Raiding the Future – Impacts of Violent Livestock Theft on Development and an Evaluation of Conflict Mitigation Approaches in Northwestern Kenya

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Abstract

Violent livestock theft has a long history in northwestern Kenya. Yet, in the recent past socio-economic developments in combination with more frequent and prolonged droughts and the availability of small arms have turned raiding into a more frequent, violent and destructive activity. In our case study we analyze the raiding between the Turkana and the Pokot of northwestern Kenya. We identify the key conflict actors and factors, and describe how the dynamics of raiding pose an obstacle to development in the region. In a second step we evaluate three approaches of conflict mitigation: peace meetings, disarmament, and the facilitation of livestock movement.

Our analysis is based on extensive field research conducted in 2011. We interviewed the relevant conflict parties, including community members (raiders, pastoralists, elders, chiefs, women) as well as governmental and non-governmental representatives. Further, we draw on insights from the Security in Mobility (SIM) initiative and the European Instrument for Democracy & Human Rights (EIDHR) project.

Our preliminary findings suggest that the increasingly violent raiding activities between the Turkana and Pokot create an omnipresent perception of insecurity in both communities. This results in inefficient utilization of resources (pasture, markets, infrastructure) which poses a significant obstacle for development. While governmental disarmament campaigns have aggravated power disequilibria among conflict parties, facilitating of safe livestock movement and inter-communal peace meetings show signs of progress. However peace meetings need to further integrate the actual conflict actors instead of focusing exclusively on elders and governmental officials. Overall we try to illustrate the complexity of conflict causes and actors which calls for a more holistic approach of conflict management and mitigation.

Keywords: raiding, conflict, development, pastoralism, Kenya

1. Introduction

Conflict is not a new phenomenon in arid Northwest Kenya. For centuries pastoralist communities have periodically used violence to access land, water and to steal livestock from neighboring groups (Eaton 2008b). Yet, in the recent decades the cultural practice of livestock theft has experienced significant changes which in combination with the availability of small arms and the effects of extended droughts made raiding more frequent, violent and destructive (GoK 2008; Mkutu 2008; UNDP 2011; UNOCHA 2011; Schilling 2012; Schilling et al. 2012a; Schilling et al. 2012b). In our case study we take a closer look at the “conflict hotspot” (Locham 2011a) between the Turkana and the Pokot. We first analyze the key developments, actors and factors driving the conflict (section 2). Then we discuss the following questions:

1. What effects does the conflict have on development?
2. How successful are the conflict mitigation approaches?

For the first question, we mainly focus on the effects on resource utilization. To answer the second question we analyze and evaluate three different types of conflict mitigation approaches: peace meetings facilitated by international and local non-governmental organization, government disarmament campaigns, and the facilitation of livestock movement within the Security in Mobility (SIM) initiative of a group of international organizations (section 4). In the
last section of the case study we confront the findings of our factor-actor analysis with the results of the conflict mitigation approaches to draw conclusions for lessons learned and to point to some critical questions relevant for further studies.

Our analysis is based on research conducted in March and from September to December 2011 in the research area (see figure 1). We used semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions to interview 166 persons, including community members (raiders, pastoralists, elders, chiefs, women) as well as representatives of governmental and non-governmental organizations. Further, we analyzed conflict data and drew on insights from the SIM initiative and the European Instrument for Democracy & Human Rights (EIDHR) project which financed the peace meetings.

2. Background of the Conflict
This section introduces the conflict area, describes recent trends and developments, and discusses the role of key conflict actors and factors.

Conflict Area

The conflicts take place in an area of Northwest Kenya which encompasses parts of two counties: the southern tip of Turkana and the northern tip of West Pokot (figure 1). The two counties show significant differences in their level of development, climatic conditions and livelihood bases.
With a size of 77,000 square kilometers, a per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 171 USD (UNDP 2006) and a Human Development Index (HDI) of 0.333 (UNDP 2010), Turkana is the largest but also poorest and least developed county in Kenya. Most of the 855,000 people living in Turkana are pastoralists whose lifestyle of moving with livestock (cattle, goats, sheep and camels) is well adapted to the harsh climatic conditions (McCabe 1990; GoK 2008, 2009). A temperature range of 24°C to 38°C (mean 30°C) and low annual precipitation levels (about 120 mm in the central plains around Lodwar) result in a mostly arid to partly semi arid climate and a landscape characterized by shrubland, savanna and desert. Most of the erratic and unreliable rainfall is received between March and May (long rains) and between October and December (short rains). Besides the major rivers Turkwel and Kerio, Lake Turkana is the only significant and permanent source of water (GoK 2008). In addition to the limited and strongly varying resource basis, Turkana has experienced significant political marginalization which has led to a
lack of basic services such as education, road infrastructure and health services (GoK 2007; McSherry and Brass 2008).

