The Genocide Prevention Task Force was convened by the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, The American Academy of Diplomacy, and the United States Institute of Peace to generate practical recommendations to enhance the U.S. government’s capacity to respond to emerging threats of genocide and mass atrocities.

“The world agrees that genocide is unacceptable and yet genocide and mass killings continue. We have a duty to find the answer before the vow of ‘never again’ is once again betrayed.”

—MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT AND WILLIAM S. COHEN

The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, a living memorial to the Holocaust, was created to inspire leaders and citizens to confront hatred, prevent genocide, promote human dignity and strengthen democracy. Federal support guarantees the Museum’s permanence, and donors nationwide make possible its educational activities and global outreach.

The American Academy of Diplomacy is dedicated to strengthening the resources and tools America brings to managing its diplomatic challenges, and accomplishes this through outreach programs, lectures, awards, and writing competitions. In doing so, the Academy promotes an understanding of the importance of diplomacy to serving our nation and enhancing America’s standing in the world.

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan, national institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, promote post-conflict stability and development, and increase peacebuilding capacity, tools, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by directly engaging in peacebuilding efforts around the globe.

To download the complete Task Force report visit: www.ushmm.org • www.academyofdiplomacy.org • www.usip.org
PREVENTING GENOCIDE
PREVENTING GENOCIDE
A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers

Genocide Prevention Task Force
Madeleine K. Albright • William S. Cohen
Co-Chairs
John Danforth • Thomas Daschle
Stuart Eizenstat • Michael Gerson
Dan Glickman • Jack Kemp
Gabrielle Kirk McDonald • Thomas R. Pickering
Julia Taft • Vin Weber • Anthony Zinni

Brandon Grove, Executive Director
We dedicate this report to the millions of innocent children, women, and men who have suffered and died from mass atrocities and genocide.

We honor the memory of Julia Vadala Taft, a member of our Task Force, who cared deeply about preventing future genocides.
CONTENTS

Foreword: A Call to Action by the Co-Chairs ix
Letter from the Convening Organizations xi
Executive Summary xv
Defining the Challenge xix

CHAPTER 1 Leadership: The Indispensable Ingredient 1
CHAPTER 2 Early Warning: Assessing Risks and Triggering Action 17
CHAPTER 3 Early Prevention: Engaging before the Crisis 35
CHAPTER 4 Preventive Diplomacy: Halting and Reversing Escalation 55
CHAPTER 5 Employing Military Options 73
CHAPTER 6 International Action: Strengthening Norms and Institutions 93

Summary of Recommendations 111

Appendices 115
A. Task Force Members
B. Expert Group Members
C. Task Force Staff
D. List of Consultations
E. Plenary Sessions
F. Acronyms
FOREWORD:
A Call to Action by the Co-Chairs

The year 2008 marks the 60th anniversary of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. It is also the 20th anniversary of the ratification of this treaty by the United States. As Americans consider our country’s role in the world in the years to come, we are convinced that the U.S. government can and must do more to prevent genocide, a crime that threatens not only our values, but our national interests. This report provides a blueprint that can enable the United States to take preventive action, along with international partners, to forestall the specter of future cases of genocide and mass atrocities.

The world agrees that genocide is unacceptable and yet genocide and mass killings continue. Our challenge is to match words to deeds and stop allowing the unacceptable. That task, simple on the surface, is in fact one of the most persistent puzzles of our times. We have a duty to find the answer before the vow of “never again” is once again betrayed.

In recent times, we have seen an upsurge in interest and activism at the grassroots level in the United States, galvanized by the crisis in Darfur and driven in large part by students and faith-based organizations nationwide. Preventing genocide and mass atrocities is a purpose that transcends partisan lines and demands public support at all levels of society.

We seek to honor the memory of past victims of genocide and mass atrocities by encouraging future action. We believe that preventing genocide is possible and that striving to do so is imperative, both for our national interests and for our leadership position in the world.
The fundamental goal of this report is to identify practical steps to enhance the capacity of the U.S. government to prevent and respond to genocide and mass atrocities. We recognize the limitations of time and resources as well as other constraints on policymakers, but we believe that the changes we propose are realistic and necessary to ensure that senior officials have all the information they need to act—and to act in time—when faced with the next potential genocide. We must do better.

We wish to thank all those who contributed to our process, both inside and outside the U.S. government and around the world. We are grateful to our expert group leaders, the members of their teams, the staff from the convening institutions, and the staff from our own offices. We want to express our special thanks to the conveners of this project and to our colleagues on the Genocide Prevention Task Force, whose commitment to this effort was unwavering, and whose wisdom and judgment guided our deliberations on this very difficult subject.

Madeleine K. Albright and William S. Cohen, Co-Chairs
LETTER FROM
THE CONVENING ORGANIZATIONS

We have the privilege of leading three organizations that share a commitment to enhancing America’s role in promoting peace and preventing genocide and mass atrocities.

The idea for the Genocide Prevention Task Force arose out of a desire by each of our institutions to reach beyond our individual capabilities and build a practical framework that could help the U.S. government better respond to threats of genocide and mass atrocities. We fully recognize the enormity of this challenge and the ambitious scope of the recommendations in this report, and we hope we have made a meaningful contribution toward this end.

We are deeply grateful to the co-chairs of this task force: former U.S. secretary of state Madeleine K. Albright and former U.S. secretary of defense William S. Cohen. Their leadership and investment of time and energy in this project have resulted in a report that, if implemented, can positively enhance the U.S. government’s ability to prevent future genocides and mass atrocities. The selection of the membership of the task force was a collective enterprise between the convening organizations and the co-chairs, leading to the creation of a strong panel of American leaders.

We thank the individual task force members, whose wide range of talent and expertise strengthened our deliberations and final product. The task force included former government officials from both parties and from several administrations. It comprised people with international, diplomatic, military, humanitarian, and other relevant experience: John Danforth,
Thomas Daschle, Stuart Eizenstat, Michael Gerson, Dan Glickman, Jack Kemp, Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Thomas R. Pickering, Vin Weber, and Anthony Zinni. Julia Taft was an active member until her untimely death in March 2008.

The task force was guided and informed by the work of our expert group leaders—Lawrence Woocher and J Alexander Thier of the United States Institute of Peace, Paul Stares of the Council on Foreign Relations, Victoria Holt of the Henry L. Stimson Center, and Tod Lindberg of Stanford University’s Hoover Institution—and the members of their working groups and project staff. The work of the five expert groups covered the comprehensive set of actions required for effective genocide prevention and response: (1) assessing risks and providing warning of potential atrocities; (2) pre-crisis engagement in countries at risk; (3) halting and reversing escalation toward mass violence; (4) military options to prevent and stop ongoing atrocities; and (5) shaping the international system to prevent genocide.

The Genocide Prevention Task Force was officially launched on November 13, 2007 at the National Press Club in Washington. The task force held three formal plenary meetings (in December 2007, May 2008, and September 2008) as well as numerous consultations and informal exchanges. Our expert groups consisted of some fifty individuals from nongovernmental organizations and academia as well as former government officials across the political spectrum. Each group explored the critical objectives and major challenges in its domain, the readiness of the U.S. government to achieve these objectives and meet these challenges, and the institutional and strategic changes that would enhance U.S. government preparedness. Their discussions generated scores of insights and good ideas.

Our special thanks go to the executive committee of the task force: Brandon Grove, executive director (The American Academy of Diplomacy, or AAD); Ann-Louise Colgan, project manager; John Heffernan (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, or USHMM); and Abiodun Williams and Lawrence Woocher (United States Institute of Peace, or USIP), as well as Tara Sonenshine, strategic advisor to the task force. We would also like to thank USHMM’s Committee on Conscience for all their support.
We acknowledge with appreciation the support of the leadership of the three convening organizations: at USHMM, Fred S. Zeidman, chairman, Joel M. Geidner, vice chairman, and Tom A. Bernstein, chairman, Committee on Conscience; at AAD, Thomas R. Pickering, chairman, Marc Grossman, vice chairman; and at USIP, J. Robinson West, chair, and George E. Moose, vice chair.

Finally, we would like to recognize with gratitude the support of Humanity United, the lead funder of this project, as well as the Sudikoff Family Foundation.

Sara J. Bloomfield, Director, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Ronald E. Neumann, President, The American Academy of Diplomacy
Richard H. Solomon, President, United States Institute of Peace
The conclusions and recommendations reached in this report emanate from the fundamental reality that genocide and mass atrocities threaten American values and interests.

Despite past efforts to prevent and halt systematic episodes of massacres, forced displacements, and mass rapes, such atrocities have persisted in our era. In the last century, tens of millions of people lost their lives in episodes of mass killings. People of conscience rightly demand: “never again.” There is no doubt that genocide and mass atrocities exact a horrific human toll. They constitute a direct assault on universal human values, including, most fundamentally, the right to life.

Genocide and mass atrocities also threaten core U.S. national interests.

They feed on and fuel other threats in weak and corrupt states, with dangerous spillover effects that know no boundaries. If the United States does not engage early in preventing these crimes, we inevitably bear greater costs—in feeding millions of refugees and trying to manage long-lasting regional crises.

In addition, U.S. credibility and leadership are compromised when we fail to work with international partners to prevent genocide and mass atrocities.

We conclude in this report that preventing genocide is an achievable goal. Genocide is not the inevitable result of “ancient hatreds” or irrational lead-
ers. It requires planning and is carried out systematically. There are ways to recognize its signs and symptoms, and viable options to prevent it at every turn if we are committed and prepared. Preventing genocide is a goal that can be achieved with the right organizational structures, strategies, and partnerships—in short, with the right blueprint.

**A Blueprint for Action: Beginning with Leadership and Political Will**

The report provides a number of concrete steps that the U.S. government can take to confront genocide and mass atrocities before they occur. At the same time, we recognize that making progress toward preventing genocide requires leadership and political will.

The case for preventing genocide and mass atrocities must be made from the president on down—ideally at the beginning of a new administration. History has shown that prevention is possible with sufficient interest and attention from the highest ranks of our government. But high-level attention has been extremely difficult to mobilize and sustain. The absence of an overarching policy framework or a standing interagency process has further inhibited action and contributed to a sense of futility among some policymakers.

**We urge America’s 44th president to demonstrate at the outset that preventing genocide and mass atrocities is a national priority.** A new administration should develop and promulgate a government-wide policy to this end. We recommend a new standing interagency mechanism for analysis of threats and coordination of appropriate preventive action as part of a comprehensive policy framework for genocide prevention. Achieving this goal will require the president to muster political will that has too often been lacking in the past.

We are keenly aware that the incoming president’s agenda will be overfull from day one. Preventing genocide and mass atrocities need not be seen as an add-on to the core foreign policy domain. The means and ends of genocide prevention dovetail with other U.S. priorities, providing a rare and important opportunity for progress.
Assigning Resources to Match Priorities

The Genocide Prevention Task Force recommends increased and more flexible funding for the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities. Congress should invest $250 million—less than a dollar for every American each year—in new funds for crisis prevention and response. The availability of a portion of the new funds ($50 million) for rapid allocation in support of urgent activities to prevent or halt emerging crises is a key element of this recommendation.

A Comprehensive Strategy

What makes this report different from other examinations of the subject is that we present a comprehensive policy approach designed to ensure an effective response to genocide that is not held hostage to arguments over resources, intelligence, geography, sovereignty, or legal definition. To prevent genocide, our government must draw on a wide array of analytical, diplomatic, economic, legal, and military instruments and engage a variety of partners. The United States has many tools at its disposal, a wide range of options between the extremes of doing nothing and sending in the Marines.

Early Warning: Assessing Risks and Triggering Action

The first step toward prevention is building a reliable process for assessing risks and generating early warning of potential atrocities. We recommend that the director of national intelligence initiate the preparation of a national intelligence estimate on worldwide risks of genocide and mass atrocities, and that the results be included in annual testimony to Congress on threats to U.S. national security. Acute warning of potential genocide or mass atrocities must be made an “automatic trigger” of policy review.

Early Prevention: Engaging before the Crisis

Efforts to prevent genocide should begin well before a crisis has erupted. With international partners, we must engage leaders, develop institutions, and strengthen civil society within high-risk countries. Doing so will reduce capacities and motivations for mass violence while increasing social and
institutional safeguards. Funding for crisis prevention in countries at risk should be expanded through a new genocide prevention initiative funded through existing foreign assistance mechanisms.

**Preventive Diplomacy: Halting and Reversing Escalation**

Even when signs of preparation for genocide are apparent, there are opportunities to alter leaders’ decisions, interrupt their plans, and halt and reverse escalation toward mass atrocities. We recommend the creation of a new high-level interagency body—an Atrocities Prevention Committee—dedicated to responding to such threats. It would improve our crisis response system and better equip us to mount coherent and timely strategies for preventive diplomacy. This new committee should prepare interagency genocide prevention and response plans for high-risk situations.

**Employing Military Options**

U.S. leaders must consider how to leverage all instruments of national power to prevent and halt genocide and mass atrocities, including military assets. Military options are especially relevant when opportunities for prevention have been lost, but they can also play an important role in deterring and suppressing violence. We recommend that genocide prevention and response be incorporated into national policy guidance and planning for the military and into defense doctrine and training. The United States should redouble its support for international partners such as the United Nations and the African Union to build their capacities to deploy effective military responses to mass atrocities.

**International Action: Strengthening Norms and Institutions**

The United States should be a leader in preventing genocide and mass atrocities, but we cannot succeed alone. America has an interest in promoting strong global norms against genocide so that sovereignty cannot be used as a shield. We must also make international and regional institutions more effective vehicles for preventing mass atrocities. We recommend that the United States launch a diplomatic initiative to create an international network for information sharing and coordinated action to prevent genocide.
DEFINING THE CHALLENGE

Some we see; others remain invisible to us. Some have names and faces; others we do not know. We speak of the victims of genocide and mass atrocities, their numbers too staggering to count.

Individual lives—disrupted, damaged, and lost forever—are never far from our minds as we write this report. By its nature, a blueprint for U.S. policymakers must be concrete to be credible. Inevitably, it must confront the challenges of bureaucracies and budgets, policies and political will. But we must never lose sight of the evil inherent in the subject matter and the human beings who suffer as a result of that evil.

In the last century, tens of millions of people lost their lives in episodes of mass killings. Shortly after the turn of this century, the international community stood by as murders, rapes, destruction, and dislocation began to unfold in Darfur.

The Genocide Prevention Task Force and its experts posed some vexing questions. Why—sixty years after the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and twenty years after its ratification by the United States—are we still lacking the institutions, policies, and strategies to reliably prevent genocide and mass atrocities? Why is our national security bureaucracy too often unable to marshal what is needed to prevent the human suffering and loss of life that accompanies mass violence? How is it that many Americans are rallying against genocide, but our nation seems unable to prevent the large-scale and deliberate attacks that shake our national conscience and threaten our national security?
How is it that after the Holocaust—despite the international community vowing that the “odious scourge” of genocide must never be permitted and that international leaders would “undertake to prevent and to punish” this crime—we could not fully meet that challenge?

**Making the Case: A Threat to Values and Interests**

Genocide and mass atrocities are a direct assault on universal human values, including most fundamentally the right to life. These crimes also threaten core U.S. national interests in several ways:

First, genocide fuels instability, usually in weak, undemocratic, and corrupt states. It is in these same types of states that we find terrorist recruitment and training, human trafficking, and civil strife, all of which have damaging spillover effects for the entire world.

Second, genocide and mass atrocities have long-lasting consequences far beyond the states in which they occur. Refugee flows start in bordering countries but often spread. Humanitarian needs grow, often exceeding the capacities and resources of a generous world. The international community, including the United States, is called on to absorb and assist displaced people, provide relief efforts, and bear high economic costs. And the longer we wait to act, the more exorbitant the price tag. For example, in Bosnia, the United States has invested nearly $15 billion to support peacekeeping forces in the years since we belatedly intervened to stop mass atrocities.

Third, America’s standing in the world—and our ability to lead—is eroded when we are perceived as bystanders to genocide. We cannot be viewed as a global leader and respected as an international partner if we cannot take steps to avoid one of the greatest scourges of humankind.

No matter how one calculates U.S. interests, the reality of our world today is that national borders provide little sanctuary from international problems. Left unchecked, genocide will undermine American security.

A core challenge for American leaders is to persuade others—in the U.S. government, across the United States, and around the world—that preventing genocide is more than just a humanitarian aspiration; it is a national and global imperative.
**Political Will and Sovereignty**

At the beginning of the report, we acknowledge that the United States’ record in responding to threats of genocide has been mixed. Over the span of time, our top officials have been unable to summon the political will to act in a sustained and consistent manner or take the timely steps needed to prevent genocide and mass atrocities from occurring. The road to genocide prevention may be paved with the best intentions, but our leaders have not always been bold enough in confronting congressional skeptics or reluctant policymakers. Moreover, a lack of dedicated resources for prevention and the absence of bureaucratic mechanisms designed for rapid analysis and response have become a rationale for inaction.

Summoning political will requires leadership, not only after a crisis strikes, but also before one emerges. It means taking on inertia within the government, investing political capital, doing the heavy lifting of persuasion. Political will involves fending off critics and cynics. It means bucking the tides of caution. It means risking failure.

Traditional views of sovereignty have also been major obstacles to effective international action. It has often been argued that external action in response to threats of genocide constitutes unacceptable interference in a country’s domestic affairs. There is a growing understanding, however, that sovereignty implies rights and obligations, and that states have a basic responsibility to protect their citizens from genocide and mass atrocities. No government has the right to use national sovereignty as a shield behind which it can murder its own people. The challenge for the world community is not only to state this principle, but to implement it.

**Avoiding Definitional Traps**

Finally, there is the definitional challenge of invoking the word *genocide*, which has unmatched rhetorical power. The dilemma is how to harness the power of the word to motivate and mobilize while not allowing debates about its definition or application to constrain or distract policymakers from addressing the core problems it describes.

To avoid the legalistic arguments that have repeatedly impeded timely and effective action, the task force has defined its scope in this report as the
prevention of “genocide and mass atrocities,” meaning large-scale and deliberate attacks on civilians. The victims of genocide and mass atrocities are typically targeted because of their identification as members of a group. In defining its scope, the task force has not attempted to circumscribe which kinds of groups deserve special protection or to articulate how these groups should be defined. The colloquial description of large-scale and deliberate attacks on civilians is buttressed by a framework in international law that has been accepted by the United States and other governments and that defines serious crimes meriting special international concern. * We use the term genocide in this report as a shorthand expression for this wider category of crimes. Moreover, the central purpose of our effort being prevention, we are advocating the adoption of measures before acts of massive violence have been committed or labeled.

This task force is not a historical commission; its focus is on the future and on prevention. At the same time, we recognize the importance of learning from the past and the dangers of denying past crimes. In seeking to understand the key challenges and identify potential recommendations, we drew on a wide range of past experiences that can inform future action. There are many references to specific countries and historical events in this report, not all of which necessarily fall into the category of genocide, but all of which have relevant lessons for our objective: to help the U.S. government prevent future cases.

**Strategic Approach**

*There is no consensus as to the causes of genocide and mass atrocities,* nor is there one commonly agreed-upon theory that sufficiently explains the key catalysts, motivations, or mechanisms that lead to them. History has shown that genocide and mass atrocities can manifest themselves in highly variable ways, and we should not assume that future perpetrators will follow old patterns.

* Those crimes are: (1) genocide as defined in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) and (2) crimes against humanity as described in the Nuremberg Charter (1945) and most recently defined in the Rome Statute creating the International Criminal Court (1998). Many of the specific acts constituting these crimes are also proscribed by the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and in customary international law; war crimes can include individual criminal acts, but generally become a matter of international concern if they are committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.
At the same time, we know that genocide has deep roots and that its execution requires planning and organization. Seizing on opportunities to prevent mass atrocities requires a comprehensive approach, breaking through bureaucratic silos to draw on a wide array of analytical, diplomatic, economic, legal, and military instruments and engaging with a variety of partners. It also requires a combination of high-level attention and standing institutional mechanisms.

In organizing our work, we considered how the U.S. government could develop and deploy more effective strategies to identify and pursue opportunities for prevention. This led us to study five distinct but interrelated domains:

• **Early warning: assessing risks and triggering action.** Early warning based on risk analysis highlights for policymakers threats of genocide and opportunities for prevention. It is critical for prioritizing our efforts, informing the design of effective strategies, and spurring action. By improving the accuracy of warnings and ensuring that they are channeled effectively to decision makers, we will find greater opportunities for preventive action.

• **Early prevention: engaging before the crisis.** The greatest opportunities for prevention appear long before violence begins. Many countries are vulnerable to extreme violence. By engaging leaders, institutions, and civil society at an early stage, the United States can help countries steer clear of these dangers.

• **Preventive diplomacy: halting and reversing escalation.** Even when signs of preparation for genocide are apparent, there are opportunities to alter leaders’ decisions and interrupt their plans. By improving our crisis response system, we will be better prepared to mount coherent, carefully calibrated, and timely preventive diplomacy strategies.

• **Employing military options.** When opportunities for prevention have been lost and the best that can be achieved is to forcefully stop ongoing atrocities, military means are crucial. U.S. military assets can also play an important role in supporting and providing credibility to options short of the use of force. By being prepared to employ military options as part of comprehensive genocide prevention strategies, we will strengthen our capacity and our effectiveness.
International action: strengthening norms and institutions. The United States has an interest in promoting a system of international norms and institutions that averts potential genocide and mass atrocities before they occur, stops them quickly and effectively when they occur, helps societies rebuild in their wake, and holds perpetrators accountable. By working in partnership with others in the global community, the United States will multiply its positive impact.

This report includes a chapter corresponding to each of these areas, in which we review recurring challenges, assess current readiness of the U.S. government, and make recommendations that address both strategy and institutional structures. There are a number of themes that cut across chapters, and each of our five expert groups’ research and deliberations informed and contributed to all pieces of the report. In our opening chapter, we take up the question of leadership, which we found to be at the heart of our endeavor.
In periods where there is no leadership, society stands still. Progress occurs when courageous, skilful leaders seize the opportunity to change things for the better.

—President Harry S Truman

Nothing is more central to preventing genocide than leadership—from the president, Congress, and the American people. In subsequent chapters of this report we propose numerous specific ideas that we believe will enhance U.S. government capacity to prevent genocide. But none of these will be realized without the best kind of American leadership: farsighted, energetic, and optimistic, eschewing partisanship to rally our government and our people to a great calling.

Our focus on leadership emanates from three major themes that emerged from the Genocide Prevention Task Force’s research and consultations:

1. Interest and attention from the highest ranks of the U.S. government have been crucial to most past successful prevention efforts. But high-level attention is extremely difficult to mobilize and sustain because of competing priorities and a pervasive, crisis-driven, reactive culture.
Attention from the president and his or her close group of senior advisors is the most prized commodity in Washington policy circles. When high-level officials are actively engaged, progress is usually possible. Our research and our personal experience have shown this to be true for genocide prevention. The attention of individual officials and personal relationships are major parts of virtually all reported success stories. This fact encourages us about the prospects for progress, given a serious commitment from the incoming president and national security advisor. At the same time, however, it vexes us that our government has left preventing genocide to the vagaries of personality and chance.

High-level attention has been most common when policymakers have been sensitized by recent past atrocities and when threats have emerged in regions of geopolitical importance. In early 2008, for example, the personal intervention of the secretary of state reportedly was instrumental in tamping down the post-electoral violence in Kenya, a linchpin country in East Africa. In the late 1990s, high-level U.S. officials recognized Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic’s escalating repression of Kosovar Albanians following his war crimes in Bosnia and took resolute action with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners when he proved recalcitrant. Likewise, in the aftermath of the mass killing in Rwanda in 1994, U.S. officials became deeply concerned about the possibility that mass killing could be unleashed in neighboring Burundi. The national security advisor worked with the assistant secretary of state for African affairs, the U.S. ambassador, and others in the international community to bolster peacemaking efforts in Burundi, with relative success.

The obvious problem is that one cannot rely on high-level attention, particularly if one believes, as we do, that action before or at an early stage of a crisis holds the greatest promise. The demands on senior U.S. national security figures are enormously taxing and constantly expanding in scope and complexity. We know firsthand, for example, that the attention of senior policymakers was distracted from Rwanda in 1994 by other crises unfolding at the same time in Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti. Furthermore, most cases of genocide or mass atrocities occur in places that have been in a state of semi-permanent, low-level crisis over years. If it is difficult to get one meeting with the national security advisor to discuss an escalating genocidal crisis where our other interests are not implicated, what can be done when a crisis bubbles near but just short of catastrophe for months on end?
The answer must lie in a combination of creating systems to institutionalize effective early responses at the working level and demonstrating presidential priority to facilitate high-level attention when necessary.

2. U.S. policy responses to perceived threats of genocide or mass atrocities have typically been ad hoc, lacking an overarching policy framework, a standing interagency process for devising and implementing preventive strategies, and significant dedicated institutional capacity.

Simply put, the U.S. government does not have an established, coherent policy for preventing and responding to genocide and mass atrocities. The manner in which the United States has generally handled the emergence of genocidal crises reflects the lack of priority placed on these issues. Admireable individuals have at various times tried to cobble together effective responses in the face of bureaucratic indifference (or resistance) and political obstacles. Some of these efforts made temporary progress in strengthening U.S. policy efforts, only to dissipate when attention turned elsewhere. In addition, well-intentioned U.S. officials too often have repeated the mistakes of the past because there have been neither reliable, long-standing institutional structures nor systematic efforts to draw lessons from both success and failure.

The lack of a policy framework is particularly problematic. The fact that genocide has largely been an invisible issue in the U.S. government bureaucracy has made it difficult to get critical information about grave risks of genocide or mass atrocities to key decision makers before a crisis has become full blown. Absent demonstrable high-level priority or a strategic framework, it is too easy to dismiss warnings as alarmist and to marginalize the few specialists in the government. The lack of overarching policy gives the advantage to individuals or parts of the U.S. government that prefer to avoid involvement in genocide prevention efforts, for whatever reason. It takes little to disrupt a process, slow it down, or place obstacles in its way if there is no policy framework to provide guidance and promote accountability.

Preventing genocide appears to be a responsibility held simultaneously by no one and everyone in the U.S. foreign policy apparatus. It can be argued that every U.S. diplomat, development professional, and military officer is
helping reduce the risk of mass atrocities by doing his or her normal work. Yet virtually no one identifies preventing genocide as an explicit or mainstream objective.

The task force does not measure effectiveness by looking to the size of an office or the size of a budget. Cognizant of the marginalization of most “functional” bureaus and the sidelining of “special initiatives,” we support integrating attention to prevention of genocide into broader foreign policy-making functions and structures. Nevertheless, the lack of appreciable dedicated capacity is, by any measure, problematic.

The State Department Office of War Crimes Issues (S/WCI) is the closest the U.S. government has to a home for focused attention to atrocities prevention. The office was created in 1997 to advise the secretary of state on U.S. efforts to address serious violations of international humanitarian law committed anywhere in the world. But only a small proportion of the staff’s time—perhaps as little as 10 percent—is dedicated to monitoring risks, planning for contingencies, engaging in preventive diplomacy, or coordinating preventive actions. Most of its resources go toward supporting international criminal tribunals and managing legal issues related to U.S.-held detainees. These are important matters, but should not detract from our government’s efforts to prevent mass atrocities.

Like most current high-priority foreign policy concerns, preventing genocide requires a whole-of-government approach that leverages all relevant sources of national power and influence. One pattern that has limited the effectiveness of U.S. responses to threats of genocide or mass atrocities has been the strong tendency to think and act within bureaucratic silos. The lack of regular attention in the interagency process has led to uncoordinated efforts that have too often failed.

3. U.S. officials recognize the importance of partnerships with other actors—including other governments, the United Nations, regional and subregional bodies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), faith-based groups, and the private sector—but there is little understanding of the capacities of these prospective partners and of the options for concerted action.

From the outset, this task force was unanimous in its conviction that the United States should seek to work with other actors in the international
community to prevent genocide. The United States will continue to have great influence in the world, particularly relative to other individual states. But the U.S. government may not always be the most influential actor and may not always have enough influence by itself to prevent genocide and mass atrocities. In many cases, the influence of neighboring states, regional powers, and patron states will outweigh that of the United States. Building anti-genocide partnerships is a practical necessity.

It is also a real possibility. There are few things that garner as much global consensus as averting the horror of genocide and mass atrocities. In the six decades since the adoption of the Genocide Convention by the UN General Assembly, 140 states representing almost 90 percent of the world’s population have joined the treaty. At the World Summit in 2005, every government in the world accepted “the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” and affirmed that the “international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility … to help protect populations” from these crimes. World leaders also resolved “to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council … should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations” from these crimes. The breadth of global consensus is critical because mass atrocities do not restrict themselves to any region of the world. It represents a strong foundation for intergovernmental cooperation to prevent genocide and mass atrocities. (We discuss international norms and institutions further in Chapter 6.)

In addition to governments and intergovernmental organizations, civil society is a key partner, the breadth of which extends from major international NGOs working in human rights advocacy, humanitarian assistance, and development to local groups in high-risk communities, such as religious organizations, women’s groups, and trade organizations. Civil society actors worldwide have pushed their governments to build institutions to match their stated commitments to the responsibility to protect, and to ensure accountability for past atrocities.

