Effectiveness of Nonviolent Civic Action

Simulation on Colombia

Scenario and Background
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I. Simulation Introduction

From June 23-25 you will participate in a 9-hour simulation that will provide a deeper understanding of the topic for which you have written an award-winning essay. The simulation will be based on a national summit being held in Bogota, Colombia. The summit is being convened to bring together representatives from civil society and the government to discuss the political and social objectives of both groups in the lead up to a massive civilian demonstration against the ongoing violence in Colombia on the Inauguration day of Colombia’s recently elected president. The summit will include two separate sessions over the course of the three days. On the first day, various stakeholder groups will meet separately in plenary sessions to discuss common objectives and strategies. The following two days will be reserved for a general session for all stakeholders to come together to engage in constructive dialogue.

The purpose of the summit will be to produce a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) among all parties present. The MOU will need to address the implications, potential effectiveness, and repercussions of creating what stands to be Colombia’s largest ever civilian demonstration on the streets of Bogotá during the upcoming inauguration ceremonies. Additionally, it will provide a platform for all groups present to share and advocate for their political vision and for how the various groups might work together to achieve common goals. How such a demonstration would take place, who would be involved, what the message would be, where it could take place, and if it can take place at all will be items for discussion.

On the first day, both the civil society groups and government representatives will meet amongst themselves in two separate plenary sessions to discuss common objectives and strategies as they prepare for the following day’s summit. The civil society plenary will bring together community leaders, human rights advocates, international experts, and other relevant victims and stakeholders in the struggle to end violence within Colombia. The government plenary session will include representatives from the incoming administration, senior government officials, security experts, and various international and domestic advisors. The goal for each plenary session will be to consolidate agendas into one platform that addresses the needs and interests of each group facing the upcoming demonstrations.

On the second and third days, participants from the two groups will meet together. While both groups will have a head of delegation, all summit participants will contribute to the overall discussions. At the end of the three-day summit, participants must attempt to produce a comprehensive Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between a cohesive civil society group and the Colombian government. A successful MOU must determine the legitimacy of the demonstration, reconcile the political objectives of all parties present, determine the methods of the demonstration and rules of engagement for both sides, and come to an agreement as to what message the demonstrators and the Colombian government will be sending to Colombians and the world.

If successful, the Inaugural Day Rally—for all parties—could demonstrate to both the government and citizens of Colombia a true commitment to nonviolent peace.
Enclosed, you will find the necessary materials to prepare for the three-day simulation:
• Simulation Scenario
• Issues for Discussion
• Background Issues and Readings
• Public Roles
• Private Role (Your assigned role)

This simulation is based on facts, but is fictional. The simulation assignment is fictional, as are any descriptions used to describe the incoming Colombian president and his administration. A few of the roles in the simulation have names of people who are real; however, the descriptions of their interests and motivations, as well as their goals are fictional. Those fictional portions of the scenario and background have been highlighted in red. We encourage you to take the scenario and the roles seriously while keeping this in mind.

In preparing for the simulation and during the simulation, it is critical that you identify the key issues and motivations for other parties to the summit as well as understand the role that you must play in outlining the requirements for a successful demonstration. Be sure to consider the impending short and long-term effects of both a successful and unsuccessful demonstration rally on Inauguration Day in August. Think also about the effects of your contributions to or dissent from the terms agreed to in the MOU. To that end, you are being provided with summaries of the public positions of the other attendees to the summit. In addition, you alone are being given a private role sheet detailing specific concerns and objectives that you and your government or organization has regarding the movement.

As you read through the background materials and roles:

• Consider the goals and interests of the individual you are playing; determine what the organization or institution you represent wants to accomplish during the three days of the meeting.
• Take notes on how and where your perspective and interests can be addressed and how your interests may be in conflict or in balance with those of others in the simulation.
• Try to identify specific approaches to these issues and come up with possible actions that can address your interests, and consider how you can best advocate for them in the committee meeting.
• Consider what set of skills and resources each group brings to the table and how they can be most effectively used to bring about an end to the violence.

During the simulation, attendees will identify solutions to address the needs and interests of different constituencies. It is important that you anticipate these differences and consider how they will impact the recommendations for the MOU. You will need to stay focused on the overall objective of the summit while honoring your own unique interests.
II. Simulation Scenario

Scenario Assignment

For over 60 years, Colombia has been involved in an internal armed conflict that has destroyed many lives and polarized its population. Colombia has the world’s second largest internally displaced population, and the war continues on average to claim the lives of 14 civilians a day.

Colombia has just held presidential elections in May 2010, ushering in a new government and opening the door for new opportunities. Colombians from every sector of society are anxious about the direction the newly elected administration will take in regards to the ongoing violence affecting the country—including the recent election-related violence perpetrated by illegally armed groups. A potential turning point for this country is fast approaching, and both expectations and demands of the incoming administration to put an end to the violence are very high.

Colombians are mobilizing across the country and around the world to support the victims of violence and to demand that the new administration take action to halt the violence, including that used by the government. Amidst the ongoing violent conflict in Colombia, civil society groups and international advocates are speaking out on behalf of innocent victims that have suffered at the hands of the various armed actors including the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), paramilitary organizations, and government security forces. On the upcoming Inauguration Day in August, the National Movement of Victims of State Crimes (MOVICE) plans to lead a massive demonstration to express a cohesive discontent among the victims of violence and champions of peace, and demand action from the new government.

The Washington D.C. based International Center on Non-Violent Conflict (ICNC) had been following the recent non-violent demonstrations in Colombia closely, and when the organization became aware of MOVICE’s plans, it immediately offered assistance. ICNC convinced MOVICE that in order to be effective, MOVICE would need to include all the relevant civil society voices, despite their differences, in the planning of the movement. MOVICE then called together members from across civil society in order to develop a cohesive non-violent movement, inclusive of all victims of the war and all those fighting for peace, to collectively voice opposition to the continuing violence and kidnapping in Colombia.

Additionally, ICNC persuaded MOVICE that in order to ensure a successful and peaceful demonstration, there would need to be an understanding between the demonstrators and government and security officials. When ICNC reached out to the president elect’s team, they jumped at the opportunity to participate in a summit with the Movement’s representatives, eager to pre-empt a negative mark in Colombian history, and perhaps even sway the demonstrators to show support for the incoming administration. ICNC called on the outgoing president Uribe’s Senior Domestic Policy Advisor, Manuel Constantine Gonzalez, to pull together the relevant stakeholders and advisors for the
incoming administration and act as an objective custodian of the government’s plenary session.

