

# **DDR in DRC: The Impact of Command and Control**

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Joanne Richards  
PhD Candidate, Political Science  
Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement  
Geneva Institute of International and Development Studies

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## Introduction

This case study examines Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In September 2011 the DRC's national program of DDR came to a close, ending a difficult and drawn out process. In early 2003, an estimated 150,000 combatants were expected to be processed and returned to civilian life under the government's national plan for DDR.<sup>1</sup> Since that time, existing armed groups have splintered and new armed groups have emerged in DRC. By December 2009, 208,438 combatants had handed over weapons and demobilized.<sup>2</sup> However other combatants have continued to fight. This case study examines why this variation exists. Two central questions are addressed. First, why have some combatants in DRC joined DDR programs while others have resisted? Second, how do individual motivations for and against DDR differ by military rank?

DDR practitioners increasingly recognize that high ranking officers, particularly military commanders, may refuse DDR because they are dissatisfied with the incentives on offer.<sup>3</sup> DDR programs typically offer combatants some kind of transitional assistance package in order to ease their return to civilian life. Typical incentives include an on-the-spot cash payment to cover the ex-combatant's immediate needs, followed by a series of monthly cash payments. Vocational training is also often offered. Some DDR programs provide the same incentives to all former combatants.<sup>4</sup> However, other DDR programs vary these benefits in accordance with an individual's military rank.<sup>5</sup> The logic behind ranked incentive schemes is that commanders may profit more from armed conflict than their troops. As a result, these individuals may be reluctant to accept DDR, particularly if demobilizing means accepting a package which offers less than can be gained from continuing to fight.

Less is known about why low ranking combatants enter DDR or resist. From a practitioner perspective, the demobilization of rank and file fighters is viewed as a voluntary process driven by the political will of armed group leaders.<sup>6</sup> This explains why DDR programs are typically discussed during peace talks, when high-ranking representatives from opposing sides agree to cease hostilities.<sup>7</sup> The assumption is that when leaders agree to peace, their followers will simply follow. However, the political preferences of low-level combatants may be more extreme or more moderate than those of their leaders. Some low-level combatants may have also joined armed groups for entirely apolitical reasons such as greed or social status.<sup>8</sup> For political will to filter down to the rank and file, a leader must possess strong command and control over his or her troops. Unfortunately this kind of command and control can also be used to block demobilization of the rank and file when high-level political will is lacking. This was observed, for example, following the Bicesse Accords in Angola.<sup>9</sup> Currently we have only a limited understanding of how leaders and military commanders use incentives and constraints to influence their troops with regards to DDR.

This case study aims to shed light on the relationship between soldiers and commanders, and examines the impact of command and control on DDR in DRC. Here DDR refers to the formal DDR program initiated by the DRC government.<sup>10</sup> This program was designed to collect arms and munitions (disarmament), to convert soldiers to civilians (demobilization), and to return former combatants to their communities of choice (reintegration). Command and control is defined as the act of giving orders and of monitoring and influencing how these orders are carried out.<sup>11</sup> Military commanders are the focal point of command and control because they give orders to subordinates, but also receive orders from higher-ups. Five armed groups are subject to analysis. These are CNDP, RCD-Goma, PARECO, APCLS and Mai Mai Kifufua. Information is drawn from interviews with former members of these groups conducted between June and September 2011 in Goma, North Kivu province. Respondents are former rank and file combatants, platoon commanders, lieutenants, sergeants, colonels and staff officers. This

interview data is collaborated and cross-checked against interviews with DDR practitioners in DRC, and also against a detailed review of the relevant literature.

The analysis shows that command and control over low ranking troops in all five armed groups was strong. Commanders who refused to demobilize severely punished troops who attempted to desert their military unit. The introduction of one size fits all DDR programs also prompted some commanders to clamp down and increase the severity of this punishment. At worst, deserters could be killed or have family members killed. In this way, simply increasing the DDR payouts on offer to the rank and file may have the adverse effect of encouraging troops to stay within their armed group. This is because attempting to enter DDR risks consequences far greater than the benefits on offer. Ranked incentive schemes may therefore be helpful in groups where command and control is strong. This is because getting commanders to enter DDR removes constraints on low ranking soldiers and allows them to make their own choices. By contrast, in groups where command and control is weak, ranked incentive schemes may not be necessary. This is because orders, monitoring, and punishment do not interfere with individual choice to such a great extent.