West Pokot (population of 513,000 inhabitants, area of 9,100 square kilometers) on the other hand has a higher level of development with a per capita GDP of 289 USD (UNDP 2006) and a HDI of 0.4655 (UNDP 2010). The climatic conditions (up to 1,600 mm annual rainfall in the highlands and lower temperatures) allow for crop farming (GoK 2005). However, in the research area pastoralism prevails which is only opportunistically supplemented by subsistence farming (Oesterle 2008; 2011 and interviews with Pokot pastoralists). At the time of the interviews (September to November) the research area in West Pokot had received significant rainfall while the long rains in Turkana had completely failed. Consequently, the Pokot side was rich in pasture, water and animals while the communities on the Turkana side relied almost entirely on food aid as they had lost most of their livestock during the extended dry period (Apeangolemuk 2011; Idomo 2011, and figure 2; Lowoton 2011; Totoo 2011). Illustrating the dependence on external help, one pastoralist warned: “if the NGOs go, people die” (Losuriu 2011).

Figure 2 Livestock at a watering point near Alale, West Pokot (left) and distribution of relief food in Lokiriama, Turkana (right) (Own pictures)

Although livestock numbers for Turkana and Pokot are highly unreliable as the last census was done in 1987 (Ajele 2011), the government organization CEWARN (Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism) reports that between 2006 and 2009 the region experienced a net loss of livestock of more than 90,000 due to raiding alone (CEWARN 2010).

Trends and Developments

Over the past two centuries livestock raiding in Northwest Kenya has seen highly peaceful periods (1929 to 1953) and periods of violence (1954 to 1992) (Eaton 2008b). In 2000 CEWARN and the nongovernmental organization TUPADO (Turkana Pastoralist Organisation) started to collect data on raiding which enables us to quantitatively verify qualitative statements on recent developments (Ekal 2011). The data shows that livestock raiding is a frequent and deadly activity. On average 71 raids were recorded per year (six raids per month) between 2006 and 2009 in Turkana alone (TUPADO 2011). In 2006, 139 people died in raids while 27 were injured. These numbers increased to 190 and respectively 80 in 2009 (ibid.). Figure 3 shows the

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1 In 2007 the government of Kenya has acknowledged its failure in a policy on Arid and Semi Arid Lands (ASAL): “Previous policies aimed at revitalising ASALs were drafted with a degree of bias against pastoralism as a viable sustainable way of life. Emphasis was put on sendentarization of nomadic pastoralists with a strong focus toward crop farming. Because such policies were mainly top-down, discriminative and unconsultative, they often failed” (GoK 2007b:ii).
number of raids and raid related deaths between 2006 and 2009 for Turkana and Pokot. An increase in both numbers can be noted since 2007.

Figure 3 Number of raids and raid-related deaths in Turkana and Pokot between 2006 and 2009 (Own representation based on CEWARN 2010)

Based on the conducted interviews with community members in Turkana and West Pokot, three types of raids can be identified according to their number of participating raiders (see also Schilling et al. 2012b). First, highly organized “mass raid” in which several hundreds to even thousands of raiders “come from all over Turkana” (Raider T1 2011) to attack a whole community in a neighboring county. Second, in “Adakar” raids several dozens and occasionally up to a few hundred raiders from near-by villages come together to raid one village or graal (a place where animals are kept at night) of a rivaling community. The third type of raids is the smallest with mostly a hand full to rarely more than 15 participating raiders. The targets of these raids are usually small, unprotected graals or a group of animals which is only accompanied by one pastoralist or herdsboy who is forced to drive the livestock to the host area of the raiders (Raider T2 2011). Once this area is reached, the hostage is usually released. Only few raiders stated that the hostage is killed afterwards (for example Raider P8 2011; Raider T3 2011). The interviews suggest a shift from mass and Adakar raids to smaller but more frequent raids (Cecilia 2011; Raider T5 2011). This perception is reflected in the data which shows a decreasing average number of raiders per raid (figure 4).