The diversity of potential partners poses a challenge to match its opportunity: How can the U.S. government most effectively work in partnership with other actors to prevent genocide and mass atrocities? The structures and processes that work well in cooperating with states are not likely to
work as well with grassroots NGOs. Meanwhile, existing multilateral structures, such as the UN Security Council, have proven to be difficult if indispensable vehicles for leveraging effective strategies to prevent genocide and mass atrocities. We must look for ways to invigorate existing mechanisms for working in partnership, and find new, flexible mechanisms suited for this mission.

To the President

Recommendation 1-1: The president should demonstrate that preventing genocide and mass atrocities is a national priority.

This could be accomplished through a strong statement in the president’s inaugural address, an early executive order, and continuing public statements, such as emphasis in successive State of the Union addresses. There are numerous examples of incoming presidents using these means to signal increased priority to an issue. Perhaps most illustrative for our purposes was President Jimmy Carter’s emphasis on human rights. He spoke frequently about human rights on the campaign trail, made it a major theme of his inaugural address, and emphasized its centrality to U.S. foreign policy in a speech that marked the 30th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in December 1978.

Clear presidential priority is the single most reliable way of enhancing attention to an issue throughout the U.S. government. We heard from current officials, for example, that President George W. Bush’s pledge of “not on my watch,” which he reportedly made on the margins of a memo recounting U.S. inaction in 1994 Rwanda, made a difference in bureaucratic debates about U.S. action in Darfur. As this case has shown, presidential attention is no panacea. But it sets a tone that challenges those who favor business as usual and can tilt the debate in positive ways.

We are keenly aware that the incoming president’s agenda will be overfull from day one. Preventing genocide and mass atrocities need not be seen as an add-on to the core foreign policy domain. The means and ends of genocide prevention dovetail with other U.S. priorities, providing a rare and important opportunity for progress.
Recommendation 1-2: Under presidential leadership, the administration should develop and promulgate a government-wide policy on preventing genocide and mass atrocities.

The most recent official policy statement in this area comes from the 2006 National Security Strategy, which states:

We must refine United States Government efforts—economic, diplomatic, and law-enforcement—so that they target those individuals responsible for genocide and not the innocent citizens they rule. Where perpetrators of mass killing defy all attempts at peaceful intervention, armed intervention may be required, preferably by the forces of several nations working together under appropriate regional or international auspices.

This is a good foundation. We believe the next National Security Strategy should go further, and should state explicitly that the prevention of genocide is in U.S. interests and that all appropriate agencies of the U.S. government should plan and be prepared to act to support this objective.

While the National Security Strategy sets the broad framework for U.S. foreign policy, it stops short of articulating policy at the operational level. The Department of State and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Strategic Plan and the National Defense Strategy translate the National Security Strategy into high-level strategy for the key executive agencies. But the best vehicle for developing and promulgating a government-wide policy is a presidential directive—a national security presidential directive (NSPD) in the George W. Bush administration’s terminology, a presidential decision directive in the Clinton administration’s.

A presidential directive would be valuable, first, in requiring senior officials from all relevant executive agencies to participate in a process of inter-agency policy development. The end product should combine a clear, agreed-upon statement of policy with operational guidance for specific situations. It would also trigger follow-on work to fill out important details of policy implementation. We believe a directive on preventing genocide and mass atrocities should encompass many of the specific recommendations offered in this report as a set of mutually reinforcing initiatives.

A recent example of how a presidential directive can serve as an instrument for government-wide policy development is National Security Presidential
Directive–44, “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization.” NSPD-44 starts with a clear statement of policy, assigns responsibilities to the State Department and other executive agencies, and establishes a new National Security Council (NSC) committee for interagency policy coordination. This committee has since taken action to implement specific aspects of the overarching policy.

**Recommendation 1-3:** The president should create a standing interagency mechanism for analysis of threats of genocide and mass atrocities and consideration of appropriate preventive action.

A central component of a government-wide policy should be a new institutional mechanism that can effectively coordinate action across agencies, directed from the White House and co-chaired by senior officials from the NSC and State Department. Specifically, we propose creating an Atrocities Prevention Committee (APC) with direct links to the national security advisor and, by extension, to the president. The APC would comprise, at a minimum, representatives from State—including regional bureaus; the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL); S/WCI; and the Bureau of International Organization Affairs—Defense (including the Joint Chiefs of Staff), the intelligence community, the Department of Justice, the Department of the Treasury, and USAID, all at the level of assistant secretary. It would convene every other month to discuss the latest risk assessment and warning analysis, or at any other time one of its members requested an emergency meeting. In the latter circumstance, a member would have the option to seek the emergency meeting at the level of deputy national security advisor or deputy secretary, making it, in effect, a meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee.

As Chapter 4 describes in greater detail, the APC would review the status of countries of concern according to the best available analysis and develop prevention and response plans, facilitating decisions at the NSC Deputies Committee and Principals Committee levels as necessary. The APC’s work would be supported and coordinated by a newly created NSC directorate for crisis prevention and response. This directorate would be appropriately staffed and resourced to direct and coordinate U.S. government action across a broad range of instability and humanitarian emergencies, not solely genocide and mass atrocities. Situating the APC in this context would
give the committee dedicated, specialized capacity while integrating its work into mainstream priorities.

The temptation when addressing specific concerns is to create a specific set of responses, such as a special coordinator with a single, stand-alone office. However, as similar initiatives have demonstrated, the end result is typically bureaucratic marginalization if not outright irrelevance. By embedding genocide prevention initiatives into a larger functional imperative—namely, crisis prevention and response—the likelihood that the United States would be prepared, able, and, moreover, willing to respond in the future would be significantly enhanced.

While an effective NSC structure is critical for interagency coordination and providing a link to the White House, effective organization within the State Department is equally important, given how deeply State is involved in virtually all U.S. efforts to prevent genocide and mass atrocities. We recommend that the secretary designate the assistant secretary for democracy, human rights, and labor as the single point of responsibility for coordinating genocide prevention efforts with others in the department, particularly the regional bureaus. Genocide is, fundamentally, a human rights issue, and DRL’s broad mandate should help the assistant secretary mobilize preventive actions at an early stage, long before mass atrocities are imminent. To be effective as a senior point person for State, the assistant secretary must command respect throughout the department and abroad, with demonstrable ability to take policy disputes directly to the secretary. The staff and resources of DRL should be supplemented to match the additional responsibilities of coordination within State and outreach abroad to mobilize support for preventive action. Together with the NSC director for crisis prevention and response—or an equivalent senior NSC official, if that position is not created—the assistant secretary should co-chair the APC.

**Recommendation 1-4:** The president should launch a major diplomatic initiative to strengthen global efforts to prevent genocide and mass atrocities.

Personal diplomacy by the president is especially influential with other heads of state. The president should make genocide prevention a key theme
in U.S. diplomacy, with a major initiative designed to strengthen international efforts in this area and willingness to engage personally in particular crisis situations. This kind of presidential diplomacy would also serve broader U.S. interests by providing a platform for U.S. global engagement where there is a broad comity of interests.

The president should emphasize that the early and energetic engagement of the international community is likely to be the most effective way to defuse crises threatening to lead to genocide or mass atrocities. He should deliver this message directly to the United Nations in his first speech to the General Assembly. The president should call on other world leaders to join him in similar declarations at the Group of Eight (G-8) summit, at regional summits, and in bilateral meetings with other heads of state. These statements should be accompanied by tangible actions, such as support for an international network (see Recommendation 6-1) and other actions described elsewhere in this report, to demonstrate U.S. commitment to these principles. As an element of this expression of resolve, the United States should also reaffirm its support for the principle of the “responsibility to protect.”

To the Leaders of Congress

The tenacity of members of Congress, individually as well as through the committee structure and the Human Rights Caucus, has been a prime catalyst for human rights and genocide awareness in the U.S. government and beyond. Their role cannot be overstated. Working on a bipartisan basis, members of Congress have helped expose acts of genocide and related abuses and spurred the executive branch to more vigorous action. There are dozens of legislators who have been active on these issues over the years, frequently serving as the moral voices and most effective communicators in these efforts. We encourage members to stay engaged and continue to exercise their leadership role as a co-equal branch of government. We offer recommendations to congressional leaders below, designed to leverage their unique role in our government, enhance their own influence, and promote productive executive-legislative interaction.
**Recommendation 1-5:** Congress should increase funding for crisis prevention and response initiatives, and should make a portion of these funds available for rapid allocation for urgent activities to prevent or halt emerging genocidal crises.

Current U.S. government funding mechanisms work against the mounting of robust, coherent, and timely preventive strategies in two ways. First, the overall amount of money devoted to prevention-oriented activities is insufficient; if increasing early investment leads to prevention of even one crisis, it will have generated a healthy return in dollars and lives. Second, it is extremely difficult for executive agencies to mobilize even small amounts of money quickly to head off an emerging crisis. Mass atrocities do not follow U.S. government budget cycles, and an executive agency’s budget allocation in any given month might have been planned almost two years prior. Responding quickly and effectively to unforeseen crises requires a better way to allocate a portion of U.S. government resources.

We propose that Congress appropriate an additional $250 million annually to the international affairs budget to finance initiatives to prevent genocide and mass atrocities in countries at risk. This additional investment—less than a dollar for every American each year—would not only support valuable individual projects, but also provide focus for foreign policy professionals engaged in high-risk countries.

The bulk of the funds should be channeled into a new $200 million genocide prevention initiative, to be funded through an expansion of resources in existing foreign assistance accounts (see Chapter 3). These funds would boost critical atrocities prevention efforts in high-risk environments identified and prioritized through enhanced early warning and interagency coordination mechanisms. The additional $50 million should be reserved for rapid allocation to support urgent off-cycle projects. If Congress chooses to provide the State Department with funds for rapid allocation through a conflict response fund, as the George W. Bush administration has proposed, it should ensure that the scope of the new account includes funding focused on preventing genocide. Otherwise, this money could be a stand-alone fund for urgent response to genocidal crises. Another option would be for authorizing committees to amend Section 451 of the Foreign Assistance Act, which enables the president to reprogram up to $25 million per year for unforeseen contingencies, boosting the cap and explicitly authorizing use of the money to respond to genocidal crises.
There is a variety of programs one could imagine such a fund being used for. These include support for diplomatic initiatives by regional or nongovernmental actors, targeted stabilization projects (for example, emergency assistance to local security forces), urgent military assistance to multilateral peace operations, direct nonmilitary intervention (jamming radios, cell phones), and inducements to influential leaders.

Allocation of off-cycle funds should require a formal presidential certification that strict criteria for emergency use have been satisfied, as well as official congressional notification. Administration officials should consult informally with leaders on Capitol Hill any time they are considering allocation of resources from this fund. Strong congressional oversight is not only crucial to garnering support for this proposal, but would also promote constructive executive-legislative partnership in preventing genocide and mass atrocities. We note that there are precedents for this type of fund at the State Department, including the Emergency Refugee and Migration Fund and the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Fund.

Fully half of this task force served as members of Congress. We know that lawmakers tend to resist proposals that give the executive branch more autonomy in allocating congressionally appropriated funds. We share these instincts. We also recognize that there are similar proposals on the table for broader purposes—for example, aiding states in transition. Yet we are faced with a serious challenge and a potential solution. We believe adequate procedural safeguards can be adopted to satisfy concerns on Capitol Hill. No future U.S. official should be forced to watch escalating atrocities knowing that our government could respond more effectively if only it could free up a small amount of money.

**Recommendation 1-6:** The newly established Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission should make preventing genocide and mass atrocities a central focus of its work.

The Congressional Human Rights Caucus has long been a mechanism for raising awareness and promoting action on a broad range of human rights issues. As a caucus, however, it did not have a steady stream of resources and depended almost entirely on its leadership for direction and support.
We welcome recent action by the House of Representatives to convert the caucus into a more permanent body, with more secure funding and stronger connection to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Fittingly, the House named this new body the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, in honor of the long-time leader of the Human Rights Caucus who passed away in 2008.

The commission’s mandate is to “promote and advocate … internationally recognized human rights norms as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other relevant international human rights instruments.” Genocide and mass atrocities represent the most egregious of all human rights violations. The Genocide Convention was, in fact, the first modern human rights treaty, adopted a day before the Universal Declaration. As a core human rights issue, responding to threats of genocide should be an integral part of the Lantos Commission’s work. The commission should spotlight and monitor emerging threats of genocide and mass atrocities and act as a vehicle for members of Congress to become informed about these threats and raise awareness about situations that may not be covered by the existing committee structure. While the commission is a body of the House, we encourage members of the Senate to cooperate closely with it. We also encourage the commission to cooperate with non-governmental groups and other partners engaged in documenting early warning signs of genocide and mass atrocities.

The Lantos Commission can play an important role in coordinating efforts by the committees and subcommittees that have oversight authority related to preventing genocide and mass atrocities, but it cannot substitute for appropriate committee action. Not surprisingly, numerous committees share oversight responsibility for executive action related to preventing genocide and mass atrocities (for example, foreign affairs/relations, armed services, intelligence, judiciary). To ensure that this issue does not fall through the cracks, all regional subcommittees of the House and Senate foreign affairs and foreign relations committees should add the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities to the terms of their jurisdictions, which are issued with each new Congress.
Recommendation 1-7: Congressional leaders should request that the director of national intelligence (DNI) include risk of genocide and mass atrocities in his or her annual testimony to Congress on threats to U.S. national security.

There are multiple benefits of this idea. First, it would raise the priority given to genocide and mass atrocities in the intelligence community by virtue of the need to prepare the DNI to brief and respond to questioning by members of Congress. Second, it would promote stronger executive-legislative interaction on these issues, one of the task force’s overarching objectives. The DNI gives his or her annual testimony before the House and Senate select committees on intelligence and the House and Senate armed services committees. These and other committees, or their subcommittees, are then in a position to call on administration policymakers to discuss specific country situations in depth. Third, public testimony by the most senior U.S. intelligence official is likely to be valuable to NGOs seeking to raise public attention and mobilize support for more vigorous preventive action in various venues. The intelligence related to genocide warning is rarely highly classified; a public hearing would be appropriate.

To the American People

Recommendation 1-8: The American people should build a permanent constituency for the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities.

The striking level of public engagement in the Darfur crisis suggests enormous untapped potential for genocide prevention in nongovernmental and civil society organizations around the world. In the United States, the grassroots activism mobilized in recent years represents a remarkably wide and diverse alliance of citizen groups—left and right, religious and secular, urban and rural, young and old, from all races and backgrounds—coming together in the shared belief that we as Americans can do more to halt needless massacres of innocents.

In today’s age of electronic media communications, Americans are increasingly confronted in their living rooms—and even on their cell phones—with information about and images of death and destruction virtually anywhere they occur. This instantaneous media communication has already
been shown to sensitize Americans to the suffering of people in all corners of the globe. The Internet has proven to be a powerful tool for organizing broad-based responses to genocide and mass atrocities, as we have seen in response to the crisis in Darfur.

We urge the American people to continue to support more assertive government action in response to genocide and mass atrocities. We especially urge a greater focus on prevention and on encouraging U.S. government engagement at the earliest possible stage, before a crisis develops. The State Department, White House, and congressional leaders should work to develop outreach strategies and strong relationships with NGOs and citizen groups. Such relations can positively reinforce efforts to raise attention to and allocate resources for engagement in atrocities prevention.
CHAPTER 2

EARLY WARNING: Assessing Risks and Triggering Action

A destruction that only man can provoke, only man can prevent.
—Elie Wiesel

The first major element of a comprehensive system to prevent genocide and mass atrocities is a reliable process for assessing risks and generating early warning of potential atrocities. While some preventive strategies can be employed without respect to when and where risks are greatest (for example, advancing global norms and institutions, discussed in Chapter 6), most will need to be targeted to specific situations at specific points in time. At its most basic level, early warning means getting critical information to policymakers in time for them to take effective preventive action. Effective early warning does not guarantee successful prevention, but if warning is absent, slow, inaccurate, or indistinguishable from the “noise” of regular reporting, failure is virtually guaranteed.

In its popular conception, early warning is often equated with an alarm bell sounded just before disaster strikes. This notion is much too limited. If signs of genocide and mass atrocities are only detected once violence has begun to escalate, decision makers are left with only costly and risky options. In contrast, if underlying risks and evolving dynamics can be recognized and described accurately in advance of or at the early stages of a crisis,
the full panoply of policy options will be viable. A range of instruments suitable for reducing risks in pre-crisis situations and halting escalation of emerging crises will be discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, respectively.

Beyond warning as such, accurate assessment of the relative risks of genocide and mass atrocities will permit efficient allocation of limited resources and policy attention. Furthermore, fine-grained analysis of specific contexts, actors, and dynamics of high-risk situations is a prerequisite for development of successful preventive strategies. There are few, if any, one-size-fits-all solutions. Effective strategies must be tailored carefully, based on a deep understanding of case-specific characteristics.

Chronologically, risk assessment and early warning can be considered the first phase of preventing genocide. The kind of information collection and analysis required for effective early warning, however, is equally necessary for supporting, evaluating, and fine-tuning ongoing strategies. For instance, assessing the impact of a regional mediation effort or financial sanctions against militia leaders requires analysis of the evolving capabilities, attitudes, and operational activities of key actors. Thus, improving early warning capacities should benefit U.S. government efforts to prevent and respond to genocide and mass atrocities across all phases of prevention and response.

Many people who have studied genocidal crises have asserted that “early warning is not the problem.” Weighed against the challenges of generating political support for vigorous early action, getting bureaucracies to respond nimbly, and wielding preventive strategies that will halt escalation and relieve underlying pressures, early warning could be seen as a less severe problem. The Genocide Prevention Task Force, however, chose to frame the question differently: Instead of asking whether early warning is the problem or the biggest problem, we asked whether the U.S. government could improve its early warning systems in ways that would increase the chances of preventing future acts of genocide and mass atrocities. We are convinced that the answer is yes.

**Core Objectives**

Effective early warning should begin with global scanning and assessment of short- and long-term risks, move to detailed monitoring and analysis of high-
risk situations, and end with reliable mechanisms for communicating results to policymakers in a way that will promote sound preventive action.

The impetus for global risk assessment is largely pragmatic. Given resource limitations, it is infeasible to engage in detailed monitoring of the entire globe. A global risk assessment will generate a “watch list” of states or situations at highest risk, based on structural or long-term characteristics known to be associated with genocide and mass atrocities (for example, history of mass violence; see page 25 for other risk factors). In addition, structural risk assessments provide a context for interpreting ambiguous information; for example, when there are significant uncertainties about events developing in a state that exhibits many long-term risk factors, an analyst should be more concerned, whereas the same pattern of events in a place with few or no known structural risk factors should raise less concern.

A watch list, as its name suggests, should be just the start of more detailed monitoring and analysis. For situations identified to be at elevated risk, early warning requires a thorough understanding of the fault lines along which genocide and mass atrocities might develop, the ideologies and organizational capacities—especially money and material resources—of potential perpetrators, the role of third parties, the extent of “negative support” in the population for genocide and mass atrocities, and so forth. As noted above, mass atrocities have unfolded differently in each case—for example, forced exile of Armenians into unlivable conditions, slave labor and starvation in Cambodia’s “killing fields,” and attacks by paramilitary death squads in Guatemala. It is crucial for early warning analysts to try to anticipate the range of plausible scenarios through which perpetrators could effect large-scale and systematic attacks on civilians. These scenarios enable analysts to identify case-specific indicators that genocidal dynamics are emerging or escalating—or that windows of opportunity for constructive action are opening—providing focus for ongoing monitoring.

We emphasize that early warning is about providing information and analysis that promotes effective preventive action, not predicting exactly where and when genocide or mass atrocities will occur. Forecasts need not be perfect to make early warning useful. Indeed, prediction implies both a degree of confidence in our knowledge of future events that is unrealistic and a passivity regarding future outcomes that is counterproductive. Nev-
Nevertheless, past efforts at risk assessment and early warning have suffered because resulting lists of high-risk countries outstripped policymakers’ capacity to take preventive action. Increasing the accuracy and precision of risk assessment is therefore critical.

Analyses about conditions or trends that might lead to genocide or mass atrocities, indicators of active movement in that direction, and forecasts of plausible future scenarios must be effectively communicated to decision makers. This component of early warning is sometimes overlooked, but is fundamental. Early warning is only as good as its weakest link, and this is frequently the communication of warning analysis to decision makers and a mechanism—or lack thereof—for using this analysis to support appropriate policy action. No matter how good information and analysis is, if it gets stuck in the bureaucracy or is presented to policymakers disconnected from any ideas about practical preventive measures, it will have little impact.

**Major Challenges**

Challenges to effective early warning fall into two broad categories: (1) generating timely and accurate warning analysis and (2) getting warnings to be heard by policymakers and taken into consideration in their policy planning.

Producing accurate warning analyses first requires thorough reporting on relevant actors and events. While it is the responsibility of U.S. embassies and missions to know what is happening in their host country, the tendency has been to report on developments in the capital rather than more remote rural areas, if only because of resource constraints. This was reportedly the case with the U.S. Embassy in Kigali, Rwanda in 1994, during the civil war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the late 1990s, and with diplomatic reporting from Nairobi prior to the violence in Kenya in 2007–08. The State Department’s transformational diplomacy initiative, still in its early stages, aims to relieve some of these problems by shifting U.S. diplomats to developing countries and encouraging them to travel beyond the capital city.

The availability of news reporting on even remote parts of the world has tempered the information problem significantly. Counterintuitively, how-
ever, the bounty of information—which can only be expected to grow in the future—does not necessarily ease the analytic challenge. First, the amount of material can be overwhelming, and second, it is hard to judge the accuracy of the reporting. For example, a crucial and difficult task for analysts is to distinguish systematic killing of civilians from more generalized background violence, as most if not all mass atrocities occur in the context of a larger conflict or a campaign of state repression. When our diplomatic and intelligence reporting from the post is inadequate, analysts in Washington are left to make judgments from ambiguous and frequently conflicting information and assessments.

The accuracy of analysts’ warnings will also depend on the extent to which they can identify warning signs or indicators of genocide and mass atrocities. While scholars have had some success in identifying long-term risk factors, it has proven much more difficult to find generalizable near-term indicators, “accelerators,” or triggers. For example, pervasive hate speech is often cited as a warning sign of potential genocide, the Nazi propaganda machine and hate radio in Rwanda being just two examples. But we have observed many cases of pervasive hate speech that have not led to genocide or mass atrocities.

More research into the general dynamics of escalation to genocide and mass atrocities is warranted. In the meantime, analysts must consider how genocide or mass atrocities might manifest themselves in a particular context, generating a set of case-specific indicators. A related challenge stems from the fact that earlier warning, which is obviously preferable, typically means lower confidence that the apparent trends toward mass atrocities are real and significant. Earlier warnings are, therefore, easier to dismiss as being alarmist.

The recent post-electoral violence in Kenya illustrates the challenge of inaccurate warning. Most analysts anticipated some violence surrounding the election. But none imagined the scale, rapidity, and ferocity of violence and forced migration. Policymakers, as a result, were left to scramble in crisis response mode without having done advance planning—or set aside resources—for such a contingency. The collective response to the crisis in Kenya was impressive, but was far from assured given the lack of accurate warning.
The second major challenge is getting warnings to be heard by appropriate policymakers and taken into consideration in their policy planning. Many of us have had the experience in government of receiving warnings only at late stages, when violence had already gained momentum. Sometimes this reflects a reluctance to report bad news or accept that current policies are failing. Other times, cautious or risk-averse officials err on the side of transmitting too much or too generalized information, resulting in it being either dismissed or discredited. Given the information overload that senior officials experience, simply adding to their already overflowing inboxes more information on potential threats is not the answer. Meanwhile, policymakers are likely to be grappling with many other pressing issues and priorities—the more so at successive levels of seniority. Thus, for early warning to be effective, the response to warning must be built on an institutional mechanism that links analysis of plausible future scenarios with assessment of possible policy options. As one former official described it, a warning product is of little value unless it is linked to “an empowered process” of policy review and action.

Beyond these challenges, it is too frequently the case that parts of the U.S. government actively resist learning about grave risks of genocide or mass atrocities. Incentives for blocking efforts to illuminate imminent or ongoing atrocities can stem from a desire to avoid becoming entangled in complex situations or simply a natural desire to turn away from hard choices. Furthermore, many government officials perceive an interest in shielding their principals from accountability for possible failures if no obvious benefit is seen to balance the risk: it is easier to deflect charges that one should have known but was never informed than that one knew and yet chose not to act.

Few if any of these challenges are unique to the U.S. government, and many are common to the “warning-response problem” across a range of possible events. Warnings always entail a degree of uncertainty, and human beings naturally resist paying certain costs today, even if small, to protect against uncertain future costs; this is true of bureaucracies all the more so. Add to this the incentives for political leaders to focus on short-term costs and benefits, and the tendency for bureaucracies to resist risky action, and it should not surprise us that it is difficult to generate support for preventive action. Also, people with designated responsibility to provide warning have incentive to “overwarn” to shield themselves from criticism for failing
to foresee a significant event, which in turn makes it easier for recipients of warnings to discount them. The task force believes these factors can be counteracted, if not completely overcome, through a combination of deft political leadership and innovative institutional design.

**Readiness to Meet the Challenge**

**Principal U.S. Government Actors**

U.S. embassies, USAID missions, and U.S. armed forces deployed around the globe represent the front lines of U.S. foreign policy, generating large amounts of information that could be relevant to preventing genocide and mass atrocities. The State Department and USAID employ roughly 6,600 and 1,000 foreign service officers (FSOs), respectively, and the U.S. military has about 500,000 troops forward-deployed worldwide. Although early warning of genocide and mass atrocities is mainly the province of the intelligence community and diplomats, all of these U.S. personnel can be valuable sources of information.

Task force consultations indicate that the intelligence community currently dedicates several to genocide, war crimes, and related issues. This includes a very small War Crimes and Atrocities Analysis Division within the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). At the National Intelligence Council (NIC), the national intelligence officer for warning leads a team of analysts to oversee and coordinate all strategic warning, including that related to genocide and mass atrocities. In addition, the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) has a monitoring function, though it remains underdeveloped and its ambit does not explicitly include genocide and mass atrocities. USAID’s Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) provides analytical and operational tools related to conflict and development, including some assessment activities. There may also be other isolated efforts within the U.S. government related to early warning of genocide and mass atrocities or associated events. For example, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency sponsors a project to develop an integrated crisis early warning system for forecasting and decision support vis-à-vis a wide array of crises, including genocide and mass atrocities. Lacking high-level focus or an effective coordination hub, however, the dispersed nature of these various efforts has limited their overall impact.
We note also that the State Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) prepares annual reports on human rights in nearly every country in the world. The reports are required by statute to include, “wherever applicable, consolidated information regarding the commission of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and evidence of acts that may constitute genocide.” But unlike other subjects that are mandated to be discussed (for example, religious freedom), genocide and mass atrocities do not receive mention in every report, even if only to note that there is no evidence of problems.

**Tools and Capacities**

Substantial progress has been made in and outside of the U.S. government since the end of the Cold War in methods for identifying risks of genocide and mass atrocities. The task force’s research suggests that, while it is impossible to anticipate exactly when and where the next genocide may occur, it is relatively easy to identify one to two dozen countries at highest risk. The most systematic effort in this direction has taken place through the U.S. government–sponsored Political Instability Task Force (PITF), a consortium of academic experts working since 1994 to assess and explain the vulnerability of states around the world to political instability and state failure.

Empirical analysis by the PITF and others indicates that the strongest and most reliable genocide risk factor is the existence of an armed conflict or a change in regime character. Virtually all instances of genocide or mass atrocities since World War II occurred coincident with or closely following a major internal conflict or the taking of power by more radical or more harshly authoritarian leaders. Examples include Cambodia, Guatemala, Algeria, the former Yugoslavia, and Sudan. Other conditions associated with elevated risk of genocide and mass atrocities include history of genocide, autocracy, state-led discrimination, and high infant mortality (see sidebar). It is worth underscoring that there is little support for the conventional wisdom suggesting that religious or ethnic diversity in itself poses risks for genocide or mass atrocities.

The Atrocities Watchlist (AWL), issued quarterly by the NIC’s Warning Staff since 1999, is the major regular product on these issues, drawing on systematic analysis of known risk factors and qualitative judgments by
regional experts. The AWL is a classified product, reportedly distributed across the government to various offices in State, Defense, USAID, and the NSC. A short document, it identifies countries and situations at different levels of concern and describes briefly the current dynamics and potential for future changes. The NIC issues a separate Instability Watchlist biannually focusing on broader risks of political crises and conflict, including humanitarian emergencies.

Consultations with current and former officials lead the task force to conclude that the AWL is not as well known or useful as might be expected. Several current and former U.S. government officials said they did not recall ever having seen or even heard of the AWL. Respondents acquainted with the AWL gave it mixed reviews. Many judged it to be fairly thorough and accurate. Most noted, however, that it rarely points to situations not already known to be at great risk by policymakers—or, as some suggested, anyone following international news. The task force’s sampling of opinions about the AWL, including those of us who have been on the receiving end, suggests that it adds only marginal value. The problem, however, is not necessarily with the AWL. Watch lists are helpful to the extent that they are linked to more detailed analysis of evolving dynamics and, most important, with a process for generating action. These linkages in the current system appear to be fragile at best.