## Background and Key Actors

The country now known as DRC gained independence from Belgian colonial rule in June 1960. Five years later, Mobutu Sese Seko became president, a position he occupied for 32 years. In October 1996 an armed rebellion broke out against Mobutu. This rebellion was planned and directed by Rwanda, and resulted in Mobutu's departure from power in May 1997.<sup>12</sup> The Congolese face of this rebellion was the AFDL armed group, headed by Laurent Désiré Kabila.<sup>13</sup> Kabila led a diverse coalition of anti-Mobutuist elements who claimed to be fighting against Mobutu's dictatorial regime. The movement also had substantial backing from the Banyamulenge, a Kinyarwanda speaking population of Tutsi-herders living in DRC's South Kivu province.<sup>14</sup> The Banyamulenge are originally from Rwanda, and their status as Congolese citizens has long been a highly politicized question.<sup>15</sup> On January 5<sup>th</sup>, 1972, a nationality law was passed granting Zairian citizenship to the Banyamulenge.<sup>16</sup> However a subsequent law, passed on June 29, 1981, retroactively retracted this status. This left many Banyamulenge faced with the threat of expulsion.

The precarious citizenship of the Banyamulenge in Zaire was exacerbated by events in neighboring Burundi and Rwanda. In 1993, the assassination of Burundian President Ndadaye triggered an exodus of Burundian Hutu into South Kivu. The next year roughly 1.2 million Rwandan Hutus crossed into North and South Kivu following the 1994 Rwandan genocide.<sup>17</sup> Many Hutu *genocidaires* and former Rwandan soldiers went into refugee camps in Uvira and Fizi (South Kivu province). These two areas have traditionally been home to the Congolese Tutsi Banyamulenge. Violence against the latter soon escalated. "Native" ethnic groups took advantage of the situation by colluding with the Hutu *genocidaires* and attempting to drive out the Banyamulenge. In an attempt to gain support from these "native" Zairians, Mobutu's regime armed the Hutus.<sup>18</sup> Furthermore, on April 28<sup>th</sup>, 1995, the Mobutu regime stripped all Banyamulenge of their Zairian citizenship and a little over a year later, the deputy governor of South Kivu ordered the Banyamulenge to leave Zaire. The Banyamulenge refused to leave, and turned to Rwanda for help.

At this time, Rwanda's Tutsi-led government was trying to deal with cross-border attacks launched by Hutu *genocidaires* from refugee camps in DRC. The coalescence of Banyamulenge and Rwandan interests prompted the latter to create an armed group, known as AFDL, which brought together Banyamulenge and various anti-Mobutuist elements with Rwandan forces.<sup>19</sup> The AFDL armed group was officially founded on October 18<sup>th</sup>, 1996. Nearly 8 months later,

Mobutu was ousted and AFDL's leader, Laurent Kabila was installed as president of the newly renamed Democratic Republic of Congo. Relations between Kabila and his Rwandan backers soon began to deteriorate. In large part this was because Rwandan troops remained in DRC even after Kabila took power. The highly visible presence of Rwandans in DRC's national army and government led Kabila to worry that he was perceived as a mere tool of Rwandan interests.<sup>20</sup> In an attempt to increase his internal legitimacy, he ordered all Rwandan and other foreign military to leave DRC on July 26<sup>th</sup>, 1998.