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2 Pokot refers to county West Pokot and the significantly smaller county of East Pokot.
3 All names of interviewed conflict actors (raiders, security personnel) have been made anonymous to obviate any consequences for the interviewees.
The shift from larger to smaller but more frequent raids may be explained by two reasons. One, as the communication infrastructure in the region is improving, mid- and larger sized raids rarely go unnoticed by the government authorities who then inform their counterparts in the area which is potentially targeted by the raid (Akeru 2011; Ivutu 2011; Oringano 2011). Smaller raids on the other hand require a shorter organization period and hence attract less attention. The second reason is likely to be related to the larger development of commercialization of raiding. Krätli and Swift define the commercialization as “an aspect of the wider integration of pastoralists within a market economy” (2003:8). Or simply speaking, the stolen livestock is sold for profit instead of kept for restocking. The question is: who and what is driving the described conflict developments. This question will be addressed in the following sections.

**Actors**

Almost sixty percent of all raids in Turkana county between 2006 and 2009 were conducted by the Pokot of Kenya and Uganda, followed by the Toposa of Sudan (11%) and the Dasenach of Ethiopia (9%) (TUPADO 2011). In the southern part of Turkana the Tepeth and Jie of Uganda also raid the Turkana on their own or in alliance with the Pokot (Lokuwam 2011a; Mukoo 2011; Raider T1 2011). The Turkana on the other side raid the Pokot in West Pokot and less often in Uganda. Occasionally, the Turkana form raiding alliances with the Matheniko of Uganda to attack the Pokot (Mukoo 2011). The conflict between the Turkana and the Pokot has been going on for so many decades that most interviewees were unable to remember when they last had peace with the other group (for example Lokuwam 2011b). Regardless of the group, the ones conducting the raids are predominantly male youth and younger men mostly below the age of 30 who have not received a formal education. All 21 interviewed raiders (nine in Turkana, twelve in Pokot) stated to own livestock and hence can be considered pastoralists. The raiders were asked to give their primary and secondary reason for engaging in raiding. In Turkana “hunger”, “drought” and “wealth” were the strongest motives while the Pokot named payment of dowry, wealth and the defending or expansion of territory (table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Motive</th>
<th>Hunger</th>
<th>Wealth</th>
<th>Dowry</th>
<th>Land</th>
<th>Drought</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkana</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pokot</td>
<td></td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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4 The number of interviewed raiders is too low to be representative for the counties. However, taking into account that raiders are a delicate group to interview, the results help to complete the picture drawn by the remaining interview and data analysis.
The role of elder, women and chiefs in raiding is ambivalent. In the short term the community usually gets a share of the acquired livestock, especially after a successful Adakar or mass raid (see previous section). In the long run however, the community suffers from the negative consequences of the conflict (see next section and Schilling et al. 2012b).

The findings on the role of the elders are particularly contrasting. On the one hand the majority of Turkana and Pokot raiders report that the elders encourage or even assist their raids with blessings and information (for example where to find the enemy’s livestock). Further, the raiders state that the elders receive a share of the livestock, sometimes even “the biggest bull” (Raider P3 2011). On the other hand, most elders claim to discourage the raiding. Yet, some acknowledged that they occasionally benefit from the raids or “they [the raiders] just go one their own” (Lokuwam 2011a). One focus group discussion with both raiders and elder in Lokiriama was instrumental to match these seemingly opposing views. During times of peace with the Pokot the elder discourage the youth to raid the Pokot while during times of conflict the elder hardly ever refuse a pre raid blessing. The interviews further suggest that the elder on the Turkana side have lost influence over the youth.5