**Partners**

As with other aspects of preventing genocide, the United States cannot satisfy the need for early warning by itself. The United States may have
unmatched global capacity to collect intelligence, but other actors may have better access to specific situations of interest. Sometimes a local church group can provide more timely and accurate information than the world’s largest intelligence service can. In addition, there is tremendous analytic expertise outside of the U.S. government—in academia, international NGOs, think tanks, grassroots civil society groups, other governments, and intergovernmental organizations. Yet cooperation between the U.S. government and other governments, intergovernmental organizations, and NGOs with respect to early warning remains relatively underdeveloped. Acknowledging the value of outside expertise, the DNI issued an intelligence community directive in July 2008 on analytic outreach prescribing a series of steps to encourage analysts to leverage this expertise more effectively.

NGOs such as Amnesty International, Human Rights First, Human Rights Watch, International Crisis Group, and Physicians for Human Rights, plus several organizations that have emerged more recently with a specific mandate related to genocide and mass atrocities—ENOUGH, Genocide Intervention Network, Genocide Watch, and Save Darfur Coalition, for example—are just a few sources of relevant information and analysis. The U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum’s Committee on Conscience is another source for information on threats of genocide. Operational NGOs providing humanitarian assistance have long been crucial partners for U.S. government responses to human-made and natural disasters. Aid workers on the ground often have the best understanding of local populations and evolving conflict dynamics; they can be valuable partners for early warning as long as their neutrality and security are appropriately safeguarded. Likewise, U.S. policymakers should not overlook the role of indigenous NGOs and civil society groups in high-risk countries, notably including religious communities. A final component of the civil society sector is the growing community of academic experts and other scholars, both in the comparative study of genocide and mass atrocities and on specific situations of interest.

While U.S. officials increasingly recognize the potential value in cooperating with NGOs for early warning of genocide and mass atrocities, institutional culture, lack of established mechanisms for collaboration, and even legal restrictions on sharing information (for example, high-resolution satellite imagery that can indicate destroyed villages) all limit the current ex-
tent of cooperation. Most cooperation with partners in this domain appears to be ad hoc and driven by individuals rather than systems. For example, the ambassador-at-large for war crimes issues convenes monthly meetings in Washington with human rights NGOs, and at least some ambassadors at post convene similar meetings with civil society groups. These appear to be undertaken entirely on the initiative of individual officials, however. A rare systematic effort is the Global Futures Forum, initiated by the U.S. intelligence community in 2006 as “a multinational, multidisciplinary intelligence community that works at the unclassified level to identify and make sense of emerging transnational threats.” The forum includes a “community of interest” on genocide prevention that, while inchoate, may hold promise as a venue for deepening cooperation between the U.S. government, scholars, and NGOs as well as other governments.

Enhancing cooperation on early warning with the United Nations and regional intergovernmental organizations has its own set of challenges and potential rewards. The United Nations has at various times attempted to develop more significant capabilities for early warning of political crises or violent conflict, to little effect. The UN secretary general appointed a special advisor on the prevention of genocide with an early warning mandate in 2004, but this office remains under-resourced and challenged bureaucratically. The adoption of the “responsibility to protect” at the 2005 World Summit, which explicitly calls on the international community to “support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capacity,” may provide a new opportunity. The secretary general has expressed a commitment to institutionalizing the responsibility to protect in the UN system, appointed a separate special advisor to develop the concept and explore potential mechanisms, and is working with member states to move this agenda forward.

The African Union (AU) and Africa’s regional economic communities—for example, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development—are engaged in systematic early warning efforts to support their efforts to prevent violent conflict, if not genocide and mass atrocities specifically. The U.S. government has provided financial and technical support to these initiatives. Development of other regional early warning systems, especially in Asia and the Middle East, would be desirable, but there has been little progress in this direction outside of Africa and Europe.
Responding to the Challenge

Recommendation 2-1: The director of national intelligence should initiate the preparation of a national intelligence estimate (NIE) on worldwide risks of genocide and mass atrocities.

NIEs represent the most rigorous and thorough process of reaching an intelligence community-wide judgment, going through several iterations of drafting, briefing, comments, and revisions, and ultimately requiring approval by the National Intelligence Board, composed of the heads of all relevant intelligence agencies. An NIE on global risks of genocide and mass atrocities would, first, engage a wide array of senior analysts and policymakers in defining the policy-relevant questions, considering available evidence, and generating key judgments and dissenting views. This process would raise the profile of the issue and sensitize intelligence officers and analysts across the community. NIEs frequently include a summary of opinions of nongovernmental experts, so the process would engage outside experts as well. Second, NIEs are typically briefed to the president, members of Congress, and other senior officials, contributing to the effort to attract attention from high-level decision makers. Third, an NIE would highlight areas of poor knowledge or lack of consensus, pointing to actions that would improve analytic capacities in this area.

An NIE on global humanitarian emergencies, which included a short section on genocide and crimes against humanity, was released in 2001; it merits updating and more in-depth analysis. The national intelligence assessment (NIA) on the national security implications of global climate change to 2030, which was briefed to Congress in June 2008, could serve as a useful model. The study drew on substantial bases of knowledge outside of the U.S. intelligence community to generate key judgments on global and regional trends and consequences for the United States. In briefing the NIA to Congress, the chairman of the NIC concluded by highlighting several challenges to collection and analysis and outlining future research plans. As with most NIE/NIA processes, the value was more in the high-level attention and analytic rigor feeding into the policy debate than in precise forecasts.
Recommendation 2-2: The national security advisor and the director of national intelligence should establish genocide early warning as a formal priority for the intelligence community as a means to improve reporting and assessments on the potential for genocide and mass atrocities.

Sending a clear signal to the intelligence community that genocide and mass atrocities represent threats to U.S. national interests that demand attention would almost certainly increase the amount and improve the quality of relevant information collected. The National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) is the current mechanism for establishing U.S. intelligence priorities, by issue and by country. Risks of genocide and mass atrocities relate to a number of the twenty-plus issues currently in the NIPF—for example: human rights and war crimes, regional conflict and crisis, democratization and stability. We believe, however, that genocide and mass atrocities should be explicitly mentioned as a priority. Not all situations of human rights abuses or even regional crises need concern the president and his top advisors. All cases of genocide or mass atrocities should. Thus, genocide and mass atrocities deserve a more prominent place in the NIPF—or whatever process the incoming administration uses to establish intelligence priorities.

Recommendation 2-3: The State Department and the intelligence community should incorporate training on early warning of genocide and mass atrocities into programs for foreign service and intelligence officers and analysts.

No matter what policies, systems, and structures are adopted, effective warning depends on the knowledge and skills of individuals. Therefore, it is imperative that the front lines of America’s foreign policy apparatus be equipped to understand genocide and mass atrocities, to recognize conditions that might lead to these crimes, and to employ analytic techniques specially suited to warning (for example, scenario gaming). A training initiative would help analysts distinguish critical warning signs from background noise. It would also promote a shift in the culture of FSOs and analysts writ large, to “get early warning and prevention of genocide into the DNA of regular analysts,” in the words of one former official.
The ambassador-at-large for war crimes issues has engaged in some training activities, but these do not appear to be standard. DRL conducts some training at the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) more broadly on human rights and religious freedom, as directed by the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998. Training focused on genocide and mass atrocities could be paired with these and existing courses at FSI on conflict assessment. It should become required training at least for FSOs being deployed to high-risk countries. Training initiatives should aim to reach higher-level officials (for example, via the Ambassadorial Seminar and deputy chief of mission training) as well as junior officers.

Analyst training for early warning of genocide and mass atrocities could be a joint initiative of the national intelligence officer for warning, given his explicit mandate to promote analyst training in techniques that might contribute to improved warning, and the State Department’s Office of War Crimes Issues or DRL, given their substantive expertise and reach to FSOs. Both the FSI and the Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis would be important partners for a new training initiative.

Recommendation 2-4: The national security advisor should create a “mass atrocities alert channel” for reporting on acute warning of genocide or mass atrocities akin to the State Department’s “dissent channel.”

This mechanism would reduce the chance that concerns about impending atrocities might fail to reach high-level policymakers for bureaucratic or political reasons. Such a new mass atrocities channel would be designed to be a seldom used fail-safe mechanism. If other elements of the system worked well, there would be no need for a dedicated mass atrocities channel. Yet, the specter of genocide and mass atrocities is sufficiently grave—and history indicates warnings sometimes get stuck in the system for political or bureaucratic reasons—that the task force believes a special mechanism is warranted as a last resort.

This channel should be reserved for situations when a U.S. official in the field judges there is a significant risk of massive atrocities or genocide in the near term and finds the standard lines of reporting to be blocked. The channel would transmit a message directly to the co-chairs of the Atrocities Prevention Committee (APC)—the director for crisis prevention and re-
sponse at the NSC (a proposed new position, as discussed in Chapter 1) and the assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights, and labor—in addition to a senior official at the official’s home agency (for example, the State Department director of policy planning or the under secretary of defense for policy). One or both of the recipients would be required to send a prompt response from Washington addressing the concerns. All communications sent through this channel would also trigger immediate discussion by the APC.

**Recommendation 2-5: The national security advisor should make warning of genocide or mass atrocities an “automatic trigger” of policy review.**

There is a balance to be struck between too sensitive a trigger that compels review too often, becomes burdensome, and gets ignored, and too high a bar that fails to trigger review in serious situations until it is too late or too difficult to take action. In addition, because each case is different in significant ways, it is hard to specify which actions should be triggered on warning. The main point, however, is not to prescribe specific steps, but to institute a mechanism that at least forces policymakers to consider the situation. They could always choose to discount the warning or judge that ongoing government actions are sufficient. The fundamental advancement over the current system is that this kind of mechanism would make it much harder for U.S. government officials to avoid making a decision vis-à-vis the situation.

We propose a new warning-response mechanism that is calibrated based on the severity and urgency of the warning, so as to avoid a single, all-or-nothing trigger. The most acute level of warning, based on the AWL and a request by any member of the APC, should trigger a discussion of policy options at an NSC Deputies Committee meeting. Less acute but still serious warnings (for example, high level of concern on the AWL) should trigger deeper analysis of the evolving dynamics and preparation of crisis response plans by the APC. Any time a country appears on the AWL for the first time, reappears after having fallen off, or remains at moderate concern, it should trigger actions such as enhanced information collection, consultation with independent experts, and preparation of crisis prevention plans.
Recommendation 2-6: The State Department and USAID should expand ongoing cooperation with other governments, the United Nations, regional organizations, NGOs, and other civil society actors on early warning of genocide and mass atrocities.

This expanded cooperation would at the same time improve the analysis available to U.S. policymakers and promote early preventive action by others in the international community. We offer the following ideas to enhance cooperation with the major categories of key partners. These recommendations relate closely to broader strategies for cooperation with partners, discussed in depth in Chapter 6.

The State Department should launch a major diplomatic initiative to create a permanent network of like-minded international actors to continuously exchange information on risks of genocide and mass atrocities. The group of states should extend beyond the circle of allies with which the United States regularly shares intelligence, as there is a broad community of interests against genocide and mass atrocities and little relevant information is derived from sensitive sources and methods. This network could also serve as a hub for cooperation with NGOs and regional organizations including the European Union. Recommendation 6-1 describes the network and its functions in greater detail.

At the United Nations, the United States should pursue information sharing in both directions. UN agencies with significant presence in the field—the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), World Food Programme, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and United Nations Children’s Fund—are a rich potential source of information relevant to early warning. On the response side, the United States should offer information and analysis, within normal constraints, to the UN Department of Political Affairs, DPKO, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the secretary general’s special advisor on the prevention of genocide, and any forthcoming institutional mechanism related to the responsibility to protect. In addition, U.S. representatives at the UN Security Council should welcome briefings by the secretary general’s special advisor on the prevention of genocide. It could be valuable for the special advisor to brief the Security
Council regularly, as the emergency relief coordinator does, while still leaving space for ad hoc briefings to the council on emergent crises.

The United States should continue to support the development of regional early warning systems at the AU and African subregional organizations and push to incorporate specific attention to genocide and mass atrocities. U.S. diplomats should encourage the possibility of a regional early warning system for Asia supported by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN has been slow to engage on political issues, but its commitment to creating a regional human rights body is encouraging, and the ASEAN Regional Forum’s “Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy” provides a natural basis for discussing how early warning can be strengthened across the region. The United States should also coordinate with the European Union, which is engaged in its own early warning activities and has been a major supporter of capacity building by other regional organizations.

NGOs and civil society, broadly defined, are critical partners for information collection and analysis. The long-term, ongoing engagement exemplified by regular meetings between American diplomats and NGOs, in the field and in Washington, produces tangible rewards. It should not be left entirely to the discretion of individual officials, but should become standard practice. Local religious leaders in particular are often cognizant of social, political, and economic dynamics in rural areas that U.S. diplomatic missions cannot easily access or monitor. Given this reality, U.S. embassies should explore means by which to engage religious leaders and institutions in early warning efforts.
CHAPTER 3

EARLY PREVENTION:
Engaging before the Crisis

Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has.
—MARGARET MEAD

The Genocide Prevention Task Force believes that early prevention is not only the preferred course of action in strategic, resource, and moral terms; we also believe that engaging early can successfully obviate the need for a much more difficult crisis response at a later stage. Early prevention, however, is not easy. Building sustainable peace in fragile societies requires serious long-term investment. The U.S. government will need to increase resources, boost capacities, and exercise leadership to make prevention a priority. Because we cannot be certain where the next genocide will take place, the United States must be prepared to engage effectively in many complex situations simultaneously.

The recommendations in this chapter are not intended to be a panacea for all failing states or societies in conflict. However, the task force recognizes that mass atrocities and genocide almost always occur in the context of violent conflict or in the wake of major political instability, and that these factors are most prevalent in impoverished countries where ordinary citi-
zens lack economic opportunities. We believe, therefore, that promoting economic development and strengthening capacities to prevent instability and violent conflict of all kinds should be integral parts of a genocide prevention strategy. Many other efforts have addressed these broad challenges, notably including the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (1997), the Center for Global Development’s Commission on Weak States and U.S. National Security (2004), and most recently, the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Commission on the Legal Empowerment of the Poor (2008). We recognize the value of the results of these efforts for our work and seek to build on them by developing proposals specifically designed to prevent genocide and mass atrocities at the earliest possible stage.

**Major Challenges**

Effective early prevention requires: (1) an understanding of the conditions and triggers that lead to and enable the commission of mass atrocities, (2) the means required to mitigate those conditions, and (3) a concerted strategy to apply those means.

The task force finds that mass atrocities are generally perpetrated when underlying risk factors—such as ethnic or sectarian discrimination, nationalist myths, armed insurgency, or political and economic exclusion—are exploited by opportunistic elites seeking to amass power and eliminate competitors. Therefore, early prevention will have a better chance of succeeding when integrated efforts address both underlying causes of conflict and the means and motives of leaders.

Grievances over inequitable distribution of power and resources appear to be a fundamental motivating factor in the commission of mass violence against ethnic, sectarian, or political groups. That same inequality may also provide the means for atrocities to be committed. For example, control of a highly centralized state apparatus and the access to economic and military power that comes with it makes competition for power an all-or-nothing proposition and creates incentives to eliminate competitors. This dynamic was evident in Rwanda and Burundi and is serious cause for concern in Burma today.
It is equally important to focus on the motivations of specific leaders and the tools at their disposal. There is no genocidal destiny. Many countries with ethnic or religious discrimination, armed conflicts, autocratic governments, or crushing poverty have not experienced genocide while others have. The difference comes down to leadership. Mass atrocities are organized by powerful elites who believe they stand to gain from these crimes and who have the necessary resources at their disposal. The heinous crimes committed in Nazi-occupied Europe, Cambodia, and Rwanda, for example, were all perpetrated with significant planning, organization, and access to state resources, including weapons, budgets, detention facilities, and broadcast media.

There are also key triggers that can tip a high-risk environment into crisis. These include unstable, unfair, or unduly postponed elections; high-profile assassinations; battlefield victories; and environmental conditions (for example, drought) that may cause an eruption of violence or heighten the perception of an existential threat to a government or armed group. Sometimes potential triggers are known well in advance and preparations can be made to address the risk of mass atrocities that may follow. Poorly planned elections in deeply divided societies are a commonly cited example, but deadlines for significant policy action, legal judgments, and anniversaries of highly traumatic and disputed historical events are also potential triggers that can be foreseen.

In order to ameliorate these conditions and triggers, effective early prevention efforts need to match tools to the most salient factors in a given context. Even with a targeted strategy, such efforts to change underlying social, economic, or political conditions are difficult and require sustained investment of resources and attention. Given the challenge of stimulating constructive, long-term change in troubled environments, targeting leaders and their resources through positive and negative inducements may be one of the most effective strategies to steer a country off the path to genocide at an early stage.

The task force is keenly aware that increasing early prevention efforts faces significant hurdles and that early engagement is fundamentally a speculative venture. It is difficult to prove that a crisis would have occurred or been more severe but for the investment made in preventive efforts. There
are few cases, like the UN Preventive Deployment in Macedonia, that are widely agreed examples of successful preventive action.

The inability to demonstrate clear successes is vexing to policymakers who must focus limited resources. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that watch lists of countries “at risk” can be long, due to the difficulty of anticipating specific crises in a world generally plagued by instability. Paradoxically, the resource limits facing decision makers are precisely why effective early prevention is so important: to keep potential crises off the front burners. Preventing crises from emerging allows us to respond more effectively to those that are not prevented. At the same time, genocide almost always occurs in the context of violent conflict, so progress in preventing or ending violent conflict will have a direct and positive impact on preventing genocide or mass atrocities.

**Readiness to Meet the Challenge**

The capacity and resources of the United States dedicated to the pre-crisis prevention of mass atrocities are limited and dispersed. There are no specific entities or programs devoted to the early prevention of genocide or atrocities per se. All such resources will be found more generally under “conflict prevention,” and even there dedicated resources are limited. Instead, conflict prevention is generally a subordinate goal seen as a part of overall policy considerations such as national security, good governance, and poverty reduction. The significant exception is for efforts in post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction, where preventing a relapse into conflict is a high priority.

**Assessment**

As elaborated in Chapter 2, the intelligence community and diplomats generate a range of analyses on conflict and atrocities risk and early warning. For crafting effective pre-crisis strategies, detailed assessments of conflict dynamics are particularly important. In this vein, the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and USAID’s Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) have led the development of an interagency conflict assessment
framework, which can be expected to reveal conflict dynamics relevant to the risk of mass atrocities, but as yet it is not widely used. CMM, more generally, seeks to integrate conflict mitigation and management into USAID’s analysis, strategies, and programs, including by using USAID’s own conflict assessment framework.

**Policy**

S/CRS is mandated to coordinate and institutionalize civilian capacity and action to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations. It undertakes country-specific planning and develops generic tools for assessment and implementation, and it has begun to focus limited resources on instability in countries beginning to show signs of violent conflict. There is not a specific focus on prevention of atrocities in its mandate or planning, but given its focus on conflict and efforts to develop new civilian capacity to respond to crises, S/CRS would be a logical place to develop doctrine on genocide prevention.

The State Department Office of War Crimes Issues (S/WCI), described in Chapter 1, primarily addresses post-atrocities accountability and U.S.-held detainee issues, and works very little on direct prevention efforts. The Policy Planning Staff at the State Department provides analysis and guidance to the secretary on a range of issues including prevention of conflict, but it is not known to have pursued any specific planning on the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities. Ultimately, the National Security Council (NSC) has responsibility for policy coordination on issues related to national security, including conflict, genocide, and mass atrocities. But the NSC has been primarily consumed by crisis management, not crisis prevention.

**Implementation**

The U.S. government has robust capacity to undertake conflict prevention initiatives through the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Treasury, and Commerce as well as USAID, and also through the considerable extended foreign aid apparatus that includes the National Endowment for Democracy and the party institutes, the United States Institute of Peace, and other NGOs and contractors working throughout the world.
The USAID Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) focuses on short-term rapid response to a variety of crises, but OTI also does some work on peacebuilding and conflict management, supporting mediation efforts in places such as Aceh, Indonesia and programs promoting dialogue between minority groups and government officials to reduce tensions in places such as Venezuela.

In addition, significant budgetary allocations go for efforts that contribute to conflict prevention indirectly. For example, the Human Rights and Democracy Fund administered by the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) provided more than $300 million in grants to projects around the globe in fiscal year 2007. In addition, as detailed below, governance programs, development efforts, and security sector reform (SSR) are all essential to reducing risks of large-scale violence. Thus, the U.S. government invests each year in many projects that arguably have a connection to genocide prevention, although they are not specifically designed or deployed for this purpose.

The U.S. military establishment also has demonstrated an increasing interest in conflict prevention. Defense Department Directive 3000.05, issued in 2005, made stability operations a core mission of the U.S. armed forces. The resulting initiatives to build such capabilities are affecting training and doctrine, redirecting substantial resources, and enhancing the military’s need for stronger collaboration with civilian agencies responsible for other elements of stabilization operations. The International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) is also meant to contribute to conflict prevention by training foreign military officers in principles and practices of democratic governance. Similarly, the Expanded IMET program trains civilian leaders in oversight and management of the military, a critical capacity to ensure civilian control of the armed forces. The military’s role is discussed further in Chapter 5.

**Multilateral and International Capacity**

Our multilateral and international partners likewise have a general conflict prevention perspective rather than a direct focus on genocide and mass atrocities, and also suffer somewhat from lack of coordinated policies and implementation. Several individual governments, plus UNDP’s Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery, the UN Peacebuilding Commission, the
World Bank, the African Union, and the European Union are all actively engaged in conflict prevention, with special focus on preventing relapse in post-conflict societies. Other than very small initiatives by the UN secretary general, none of these efforts are specific to preventing genocide. We discuss international partnerships further in Chapter 6.

Responding to the Challenge

Strategy and Tools

Successful early prevention requires a multifaceted strategy that simultaneously reduces capacities and motivations for mass violence while increasing the social and institutional safeguards against mass violence. Like all crimes, genocide requires a combination of means and motive. Disrupting the link between the tools of mass violence—for example, proliferation of small arms, unaccountable security forces, hate media, and misappropriated funds—and the proponents of violence is essential. It is also crucial to change the perceived costs and benefits to ruthless leaders by creating a sense of security and shared well-being among disparate groups. At the same time, accountable institutions and a strong civil society will provide a bulwark against the designs of conflict entrepreneurs. The refusal of security forces or judicial officials to implement abhorrent policies can diminish the capacity and legitimacy of such efforts. Furthermore, popular resistance to mass violence by a broad cross-section of society, rather than solely vulnerable groups, can be a far more powerful response than international condemnation.

A targeted pre-crisis atrocities prevention strategy thus requires focusing on three primary elements: leadership, institutions, and civil society. It is in these pillars of modern society that the capacity both to undertake and to prevent genocide is found. To target these critical elements, we need to expand and hone the tools available for genocide prevention and wield them effectively. Ultimately, there is no single model or checklist appropriate for every environment, nor is any country irreversibly prone to genocide. Standing alone, none of these pillars can support an effective pre-crisis genocide prevention strategy. When translated into tailored, context-specific approaches, however, they form our best hope of never again having to say “never again.”
Recommendation 3-1: Early prevention strategies should aim to influence leaders by using positive and negative inducements, aggressive enforcement of international regimes, and fresh approaches to conflict transformation.

Leaders—whether presidents, generals, traditional chiefs, or religious figures—are at the core of the political and social dynamics that lead toward or away from atrocities. Genocide requires significant leadership to rally perpetrators and to gather and deploy resources. Whether committed with chemical weapons, Kalashnikovs, or machetes, mass atrocities require the resources, organization, discipline, and ideology that are supplied by leaders who believe they have something to gain from genocide. Such decisions are not sudden; planning and creating a conducive environment can take place over years. Thus, the ability to influence leaders, to change their calculus, alter their goals, or diminish their capacity to do harm well before atrocities begin, is a fundamental element of a successful early prevention strategy.

Preventing genocide also requires leadership. Whether by bridging the divide between estranged groups, contesting elections against demagogues, or raising concern abroad, successful pre-crisis engagement will rest principally on the ability and willingness of indigenous leaders to act. Providing resources and support to such leaders while increasing their accountability are equally important elements of a successful early prevention strategy.

Employ positive inducements. Foreign assistance in the form of grants, loans, debt relief, budgetary support, technical assistance, and equipment and training can be effective means of persuading leaders to pursue broader goals of peacebuilding. Favorable trade and investment policies have similar dual-use potential in rewarding positive leadership while also expanding economic empowerment and promoting economic and political interdependence. Political and other official recognition and diplomatic attention are often important carrots that can tempt isolated regimes to pursue responsible policies toward their people.

Use negative inducements. These inducements may help deter or dissuade leaders with poor human rights records from committing atrocities by signaling the resolve of the international community, eliminating access to resources necessary to undertake mass violence, or directly attacking the assets, privileges, and stature of leaders. Even before a genocidal crisis has
taken hold, sanctions against specific industries, imports, or exports, or against travel and finances of specific individuals, can be a powerful tool, if properly targeted to ensure they do not damage the economic opportunities of ordinary citizens and if broadly supported by international and especially regional partners. Aid conditionality may be used to improve the behavior of regimes that benefit from significant external financial assistance. Threatening legal and moral accountability for violations of international law, especially in the era of the International Criminal Court and ad hoc tribunals, signals potentially serious repercussions for inexcusable behavior. The indictments of Liberia’s Charles Taylor, Serbia’s Slobodan Milosevic, and Iraq’s Saddam Hussein are emblematic of this trend. Public shaming through regional and international human rights mechanisms can also influence the behavior of regimes that seek to escape isolation and opprobrium.

**Interdict funds and arms.** Genocides are organized by people with access to weapons and funds, and with the network and assets to distribute them. Resources provided by external actors frequently aid in the commission of atrocities. In those countries identified to be at risk, a high priority should be placed on identifying any effort to marshal and distribute resources intended for the commission of atrocities. Specific responses may include tracking arms purchases and financial transactions, arms embargoes, sanctions or legal actions against individuals or public and private enterprises involved, and restrictions in resource flows either through limits on the marketing of products (such as conflict diamonds and timber) or escrows on public resources such as oil and gas revenues.

**Build collaborative capacity.** War and long-standing systemic discrimination and exclusion produce deep mistrust, inhibit communication, and dehumanize opponents. In order to create a physical and psychological environment suitable for reducing tensions and building trust, leaders must (re) learn how to collaborate across divisions within their society and must eschew a zero-sum mentality of politics. Programs that bring government and community leaders together to build relationships and develop their communication skills and mutual understanding can help transform leaders from adversaries into partners. The Burundi Leadership Training Program (BLTP) and the Iterative Peacebuilding Initiative in Kirkuk, Iraq are two examples of programs in atrocity-prone environments that bring together leaders to engage in a process of dialogue and reconciliation that
builds confidence and skills to resolve problems together. More than simply workshops, these processes use complex simulation exercises to force adversaries to collaborate and resolve specific issues relevant to their own ongoing process of conflict transformation. In Burundi, for instance, military leaders were able to overcome a long-standing impasse over the ethnic composition of the army following an intensive BLTP retreat.

**Recommendation 3-2:** Early prevention strategies should support development of institutions in high-risk states by supporting power sharing and democratic transition, enhancing the rule of law and addressing impunity, and reforming security forces.

Moving societies away from conflict and impunity and toward accountability and the rule of law requires the development and reform of key institutions. The distribution of power and resources in a society and the protection of the basic rights of its citizens must be determined according to fundamental agreed principles of fairness and equality and must be administered according to the rule of law. The powerful must be constrained by rules and transgressions must be punished. Forging broad consensus on the rules of the game and creating institutions to uphold those rules and guard against their abuse is of paramount importance to preventing atrocities.

**Support power sharing and democratic transition.** Grievances over power sharing and resource distribution are one of the most common elements in atrocity-prone environments; reaching a sustainable agreement among communities in discord and their leaders is a necessary step in the transformation of the conflict. There is no one formula for power distribution. Such choices must be based on demographic, geographical, historical, and other contextual factors. Perhaps most important, however, is that the fundamental rules of the game are inclusive and agreed upon by concerned parties.

To this end, the more representative and accountable the form and method of governance, the more likely that, over time, rules will be respected and enforced. Meaningful checks and balances among the branches of government—horizontal accountability—increase the likelihood that legislative and judicial oversight will help constrain abuses by the executive. Similarly,
distributing power among the national, regional, and local levels—vertical accountability—can help ensure that resources are distributed to minority populations and that political exclusion is minimized.

While democratic governance is among the best long-term hedges against genocide, the introduction of electoral competition into divided societies can heighten the prospect of conflict. It is, therefore, critical that governance arrangements remove the mentality of zero-sum, winner-take-all politics that drive impulses to demonize, exclude, and exterminate. Far more effort can be devoted to increasing electoral cooperation rather than competition and to ensuring that electoral systems produce democratic actors.