Rwanda reacted to Kabila's actions by supporting a military effort to remove him. The initial aim of this intervention was to replace Laurent Kabila with someone who would better help to secure Rwanda's western border. Uganda also justified its intervention in terms of border security.<sup>21</sup> Together Rwanda and Uganda formed a new armed group known as RCD which announced its leadership on August 16<sup>th</sup>, 1998.<sup>22</sup> RCD fractured less than a year later and from this point on the original RCD became known as RCD-Goma, while a new rebel group, the Ugandan-backed and Banande-based RCD-K/ML took root in Kisangani. RCD-Goma aimed to remove President Laurent Kabila, who was accused of corruption and tribalism.<sup>23</sup> However the rebels' military aims were thwarted when Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and to a lesser extent Sudan, stepped in with military support for the incumbent. The war entered a period of stalemate, with many new groups emerging to challenge Kabila.<sup>24</sup> Other local self-defense forces, known as "Mai Mai" groups, fought on the side of the government. The stalemate was eventually broken with the signing of the Global and Inclusive Agreement in 2002.<sup>25</sup> This agreement committed RCD-Goma and the Mai Mai groups to integrate their troops into a newly reformed national army, FARDC.<sup>26</sup> These troops would then be given the choice of staying within the national army or returning to civilian life.

In order to implement this agreement, the DRC government produced a National Plan for DDR in May 2004. An implementing agency known as CONADER was also created.<sup>27</sup> According to the National Plan, an adult combatant reporting for a CONADER DDR program was to receive an immediate "safety net" payment of 110USD, an official card of demobilization, and 25USD per month for twelve months.<sup>28</sup> Adult ex-combatants were also eligible to receive support for social-economic reintegration, including the opportunity to receive schooling, professional training, or help with agricultural activities. The incentives for DDR were the same for all former adult fighters going through a CONADER program, regardless of their former rank. DDR got underway in DRC in November 2004, and a large majority of the armed group RCD-Goma was soon demobilized. However two dissident brigades within RCD-Goma refused army integration forming the new armed group, CNDP, in July, 2006.<sup>29</sup> Led by Laurent Nkunda, CNDP was backed by Rwanda and claimed to be fighting for the protection of the Tutsi population, including the Banyamulenge. Other new local defense groups soon emerged to counter what they saw as the threat posed by CNDP. These armed groups included Mai Mai Kifuafua and also, PARECO, a coalition of Mai Mai groups established on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of March, 2007.<sup>30</sup> Representatives from CNDP and these Mai Mai groups attended the Goma Peace Conference in early 2008 and signed the Acts of Engagement. However a faction within PARECO refused to implement the agreement. This faction formed the new armed group, APCLS, in April 2008 arguing that the interests of the Hunde community had been marginalized at the Goma Conference.<sup>31</sup>

Armed groups which signed the Acts of Engagement were incorporated under the DDR framework outlined in the government's 2004 National Plan. However in mid-December 2008, Rwanda and DRC reached a secret bilateral agreement to neutralize CNDP. According to this agreement, former CNDP fighters would be immediately integrated into FARDC. This "accelerated integration" process began in January 2009 and the vast majority of CNDP joined DRC's national army. Many members of PARECO and the other Mai Mai groups did the same. This integration process reduced the number of combatants expected to join DDR programs from roughly 20,000 to 5,000.<sup>32</sup> However, while many combatants have now either integrated or

demobilized, small groups of Congolese combatants continue to resist. In September 2011, as DDR officially closed, roughly 300-400 APCLS combatants and 300-400 PARECO combatants remained active in DRC.<sup>33</sup> Scattered groups of Mai Mai Kifuafua combatants also continued to refuse DDR.

## Armed Groups and Individual Ranks

In order to explain why some combatants have entered DDR while others have refused, it is helpful to look more closely at command and control. A natural starting point is to examine the organizational structure of the five armed groups analyzed here. Both RCD-Goma and CNDP had regular Rwandan and/or Ugandan army troops within their ranks. Owing to the influence of these external actors, both groups were organized in the same way as conventional national armies. More surprisingly, this model was also adopted by the Mai Mai groups including PARECO, APCLS and Mai Mai Kifuafua. As a former lieutenant in Mai Mai Kifuafua explained, this was because many Kifuafua commanders had previously served in DRC's national army.