On both sides, women are found to have an influence on the raiding activity of their men. They either encourage their men and prepare meals after a successful raid (for example Lokomar 2011) or they play a discouraging role for example by expressing their fear to loose their man (for example Lokuwam 2011b). The village chiefs are in a difficult position. On the one hand they are the representation of the national government on the ground and hence have to assist in the recovery of livestock stolen by members of their community and support national disarmament efforts (see section 4), on the other hand they understand the raiders and their community’s need for arms as a means of self protection (Akeru 2011; Ivutu 2011; Kaliamoi 2011). The major external actors are the national government, as well as several non-governmental organizations (NGOs) who’s objective it is to reduce the conflicts and to promote development (Kisiangani 2011; Locham 2011b; Mukoo 2011).6 Especially in Turkana, numerous local organizations such as TUPADO, Reconcile and Riam Riam as well as international ones such as Oxfam, International Rescue Committee UK, Red Cross and Practical Action are present. In the research area in Pokot the NGO engagement was found to be significantly smaller.

The only group profiting from the raiding on the short and long term, are the traders and business men who get access to inexpensive livestock which they can sell for a higher price in urban centers such as Lodwar, Nairobi or Moroto in Uganda (National Council of Churches of Kenya 2001; Eaton 2010; Naida 2011).

Factors

Scholars have come up with a variety of different key factors to explain the phenomenon of livestock raiding among pastoralists in Kenya. The spectrum ranges from poverty (Omolo 2010), payment of dowry and accumulation of general wealth (Bollig 1993; Hendrickson et al. 1998) to retaliation (Eaton 2008b), commercialization (Krätli et al. 2003; Buchanan-Smith and Lind 2005), tribal-based politics (McCabe 2004), the availability of small arms (Gray et al. 2003; Mkutu 2006) and climate change related (Campbell et al. 2009; Witsenburg and Adano 2009;

5 To what extent this decline in influence can be attributed to the general impoverishment of the Turkana community or to other cultural shift, is beyond the scope of this case study.

6 See also (Eaton 2008a).
Schilling et al. 2012a) and unrelated resource degradation (Meier et al. 2007). All studies acknowledge that the competition for resources in the form of water, pasture, land and livestock play a role in the conflicts in one way or another. In our study on the raiding between the Turkana and the Pokot we find the major conflict causes to be asymmetric. A connection between the accumulation of wealth and the commercialization of raids was more pronounced in the interviews with government officials (Akeru 2011; Ivutu 2011; Oringano 2011) and experts (Kimani 2011; Mukoo 2011; Tulel 2011) while raiders denied that they sell a large portion of the captured livestock. Likewise, several experts (among them Kimani 2011; Mukoo 2011; Tulel 2011) suggested that the expansion of Pokot territory into the plains of Turkana and vice versa is politically driven while few indications to support this notion were found during interviews with the communities. Regardless of the degree of political instrumentalization, the unclear demarcation of Pokot and Turkana and hence the motivation to redraw territorial boundaries can be considered a contributing conflict driver (table 1). Figure 5 attempts to give an overview of the described conflict factors and actors. In addition, mitigation instruments are shown which will be discussed further in section 4. In order to distinguish the links between actors and instruments, each actor has been assigned its own color (orange for national government, brown for local government, and so forth). The possible effects are shown in the legend on the lower right hand corner of the figure. Three types of effects are possible. A green arrow indicates an increasing or enforcing effect from an instrument or factor on another. It should be read as “if this factor increases, the dependent factor also increases”. For example if climate change intensifies, floods and droughts are also likely to increase (see factor column). A red arrow indicates a reversed sign between cause and effect. It should be read as “if this factor increases, the dependent factor decreases”. For example if floods and droughts increase, the resource basis will reduce. A third type of effect is represented by a black arrow which means that an effect is ambivalent or both enforcing and dampening at the same time or at different points in time. For example an ambivalent effect links