Based on subsequent discussions among MOVICE, ICNC, and the two representatives from the incoming and outgoing administrations, the parties determined that the general session should be presided over by a neutral, high-ranking member of the Catholic Church of Colombia in order to maintain impartiality and command respect. ICNC and Constantine Gonzalez reached out to one of Colombia’s most respected clergymen, Cardinal Rubiano Hoyos, the President Emeritus of the Pontifical Commission of Colombia to chair the summit. Cardinal Hoyos accepted the invitation from ICNC and Gonzalez and will serve as host and facilitator between the two delegations.

On June 23, 24 and 25 you will attend both a preparatory plenary meeting amongst your peers, followed by a general summit in Bogotá with all of the other participants. On the first day, both the civil society groups and government representatives will meet among themselves in special plenary sessions to discuss common objectives and strategies. On the second and third days, all participants will meet together to tackle the broader issues necessary to come to an MOU. You will contribute to the overall discussion with the objective of producing a cohesive MOU that includes a set of principals, agreed upon by all member parties, which should guide both the movement and the government by the end of the three-day conference.

For the attendees of the plenary session lead by ICNC:
Working alongside representatives from all affected sectors, you will be tasked with taking part in creating an overarching message for the movement; drafting a set of guiding principles for unification amongst all stakeholders; formulating functional objectives of the movement—specifically for the Inauguration Day rally; identifying the necessary and appropriate tools for success; and eliciting commitment from domestic and international participants. As a unified front, the campaign to end the violence in Colombia will not be possible to ignore.

For the attendees of the plenary session lead by Manuel Gonzalez:
Working alongside representatives of both the previous and incoming administrations, security sector, international allies, and various official advisors, you will be tasked with deciding what the official response to the movement should and will be. By addressing the political and security concerns within your plenary session, it will be important to agree on what role the government will play in the outcome of Inauguration Day.

On June 24, 2009, all of the participants will be seated around a conference table at the summit meeting, their plenary sessions behind them. Although you are not personally acquainted with many of the participants, you have studied the areas of common interest and individual commitment. With a clear vision about your critical contributions to the meeting, you look forward to lively discussions and intensive negotiations.
Scenario Background

In the lead-up to this past May’s elections, there were attempts by all political parties in Colombia to assert influence and control, and in some cases direct attempts to exacerbate instability. Forceful coercion, bullying tactics, and acts of violence meant to silence the anti-violence movement were perpetrated by both FARC and paramilitaries without punishment. Despite this, the voices for peace remain strong and with the rise in information technology, continue to proliferate at home and abroad.

In 2008, hundreds of thousands of demonstrators marched throughout Colombia and around the world to support the victims of rebel, paramilitary and state violence in the country. The protest, organized by MOVICE, aimed to demonstrate solidarity for those who have suffered violence, death of loved ones, and other human rights abuses in the ongoing armed conflict. Throughout recent years, human rights organizations have sought to bring Colombia’s conflict to national and international attention and demand an end to the impunity that persists for the perpetrators of violent crimes. With the aid of social networking platforms, MOVICE gathered enough momentum in March 2008 to organize non-violent demonstrations in 102 Colombian cities, gathering 40,000 people in Bogotá alone. The event was an example of how social media--such as text messaging, twitter, and Facebook--can be used to rally large number of people globally to a cause.

Only one month prior to the victims rally led by MOVICE, another march had been held against the nation's oldest and most powerful rebel group, the FARC. This movement also used social networking as a critical component of its organization, and was able to rally millions around the world through a Facebook page called “One Million Voices Against Farc.” The virtual movement gathered enough momentum that eventually “No Mas Farc” rallies were held in 45 cities in Colombia and 115 cities worldwide. Although these protests had the support of the government, several non-governmental organizations and some opposition political parties, thought its rally cry of “No Mas FARC” polarized Colombian society rather than bringing it together. While few Colombians support the rebel group, many were uncomfortable with this message because it failed to recognize those who have suffered at the hands of the paramilitaries and state security forces. In the wake of the “No Mas FARC” rally, MOVICE mobilized to recognize these victims, spotlighting victims of conflict beyond those created by the FARC. Colombian officials accused the MOVICE march of being a tool of the guerrillas to undermine the government and labeled MOVICE as being “pro-FARC.” As a result, many rally supporters received death threats warning them against attending the demonstrations. MOVICE continued with the march and garnered widespread international support.

When a number of the rally organizers were killed after the march, movement leaders blamed the government for having left organizers and human rights defenders vulnerable to violent retribution after being falsely tied to guerrillas.

Recently at an election rally on the outskirts of Medellin, members of the FARC appeared to demand political inclusion. Kidnapping the local mayor and his son, the guerrillas attempted to send a signal that no one from the town vote against the political agenda of the FARC. In retaliation the Black Eagles paramilitary group responded by launching a grenade attack on a peasant farmer community suspected of being...
sympathetic to the FARC during a pre-election community meeting, killing three and wounding several more. The attacks instigated an outbreak of violence around the country as illegal armed groups, both rebels and paramilitary, terrorized the civilian population fighting forcefully for influence. Violent massacres prompted sympathetic outrage among diverse constituencies of victims around the country, groups including peasant farmers (campesinos), Afro-Colombians, human rights defenders, indigenous communities, and urban residents and elites. Additionally, the international community demonstrated its support for the victims by pressuring the Colombian government to condemn these actions and seek justice on behalf of the victims.

As acts of election-related violence threatened all corners of Colombia a chorus of whispers grew for the need of a single cohesive movement to take up the cause of non-violent peace and justice. Despite the ideological and demographic differences between the various victims’ rights groups, MOVICE was prompted by the ICNC to use its domestic and international network to call together all of the different organizations to join forces and amplify their voices. Based on the success of the 2008 demonstrations, MOVICE’s network has grown considerably with support from domestic and international NGOs and civil society organizations. MOVICE has begun gathering momentum and support but has come to understand that it cannot unify the movement without the inclusion of the “No Mas FARC” campaign. Outreach to the movement’s leaders to discuss collaboration has begun.

MOVICE recognizes there will be challenges in bringing so many different groups to the table, but it is willing to proceed in order to strengthen the cause. Using online resources and civil society connections, movement leaders believe they can rally Colombians across the country in large numbers. The ICNC is already active in supporting workshops in nonviolent conflict attended by activists and citizens hoping to use civilian-based, nonviolent action as a way to strengthen democracy and seek protection of human rights. ICNC also has experience elsewhere around the globe in bringing conflicting parties together at the same table to discuss the potential for nonviolent movement.

MOVICE will also have to overcome infrastructural barriers in order to reach out effectively to many marginalized communities that are physically isolated in Colombia. In light of recent election violence in Colombia, MOVICE and the ICNC agree the time is ripe to host a summit aimed at bringing together the relevant leaders of civil society needed to create a more powerful non-violent civic movement.

