Armed Groups and Sexual Violence:  
When Is Wartime Rape Rare?*

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This article explores a particular pattern of wartime violence, the relative absence of sexual violence on the part of many armed groups. This neglected fact has important policy implications: If some groups do not engage in sexual violence, then rape is not inevitable in war as is sometimes claimed, and there are stronger grounds for holding responsible those groups that do engage in sexual violence. After developing a theoretical framework for understanding the observed variation in wartime sexual violence, the article analyzes the puzzling absence of sexual violence on the part of the secessionist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam of Sri Lanka.

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The frequency of rape of civilians and other forms of sexual violence varies dramatically across conflicts, armed groups within conflict, and units within armed groups. The form of sexual violence also varies, including rape of women and girls and also of men and boys, sexual torture, forced pregnancies, and abortion. Yet with some exceptions, the literature on wartime sexual violence focuses on cases where the pattern of sexual violence represents one end of the observed spectrum, namely, widespread rape of civilian girls and women, as in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone.

Common explanations for wartime reflect that emphasis: Rape is an effective strategy of war, particularly of ethnic cleansing; rape is one form of atrocity and occurs alongside other atrocities; war provides the opportunity for widespread rape, and many if not all male soldiers will take advantage of it. Yet in the repertoire of violence of armed groups, rape occurs in sharply varying proportions to other forms of violence against civilians; in some cases the ratio is relatively high, in others very low. Many armed groups, including some state militaries, leftist insurgent groups, and secessionist ethnic groups, do not engage in widespread rape despite frequent interaction with civilians on otherwise intimate terms. Indeed, some armed groups engage in ethnic cleansing—the classic setting for widespread rape—without engaging in sexual violence.

Thus this article explores a particular pattern of sexual violence: the relative absence of wartime sexual violence by one or more armed groups. This absence is particularly striking when it is one-sided. This neglected fact has important policy implications: If some groups do not engage in sexual violence, then rape is not inevitable in war as is sometimes claimed, and there are stronger grounds for holding responsible those groups that do engage in sexual violence.

I begin by defining a number of terms, raising some conceptual problems with those terms, and addressing a few caveats. Focusing on sexual violence against civilians with only passing reference to patterns of sexual violence within armed groups, I then argue that candidate explanations for the absence of wartime sexual violence do not account for the absence of sexual violence by some groups. After developing a theoretical framework for understanding patterns of wartime sexual violence, I elaborate the observable implications of the framework for cases where rape is absent or strikingly rare. In light of this framework, I then describe the patterns of sexual violence in the Sri Lankan conflict, focusing on the apparent rarity of sexual violence on the part of the Tamil secessionist group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). In the conclusion, I very briefly discuss the absence of sexual violence on the part of insurgents in El Salvador, as well as the evolving pattern of sexual violence in the repertoires of armed groups in Peru and in KwaZulu Natal, South Africa.
DEFINITIONS, CLARIFICATIONS, AND CAVEATS

By *repertoire of violence*, I mean the violent subset of what Charles Tilly calls the repertoire of contention, namely, that set of practices that a group routinely engages in as it makes claims on other political or social actors. A particular group may include in its repertoire any or all of the following: kidnapping, assassinations, massacres, torture, sexual violence, forced displacement, and so on. By *rape*, I mean the penetration of the anus or vagina with any object or body part or of any body part of the victim or perpetrator’s body with a sexual organ, by force or by threat of force or coercion, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment, or against a person incapable of giving genuine consent. Sexual violence is a broader category that includes rape, sexual torture and mutilation, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, enforced sterilization, and forced pregnancy. By the *absence* of sexual violence, I mean that sexual violence is very rare but not necessarily entirely absent. Throughout, by *armed group*, I mean both state militaries and nonstate armed actors.

Of course the observed absence of sexual violence in a conflict or by a particular group might reflect our ignorance of its actual occurrence rather than a true absence. There are many reasons that rape and other forms of sexual violence are underreported in wartime. It is not reasonable to assume that it is underreported to the same degree across conflicts, parties, and regions: The conditions promoting the reporting of sexual violence, including the resources available to human rights and women’s groups, vary radically. And the degree of underreporting varies as well with the form of sexual violence: Rape, particularly rape of males, is likely less reported than other forms in most settings. Nonetheless, the extreme variation in the incidence of sexual violence across conflicts and groups, together with the existence of well-documented low-incidence cases, suggests that there are cases of relatively low sexual violence: Not all the apparent absence is an artifact of our ignorance. For example, it is unlikely that the apparent absence of sexual violence in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict reflects underreporting, given the scrutiny of violence there by domestic human rights groups and international actors.

That said, it can be very difficult—and indeed, mistaken—to infer the frequency of sexual violence from reports of human rights and women’s organizations. The frequency and type of incidents reported are shaped by oft-noted factors such as the willingness of victims to talk, the resources available, whether forensic authorities record signs of sexual violence, and the regional and partisan bias of the organization. In addition, the description of sexual violence as “widespread” and “systematic” may reflect an organization’s attempt to draw resources to document sexual violence (whatever its actual level) rather than the frequency of incidents per se, or may reflect legal rather than social science concepts. And in settings where political violence is ongoing, organizations may feel it prudent to state that
all sides engage in sexual violence, whatever their beliefs and data about asymmetric patterns.

Despite these caveats, the variation in the incidence and form of sexual violence is sufficiently large that it exceeds the likely “error bars” in the reporting of the better-documented cases. It is unlikely, for example, that the level of rape of women and girls was so much less in Bosnia-Herzegovina or that it was so much more in Israel/Palestine as to confound the observation of significant variation.

Incomplete Explanations

One explanation for the absence of sexual violence against civilians by an armed group is that the group exerts little violence of any kind against civilians. Considering common explanations for massive sexual violence (rape as a terrorizing weapon of war, as ethnic cleansing, as collective punishment) suggests variations on this explanation: Groups that do not engage in other forms of terror will engage in little sexual violence, and so on. The absence of sexual violence simply reflects that more general restraint in the use of violence. An example of a group for whom this explanation of general restraint is plausible is the insurgent group in the Salvadoran civil war (see below). Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy M. Weinstein identify a number of factors that shape this general propensity of the level of abusiveness on the part of armed groups (more below). But some insurgent groups, such as the LTTE in Sri Lanka and many Marxist-Leninist groups, engage in significant levels of other forms of violence against civilians but rarely engage in sexual violence. Levels do not vary consistently across the repertoire of armed groups: Some exert unusually high levels of sexual compared to other forms of violence, others unusually low levels. Thus we should not assume that sexual violence varies with the general level of abuse.

An obvious explanation for the absence of sexual violence against civilians is the absence of civilians, perhaps because the armed group operates far from civilian areas. However, this circumstance is likely to be rare and thus fails to explain the variety of observed cases, for several reasons. First, insurgent groups nearly always depend on civilians for supplies and intelligence, and sometimes for cover as well. While state militaries may defend boundaries far from civilian areas, they nearly always also occupy cities and major towns, giving ample access to civilians for at least part of the force. Second, it is often the case that the women and children are among the last residents to flee contested zones as men, targeted more frequently with lethal violence, leave the area or join an armed group. Thus the presence of girls and women, the usual targets of rape, tends to persist, particularly on the part of poor rural populations dependent on
access to land, the frequent setting of contemporary civil wars. Finally, some armed groups capture and abduct targets of sexual violence, sometimes holding them for long periods of time. Thus a local absence of civilians does not per se account for an absence of sexual violence.