![Figure 5 Schematic overview of conflict factors, actors and mitigation instruments in Turkana and West Pokot (Own representation based on conducted interviews and data analysis) and actors. In addition, mitigation instruments are shown which will be discussed further in section 4. In order to distinguish the links between actors and instruments, each actor has been assigned its own color (orange for national government, brown for local government, and so forth). The possible effects are shown in the legend on the lower right hand corner of the figure. Three types of effects are possible. A green arrow indicates an increasing or enforcing effect from an instrument or factor on another. It should be read as “if this factor increases, the dependent factor also increases”. For example if climate change intensifies, floods and droughts are also likely to increase (see factor column). A red arrow indicates a reversed sign between cause and effect. It should be read as “if this factor increases, the dependent factor decreases”. For example if floods and droughts increase, the resource basis will reduce. A third type of effect is represented by a black arrow which means that an effect is ambivalent or both enforcing and dampening at the same time or at different points in time. For example an ambivalent effect links]
food aid and food security. On the one hand food aid improves food security in the short term (Bush 1995; del Ninno et al. 2007). On the other hand, food aid has the potential to undermine traditional mechanisms to cope with food shortages and hence contribute to food insecurity in the long term (Jayne et al. 2002).

3. Effects of Conflict on Development

The conflict between the Turkana and the Pokot has undermined trust and created an omnipresent perception of insecurity in both communities. In Lokiriama for example, one woman reported that even children have been killed by the Pokot at a nearby borehole (Lokuwam 2011b). A Turkana pastoralist expressed concerns to "perform a biological function" at night because he is afraid of "getting shot in the bush" (Ekutan 2011). The head teacher of the school in Lobei hoped that soon money would be available to fence off the school as Pokot have entered the school and scared students at daytime (Ekunoit 2011).

In Pokot, the village of Nauyapong has been abandoned due to insecurity caused by the Turkana. Only the school staff and the students remained who were constantly protected by the nearby military camp (Police officer 2011). In Lasak and Nauyapong (see figure 1), community members reported that the Turkana not only target livestock but have also started to steal maize and even beehives (Apiding 2011; Hapio 2011; Raider P1 2011).

In addition to the direct harms to the communities in the form of deaths and injuries, the perception of insecurity has led to inefficient utilization of resources (see also Schilling et al. 2012b). For instance, the area south of Loya, located in between the Turkana plains and the highlands of Pokot, was rich in pasture (left side of figure 6). Yet, neither of the two groups was accessing the area because of security concerns. Newly built markets for livestock trading remained unused, for example in Loya (right side of figure 6) or were not even officially opened like the one in Lokiriama because pastoralists were too afraid to take their livestock there (Ajele 2011; Chief inspector 2011; Naida 2011; Totoo 2011).

Another example is the road between Lokiriama and Lorengipi which was left uncompleted due to the high level of insecurity (Achuman 2011). Apart from the inefficient utilization of resources which hinders development, the conflict related lack of trust among the Turkana and Pokot has made common and peaceful resource sharing, for instance in the form of reciprocal grazing arrangements more difficult (Eriksen and Lind 2009, see also figure 5).

7 For the aspect of displacement see also UNOCHA (2011).
4. Conflict Mitigation Approaches

The previous sections have illustrated the negative effects of conflicts and hence the need to mitigate them. This section analyzes and evaluates three conflict mitigation approaches: peace meetings, disarmament, and facilitation of secure livestock movement.

Peace Meetings

Between October 2009 and September 2011 several peace meetings were organized by international and local NGOs (among them Practical Action, Reconcile, International Rescue Committee) under the European Instrument for Democracy & Human Rights (EIDHR) (Locham 2011a, b). The biggest meeting was the 38th Peace Accord held in Lokiriama on 21 September 2011 (figure 7).