Despite the Uribe government’s objections to past MOVICE rallies and FARC accusations against rally supporters, ICNC has reached out to the nation’s officials, in the hopes that all parties will recognize the benefits of working together to put an end to the traumatic violence that has plagued the country. The outgoing Senior Domestic Policy Advisor to President Uribe, Manuel Constantine Gonzalez, with no future political ambitions and the fewest ties to the incoming administration, has agreed to facilitate discussions on the government side—recognizing that a new team would benefit from his guidance.
The summit will be chaired by a senior consultant from the ICNC and Gonzalez. Participants will include leaders from the Colombian government, Bogotá police, and city officials, as well as representatives from national and international human rights organizations, indigenous communities, Afro-Colombian populations, peasant farmer assemblies and other relevant stakeholders. Those present will acknowledge the ongoing security threats for all Colombians and the potential power gained by unifying into one single movement. The goal is to consolidate efforts into one voice and organize the largest Colombian nonviolent rally to date this Inauguration Day, demonstrating to both the government and citizens of Colombia a true commitment to nonviolent peace.

For this summit, MOVICE, ICNC, and representatives of the Colombian government have identified a number of key issues that are central to the protection of human rights and the promotion of justice. These issues will be at the forefront of discussion at the summit:

**Issues for Discussion in the Civil Society Plenary (Day 1)**

- What are the common goals of this movement?
- What change are you advocating for?
- What is the main message of the movement and how will you disseminate this message in order to gain domestic and international support?
- What are the underlying principals of non-violence that will guide this movement’s cause, development and action?
- What is the slogan of the movement? What will demand the most attention and gain the most support?
- Who should participate, i.e. who is the face of the movement? How to represent/advocate for those who are too afraid to attend/cannot afford to attend (i.e. campesinos and indigenous groups)?
- What is required of your group to come to agreement?

**Issues for Discussion in the Government Plenary (Day 1)**

- Can we/should we craft a message of sympathy to the growing movement? If so, how do we convey a commitment to continuing/ramping up the “War on Terror,” while at the same time assuring the protection of human rights?
  - In other words, what are the opportunities that this movement presents for the government? What are the dangers?
- How do we most effectively minimize anti-government rhetoric during the rally on Inauguration day?
- How can the government guide our security response to the rally in order to ensure that there are zero publicized instances of real or perceived police, military, or security force brutality?
- What is required for your group to come to agreement?
Issues for Discussion in the General Session (Days 2 and 3)

The Memorandum of Understanding must address the following questions:

- What are the functional objectives of both the movement and the government, in regards to the rally on Inauguration Day?
- What is the overarching message of the movement on Inauguration Day? How can it be mutually beneficial to the civil society organizations, incoming government, and the citizens of Colombia?
- What set of skills and resources does each group bring to the table and how can they be most effectively used to bring about an end to the violence?
- Can the long-term goals of the movement be reconciled with the protection and needs of all Colombians?
- What tangible commitments can the government make publicly to take action to show the success or progress of the demonstration? Who will take an active role/participate from government and civil society constituencies?

Since the mission of MOVICE includes opposition to crimes perpetrated by the state, the organization is wary of compromising its goal of addressing human rights violations committed by corrupt government forces, but is willing to work together with the other groups in order to garner more support for the movement as a whole. MOVICE also recognizes it will need the other movements in order to gain legitimacy from the government and the rest of the country. Therefore, unification of the movement is a critically important goal of the summit. From the government perspective, deciding to legitimize the rally, minimizing anti-government rhetoric, and ensuring that there is no police or security brutality is of the utmost importance to consider. However, getting the various representatives of the national and city government of Bogotá to agree on response is no small feat. In order for the summit to be successful, there must be a balance between the demands of the various groups. In addition, the attendees should acknowledge the common objective of minimizing violence and a commitment to peace.
Colombia Quick Facts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Population</strong></th>
<th>44.91 million</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capital</strong></td>
<td>Bogotá</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government type</strong></td>
<td>Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independence</strong></td>
<td>July 20, 1810 (from Spain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic Groups</strong></td>
<td>Mestizo (58%), white (20%), Mulatto (14%), black (4%), mixed black-Amerindian (3%), and Amerindian (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religions</strong></td>
<td>Roman Catholic (90%), other (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Natural Resources</strong></td>
<td>Coal, petroleum, natural gas, iron ore, nickel, gold, silver, copper, platinum, emeralds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Languages</strong></td>
<td>Spanish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td><strong>Years compulsory</strong>--9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Attendance*--80% of children enter school. Only 5 years of primary school are offered in many rural areas.

*Literacy*--93% in urban areas, 67% in rural areas
III. Political History of Colombia

Colombia is the fourth-largest country in South America (approximately twice the size of France, or the states of California and Texas combined), sharing borders with Panama to the north, the Pacific Ocean to the west, Ecuador and Peru to the south, and Brazil and Venezuela to the east. Known as the gateway between the Americas, Colombia is best known for its dramatic contrasts: its colorful festivals, vibrant Caribbean culture, pristine coastlines rugged Andes Mountains, impoverished Amazon and inhospitable llanos (plains) where the majority of the violent conflict in Colombia’s sixty-old civil war has taken place. With 45 million inhabitants, Colombia is the second-most populous country in South America (after Brazil), and has the second largest internally displaced population in the world (after Sudan). In the rural areas an estimated 80 percent of the population lives in poverty.

Colombia has a highly stratified society with few avenues for social mobility. Combined with an inaccessible rural terrain these conditions have given way to weak governance by the state and ultimately the rise of a left-wing insurgency in competition for power and control over state resources. Colombia is ranked among the most violent countries in the world, and more than two-thirds of those injured or killed in the ongoing conflict are innocent civilians. Between 1990 and 2000 there were 26,985 civilian murders related to the armed conflict, more than twice the 12,887 fatalities in military operations over the same period.

Colombia has three mountain ranges that trisect the country and the lowlands are mostly covered in dense jungle, offering the nation’s notorious rebel and paramilitary groups some crucial advantages: topography perfectly suited to guerrilla warfare, and long mountainous borders with nations not interested in, or unable to crack down on, rebel activity.

What began as an ideological battle in the mid-1960s between the Colombian government and leftist rebels has been entrenched over the years by the rise of lucrative industries surrounding the conflict such as the narcotics trade and black market, as well as the rise of private security firms. While more than 40,000 official deaths have been attributed to the conflict since 1990, the real numbers are estimated to be well over 100,000. Nearly four million people have been forcibly displaced from their homes by the conflict and another estimated one million people have crossed international borders seeking refuge.

