: “Treat (that is, offer similar rights and guarantees) minority communities and other dual-identity groups residing in your country as well as you would expect other countries to treat minority groups that are affiliated with your country.” For example, Greece should treat its Moslem (Turkic, Pomak, and Roma) minority in western Thrace as well as it would like Albania to treat the Greek minority in southern Albania. Similarly, Turkey should treat its Kurdish minority in eastern Turkey as well as it would prefer Turkish minority communities to be treated outside of Turkey, whether in Cyprus, Greece, Bulgaria, or elsewhere. Albania, to give one more example, should treat the Greek minority in southern Albania as well as it would like Albanians to be treated in Kosovo and elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. Indeed, there are many other examples involving a variety of states with ethnically heterogeneous populations in the eastern Mediterranean and Balkans, as well as in other parts of the world.

Turning to the Aegean dispute, a much needed historic compromise between Greece and Turkey must rest on two general and two operational principles of foreign policy behavior. The first general principle involves both countries’ mutual renunciation of the use of force, possibly by both countries’ signing and ratifying a nonaggression pact. The second general principle, which follows from the first, is that the Greek-Turkish disputes in the Aegean will follow the road of peaceful settlement, involving time-tested methods such as bilateral negotiations and, in case of deadlocks, conciliation, good offices, mediation, arbitration, and adjudication.

The two operational principles apply to Turkey and Greece, respectively. For the benefit of Turkey, it must be made clear that the Aegean will not be transformed into a “Greek lake.” For the benefit of Greece, it also must be made clear that the Aegean cannot be partitioned or subdivided in a way that encloses Greek territories such as the Dodecanese and eastern Aegean islands in a zone (or zones) of Turkish functional jurisdiction.

For heuristic purposes only, we outline below one of many alternative strategies leading toward (or permitting) a comprehensive settlement of the Greek-Turkish disputes. This strategy assumes, as we stressed above, a just and mutually acceptable settlement of the Cyprus question. Furthermore, the strategy rests upon the two general and the two operational principles presented above.
Following the steps of our proposed strategy, the thorny issue of the Aegean continental shelf will once more become subject to bilateral negotiations, which should satisfy Turkey. Questions that defy mutual agreement will be submitted to arbitration or to the International Court of Justice for final resolution (which should satisfy Greece). Alternatively, both Greece and Turkey could agree (following the logic of the Antarctic Treaty) to defer the issue of continental shelf delimitation for a number of years, reserving the right to press their respective claims at the end of the moratorium period provided by any such treaty.

Needless to say, the “Antarctic approach” would gain additional appeal if we were to assume that there are no significant and profit-generating oil reserves in the Aegean region. Furthermore, the opportunity costs involving highly probable Aegean environmental dangers (caused by oil spills, for example) should be taken into consideration, given the fact that both Greece and Turkey are heavily dependent on the tourist industry to help their balance of payments.

One way of bypassing the thorny issues of Turkish challenges to Greece’s ten-mile territorial air limit (in effect since 1931) and the potential of Greece’s extending its territorial waters from the present six miles to the generally accepted twelve-mile limit could rely on this scenario: Both Greece and Turkey agree to twelve-mile limits (for both territorial waters and airspace) for their mainland territory, and to six-mile limits for Aegean islands belonging to Greece and Turkey (with the exception of Euboea and Crete, which would enjoy the twelve-mile limit because of their size and distance from Turkey).

Questions such as Flight Information Region (FIR) and NATO command-and-control arrangements in the Aegean should be handled as technical issues to be settled within the framework of the International Civil Aviation Organization and NATO, respectively, and in accordance with practices that have been employed since the early 1950s. It should be stressed that technical issues should be much more readily resolved following substantive progress in the settlement of the Cyprus and continental shelf questions.

The potentially explosive issue of minorities in Greece and Turkey should follow the dual rule discussed above: (a) minority protection should not lead to claims by either side calling for changes in international borders, and (b) minorities within a country should be treated as well as that country expects its ethically affiliated groups to be treated in other countries.

In an era favoring arms control, arms reductions, and confidence-building measures, Greece and Turkey would benefit from undertaking a series of mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFRs) involving their land and sea border areas in Thrace and the Aegean. A mirror-image reduction of offensive weapons (especially landing craft) in the border areas would go a long way toward reducing the chances of the outbreak of armed conflict as well as relieving the hard-pressed economies of both countries from the heavy burden of high military expenditures. Ultimately, all parties, including the two Cypriot communities, should pursue reductions in arms that are primarily offensive in purpose. Eventually, following a grand settlement and the establishment of peaceful and friendly relations between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean and a mutually acceptable settlement in Cyprus, the border areas between the two countries (as is the case with the solid European security community established by France and Germany) will no longer call for fortifications of any consequence.

Finally, Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, as well as other states in the region, should embark on the much needed task of mutual and balanced prejudice reduction (MBPR), whether prejudice is manifested in hostile press commentaries, textbooks, literature, theater, movies, sports, or other forms of social and cultural expression. Universities, think tanks, business and labor associations, and nongovernmental organizations can contribute to such a task immensely through carefully conceived projects that promote mutual engagement and cooperation.