The organization of political parties and conduct of elections are crucial in democratic transitions. First, the outcome of a good election must reflect—and must be seen to reflect—the will of the people. Actual or feared disenfranchisement or rigging can be an immediate trigger of intergroup conflict, as was evident in the violence following Kenya’s 2007 national elections. Second, the electoral system must allow for a high degree of representation. Representativeness does not require explicit provision for ethnic quotas, but it does require ensuring that all legitimate groups feel included in the political process. Constructing an electoral commission that reflects the diversity of the population is a critical foundation. Third, the electoral process should help to build trust between communities. Identity-based political parties, for example, tend to form in conflict environments, exacerbating tensions and pushing communities toward extremes. To ameliorate this trend, electoral laws can be designed to provide incentives for coalition building and disincentives for the formation of exclusionary ethnic or sectarian parties. Political parties that cohere around ideology—so long as it is democratic—rather than identity deepen cross-community coalitions interested in broader economic or political ends.

Enhance the rule of law and address impunity. Creating confidence among both elites and citizens that the rules will be clear, fair, and equally applied is fundamental to ensuring their participation in a rule-based system. The rules themselves must be unambiguously free of harmful discrimination, and the institutions that create, apply, and enforce the rules must be representative and fulfill their functions without regard to the status of the concerned parties. This requires that both law making and law enforcement are transparent and carried out by competent and accountable insti-
tutions. An independent judiciary, a professional prosecutorial service, and an independent bar association create the foundation for a legal system that will challenge the illegal actions of the powerful while defending the rights of the weak. Independent mechanisms to counter corruption are also essential. Supporting these institutions, as well as creating access to justice for the poor or excluded, is a critical component of efforts to address the causes of deeply rooted conflict and constrain abuses of power that may lead to atrocities.

As noted in Chapter 2, the existence of past atrocities is associated with elevated risk of future atrocities. It is, therefore, fundamental to address the legacy of past abuses. Addressing the past is required not only to serve the interests of justice and to remove cause for retribution, but also to end a culture of impunity that discounts the costs of violence. Whether through prosecution of perpetrators at the local or international level, truth-seeking, or the teaching of accurate history to all citizens, these processes of reconciliation are essential. The Institute for Historical Justice and Reconciliation is one noteworthy international initiative that is pursuing accountability, acknowledgment, and the resolution of historical disputes.

The United States should extend its support for indigenous transitional justice mechanisms that foster reconciliation around the world. Previous examples include U.S. technical assistance, through OTI at USAID, for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Peru and U.S. funding for outreach efforts to promote citizen engagement in the gacaca courts in Rwanda after 1994. The United States should also continue to provide assistance through programs such as the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program at the U.S. Department of Justice, which works with foreign governments to develop professional and transparent law-enforcement institutions, to protect human rights, and to identify and prosecute war crimes.

Reform security forces. Organized security forces have both the capacity to carry out genocide and the power to prevent it. Armed and trained security forces comprised of one ethnic, sectarian, or ideological group and in the hands of unaccountable leadership may be available to commit unspeakable crimes. The German Schutzstaffel (SS), the Cambodian Santebal, and the Caravan of Death in Chile all stand as terrible testament. Indeed, the
creation of unaccountable paramilitary forces may indicate preparations for atrocities.

However, security forces that represent all elements of a diverse society, that are trained to protect rather than destroy life, and that are legally accountable to civilian leadership are unlikely to be available for such crimes and may, in fact, prevent them. For example, during a potentially unstable transition in South Africa in the early 1990s, the powerful professional military remained responsible to executive authority, which was in turn constrained by a powerful legislature. This system of accountability helped to limit the potential for violence by the military and other groups.

Security sector reform—the effort to transform police, military, and other security forces into professional, rights-respecting services—may be one of the most direct and effective means of removing the capacity to commit atrocities. Creating military-to-military relationships can also be essential to promoting reform, through training of officers, joint exercises, and conditionality for military aid. The Pentagon’s IMET program brings foreign military officers into the U.S. military education system, which incorporates democratic governance, civilian control of armed forces, and human rights into its curriculum. Similar Department of State-administered programs using International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement funding can promote a reform agenda within the police and other civilian security forces. These programs also can build enduring relationships between U.S. civilian and military leaders and their foreign counterparts, creating an avenue for ongoing engagement to deter or address crises.

Working with security forces must be done as part of the larger context of political reform and conflict transformation. Building capacity for civilian oversight and management of the security sector is essential. Mechanisms of governance and accountability that allow for effective control and administration of security forces constitute an important check on the ability of those forces to perpetrate genocide or mass atrocities. Such oversight capacity should be built within all branches of government.
Recommendation 3-3: Early prevention strategies should aim to strengthen civil society in high-risk states by supporting economic and legal empowerment, citizen groups, and a free and responsible media.

Among the most elemental building blocks of a strong and just society are smaller groups of people, such as trade associations, local media, churches, and schools, that directly engage individuals and the communities they represent. These organizations and networks, often referred to as civil society, play a fundamental role in mobilizing grassroots support and promoting political, economic, and legal empowerment and can be a bulwark against the spread of violence. However, such organizations have also served as a catalyst of genocidal violence, with their leaders exhorting radio listeners to kill their neighbors or preaching hatred from the pulpit.

Support economic and legal empowerment. Poverty reduction and economic empowerment are essential strategies in reducing the likelihood of conflict and the conditions that can lead to the commission of atrocities. Economic growth and improved employment opportunities can be an important catalyst of citizen participation and demands for rights. Economic development, including trade and investment opportunities, can reduce feelings of hopelessness, empower individuals and groups, and strengthen the resilience of societies. Economic growth alone, however, is not sufficient. The benefits of growth must be widespread through the population. There must also be accountability in the use of public and natural resources. Mechanisms such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative allow citizens to hold their governments accountable for income sources, thereby improving the likelihood that such resources will be used fairly and for public benefit.

While overall policy changes that would improve U.S. assistance for economic development are beyond the scope of this report, there are a few specific measures that could serve to diminish the potential risk of genocide. For example, assistance programs should create employment and other economic opportunities for ex-combatants or decommissioned members of security forces, often a key source of instability unless reintegrated into the economic and social life of the country. Similarly, land rights, economic opportunity, and displacement form a critical nexus of peril and opportunity. As the Commission on the Legal Empowerment of the Poor noted, the majority of the world’s poor live outside the rule of law, without
protections that recognize their property rights. A focus on aiding governments to undertake land reform to provide property rights to landless farmers and squatters, and to compensate for loss of land rights due to displacement, may help reduce long-standing grievances.

Develop civil society. Creating a healthy society that provides numerous avenues for participation and disperses power provides the best defense against opportunistic leaders. Independent groups that can play a role in monitoring and addressing community-based conflict provide a valuable resource for early warning and dispute resolution. Groups promoting and protecting women’s rights should be a particular focus of assistance efforts. Women are frequently a target of atrocities, including sexual violence orchestrated on a massive scale. At the same time, women play an integral role in civil society efforts at all stages of conflict mitigation. Likewise, expanding educational opportunities at all levels, including those specifically designed to promote peace, is a vital step toward building a vibrant civil society. Organizations engaged in public education and advocacy for rights can help not only protect individual rights, but also promote a culture of lawfulness. Religious organizations can also provide a foundation for promoting interfaith cooperation and tolerance.

Support a free and responsible media. Free and responsible media are critical to ensuring that both citizens and governing elites are well informed and that citizens are able to hold their government accountable. Independence from state control and a multiplicity of independent outlets are essential not only for the integrity of information, but also promoting healthy political dialogue and supporting language and cultural preferences. It is also important that the media develop a sense of ethical responsibility, supporting the rule of law and diminishing intergroup tensions.

Implementing the Strategy

In order to implement the strategy outlined above, the task force recommends: (1) expanding the tools and resources available to influence leaders, develop institutions, and strengthen the fabric of society in high-risk environments; (2) partnering with international, regional, national, and local organizations; and (3) setting priorities for effective early prevention by refining analysis and understanding of key risk factors, context-specific dynamics, and best practices.
Burundi: Breaking the Cycle of Violence

Since its independence in 1962, the small East African nation of Burundi has experienced repeated episodes of extreme violence between the majority Hutu and minority Tutsi ethnic groups. When Henry Kissinger, the national security advisor, belatedly told President Richard Nixon about U.S. inaction in the face of the 1972 slaughter of more than 100,000 Hutu civilians, Nixon replied that it represented “one of the most cynical, callous reactions of a great government to a terrible human tragedy I have ever seen.”

The United States was apparently surprised by another round of massacres in 1993, which claimed perhaps 100,000 lives. One report submitted by the USAID mission director in November 1993 stated that Burundi “had been one of the most successful transitions to democracy in Africa.” Following the 1994 genocide in neighboring Rwanda, however, the United States and the international community increased their engagement in Burundi with greater attention to genocide risks.

- A focus on **leadership** has included engaging elites and community leaders in innovative programs aimed at reconciliation and rebuilding trust.
- The important work of **developing institutions** has included a new constitution, approved in 2005, and multiparty elections that produced a Hutu-led government with significant Tutsi representation. The military and police forces implemented wide-ranging reforms and ethnic rebalancing. A disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process has involved thousands of ex-combatants. The parties have also committed to a transitional justice process to address the legacy of past atrocities.
- At the same time, **civil society** in Burundi has begun to blossom, with new, independent media enterprises, women’s associations creating employment and promoting public health and peace initiatives, and human rights organizations lobbying for a national truth and reconciliation process. These mechanisms engaged a much broader swath of society in the political and reconciliation process.
- **Improved international coordination** has created a more cohesive strategic approach to addressing long-term challenges. In 2007, the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission selected Burundi for a UN integrated peacebuilding mission to support the transition from the immediate post-conflict phase to longer term development.

In many ways, Burundi’s recent history represents the extremes of international engagement. Tragic indifference to a country of limited strategic importance has given way to a level of sustained engagement that can help prevent future atrocities.

As discussed at greater length in Chapter 1, a standing interagency committee co-chaired by a senior NSC official and the assistant secretary for democracy, human rights, and labor should be created to raise the profile of genocide prevention to the highest levels of the national security bureaucracy; link early warning, pre-crisis engagement, and crisis response;
and coordinate a whole-of-government policy and response to potential and emerging crises. The Atrocities Prevention Committee (APC) would task and coordinate the completion of crisis prevention plans for situations identified to be at elevated but not imminent risk of genocide or mass atrocities. The plans themselves would, in most cases, be prepared by country experts at State and USAID, but the APC would serve as the crucial coordination hub.

**Recommendation 3-4:** Funding for crisis prevention in countries at risk of genocide or mass atrocities should be expanded through a new genocide prevention initiative, funded through existing foreign assistance mechanisms.

Without the priority that would be signaled by a dedicated genocide prevention initiative, targeted atrocities prevention projects are often neglected by U.S. development assistance. And without dedicated funds at its disposal, the APC would be unable to fully implement its crisis prevention plans. We therefore propose a new annual $200 million genocide prevention initiative to finance efforts to prevent genocide and mass atrocities in countries at risk. Funded through existing mechanisms within the foreign assistance budget, such as Development Assistance and the Economic Support Fund, this initiative will ensure appropriate visibility, cohesion, and priority for crucial pre-crisis genocide prevention efforts. To create and sustain this initiative, the State Department’s Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance and the Office of Management and Budget must make preventing mass atrocities a priority, integrate relevant projects into country strategies, and request additional funds from Congress for this purpose. Congress should then approve these funds based on annual budget submissions from the administration.

Genocide prevention initiative funds should be allocated based on a competitive interagency application process, which would be coordinated by the APC and linked to its preparation of crisis prevention plans for at-risk countries. DRL, as the lead actor within State, should administer these funds. During the budget planning process, country teams and agencies would propose projects to address specific risk factors based on in-depth assessment of risks and the necessary steps to reduce them. Examples might include support for demobilization and job creation for ex-combatants in
Burundi, community reconciliation programs in Iraq, or land reforms in Kenya—critical tools for reducing conflict and increasing political and economic participation, thus mitigating the high risk of future atrocities. This model draws on the successful British Conflict Prevention Pool, launched in 2004, that has dedicated several hundred million pounds to conflict prevention efforts worldwide.

This competitive funding process should, in turn, drive more refined assessment of both the risk factors and the impact of programming on those factors. Thus, the dedication of funds for early prevention would serve as a critical research and development tool to improve the capacity of the U.S. government and its international and nongovernmental partners to prevent genocide and mass atrocities. To that end, the Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance would require recipients to employ an effects-based planning and reporting model, and would produce an annual report assessing the impact of funded programs.

The amount of additional dedicated funds we propose would provide an average of $15 million to $20 million in new program funds annually to each of ten to fifteen countries deemed at high risk of future atrocities. This is a serious investment, if sustained, but it is only a fraction of the cost of a single outbreak of serious conflict that leads to atrocities and/or military intervention. We strongly believe that the costs of preventing genocide are small—in a fiscal, political, and moral sense—compared to the incalculable costs of failure. The additional funds recommended in this report amount to less than one dollar per American per year. In addition, the proposed size of the genocide prevention initiative is roughly comparable to what the U.S. government allocates to other conflict-related assistance programs, such as the Global Peace Operations Initiative and the Commanders Emergency Response Program, as well as the British government’s Conflict Prevention Pool.

**Recommendation 3-5:** The State Department and USAID should enhance coordination with international partners both in terms of policy and in-country implementation.

As elaborated on in Chapter 6, the assistant secretary for democracy, human rights, and labor should be responsible for liaising with the primary
genocide and conflict prevention initiatives in international organizations including the European Union, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), World Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and United Nations (for example, UNDP’s Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery, and the Peacebuilding Commission). For pre-crisis engagement, it is critical that coordination take place at the levels of policy and in-country implementation. At both levels, the United States should organize or participate in existing multidonor coordination mechanisms. Where possible, conflict assessments should be done jointly to promote common understanding of conflict dynamics and risks, which should facilitate more coherent strategies among key actors. In-country coordination, in particular, should include regional organizations and NGOs. Where possible, strong coordination with responsible host nation institutions should be a primary organizing principle. These mechanisms can play an early warning function, improve impact, and reduce the likelihood that efforts are duplicative or counterproductive.

As Chapter 2 outlines, risk assessments should help policymakers prioritize where they invest limited resources. But analysis of static risk factors alone will often produce lists of high-risk states that are still too long to target U.S. early preventive action. Thus, U.S. officials must look beyond static risk factors to assess four critical elements: (1) potential triggers (for example, elections or environmental pressures); (2) whether leadership in at-risk countries has means and motive to commit atrocities; (3) whether the United States has effective levers to influence behavior in a given context; and (4) what would be the likely costs, human and otherwise, of failure to prevent a crisis. The results of improved prioritization can help focus the implementation of early prevention strategies.
CHAPTER 4

PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY:
Halting and Reversing Escalation

Who, in our interdependent world, can turn their back on people in other lands when press, radio, and television bring us the graphic reality of abuse, death, genocide, and senseless and destructive wars?
—Nelson Mandela

Confronted with credible evidence that genocidal acts or mass atrocities are being planned or, worse, about to commence, the United States should seek to halt and reverse further escalation as quickly as possible. The clear preference would be to accomplish this peacefully, without having to threaten or use military force, and in concert with partners, given the many benefits of collective action. Such efforts, furthermore, should ideally be directed at not only defusing the crisis, but also resolving its underlying causes so that the problem does not have to be revisited at a later date.

Based on an analysis of the recurring challenges that have impeded effective action in the past, and on an assessment of current readiness, the Genocide Prevention Task Force has identified a number of reforms, options, and strategies that can enhance the responsiveness and effectiveness of U.S. efforts to halt and reverse escalating threats of mass atrocities.
Major Challenges

Past U.S. efforts have been shaped and ultimately determined by a recurring set of interrelated factors.

Interests and priorities. Calculations of national interest are always going to influence U.S. actions. Moral and humanitarian concerns—even when these are rightly recognized as U.S. national interests—have often been overridden by other priorities. For example, when U.S. ambassador Henry Morgenthau warned of unfolding atrocities against Armenians in 1915, the United States was resolved to remain neutral in World War I and not to sever relations with the Ottoman Empire, and therefore refused to take strong action. Similarly, despite repeated and detailed diplomatic reporting of widespread atrocities by the Pakistani army in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in 1971, the Nixon administration declined to condemn Pakistan publicly for fear that such action would compromise Pakistan’s assistance in improving relations with China—the primary diplomatic initiative at the time. Similar calculations about Cold War political dynamics appear to have influenced the tepid U.S. response to atrocities in Cambodia and Central America.

In contrast, when U.S. interests have been more clearly threatened, the level of engagement has increased. Concern about the impact of the Balkan conflict on the cohesion of the Western alliance and stability in southeastern Europe clearly motivated the United States to act more forcefully in Bosnia and later in Kosovo. Fear for the stability of a major Asian country (Indonesia) and the need to support a valued regional ally (Australia) also motivated U.S. action in East Timor in 1999. Even so, these cases all followed considerable vacillation and missed opportunities for early preventive action.

Policy choices and dilemmas. Generating the necessary will to act involves calculations of national interest—costs, risks, and benefits—as well as assessments of the likely effectiveness of the available policy choices. In the past, the belief that little or nothing could be done to halt or reverse an escalating crisis, short of full-scale military intervention, has fatally undermined political will. Conversely, when a range of viable options are clear to decision makers, the United States is more likely to respond, not
only in situations when traditional U.S. interests are directly involved, but also when this involvement is less clear.

Various factors influence the availability of policy choices. Time is one. In circumstances when genocide or mass atrocities occur at a rapid pace—what we might call “volcanic” genocide—certain options are clearly less relevant than others. Fact finding and observer missions, for example, are better suited for use in slowly evolving crises—what we might call “rolling” genocide. They can help establish facts, deter potential atrocities within a narrow area of observation, and set the stage for more aggressive actions if escalation continues—as the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission did in 1998–99. But these missions take time to organize and deploy, and generally lack the power to affect fundamental calculations of perpetrators, so they are rarely viable options in the face of rapidly escalating genocidal violence.

Much depends on the characteristics of the country at the center of the crisis. The geographical location, political character, and economic profile of the target country all determine which levers of influence—positive and negative—are available to the United States and likely to be effective at any given time. Geographically remote countries that are autocratically governed and have limited integration into the global economy are generally harder targets to influence through diplomatic and economic means. Whether there are other groups or communities in a particular country, or diaspora networks, that can be used to exert pressure is another key variable. Much depends on the relationship of the target country to its neighboring states as well as major powers. Russia’s and China’s respective relationships with Serbia and Sudan are recent examples of how a great power patron can complicate diplomacy.

Successful diplomacy has also typically rested on finding the right mix of coercive and cooperative inducements. Reconciling the inherent tensions is not easy and entails a variety of calculations. Will an offer of positive inducements to cease genocidal preparations alter behavior or will it signal weakness that emboldens further escalation? Will a threat of penalties including ultimately the use of military force weaken or harden the behavior of key actors within the target country? Will overt support to the threatened communities reduce their vulnerability or embolden them to
take actions that will only escalate the problem? As past crises illustrate, there is no simple formula to follow. Every situation requires a careful calibration of these concerns and options.

International support. The benefits of collective action are clear, but international support can be difficult to mobilize. Aside from calculations of national interest, the generally accepted principles of national sovereignty and nonintervention present formidable barriers. While the 1948 Genocide Convention and more recently the “responsibility to protect” provisions of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document provide the legitimate basis for overriding national sovereignty, neither has been formally invoked by a state for the purpose of preventive action. Mobilizing international institutions for timely responses in crisis situations is usually difficult and often frustrating as a consequence, as discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6. Thus, rather than demonstrating international resolve, attempts at collective action have often ended up having the opposite effect.

Legal and budgetary concerns. U.S. crisis response in the past has sometimes been impeded by legal and budgetary issues. The former often involves domestic jurisdictional questions about the authority of the U.S. government to restrict, for example, private commerce and personal interactions with foreign entities. When the U.S. interests at stake are perceived to be less compelling, the budgetary implications of mounting a response have also repeatedly emerged as a source of contention within the U.S. government. Thus, discussions about jamming the radio transmitters broadcasting hate speech in Rwanda, offering helicopters to aid peacekeeping forces in Darfur, and providing transportation for diplomats engaged in the Kenyan mediation effort reportedly got tied up by the question of who would pay the bill.

Readiness to Meet the Challenge

An assessment of the current readiness of the United States to meet the challenge of halting and reversing genocidal violence reveals a mixed picture. The United States has unparalleled capacity to respond to and manage international crises by virtue of its worldwide intelligence collection network, highly developed technical capacities and procedures for rapid
intragovernmental communication and consultation, diplomatic presence around the world, influence in major international organizations, preeminent place in the global economic and financial system, and, last but not least, military power projection capabilities that are second to none.

Yet for all its organizational and material capacity, the United States does not appear well prepared to respond rapidly to the threat of genocide or mass atrocities. Judging from an assessment of the relevant decision-making structures, policy planning arrangements, tools and capacities, organizational culture, and the state of prior coordination with prospective international partners, there is significant room to improve U.S. responses in future circumstances.

Decision-making structures. The U.S. government’s decision-making machinery to respond to heightened warning of genocide or mass atrocities can be activated in one of two ways—either in a top-down fashion at the request of the president and the national security advisor or through a bottom-up process that likely originates in the Department of State. The former may be precipitated by something that the president or national security advisor has heard or read in their daily intelligence briefings, from private discussions with foreign leaders and the heads of international organizations, or simply from media reports. Alternatively, diplomatic reporting through the State Department’s regional bureaus or analysis by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research could provide the stimulus for bottom-up activation. The U.S. ambassador-at-large for war crimes issues, who heads the Office of War Crimes Issues and reports directly to the secretary of state on U.S. policy responses to atrocities worldwide, could also prompt high-level attention.

While the circumstances of a crisis may warrant an immediate meeting of the National Security Council (NSC), deliberations generally begin first in its Deputies Committee—the senior sub-Cabinet interagency policy forum. Their recommendations, or set of policy options if no consensus has been reached, are then forwarded for discussion to the Principals Committee made up of Cabinet-level officials and formally chaired by the president. In principle if not always in practice, presidential decision follows from their deliberations and recommendations. This mechanism for crisis management, however, has rarely been used to consider threats of genocide or mass atrocities.
Policy planning. Currently, no single office or interagency body in the U.S. government is responsible for thinking about or planning for how the United States might respond to warning of genocide or mass atrocities. The Atrocities Prevention Interagency Working Group, which functioned between 1998 and 2000, was not continued or replaced with an equivalent mechanism in the reorganization of the NSC that followed the change in administrations.

The NSC does not currently have any significant planning and coordinating responsibility for actions vis-à-vis genocidal crises. NSPD-44 assigned the secretary of state—and specifically the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)—lead responsibility for coordinating policy and planning for the broader category of complex contingency operations, which might include crisis response to potential mass atrocities. S/CRS has suffered from funding shortfalls, a relatively weak standing within the State Department (to say nothing of the larger U.S. bureaucracy), and uncertainties about its long-term future. Its dominant priority has been to improve U.S. civilian capacity and civil-military coordination for post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction rather than crisis prevention and response. Preventing genocide or mass atrocities is not part of its formal mission.

Tools and capacities. The United States has a wide range of tools at its disposal to halt and reverse mass atrocities. Indeed its overall capacity is unparalleled by any other state and, in most cases, coalitions of states. Table 1 encapsulates the range of measures that are in principle available to the United States. The tools are organized according to their functional type and whether they are designed to affect behavior either cooperatively or coercively.

As Table 1 shows, the United States can employ a range of diplomatic tools to influence an unfolding situation, from supporting mediation efforts or negotiations to condemning parties, expelling diplomats, or supporting the suspension of membership in international bodies. In the economic realm, cooperative measures may include trade incentives or increased aid, while more coercive tools such as trade sanctions, embargoes or seizure of assets may also prove persuasive. Available legal measures cover a similar range from arbitration or offers of amnesty to support for domestic indictments
or referral to international courts. Finally there is a wide spectrum of military options, which are explored in more detail in Chapter 5, and may include overt or covert measures. These tools may include cooperative measures such as military assistance, training, or security guarantees; or coercive measures, from heightened presence to sabotage to intervention.

By virtue of its intensive, day-to-day global diplomatic, economic, and military operations, the readiness of the U.S. government to use some of these instruments at short notice is quite high—though not necessarily in a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>COOPERATIVE</th>
<th>COERCIVE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DIPLOMATIC</td>
<td>• Dialogue facilitation/mediation</td>
<td>• Condemnation (unilateral, multilateral)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Negotiation support/technical assistance</td>
<td>• Naming/shaming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Fact finding/observer missions</td>
<td>• Recalling/expelling diplomats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Recognition, normalization, membership, favored status, etc.</td>
<td>• Travel bans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Withdrawal of mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Suspension/expulsion from international organizations, cultural/sporting boycotts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECONOMIC</td>
<td>• Trade incentives (tariff reductions, direct purchases, favored status,</td>
<td>• Trade sanctions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>subsidies, import/export licenses, etc.)</td>
<td>• Divestment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Investment</td>
<td>• Aid reduction or suspension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Debt relief</td>
<td>• Comprehensive/selective embargoes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Increased aid</td>
<td>• Seizure of assets of elites responsible for the killing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEGAL</td>
<td>• Fact finding</td>
<td>• Domestic indictments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Arbitration</td>
<td>• Referral to international courts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Amnesty/immunity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILITARY (OVERT/COVERT)</td>
<td>• Military assistance/intelligence</td>
<td>• Withdrawal of military assistance, arms embargoes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Arms supply</td>
<td>• Heightened presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Training</td>
<td>• Jamming, information operations, sabotage, leadership targeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Security guarantees</td>
<td>• No-fly zones, safe havens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Information operations</td>
<td>• Intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Safe havens/evacuation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

fully coordinated or strategic manner. Some diplomatic measures could be implemented relatively quickly. Economic and military measures will typically take longer to execute; however, since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has become more adept at designing and implementing targeted sanctions. (See sidebar on page 69 for a discussion of sanctions as a tool for responding to a genocidal crisis.) As always, much will depend on the given situation and competing demands. For example, recent diplomatic efforts to help prevent major violence in Kenya, while successful, exposed several difficulties ranging from redirecting intelligence support and securing reliable diplomatic transportation to getting contingency funds released to finance the negotiations.

Organizational culture. Despite general recognition of the clear benefits of early preventive action over more costly remedial efforts, the default organizational culture within the U.S. government still favors the latter. This is reflected in the low priority given to strategic planning, contingency preparations, realistic exercising, and learning from the past. The principal exception is the Department of Defense and the U.S. armed forces, which put a premium on all these activities. USAID and particularly its crisis response and humanitarian relief components are also to be commended for their pre-crisis preparedness. But in the NSC and the State Department, the dominant mode of operation is reactive and therefore improvised. Neither organization has any established mechanism or places any requirement on its staff to analyze its operations after the fact. As a result, knowledge gained from past operational experiences is not systematically retained or incorporated into future plans.

The lack of dedicated attention to learning from the past is matched by a tendency not to look ahead to the future. While many departments in the executive branch have a nominal responsibility to conduct strategic planning, the reality is that most staff either play a marginal role in policy development or they are drawn too closely into supporting day-to-day operations. This has long been the situation at the NSC despite periodic efforts to improve its capacity to conduct strategic planning and coordination.

Partners. The combination of America’s unsurpassed diplomatic representation around the world, its preeminent position of influence in most if not all major international organizations, and the support it gives directly or
indirectly to a large number of NGOs provides it with an immense capacity to forge productive partnerships for the purpose of preventing genocide. But the United States has not yet made a significant effort to engage prospective partners in planning for coordinated or collective action in such circumstances. In addition, the bulk of U.S. international capacity-building initiatives has been aimed at enhancing the peacekeeping rather than the conflict prevention capabilities of other organizations. For example, the United States helped block a 2008 proposal by the UN secretary general to strengthen the UN Department of Political Affairs’ capacity for preventive diplomacy. Global capacity for preventive diplomacy and crisis management remains underdeveloped.

**Responding to the Challenge**

Much can be done to improve the readiness and capacity of the United States to respond to acute warning of genocide and mass atrocities. As indicated above, a clear commitment by the president to the prevention of mass violence is a necessary starting point to accomplishing this goal. Instituting the measures proposed in Chapters 2 and 3 to help identify states at risk, mitigate that risk through early structural prevention measures, and warn of dangerous developments in a timely fashion is obviously necessary too.

It is nevertheless prudent for the United States to assume that threats of genocide and mass atrocities may emerge in places not previously identified or that early preventive action may prove insufficient. Putting the United States in the best possible position to respond requires that it enhance its current preparedness in four mutually reinforcing areas: the structure and process of crisis response arrangements; the analytical support and range of strategic choices available to U.S. decision makers; operational readiness and capacity to implement preventive action decisions; and the design of policy and preventive strategies drawing on lessons from experience.
Crisis Response Structure and Process

**Recommendation 4-1:** The new high-level interagency committee—the Atrocities Prevention Committee—should meet every other month (and as needed at other times) to review the status of countries of concern and coordinate preventive action.

With the goal of connecting early warning to planning and response, a standing interagency committee, the APC, should be established, as discussed in Chapter 1. The task force believes that, unlike with the earlier Atrocities Prevention Interagency Working Group, the work of this body must be directed from the White House and co-chaired by a senior NSC official with direct links to the national security advisor and by extension the president. Co-chaired by the assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights, and labor, the APC would comprise at a minimum representatives from State, Defense (including the Joint Chiefs of Staff), the intelligence community, Justice, Treasury, and USAID, all at the level of assistant secretary. It would convene every other month to discuss the latest risk assessment and warning analysis, or at any other time one of its members requested an emergency meeting. In the latter circumstance, a member would have the option to seek the emergency meeting at the level of deputy national security advisor/deputy secretary, making it in effect a meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee.