A typical national army takes a large number of individuals and organizes them into smaller groups. Typically each small group has an immediate commander, making monitoring and surveillance of the entire army more manageable. To take an example, many national armies begin at the level of sections (or squads) consisting of around 9-10 soldiers.<sup>34</sup> A platoon is the next level of organization and may consist of three to five sections. Three to five platoons form a company (otherwise known as a battery or troop) which is headed by a captain. Four to six companies form a battalion (or squadron) headed by a lieutenant colonel. Two to five battalions form a brigade, three to five brigades form a division, and in turn, two or more divisions form a corps. Following this generic model, a national army will contain two or more corps and will be led by a general. This generic structure is illustrated in Table 1.

**Figure 1: A general national army structure<sup>35</sup>**

Element	Size	Commander <i>Second in command</i>
Squad/Section	9 - 10 soldiers	Sergeant
Platoon	16 - 44 soldiers	Lieutenant <i>Sergeant First Class or Staff Sergeant</i>
Company/Battery/Troop	62 - 190 soldiers	Captain <i>First Sergeant</i>
Battalion/Squadron	300 - 1,000 soldiers	Lieutenant Colonel <i>Command Sergeant Major</i>
Brigade/Regiment/Group	3,000 - 5,000 soldiers	Colonel <i>Command Sergeant Major</i>
Division	10,000 - 15,000 soldiers	Major General
Corps	20,000 - 45,000 soldiers	Lieutenant General
Army	50,000 + soldiers	General

All five of the armed groups analyzed here were organized according this general national army structure. Former RCD-Goma combatants reported that a brigade was made up of close to five battalions. In each battalion there were roughly 150 troops or six companies, and in each company there were three platoons and three sections. Ex-combatants within PARECO reported that the group was identical to DRC's national army, FARDC, except that it lacked reinforcements. A PARECO platoon was made up of somewhere between 20 to 40 soldiers and a

company was composed of roughly 70-80 soldiers. APCLS was similarly organized into sections (consisting of five soldiers), platoons (which were made up of three sections), followed by companies and brigades. Six brigades formed a division managed by the leader of the group, General Janvier. Mai Mai Kifuafua was a much smaller group in which only 50 soldiers formed a battalion.

In national armies, individuals at high ranks have more responsibility and receive more compensation than individuals at lower ranks. This was also the case within the armed groups in DRC. As a former first-lieutenant in PARECO explained “the major receives more than the captain, the captain receives more than the first-lieutenant, and the first-lieutenant receives more than the second-lieutenant...in terms of food and salary.” The personal staff of high ranking military commanders also shared some of the benefits accorded to higher ranks. A former bodyguard to a Major General within CNDP stated that he never made any attempt to leave the group because his quality of life was very good. Although he did not receive a salary, he was well provided for by the Major. He ate well and did not have to sleep outside with the lower ranks. For similar reasons a former escort to Colonel Felly (APCLS) also stated that life in the group was easier than civilian life. As this former escort was under 18 years of age she complained that she “was made to leave [APCLS] against her own will.” At the time of her demobilization, APCLS had agreed to release child-soldiers.

Not all combatants were satisfied with life in the group. Mai Mai Kifuafua ex-combatants unanimously reported that it was difficult to find food. Congolese rank and file members of RCD-Goma also complained that they were treated badly by Rwandan troops in positions of command. Two former corporals stated that although it was unusual for them to be paid, on one occasion they were supposed to receive 12.50USD. Owing to deductions made by their superiors they received only 3000 Congolese Francs (a little less than 6USD). Former PARECO combatants similarly complained that when they did happen to receive a salary, battalion commanders would make deductions. Two ex-members of this group spoke of a system known as “Bank Lambert.” Following this system, commanders would loan money to the troops when they needed it on the condition that double, or sometimes triple, the amount would be paid back. If an individual was unable to make the repayment, the balance would be deducted from his salary.