Following a potential grand settlement, trade, tourism, investment, and joint ventures between Greece and Turkey at home and abroad should increase significantly in textbook-style neofunctionalist fashion. Greece will also abandon its policy of linking Turkey’s EU accession strategy to the Cyprus and Aegean questions and will, in fact, seek to facilitate Turkish entry into the union. Simply, a European Turkey will be a much easier neighbor for Greece to live with than an alienated and militaristic Turkey.

In the last analysis, the state of relations between the two countries, which impacts on the prospects for peace in Cyprus, is a product of the attitudes and perceptions of ruling elites and general publics, operating within global and regional settings that currently
fluctuate between Tolerable and Undesirable scenario conditions. Looking at the region and its history, we see clear manifestations of conflicting visions of a “greater Albania,” a “greater Serbia,” a “greater Bulgaria,” and a “greater Romania.” Furthermore, the Greeks still have collective historical memories of Alexander’s Macedonian Empire and the thousand-year Byzantine Empire. The Italians can look back to the glorious centuries of the Roman Empire, and the Turks have even more recent memories of the vast territory that came with the Ottoman Empire. Needless to say, these overlapping and potentially irredentist visions could add up to a highly explosive formula. However, the countries of the region, especially if they are governed by prudent leaders, are not automatically condemned to historical recidivism, as the great experiment of post–World War II European integration thankfully reminds us.


3. We have avoided the temptation of outlining “Ideal,” “Desirable,” or “Utopian” models, seeking to remain—perhaps preemptively—within the bounds of realism.

4. These scenarios originally appeared in Theodore A. Couloumbis and Prodromos Yannas, “Alternative Futures in the Post–Cold War International System and Their Implications for Greece” (paper pre-

5. The content and definition of security vary from scenario to scenario, and the rules and guidelines informing foreign policy behavior of governments of small, medium, and large European states differ quite drastically in each case.

6. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 22–49. See also his *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). According to Huntington, the three central ingredients that render long-range cohesiveness to civilizations are ethnic, religious, and linguistic affinities.

7. For two recent and well-thought-out analyses of the Greek and Turkish settings, respectively, on which we have drawn in constructing the models in this section, see Richard Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, and Hans-Jurgen Puhle, eds., *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); and Ergun Ozbudun, “Turkey: How Far from Consolidation?” *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 3 (July 1996): 123–138.

8. Of course, one could advance the argument that a putative Western-oriented military dictatorship in Turkey could contribute to the reduction of Greek-Turkish tensions, as the Evren military regime demonstrated in the early 1980s while it was attempting to consolidate itself internally and continue enjoying U.S. support.

9. Evincing Cold War nostalgia, one could argue that a return to a bipolar system pitting a nuclear East against a nuclear West would reimpose a maximum level of constraints against the contingency of a Greek-Turkish war, given that both Greece and Turkey would most probably revert to the status of vital U.S. allies contributing to the “containment” of a potentially revanchist Russia. The problems with this view are that (a) the likelihood of a reemergence of Cold War bipolarity is slim; (b) the Cold War era was a time when Greek-Turkish relations...
soured following nearly two decades of friendlier relations; (c) Greece and Turkey went to the brink of war on several occasions during the Cold War (1964, 1967, 1974, 1976, 1987); (d) during the 1996 Imia/Kardak crisis, the United States once again resorted to crisis de-escalation diplomacy on the grounds that Greece and Turkey are still viewed as vital U.S. allies; and (e) if trends in conflict resolution in other parts of the world are indicators of the potential benefits of the Cold War’s end, Greece and Turkey have something to look forward to, given the recent reconciliation breakthroughs that seemed impossible during the Cold War, such as those in the Middle East and South Africa.

10. For the purposes of this paper, an interesting question could arise from the situation in which the Greek national setting would remain at the Tolerable level while the setting in Turkey moves in the direction of Undesirable or even Catastrophic. Clearly, in such a contingency the chances of reconciliation would be reduced unless a military regime in Turkey (in the case of the Undesirable scenario) determined that it would be in its interest to reduce tensions with Greece so it could concentrate on domestic questions and Turkey’s Eastern preoccupations.


12. In the authors’ view, the end of the Cold War offers powerful incentives to the parties in the dispute (Greek and Turkish Cypriots) to proceed with a settlement as we outline here, which would add to all Cypriot citizens’ welfare and security by facilitating the entry of Cyprus into the EU and its defense umbrella, NATO.

13. It should be noted, however, that any settlement that does not have the concurrence of Greece and Turkey will be less likely to take hold and succeed, given the respective Cypriot communities’ close affinities with Greece and Turkey.

14. Readers should keep in mind that the framework for a settlement outlined herein reflects what the authors believe will be a mutually acceptable (by Greece and Turkey) end state in the Aegean region, rather than an initial negotiation position advanced by either side.

15. The successful implementation of any peace in the Cyprus and Aegean settings will require that both communities tackle long-standing psychological distances and negative preconceptions. If the two groups do not undertake MBPR measures and if they do not institute educational reforms that pro-
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Theophanis Stavrou, University of Minnesota
Monteagle Stearns, former U.S. ambassador to Greece
Gwenyth E. Todd, U.S. Department of Defense
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