According to the substitution argument, if combatants do not have regular access to prostitutes, camp followers, or willing civilians, they will turn to rape.11 As Cynthia Enloe points out, some military officials appear to assume that “recreational rape” occurs when soldiers are not adequately supplied with sexual partners. She quotes an admiral’s comments in the aftermath of the rape of a 12-year-old girl on Okinawa by U.S. servicemen: “I think it was absolutely stupid; I’ve said several times for the price they paid to rent the car, they could have had a girl.”12 One reason for the rapid expansion of military brothels (the so-called comfort-women system) by Japanese military authorities after the widespread rape of civilians in Nanjing was to avoid such incidents in the future.13 At a recent conference I attended, a military official argued that the reason for the prevalence of rape in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was that combatants were too poor to pay prostitutes.

However, the substitution argument does not explain the frequently observed targeting of particular groups of women, nor the often-extreme violence that frequently accompanies wartime rape, nor the occurrence of nonrape sexual torture. And if this argument were complete, we would not see rape by forces with ample access to prostitutes. This is certainly not always the case, as evident in the rape of girls and women by members of the U.S. military in Vietnam.14 Similarly, combatants of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) of Sierra Leone engaged in frequent rape of civilians despite their access to many girls and women held as sex slaves. The argument rests on a number of unexamined assumptions: that only sexual relations with females gratify sexual desire, that sexual desire is so strong as to override countervailing factors, and that sufficiently many men act on those two assumptions to explain widespread rape as occurring because of the absence of prostitutes or consensual sexual partners.

Finally, an explanation sometimes made for the absence of sexual violence on the part of some armed groups is the presence of many female cadre. However, the causal mechanism is not well specified; candidates include the following. One is the substitution argument: The presence of female combatants means that male combatants do not “need” to rape. Another approach assumes that female combatants eschew sexual violence, but that is not the case as they actively engage in it in some conflicts, as in Sierra Leone and Rwanda.15 Moreover, some armed groups with significant numbers of female combatants do engage in high levels of sexual violence; the RUF of Sierra Leone is an example.16 Or perhaps the presence of women disrupts male bonding through misogynistic training practices, practices that are thought by some scholars to make sexual violence
more likely. However, the experience of female soldiers in U.S. forces is that such practices continue in more muted and covert form, despite their official banning. An organization might prohibit sexual violence by its cadre for fear that the enemy would retaliate in kind, threatening its own female cadre. Or an organization may pursue a strategy or ideology (for example, recruitment based on sexual violence by enemy forces) that both appeals to female recruits and also promotes the prohibition of sexual violence. (We will see that it is the third that appears to occur in the Sri Lankan case.)

Theoretical Framework

None of the above captures two potentially powerful reasons for the absence of sexual violence. First, group leaders may judge that sexual violence would be counterproductive or it is against their norms. Whether they can effectively enforce that choice depends on the strength of the group’s hierarchy, in particular, whether information concerning infractions flows up the chain of command and whether superiors in fact punish subordinates for infractions. Second, the observed (as opposed to the commanded) repertoire of violence exercised by combatants may depend on their own norms concerning violence against civilians. The relevant norms may be those with which recruits enter the group (possibly heterogeneous), those produced in the course of the socialization of initial induction into the group, those produced by powerful wartime small-group processes, or those selectively reinforced by the hierarchy.

The group’s repertoire may of course change over time as a result of interactions with other armed groups and civilians. For example, a group may add a particular form of violence to its repertoire in response to another group’s engaging in that form, that is, it may “mirror” the other’s repertoire, either as a strategic decision by the leadership or by individual units choosing to wield violence similar in form to that observed. Or should civilians resist a group’s rule, an armed group may turn more punitive on command or as a result of combatant frustration. I discuss each element of the framework, drawing on and adapting the sociological literature on state militaries and assessing its relevance for insurgent groups.

Leadership strategy. Military leaders seek to control the type and degree of violence wielded by their combatants, as well as its targeting, not least because of the fear that weapons wielded by soldiers may be turned against officers. Likely considerations include not only issues of military tactics and strategy but also implications for the ongoing supply of recruits, intelligence, and other necessary “inputs” to the war effort, and for the legitimacy of the war effort in the eyes of desired supporters (domestic and international alike). Even when an armed group appears to embrace terrorizing of civilians, a strategy Osiel refers
to as “atrocities from above,” there are decisions to be made about targeting and timing. In particular, military leaders may make explicit decisions to prohibit or to promote sexual violence (of different forms, against particular groups). If it occurs at a significant level, leaders who have not yet made an explicit decision may be pressed to do so (and may decide to tolerate its occurrence without an explicit decision to prohibit or promote). And of course commanders may promote high levels of violence toward civilians without a formal decision to do so using euphemisms understood as signaling to combatants that they will not be punished, a pattern Osiel refers to as “atrocity by connivance.” Or leaders may delegate certain forms of violence to groups they claim not to command, for example, militias or death squads.

Military hierarchy. Given the challenges of organizing and controlling violence toward group goals, armed groups tend to be hierarchical. Whether decisions of the leadership are effectively enforced down the chain of command within the armed group depends on the strength of the military hierarchy. Within an armed organization—particularly in the changing and often covert circumstances of irregular warfare—there are a series of principal–agent relationships down the chain of command in which the superior officer as the principal attempts to influence the behavior of those below (his or her agents) but without access to the same information. The ability of the hierarchy to enforce decisions concerning patterns of violence thus depends on the flow of information concerning those patterns up the chain of command and the willingness of superiors to hold those below them accountable, typically through punishment. High levels of “secondary group cohesion,” meaning identification with military units above the most immediate and with the armed group as a whole are critical to the resolution of principal–agent tensions and thus for a strong military hierarchy. When military superiors are seen as legitimate authorities, the likelihood of obedience even in the wielding of extreme violence is greatly enhanced.

Individual combatants. Incoming recruits carry with them cultural norms and beliefs concerning the appropriateness of different kinds of violence, including sexual violence, against particular populations. Armed groups may draw from particular subpopulations, for example, a specific ethnic group, precisely for these reasons. Some groups, for example, some paramilitary groups, actively attempt to recruit from criminal populations. State militaries often attempt to draw or conscript recruits from a wide range of subcultures in order to build national unity. The relevant pool of recruits may also reflect the organization’s resource base: Those without economic resources are more likely to attract “activist” recruits willing to make long-term commitments to ideological goals. Whether or not recruits enter an armed organization with relatively
homogeneous norms and beliefs thus depends on the recruiting practices of the organization. Those norms and beliefs may be profoundly altered as recruits are inducted into the group through both formal and informal practices, as follows.

**Small-group dynamics and “primary group cohesion.”** To build an effective armed group, recruits have to be melded into effective combatants through training and socialization. Since Stouffer et al.’s analysis of tens of thousands of interviews with U.S. soldiers during World War II, most military leaders have understood that men hold fast under fire not because of grand concepts such as patriotism or group ideology but because of their commitments to their “primary group” of fellow combatants.\(^{25}\) For example, the sustained fighting ability of the Wehrmacht until nearly the end of World War II was attributed to such “primary group” cohesion.\(^{26}\) One reason given for poor morale among U.S. soldiers late in the war in Vietnam was low group cohesion resulting from patterns of individual rather than group rotation into and out of theater.\(^{27}\)

For an effective army, not only do recruits have to stand fast under fire, but they also need to fire their weapons. In World War II, only about 15 percent of U.S. troops in combat fired; in the Korean War, about 50 percent did; in Vietnam, about 95 percent did so.\(^{28}\) Grossman (and others) attribute the dramatic increase in firing rates to increasingly realistic training that conditions recruits to battlefield conditions. Identification with the primary group also contributes to firing rates, as it absolves the combatant of individual responsibility for the wielding of violence.