Many of the ex-combatants who spoke of the difficulties of life in the group stated that they were happy to enter DDR. When these combatants were asked about the one size fits all benefits provided by the government’s DDR program many replied that they were just happy to be free. Leaving the group meant leaving their ranks behind. These respondents were all individuals at lower echelons of the military hierarchy, namely sergeants, lieutenants, and rank and file combatants. However a former captain with RCD-Goma expressed dissatisfaction at having been treated in the same way as his former subordinates. This dissatisfaction was compounded by the fact that he, like many ex-combatants in DRC, did not receive what was promised by government-led programs of DDR.<sup>36</sup> In part, this can be attributed to the mismanagement and temporary closure of CONADER.<sup>37</sup>

## **Punishment and Surveillance**

Given the difficulties of life for some members of RCD-Goma, CNDP and the Mai Mai groups, many interviewees indicated that they wanted to leave their armed groups long before their actual date of demobilization. However the prospect of being caught and punished held them back. As these groups were organized similarly to national armies, it was possible for commanders to continuously monitor their troops. This section outlines precisely how the organization of each of these groups allowed for the detection of

potential deserters. It also outlines the punishments applied to those who attempted to leave without permission from their military hierarchy.

In national armies, commanders of battalions, brigades, divisions and corps typically delegate certain responsibilities to staff officers, known as S or G officers.<sup>38</sup> S officers help battalion and brigade commanders manage information and make decisions, whereas G officers work at the corps and division levels. Typically there are five staff officers at each echelon, each of which is responsible for a broad field of interest. S1 (G1) officers are responsible for personnel, S2 (G2) officers for intelligence, S3 (G3) officers for operations and training, S4 (G4) officers for logistics, and S5 (G5) officers for civil-military operations. RCD-Goma, CNDP, and the Mai Mai groups also followed this system. Ex-RCD-Goma combatants reported that S1 officers were responsible for paying the soldiers, S2 officers were responsible for military intelligence and for guarding the military prison, further, S3 officers were in charge of military planning. Members of CNDP, RCD-Goma, PARECO and Mai Mai Kifuafua also reported that S4 officers were responsible for managing the arms depot.

In the US Army, at echelons below the brigade level, certain soldiers perform functions which are similar to those performed by S officers. However, these soldiers do not have staff officer (“S”) status.<sup>39</sup> By contrast, in the DRC armed groups, “S” designation was sometimes carried all the way down the military hierarchy. A former APCLS combatant reported that each section had its own S3. A former member of RCD-Goma similarly noted that a platoon of 12 people had its own S2 responsible for monitoring the troops. A former company commander with CNDP also explained that each section of 12 people had two chiefs responsible for observing the rank and file. These kinds of organizational structures meant that low ranking troops could be kept under surveillance at all times. Former rank and file combatants within RCD-Goma explained how a combatant who did not demonstrate the appropriate level of morale, or did not interact well with other troops would be suspected of being a potential deserter. They would then be reported to the commander who would decide on the appropriate punishment. A former captain in RCD-Goma also stated that if he did something wrong his superior could find out by talking to the S2. He would then be reported and punished.

The typical way for commanders to check for desertions among their troops was during military parades. In national armies, military parades are typically held for ceremonial purposes during national holidays.<sup>40</sup> Typically they consist of marching and weaponry drills. In DRC parades were held regularly in RCD-Goma, CNDP, and the Mai Mai groups. A PARECO platoon chief stated that parades would be held every morning, and if his captain demanded it, every hour throughout the day if necessary. At parades the platoon chief was required to count everyone present and write a list of attendees in his morning report. The morning report would then be passed on to his captain. In the report it was necessary to detail who was present, who was missing “without justification” and who was sick. If any individuals were absent without leave then the search for the individual would commence. A former APCLS combatant similarly said that commanders would ask combatants questions during military parades. This individual stated that because of the “fetishes” given to Mai Mai combatants they would

tell the truth, meaning that individuals suspected of wanting to quit would be denounced.<sup>41</sup>

In some cases, it was possible for combatants to take a leave of absence from the group for one or two days. When this happened in CNDP, precautions were taken to ensure that the combatant did not desert whilst having the opportunity to do so.<sup>42</sup> A former sergeant within CNDP stated that a combatant going on leave would be issued with an official document. However before the combatant was allowed to depart, the registration number of his weapon would be recorded alongside the names of his mother, father, grandfather and other family members. This was done to make it easier to trace the combatant if he failed to return. It was also to let the combatant know that failure to come back would endanger his family. A former member of RCD-Goma explained how his parents were killed as a result of his escape attempt. Ex-combatants with Mai Mai Kifuafua also stated that the relatives of escapees were likely to suffer reprisals. A former lieutenant with the group stated that the group would even hold family members hostage until the escapee returned.