An estimated seven hundred government representatives and community members of the Turkana and Pokot of Kenya, the Matheniko and Jiie of Uganda, the Topossa of Sudan and the Nyangatom of Ethiopia attended the Accord which was organized by a group of eleven local and international non-governmental organizations. The aim of the Accord was to “promote peace, human security and development in the region through the use of local peace initiatives by the communities in Karamoja cluster” (Practical Action 2011). Kenyan and Ugandan groups performed traditional dances and plays addressing issues of conflict, violence, raiding and marginalization, shared values and cooperation. These topics were further elaborated by the speeches of government officials. The most prominent speaker was former Kenyan president Daniel arap Moi. He stressed the need for cooperation between Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Sudan to contribute to peace and stability. The general atmosphere of the Peace Accords can be described as friendly and appreciative. The accord illustrates some general strength and weakness of peace meetings held between the Turkana and the Pokot. To facilitate meetings between conflict parties generally offers the opportunity to mitigate conflict through interaction and dialogue. At the Lokiriama accord however, no discussion was facilitated among the government representatives or participants. A second critical question is: who is attending the peace meeting. Smaller peace meetings are usually attended by the local chief or assistant chief and members of the peace committees which consist of elders or other respected members of each community (Archibo 2011; Lodea 2011; Sikirika 2011). One elder who is regularly called to the peace meetings, summarized the success of these “barasa”, in a few words “they don’t help”
(Sikirika 2011). He continued to explain "when the meeting is going on they [the Pokot] are there in the bush, when the meeting ends they start raiding people immediately". Similar statements were made by other attendees of peace meetings, for example by Lodea (2011) and Nangotot (2011). One reason for the limited success of the peace meetings between the Turkana and the Pokot could be that the actual persons committing and suffering most from the raids, the raiders themselves, do not attend the meetings (Archibo 2011; Lodea 2011; Raider P3 2011; Raider P4 2011; Sikirika 2011). Neither do women play a central role in the peace meetings. As one interviewee phrased it: "so far, the few women attending the meetings, only prepare tea for the men" (Tulel 2011).

Against this background, it seems recommendable to let elders and women facilitate the dialogue between community members and especially raiders. To minimize the raiders' fear of the punishment, the attendance of governmental representatives could be limited. This approach is promising to come to binding peace agreements which have the potential to stabilize relationships between groups as the peace agreement between the Turkana and the Matheniko has shown for almost 40 years (Lomor 2011; Sikirika 2011).

**Disarmament Campaigns**

There can be little doubt about that the availability of small firearms (predominantly AK47, G3 and Mac 4) has made the conflicts in northwestern Kenya more deadly (Gray et al. 2003; Mkutu 2006). The Ugandan and the Kenyan government have made numerous non-forceful (for example 2001 and 2009) and forceful (1984 and 2002) attempts to disarm the region (Knighton 2003; Mieth 2006; Eaton 2008b; Kaliamoi 2011; Longolol 2011; United States Department of State 2011). As the disarmament campaigns of the 20th century were unsuccessful in the best case and causing massacres in the worst case (Wepundi et al. 2011), the government of Kenya established the Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons in 2003 to improve the coordination of disarmament operations (GoK 2011). The most recent disarmament campaign Dumisha Amani II ("sustain peace") in northwestern Kenya started with a voluntary phase in February 2010 which was followed by a coercive phase two months later (Raider P3 2011; Wepundi et al. 2011). Saferworld, citing government records, states that until August 2010 the campaign had recovered 1,201 firearms (ibid.). Considering that the majority of the 50,000 to 150,000 estimated illegal firearms of the country is likely to be found in the northern parts of Kenya, the number of recovered firearms within Dumisha Amani II seems low (Mkutu 2008; IRIN 2010). Especially, because an unknown percentage of the persons surrendering their illegal guns have received registered new guns in return. Figure 8 documents this procedure during a "disarmament" event in northern Pokot in May 2011.

![Figure 8: Surrender of illegal firearm (left) in exchange for government gun (right) during a disarmament campaign in Kasai, West Pokot in 2010 (Pictures by Peter Ngati)](image-url)
Disarmament is a highly delicate instrument. Josep Elim, project coordinator for the peace NGO Riam Riam warns that selective disarmament can make “one community more vulnerable to others who are still armed” and therefore “lead to extinction of some communities” (Interview conducted by Moses Akuno, published in UNOCHA 2010c:4). For disarmament to work, it would have to be done in all relevant communities simultaneously and to the exact same degree.

Further, rearmament of groups would have to be prevented. As all these conditions are impossible to satisfy, the government should abandon this instrument. Despite being hardly successful, past disarmament campaigns had several unintended consequences. These include: undermining the trust in the government as abusive violence was used during the campaigns (United States Department of State 2011), aggravating power disequilibria among conflict parties and creating a strong self-perception of vulnerability in the disarmed community (Mkutu 2006, 2007; Akoule 2011; Oesterle 2011). This perception was widespread among the Turkana and the Pokot who both claimed that the enemy is much better armed. While all community members who were asked about the availability of weapons, confirmed that the raiders of both sides are well-armed with automatic guns (Lowoto 2011; Raider P1 2011; Raider T3 2011), the visibility of these weapons was more pronounced in Turkana.