Training and socialization to the small group takes place both formally through the immersion experience of boot camp, surprisingly similar across state militaries and insurgent armies alike, and informally through initiation rituals and hazing.\(^{29}\) In state militaries, the powerful experiences of endless drilling, dehumanization through abuse at the hands of the drill sergeant, and degradation and then “rebirth” as group members through initiation rituals typically meld recruits into combatants whose loyalties are often felt to be stronger than those to family.\(^{30}\) The purpose of the endless drilling of combat units is to instill unconditional and coordinated obedience to commanding officers, thought to be necessary on the battlefield. The result is a setting where conformity effects are likely to be extremely strong. Armed groups manage member emotions through highly standardized, repetitive, collective rituals, as in the expression of grief through a single volley fire at military funerals.\(^{31}\) Brutalization of recruits is intended to enhance aggression, which the discipline of drill is intended to control.\(^{32}\) In some state militaries, training and hazing rely on abusive gendered stereotypes to reshape individual identities and to build group cohesion, evident in the traditional rhetoric of US drill sergeants – recruits are “ladies” and “fags” – and the misogyny of marching chants— “This is my rifle; this is my gun [hand on crotch]/This is for fighting;
Joshua Goldstein argues that the practices of militarized masculinity account for the specifically sexual violence against enemy civilians (and combatants), but such practices are too widespread to account for the observed variation in sexual violence.

Even after intensive training, norms and practices may evolve dramatically after deployment to active engagement. Both the suffering and wielding of violence may bring profound changes to norms and practices. The increasing desensitization of combatants and dehumanizing of victims, the anxiety and uncertainty of combat and the threat of violence, the displacement of responsibility not only onto the group but onto the enemy who “deserves what they got,” are powerful wartime processes that may reshape group repertoires toward the wider use of violence, wider in the sense of both those targeted and forms of violence. Collective responsibility for atrocities can itself become a source of group cohesion and a bulwark against betrayal. Indeed, small-group dynamics can undermine military discipline when small-group loyalties and conformity effects within the group lead to withholding of information from commanding officers, disobedience, or the extreme example of the “fragging” of U.S. officers in Vietnam.

Much of the above applies to insurgent forces as well as state militaries. Recruits have to be socialized to follow orders, in addition to being trained in the technical aspects of warfare. Leaders attempt to control the violence of their combatants; whether they succeed in doing so depends on the strength of the hierarchy linking combatants and leaders. Humphreys and Weinstein found that unit cohesion and discipline—rather than the level of contestation, social structure such as community or ethnic ties, or the existence of a local economic surplus—best explained patterns of civilian abuse in Sierra Leone.

However, the irregular warfare strategy adopted by many nonstate armed groups enormously complicates the ability of the hierarchy to enforce decisions. Units may operate independently for significant periods of time with little direct contact with superiors in the hierarchy with the result that little information about unit practices flows up the hierarchy and superiors have little opportunity to punish infractions by subordinates. To minimize damage from interrogation of captured cadre, members may in fact know little about the group beyond the small unit. Unless the insurgent group controls a significant area, training of new recruits is covert and may be interrupted.

Insurgent groups manage these challenges in a variety of ways. Jeremy Weinstein argues that groups with economic endowments draw opportunistic recruits who will be more likely to wield violence in their private interest; such groups tend to wield violence indiscriminately. In contrast, those with social endowments draw activist recruits willing to make commitments to group goals over long time horizons. Such groups insist on extensive indoctrination and
training. However, in his emphasis on contrasting pools of recruits, Weinstein underestimates the power of socialization and training practices in melding recruits—typically male teenagers—into group members. Some armed groups, often leftist groups that understand their armed struggle is likely to continue over many years and perhaps decades, go to impressive lengths to inculcate group ideology and identification long after the initial training period. That is, the distinct patterns of violence may reflect group strategy concerning training, discipline, and incentives and group ideology rather than distinct pools of recruits. To the extent that the organization relies on child recruits, training and socialization likely play a significantly more important role than time horizons. Indeed, Dara Cohen argues that groups that recruit forcibly may rely on gang rape of civilians as a powerful socialization practice to create group cohesion.

Insurgent groups also manage the challenge of sustaining a command and control hierarchy in different ways and to different degrees. For example, the North Vietnamese Army model of three-person small units headed by a party cadre combined strong primary-group cohesion with ongoing surveillance of the primary group by the party, a combination argued to account for the army’s resilience in the face of U.S. firepower.

**Observable Implications: When Is Wartime Rape Rare?**

The theoretical framework is of course relevant for analysis of all forms of violence, not just sexual violence. In what follows, I focus on its observable implications that are particularly relevant for analysis of patterns of sexual violence.

The top-down implication. If leaders judge sexual violence to be counterproductive to their interests and if the hierarchy is sufficiently strong, little sexual violence will be observed. By sufficiently strong, I mean strong enough to restrain sexual violence by individual combatants or particular units. (Of course, a strong organization could judge sexual violence as in its interests and effectively enforce such violence by its combatants, but here we focus on the absence of sexual violence.)

What considerations would lead leaders to attempt to effectively prohibit sexual violence by combatants? First, many armed groups fear the consequences of uncontrolled violence by its combatants: Such forces may be unready to counter a surprise attack, they may prove difficult to bring back under control, and they may even turn their sights on their commanders. And unintended consequences may be severe, such as the entry of an ally of the enemy into the fray.

Second, when an armed group is strongly dependent on civilians for logistical support, such as supplies, recruits, and, especially, intelligence (which is difficult to coerce over a long period of time), and when leaders anticipate
relations continuing over some sustained time period, they are likely not to tolerate sexual violence against those civilians for fear of eroding their base of support. They might, however, tolerate sexual violence against other civilians, unless they feared an erosion of control over their forces or an intense reaction by the enemy that other forms of violence do not provoke.

Third, an armed group that aspires to govern civilians is less likely to tolerate mass rape of its future constituency. (This may explain why mass rape occurs in some (but not all) secessionist conflicts: The armed group carries out mass rape against civilians it plans not to govern.)

Fourth, an armed group that seeks state power and that sees itself as the embryo of a new, more just social order is likely to restrain its use of sexual violence because such violence violates the norms of the new society or as a means of legitimizing that ideology both to members and to its likely constituents. Nationalist and anticolonial insurgencies may prohibit sexual violence and seek female cadre as part of an ideological commitment to becoming a modern state army. Leninist groups may suppress sexual violence as part of the general emphasis on discipline and self-sacrifice for the group, and their commitment (in varying degrees) to gender equality. Relatedly, in conflicts where one party engages in massive violence against civilians, the other party may practice restraint as a way to demonstrate moral superiority.

Finally, leaders may prohibit sexual violence out of deference to international law for various reasons, perhaps because they aspire to some sort of international recognition or because they fear financial backers may disapprove.

Armed groups that rely on female combatants may have additional reasons to restrain sexual violence on the part of their troops. If female combatants are valued, commanders may fear that sexual violence against civilians may evolve into sexual violence against fellow group members, undermining group cohesion and morale. Or commanders may fear that sexual violence by combatants may deter future female recruits, for fear of suffering or witnessing such violence, if female combatants do not in fact welcome sexual violence against enemies; see above. (Of course, an armed group may attract female recruits and effectively prohibit sexual violence for a third, unrelated reason, such as those given in the previous paragraph.) Commanders may fear that their own civilians or combatants may be targeted with sexual violence in revenge should their own combatants engage in it.