The APC would review the status of countries of concern on the Atrocities Watchlist (AWL) (and the related Instability Watchlist) and coordinate preventive action by executive agencies, facilitating decision making at successively higher levels as necessary. Every other month, the APC would review implementation of previously agreed actions, their resulting impacts, and the current status of relevant situations. The work of this body would be supported and coordinated by a newly created NSC directorate for crisis prevention and response. This directorate would be appropriately staffed and resourced to direct and coordinate U.S. government action across a broad range of violent conflict, political instability, and humanitarian emergencies, not solely the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities. On these broader issues, the NSC directorate would work in close partnership with S/CRS.

In addition to policy planning and coordination, the directorate for crisis prevention and response would oversee the regular exercising of U.S. crisis
management structures and procedures, the rehearsal of specific operational plans before implementation, and the commissioning of “after action” reports to generate lessons learned. Provision should be made to ensure that the results of these studies be taken into account during future crises and, where relevant, incorporated into future policy planning. A permanent and accessible repository for these studies should be established and made available to succeeding administrations.

**Decision Support and Planning**

**Recommendation 4-2: The Atrocities Prevention Committee, working with NSC staff, should prepare interagency genocide prevention and response plans for high-risk situations.**

With more systematic planning, policy and political dilemmas can be reduced and managed in ways that increase the likelihood that the United States will respond in a timely and effective manner. This requires a dedicated effort to prepare and support the decision-making process in situations of heightened concern with timely and accurate information, tailored risk assessments, and, most important, the provision of a broad and flexible range of policy options to avoid politically difficult all-or-nothing choices.

The APC would task and coordinate the preparation of crisis prevention plans for countries identified as being of “moderate concern” on the AWL. These plans would encapsulate the available pre-crisis prevention initiatives (described in Chapter 3). For those countries deemed to have a high and rising level of risk, the APC would have the authority to request heightened intelligence surveillance and monitoring of case-specific indicators and warnings (described in Chapter 2). Simultaneously it would also initiate the preparation of a specific interagency crisis response plan, beginning with three assessments:

1) A detailed target country assessment by the intelligence community that identifies potential points of leverage and policy intervention. This assessment would provide basic political-military, economic, and demographic information; details about the senior leadership, their sources of support (domestic and foreign), internal opposition, and potential motivations to authorize or permit mass atrocities; details
about the potential perpetrators, their motivations, command and control arrangements, and potential methods of mass killing; and finally, details on the identity, number, location, and vulnerability of the potential victims.

2) An atrocities estimate and impact assessment including, among other things, the potential scale of violence, the risk to U.S. citizens and property, the impact on the political stability of the country, the probable effect in terms of internal or external migration, the risk of intervention by neighboring states, and the likely political and economic consequences both regionally and globally if action is not taken.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Group</th>
<th>Crisis Escalation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DECISION MAKERS</strong></td>
<td>Diplomatic pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mediation/negotiation/arbitration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political/economic incentives or threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Media campaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legal threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political/economic penalties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PERPETRATORS</strong></td>
<td>Arms embargo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informational operations/media campaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legal threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military options (radio/cell jamming, no-fly zones, covert operations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VICTIMS</strong></td>
<td>Defense support (warning, covert training, or military assistance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interpositional deployments/physical barriers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Safe havens/evacuation routes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Humanitarian relief/support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>THIRD PARTIES</strong></td>
<td>Diplomatic pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political/economic incentives or threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Media campaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indirect/direct support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Illustrative Targeted Measures
3) A policy options assessment that draws on the target country analysis to lay out a range of potential U.S. responses matched to rising levels of crisis escalation. This assessment should be generated by a standard planning framework to speed the process but also ensure that a comprehensive review of all the options takes place. More specifically, this would tailor specific responses to the relevant target groups in latent or emerging genocidal situations: (a) those planning, authorizing, and fomenting genocide/mass atrocities (to affect their decision calculus); (b) those likely to carry out the genocide/mass atrocities (to reduce their operational effectiveness); (c) the potential victims (to improve their chances of survival); and (d) other relevant domestic and foreign actors (to persuade and mobilize them to play a positive role). Table 2 presents illustrative preventive measures relevant to these target groups at various stages of crisis escalation. On the basis of this analysis, different policy packages or “playbooks” would be developed that could be mixed and matched to respond to a variety of contingencies for different phases of a crisis.

The crisis response plan would draw on these assessments to create a detailed interagency operations plan that would define among other things: U.S. interests, objectives, desired end-state, lead agency responsibilities and tasks, potential international partners, lines of authority and coordination, sequencing, and necessary preparatory measures. The latter would cover a host of requirements: congressional liaison, diplomatic coordination, consultation with necessary legal authorities, funding, and media coordination. Provision should be made to rehearse the crisis response plan and subject it to “red team” review—that is, gaming in which a group is designated to play the role of the adversary—so long as this would not delay timely response. The plan would be presented for approval to the NSC Deputies Committee, and if necessary, the Principals Committee, and then briefed to key members of Congress and their staff.

We cannot anticipate exactly how many crisis prevention and crisis response plans the APC should be capable of completing each year. If the number of countries on the AWL in the “moderate” and “high and rising” risk categories proves unmanageably large, the APC would need to identify priorities based on factors beyond risk of genocide—for example, the extent of U.S. influence and potential impact on other U.S. inter-
ests. This scenario should also spur further efforts to improve the precision of risk assessment methods and reconsider the level of resources given to the APC.

Operational Readiness and Capacity

Recommendation 4-3: The secretary of state should enhance the capacity of the U.S. government to engage in urgent preventive diplomatic action to forestall emerging crises.

The best conceived plans can still be rendered ineffectual if the ability to execute them in a timely fashion is flawed. An important first step is to ensure that the necessary funds to support a crisis response operation can be released and disbursed rapidly. As discussed in Chapter 1, a special fund with flexibility for rapid allocation should be established for this purpose. The capacity of the United States to mount and support at short notice a special diplomatic initiative—whether for fact finding, diplomatic representation, or mediation—should be enhanced. This has already begun for stabilization and reconstruction duties with the creation of the State Department’s Civilian Response Corps, which currently consists of a small active response corps that can be deployed within forty-eight hours, plus a larger civilian reserve corps, with “standby” and “reserve” members. A comparable surge capacity for preventive diplomacy should be created not unlike that being developed by the United Nations with its Mediation Support Unit and associated standby team of experts. This could be achieved as an extension of the Civilian Response Corps, if its scope and mandate were widened, or as a separate initiative.

As it improves its own readiness to respond, the United States should also actively encourage others to do the same, at both the national and international level. Many of the initiatives discussed above are equally applicable for other parties. As described in Chapter 6, we recommend creating an international network to “internationalize” the work described above by including like-minded governments and even nongovernmental actors. In addition, the United States should help improve the capabilities of the fledgling UN effort to improve its support to conflict mediation efforts such as occurred in the Kenya crisis of 2007–08. Similar initiatives are also underway in other international organizations, notably the African Union.
Advance consultations with likely partners about the generic challenges to collective action would also be desirable.

**Policy and Strategy Design**

Beyond these structural and process-related recommendations to improve U.S. readiness, we can also offer some broad policy guidelines—recognizing, as indicated earlier, that there is no magic formula for preventive action. These guidelines should be considered in preparing crisis response plans.

**Recommendation 4-4:** Preventive diplomacy strategies should include the credible threat of coercive measures, should avoid an overly rigid “escalatory ladder,” and should not dismiss potential benefits of rewarding “bad people” for “good behavior.”

The credible threat of coercive measures, including ultimately the use of force, is widely seen as a necessary complement to successful preventive diplomacy. Certainly, these threats have to be carefully calibrated in ways that do not undermine the prospects of a peaceful solution or, worse, become self-fulfilling in provoking or accelerating the very outcome that the diplomacy was intended to avert. Unless they are truly credible, however, such threats should generally be avoided. Aggressive rhetoric matched with meager action—as has been the case in Darfur—sends a clear message of weakness to potential perpetrators and damages the credibility of the United States more broadly. Policymakers must seriously consider what they are willing to do to prevent or halt mass atrocities before making bold public statements.

In crafting preventive diplomatic strategies, care must be taken not to follow an overly rigid process or “escalatory ladder” with potential perpetrators. While a set of sequential steps is often necessary to gain international support and, moreover, demonstrate that peaceful alternatives have been exhausted to enhance the legitimacy of coercive ones, this approach can be exploited and “gamed” by adversaries to undermine the impact of diplomatic action. Stronger measures at earlier stages, though perhaps difficult to muster politically, often have a greater chance of success.
Guidelines for Imposing Sanctions

It is important not to overestimate what sanctions can achieve in the face of impending genocide. However, several guidelines increase the chance of their success:

- Eschew the common approach of successively imposing gradually harsher sanctions over a long period of time. The regime in question is unlikely to be deterred by minor, symbolic measures (usually the first step); sanctions generally only succeed when they really bite. In addition, once genocidal rumblings begin, there is rarely much time to spare.

- Maximize the impact of the sanctions quickly. This suggests the importance of gaining international cooperation, since in today’s world, unilateral sanctions are unlikely to cause sufficient discomfort to the regime to sway its behavior. Widely supported multilateral sanctions also signal to the offending regime that no major international player will defend its action.

- Couple sanctions with other tools to achieve the desired effect. Sanctions are a tool, not a strategy—and the strategy to prevent imminent genocide should embody multiple tools aimed at collectively changing the calculation of the regime in question. The quick, united, and multifaceted approach adopted by the international community toward Kenya in early 2008 is a rare but excellent example of such an effective strategy.

Following all of these guidelines may not always be possible, particularly in compressed time frames. However, sanctions may still be worth pursuing as a means to catalyze international action.

It is important to note that the threat of sanctions is often more effective than their actual imposition. If policymakers are using multiple tools, the threat of sanctions can provide leverage. In the wake of the Asian economic crisis, for example, the mere threat to withhold loans and aid to Indonesia in 1999 badly shook Indonesia’s currency and helped spur Jakarta to rein in the military in East Timor.

Similarly, although it is likely to be distasteful if not morally hazardous, policymakers should not dismiss the potential benefits of rewarding “bad people” for “good behavior” if it is likely to have the ultimate effect of preventing an outbreak of mass violence. Halting and reversing crisis escalation may require negotiating with—and even offering inducements to—unsavory people.

**Recommendation 4-5:** Preventive diplomacy strategies should engage international actors who have influence with potential perpetrators, be mindful of becoming hostage to peace negotiations related to a broader conflict, and maintain consistency in the messages conveyed.
Policymakers should seek to engage those in the international community who have influence with the perpetrators and leverage those relationships as part of the crisis response plan. Neighbors will generally share an interest in peace and stability and desire to prevent spillover effects of genocide and mass atrocities, and they will often have greater influence on the ground and with the regime in question than other external actors will.

When genocidal regimes have prominent patrons in the international community, these states should be a major focus of preventive diplomatic efforts. Prominent individuals and organizations including the business community and mass media outlets and, if relevant, diaspora networks should also be integrated into the overall diplomatic effort. The United States and the international community should demonstrate to potential perpetrators that their actions will not go unnoticed or unrecorded for potential criminal indictment. This includes encouraging the efforts of NGOs—indigenous and international—and mass media to increase transparency during a crisis.

Given that genocide and mass atrocities typically arise in the context of a larger conflict for which there is often an ongoing peace process, policymakers should be mindful of the dangers of becoming overly dependent on—or even hostage to—that process to the extent that other preventive initiatives are ignored or dismissed. Preoccupation with ongoing negotiations during the early stages of the Bosnia crisis as well as during the Arusha peace process in Rwanda effectively precluded other initiatives for fear that they would disrupt ongoing negotiations. At the same time, decision makers should also be prepared to exploit opportunities that present themselves, such as the possible deployment of monitoring groups and peacekeeping forces that can deter and hinder potential escalation.

Policymakers should maintain consistency and discipline in messages conveyed to potential perpetrators and other actors. U.S. and international diplomatic efforts suffer when they do not speak with one voice, as was reported to have occurred in Darfur. The same is also true for diplomatic initiatives that involve multiple international actors, to avoid potential perpetrators from playing one off against another or “forum shopping” to gain tactical advantage. The diplomacy during the Kenya crisis is an example where international engagement was consistent and disciplined, focusing on a single negotiating channel and with different actors reinforcing each other’s efforts.
CHAPTER 5

EMPLOYING MILITARY OPTIONS

You wait until the tragedy happens instead of taking care of the symptoms of the tragedy before it blows up? What kind of logic is that?
—Omer Ismail, Co-Founder, Darfur Peace and Development Organization

To support U.S. effectiveness in preventing and halting genocide, U.S. political and military leaders must consider how military assets can be employed toward these objectives. Despite the arguments put forth in much of the popular debate, the United States does not face an all-or-nothing choice between taking no military action and launching a major intervention. The Genocide Prevention Task Force finds there is a wide range of military strategies that can be employed in support of diplomatic and political efforts, up to and inclusive of military operations to halt violence against civilians.

Policymakers face major challenges in determining whether, when, and how to use military force to prevent or counter the escalation of violence to the level of genocide. Leaders within the United States and elsewhere still debate whether robust military action in 1994 could have thwarted the massacres in Rwanda or whether international forces in 2003 could have prevented the attacks by janjaweed militias in Darfur. Others cite U.S.- and NATO-led military actions to protect the Kurds in Iraq (1991) and Kosovar Albanians (1999) as successful interventions.
Throughout this report, we have placed our emphasis squarely on prevention. But we cannot assume that nonmilitary preventive measures will always succeed, even if the recommendations in the previous chapters are adopted. Preventing or halting genocide may, at times, require the nonconsensual use of force. There is no military “solution” to genocide, but military options can be critical parts of a whole-of-government solution.

**Major Challenges**

The decision to use military capabilities is fundamentally political, reflecting U.S. national security interests, domestic politics, and the realities of the international system. When considering the use of military assets to prevent or halt genocide and mass atrocities, several key challenges arise: the nature of genocide itself, domestic political challenges, international political challenges, and military challenges.

**The Nature of Genocide**

Genocide is often state-supported and almost always occurs in the context of a broader armed conflict. Unlike war, genocidal violence is specifically aimed at civilians. Halting it usually requires “taking sides,” since offering civilians physical safety and interrupting belligerent actions are not neutral acts. Even humanitarian action in the wake of mass atrocities may need to depart from strict neutrality so as not to provide succor to perpetrators. Military action to prevent and halt genocide falls between normal mission categories, such as peacekeeping and war-fighting, and may shift from consensual to nonconsensual as the environment moves from permissive to hostile. These characteristics make preventing genocide politically and militarily difficult.

**Domestic Political Challenges**

Among the major factors that have hindered effective political decision making in response to genocide and mass atrocities has been the lack of clear understanding of the range of military options that can help prevent or stop genocide (and their implications). This was apparent in Rwanda (1994), Srebrenica (1995), and Darfur (2004–present), where some argue that military action could have halted massive attacks against civilians.
Others cite U.S. operations in Lebanon (1982), Kosovo (1999), and Iraq (2003) as underestimating the difficulty of halting atrocities and the danger of provoking greater violence against civilians.

This gap in imagination and understanding hinders effective early action and civil-military decision making about a genocidal situation’s relevance to U.S. national security interests, to say nothing of public opinion, the risk of casualties and other military obligations, and prospects for success. Political leaders must consider whether military actions are likely to succeed or might instead endanger civilians further; whether such actions might quickly halt violence or might instead bring about reprisals and exacerbate instability. In addition, fear of mission creep and lack of an exit strategy can make U.S. leaders reluctant to commit armed services in response to genocide.

There will be times when U.S. leaders must decide whether to take military action to halt mass atrocities without the consent of the country in question. The task force recognizes that such decisions will be weighty and may face resistance from some political and military leaders and from the public, particularly when the U.S. military is overstretched. These decisions rest firmly with U.S. political leaders, who must carefully consider the appropriate response in each case. But military leaders should be prepared to support the decision-making process by describing a range of options, their risks, and likely consequences. Senior civilian and military leaders may have differing judgments about how central preventing genocide is to U.S. national security interests, so clarity about potential options will help focus judgments about policy in specific cases.

**International Political Challenges**

U.S. military actions will be considered within modern international legal and political structures, in which actions beyond self-defense or those authorized by the UN Security Council are generally considered illegitimate and/or illegal. As Chapter 6 describes, the adoption of the concept of the “responsibility to protect” may signal a shift away from the absolute conception of sovereignty, but the principle of nonintervention still carries significant weight internationally. Authorization by the UN Security Council to take coercive action requires the consent (or abstention) of its permanent members, but there is no guarantee of agreement on actions perceived
to violate sovereignty. The Security Council approves peace and stability operations, for example, with the presumed consent of a host government. The Security Council rarely authorizes peace operations or peace enforcement missions when a state is targeting its own civilians. Nations may act without Security Council authorization, as the United States did with NATO in 1999 to launch air strikes against Serbia, but that absence can make an operation more difficult by calling into question its legitimacy and reducing international support.

**Military Challenges**

Efforts to prevent the escalation of violence to genocide present challenges for even the most capable militaries. The U.S. armed forces can conduct many tasks inherent in prevention of mass violence against civilians, but counter-genocide operations differ from traditional military missions in their emphasis on protection of civilians as a primary objective, rather than as a tangential goal or consequence of achieving a broader aim, as well as in their emphasis on addressing the drivers of conflict.

Many established military practices are relevant to the goal of preventing and halting mass killing. Traditional war-fighting requires militaries to focus on objectives such as defeating enemies and capturing territory. But combat operations do not focus on immediate protection of civilian populations or on those who threaten them. In these missions, civilian protection tasks typically are limited to preventing collateral damage, respecting the Geneva Conventions, and halting the behavior of known belligerents. Peacekeeping operations are intended to protect civilians—but presume that there is a peace to keep, deploy after the conclusion of major hostilities, and provide for basic public security to support a peace process. Peacekeeping missions rely on host-state consent and a minimum use of force, setting them up to prevent harm to local populations to the extent possible, but without an expectation of widespread and systematic violence against civilians. Counterinsurgency operations focus clearly on protecting populations, but as a means to defeat an insurgency rather than as an end in itself. Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) focus on protecting a selected part of a civilian population by helping them leave a conflict zone; they do not protect all civilians under attack. Operations of stability police units—carabinieri or gendarmerie-like units, which can help fill
security gaps between military and civilian police activities—are also relevant to counter-genocide missions.

As with all potential military operations, there is need for more than just a military solution. Clear political-military planning and emphasis on a whole-of-government approach are vital to success.

To assess and then to enhance the U.S. ability to prevent and halt genocide and mass atrocities, we need better understanding of five areas. Does the U.S. military currently prepare for such missions? What are critical elements of potential counter-genocide operations that any military would need to consider in advance? What is the range of potential military options and strategies for preventing and responding to genocide and mass atrocities, drawing lessons from past cases? How does the United States identify and assess substantive gaps in preparedness for military activities to halt genocide and to work with international actors in such activities? What are the options for enhancing global capacity to prevent and respond to genocide, as well as the potential U.S. role in enhancing that capacity?

**Readiness to Meet the Challenge**

When it comes to conducting major combat operations, the U.S. military is the most capable and well-prepared armed service in the world, with air, land, and sea assets and six regional commands across the globe. U.S. forces anticipate, plan for, and address a wide range of scenarios and contingencies worldwide. Assessing U.S. preparedness to use military assets effectively to prevent genocide is difficult, given the breadth and depth of the Department of Defense, its human and materiel resources, and the resources it harnesses worldwide. Nonetheless, a few conclusions can be drawn.

First, the Department of Defense has not developed specific tools to prevent or respond to genocide. There is a lack of training, doctrine, and scenarios to prepare for a mission where force is required to protect civilians. Second, the United States can prepare military options rapidly in response to a crisis if directed to act. But such planning lacks a basis in a broader understanding of what missions to halt genocide may require and how that relates to other traditional missions. This posture suggests that the Defense
Department options for policymakers will be developed through a crisis response, rather than a deliberative process, and may not be part of a larger planning effort within the NSC, State, USAID, and other U.S. and international entities, as recommended in Chapter 4. Third, the lack of advance analysis undermines an institutional understanding of what capabilities and technologies are needed to effectively support potential missions alone and with international partners in genocide prevention. Fourth, other nations and multinational organizations—primarily the United Nations, NATO, European Union, African Union (AU), and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)—rely on doctrine, training, guidance, and scenarios developed by western nations such as the United States. Indeed, U.S. policy is to support these organizations as a front line for addressing the prevention of mass atrocities and running peace operations. But without a better U.S. government-wide understanding of how military assets can be employed across the spectrum of an unfolding genocide, the United States undermines its own ability to support these regional and multinational organizations. There are numerous approaches the U.S. government could adopt to better prevent genocide and to strengthen U.S. partnerships with other nations and organizations to this end.

**Tools and Capacities**

The most important tools for military preparedness are national policy, doctrine, plans, and training. The 2006 National Security Strategy states, “Where perpetrators of mass killing defy all attempts at peaceful intervention, armed intervention may be required, preferably by the forces of several nations working together under appropriate regional or international auspices.” Yet the task force found no clear evidence of corresponding high-level or internal military follow-on guidance to prepare for such a situation, such as within corresponding defense planning scenarios or planning directed either by the Joint Staff or led by the regional commands (for example, functional plans, directed plans, or current operations).

It is evident that senior U.S. leaders have not directed the Department of Defense to prepare for missions where the prevention of genocide is the primary goal. In general, U.S. military strategies and preparedness are not focused on scenarios of genocide, and thus are not specifically designed to prevent and react to the escalation of violence leading to genocide. Currently, U.S. military responses to perceived threats of genocide are event-
driven and based on anticipation of an immediate crisis. The United States has the ability to respond rapidly to events, certainly, given its extensive planning process. Indeed, even an informal understanding of potential strategies for the prevention of genocide demonstrates that tasks for such missions may be familiar. Gaps remain, however, in the strategic understanding of the challenges that genocide and mass atrocities pose and in developing appropriate ways to anticipate and address civilian protection (for example, safe areas and appropriate use of force).

What is missing is guidance that directs the Defense Department to identify which tasks may be useful or critical, how they should be organized into a coherent strategy to achieve the specific objective, and the requirements for resourcing the mission. A strategic approach is also needed to support policy decisions in the midst of a developing crisis, both alone and with partners.

One type of operation closely related to preventing or halting genocide that is discussed in current U.S. military doctrine is peace and stability operations. Military planning tools for peace and stability operations emphasize maintenance of a secure and stable environment. U.S. military doctrine for peace and stability operations does not acknowledge halting genocide as a potential crisis response requirement. There is enough doctrine to find some guidance and to identify potential tasks, but not to provide strategies or to focus substantial attention to the question. This gap affects the strategic understanding of genocidal situations, as well as issues such as escalation of force and leadership roles. Because training priorities are derived from doctrine and mission identification, there is little indication of preparation or training for preventing or halting genocide as a potential mission or as a component of a larger mission.

Military guidance on many of the tasks required of forces in counter-genocide operations—such as maintenance of safe havens, provision of humanitarian aid, and traditional war-fighting—is woven into doctrine and planning for other types of operations, such as peace and stability operations, non-combatant evacuation, counterinsurgency, and peacekeeping. For example, both the Joint Capstone Doctrine (JP 3-0), issued in 2006, and the Army Capstone Doctrine (FM 3-0), released in 2008, provide adequate guidance at the operational level to accomplish any mission related to the prevention and response to genocide. Neither document mentions “geno-
cide,” however, or offers in-depth discussion or direct recognition of issues concerning the protection of affected populations or a government perpetrating genocide. Additionally, the Universal Joint Task List (last updated in September 2006) and the 2008 draft of the Army’s Universal Task List, which serve as standard catalogues of collective tasks, include many tasks that would likely be employed to halt genocide, but without reference to them specifically in that context.

U.S. policy is shifting broadly toward increased preparedness for military tasks that are applicable to efforts to prevent and halt conflict, and likely, mass violence. The U.S. military increasingly acknowledges a link between stabilizing fragile and failed states and promoting national security. In November 2005, Defense Directive 3000.05 on military support for stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations designated stability operations as a “core” military mission that demands priority on par with combat operations. The directive called for integration of stability operations across all Defense Department planning and policies. It also acknowledged the importance of military-civilian cooperation and an interagency approach to stability operations, giving the under secretary of defense for policy responsibility for coordination with the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization created in July 2004.

Another illustration of this shift can be found in the Army stability operations field manual (FM 3-07), released in late 2008, which indicates recognition of the unique nature of civilian protection tasks. FM 3-07 refers to “civil security” as integral to stability operations, describing it as the most resource-intensive of stability operations tasks. This attention differs from the previous FM 3-07, released in 2003, which treats civilian security as a secondary theme and a potential task rather than an essential component of stability operations. More important, the newer version considers the possibility that a host government may be the source of the problem or threat.

These efforts, while extremely helpful, do not form a strategic framework or fill the gaps in U.S. preparedness for genocide response. Just as military operations need to be understood as part of a broader political strategy, individual military tasks must be understood in a broader strategic framework. When a mission’s goal and center of gravity are civilian protection,
military leaders need to calculate choices differently than in other missions. If resources do not suffice, for example, to both defend civilians already gathered in a secure location and halt belligerents, leaders may protect those already secured and forego offensive measures. Alternatively, the protection objective may obligate military leaders to take measures to stop the perpetrators before they harm others. Leaders may need to emphasize speed and mobility as time lost can mean more civilians targeted. The absence of strategic and operational planning specific to counter-genocide operations indicates that the U.S. military does not perceive—and therefore does not prepare for—the potential for forces to be deployed with that as a primary objective.

**Critical Elements of Readiness for Genocide Response**

To better identify what U.S. military readiness to prevent genocide entails, and what policies may be needed to support an effective response, it is helpful to consider the process that can lead to genocidal violence. Understanding the process helps to identify the areas where such violence could be interrupted. Various plausible pathways by which mass atrocities could develop in a given setting should be described in scenarios that accompany warning analysis, as discussed in Chapter 2. This should include, for example, whether genocide is likely to develop quickly and suddenly (“volcanic”), or slowly and gradually (“rolling”). Important contextual factors—such as whether an environment for military action is permissive or hostile; the nature of belligerents and the status of the civilian population; and connections between leaders, followers, and the means of violence—should be captured in crisis response plans, as described in Chapter 4. Recognizing that specific processes will differ from case to case, Figure 1 depicts a model that can be useful as a military planning tool to identify interruption points and corresponding military options.

Military assets can help identify early warning indicators and describe these important contextual factors. Current U.S. capacities range from publicly known assets to classified assets, including data collection, satellite surveillance, communications interceptions, knowledge of countries and leadership, and experience with terrain and belligerent strategies. When multilateral peace operations are already deployed, joint mission analysis centers that combine civilian and military capabilities to conduct medium- to long-term threat analyses and risk assessment for local security are an-
Figure 1: Process of Violence: A Military Planning Tool

**Key:**
- = leads to
- = when
- Example: political uncertainty leads to group mobilization when leaders judge that target group seriously threatens their intent to keep/gain power or impose an ideology.

**Note:** The connections in the process are potential intervention points, at which a menu of options comes into play.

**Considerations:**
- Environment: permissive or non-permissive
- Nature of belligerents: state and/or nonstate; strong or weak; transnational allies/suppliers or not
- Nature of civilians: accessibility, size of population, geographically mixed or separated groups
other important resource. As Chapter 2 discussed, political and military leaders are more likely to be prepared to act if they receive useful analysis and intelligence that include such indicators. Such intelligence is also important for helping the military to be better aware of the characteristics of the actors, circumstances, and potential operational environment.

All this analysis should feed into a consideration of the tactics and strategies that could be employed at various stages of escalation, from an unstable state to the beginning of killing to a condition of genocide. Table 3 shows a wide range of options for responding to the potential for genocide;

### Table 3: Graduated Military Options for Genocide Prevention and Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PREVENTION</th>
<th>DEFENSE</th>
<th>OFFENSE</th>
<th>RESTORE ORDER, TRANSITION TO SUSTAINED PEACE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Focus on physical protection for civilian population</strong></td>
<td><strong>Focus on halting actions of belligerents</strong></td>
<td><strong>Disrupt means and capabilities of perpetrators</strong></td>
<td><strong>Defeat Militarily defeat perpetrators</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRESENCE</strong></td>
<td><strong>PHYSICAL (STATIC) PROTECTION</strong></td>
<td><strong>COERC/E COMPEL</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deter violence through military presence or threat</td>
<td>Defensively protect vulnerable civilians in fixed locations</td>
<td>Disrupt supply lines</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol on land, at sea</td>
<td>Protect villages, stadiums, churches, etc.</td>
<td>Control borders, roads</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct military exercises</td>
<td>Protect IDP/ refugee camps</td>
<td>Enforce no-fly zone</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use satellites/ unmanned aerial vehicles to gather information on potential atrocities</td>
<td>Establish interpositionary operations</td>
<td>Impose arms embargo/cut off military assistance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position military assets in deterrent posture; for example, off-shore or in neighboring territory</td>
<td>Protect humanitarian corridors</td>
<td>Jam media, hate radio, and other communications</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping and monitoring</td>
<td></td>
<td>Precision targeting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase intelligence collection, surveillance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Build capacity of legitimate security forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
these options run along a spectrum from preventive efforts to defensive measures and offensive actions to longer term peacebuilding. These categories overlap; military options may be used simultaneously and can be applied to identify potential mass atrocities, to deter such violence, and to halt genocide. In preventive mode, military capacity, along with diplomatic, economic, and political efforts, could be used to bolster the credibility of diplomacy, deter escalation of violence, and prepare for possible protection operations. For example, exercises could be held in neighboring countries and satellite technology used to gain intelligence about the perpetrators and the civilian population. (Actions such as these can be useful throughout the phases of genocide prevention addressed in this report, from early warning, to pre-crisis engagement, to preventive diplomacy.) Likewise, even after atrocities have begun, protecting internally displaced persons (IDPs) or refugee camps can be a viable option short of offensive operations; disrupting supply lines and jamming perpetrators’ communications are examples of potentially useful offensive operations short of full-scale intervention.