Presently, a series of failed official peace processes and numerous unofficial attempts to secure a lasting ceasefire have all fallen short of ensuring human rights and protection of civilians in Colombia. International groups monitoring Colombia report that the conflict has resulted in intolerable levels of human rights violations, largely blaming the paramilitaries and guerrillas alike for their insurgent tactics—and declaring the country to be in a humanitarian crisis.
a. La Violencia

The roots of the Colombian conflict are found in a long-standing power struggle between the Liberal and Conservative political parties dating back to the mid-19th century, which resulted in regional divisions and periods of intense violence. Between 1899-1903, the country erupted into a civil war—known as the War of a Thousand Days—which resulted in the death of more than 100,000 people. Even after the war ended, tensions remained high and hostilities between the two political parties continued to escalate, resulting in sporadic violence and unrest throughout the country that lasted well into the next century.

In the spring of 1948, a popular liberal politician and leading presidential candidate, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, was assassinated on the streets of Bogotá, prompting a massive set of reactionary riots known as the Bogotá Bogotazo. A rising star in Colombian politics, Gaitán was said to be a symbol of stability and hope for the violence-torn country and a bridge between the warring political factions who had been fighting one another for half a century. Within days of his killing, violence spread to other major cities and continued for the next decade in a nightmarish period of bloodletting that is known as La Violencia, and resulted in over 200,000 deaths.

With Gaitán’s death and the rise to power of the conservative elite, many liberal workers and peasants retreated from the cities and into the rural areas seeking a more egalitarian way of life. This demographic shift further polarized the country between the urban conservative elite and the rural liberal proletariat, and it was during this period that a counterinsurgency to political-military power was born.

b. Beginnings of the Insurgency

The growing tension between the classes during this time was compounded by the failure of the Colombian government to provide political representation and services for the peasant class as well as its failure to provide adequate protection to wealthy landowners in an increasingly lawless countryside. Without basic state-supported services such as healthcare and education, rural proletariat leaders filled this political and ideological vacuum with the creation of rebel groups to advance their socialist agenda. Likewise, without a strong state presence to preserve peace and justice, wealthy land-owners became vigilant against near-constant threats of banditry and extortion and filled this security gap by forming and funding paramilitary groups. These groups operated outside of government control and took the law into their own hands.

The 1960s saw the growth of numerous rebel factions. One such group, the National Liberation Army (ELN) was initiated by students of Marxism, many of them inspired by Che Guevara’s socialist ideology. Other smaller guerilla groups also emerged including the M-19 (one of Colombia’s largest rebel groups before they disarmed and transitioned into a political party in the 1980s), the Popular Liberation Army, and the indigenous groups’ Movimiento Armado Quintín Lame. Another rebel group that was founded during this period is Colombia’s oldest and largest: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Founded in 1964 by Jacobo Arenas and Manuel “Sureshot”
Marulanda, its goal was to replace the existing political leadership and system, modeling itself after the guerilla movement in nearby Cuba.

Cuba, where a successful revolution had just overthrown the conservative Batista regime, provided not only inspiration, but also a training ground for aspiring revolutionaries. The rhetoric of the Cuban revolution appealed to rural Colombians because of its message of equal distribution of land and resources, the right to sovereign territories, the right to self-determination, to independence, and to a better way of life.

By the 1980s the FARC had begun to bolster their financial base by expanding their operations to the production and distribution of cocaine, and by levying taxes on the drug cartels as well as extorting taxes from large landowners. By the 1990s, their membership nearly doubled, and their activities— which included kidnappings, hostage-taking, bombings, hijackings, murders and drug trafficking—skyrocketed. Alongside politically-motivated killings, drug-related crime has become the most common cause of death in Colombia after cancer.

During this time, the FARC’s membership grew to include nearly 18,000 combatants and they maintained a presence in nearly 35 percent of Colombia’s territory. The FARC was supplying the U.S. drug market with 60 to 70 percent of its cocaine, bringing lucrative profits back to the rebel group’s coffers. In addition to stockpiling weapons and training combatants with these illicit gains, the FARC built schools, hospitals, and provided social services for their support base. Thus, the FARC essentially acted as a shadow government in the rural areas where Bogotá’s influence did not extend.

Since the FARC’s goals and incentives were no longer exclusively ideologically driven, the violence morphed into an intractable conflict with the state not only for control over land or resources, but more importantly for survival of their livelihood through controlling their area and sphere of influence over the people. The FARC were now fighting a war on two fronts: the first with the state in a political and military struggle for power, and the second with paramilitary groups in a bloody turf war seeking to remove any threat to its territorial control, sphere of authority, and rule over the drug market. Trapped in the middle of the battlefield, thousands of innocent civilian lives were lost (mainly women and children under the age of 18) through extrajudicial kidnappings and killings, and many more were displaced due to threats of violence.

The paramilitaries were formed in the 1960s and 1970s as loosely organized groups of civilians that were armed and equipped by the military with the means to protect themselves against violence and extortion by the rebel groups, especially in rural areas where the presence of the state was weak. They were initially financed by private business and landowners in exchange for the security and protection of their assets. By the 1980s the paramilitaries also had close ties to drug cartels, which were often competing with the guerrilla-run drug operations, and critics have described the present-day paramilitary groups as little more than illicit private security firms for drug traffickers and thugs for the government. Left-wing activists and local communities that promoted self-supporting, non-government activities for human rights and development were often targeted for massacres, kidnappings and assassinations by the paramilitaries.
The government claimed to have no direct ties with the paramilitary groups (although secret meetings were said to be held between high-ranking members of Congress and paramilitary leaders – many of whom were notorious drug lords), and indeed as the number of human rights abuses continued to mount, the paramilitaries seemed to be accountable to no one.

From Bogotá’s perspective, what had begun as a peasant uprising had mushroomed into an increasingly-bloody civil war with a powerful enemy in the rebels and a renegade ally in the paramilitaries independent of government control. Further, both the rebels and paramilitaries were largely being financed by the multi-million dollar drug industry, causing serious concern for Colombia’s main ally to the North: the United States.