*The bottom-up implication.* If commanders prohibit sexual violence (or if they promote sexual violence but the hierarchy is too weak to enforce that policy) and if individual combatants and their units endorse norms against sexual violence, little sexual violence by those combatants will occur. Such norms may take the form of internalized cultural norms or group codes of conduct whereby non-combatants are viewed as beyond the circle of legitimate violence. In particular, the norms may be pollution taboos, whereby sexual violations with civilians
associated with the enemy are perceived as polluting to the perpetrator. Or they may be norms comprising an internalized self-perception on the part of members as a liberating rather than an occupying or punishing force. (Note that the norms themselves may originate with the leadership; the issue is whether they have been internalized as norms by individual combatants.)

The conditions for such shunning of sexual violence by combatants are demanding. The wartime processes of brutalization, desensitization, and dehumanization discussed above must not have eroded such normative constraints. And given the powerful influence of small-group dynamics in armed units, all or nearly all combatants must endorse the norm, and enforce it against the few who attempt to transgress it. The chances of such restraint are likely higher if the armed group itself endorses and attempts to reinforce such norms. In the case of internalized cultural norms, the chances are likely lower in the case that combatants are deployed far from home and ongoing reinforcement of norms and practices.

When individual and unit norms and practices are distinct from those promoted by the armed organization, which dominates (in the sense of governing behavior), depends on the disciplinary strength of the organization. If organizational strength is insufficient, individual and unit norms will dominate with the organization unable to deter behavior it would rather prevent. For example, although the Sri Lankan military does not appear to endorse or promote sexual violence against Tamil women on military operations and at checkpoints, it does not appear sufficiently well disciplined to prevent it, as we will see below. Above the threshold, combatants comply with the organization’s rules concerning violence either because they internalize its norms or because they prefer compliance to the disciplinary consequences of noncompliance.

Clearly the strength of the hierarchy (the ability of the hierarchy to enforce decisions taken by the leadership) is central to the theoretical framework and its implications. For the framework to be useful in analyzing repertoires of violence, the degree of hierarchical strength must be observable apart from patterns of violence, in particular, sexual violence, against civilians. In the analysis below, I rely on two observable indicators of organizational strength: the ability effectively to tax the civilian population and the organization’s punishing of combatants who break rules and norms other than those concerning violence toward civilians. By tax effectively, I mean the ongoing, widespread collection of taxes or other revenue from the civilian population without their “deviation” to private consumption by combatants.

SRI LANKA: THE ORIGINS OF THE CONFLICT

Sri Lanka’s decades-long civil war is a case of a secessionist ethnic conflict, but in Sri Lanka neither side appears to engage in sexual violence as a
strategy of war, with the possible exception of the use of sexual torture of detainees by state agents. Members of the state military and police engage in some rape of Tamil girls and women during military operations and at checkpoints, but to a far less degree than occurs in some other ethnic conflicts, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sudan. Of particular interest is the apparent absence of sexual violence on the part of the Tamil insurgent group LTTE against civilians, despite the group’s inflicting frequent civilian casualties. Such casualties occur in the context of reprisal attacks on non-Tamil villages, assassinations of political and military leaders, and bombings of transportation facilities. Most tellingly, the LTTE did not engage in sexual violence during their forced displacement of tens of thousands of Muslims from the Jaffa peninsula in 1990. As ethnic cleansing is the classic setting for rape as a strategy, this restraint in their use of sexual violence is striking. Thus the overall pattern is one of asymmetric engagement in sexual violence. I first describe the origins of the conflict and patterns of sexual violence against Tamil civilians by state forces. I focus on the puzzling absence of sexual violence in the LTTE’s repertoire of violence.

The origins of the war lie in a particular pattern of postindependence politics. In 1981, Tamils composed about 18 percent of the population, of which a third (the so-called Indian or Estate Tamils) are descendants of migrant workers from India over the last century and a half, and two-thirds are “Sri Lankan Tamils” whose ancestors have lived in Sri Lanka for many centuries. Muslims composed 7 percent of the total population and Christians 8 percent. The Sinhalese composed the majority of the population (74 percent); the vast majority of this language group is Buddhist (90 percent of Sinhalese). Despite Sinhalese nationalist myths concerning the Aryan origins of the Sinhalese, there is a long-standing pattern of assimilation of South Indian migrants into the Sinhalese ethnic group. Although Tamil and Sinhalese cultures share many features, ethnic tensions developed under British rule, which favored the Sri Lankan Tamil group for civil service and other professional employment. In the aftermath of independence, Sinhalese nationalists rallied a broad alliance of Sinhalese classes against English-speaking Tamil elites that dominated the new government, and once they won elections, instigated language, university admission, and hiring policies that increasingly favored the Sinhalese at the expense of the Tamils. In response, Tamil elites led various nonviolent campaigns that led to a number of cross-ethnic pacts, but key provisions were not implemented, largely as a result of intra-Sinhalese politics.

As a result, two Sinhalese parties dominated national politics after independence, competing for votes in a classic pattern of ethnic outbidding: Each party used the other’s efforts at ethnic compromise to rally voters against the other. State irrigation and settlement schemes that moved Sinhalese farmers into traditionally Tamil areas increased tensions, particularly in the east. As parliamentary politics and nonviolent campaigns had little practical results, Tamil militant
groups emerged in the 1970s, calling for the founding of a separate state, Tamil Eelam. In 1975, Velupillai Prabhakaran, the founder and still-unrivaled leader of the group that became the LTTE, carried out the first assassination of a state official. State forces engaged in increasingly draconian tactics in response.

Since independence, there have been seven major occurrences of ethnic violence against the Tamil minority. The violence against Tamils in July 1983 was more widespread than earlier violence and led to the emergence of civil war. The violence began after Tamil militants killed thirteen soldiers in the northern Jaffna district. Police in Colombo did little to quell the violence but stood by as mobs led by men carrying lists of Tamil households and businesses attacked Tamils, burning homes, businesses, and cars, sometimes with victims inside. Several hundred, perhaps thousands, of Tamils were killed; tens of thousands homes and businesses destroyed; and approximately a hundred thousand displaced from their homes. Violence extended into neighborhoods as Sinhalese targeted some Tamil neighbors while protecting others, though often not their property. It appears that some women were stripped, some were then burnt; there are reliable claims that some were raped.

In the aftermath of the pogrom, Tamil youth sought to join the various militant organizations in large numbers. Aided by Tamil politicians in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu and later by the Indian intelligence service, the groups compiled arms and trained in various techniques of warfare. Indian political intervention culminated in its negotiation of an accord with the government that set the terms of political devolution to provincial bodies and the sending of peace-keeping troops. Before and during the Indian military intervention (1987–90), competition between Tamil armed groups accounted for a substantial fraction of deaths due to political violence, with the LTTE emerging as the dominant group. There were two reasons: The LTTE was skeptical of India’s ultimate intentions and built arms and cadre separately in addition to those available via Indian support. And the LTTE deployed an unparalleled degree of violence against the rival organizations, wiping out some and forcing others to seek Indian or government protection. Despite LTTE’s nominal acquiescence to the Indian intervention, relations soon deteriorated into war that culminated in India’s withdrawal in 1990. As the fabled Indian army sought unsuccessfully to defeat the insurgent group, Indian combatants abused civilians, including by what appears to have been fairly frequent rape of girls and women and torture of boys and men suspected of links to the LTTE.