**Working with Partners**

Responsibility for genocide prevention and response does not fall to the United States alone, as discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6. Although the United States employed robust military options in northern Iraq and the Balkans to halt mass atrocities, in general the United States has not led such efforts. More traditionally, the United States provides support to operations led by other nations and multinational organizations—such as the Australian-led intervention in East Timor (1999), the ECOWAS mission in Liberia (2003), and the AU mission in Darfur (2004–07)—to provide stability to conflict zones, but not designed primarily to prevent genocide at the time. Multinational peace and stability operations may already be deployed where genocidal violence threatens or erupts. Where this is the case, new forces may be needed to reinforce or replace such operations.

Five multinational organizations have authority and some capacity to use military force to help prevent and halt genocide: the United Nations, AU, NATO, European Union, and ECOWAS. Each institution has unique strengths and commitment, but none currently combines political will, international legitimacy, and operational capacity to act consistently and effectively on its own, especially if violence develops quickly. Current U.S.
policy is to support international partners as a front line for addressing the prevention of mass atrocities and running peace operations, so it is important to understand and build their capacities in this area.

*United Nations.* The United Nations is not a military organization; its legitimacy and willingness to deploy missions to prevent conflict stem from its universal membership, the UN Charter, and the Security Council. With more than sixty years of experience with military peacekeeping operations, the United Nations is now making progress in developing tools used by states, such as doctrine, intelligence, training guidelines, and clearer leadership structures. The United Nations also has programs and policies aimed at supporting early warning, preventive actions, and political settlement of conflicts, all of which are important elements in transitioning from the use of military force to halt conflict to sustaining a stable peace.

While operational, UN peace operations are not equipped to prevent or halt large-scale violence against civilians. The United Nations’ ability to organize, deploy, and manage military forces effectively is neither rapid nor comprehensive. It is overstretched, with seventeen peace operations and more than 100,000 personnel deployed, as of mid-2008. Challenges such as the uneven training and equipment of the peacekeepers sent for UN missions hinder the missions’ capacity to operate in non-permissive, highly hostile environments. Those forces often come with national caveats on their role in missions including the use of force; the United Nations often faces command and control issues, as well as gaps in military intelligence capacities, communications systems, logistics, training, and other aspects of advanced preparation for complex missions.

Furthermore, the United Nations is designed to deploy military and police forces with consent of the host government, in support of a political resolution to conflict where there is a “peace to keep.” As demonstrated by the struggle to convince the Sudanese government in Khartoum to allow deployment of peacekeepers to Darfur, the requirement for government consent can impede effective peace operations if the government in question is complicit in, or indifferent to, the violence taking place.

*AU and ECOWAS.* Both these organizations have deployed operations to help halt atrocities and to serve as peacekeeping forces. The AU, under its Constitutive Act, has authority to intervene coercively in cases of genocide or crimes against humanity. The AU has ambitious plans for a continent-
wide African standby force, based on five regional forces to be ready after 2010, but needs increased preparedness, troop and police capacity, logistics and mobility, and sustainability. ECOWAS also has authority and operational peacekeeping and headquarters capacity, but like the AU, needs external partners to support, manage, and sustain effective deployments.

**NATO and the European Union.** NATO and the European Union are the most capable potential actors for genocide response, with some experience and willingness to lead multinational forces in areas where violence is escalating. NATO, for example, led an air campaign against Serbian forces targeting civilians in Kosovo in 1999. EU-led stabilization operations have included Operation Artemis (2003), which reinforced UN peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the current presence of EU forces in Chad, to provide security for humanitarian operations along the border with Darfur. NATO and the European Union are developing new force structures intended to enhance their respective readiness to undertake humanitarian operations that can include robust military power. NATO has established a NATO Response Force (NRF) with commitments from member states of land, air, and sea troops for six-month periods, to include up to 25,000 troops, trained in advance. The NRF has technological capabilities and is capable of carrying out missions across the full spectrum of military operations, including disaster response, NEOs, and early response ahead of larger, follow-on forces. The force can deploy after 5 days notice and sustain operations for 30 days or longer if resupplied. The European Union is establishing a series of Battlegroups, consisting of 1,500 soldiers each, to provide early, rapid response for stand-alone operations or as a precursor to longer term forces. The Battlegroups are meant to be deployable within 15 days with self-sustaining combat and service support for up to 30–120 days. The Battlegroups are intended to be flexible enough to take on crisis response missions and to conduct combat operations in hostile environments.

**Responding to the Challenge**

As discussed in Chapter 1, the president should ensure that the next National Security Strategy establishes genocide prevention as a policy priority and directs all relevant U.S. agencies—including the Defense Department—to develop appropriate analysis and plans to support U.S. and multina-
tional organizations’ efforts to prevent genocide. Further, genocide prevention and response should be addressed within the National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy. Discussion of the military’s roles and requirements for genocide response should also be included in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The QDR planned for release in 2009 currently is being written without reference to genocide response; the anticipated 2013 QDR should remedy this gap.

**Recommendation 5-1:** The secretary of defense and U.S. military leaders should develop military guidance on genocide prevention and response and incorporate it into Department of Defense (and interagency) policies, plans, doctrine, training, and lessons learned.

The United States has multiple tools to increase policy guidance and plans. To impact regional commands, the Joint Chiefs of Staff could issue a directive requiring U.S. combatant commanders to develop plans for genocide prevention within their areas of operation. Genocide prevention could be integrated into the existing defense planning scenario for humanitarian operations, which currently contains guidance on a range of tasks related to protection of civilians. To expedite the process of developing new guidance, the scenario for humanitarian intervention could be expanded to include more specific guidance on implementing genocide prevention as a primary military objective (and called “humanitarian intervention and civilian protection.”)

Military planners could develop both standing and crisis response plans that include genocide prevention as a contingency, including operational plans. This planning should be closely coordinated with the preparation of crisis response plans under direction of the NSC Atrocities Prevention Committee (APC), as discussed in Chapter 4. Such planning could take the form of either a functional plan, intended for stand-alone missions, or a branch or sequel plan, where genocide is related to other anticipated missions, such as a stability operation, disaster relief, or counterinsurgency. The latter is a venue through which military leaders could prepare for the prospect of mass violence against civilians as a by-product of other military operations. In this context, we note that the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard University, in collaboration with the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, has an initiative underway to
help develop military planning tools that could inform U.S. military efforts to develop genocide-specific operational plans.

Language to protect civilians from mass atrocities should be added to the standing rules of engagement (ROE) issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This would lead to the development of training and secure funding for counter-genocide operations. The United States could utilize templates of various political-military “flexible deterrent options” as a matrix for genocide prevention.

To develop military doctrine and mission guidance, the United States should support mapping out the full range of early and longer term options to prevent, deter, interrupt, halt, or defeat those who would organize and lead a genocide, both as part of a preventive strategy and as part of full-spectrum operations, to include both kinetic and non-kinetic tasks. Efforts to map genocide pathways should identify “interruption points” among leaders, followers, and the means of carrying out the violence. The military could help analyze such scenarios and develop planning models to integrate with other mission types, such as peace and stability operations. Looking at past cases in which civilians faced the threat or reality of large-scale violence, we can deduce some broad preventive strategies, both defensive and offensive, for use across progressive phases of involvement.

To enable senior U.S. officials to understand the key elements of counter-genocide operations, training and exercises should be developed on various genocide prevention scenarios and the range of military options available. War-gaming, simulations, scenarios, table-tops, and other training and planning tools could be especially valuable for identifying and planning for potential situations and challenges on the ground. These initiatives should extend and expand ongoing efforts in related areas, such as joint peacekeeping exercises conducted at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk. Further, genocide prevention should be incorporated within existing systems of lessons learned, after-action reviews, officer education programs, and other means of analyzing the experiences of U.S. military (and international) personnel in operations that involved the protection of civilians. For example, the Defense Department could interview battalion commanders and those serving under them in Iraq to record lessons learned and insights into protection of civilians. Once again, these activities should
be coordinated closely with simulation and lessons learned activities of the APC, described in Chapter 4.

Responsibility for military strategic planning for potential rather than imminent operations falls to the combatant commands. These commands base long-term planning on their assessment of the security needs and risks in their areas of operations. Given its mandate to combine interagency resources to address the region’s human security challenges—poverty, health crises, poor governance—in addition to more traditional, hard security concerns, the new U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) may offer an opening for the United States to enhance preparedness for genocide prevention in Africa.

**Recommendation 5-2: The director of national intelligence and the secretary of defense should leverage military capacities for intelligence and early warning and strengthen links to political-military planning and decision making.**

As noted in Chapter 2, the earlier the United States can recognize risks of mass atrocities, the wider the range of preventive options will be. Strengthening intelligence and early warning is especially important to avoid the false dichotomy of doing nothing or sending in a large-scale intervention. The bulk of all U.S. government intelligence assets reside in the Defense Department. These capabilities can be used, in particular, to strengthen links between indicators of potential violence and the effective use of military assets to support political strategies. For example, U.S. officials have cited difficulties both in gaining access to some areas of classified U.S. information and in leveraging it effectively. Today, governmental and commercial capacities—satellites, communications systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, and other technical assets—can help with identifying patterns as crises emerge. More active measures could help harness attention to potential mass atrocities, such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff issuing a standing order that joint task force commanders and combatant commanders report on indicators of genocide as part of their daily situation report. Integrating genocide indicators into military intelligence gathering will assist commanders in gleaning granular information on issues such as political activities, insurgent actions, crime, and civilian reactions to ongoing developments and smaller events.
Recommendation 5-3: The Departments of Defense and State should work to enhance the capacity of the United Nations, as well as the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, and other regional and subregional bodies to employ military options to prevent and halt genocide and mass atrocities.

These organizations are valuable allies in all phases of genocide response from prevention, to military intervention, to long-term peace and stability building, and the United States should work to enhance their capacity as front-line actors. The United States should support and reinforce UN and internationally led peace and stability operations, with a focus on improving efforts to protect civilians along the trajectory of genocidal violence. Support should include development of doctrine, training, and other tools to prepare organizational responses to crises, as well as training and scenario-based exercises for leadership and planning. The United States could also support enhanced use of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter—which recognizes regional organizations—to link UN authorization of designated multinational organizations or regional operations to provision of financial, operational, and/or logistical support. Resourced, mobile, and capable peacekeepers are more likely to prevent escalation of violence and stave off genocide.

One way to enhance peacekeeping capacity in the UN context would be for developed countries to increase their military contributions to UN peace operations. Bolstering UN peace operations would strengthen their effectiveness and help prevent and end deadly conflict.

Recommendation 5-4: The Departments of Defense and State should work with NATO, the European Union, and capable individual governments to increase preparedness to reinforce or replace United Nations, African Union, or other peace operations to forestall mass atrocities.

As witnessed in Rwanda and Bosnia, multinational peace operations may already be on the ground when atrocities escalate. Where violence grows, multinational peacekeeping missions could come under threat themselves and be unable to protect vulnerable populations. Such missions need rapid reinforcement if violence escalates, which is far outside the current capacity of the United Nations, AU, and ECOWAS. The European Union and
NATO could incorporate this role as part of their raison d’être, preparing both to lead counter-genocide operations and provide over-the-horizon backup for peace operations. Currently, however, such rapid reinforcement capacity exists only within a handful of western militaries. The need for backup capacity for UN forces could be remedied by creating a strategic reserve that would be drawn from countries contributing to UN missions.

Multinational or U.S. forces could reinforce or replace peace support operations overwhelmed by violence against civilians. Two critical elements are mobility and quick response. If genocide grows swiftly, both capacities are badly needed. The United States can also provide supplementary logistical and operational capabilities to institutions or countries willing to intervene in crises, as it did by providing support to Australia’s intervention in East Timor. The United States should therefore work with like-minded nations, as well as the United Nations, AU, European Union, ECOWAS, and NATO to prepare for such contingencies, and to ensure that adequate guidance, training, planning, information-sharing, and coordination mechanisms are established. NATO could, for example, create a genocide prevention standardization agreement (STANAG), which would provide a conceptual basis for operations of its forces. The United States should include genocide-related scenarios in its multinational experiments (MNE) campaign, a series of seminars and military experiments designed to improve planning and coalition operations. The MNE-5 planned between 2008 and 2010 in Africa could benefit from scenarios simulating the challenges that arise when a regional conflict escalates into mass atrocities.

**Recommendation 5-5:** The Departments of Defense and State should enhance the capacity of the United States and the United Nations to support a transition to long-term efforts to build peace and stability in the wake of genocidal violence.

The U.S. government is increasingly recognizing that long-term support for post-conflict development is critical to sustaining security and preventing the reemergence of violence. It is also an important part of planning for the next stage after an intervention to halt genocide or mass atrocities. Just as consideration of military action must form part of a comprehensive approach to prevent or halt genocide, so too must there be a clear exit strategy in the case of intervention, and a reconstruction plan involving civilian
and international partners. Continued vigorous diplomacy through intervention and post-intervention periods is critical to working out suitable conditions for the exit of military forces (for example, commitments by parties to new security arrangements).

Spurred by its experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States has established initiatives to enhance whole-of-government capacity to support reconstruction and stabilization in conflict-affected nations. The United Nations, with a greater breadth of peacebuilding experience, is working to hone strategies and mechanisms for a range of post-conflict recovery activities, including the demilitarization and reintegration of ex-combatants, rebuilding states’ governance institutions, and facilitating long-term economic growth. These endeavors are critical to building international capacity to enable intervention forces to exit in a smooth transition to longer term peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. As the United States strives to enhance its own post-conflict stabilization capacity—civilian and military—it could, for example, provide U.S. personnel to serve in the headquarters of missions by the United Nations and other multinational organizations to learn from their experience and to support efforts to develop long-term peacebuilding strategies.
CHAPTER 6

INTERNATIONAL ACTION: Strengthening Norms and Institutions

It takes great moral strength to give up temporary political interests and inconveniences in order to build something bigger and better which will serve mankind as a whole.
—Raphael Lemkin

The record of the international community in responding to threats of genocide and mass atrocities falls far short of what the Genocide Prevention Task Force believes is adequate. Improving on this record must begin with a frank acknowledgment that for too long, too many nations and international institutions have found it too easy to avert their gaze from mounting signs of the most grievous peril to human life until too late. Even when the intervention of the international community has been forthcoming, it has usually been made more difficult for having been delayed. The lives lost in the interim, of course, can never be restored. The tragic backdrop against which this report appears is one of international indifference or inability to act effectively to prevent genocide and mass atrocities.

At the same time, the task force recognizes that a strong normative framework and capable international institutions are critical components of a U.S. strategy to prevent and halt genocide and mass atrocities. While the
focus of this report has been on the role of the U.S. government, partnerships with a range of international actors are not just desirable, they are a necessary requirement for successful efforts to counter genocide and mass atrocities in the future.

**Core Objectives**

The United States must be a leader of the international community in responding to the threat of genocide and mass atrocities. An honest accounting shows that the United States has much to its credit in these matters—from mobilization for total war to defeat the genocidal Nazi regime, to lesser military campaigns aimed at halting mass atrocities in Bosnia and Kosovo, to the enforcement of a no-fly zone in Iraq to protect that country’s Kurdish population from Saddam Hussein’s regime. In addition to military measures, the United States has been active diplomatically, for example in Kenya in early 2008, to prevent situations posing the danger of mass atrocities from escalating. And the American people have historically provided generous humanitarian assistance to victims of mass atrocities, dating back to the philanthropic contributions mobilized to aid the Armenian people early last century.

In some instances, the United States has acted alone, but the United States tends to be at its strongest when acting in a leadership role in partnership with other nations, international institutions, and NGOs. Although U.S. capabilities and leadership have often been decisive with regard to the success of a particular endeavor, the contributions others have made, in material assets and in strengthening the legitimacy of the action internationally, cannot be overstated. We believe such partnerships will be central to future successes.

While the United States has much to its credit, candor demands acknowledgment that it has not always lived up to the aspirations codified in the Genocide Convention, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the UN Charter—or the principles of our own Declaration of Independence, which insists that all people are endowed first of all with an inalienable right to live. Too often, the United States has failed to act in a timely fashion and has engaged in counterproductive finger-pointing and denial. In the case of Rwanda in 1994, the United States found itself in the distress-
ing but morally necessary position of apologizing for failure to take timely action to halt the massacres of hundreds of thousands of people. More recently, the U.S. president and Congress declared the situation in Darfur to be genocide, but little concrete action followed.

**Major Challenges**

Blame for inaction hardly belongs solely to the United States; other governments have been willing to turn a blind eye to mass atrocities. Sometimes this indifference is a direct result of their own complicity, or a judgment that their own national interests override any concerns about mounting atrocities. Sometimes, governments seek refuge in the principle of a state’s sovereign right of noninterference in its internal affairs at the expense of victims of mass atrocities.

The United Nations, too, has fallen prey to inaction and obfuscation. Just as the U.S. government must acknowledge that the United Nations responds to the political will or absence thereof among member states, so too must the United Nations fully embrace its unique institutional role in galvanizing and coordinating action when the international community finds itself wrestling with the gravest of crises. The UN Charter embodies universal principles, and the key challenge facing the member states of the United Nations is to use the unique legitimacy of the organization to uphold them, especially when great numbers of lives hang in the balance.

Even among states that are respectful of the rights of their own people, the political will to take action to prevent mass atrocities elsewhere is often missing. And governments contemplating action are often stymied by the sheer difficulty of organizing an effective response, alone or with others.

While many past episodes suggest that the international community responds to the threat of genocide and mass atrocities most effectively when the United States is actively engaged, many governments are wary of U.S. involvement and regard assertive U.S. policies as ultimately self-interested, even or perhaps especially when framed in terms of humanitarian purposes. Some of this sentiment is simply a by-product of the U.S. position as the world’s leading military power. Some of it is traceable to suspicion of U.S. ambitions to transform other societies through such long-standing policies.
as democracy promotion. Some of it is a response to the policies of a particular U.S. administration. Certainly, opposition to the Iraq war casts a long shadow. The United States cannot ignore this wariness. Rather, the U.S. government must deal with it straightforwardly: first, by stating clearly the principles and parameters of U.S. policy regarding genocide and mass atrocities, and second, by explaining on a case-by-case basis why action in response to such threats is important, what the stakes are, and why inaction is unacceptable.

**Readiness to Meet the Challenge**

In some cases, the United Nations has been the most effective vehicle for U.S. engagement. It is generally the preferred forum for many long-standing U.S. allies whose participation substantially contributes to effective action. It is also the forum that most states, democratic or nondemocratic, allies or antagonists of the United States, hold as the unique grantor of legitimacy in the international system. In seeking to lead an international effort to prevent mass atrocities or genocide, the United States will find opportunities and challenges at the United Nations.

The most important opportunity is the legal force and unparalleled legitimacy in the eyes of world governments of a UN Security Council resolution—if it is possible to obtain one. The greatest challenge is doing exactly that, often against the opposition or skepticism of other members of the Security Council, in particular the permanent members who have veto power. Too often, the price of agreement of all five permanent members has been the watering down of a response to an emerging threat to the point at which the resolution is ineffectual in averting the threat. Nevertheless, in responding to gathering threats of genocide or mass atrocities, the United States must work hard to succeed in the Security Council. Forging an effective response in cases involving the risk of mass atrocities is diplomacy at its hardest, and at its most urgent. The specific dynamics of each individual case will determine how long the United States should pursue a Security Council resolution before deeming it unachievable. However, even if an effective Security Council resolution remains elusive, the United States will earn international respect and credit for having tried. That respect may, in turn, prove vital in considering other avenues to address the emerging threat.
Partners

It is unacceptable to ignore a threat of mass atrocities or genocide. If the Security Council is unable to act, there may be other appropriate options.

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter specifically envisions regional arrangements in support of peace and security, provided they are consistent with the principles and purposes of the United Nations and enforcement actions are authorized by the Security Council. In recent practice, regional organizations have often notified the Security Council of actions taken under their auspices after the fact, rather than seeking authorization in advance. Many African states have demonstrated a willingness to take action through the African Union (AU) and subregional organizations, though such willingness has often been hampered by inadequate capacity. As discussed in Recommendation 5-3 and below, the U.S. government can work to fill these capacity gaps. Other regional organizations may have a role to play in their own neighborhoods.

NATO is a multilateral organization increasingly willing to act outside the territory of its membership. In response to a 2005 request from the AU, for example, NATO approved an assistance package for the AU mission in Darfur. In some instances, it may be appropriate to look to NATO to play a larger role in the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities. In 1999, the United States led an effective NATO effort to avert mass atrocities in Kosovo.

In the end, however, even if all institutions and organizations prove unable to take effective action, the United States should still be prepared to take steps to prevent or halt genocide. In such an instance, the only choice for the United States may be to try to assemble a coalition of like-minded nations to act. The international network proposed in Recommendation 6-1 could provide the basis for consultation and formation of coalitions prepared to act in specific cases. While the United States may face criticism for taking strong action in these cases, we must never rule out doing what is necessary to stop genocide or mass atrocities.

Tools and Capacities

Notwithstanding a record of past action that is mixed at best, members of the international community have begun to take steps, both normative and practical, that hold promise for saving lives.
Responsibility to protect. The potentially most important normative advance in relation to the threat of mass atrocities since the 1948 adoption of the Genocide Convention is the endorsement in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document of the “responsibility to protect,” the principle that states have a sovereign responsibility to take effective action to protect populations resident on their territory from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing, and that the international community as a whole must assist states in fulfilling this responsibility when appropriate and must take effective action to prevent or halt a slide toward mass atrocities and genocide when a state manifestly fails to fulfill its sovereign responsibility. An important related concept within the AU is the principle of members’ “nonindifference” to atrocities and other egregious violations of provisions of the AU Constitutive Act. The AU Constitutive Act, in fact, granted African heads of state a collective “right to intervene” in cases of genocide a few years before the “responsibility to protect” concept was adopted at the United Nations.

The responsibility to protect is best understood as an important tool for moral suasion. Properly construed and carefully implemented on a case-by-case basis, the principles of responsibility to protect and nonindifference provide a strong basis for mustering political will and resources to prevent genocide and mass atrocities. The responsibility to protect is not, however, self-executing. Neither agreement to the language of the Outcome Document, nor its invocation in a particular case, creates a legal obligation to act nor sets in motion automatic action. Similarly, while parties to the Genocide Convention recognize genocide as a crime under international law, which they undertake to prevent and to punish, this has not been an effective trigger for international action. Both the Genocide Convention and the Outcome Document include a greater focus on prevention than is often noted, and taken together, these commitments form an important part of the international framework for preventing and halting genocide and mass atrocities.

Some governments that joined the consensus on the Outcome Document subsequently have voiced skepticism about the responsibility to protect. Many states are wary of the diminution of the principle of non-interference by outsiders in a state’s internal affairs. Some see the responsibility to protect as, or fear it will become, a modern-dress version of the droit d’intervention, a legitimizing pretext for great-power (especially U.S.) military adventurism to remake the world.
However, it has proven possible to win over some skeptics, including states with questionable human rights records of their own. In some cases, such states have been willing—and may in the future prove willing—to join the international community in taking action to fulfill the protection function in egregious cases of mass atrocities. Moreover, such states may see a benefit for themselves in the responsibility to protect, to the extent that it makes the resources of the international community available to them to fulfill their sovereign responsibility toward their people.

Above all, however, the responsibility to protect places an emphasis on early action for the prevention of atrocity crimes, which, pursued successfully, will obviate the need for non-consensual military intervention. Making these aspects of the responsibility to protect clear is a matter for adroit diplomacy at the United Nations and elsewhere.

A revolution in conscience. Not only many national governments and NGOs, but also international institutions and regional and subregional organizations have increasingly recognized that preventing genocide and mass atrocities and the conflicts that can lead in that direction is an urgent priority and they have begun to take steps to facilitate effective and timely responses to threats. For example, the UN secretary general has acted to expand the office of the special advisor on the prevention of genocide and appointed another special advisor to work on conceptual, institutional, and political dimensions of the responsibility to protect. The UN high commissioner for human rights has been an effective independent voice and commands important field resources. The AU has enhanced its early warning capability and developed extensive plans to improve its capacity to act effectively in response to threats to peace and security, including genocide and mass atrocities. Similarly, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has emerged as a strong subregional African organization, willing to play a role in responding to threats to peace and security, including mass atrocities. In Asia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has adopted a new human rights charter, a first for the region, and some of its member states have been among the foremost proponents of the responsibility to protect.

The European Union appears likely to create a new institutional mechanism on the prevention of genocide and it has adopted a new Africa strategy that calls for dedication of substantial resources to improving AU ca-
pacity. NATO has provided assistance to the AU mission in Sudan. The United States and the European Union have opened diplomatic missions to the AU, and other governments, alone or acting in concert, have taken steps to boost both normative awareness of the need to prevent mass atrocities and the capacity to take action. NATO has a liaison officer in Addis Ababa, the AU headquarters. In Brussels, a NATO deputy secretary general has been designated the focal point for cooperation between NATO and other institutions. NATO and the United Nations have reached agreement on a memorandum of understanding that clarifies the nature and scope of their mutual interest.

Other international actors play an increasingly important role in efforts to prevent genocide and mass atrocities. Religious institutions and leaders provide timely warning about threats in remote areas they serve, as mentioned in earlier chapters, and can act as catalysts for preventive action in their communities. While some multinational corporations remain largely indifferent to the threat of mass atrocities, except with regard to their own personnel, more responsible companies are beginning to recognize the potential damage to their interests that an association with perpetrators of mass atrocities can bring; they also recognize that their own current and future investment plans can offer leverage over governments to promote more responsible behavior. The international financial institutions (IFIs) also have a role to play in preventing genocide and mass atrocities. Understanding that widespread violence is profoundly disruptive of economic development and places existing (or potential) investment in a country in a high-risk category, the World Bank has moved in recent years to include violent conflict and governance as factors in its design or withholding of assistance.

The scope of activity along the lines described here indicates a revolution in conscience in the international community on the need to act early to prevent genocide and mass atrocities. Collectively, it offers a glimpse of the possibility of a world in which genocide is a thing of the past. But much work remains to be done, and the United States must lead.

*Impunity no more.* There is an emerging international consensus that perpetrators of genocide and mass atrocities must be held accountable for their conduct. For much of recorded history, accountability was deeply
intertwined with “victor’s justice,” and was often practiced brutally and in the spirit of revenge.

The principle of nonimpunity emerged in the 20th century not only as a principle of accountability but also as a juridical process protecting defendants’ rights. In 1993, the UN Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, with a mandate to prosecute grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, violations of the law or customs of war, genocide, and crimes against humanity. As of mid-2008, the tribunal had indicted 161 persons and concluded proceedings against more than 100. The most notable defendant was certainly former Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic, who died before a judgment was rendered in his case. The arrest of Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic in July 2008 for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity committed in Bosnia in the 1990s represents important progress in bringing war crimes suspects to justice.

In 1994, the Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to investigate genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II. As of mid-2008, the court had issued 94 indictments. In 2000, a Security Council resolution directed the UN secretary general to negotiate with the government of Sierra Leone the creation of a special court to investigate violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leone national law. This “hybrid tribunal” has issued twelve indictments. Another hybrid court, the Extraordinary Chambers of the Court in Cambodia, created in 2004, with the first suspects being accused in 2007, is at last holding to account surviving Khmer Rouge perpetrators of atrocities between 1975 and 1979, including the notorious Ieng Sary. The United States supported the creation of these tribunals.

Meanwhile, in 2002 the International Criminal Court (ICC) began operations under the provisions of the so-called Rome Statute of 1998, an international treaty now joined by 106 state parties. The United States signed the Rome Statute under the Clinton administration in 2000, but identified aspects of the treaty requiring further negotiation. President Clinton recommended no Senate action on the treaty until U.S. concerns had been met; thus the United States was never a state party to the treaty. Officials
objected especially to the treaty’s asserted jurisdiction over nationals of states that were nonparties for acts committed on the territory of states party to the treaty. U.S. negotiators had argued unsuccessfully for treaty language that would have established the court’s jurisdiction only over nationals of state parties for actions in the territory of state parties.