On one hand the U.S. saw a strategic ally in Colombia as a leader in democratic values and free market thinking for the southern hemisphere; on the other hand, Colombian cocaine and heroin flowing into the U.S. was a major issue that required action. Furthermore, the U.S. was concerned that political instability and human rights violations by the rebel and paramilitary groups, if left unaddressed, could threaten security in the entire region.

c. War on Drugs

Violence in Colombia escalated into frequent clashes between the government forces, paramilitaries and rebel groups. The war reached a climax in 1992 with the killing of Pablo Escobar, the liberal and notorious drug lord and head of the Medellin Cartel – at that time the most powerful in the country - by Colombian security forces with the help of the United States. This was a severe blow to the rebels who were financed by the drug cartels in exchange for providing private security against the Colombian military and paramilitary groups. Escobar’s death and the subsequent rapid decline of the Medellin Cartel significantly damaged the rebels’ political and military image. In turn, Escobar’s death was seen as a major victory for the Colombian government, and laid the groundwork for future collaboration between Colombia and the United States in fighting the drug war.

In 1998, then-President Andres Pastrana met with U.S. President Bill Clinton to discuss a “Marshall Plan” for Colombia which included an aid package of several billions of dollars in military support and training as well as economic development assistance, to reinforce the Colombian state’s ability to effectively combat drug trafficking and the guerrilla movement.
Plan Colombia

Colombia is the third largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid (after Israel and Egypt) and a strategic ally in the region. Since 2000, the U.S. foreign assistance to Colombia, known as Plan Colombia, has totaled more than $6 billion in economic and military assistance. Plan Colombia’s goal was to bolster economic development, strengthen democratic process, promote human rights, and counter the narcotic trade.

Shortly after the attacks of September 11th, 2001, the FARC, ELN and the paramilitary group the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) were all added to the United States’ and European Union’s international list of terrorist organizations. Plan Colombia subsequently shifted away from fighting the War on Drugs through economic development to fighting the War on Terror through a highly-militarized approach. Since 2001, more than 60 percent of U.S. assistance to Colombia has been earmarked for counter-narcotics military operations against the FARC (including equipment, training, fumigation, and civilian intelligence gathering).

According to a U.S. Justice Department indictment in 2006, the FARC continued to supply more than 60 percent of the cocaine entering the United States, and more than 50 percent of the world's total cocaine. Critics of Plan Colombia hold that coca and poppy production – used to make cocaine and heroin – have actually increased over the last decade despite joint U.S.-Colombian measures.

Uribe's Democratic Security Approach

President Alvaro Uribe was elected in 2002 on a platform to bring an end to the violence. Uribe came to power with a three-part Democratic Security Policy (DSP). First, the DSP increased counter-narcotics and anti-terrorism spending, raising the number and capacity of troops across the country. Second, it increased protection of state assets such as oil and natural gas pipelines, which rebel groups frequently attacked or threatened to attack to extort large payoffs. Finally, the DSP sought to strengthen security linkages to rural areas in three ways: by creating a million-person network throughout the country of civilian informants and collaborators, by organizing a semi-trained peasant militia force to operate in their own home communities, and by taking steps to decentralize military command by granting the military a range of police powers.

In 2003, Uribe orchestrated a major peace deal in which 31,000 paramilitary members and an additional 20,000 members of other illegal armed groups from the rebel factions (including members of the FARC and ELN) were demobilized. In 2005, a controversial law, the Justice and Peace Law, was passed which made demobilized combatants eligible for reduced jail time and protection from extradition if they gave details of their involvement in torture, killings and other crimes. Two years later, a government report announced that homicides, kidnappings, and terrorist attacks in Colombia had decreased by as much as 50 percent - their lowest levels in almost 20 years. The government had established a permanent police or military presence in every Colombian municipality for the first time in decades.
However, implementation of the DSP has been controversial and moves to complete the demobilization process have been fraught with difficulties. In January 2005, Human Rights Watch reported that "paramilitary groups maintain close ties with a number of Colombian military units... [and] the Uribe administration has yet to take effective action to break these ties by investigating and prosecuting high-ranking members of the armed forces.” Furthermore, the discovery of links between presidential intelligence service and paramilitaries as recently as 2005 and the killing of 10 elite counter-narcotics police officers by an army unit in May 2006 have raised fears of infiltration of key state institutions by drug mafia and paramilitaries. In addition to allegations of illicit government ties with the paramilitaries, new armed paramilitary groups, such as the Black Eagles, have emerged to fill the power gap left by those who have demobilized.

d. Current Conditions

Within the past few months, the national political scene in Colombia has experienced significant developments. The Constitutional Court decided in February not to allow President Uribe to seek a third term and tensions increased on each side of the conflict with rebel forces seeking greater political legitimacy through acts such as the release of long-held hostages.

Colombia’s Constitutional Court on February 26th excluded the possibility of President Uribe running for a third term by striking down a proposed referendum that would have asked voters to allow the popular president to seek another four years in office. This major decision has opened the door for reform in Colombia, including changes to Uribe’s market-friendly politics, as well as the Democratic Security Policy. However, Uribe enjoyed widespread support, and many argue he was on a path towards results. Though it was his party’s candidate that ultimately received the vote, and he therefore will likely try to continue much of what Uribe had started, the experience of the campaign and elections themselves were traumatic for Colombia and have left the incoming administration with a whole new set of challenges to face.

As elections drew near, there were attempts on all sides of Colombia’s conflict to assert influence and control, in some cases actively attempting to exacerbate instability. Forceful coercion, bullying tactics, and even accounts of violence perpetrated by both FARC and paramilitary groups attempted to silence the voices calling for peace and non-violent reconciliation in Colombia. While the FARC used coercion to seek greater political inclusion prior to the vote, paramilitary organizations, such as the infamous Black Eagles, responded with violent suppression tactics to prevent just that, and ultimately have become the greatest recent perpetrator of violence.

The incoming administration will need to continue building on the security gains attained under Uribe. However, experts say reforms to the security policy should be undertaken to promote an integrated conflict resolution strategy that addresses non-military aspects of the security agenda, including the root causes of the protracted conflict. These challenges include strengthening the protection of human rights, combating rural alienation through more effective development programs and developing a political
framework for resolving the conflict. The administration will also have the task of addressing the unfortunate violence that overshadowed the election period, healing recent national wounds as they advance new peace initiatives.

Military tensions were already on the rise prior to recent elections. In October 2009, Colombia and the United States signed a deal giving the U.S. military access to seven Colombian bases. This exacerbated already-tense relations with Colombia’s neighbors Venezuela and Ecuador and added to Colombia’s defense concerns after Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez ordered 15,000 troops to the border in preparation for a possible war. In a bold attempt to assert their positions in the conflict, the FARC and the ELN announced that they intended to stop fighting each other and concentrate on attacking the armed forces. New paramilitary outfits continue to emerge onto the scene to respond these threats and to further themselves from the control or support of the government. Just before the New Year, the governor of the southern state of Caquetá, Luis Francisco Cuellar, was abducted from his home and found murdered the following day in a botched kidnapping attempt. Officials blamed the FARC for the killing, and the incident quickly became cited as justification for paramilitary vigilance that exploded during the winter months leading up to elections.