Civil war between the LTTE and government forces has continued since 1990, with the exception of a few periods in which ceasefires and negotiations were attempted. State forces—the military, the Special Task Force and other police groups, and paramilitary groups, including the Muslim Home Guards and some Tamil militant groups that allied with the government after their defeat by the
LTTE—have engaged in a wide repertoire of violence toward Tamil civilians, ranging from torture during interrogation to reprisal killings of villagers to significant numbers of disappearances. Among these human rights violations is a moderate to low but persistent level of sexual violence by state forces.54

**Sexual Violence by State Forces in Sri Lanka**

There are two patterns of state-sponsored sexual violence. First and likely more prevalent is the custodial rape and sexual torture of girls and women and also of boys and men. Torture in detention takes place in various sites, particularly police stations and army bases, and takes a myriad of forms. Among them are rape with plantain flowers soaked in chilies, bottles, or other objects; electric shocks or the application of chilies to the genitals; piercing of male genitals; forced sexual relations with other prisoners; and slamming testicles into a drawer.55 Torture of those detained is “endemic” in Sri Lanka according to the Law and Society Trust;56 in many of the cases described, sexual torture is a recurring theme. In one case, a woman who had been gang-raped in a police station in Amparai district was killed; a grenade in her vagina erased all evidence.57

Second is the rape of Tamil girls and women at checkpoints and during military or police operations, settings that one human rights expert terms “semi-custodial settings of opportunity.”58 Neloufer de Mel describes several such cases, one of which occurred in Colombo.59 In an interview, one former military officer stated that it depends on the officer in charge. . . . It depends on field commanders: Good commanders don’t allow it, keep tight rein on discipline. By and large troops adhere to that. Weak commanders lead to excesses. It’s a matter of professionalism. At road blocks and check points, rape happens because of a lack of supervision and monitoring.60

In a statement to Carolyn Nordstrom, a serving officer made the point more graphically:

It’s crazy; it’s completely crazy. I can’t control my troops. It’s awful up there. One of the soldiers [government, largely Sinhalese] is hit by a guerrilla [Tamil], or they run over a land mine, or a bomb explodes, and they go nuts. It’s been building up and building up, and they just go wild. The guerrillas have long since melted away, and the soldiers turn their fury on the first available target. Of course, the only people around are civilians. They open fire on everyone, they destroy everything in sight, they rape and torture people they catch on the streets or in their homes, they lob bombs into homes and schools, markets, and city streets. I’ve tried to stop them, I try to control the situation. I can’t. None of us commanders can—though god knows some don’t try. The troops just take off like this and there’s no stopping them. We can’t discipline them. We can’t prosecute them. We can’t dismiss them—we’d have no army left if we did. The situation up north is completely out of control, and there isn’t a damn thing we can do about it.61
The evolving prevalence of this pattern of sexual violence by state forces is extremely difficult to evaluate. In their monitoring of thirty newspapers, the Women and Media Collective found thirty-seven reported cases of rape by members of the Armed Forces in 1998. One Tamil nationalist Web site lists seventeen cases in 1996, eighteen in 1997, five in 1998, three in 999, one in 2000, and six in 2001. It may be the case that willingness to report rape has increased after the prosecution of nine soldiers for the rape and murder of Krishanthy Kumarasamy at a checkpoint in 1996 and the murder of her mother, brother, and neighbor, who had gone looking for her. If true, this would suggest that sexual violence by state agents is decreasing, given the pattern of declining cases and increased likelihood of reporting. In interviews, two human rights experts and one military expert argued that indeed is the case, perhaps as result of increased human rights training and the prosecution of a few cases.

It is difficult to tell based on the evidence available whether the pattern of ongoing (though perhaps declining) sexual violence at checkpoints and during operations is due to tolerance on the part of state authorities or an inability to control members of the police and military. The ongoing pattern of sexual violence and other forms of torture of suspected Tamil militants (but also of common criminals) is more clearly a case of state tolerance for violence, as it occurs in state facilities under the direct control of military and police authorities.

The Absence of Sexual Violence by the LTTE

In contrast, there are very few allegations of sexual violence against civilians by LTTE members (with the exception of a limited number of cases of sexual torture of members of other militant organizations; see below). Rape of child combatants apparently does not occur despite the large numbers of girls recruited, often by force. One well-placed expert stated that even after the split of the LTTE in 2004 and the subsequent freeing of child recruits and their re-recruitment, he had never heard any allegations of child sexual abuse by LTTE cadre. With one exception, the human rights and military experts whom I consulted concurred that there was very little sexual violence by the LTTE. I first summarize reported instances of sexual violence by the LTTE and then show that the LTTE is not generally restrained in its practice of violence against civilians.

The most detailed and consistent reports of human rights violations in areas of LTTE control and influence come from the University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna), a network of human rights activists that receives and evaluates reports from across northern and eastern Sri Lanka. In contrast to the many detailed allegations of sexual violence by state agents, the group reports only a handful of cases by LTTE cadre. A review of the many documents on its Web site yielded the following allegations of sexual violence by persons having some
affiliation with the LTTE. The most specific allegation states that on June 15, 2002, LTTE cadre raped a girl who had managed to escape after being forcefully conscripted into the LTTE. A widow near Batticaloa accused a well-known LTTE cadre, “Gadaffi,” of attempted rape. Friends reported the incident to the LTTE office and, after a hostile reception, to the Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission. It was subsequently rumored that he had been disciplined, but he remained a trainer for the LTTE. A former member of the LTTE who was working for the local intelligence chief at the time was accused of the rape and murder of a woman in December 2003. When police appeared ready to arrest him, the LTTE “took Antony to their area and blocked the arrest, giving the impression that they would punish him themselves.”

There are two other allegations that include no details. Bulletin No. 10 states that LTTE members raped Sinhalese women during a 1995 massacre; I could find no other mention of said massacre on the Web site. Bulletin No. 44 claims that LTTE cadre raped at least three Estate Tamil women who had settled in the north; no details are given. Special Report 7 refers to two incidents previously reported, but I could not find any reference in earlier reports.

I found two other allegations of rape by LTTE members. In her research on suicide bombers, Mia Bloom reports that three Tamil women were raped by Tamil men and were then approached by the LTTE to join the suicide group as a way to recover family honor although they had not reported the rape, an allegation she termed “shocking since the LTTE traditionally has never abused women nor has advocated or permitted the use of rape against enemy women.”

According to Margaret Trawick, an anthropologist who did field work in the Batticaloa area of eastern Sri Lanka, after four cadre gang-raped a 13-year-old girl, “As punishment, their hands were bound and they were dragged behind a tractor. At the end their bodies were torn up, and they were crying for water when they died.”

In 1990, the LTTE forcibly displaced seventy-five thousand Muslim civilians from the Jaffna peninsula, Mannar Island, and other areas of northern Sri Lanka. Sri Lankan Muslims are the descendants of Arab and Indian traders who settled in Sri Lanka many centuries ago and intermarried with the local population. While Muslims lived throughout Sri Lanka, their population was particularly concentrated in eastern and northern Sri Lanka. Many were bilingual in Tamil and Sinhalese. This ethnic cleansing took place in the context of sharply increasing competition for control of the military and social vacuum left by the withdrawal of the Indian force. Violence against Muslims began in eastern Sri Lanka under the rubric of punishing Muslims for collaborating with government forces. In early August, LTTE cadre killed more than one hundred men and boys attending services at two mosques. Shortly after, cadre
killed about 120 Muslims in Eravur. In the aftermath of the violence, many Muslim farmers abandoned their fields for the relative safety of towns. In late October, the LTTE gave Muslims throughout northern Sri Lanka forty-eight hours to leave, with the exception of those in Jaffna, who were given just two hours. Despite the protests by many Tamils that their Muslim neighbors posed no threat, cadre forced all Muslims to leave, collecting all but a few possessions as they went.