In short, many interviewees stated that they resisted DDR because of the dangers it presented to both themselves and their families. If a combatant's immediate commander refused to enter DDR it was highly unlikely that the combatant would be permitted to do so. In all five groups, punishments for desertion were severe and included imprisonment, death, and the killing of family members. Mai Mai Kifuafua combatants even reported that punishments were made more severe when DDR programs began. Overall, entering DDR required an opportunity rather than merely a motivation to do so. Some combatants stayed because the potential punishment was worse than enduring the lack of food and salary that life in the groups sometimes entailed. As mentioned in the previous section, others stayed because life in the group was comfortable.

### **Lessons Learned: Will the rank and file follow?**

The existing academic literature suggests that more robust DDR packages may encourage combatants to enter DDR programs.<sup>43</sup> By contrast, this case study suggests that slightly increased incentives are not likely to encourage the DDR of low ranking combatants when command and control is strong. Instead, in groups organized similarly to national armies, increased incentives may cause recalcitrant commanders to increase surveillance and punishment against those who attempt to leave. This may actually deter defections rather than encourage them. Increasing the incentives on offer may also encourage commanders to engage in new recruitment. They may do this in order to siphon off a cut of the DDR payments received by their troops.<sup>44</sup>

Slightly increasing the cash incentives on offer for DDR is also unlikely to placate military commanders. This case study suggests that commanders can make money by intercepting salaries which are sent from higher up in the military hierarchy and are intended for their troops. As occurred in the Mai Mai group PARECO, commanders can also charge their subordinates exorbitant rates on loans. In terms of pure cost-benefit calculus, a 25USD payment per month is unlikely to be attractive to an individual with a relatively large number of troops under his control. This case study suggests that for the



ranks of captain and above, one size fits all incentives are unappealing not only in monetary terms but also in terms of status. Combatants may prefer not to leave their groups when they believe they are being given a less-than-honorable discharge.<sup>45</sup> A package more commensurate with the combatant's rank and foregone income may therefore be more appropriate.

DDR programmers have previously resisted ranked incentives schemes. Such schemes are thought to reinforce the very chain of command that DDR is trying to dismantle.<sup>46</sup> By contrast, this case study suggests that ranked incentives may be necessary in groups which are organized similarly to national armies. This is because where command and control is tight, lower ranking combatants may be presented with the opportunity to enter DDR only when their commander leaves the group. Among lower ranks, the simple motivation to join a DDR program will not be sufficient. Recalcitrant commanders may be reluctant to let go of even one of their troops for the simple reason that losing troops depletes military manpower. By contrast, simply raising the amount of a one size fits all incentive may work more efficiently in groups where command and control is weak. This is because orders, monitoring, and punishment do not interfere with individual choice to such a great extent.

It is also important to note that while ranks were superficially similar across the armed groups in DRC, commanders within the Mai Mai groups often did not have the same level of military training as commanders in RCD-Goma and CNDP. If employing a ranked incentive system, DDR programmers may have to deal with a situation in which commanders in one group complain that they are entitled to receive more than commanders in another. Looking closely at each group and its organizational structure will be required.

Finally it should not be assumed that low ranking combatants will always follow their commanders into DDR. As this case study has shown, combatants who are dissatisfied with their quality of life in the group, or are tired and disillusioned with combat, are likely to follow. However others may still be reluctant, particularly if they believe that life in the group is easier than life with DDR. Programmers therefore face a difficult balance when dealing with groups with strong command and control. At low ranks, DDR packages must be made attractive enough to seem appealing. However, if made too attractive, commanders may try to increase recruitment and may also tighten their grip on the rank and file.