It seems any progress, albeit controversial, that Uribe made in ending the war, is quickly being eroded in 2010. As the situation threatens to deteriorate, the demand and conditions necessary for effective anti-violent intervention are ripening, and the country looks to its new national leadership team with high expectations.
IV. Violent Actors in Colombia

The FARC

The FARC was originally a Marxist group borne out of peasant and land-owner discontent with the government, and its goal was to replace the existing political leadership and system with a more orthodox Marxist ideology. The FARC found its greatest support base in the rural peasantry and its financial base in levying taxes on the drug cartels and extorting taxes from large landowners.

The FARC continued to operate and gain support for its ideological views in the rural areas through the 1960s and 1970s. It was in the early 1980s that the FARC began to realize the potential wealth and power that could be attained through production and distribution of cocaine, and a strategic shift in goals occurred: the FARC’s role as a major player in global drug trafficking emerged as a means of support for waging a military campaign against the state. The financial windfall garnered from the production and distribution of illegal narcotics aided the transformation of the organization’s image from rebel group to army.

As paramilitary groups grew in the 1990s, the rebel group shrank considerably both in size and in influence. In addition to Uribe’s hard line approach to the guerrillas and the coca trade, stepping up the military offensive against rebel groups and their main source of income, record desertions (3,000 in 2008 alone) also suggest morale inside FARC has been hit. The group had about 18,000 fighters in the late 1990s (an estimated 30 to 50 percent of whom were 18 years-old or younger), but this is believed to have dropped to about 9,000 today. In 2008, the FARC suffered a series of blows, including a cross-border raid on their camp by government forces in nearby Ecuador in which senior FARC commander Raul Reyes was killed, the death by natural causes of their founding leader, Manuel “Sureshot” Marandula, and finally, the dramatic rescue of 15 high-profile hostages, including former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt.

Yet, rebels still control the rural areas, particularly in the south and east where the presence of the state continues to be weak and their hostage-taking industry is unfortunately still booming. The FARC now operate under new leadership and appear to be on the rise: the rebels claimed responsibility for more attacks in 2009 than any year since 2003. As of May 2009, the FARC is holding an undetermined amount of hostages – supposedly numbering in the hundreds – including 22 soldiers and police whom the guerrillas want to swap for government concessions.

Paramilitary Activity

A 1965 Colombian law allowed the government to equip the civilian population in initiatives to “restore public order.” The army was enabled to organize the population against the rebels to provide on-the-ground intelligence and support for military troops in combat operations. The paramilitaries have long been seen as the illicit military arm of the government who are fed resources in order to help fight the insurgent groups using
any means possible where legal means have failed (including violent threats, kidnapping and murder, methods which the state cannot employ). Additionally, key leadership positions within the paramilitary blocs have been held by notorious drug lords, blurring the lines between the government’s counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics activities.

The United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), the largest and best-known umbrella group for the paramilitaries, was formed in 1997 and has its roots in the civilian units formed during the 1960s and 1970s that were created with the support of the government and the financing of drug traffickers. During the 1980s, at the height of the drug boom, as the FARC was reaping growing benefits from the drug trade, the AUC also began competing for control of the drug market.

Although the Colombian courts passed a law in 1989 declaring paramilitary activity unconstitutional, the Colombian military and certain members of Congress are suspected of continuing to collaborate closely with the paramilitary groups in their fight against the rebels and the war on drugs. The AUC are estimated to receive as much as 70 percent of their financial support directly from the illegal drug industry in exchange for private security, and are blamed by human rights organizations for as much as 80 percent of atrocities committed against the civilian population, in particular the recent election-related violence.

State Response

In 2002-2003, President Uribe reinforced the powers of the military by declaring a state of unrest and instituted new programs to utilize civilians in military activities. In a parallel move, Uribe issued a declaration in conjunction with the Justice and Peace Law which dramatically reduced the sentencing of paramilitary-related crimes and included a clause protecting former paramilitary members from extradition in exchange for information and collaboration.

The state’s response to the FARC has been much less lenient. Through Plan Colombia, the Colombian government has access to some of the United States’ best military technology and training. Whereas the Colombian state’s response to the paramilitaries has been one of reconciliation and reintegration, the state’s response to rebel groups has been defined primarily by force.

When Colombia and the United States signed the controversial 2009 deal to allow the U.S. military use of Colombian airbases to “fight common threats”, including drug trafficking and terrorism, Colombia’s neighbors expressed their strong concern over increased U.S. military presence in the region, prompting response to an additional, somewhat distracting, threat on national security.
Considered collectively, the many groups campaigning for an end to the civil war inside Colombia comprise one of the world’s largest and most prolonged peace mobilization movements. Such a movement is defined as a popular process that expresses a collective demand for an end to the violence and respect for the civilian population’s rights through nonviolent means. An unfortunate feature of the Colombian peace movement has been the lack of unity among the different groups, each with their own variation of the same anti-violence message. Nonviolent mobilization efforts have protested violence perpetrated by the government, guerrilla movements, and paramilitaries, but they frequently show a preference to focus on one above the others. However, the primary purpose for acting collectively and nonviolently for peace in Colombia has been to popularly express the overall rejection of the armed conflict and its negative consequences for the citizens of Colombia. Nonviolence is not only a way of confronting the continual violence from multiple sources in Colombia; for groups existing on their pacifist principles alone, it is a matter of survival.

**Violence on Civilians**

In the early 1980’s, as a result of the FARC’s established role in the drug trade and related strength, the Colombian government lost control over large swaths of rural territory controlled by the guerrillas. Bent on defeating the FARC, the government employed a variety of strategies to combat the guerrillas, at times using seemingly desperate measures such as sanctioning and facilitating the creation of more paramilitary structures. While there were some initial successes as a few groups immediately improved security and began to coordinate closely with state security and military forces, many of the start-up paramilitary groups descended into thuggery, intimidation, and power abuse. During this period the civilian population remained defenseless against both the FARC and the paramilitaries, wedged between two armed forces competing for power. Instances of abuse, murder, rape, and extortion were widespread throughout Colombia. Citizens had little recourse for the abuses and simply living with the threats and the abuse became a way of life.

**“No Mas FARC”**

In early 2008 hundreds of thousands of Colombians marched throughout the country and in 115 major cities throughout the world to protest against the FARC—specifically their use of kidnapping as weapon. What began as a group of young people venting their rage at the FARC on Facebook ballooned into an international event now recognized as “One Million Voices Against FARC.”