Although ethnic cleansing is a classic setting for widespread rape, LTTE cadre engaged in little sexual violence in the process of forcing Muslims out. Indeed, my review of press archives, human rights reports, documents of women’s organizations, and academic and policy literature revealed no incidents of sexual violence, in contrast to many detailed reports of robbery by LTTE cadre. Muslims women human rights activists in interviews reported that they had never heard of an incident of sexual violence during the 1990 ethnic cleansing during their decades of work in the refugee camps. One reflected that through a process of organization and outreach by nongovernmental organizations, a group of activist Muslim women had emerged in the camps that would now be articulate about sexual violence, had it occurred. Human rights experts I consulted concurred in asserting they had never heard of sexual violence by the LTTE in 1990. The experts whom I consulted concurred (with the one exception mentioned above) that they had never heard of sexual violence by the LTTE in 1990.

The absence of sexual violence does not reflect a general restraint in the use of violence against civilians by the LTTE. One academic expert on Tamil culture and the conflict commented, “They don’t wait around to indulge in sexuality, they just shoot you down.” In addition to violence against Muslims, the LTTE has a long record of massacring Sinhalese civilians, sometimes in reprisal for government violence and sometimes without apparent antecedents. In 1985, the LTTE killed 146 civilians in an indiscriminate attack near an important Buddhist temple in Anuradhapura. More recently, despite the nominal ceasefire in place, in 2006 the LTTE killed more than one hundred Sinhalese civilians in various villages in the northeast, including sixty-eight in the village of Kebithigollewa. The LTTE also kills civilians in the course of its political assassinations, often carried out in public settings with blatant disregard for the inevitable accompanying civilian casualties, as in its attacks in 2000 on the post office in Vavuniya, a bomb outside the prime minister’s office, and bombs in Batticaloa near the police station and temple and during the assassination of the industrial development minister, the last of which alone killed twenty civilians.

The LTTE also exercises significant violence against Tamils, consolidating its dominance of Tamil politics through a series of conflicts in which its cadre killed members of other groups, both armed militants and politicians. For example, in
1986, the LTTE killed nearly two hundred members of the rival organization TELO in surprise attacks on its bases.\textsuperscript{86} The LTTE also engages in torture of members of rival groups.\textsuperscript{87} The one exception to the LTTE’s apparent restraint in the use of sexual violence concerns torture: in this context, there are a few reports of sexual torture by LTTE cadre of male victims. For example, one prisoner held by the LTTE for three years in the mid-1990s was regularly tortured, including the use of a hot iron on his genitals.\textsuperscript{88}

\textit{Explaining the Absence of Sexual Violence by the LTTE}

The observed absence of sexual violence on the part of LTTE cadre toward civilians is best explained by the theoretical framework’s top-down implication: Such violence is banned by the leadership and the organization’s strict internal discipline enforces the prohibition. The prohibition reinforces existing cultural mores. Tamil social norms strongly condemn sexual relations between unmarried persons, cross-caste relations, and rape of nonspouses.\textsuperscript{89} However, domestic violence, including spousal rape, is common. I suggest (but cannot show) that the prohibition would have been effective even in the absence of those mores. I first consider the top-down argument.

The LTTE is a separatist organization whose sole ideology is Tamil nationalism. Although leaders such as Anton Balasingham, the group’s spokesperson and propagandist until his recent death, occasionally spoke in socialist rhetoric, the group’s agenda does not appear to endorse socialism. Rather its central agenda, reiterated in speeches and evident in the group’s long-term refusal to compromise on anything less, is full self-determination of a casteless Tamil society in a sovereign state. Although many LTTE cadre come from Hindu families, significant numbers are Catholic. The group as an organization does not promote any particular religious practice.

Since its founding, the organization required its cadre to abandon nearly all practices of civilian life, which are seen as distractions from its sole loyalty, the attainment of Tamil Eelam. Its internal life is dominated by rhetoric of sacrifice, abnegation, commitment, discipline, and chastity under a rubric of kinship whereby senior cadre are referred to as “elder brothers.”\textsuperscript{90} Consistent with the emphasis on sacrifice of all for the organization, cadre carry cyanide tablets, which they are expected to use if capture is likely. The group originally required its cadre to abstain from sex, as well as liquor, smoking, and close contact with family or other civilians. Only after Prabhakaran decided to marry in 1984 did the organization endorse marriage among cadre, but only on the organization’s terms.\textsuperscript{91} Sexual relations outside of marriage are still prohibited. Cadre are allowed to marry only if they survive five years of combat. The group itself organizes the wedding.
This puritanical code of conduct appears to derive from leadership’s insistence that cadre commit themselves entirely to the organization, and demonstrate their willingness to sacrifice everything, including a private life. It may also reflect Prabhakaran’s character, which, according to the author of a detailed biography of Prabhakaran, M.R. Narayan Swamy, has long been grounded in a willingness to make whatever degree of sacrifice necessary for achieving Tamil Eelam. The organization’s long-standing tactical use of suicide bombers, the so-called Black Tigers, reflects this general norm of sacrifice and abnegation (but not suicide per se—if the mission can be accomplished without loss of valuable cadre, it is). The group’s practices are arguably reinforced and perhaps legitimated internally by the group’s military prowess.

In areas it controls, the LTTE enforces strict adherence by civilians to its rules, rules concerning not only loyalty to the organization but also more general forms of social control. In areas it governs, the organization prohibits child abuse, domestic violence, prostitution, pornography, and overindulgence in alcohol. After initial warnings by the local good-conduct unit, LTTE cadre imprison those who violate such rules. Sometimes they kill severe offenders, often by hanging from a central lamppost, apparently to publicly reinforce the cost of disobedience. Sex workers in Jaffna were executed when the LTTE governed the city. Although female cadre dress in guerrilla uniforms with trousers and frequently have short hair, the LTTE enforces traditional Tamil dress among civilian girls and women.

If the theoretical framework developed above is to explain the absence of sexual violence on the part of the LTTE, it must be the case either that the organization’s leadership both prohibits its cadre from engaging in it and has a military hierarchy sufficiently strong to effectively enforce that prohibition, or that combatants’ social norms effectively prohibit it. The organization does indeed proscribe sexual violence. I show below that the indicators of hierarchical strength identified above—the ability to effectively tax and to discipline cadre for internal infractions of rules—appear to be sufficiently strong that the top-down pattern (at least) is at work.

Beginning in 1987 and intensifying after 1990, the LTTE has built an extensive civil administration in areas its controls. The group cooperates with the government civil service in providing health and education services, while retaining exclusive control over security, including policing and judicial services. The group taxes civil servants in areas it controls (up to 12 percent of their government-paid salary) and also collects property taxes. In addition, the group collects “taxes” from Tamils in the diaspora, where donations if not voluntary are coerced, and some revenue may flow to the organization’s coffers through criminal enterprises. These various sources of revenue were sufficient to support an army of approximately ten thousand full-time fighters (a few estimates range up to twenty thousand), a naval force, and a small air force by the early 2000s. I have found few
allegations that individual members benefit significantly through deviating funds for their own consumption. There is, however, a significant exception: Colonel Karuna, the leader of the faction that split from the LTTE in eastern Sri Lanka in 2004, was accused of corruption and embezzlement, allegations that led to the split. His second in command reiterated those charges and now directs the faction.

The LTTE controls its cadre through a combination of socialization and brutal discipline. First, the organization inculcates its values and practices in a variety of ways. The organization was initially quite selective in its recruiting, preferring fewer but highly committed to more but less-committed cadre. However, it appears that the organization at times faces an inadequate supply of such committed volunteers, which probably contributes to the organization’s forced recruitment of child combatants. Some observers see the shortage also leading to the recruitment of female members, but there were also tactical reasons for that, namely, the ability of women wearing belts of explosives to pass through security more easily.