### **Critical Questions:**

What are the ethical dilemmas faced in the promotion of DDR?  
What lessons are unique to DRC and what lessons are relevant to other conflict situations?  
Can DDR be successful in an authoritarian context, or when there is a lack of political reform?  
What are the linkages between DDR and security sector reform?

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## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Programme National de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinsertion (PN-DDR) 2004, p20

<sup>2</sup> PN-DDR's Rapport Annuel 2010, p11. This statistic refers to individuals passing through government-led programs of DDR.

<sup>3</sup> See the UN Integrated DDR standards 2.10, page 8; UNDP Practice Note: DDR of Ex-combatants 5.1.3

<sup>4</sup> This was the case in Sierra Leone (1999) and Uganda (1992)

<sup>5</sup> This occurred in Chad (1992), Mozambique (1994) and Rwanda (1997 and 2002)

<sup>6</sup> Normally this is assumed because reintegration cannot be imposed by force.

<sup>7</sup> Escola de Cultura de pau: Analysis 2006: 8

<sup>8</sup> Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Weinstein 2002, 2007

<sup>9</sup> Bekoe 2008, p74; Krska 1997, p87

<sup>10</sup> I do not focus on the more informal DDR programs led by UNDP.

<sup>11</sup> US Army Field Manual FM101-5, May 1997

<sup>12</sup> Rwandan President Paul Kagame admitted this in a Washington Post interview, July 1997

<sup>13</sup> Allied Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo

<sup>14</sup> Turner 2007, p76

<sup>15</sup> Prunier 2009

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<sup>16</sup> At independence DRC was known as the Republic of Congo. Mobutu renamed the country Zaire in 1971.

<sup>17</sup> Ndikumana and Emizet 2003, p21

<sup>18</sup> Wright, 2008, p90

<sup>19</sup> Reyntjens 2009 Chapter 4. Uganda and Angola also supported AFDL.

<sup>20</sup> Reyntjens, 1999, p245

<sup>21</sup> Prunier 2009, p196

<sup>22</sup> On Rwandan and Ugandan involvement, see ICG Report, December 2000

<sup>23</sup> Turner 2007, p5

<sup>24</sup> These include RCD-K/ML, RCD-N, and MLC.

<sup>25</sup> Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the DRC, 16 December 2002

<sup>26</sup> FARDC - Armed Forces of the DRC

<sup>27</sup> CONADER - National Committee for DDR

<sup>28</sup> CONADER Manuel d'Execution, December 2005 ; Kasongo and Sebahara, 2006

<sup>29</sup> CNDP – National Congress for the Defense of the People

<sup>30</sup> Internal MONUSCO document.

<sup>31</sup> UN Panel of Experts Report, November 2010, para. 45

<sup>32</sup> World Bank, September 2009, p4

<sup>33</sup> Internal MONUSCO document

<sup>34</sup> This generic model is taken from the U.S. Department of the Army Pamphlet 10-1, June 1994

<sup>35</sup> Adapted from Department of the Army Pamphlet 10-1, June 1994.

<sup>36</sup> Rouw and Willems 2010, p23

<sup>37</sup> World Bank, September 2009, p3-4

<sup>38</sup> US Army Field Manual FM101-5, May 1997.

<sup>39</sup> Correspondence with former S3 officer in the US Army

<sup>40</sup> Examples are the French military parade held on July 14<sup>th</sup>, and the Soviet parades previously held on November 7<sup>th</sup>.

<sup>41</sup> This is a reference to remedies produced by local witch doctors which the Mai Mai applied to their skin.

<sup>42</sup> A study of the US Army shows that many desertions occur when combats take leave and don't come back. See Ramsberger and Bell, 2002

<sup>43</sup> Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, Weinstein, 2002, 2007

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<sup>44</sup> UNIDDRS 5.30 page 21

<sup>45</sup> In the US Army leaving with a less-than-honorable discharge means forfeiting federal education benefits, home loans and the opportunity to gain a job with the federal government. See Ramsberger and Bell, 2002

<sup>46</sup> Interview with DDR officer, UNDP, Geneva, February 2011