The movement, started by a cyber-protest group, gathered enough momentum for its leaders to organize actual physical non-violent demonstrations throughout 45 cities in Colombia. Additionally, solidarity protests were held in 115 cities worldwide. The event was an example of how technology—such as text messaging, twitter, or social
networking sites like Facebook--can be used to rally large numbers of people globally to a cause.

The protests had the support of the government, several non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and some opposition political parties; however its rally cry of “No Mas FARC” polarized some Colombians rather than bringing them together. While few Colombians support the Marxist insurgent army, many were uncomfortable with the message of the protest, preferring a broader slogan against kidnapping and violence or in favor of peace and negotiations between the government and the rebel army. Recently, having failed to highlight the victims of violence perpetrated by the paramilitary and state security violence, the “No Mas FARC” movement has faced continued pressure to join forces with the anti-paramilitary movement. Its Facebook page continues to grow in membership and its ability to reach supporters at home and abroad remains strong. However, as the anti-paramilitary movement continues to grow the future direction of the organization remains uncertain.

MOVICE

In the wake of recent movements to rally against the FARC, similar groups have begun to pop up, insisting that FARC is only one part of the picture and that Colombians must also combat the atrocities committed by the unregulated paramilitary forces, and in some cases, state security forces as well. One such group is MOVICE, a group dedicated to assisting and connecting victims of alleged “state terrorism” in Colombia.

MOVICE is one of more than 280 organizations that make up the movement against paramilitary and state crimes. The movement itself traces its beginnings to the first campaign against the perceived injustice of the 1990s when the massive loss of life accrued through general violence went largely unacknowledged by the government. A critical component of MOVICE’s work is the “Gallery of Memory Marches” where on the first Friday of every month, family members of victims carry pictures, stories, and other memorabilia of their lost loved ones. Although the Galleries represent only a small portion of the thousands affected by the conflict, their appearance in public demonstrations, major court hearings, and parliamentary discussions are an attempt to represent the suffering of an entire population, and play an integral part of the larger non-violent movement.

Due in part to the efforts of MOVICE, Colombian politicians are beginning to listen to the concerns of victims. Additionally, MOVICE has become a valuable resource to the victims of state associated violence. MOVICE has created an ethics commission composed of 20 foreigners and five local experts. Its purpose is to compile cases of human rights violations and establish legal strategy to ultimately bring perpetrators to justice. MOVICE now has 24 regional and international chapters promoting the visibility of the Colombian conflict.
VI. Colombia’s Key International Relationships

United States

Much of Colombia’s relationship with the United States is defined by the war on drugs and Plan Colombia. However, the United States is an important economic ally for Colombia in terms of trade and foreign direct investment as well. The U.S. is Colombia's largest trading partner, representing about 37 percent of Colombia's exports and 28 percent of its imports. The United States is also the largest source of new foreign direct investment (FDI) in Colombia: in 2008, FDI totaled $10.6 billion. The two countries are in the middle of negotiating what would be a historic free trade agreement as well.

Economic relations between the two take a back seat to security concerns and cooperation, however. Shortly after the attacks on September 11th, 2001, the United States added the FARC, ELN and AUC to the international list of terrorist organizations, a move effectively shifting U.S. priorities away from “a negotiated peace” in Colombia and toward a highly militarized anti-terrorism strategy as part of its “war on terror.” More than 60 percent of U.S. assistance to Colombia through Plan Colombia (a total of more than $6 billion since 2000) has been earmarked for security forces to be implemented in counter-narcotics military operations (equipping, training, fumigations, and civilian intelligence gathering). Colombia is the third largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid (after Israel and Egypt).

In short, much of the significant economic interest the United States takes in Colombia is wrapped up in its two wars there: the War on Drugs and the War on Terror.

Venezuela

Colombia's relations with its neighbor Venezuela have been tumultuous virtually since the beginning of their political definitions. Illegal incursions by the each country's military forces into the other’s territory have been frequent since the conflict in Colombia escalated in the 1980s, which subsequently triggered forced displacements both within Colombia and into Venezuela. Many of the Colombians escaping to Venezuela to work in low-end jobs later were imprisoned there under deplorable conditions, facing discrimination and enduring human rights violations. Illegally armed groups have also trespassed into Venezuela to commit crimes. Contraband flows from one territory to another depending on supply and demand along the porous border of 1,375 miles. Black market products range from gasoline, drugs and weapons to stolen cars.

The relationship between Colombia and Venezuela worsened significantly due to the ideological differences that separated Hugo Chávez and Uribe, reaching a first low point in November 2007 with a failed effort to achieve a humanitarian exchange. Since then, the relationship has continued to worsen.
When The United States and Colombia signed the controversial October 2009 deal to allow the U.S. military use of at least seven Colombian airbases to “fight common threats”, including drug-trafficking and terrorism, Chavez condemned the deal, accusing Colombia of carrying out a military incursion into his country, called his ambassador back to Caracas and froze relations with the Uribe government. Just prior to that the Colombian government had accused Venezuela of aiding the FARC’s acquisition of AT4 anti-tank rockets. Trade between the two countries was suspended, effectively halting the roughly $7 billion in annual revenue, and diplomatic relations slowed to a near stand still. In November 2009, Chavez urged his armed forces to be prepared for war with Colombia and ordered 15,000 troops to the border, amid growing tensions.

**Ecuador**

Venezuela has not been the only route of escape for Colombians fleeing the violence. Ecuador has also received many Colombian refugees, including much of the Colombian elite and upper middle class. However, the FARC have also sought safe haven in Ecuador. They suffered a major blow in 2008 when Colombian military forces mounted a cross-border raid on their camp a little more than a mile inside Ecuador. In the raid, senior FARC commander Raul Reyes was killed along with some 19 of his guerrillas, and one Ecuadorian soldier. This cross-border attack set off a diplomatic crisis between Colombia and Ecuador (and Venezuela again as well).

Colombian president Alvaro Uribe called the Ecuadorian president Rafael Correa, to assure him that Colombian forces had crossed the border in pursuit of the guerrillas during combat, rather than as a part of a planned incursion. Correa said he would investigate the events and later accused the Colombian government of lying, recalling his ambassador in Bogotá. The Colombian government subsequently apologized for its actions, but especially given the close relationship between Ecuador and Venezuela, relations with Colombia remain tense. Border traffic between the two, however, remains robust.