Training rather than selective recruitment thus appears to the basis of LTTE’s formation of disciplined cadre. In areas of LTTE control in Sri Lanka, all schoolchildren over the age of 14 are compelled to participate in exercises including security roles and mock battles. The organization is highly centralized, with strategic decisions made by Prabhakaran and the Central Committee, but field commanders have the autonomy, indeed, the obligation, to initiate tactical operations themselves. Key to the maintaining of discipline is the ongoing provision of information on a very frequent basis from operational units to very high levels of the organization, often to Prabhakaran himself. The group also maintains detailed dossiers on each member. In the opinion of one human rights expert, if sexual violence did occur on the part of LTTE cadre, if would not be opportunistic but strategic, as it is not a decision that could be implemented by individual cadre.

Second, the LTTE enforces its puritanical code of conduct within its own ranks through draconian forms of punishment when it is broken. Deserters from the organization are killed if caught; those promoting divisions within the group are executed even if they are highly ranked and valued cadre. Punishment is severe when rules prohibiting sex with fellow cadre are violated. Two of Prabhakaran’s bodyguards were executed when it was discovered that they had engaged in sex on duty. A cadre in Batticaloa killed herself rather than face the disciplinary consequences of her pregnancy. One leader of the organization was expelled in light of allegations that he had engaged in sex with another member.

Because the group’s hierarchy effectively taxes civilians and enforces its code of conduct within the organization, its organizational strength appears sufficiently strong to support the attribution of the absence of sexual violence to its effective prohibition by the leadership, enforced by the hierarchy. This appears to be a sufficient explanation for the absence of sexual violence on the part of
the LTTE. It is difficult, however, to tell from the available evidence if Tamil cultural norms against sexual relations outside of marriage also play a role, and if so, to what extent. Given the organization’s general pattern of willingness to engage in various forms of violence against civilians, also against Tamil cultural norms, it seems likely that the LTTE would effectively proscribe sexual violence even in the absence of the cultural norm.

**CONCLUSION**

Thus available evidence suggests that the top-down implication of the theoretical framework explains the LTTE case: The organization prohibits sexual violence and effectively enforces that decision through a tightly controlled military hierarchy in which punishment is swift and severe. However, whether the existence of norms in Tamil society against sexual violence is also a necessary factor in accounting for the rarity of sexual violence against civilians by the LTTE is difficult to determine in light of the evidence. I suspect not: The LTTE’s high level of control over its troops and the several instances in which cadre were punished for sexual relations suggests that, even in the absence of such social norms, it could effectively enforce its decision to prohibit sexual violence.

That one case confirms the top-down implication does not of course mean that other paths to a relative absence of sexual violence are not possible. A possible example: The insurgent army in El Salvador’s civil war, a nonethnic conflict pitting a leftist insurgency against an authoritarian government, effectively controlled the violence wielded by its cadre, including sexual violence. Indeed, the group exerted little violence against civilians. To be sure, the Frente Farabundo Martí para Liberación Nacional (FMLN) killed government collaborators, usually after warning them to leave the area. And its urban militia killed civilians with its poorly aimed bombs intended for military targets. Despite these caveats, the overall pattern is one of highly selective use of violence against civilians compared to other armed groups. In particular, I learned of no cases of sexual violence against civilians by FMLN cadre during my twenty-six months of field research during and just after the war. Of the 450 cases of sexual violence listed by the Truth Commission in the unpublished annexes to its report (270 cases were reported directly to the Commission by victims, family members, or friends; 180 were reported by human rights groups, churches, or other organizations) , no case was attributed to FMLN cadre.

In contrast, government soldiers and security forces engaged in sexual violence, including gang and multiple rapes, against many suspected insurgent supporters (including men) held in both official and secret detention sites. Government forces also carried out mass rape during some operations early in the war, for example, during the El Mozote massacre in 1981. Compared to many nonstate armed groups, the FMLN was a highly ideological organization with close and cooperative relations with many civilians.
The group fought government forces to a stalemate despite massive U.S. aid to the state; the only feasible explanation is the consistently high quality of intelligence it gathered from civilians. Cadre went through intensive ideological indoctrination that was reinforced throughout their service. Military units typically contained political officers responsible for intelligence and relations with civilians. Yet the command structure was complicated: The FMLN was a coalition of five distinct insurgent groups, each with its own chain of command, political priorities, and military tactics. For example, one of the groups, the Ejército Popular Revolucionario, killed mayors in eastern El Salvador during the middle years of the war but ended the practice after human rights groups documented the violence and the FMLN objected. Nonetheless, despite its complicated command structure, the group engaged in a narrow repertoire of violence. Further analysis will need to assess the degree to which the influence of liberation theology on initial recruits (who became local commanders if they survived the wave of state violence in 1979–83) and the group’s ideological training led to norms such that the hierarchy did not in fact need to enforce its policies through draconian punishment.

Analysis of the evolution of an armed group’s pattern of sexual violence over the course of the war may provide leverage to distinguish causal mechanisms. I am in the process of analyzing two examples of cases in which sexual violence increased in the repertoire of armed groups. In the conflict between African National Congress and the Inkatha Freedom Party in KwaZulu Natal in the 1980s and 1990s, initially Inkatha militants eschewed sexual violence, apparently due to traditional beliefs that sex undermines the warrior spirit. As the scene and protagonists shifted toward younger and more urban militants, the group began defending their turf through sexual as well as other forms of violence. Another example of an armed group that increasingly engaged in sexual violence is Sendero Luminoso, the Peruvian insurgent group. Early in the war, the group targeted government collaborators, including civilian officials, with a variety of violence, but sexual violence was rare compared to sexual violence by state forces, although it did occur, sometimes as a form of punishment for civilians engaging in behavior proscribed by the group. After the group was pushed out of its initial areas of strength, its repertoire of violence appeared to widen significantly to include sexual violence against civilians, particularly sexual slavery of indigenous women in the group’s remote strongholds, as in the case of the Asháninkas.

Rape is not inevitable in war. Armed groups - non-state actors as well as state militaries - often limit sexual violence by their members against civilians. The argument and evidence presented here may strengthen the efforts of those government, military, and insurgent leaders, UN officials, and members of non-governmental organizations who seek to end sexual violence and other violations of the laws of war.
NOTES


5. Ibid., Article 8(2) (e) (xxii)-2 to (xxii)-6.


7. Ibid.


11. A version of the substitution argument is made by evolutionary psychologists Thornhill and Palmer: Men will develop a genetic predisposition to rape as they will be better off in propagating their genes if they rape women. See Randy Thornhill and Craig Palmer, *The Natural History of Rape: Biological Basis of Social Coercion* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000). See Wood, “Variation in Sexual Violence,” for a discussion of this and other biological arguments for rape.


17. Goldstein, War and Gender.


22. Siebold, “Core Issues.”


26. Shils, “Cohesion and Disintegration”; but see Omer Bartov, Hitler’s Army (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1991) for a distinct interpretation emphasizing collective responsibility for war crimes as a disincentive to surrender.

27. An argument sometimes made is that the presence of female combatants in combat units will disrupt the formation of the necessary bonds among the male combatants. For a review of available evidence, see Leora N. Rosen, Paul D. Bliese, Kathleen A. Wright, and Robert K. Gifford, “Gender Composition and Group Cohesion in U.S. Army Units: A Comparison across Five Studies,” Armed Forces & Society 25, no. 3 (1999): 365–86.