Facilitation of Secure Livestock Movement

Mobility is an essential part of pastoralism (Birch and Grahn 2007). The aim of the Security in Mobility (SIM) initiative, started by a group of international agencies8 in 2009 is “to promote pastoralist mobility as a climate change adaptation strategy, to advocate for the reconciliation of regional security concerns with pastoralist livelihood and mobility needs, and finally, to support governments in the region to develop a regional normative framework on safe migration for pastoralists” (UNOCHA 2010a:13). The initiative works on two levels. On the local level the partners of the initiative went to pastoral communities across the Horn of Africa to identify their needs and challenges. On the national level SIM consulted the governments of Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Somalia Tanzania to initiate a legal framework which secures pastoral movement across international borders (Okoro 2011).

SIM addresses a relevant and so far widely neglected issue. The different backgrounds and expertise of the participating agencies ensure that the problem is analyzed from a variety of perspectives. Through a number of publications (UNOCHA 2010a, b; UNOCHA 2010c) attention has been drawn to political marginalization, resource scarcity and conflict as the key challenges identified by the initiative. Important steps towards an intergovernmental legal framework on pastoral mobility have been taken (Okoro 2011). However, as no documents have been signed yet, no impact of improved pastoral security can be expected on the ground. Once a legal framework has been established, the next challenge will be its full and coordinated implementation.

5. Conclusion

The conflicts between the Turkana and Pokot in Northwestern Kenya are frequent, violent and destructive. In addition to the human casualties as immediate results of livestock raids, the conflict on the mid to long run undermines trust between the communities and creates an omnipresent perception of insecurity. The insecurity in turn results in underutilized pasture, unused markets, and unfinished infrastructure projects which in combination hinder development. To effectively reduce the conflicts, the mitigation approaches have to match the

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8 These include United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).
complexity of the various conflict factors and actors. This is not an easy task, as the discussion of the three mitigation approaches has shown. Peace meetings have proven to be successful in the past but for the concerned conflict a shift is necessary from focusing exclusively on elders and governmental officials to a stronger integration of raiders and women. Disarmament, especially when executed forcefully, is an inappropriate instrument as it is impossible to disarm all conflict parties at the same time, to the same degree and to prevent rearmament afterwards. Past disarmament campaigns even had negative unintended consequences which include undermining the communities’ trust in the government, aggravating power disequilibria among conflict parties and promoting perceptions of vulnerability. The facilitation of safe livestock movement and the strengthening of pastoral communities, as attempted by the Security in Mobility initiative is promising. The actual impact on the ground can yet only be determined once a legal framework has been developed and implemented.

Lessons Learned and Critical Questions

The case study shows that different factors and actors need to be addressed at different scales. Peace meetings are best placed in the hands of local communities while issues of marginalization need to be resolved on the national scale, and the availability of small arms requires an intergovernmental solution. Further, the constellation of conflict factors and actors is complex. Failure to properly take this complexity into account can result in shortsighted and aggravating operations such as disarmament. On the positive side, external actors have a variety of instruments at hand which potentially can interrupt the conflict chain at different stages (see figure 5).

The success of these instruments depends on how well the following critical questions are taken into account: How can instruments be (a) tailored to the needs of the affected communities and (b) carefully coordinated with other instruments, factors and actors at play? How do the different scales affect each other? Specifically, what impact does the broader political context have on local peacebuilding initiatives? And how in turn do local peacebuilding efforts affect the national level? What can be done to create a peace-positive spill-over effect from the local to the national level and vice versa? How can it be avoid that local peacebuilding efforts, especially when driven by external actors such as development organizations, undermine the legitimacy and credibility of the national government? If this cannot be avoided, what are the risks of a weaker government? To what extent is it possible to develop different scenarios to be prepared for different outcomes of peacebuilding interventions? How can the sustainability of any peacebuilding initiative be improved? In what way is it possible to create synergies between actors in the peacebuilding and actors in the climate adaptation field? Overall, how can climate adaptation be peace-positive and peacebuilding be climate-sensitive?

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