Citing principally this objection and the prosecutor’s authority to initiate cases on his or her own motion (with the approval of two judges on the court), the U.S. government under the Bush administration effectively de-activated the U.S. signature on the Rome Statute in 2002, shortly following the threshold event of sixty national ratifications required for the court to become established and operational. The court has since accepted self-referrals from three national parties: the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2004), Uganda (2004), and the Central African Republic (2005).

Many observers questioned whether the Bush administration was opposed in principle to any sort of international criminal court or whether its objections were confined to those stated. In 2005, the UN Security Council took up a resolution referring the situation in Darfur to the ICC prosecutor. The resolution included language specifically exempting the nationals of nonparties from any claim of jurisdiction on the part of the court. And this was an instance of the court being asked to take up a situation under the specific mandate of the Security Council, not solely on its own authority or at the request of a state party. To the surprise of some, the United States abstained, thus allowing the resolution to go forward, and the ICC accepted jurisdiction.

The United States regularly has affirmed a de facto commitment to international justice and the referral of atrocity crimes to international tribunals when local courts are unable or unwilling to hold perpetrators accountable. In short, notwithstanding continuing U.S. government objection to certain important facets of the governing structure of the ICC, the United States has shown that when its specific objections can be satisfied with an appropriately framed Security Council resolution referring a matter to the ICC, the United States has no disagreement in principle with the ICC taking jurisdiction. Senior U.S. officials have since made statements in support of the court’s work on the Darfur situation, and have more broadly affirmed the U.S. commitment to international justice.
Some have questioned whether the threat of ICC prosecution has a deterrent threat on potential perpetrators of atrocity crimes in the way that fear of prosecution under national law deters ordinary crime. Although the history of the principle of nonimpunity for mass atrocities is too short to render anything like a definitive judgment, anecdotal evidence suggests that some perpetrators are more fearful that they will be prosecuted by the ICC than that they will be held accountable locally. It is important to note that any deterrent benefit from the threat of ICC prosecution will be felt most keenly to the extent that the international community demonstrates its willingness to detain indicted fugitives and bring them before the court.

Some have also expressed concern that the threat of ICC prosecution is a powerful deterrent only so long as it is credible but unused. By this reasoning, once an indictment has been handed down, the accused no longer has reason to restrain his or her conduct. Others fear that an ICC indictment might stand in the way of a desirable peace agreement that would include a provision granting amnesty or immunity in exchange for cessation of hostilities. These debates have come to the fore in 2008 with the ICC prosecutor’s presentation of evidence to a panel of judges asking for the issuance of an arrest warrant against Sudanese president Umar Hassan al-Bashir on charges of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes for his role in the violence in Darfur.

Such concerns illustrate that nothing in international politics comes entirely without cost: For every benefit, there is some price to be paid. The question over the long term is whether the benefits of an international legal regime of non-impunity outweigh the costs. By their actions, responsible members of the international community, including the United States, have concluded that the potential benefits do indeed outweigh the costs, and they are unlikely again to allow disputes over the means of pursuing justice to overwhelm the principle that justice must be done.

It is a considerable achievement of the international community, of which the United States is an integral part, that the norm-creating work related to the protection of populations from the threat of genocide or mass atrocities has been largely completed, beginning with the identification of war crimes and crimes against humanity, continuing through the adoption of the Genocide Convention, and now through acceptance of the principle of
nonimpunity and the concept of the responsibility to protect. Were any of these pieces missing from the international system, the most urgent task facing those concerned to prevent genocide and mass atrocities would be to press for their adoption. With these elements in place, the focus must now shift to implementation and to operationalizing the commitments they contain.

Responding to the Challenge

As discussed in Chapter 1, engaging global partners in genocide prevention should begin with personal diplomacy by the president, for example, through a speech to the UN General Assembly and in discussions with his or her G-8 counterparts. In addition, we recommend:

**Recommendation 6-1:** The secretary of state should launch a major diplomatic initiative to create among like-minded governments, international organizations, and NGOs a formal network dedicated to the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities.

Despite a range of potential partners, there currently exists no coherent framework for U.S. government engagement with other governments, international and regional organizations, and NGOs to facilitate effective and early action to prevent genocide and mass atrocities.

The network, once constituted, would institutionalize information and intelligence sharing and cooperation among members. It would provide a forum for airing NGO warnings and would ensure that information about emerging threats of mass atrocities entered deliberations among senior policymakers in a timely fashion. It would also constitute an international working group for considering emerging threats and how to respond to them, and could form the basis for coordinated action up to and including the deployment of military forces by a multinational coalition of states. This would help address the need, described in Chapter 5, to back political strategies with viable and credible military options. Designed to supplement (not supplant) the work of the United Nations, international and regional organizations, NGOs, and other governments, the network’s chief utilities would reside in the facilitation of the flow of information, and co-
ordination of preventive strategies and capacity-building initiatives across national borders. Further, this network could engage developed and developing states, provide stronger links to existing organizations, and help nations identify and bridge capacity gaps in current abilities and take effective action across the spectrum of counter-genocide strategies.

As a first step, the U.S. government should convene a major international conference whose purpose would be to create the network through the adoption of a statement of principles for the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities. It would lead to the designation of a focal point on this issue by all participating governments, international and regional organizations, and NGOs. These designated focal points would have the responsibility for follow-up efforts in information sharing and the coordination of prevention strategies and capacity-building initiatives.

The secretary of state should designate the assistant secretary for democracy, human rights, and labor as the focal point for international coordination and cooperation on prevention of genocide and mass atrocities. On an ongoing basis, the assistant secretary would seek to kindle a robust dialogue between the U.S. government and international NGOs and work to ensure that adequate resources flow to those NGOs generating critical information for early warning, such as the International Crisis Group.

The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor would also seek to mobilize non-traditional resources for the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities, including the public finance and business sectors. For example, the United States should recruit responsible multinational corporations into an initiative, drawing on the experiences of the UN Global Compact and the Global Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, in which they can contribute to the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities, both directly in terms of the influence they may have in countries in which they have invested or operate, and indirectly through declaratory support for the statement of principles for the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities. Through such an initiative, the United States can multiply its prevention efforts, and corporations can demonstrate their responsibility to a growing constituency of socially conscious consumers.

The United States should also encourage the IFIs to participate in the network and to monitor information regarding emerging threats of mass atrocities in client countries. Financing should not flow in “business-as-
usual” fashion to any country moving toward genocide or mass atrocities; if it flows at all, it should only be in coordination with steps to reverse that trend. In addition, the possibility that World Bank financing may be denied or withdrawn unless policies leading to genocide are changed will supplement international diplomatic pressure on the government in question.

**Recommendation 6-2: The secretary of state should undertake robust diplomatic efforts toward negotiating an agreement among the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council on non-use of the veto in cases concerning genocide or mass atrocities.**

The United States has a strong interest in improving the effectiveness of the UN Security Council in responding to mass atrocities. There is no substitute in the international system for a strong statement by the council; the United States must, therefore, invest diplomatic capital in negotiations within the council on specific cases, as well as in efforts to improve the functioning of the body itself. Too frequently, one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council has made effective collective action virtually impossible by threatening veto, implicitly or explicitly. This has led to either watered-down, ineffectual resolutions, or no resolution at all. Uniquely empowered by the UN Charter, the five permanent members have unique responsibilities to fulfill the mission of the charter.

The U.S. ambassador to the United Nations should initiate a dialogue among the five permanent members (P-5) of the Security Council on the special responsibility they have to prevent genocide and mass atrocities. A principal aim should be informal, voluntary mutual restraint in the use or threat of a veto in cases involving ongoing or imminent mass atrocities. The P-5 should agree that unless three permanent members were to agree to veto a given resolution, all five would abstain or support it. This should apply, in particular, to resolutions instituting sanctions and/or authorizing peace operations in situations when mass atrocities or genocide are imminent or underway. The P-5 should also agree that a resolution passed by two-thirds of the General Assembly finding that a crisis poses an imminent threat of mass atrocities should add further impetus to an expeditious Security Council response without threat of a veto. An agreement along these lines would make the Security Council a more effective vehicle in cases when a permanent member might otherwise prefer to block action. This
dialogue should also address the prospect of increased contributions by the P-5 to UN peacekeeping operations, as discussed in Chapter 5.

**Recommendation 6-3: The State Department should support the efforts currently under way to elevate the priority of preventing genocide and mass atrocities at the United Nations.**

The United States should support the efforts of the UN secretary general’s special advisor on the prevention of genocide and the special advisor working on the responsibility to protect. It should carefully study proposals for mechanisms to implement the responsibility to protect issued by the secretary general and offer support as appropriate. The United States also should share information with those offices and support efforts to give more resources to their work. Finally, it should help the special advisor on the prevention of genocide establish a firm footing at the Security Council by inviting him to brief the council periodically and on specific situations of concern.

The United States must support the independence of the UN high commissioner for human rights and seek to strengthen his or her capacity and that of human rights rapporteurs and officers in the field. The United States must recognize that its own conduct may, from time to time, be subject to criticism from this office under the principle that all governments can improve their human rights performance. The United States also must recognize that the alternative to an independent high commissioner is not one more favorably disposed toward the United States and U.S. views of human rights, but a high commissioner more beholden to human rights abusers. Finally, the United States should support the high commissioner’s consistent participation in policy formulation within the UN system.

The United States must recognize that, however egregious its failings so far, the UN Human Rights Council has, in principle, the potential to facilitate international efforts to prevent genocide and mass atrocities. Whether from the inside or the outside, the United States must work to reform this body. The central objective of reform efforts should be for the council to devote its full attention to the most severe human rights problems in the world.

The United States should carefully assess biennially whether the benefits of membership on the Human Rights Council outweigh the costs. Neither a
doctrinaire position that membership is always beneficial to the broader cause of human rights, including the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities, nor the contrary position that U.S. engagement at the council is always deleterious because of the body’s flaws, is appropriate. Largely in accord with former secretary general Kofi Annan’s proposal, the United States worked for and hoped for a Human Rights Council more effective than the failed Human Rights Commission it replaced. This hope was misplaced, but it may be possible for the United States to press a reform agenda in conjunction with seeking a seat on the council and then assess future participation on the basis of the progress of reform. At the same time, the United States must not rule out more aggressive approaches in the event the council proves immutably resistant to reform.

**Recommendation 6-4:** The State Department, USAID, and Department of Defense should provide capacity-building assistance to international partners who are willing to take measures to prevent genocide and mass atrocities.

The United States should begin or augment bilateral and multilateral dialogues grounded in partnership and in a commitment to preventing genocide and mass atrocities. The result should be, as appropriate, a memorandum of understanding spelling out an action plan establishing goals, deliverables, and timetables for the parties. The United States should begin this process at once, with all governments and institutions ready and willing to engage seriously on this basis. Both the AU and ECOWAS have expressed the desire to engage with the United States and others to build their capacity to prevent conflicts that may lead to genocide and mass atrocities. As ASEAN is gaining competencies on human rights and other issues related to protecting civilians, the United States should engage as fully as possible in building these capacities.

Capacity building should include support across the full range of genocide prevention and response. As discussed in earlier chapters, this should include further development of regional early warning systems, such as the African continental early warning system; enhancing preventive diplomacy capacities, such as the UN mediation support unit; and building military capabilities, such as the ECOWAS standby force.
Previous capacity building efforts have suffered in part because of poor coordination among donors. The United States should, therefore, pay special attention to promoting greater coherence and coordination in partnerships designed to enhance international capacity to prevent genocide and mass atrocities. The United States should commit to a commensurate increase in its resource commitment to partners.

**Recommendation 6-5: The secretary of state should reaffirm U.S. commitment to nonimpunity for perpetrators of genocide and mass atrocities.**

Although the stated concerns of the U.S. government preclude the United States from becoming a party to the Rome Statute at present, the United States must acknowledge, embrace, and build on the emerging modus vivendi between the U.S. government and the ICC. The United States should send an observer delegation to the ICC assembly of state parties deliberations in 2009 and 2010, participating as fully as possible in the assembly’s scheduled discussions on the definition of the crime of “aggression,” among other topics of considerable importance to the United States.

Within the constraints of U.S. law, the United States should cooperate fully and share information with the court on all situations in which the United States has not opposed the court taking jurisdiction. Of course, the decision as to what to share should be made on a case-by-case basis with due regard to the sensitivity of intelligence sources and methods. The United States should downgrade the salience of its objections to the court in its bilateral relations with countries that are state parties to the Rome Statute.
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Leadership

To the President

1-1. The president should demonstrate that preventing genocide and mass atrocities is a national priority.
1-2. Under presidential leadership, the administration should develop and promulgate a government-wide policy on preventing genocide and mass atrocities.
1-3. The president should create a standing interagency mechanism for analysis of threats of genocide and mass atrocities and consideration of appropriate preventive action.
1-4. The president should launch a major diplomatic initiative to strengthen global efforts to prevent genocide and mass atrocities.

To the Leaders of Congress

1-5. Congress should increase funding for crisis prevention and response initiatives, and should make a portion of these funds available for rapid allocation for urgent activities to prevent or halt emerging genocidal crises.
1-6. The newly established Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission should make preventing genocide and mass atrocities a central focus of its work.
1-7. Congressional leaders should request that the director of national intelligence include risk of genocide and mass atrocities in his or
her annual testimony to Congress on threats to U.S. national security.

**To the American People**

1-8. The American people should build a permanent constituency for the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities.

**Early Warning: Assessing Risks and Triggering Action**

2-1. The director of national intelligence should initiate the preparation of a National Intelligence Estimate on worldwide risks of genocide and mass atrocities.

2-2. The national security advisor and the director of national intelligence should establish genocide early warning as a formal priority for the intelligence community as a means to improve reporting and assessments on the potential for genocide and mass atrocities.

2-3. The State Department and the intelligence community should incorporate training on early warning of genocide and mass atrocities into programs for foreign service and intelligence officers and analysts.

2-4. The national security advisor should create a “mass atrocities alert channel” for reporting on acute warning of genocide or mass atrocities akin to the State Department’s “dissent channel.”

2-5. The national security advisor should make warning of genocide or mass atrocities an “automatic trigger” of policy review.

2-6. The State Department and USAID should expand ongoing cooperation with other governments, the United Nations, regional organizations, NGOs, and other civil society actors on early warning of genocide and mass atrocities.

**Early Prevention: Engaging before the Crisis**

3-1. Early prevention strategies should aim to influence leaders by using positive and negative inducements, aggressive enforcement of international regimes, and fresh approaches to conflict transformation.

3-2. Early prevention strategies should support development of institutions in high-risk states by supporting power sharing and dem-
ocratic transition, enhancing the rule of law and addressing impunity, and reforming security forces.

3-3. Early prevention strategies should aim to strengthen civil society in high-risk states by supporting economic and legal empowerment, citizen groups, and a free and responsible media.

3-4. Funding for crisis prevention in countries at risk of genocide or mass atrocities should be expanded through a new genocide prevention initiative, funded through existing foreign assistance mechanisms.

3-5. The State Department and USAID should enhance coordination with international partners both in terms of policy and in-country implementation.

**Preventive Diplomacy: Halting and Reversing Escalation**

4-1. The new high-level interagency committee—the Atrocities Prevention Committee—should meet every other month (and as needed at other times) to review the status of countries of concern and coordinate preventive action.

4-2. The Atrocities Prevention Committee, working with NSC staff, should prepare interagency genocide prevention and response plans for high-risk situations.

4-3. The secretary of state should enhance the capacity of the U.S. government to engage in urgent preventive diplomatic action to forestall emerging crises.

4-4. Preventive diplomacy strategies should include the credible threat of coercive measures, should avoid an overly rigid “escalatory ladder,” and should not dismiss potential benefits of rewarding “bad people” for “good behavior.”

4-5. Preventive diplomacy strategies should engage international actors who have influence with potential perpetrators, be mindful of becoming hostage to peace negotiations related to a broader conflict, and maintain consistency in messages conveyed.

**Employing Military Options**

5-1. The secretary of defense and U.S. military leaders should develop military guidance on genocide prevention and response and incorporate it into Department of Defense (and interagency) policies,
plans, doctrine, training, and lessons learned.

5-2. The director of national intelligence and the secretary of defense should leverage military capacities for intelligence and early warning and strengthen links to political-military planning and decision making.

5-3. The Departments of Defense and State should work to enhance the capacity of the United Nations, as well as the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, and other regional and subregional bodies to employ military options to prevent and halt genocide and mass atrocities.

5-4. The Departments of Defense and State should work with NATO, the European Union, and capable individual governments to increase preparedness to reinforce or replace United Nations, African Union, or other peace operations to forestall mass atrocities.

5-5. The Departments of Defense and State should enhance the capacity of the United States and the United Nations to support a transition to long-term efforts to build peace and stability in the wake of genocidal violence.

International Action: Strengthening Norms and Institutions

6-1. The secretary of state should launch a major diplomatic initiative to create among like-minded governments, international organizations, and NGOs a formal network dedicated to the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities.

6-2. The secretary of state should undertake robust diplomatic efforts toward negotiating an agreement among the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council on non-use of the veto in cases concerning genocide or mass atrocities.

6-3. The State Department should support the efforts currently under way to elevate the priority of preventing genocide and mass atrocities at the United Nations.

6-4. The State Department, USAID, and Department of Defense should provide capacity-building assistance to international partners who are willing to take measures to prevent genocide and mass atrocities.

6-5. The secretary of state should reaffirm U.S. commitment to nonimpunity for perpetrators of genocide and mass atrocities.
APPENDIX A

TASK FORCE MEMBERS

Madeleine K. Albright

Co-Chair

Madeleine Albright is a principal of The Albright Group LLC, a global strategy firm, and chair and principal of Albright Capital Management LLC, an investment advisory firm focused on emerging markets. Dr. Albright was the sixty-fourth secretary of state of the United States. In 1997, she was named the first female secretary of state and became, at that time, the highest-ranking woman in the history of the U.S. government. As secretary of state, Dr. Albright reinforced America’s alliances, advocated democracy and human rights, and promoted American trade and business, labor, and environmental standards abroad. From 1993 to 1997, Dr. Albright served as the U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations and as a member of the president’s cabinet. She is the first Michael and Virginia Mortara Endowed Distinguished Professor in the Practice of Diplomacy at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. She chairs both the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and the Pew Global Attitudes Project and serves as president of the Truman Scholarship Foundation. Dr. Albright co-chairs the UNDP Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor and serves on the board of directors of the Council on Foreign Relations, the board of trustees for the Aspen Institute, and the board of directors of the Center for a New American Security. Dr. Albright earned a Bachelor of Arts with honors from Wellesley College and a Master degree and doctorate from Columbia University’s Department of Public Law and Government, as well as a certificate from its Russian Institute.
William S. Cohen  
Co-Chair

William Cohen is chairman and chief executive officer of The Cohen Group, a business consulting firm based in Washington, DC that provides business consulting and advice on tactical and strategic opportunities to clients in quickly changing markets around the world. He serves on the board of CBS and on the advisory boards of the U.S.-India Business Council, the U.S.-China Business Council, and Barrick Gold International. He is a senior counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the weekly world affairs contributor for CNN’s Situation Room with Wolf Blitzer. Secretary Cohen served as secretary of defense from 1997 to 2001, where he oversaw the largest organization in the United States with a budget of $300 billion and three million military and civilian personnel. Under his leadership, the U.S. military conducted operations on every continent, including the largest aerial bombardment (Kosovo and Bosnia) since World War II. His term as secretary of defense marked the first time in modern U.S. history that a president chose an elected official from the other party for his cabinet. Before his tenure at the Department of Defense, he served three terms in the U.S. Senate and three terms in the U.S. House of Representatives, where he served on the House Judiciary Committee during the 1974 impeachment proceedings and the 1987 Iran-Contra Committee. He also served as mayor of Bangor, Maine. Secretary Cohen was born in Bangor and received a Bachelor of Arts in Latin from Bowdoin College and a law degree from Boston University Law School. He has written or coauthored ten books: four nonfiction works, four novels, and two books of poetry.

John Danforth

Former U.S. Senator John Danforth is a partner with the law firm of Bryan Cave LLP. In 2004, Danforth represented the United States as ambassador to the United Nations, where he focused on ending the North-South civil war in Sudan, a twenty-year conflict that killed two million people and displaced five million more. A peace agreement between the two sides was ultimately signed in Nairobi, Kenya on January 9, 2005. President George W. Bush appointed Danforth as special envoy to Sudan in 2001. Danforth represented the State of Missouri in the U.S. Senate for eighteen years until he retired at the end of 1994. Danforth began his political career in 1968,
when he was elected attorney general of Missouri, his first race for public office. He was reelected to the post in 1972. He was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1976 and reelected in 1982 and 1988. Currently, Danforth is chairman of the Danforth Foundation, a philanthropic organization focused on strengthening the St. Louis metropolitan area. Additionally, Danforth serves on the boards of Cerner Corporation and Greenhill and Company. He has authored two books: *Resurrection* and *Faith and Politics*. Danforth graduated with honors from Princeton University in 1958. In 1963, he received a Bachelor of Divinity degree from Yale Divinity School and a Bachelor of Laws degree from Yale Law School. Before seeking public office, Danforth practiced law in New York City and St. Louis.

**Thomas Daschle**

Born in Aberdeen, South Dakota, Tom Daschle graduated from South Dakota State University in 1969. Upon graduation, he entered the United States Air Force, where he served as an intelligence officer in the Strategic Air Command until mid-1972. After serving on the staff of Senator James Abourezk, Daschle was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1978, serving eight years. In 1986, he was elected to the U.S. Senate. In 1994, Senator Daschle was elected by his colleagues as their Democratic leader. Senator Daschle is one of the longest-serving Senate Democratic leaders in history and the only one to serve twice as both majority and minority leader. Today, Senator Daschle is an advisor to the law firm of Alston & Bird, where he provides strategic advice on public policy issues such as climate change, energy, health care, trade, financial services, and telecommunications. He is also a distinguished fellow at the Center for American Progress, a visiting professor at Georgetown University, and a public speaker. In 2007, he joined with former majority leaders George Mitchell, Bob Dole, and Howard Baker to create the Bipartisan Policy Center. He is also co-chair of the ONE Vote ’08 Campaign, along with former Senate majority leader Bill Frist. Senator Daschle has published articles in numerous newspapers and periodicals and is the author of two books, *Critical: What We Can Do About the Health-Care Crisis* and *Like No Other Time*. He also serves on the boards of multiple foundations and businesses. He is married to Linda Hall Daschle and has three children and four grandchildren.
Stuart Eizenstat

Stuart Eizenstat is a partner at Covington and Burling LLP, where he heads the firm’s international practice. During a decade and a half of public service in three U.S. administrations, Ambassador Eizenstat held a number of key senior positions, including chief White House domestic policy advisor to President Jimmy Carter (1977–81), ambassador to the European Union, under secretary of commerce for international trade, under secretary of state for economic, business, and agricultural affairs, and deputy secretary of the Treasury in the Clinton Administration (1993–2001). During the Clinton Administration, he had a prominent role in the development of a number of key international initiatives. Much of the interest in providing belated justice for victims of the Holocaust and other victims of Nazi tyranny during World War II was the result of his leadership as special representative of the president and secretary of state on Holocaust-era issues. He successfully negotiated major agreements with Switzerland, Germany, Austria, France, and other European countries covering restitution of property, payment for slave and forced laborers, recovery of looted art, bank accounts, and payment of insurance policies. Ambassador Eizenstat has received seven honorary doctorates from universities and academic institutions. He has been awarded high civilian awards from the governments of France (Legion of Honor), Germany, and Austria, as well as from Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, and Secretary of the Treasury Lawrence Summers. He is a Phi Beta Kappa, cum laude graduate of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and a graduate of Harvard Law School.

Michael Gerson

Michael Gerson is the Roger Hertog Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. His work focuses on issues of global health and development, religion and foreign policy, and the democracy agenda. He is the author of Heroic Conservatism (HarperOne, October 2007), a columnist syndicated with the Washington Post Writers Group, and a contributor to Newsweek. He serves on the United States Holocaust Memorial Council, the Holocaust Memorial Museum’s Committee on Conscience, and USAID’s Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid. Before joining the Council on Foreign Relations in July 2006, Mr. Gerson was a top aide
to President George W. Bush as assistant to the president for policy and strategic planning (February 2005 to June 2006). Prior to that appointment, he served in the White House as deputy assistant to the president and director of presidential speechwriting (January 2001 to July 2002) and assistant to the president for speechwriting and policy advisor (July 2002 to February 2005). Mr. Gerson joined Bush’s presidential campaign in early 1999 as chief speechwriter and senior policy advisor. He was previously senior editor covering politics at *U.S. News and World Report*. Mr. Gerson was a speechwriter and policy advisor for Jack Kemp and a speechwriter for Bob Dole during the 1996 presidential campaign. He has also served Senator Dan Coats from Indiana as policy director. Mr. Gerson is a graduate of Wheaton College in Illinois. He grew up in the St. Louis area and now lives with his wife and sons in northern Virginia.

**Dan Glickman**

Dan Glickman is chairman and chief executive officer of the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) Inc. Prior to joining the MPAA, Mr. Glickman was the director of the Institute of Politics at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government (August 2002–August 2004). Mr. Glickman served as the U.S. secretary of agriculture from March 1995 until January 2001. Before his appointment as secretary of agriculture, Mr. Glickman served for eighteen years in the U.S. House of Representatives, representing Kansas’s fourth congressional district. During that time, he served as a member of the House Agriculture Committee and was also an active member of the House Judiciary Committee. Before his election to Congress in 1976, Mr. Glickman served as a member and president of the Wichita, Kansas school board; was a partner in the law firm of Sargent, Klenda, and Glickman; and worked as a trial attorney at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Secretary Glickman serves on the board of directors of the Faith and Politics Institute, Food Research and Action Center, Friends of the World Food Program, and RFK Memorial Foundation. He received his Bachelor of Arts in history from the University of Michigan and his Doctor of Law degree from The George Washington University. He has been a senior fellow and part-time instructor in the public policy departments at Georgetown University and Wichita State University, and in 2006 received an honorary Doctor of Laws from The George Washington University Law School.
Jack Kemp

Jack Kemp is founder and chairman of Kemp Partners. From 1993 to 2004, he served as codirector of the public policy institute Empower America, which he founded with former secretary of education Bill Bennett and former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick. Both in and out of public office, Jack Kemp has been a major contributor in nurturing democratic capitalism, not only in the United States, but throughout the world. Mr. Kemp, who ran for president in 1988, gained further prominence in the national spotlight in 1996, when he was selected to be the Republican Party’s candidate for vice president of the United States. Prior to cofounding Empower America, Mr. Kemp served four years as secretary of housing and urban development under President George H.W. Bush and proved to be one of our nation’s most innovative leaders in that role. Before his appointment to the cabinet, Mr. Kemp represented the Buffalo area and western New York for eighteen years in the U.S. House of Representatives. Mr. Kemp serves on a number of corporate boards and travels extensively in the United States and around the world for lectures as well as business. He is a nationally syndicated columnist focusing on economic issues and trade and foreign policy, while also appearing on a variety of political talk shows. He was also the chair for Habitat for Humanity’s More than Houses campaign and serves as a board member for Howard University as well as for the schools of public policy at Pepperdine and UCLA.

Gabrielle Kirk McDonald

Gabrielle Kirk McDonald currently serves as a judge with the Iran–United States Claims Tribunal in The Hague, The Netherlands. This is Judge McDonald’s second assignment in The Hague. Her first was with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia as one of the original judges elected by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1993. She presided over the first trial and in 1997 she was elected president of the tribunal. From 1979 to 1988, she served as a judge in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. She is a member of the bars of New York and Texas. Judge McDonald began her legal career as a staff attorney with the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund in New York City and continued as a civil rights attorney with firms in Texas. Besides having taught law at several law schools in the United States, Judge
McDonald has written many articles and edited a book on international criminal law. She is also a frequent lecturer on the work of international criminal tribunals and a business and human rights consultant. Judge McDonald has received numerous awards and honors in recognition of her achievements. A member of the board of trustees of Howard University, she has also served on the executive board of the American Bar Association Center for Human Rights and on the board of directors of the American Arbitration Association. Judge McDonald attended Hunter College and Boston University and is a graduate of Howard University School of Law, first in her class.

**Thomas R. Pickering**

Thomas R. Pickering is a former U.S. under secretary of state and ambassador and is currently vice chairman at Hills & Company. Before joining Hills & Company, Ambassador Pickering was senior vice president for international relations at the Boeing Company. Ambassador Pickering held the personal rank of career ambassador, the highest in the U.S. foreign service. He has served as U.S. ambassador to the Russian Federation, India, Israel, El Salvador, Nigeria, and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. From 1989 to 1993, he served as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. His service in the U.S. government began in 1956 in the U.S. Navy. On active duty until 1959, he later served in the Naval Reserve to the grade of lieutenant commander. Between 1959 and 1961, he served in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the State Department and in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Ambassador Pickering received a Bachelor’s degree, cum laude, with high honors in history, from Bowdoin College in 1953. In 1954, he received a Master’s degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He was awarded a Fulbright Scholarship to the University of Melbourne in Australia and received a second Master’s degree in 1956. In 1984, he was awarded an honorary Doctor of Laws degree from Bowdoin College and has received similar honors from twelve other universities.
**Julia Taft**  
*1942–2008*

Julia Taft, a leading authority on humanitarian and international development issues, held senior positions in both government and the private sector throughout her career. During 2006, she served as interim president and chief executive officer of InterAction, a coalition of more than 160 U.S.-based private voluntary organizations working on development, refugee assistance, and humanitarian relief. From 2001 to 2004, Ms. Taft was the assistant administrator and director in the UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, which addresses issues of crisis prevention, postconflict recovery, institution building, and natural disaster mitigation. In January 2002, she headed the UN Task Force coordinating and formulating a single, coherent recovery effort for Afghanistan in support of the work of the special representative of the United Nations secretary general for Afghanistan. She led similar efforts for Iraq, Haiti, and Liberia. Prior to joining UNDP, Ms. Taft served as assistant secretary of the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration at the U.S. State Department from 1997 to 2001. She was president and chief executive officer of InterAction from 1993 to 1997. She also served as director of USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance. Ms. Taft received several awards, including a White House Fellowship (1970), One of the Ten Most Outstanding Men and Women in Federal Service (1976), the Presidential End Hunger Award (1989), the USAID Distinguished Service Award (1989), and the USSR Award for Personal Courage for her relief efforts in the Armenian earthquake (1990). Ms. Taft is survived by her husband, William Taft IV, and three adult children.