29. For an argument emphasizing the importance of collective drills over horizontal bonds for group cohesion and performance in state militaries, see Anthony King, “The


33. Carol Burke, *Camp All-American, Hanoi Jane, and the High-and-Tight* (Boston: Beacon, 2004); and Goldstein, *War and Gender*. Burns describes various metaphors in the U.S. military that relate arms and sex, and also suggests that this particular marching chant is no longer allowed. Richard Allen Burns, “This Is My Rifle, This Is My Gun . . . : Gunlore in the Military,” *New Directions in Folklore* 7 (2003).


39. Humphreys, “Handling and Manhandling.”


41. Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín shows in his comparison of paramilitary and guerrilla combatants in Colombia that initial socialization, discipline, and incentives are sufficiently different as to account for differences in violence between the two groups. See Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín, “Telling the Difference: Guerrillas and Paramilitaries in the Colombian War,” *Politics and Society* 36 (1998): 3–34.


47. Obeyesekere identifies three sites where political violence was increasingly institutionalized in the decades after independence: market towns where Sinhalese, Tamil, and Muslim businessmen competed; areas undergoing colonization by Sinhalese; and Colombo. See Gananath Obeyesekere, “The Origins and Institutionalisation of Political Violence,” in Sri Lankan Change and Crisis, ed. J. Manor (London: Croom Helm, 1984), 153–94. See also Tambiah, Sri Lanka; and Stanley J. Tambiah, Leveling Crowds: Ethnonationalist Conflicts and Collective Violence in South Asia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

48. Tambiah, Sri Lanka, chap. 2 and 3. Gunasinghe persuasively argues that a contributing factor was the liberalization of the economy and Sinhalese fears that Tamil business interests would fare much better in the newly competitive context, given that they had not relied on state subsidies and had extensive links to Indian interests (Newton Gunasinghe, “The Open Economy and Its Impact on Ethnic Relations in Sri Lanka,” in Economy, Culture, and Civil War in Sri Lanka, ed. Deborah and Michael D. Woost Winslow (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 2004), 99–114.


51. There appears to be no way to estimate the prevalence of sexual violence in the 1983 pogrom, given the anecdotal character of the violence and the scarcity of human rights and women’s organizations collecting information at the time.


53. Somasundaram, Scarred Minds.

54. To my knowledge, there have been no medical or human rights violations surveys of the type carried out in other conflicts to assess the extent of sexual violence in the Sri Lankan conflict. Human rights experts who have assessed the feasibility of surveys of internally displaced persons’ camps, for example, argue that conditions are not adequate for a number of reasons: Security for interviewers and interviewees would be difficult to ensure, given the presence of persons with a wide range of political loyalties living in the camps and the location of many near army bases (interviews, May 2007). Whether adequate support services exist for victims of sexual violence is also an issue. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) commissioned an assessment of the records of hospitals, police stations, and welfare centers in districts affected by the conflict. See Kamalini Wijayatilake, Study on Sexual and Gender-based Violence in Selected Locations in Sri Lanka (Colombo, Sri Lanka: UNHCR, Sri Lanka, and Centre for Women’s Research, 2004). The majority of incidents appear to refer to domestic violence by family members; the survey identified few cases of rape. The only directly conflict-related perpetrators listed were Home Guards (members of civilian
defense militias). Care International Sri Lanka commissioned a survey on gender-based violence in the district of Batticaloa, but as the survey was of seventy-five victims identified through caregivers, there is no way to estimate prevalence (see Shyamala Gomez, *A Study on Gender Based Violence in the Batticaloa District* (London: Care International Sri Lanka, 2005). If this small survey is at all representative, sexual violence not related to the conflict is much more frequent than sexual violence related to the conflict.


63. DBS Jeyaraj, *Sexual Violence against Tamil Women* (2000), www.tamilnation.org/indictment/rape/001222dbs.htm. While this article is distinctly pro–Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), its list includes cases documented in other sources as well.

64. Sexual harassment of female cadre by mid-ranking members of the LTTE command structure does occur, according to interviewees, but the extent is impossible to estimate (interviews, May 2007).


66. The exception was a former military officer who claimed that he saw clear signs of rape of women civilians who had been massacred by the LTTE in 1990 at two sites in the east. I found no confirmation of this in my interviews with human rights experts and my review of documents.

67. Founded in 1988 by faculty of the University of Jaffna, one leader of the organization was killed by the LTTE in 1989. Other faculty members known to be affiliated with the organization were gradually forced to leave northern Sri Lanka. Drawing on a network of supporters, the group continues to publish a variety of documents. Both parties to the conflict attack the group as supporters of the other side. According to a former high-level
Tamil militant, the group’s reports are “fairly accurate, I would say about 80 percent accurate. They’ve a lot of sources. The inaccuracy is not systematic, there are no deliberate mistakes. Perhaps misinformation comes up, but it’s not purposeful.” Interview, May 2007.

68. UTHR(J), *Special Report No. 14* (July 20, 2002).

69. UTHR(J), *Special Report No. 13* (May 10, 2002); *Special Report 14* (July 20, 2002).

70. UTHR(J), *Bulletin No. 35* (March 9, 2004).

71. UTHR(J), *Special Report No. 15*, section 6.1 (October 4, 2002).

72. UTHR(J), *Bulletin No. 10* (February 1996).

73. UTHR(J), *Bulletin No. 44* (March 13, 2007).


81. On the history of LTTE human rights violations, see the many reports by UTHR(J), Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the ICG, and the U.S. State Department. Stephen Hopgood argues that civilians are neither the sole nor intended target of LTTE attacks, such as that on the Central Bank in 1996 that left eighty dead; rather, civilian deaths are understood as “collateral damage” of assassinations. While his assessment may be true for political assassinations, it does not account for the other patterns of violence against civilians discussed here (Stephen Hopgood, “Tamil Tigers, 1987–2002,” in Making Sense of Suicide Missions, ed. Diego Gambetta (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005), 43–76.


87. Indeed, one former Tamil militant commented, “The Sri Lankan army should take lessons in torture from the LTTE” (interview, May 2007). Interviewees noted one pattern of restraint in the intra-Tamil violence: The various militant groups did not target one another’s families, an implicit understanding to avoid a disastrous tit for tat (interviews, May 2007).
94. de Mel, *Militarizing Sri Lanka*.
95. Trawick, “Enemy Lines.” Women cadre appear to join as a means toward empowerment, redemption, and revenge (Stack-O’Connor, “Lions, Tigers,” 56). Some girls and women joined the LTTE after the rape of themselves or family members by state forces or Indian troops. This exploiting of the occurrence of sexual abuse by state forces as a means to recruit female cadre is well documented. See de Mel, *Militarizing Sri Lanka*; and Ann Adele (Adele Balasingham), *Women Fighters of Liberation Tigers* (London: LTTE Secretariat, 1993).
97. The internal practices of the organization are known only to a certain extent. Those who leave the organization are forbidden from disclosing its secrets, a prohibition apparently enforced even in the diaspora (Narayan Swamy, *Elusive Mind*). This paragraph draws on Adele, *Women Fighters.* Balasingham, *Will to Freedom*; de Mel, *Militarizing Sri Lanka*; Narayan Swamy, *Elusive Mind*; Narayan Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka*; and Stack-O’Connor, “Lions, Tigers,” as well as interviews.
98. de Mel, *Militarizing Sri Lanka*.
101. A particular exception to this overall pattern occurred on the slopes of the San Vicente volcano when a local commander apparently became obsessed with finding government collaborators and tortured many cadre and local residents, who under extreme...
torture named each other. It took the central command some time to respond but they eventually did; the commander was relieved of duty and executed (Tom Gibb, “Salvador: Under the Shadow of Dreams” (unpublished book manuscript, 2000).


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