**Vin Weber**

Vin Weber is managing partner of Clark & Weinstock’s Washington office and is also chairman of the National Endowment for Democracy, a private, nonprofit organization designed to strengthen democratic institutions around the world through non-governmental efforts. He is a senior fellow at the Humphrey Institute at the University of Minnesota, where he is codirector of the Policy Forum (formerly the Mondale Forum). Mr. Weber is a board member of several private sector and nonprofit organizations, including ITT Educational Services, Department 56, and the Aspen Institute. He also serves on the board of the Council on Foreign Relations.
and co-chaired a major independent task force on U.S. Policy Toward Reform in the Arab World with former U.S. secretary of state Madeleine Albright. In addition, Mr. Weber is a member of the U.S. secretary of energy’s advisory board. Prior to opening Clark & Weinstock’s Washington office in 1994, Mr. Weber was president—and codirector with Jack Kemp, Jeane Kirkpatrick, and Bill Bennett—of Empower America, a public policy advocacy group. Mr. Weber served in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1981 to 1993, representing Minnesota’s second congressional district. He was a member of the Appropriations Committee and an elected member of the House Republican leadership. Prior to his congressional service, he served as campaign manager and chief Minnesota aide to Senator Rudy Boschwitz (1978–1980) and as the copublisher of The Murray County Herald (1976–1978).

Anthony Zinni

General Anthony Zinni, USMC (Ret.) is executive vice president of DynCorp International Inc. General Zinni retired from the U.S. Marine Corps in 2000 after thirty-nine years of service. He served as commanding general, First Marine Expeditionary Force, from 1994 to 1996, and as commander-in-chief, U.S. Central Command, from 1997 to 2000. Over his career, General Zinni’s military service took him to over seventy countries and included deployments to the Mediterranean, the Caribbean, the Western Pacific, Northern Europe, and Korea. He also participated in numerous humanitarian operations. General Zinni holds twenty-three personal military awards and thirty-seven unit, service, and campaign awards. In November 2001, General Zinni was appointed senior adviser and U.S. envoy to the Middle East. He has also participated in presidential diplomatic missions to Somalia, Pakistan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, and State Department missions involving conflicts in Indonesia and the Philippines. General Zinni serves on the boards of several corporations, universities, and other organizations. He holds a Bachelor’s degree in economics from Villanova University and Master’s degrees in international relations from Central Michigan University and Salve Regina University. General Zinni has written numerous articles, op-ed pieces, and monographs. He has also coauthored a New York Times Bestseller book on his career with Tom Clancy entitled Battle Ready and a foreign policy book entitled The Battle For Peace that was also a New York Times Bestseller and a Foreign Affairs Bestseller.
APPENDIX B

EXPERT GROUP MEMBERS*

* To ensure independence, no current U.S. government officials were invited to join the Expert Groups. Titles and affiliations, current at the time of participation in this project, are listed for information only. All Expert Group members served in their personal capacities.
Early Prevention: Engaging Before the Crisis

Lead: J Alexander Thier, Senior Advisor, Rule of Law Program, United States Institute of Peace
Nina Bang-Jensen, Consultant
Lorne W. Craner, President, International Republican Institute
Colonel (ret.) Thomas A. Dempsey, Professor of Security Sector Reform, U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, U.S. Army War College
Michael A. McFaul, Director, Center on Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University
James C. O’Brien, Principal, The Albright Group LLC
Stewart M. Patrick, Senior Fellow and Director, Program on International Institutions and Global Governance, Council on Foreign Relations
E. Allan Wendt, former U.S. Ambassador
Jennifer L. Windsor, Executive Director, Freedom House
Kenneth D. Wollack, President, National Democratic Institute
Howard Wolpe, Director, Africa Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Preventive Diplomacy: Halting and Reversing Escalation

Lead: Paul B. Stares, General John W. Vessey Senior Fellow for Conflict Prevention and Director, Center for Preventive Action, Council on Foreign Relations
Kenneth H. Bacon, President, Refugees International
James Dobbins, Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, National Security Research Division, RAND
Bruce W. Jentleson, Professor of Public Policy Studies and Political Science, Duke University
Princeton N. Lyman, former U.S. Ambassador; current Adjunct Senior Fellow for Africa Policy Studies, Council on Foreign Relations
Andrew S. Natsios, Distinguished Professor in Practice of Diplomacy, Mortara Center for International Studies, Georgetown University
Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Senior Fellow and Adjunct Lecturer, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
James A. Schear, Director of Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University
Walter B. Slocombe, Member, Caplin & Drysdale
Nancy E. Soderberg, Distinguished Visiting Scholar and Director, Public Policy Initiatives, University of Northern Florida

**Employing Military Options**

*Lead:* Victoria K. Holt, Senior Associate, Henry L. Stimson Center
Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Michael F. Bailey, Director, Post-Conflict Operations, RONCO Consulting Corporation
Colonel (ret.) Joseph J. Collins, Professor of National Security Strategy, National War College
Colonel (ret.) William Flavin, Chief, Doctrine, Concepts, Training and Education Division, U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, U.S. Army War College
H. Allen Holmes, former U.S. Ambassador and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict
Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Michael A. Newton, Professor of the Practice of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School
Anne C. Richard, Vice President, Government Relations and Advocacy, International Rescue Committee
Sarah Sewall, Director, Carr Center for Human Rights Policy and Lecturer, Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Taylor B. Seybolt, Senior Program Officer, Grants and Fellowships Program, United States Institute of Peace
Howard Roy Williams, President and Chief Executive Officer, Center for Humanitarian Cooperation

**International Action: Strengthening Norms and Institutions**

*Lead:* Tod Lindberg, Research Fellow and Editor of Policy Review, Hoover Institution, Stanford University
Kenneth Anderson, Professor of Law and Director of the JD/MBA Dual Degree Program, Washington College of Law, American University
Christopher B. Burnham, Managing Director and Vice Chairman of Deutsche Asset Management, Deutsche Bank
Roberta Cohen, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, and Senior Adviser, Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, Brookings Institution
Ivo H. Daalder, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, and the Sydney Stein Jr. Chair, Brookings Institution
Nancy H. Ely-Raphel, former U.S. Ambassador
Bruce P. Jackson, Founder and President, Project on Transitional Democracies
Neil J. Kritz, Associate Vice President, Rule of Law Program, United States Institute of Peace
Elissa Massimino, Washington Director, Human Rights First
William G. O’Neill, Consultant
David J. Scheffer, Robert A. Helman Professor of Law and Director, Center for International Human Rights, Northwestern University
APPENDIX C

TASK FORCE STAFF

Executive Committee

Brandon Grove, Executive Director; President Emeritus, The American Academy of Diplomacy (AAD)
Ann-Louise Colgan, Project Manager
John Heffernan, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM)
Abiodun Williams, United States Institute of Peace (USIP)
Lawrence Woocher, USIP

Former Executive Committee Members

Jerry Fowler, formerly of USHMM
Scott Lasensky, USIP
Matthew Levinger, formerly of USHMM

Expert Group Leads

Victoria K. Holt
Tod Lindberg
Paul B. Stares
J Alexander Thier
Lawrence Woocher
Media/Outreach Teams
Tara Sonenshine, Strategic Advisor to the Task Force
Arthur Berger, USHMM
Jean Freedberg, USHMM
Richard Graves, USHMM
Laurie Schultz Heim, USIP
Anne Hingeley, USIP
Andrew Hollinger, USHMM
Ian Larsen, USIP
Yvonne Siu, AAD
Allison Sturma, USIP
Lauren Sucher, USIP

Editor/Publishing Consultant
Dan Snodderly

Program Assistants
Kelly Campbell, USIP
Nicholas Howenstein, USIP
Sara Weisman, USHMM

Research Assistants
Jamie Ekern
Craig Halbmaier
Molly Inman
Joshua G. Smith
APPENDIX D

LIST OF CONSULTATIONS*

**U.S. Government Officials**

Colonel John Agoglia, Director, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, U.S. Army War College

John H. (Jack) Andre II, ASEAN Cooperation Plan Coordinator, U.S. Department of State

Keith Bean, Political Officer, U.S. Embassy, Nairobi, Kenya

Stephen Beck, Legislative Assistant, Office of Representative Tom Tancredo (R-CO)

Howard L. Berman, Member of Congress (D-CA)

Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Bittrick, Deputy Director for Security Affairs, Office of Regional and Security Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Department of State

Donald E. Braum, Senior Adviser for Civilian-Military Engagement, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, U.S. Department of State

Caren Brown, Second Secretary, U.S. Embassy, Bujumbura, Burundi

Mark Clack, Senior Legislative Assistant, Office of Senator Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD)

Jared Cohen, Policy Planning Staff, U.S. Department of State

Cindy L. Courville, U.S. Ambassador to the African Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Cheryl L. Fernandes, First Secretary, Political Affairs Section, U.S. Embassy, Abuja, Nigeria

*Affiliations are current as of the time of consultation.*
Paul S. Foldi, Professional Staff Member, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Jendayi Frazer, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, U.S. Department of State
David F. Gordon, Director of Policy Planning, U.S. Department of State
Heloisa Griggs, Counsel, Office of Senator Richard J. Durbin (D-IL)
Tiffany Guarascio, Legislative Assistant, Office of Representative Frank Pallone (D-NJ)
Laura Hall, Civilian Response Operations, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, U.S. Department of State
John E. Herbst, Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, U.S. Department of State
Hans Hogrefe, Director, Congressional Human Rights Caucus
Kenneth L. Knight Jr., National Intelligence Officer for Warning, National Intelligence Council, Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Elizabeth Kvitashvili, Director, Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation; Deputy Assistant Administrator for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Agency for International Development
Mark Lagon, Ambassador-at-Large and Director of the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State
Chris J. Lamb, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University
Matthew Lavine, Special Assistant to the Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, U.S. Department of State
Lindsay Lee, Legislative Assistant, Office of Representative Joseph Knollenberg (R-MI)
Edward P. Levine, Senior Professional Staff Member, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Alexander H. Margulies, Chief, War Crimes, Atrocities, and Democracy Analysis Division, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State
Heather Merritt, First Secretary, Political Affairs Section, U.S. Embassy, Abuja, Nigeria
Patricia N. Moller, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy, Bujumbura, Burundi
Captain Barton A. Moore, Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa Military Liaison, U.S. Mission to the African Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
J. Scott Norwood, Deputy Director for Global Security Affairs, J-5, Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Department of Defense
Sean O’Brien, Program Manager, Information Processing Technology Office, Defense Advance Research Projects Agency
Donald M. Payne, Member of Congress (D-NJ)
Douglas C. Peifer, Department of Strategy, Air War College
Harry V. Phillips, Instructional Systems Specialist, U.S. Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership
Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Mike Pryce, Professor of Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Stability Operations Institute, U.S. Army War College
Michael E. Ranneberger, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy, Nairobi, Kenya
Grover Joseph Rees, Special Representative for Social Issues and Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, U.S. Department of State
Colonel Daniel S. Roper, Director, U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Larry Sampler, Deputy Coordinator for Conflict Prevention and Strategic Communications, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, U.S. Department of State
Kori Schake, Principal Deputy Director, Office of Policy Planning, U.S. Department of State
Gregory L. Schulte, Permanent Representative of the United States to the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations Office, Vienna, Austria
Margaret Schumacher, Legislative Assistant, Office of Representative Frank Pallone (D-NJ)
Milbert Shin, Deputy Director, Office of War Crimes Issues, U.S. Department of State
Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Mark Shrives, U.S. Advisor to ECOWAS, U.S. Embassy, Abuja, Nigeria
Jennifer J. Simon, Professional Staff Member, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Dwight Alan Smith, Assistant Mission Director, U.S. Agency for International Development, Nairobi, Kenya
Major Neil Smith, Operations Officer, U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Shannon Smith, Professional Staff Member, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Eythan Sontag, Active Response Corps Officer, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, U.S. Department of State
Sheryl A. Stumbras, Director, Democracy and Governance Office, U.S. Agency for International Development, Nairobi, Kenya
Marc J. Susser, Historian, U.S. Department of State
Nyree A. Tripttree, Human Rights Officer, U.S. Embassy, Abuja, Nigeria
Jose Urquilla, Legislative Correspondent, Office of Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS)
JoAnne Wagner, Counselor, U.S. Embassy, Bujumbura, Burundi
James B. Warlick, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, U.S. Department of State
Anthony Wier, Professional Staff Member, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Clint Williamson, Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, U.S. Department of State
Richard S. Williamson, President’s Special Envoy to Sudan
Frank R. Wolf, Member of Congress (R-VA)
Donald Yamamoto, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

International and Regional Organization Officials

Alice Ackerman, Senior Operational Advisor, Operations Service, Conflict Prevention Centre, OSCE Secretariat
Charles Addo-Richtor, Standby Force, ECOWAS
Babatunde Afolabi, Conflict Prevention Unit, ECOWAS
Cyriaque P. Agnekethom, Head of Division—Small Arms, ECOWAS
Remi Ajibewa, Principal Programme Officer, Political Affairs, ECOWAS
Lieutenant Colonel Nurudeen Kola Azeez, Military Adviser, African Union Peace Support Team, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Nick Birnback, Chief, Peacekeeping Public Affairs Unit, Office of the Under Secretary General, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Alhaji Bakary Bobbo, Principal Programme Officer, Observation and Monitoring Center, ECOWAS
Michael Brown, Information Communications Technology Adviser, African Union Peace Support Team, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Tanja Chopra, Program Coordinator, Justice for the Poor: Kenya, World Bank
Peter Kofi Dadzie, Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist, Peace Fund, ECOWAS
Colonel Nuno Pires da Silva, Senior Military Liaison Officer to the African Union, NATO
Colonel Charles Debrah, Training Officer, African Standby Force, AU
Jean de Dieu Somda, Vice President, ECOWAS
Joop de Haan, Operational Support Officer: Lessons Learned Program, Conflict Prevention Centre, OSCE Secretariat
Brigadier General Jaotody Jean de Matha, Head, Operations and Support Unit, Peace Support Operations Division, AU
Francis Deng, Special Adviser to the UN Secretary General on the Prevention of Genocide
Ismaël Diallo, Director, Human Rights and Justice Division, UN Integrated Office in Burundi
Captain Ibrahim Siratigui Diarra, Executive Assistant/Chef de Cabinet, ECOWAS
Bimbo Dyelohunnu, Trafficking in Persons Unit Coordinator, ECOWAS
Martin Erdmann, Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy, NATO
Michael Gaouette, Senior Political Affairs Officer, Africa Division, Office of Operations, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Anne-Marie Goetz, Chief Adviser of Governance, Peace, and Security, UN Development Fund for Women
Michele Griffin, Officer-in-Charge, Policy Planning Unit, UN Department of Political Affairs
Andrzej Grzelka, Logistics Operations Officer, African Union Peace Support Team, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Abdou Lat Gueye, Early Warning System, ECOWAS
David Haeri, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary General, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Abdel-Kader Haireche, Team Leader, African Union Peace Support Team, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Hussein Hassouna, Ambassador to the United States, League of Arab States
Aissatou Hayatou-Tall, Expert, AU Peace and Security Council Secretariat
Mohammed Ibrahim, Disaster and Risk Reduction, Department of Humanitarian and Social Affairs, ECOWAS
Florence Iheme, Early Warning Department, ECOWAS
Major General (ret.) Samaila Iliya, Consultant, Peace and Security Department, AU Capacity-Building Team
Francis James, Head of Justice Unit, Human Rights and Justice Division, UN Integrated Office in Burundi
Abdul Janha, Consultant, Peace and Security Department, AU Capacity-Building Team
Stephane Jean, Policy and Legal Affairs Officer, Police Division, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Gregory Jordan, Chief, Situation/Communications Room, Conflict Prevention Centre, OSCE Secretariat
Admore Mupoki Kambudzi, Secretary, AU Peace and Security Council
Paul Keating, Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Ben M. Kioko, Legal Counsel/Director, AU Office of Legal Council
Brigadier General Hassan Lai, Chief of Staff, Standby Force, ECOWAS
Edward C. Luck, Special Adviser to the UN Secretary General
Youssef Mahmoud, Executive Representative of the Secretary General for Burundi, UN Integrated Office in Burundi
Geofrey Mugumya, Director, AU Peace and Security Directorate
Abdel-Fatau Musah, Conflict Prevention Advisor, ECOWAS
Matildah Musumba, Regional National Officer, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UN, Naivasha, Kenya
Charles Mwaura, Expert, Conflict Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy, AU
Dante Negro, Director, Department of International Law, Secretariat for Legal Affairs, OAS
Brown Odigie, Research Officer, Peace Fund, ECOWAS
General (ret.) C. A. Okae, Director, Peacekeeping and Regional Security, ECOWAS
Kyoko Ono, Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Robert Orr, Assistant Secretary General for Policy Coordination and Strategic Planning, UN
Ian Parker, Integrated Training Service, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Stella Mystica Sabiiti, Consultant, Peace and Security Department, AU Capacity-Building Team
Colonel (ret.) Nicholas Seymour, Policy Advisor, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Amado Shour, Human Rights Consultant, AU
Colonel (ret.) Ian Sinclair, Office of Military Affairs, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Ekkehard Strauss, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN
Benetta J. Tarr, Research Fellow, King’s College, ECOWAS
Koen Vervaeke, European Union Special Representative, and Head of the European Commission Delegation to the African Union
El Ghassim Wane, Head, Conflict Management Centre, AU

**Foreign Government Officials**

Lieutenant Colonel Simon Bacon, British Military Liaison to ECOWAS, Embassy of the United Kingdom, Abuja, Nigeria
Colonel Saleh Bala, Military Assistant, Honorable Minister of Defense, Nigerian Ministry of Defense
Emma Davies, Head, War Crimes Section, International Organisations Department, United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Heidi Hulan, Minister-Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations
Colonel Nibizi Isaie, Director of Security Policy, Office of the Vice President, Bujumbura, Burundi
Arthur Kibbelaar, First Secretary, Royal Netherlands Embassy, Bujumbura, Burundi
Jean Marie Ngendahayo, Member of National Assembly, Bujumbura, Burundi
Wu Jin Paek, Conflict Prevention Unit–Early Warning, United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Babu Rahman, Senior Principal Research Officer, International Security and Global Issues Research Group, United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Mary Shockledge, Conflict Prevention Unit–Early Warning, United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Staffan Tillander, Ambassador, Embassy of Sweden, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Daniel Trup, United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Ying Yee, Conflict Prevention Team, Conflict Group, United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein, Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the United States
Independent Experts

Guy Abbate, Instructor, Peace Operations Program, Defense Institute for International Legal Studies
Gordon Adams, Distinguished Fellow, Henry L. Stimson Center
Bryan Ardouny, Executive Director, Armenian Assembly of America
Imam Muhammed Nurayn Ashafa, Founder and Coordinator of the Inter-Faith Mediation Centre/Muslim-Christian Dialogue Forum
Amjad Atallah, Senior Director of International Policy and Advocacy, Save Darfur Coalition
Leanne Bayer, Chief of Party, PADCO Burundi
Sam Bell, Director of Advocacy, Genocide Intervention Network
Kathy Bushkin Calvin, Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer, United Nations Foundation
Jarat Chopra, Consultant
Eric Cohen, Chairperson, Investors Against Genocide
Bridget Conley-Zilkic, Project Director, Committee on Conscience, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Colleen Connors, Chief Operating Officer, Save Darfur Coalition
Christian Davenport, Professor of Government and Politics, University of Maryland
Rachel Davis, Associate, International Peace Institute
Alison Des Forges, Senior Advisor, Africa Program, Human Rights Watch
Tracy Dexter, Country Manager, International Alert, Bujumbura, Burundi
Nick Donovan, Head of Campaigns, Policy and Research, Aegis Trust
William Durch, Senior Associate, Henry L. Stimson Center
Gareth Evans, President and Chief Executive Officer, International Crisis Group
Colonel (ret.) Karl Farris, U.S. Army
Colonel (ret.) Scott Feil, Executive Director, Program on the Role of American Military Power, Association of the United States Army
Lee Feinstein, Consultant
Jerry Fowler, President, Save Darfur Coalition
Richard Goldstone, Distinguished Visitor from the Judiciary, Georgetown University Law Center
Francois Grignon, Director, Africa Program, International Crisis Group
David Hamburg, President Emeritus, Carnegie Corporation of New York
Aram Hamparian, Executive Director, Armenian National Committee of America
Mark Hanis, Executive Director, Genocide Intervention Network
Chad Hazlett, Director of Protection Programs, Genocide Intervention Network
John Heidenrich, Senior National Security Analyst, Science Applications International Corporation
Jens-U Hettmann, Security Policy Projects Coordinator, West Africa, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
Ed Huffine, Vice President, International Development, Bode Technology
Bethuel Kiplagat, Concerned Citizens for Peace, Kenya
Stephen D. Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University
Alan J. Kuperman, Assistant Professor of Public Affairs, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas
Anthony Kuria, Director of Research, Kenya National Commission on Human Rights
George Kut, Program Coordinator, Capacities for Peace Programme, Nairobi Peace Initiative Africa
Ellen Laipson, President and Chief Executive Officer, Henry L. Stimson Center
Anthony Lake, Distinguished Professor in the Practice of Diplomacy, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Jonathan Ledgard, Africa Correspondent, The Economist, Nairobi, Kenya
René Lemarchand, Professor Emeritus, Department of Political Science, University of Florida
Peter Lewis, Director of African Studies Program, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University
Eric Lief, Senior Advisor, Henry L. Stimson Center
Elizabeth McClintock, Managing Partner, CM Partners, Bujumbura, Burundi
Sean McFate, Program Director, National Security Initiative, Bipartisan Policy Center
Carola McGiffert, Vice President and Chief of Staff, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Juan Méndez, President, International Center for Transitional Justice
Abdinoor Mohammed, Manager, Stadium IDP Camp, Kenya Red Cross, Naivasha, Kenya
Anthony Muchiri, Manager, Kedong IDP Camp, Kenya Red Cross, Naivasha, Kenya

Innocent Muhozi, Director, Radio/Television Renaissance, Bujumbura, Burundi

Susan Myers, Executive Director, New York Office, United Nations Foundation

Jeffrey “Jeb” Nadaner, Lockheed Martin Corporation

Kate Nahapetian, Government Affairs Director, Armenian National Committee of America

Dorothy Ndung’u, Coordinator, Research, Learning, and Policy Programme, Nairobi Peace Initiative Africa

Willy Nindorera, Independent Researcher

David Niyonzima, Director, Trauma Healing and Reconciliation Services, Bujumbura, Burundi

Fabien Nsengimana, Director of Programs, Burundi Leadership Training Program, Bujumbura, Burundi

Godwin Odo, Program Officer, Abuja Office, The Macarthur Foundation

Diane Orentlicher, Special Counsel, Open Society Justice Initiative

Samantha Power, Anna Lindh Professor of Practice of Global Leadership and Public Policy, Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

John Prendergast, Co-Chair, ENOUGH Project

Eric P. Schwartz, Executive Director, Connect U.S.

Isaac Shapiro, Senior Advisor, Save Darfur Coalition

Hugo Slim, Director, Corporates for Crisis

Gayle Smith, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress

Gregory H. Stanton, President, Genocide Watch

Scott Straus, Associate Professor, Political Science and International Studies, University of Wisconsin–Madison

Allyson Stroschein, Policy Director, Impact ’08, Center for U.S. Global Engagement

General (ret.) Lazaro Sumbeiywo, Chair, Concerned Citizens for Peace, Kenya

Sean Turnell, Visiting Fellow, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University

J. Matthew Vaccaro, Program Director, Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies, Naval Postgraduate School

Ross Vartian, Executive Director, U.S.-Armenia Public Affairs Committee

Elon Weinstein, President, International Sustainable Systems

Roger Winter, Consultant
Timothy E. Wirth, President, United Nations Foundation and Better World Fund
Pastor James Wuye, Founder and Coordinator of the Inter-Faith Mediation Centre/Muslim-Christian Dialogue Forum
Micah Zenko, Senior Research Associate, Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

Others consulted but not listed by name:
Additional professional staff and officers with the ECOWAS Standby Force Task Force
Internally displaced persons in Naivasha, Kenya
Refugees and internally displaced persons in Bujumbura Rural Province, Burundi

Task Force Experts also benefited from participation in the following conferences:
Auschwitz Institute for Peace and Reconciliation’s Raphael Lemkin Seminar Series on Genocide Prevention: Inaugural Session, May 2008
Columbia University’s Center for International Conflict Resolution and George Mason University’s Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution: Engaging Governments in Genocide Prevention, May 2008 and October 2007
United States Institute of Peace Seminar: Religion and Genocide Prevention, April 2008
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law/Yeshiva University Conference: R2P: The Responsibility to Protect: A Framework for Confronting Identity-Based Atrocities, March 2008
Madariaga European Foundation Panel Discussion: Preventing Genocide and Mass Atrocities: Our Responsibility to Prevent, March 2008

United States Institute of Peace: Non-Governmental Support for the Early Warning Function of the Special Adviser to the UN Secretary General on the Prevention of Genocide, March 2008

Center for International Human Rights, Northwestern University School of Law: Responsibility to Protect and the International Criminal Court: America’s New Priorities, December 2007

Global Futures Forum: Conference on Genocide Prevention, October 2007

Global Peace Operations Initiative: G8++ Global Clearinghouse Conference, October 2007


APPENDIX E

PLENARY SESSIONS

The Genocide Prevention Task Force officially convened in plenary session on the following dates:

December 13, 2007
May 7, 2008
September 8, 2008
APPENDIX F

ACRONYMS

AAD  The American Academy of Diplomacy
AFRICOM  Africa Command, United States Department of Defense
APC  Atrocities Prevention Committee
ASEAN  Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU  African Union
AWL  Atrocities Watchlist, United States National Intelligence Council
BLTP  Burundi Leadership Training Program
CMM  Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, United States Agency for International Development
DDR  Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DNI  Director of National Intelligence, United States
DPKO  Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations
DRL  Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, United States Department of State
ECOWAS  Economic Community of West African States
EU  European Union
FSI  Foreign Service Institute, United States Department of State
FSO  Foreign Service Officer
G-8  Group of Eight (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, United States)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFI</td>
<td>International Financial Institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMET</td>
<td>International Military Education and Training Program, United States Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INR</td>
<td>Bureau of Intelligence and Research, United States Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNE</td>
<td>Multinational Experiments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>Noncombatant Evacuation Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIA</td>
<td>National Intelligence Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIC</td>
<td>National Intelligence Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIE</td>
<td>National Intelligence Estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIPF</td>
<td>National Intelligence Priorities Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRF</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization Response Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSPD</td>
<td>National Security Presidential Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTI</td>
<td>Office of Transition Initiatives, United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-5</td>
<td>Permanent five members of the United Nations Security Council (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PITF</td>
<td>Political Instability Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Defense Review, United States Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/CRS</td>
<td>Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, United States Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>German Schutzstaffel (Protective Squadron)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSTR</td>
<td>Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STANAG</td>
<td>Standardization Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/WCI</td>
<td>Office of War Crimes Issues, United States Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USHMM</td>
<td>United States Holocaust Memorial Museum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USIP</td>
<td>United States Institute of Peace</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Genocide Prevention Task Force was convened by the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, The American Academy of Diplomacy, and the United States Institute of Peace to generate practical recommendations to enhance the U.S. government’s capacity to respond to emerging threats of genocide and mass atrocities.

“The world agrees that genocide is unacceptable and yet genocide and mass killings continue. We have a duty to find the answer before the vow of ‘never again’ is once again betrayed.”

—MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT AND WILLIAM S. COHEN

The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, a living memorial to the Holocaust, was created to inspire leaders and citizens to confront hatred, prevent genocide, promote human dignity and strengthen democracy. Federal support guarantees the Museum’s permanence, and donors nationwide make possible its educational activities and global outreach.

The American Academy of Diplomacy is dedicated to strengthening the resources and tools America brings to managing its diplomatic challenges, and accomplishes this through outreach programs, lectures, awards, and writing competitions. In doing so, the Academy promotes an understanding of the importance of diplomacy to serving our nation and enhancing America’s standing in the world.

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan, national institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, promote post-conflict stability and development, and increase peacebuilding capacity, tools, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by directly engaging in peacebuilding efforts around the globe.

To download the complete Task Force report visit:
www.ushmm.org • www.academyofdiplomacy.org • www.usip.org