**Brazil**

The border that Colombia and Brazil share is one of dense Amazonian jungle, and virtually impossible to control, especially from the Brazilian side, whose military is largely incapable of reaching it. Perhaps the most significant part of Colombia’s relationship with Brazil is the agreement the two signed in March 2009 permitting Colombia to chase Colombian militants — who frequently cross international boundaries to avoid capture — into Brazil. For Brasilia, an agreement like this ensures that Brazil never becomes a safe haven for FARC. Perhaps most important, it also offers a chance to make progress on a prime strategic imperative for Brazil, namely, control of its immense borders.

Because battle-hardened Colombia bears most of the security burden in the agreement, Brazil’s historically uncontrollable border may now become one of its most secure borders.
VI. Multi-Media Resources

2001 Conflict and Human Development Index
Map of Colombia

Civilians Caught in the middle of the violence
Report from AlJazeera English
March 18, 2010
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f2GRhSE7i54

Paramilitary violence displaces rural Colombians to urban slums
April 9, 2009
Video Report by Irish journalist Karen Coleman
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=77KaeX2KFoI&feature=related

No Mas FARC on Facebook
http://apps.facebook.com/nomasfarc/en/?_fb_fromhash=deda065d3b32e6f7b9968781ecc5b689

Virtual photo tour of downtown Bogota and the inauguration grounds of Plaza de Bolivar:
http://studenttravel.about.com/od/bogotaphotos/ig/Bogota-Photos--Bogota-Colombi/

Bogota map showing various country Embassies in relation to Plaza de Bolivar,
inauguration ground zero:
http://photos1.blogger.com/blogger/7302/2938/1600/BogotamapEmbassies.jpg

Helicopter video footage of the No Mas FARC march in Bogota on February 4, 2008:
http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x4ldml_no-mas-farc-febrero-4_news
National Peace Essay Contest 2010 Awards Program
The Effectiveness of Nonviolent Civic Action: Simulation on Colombia

VII. Appendix & Supporting Documents
Description

1. Map of Effected Population in the Colombia Armed Conflict in 2005 [page 26]


4. Photo of Inauguration Ceremony Site at the National Capital Building in Bogota, Colombia [Below]

![Photo of the National Capital Building in Bogota, Colombia]
Colombia: Armed Conflict – Affected population (March 2005)
March 31, 2005
Source(s): United Nations Country Team in Colombia (UNCT)
Related Document: - UN Humanitarian Situation Room – Colombia Report Mar 2005
VIII. List of Public Roles

Moderators

Cardinal Rubiano Hoyos
President Emeritus of the Pontifical Commission of Ecclesia Dei - Columbia
Catholic Church of Colombia

The Catholic Church is a vocal and committed actor in the struggle for a negotiated and just peace in Colombia. The legitimacy, organizational capacity, resources and leadership of the Catholic Church in Colombia have enabled the Church to bring together conflicting sectors of Colombian society and mobilize and empower the Colombian people to search for paths to lasting peace. Church leaders have been engaged at every level of peacebuilding, from the official peace processes to grassroots initiatives. The guiding values of the Catholic Church in its peacebuilding ministry in Colombia are the respect for all life and the protection of human dignity. The Church’s mission in Colombia is dedicated to proclaiming the gospel of peace. Their neutral role was sought out to help in mitigating differences among the parties to achieve a unified front.

Cardinal Rubiano Hoyos was invited to chair the general summit by ICNC’s Anna Maria Delgado and former Domestic Political Advisor to President Uribe, Manuel Constantine Gonzalez. The parties met when ICNC and Gonzalez sought out support and experience in mediation in Colombia and looked to find a respected leader in Colombia knowledgeable in issues concerning non-violent civic action. When Delgado and Rodriguez decided to pull various non-violent stakeholder groups together with the representatives from the government and security forces, they were keen to draw on Hoyos’ experience in mediation, community organization, and crafting strategies for large cohesive non-violent movements.

Cardinal Hoyos has an extensive background in studying peace movements, human rights and non-violent civic organization. Born in Medellín, Colombia, Darío Castrillón Hoyos attended the seminaries in Antioquia and Santa Rosa de Osos before going to Rome to study at the Pontifical Gregorian University. He was ordained to the priesthood in 1952. Hoyos is a well known and well respected religious figure in Colombia. He is legendary for having once disguised himself as a milkman to gain access to the home of drug lord Pablo Escobar, and after revealing himself, successfully persuading Escobar to confess his sins. In 1998 he also served as papal envoy to the signing of the peace accord between Peru and Ecuador to settle their contentious border dispute.

Anna Maria Delgado (Moderator, Civil Society Plenary)
Senior Director of Civic and Field Learning
International Center on Non-Violent Conflict

The International Center on Non-Violent Conflict (ICNC) is an independent, nonprofit educational foundation based in Washington, D.C. ICNC develops and encourages the study and use of civilian-based, non-military strategies to establish and defend human
rights, democracy, and justice worldwide. It accepts no grants, contracts or funding of any kind from any government, government-related organization, or from any other foundation, corporation, or institution. It is funded entirely by the family philanthropy of the founding Chairman Gary Ackerman. ICNC will be assisting MOVICE in chairing the summit meeting. Their neutral role was sought out to help in mitigating differences among the parties to achieve a unified front.

Anna Maria Delgado was invited to co-chair the summit by Alejandro Ramirez. The two met when ICNC sought out Ramirez to offer support and training by their global network of experts in non-violent civic action. Delgado and Ramirez continued to stay in touch, and when the momentum carried the movement towards the inauguration rally an opportunity for collaboration presented itself. When Ramirez decided to pull various non-violent stakeholder groups together with the representatives from the government and security forces, he was keen to draw on Delgado’s experience in community organization and crafting strategies for large cohesive non-violent movements. Delgado has an extensive background in human rights and non-violent civic organization. Prior to working for ICNC she led capacity building projects for the International Rescue Committee (IRC) targeted at community-based organizations in the United States. She worked on community mobilization projects for Mercy Corps in conflict and post-conflict countries such as Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, and Afghanistan. And, she began her career working for the United Nations Office of the High Representative in Sarajevo, in Bosnia’s post-war civilian peace implementation organization.

**Manuel Constantine Gonzalez** (Moderator, Government Plenary)

[Outgoing] Senior Domestic Policy Advisor

*President Uribe’s Administration*

The job of the transition team, led by Ms. Beatriz Guzman, leading up to and through inauguration, is to get the president's momentum going so that he is already in full swing by his first day in a decision-making role. To do so, the transition team relies heavily on close coordination with the outgoing administration. The incoming president will face the daunting task of taming the largest guerrilla movement in the hemisphere, something his predecessor Alvaro Uribe made dents in and now must be carried on.

Enter Manuel Constantine Gonzalez, President Uribe's long trusted Senior Domestic Policy Advisor, and someone who knows all too well the challenges the incoming administration faces. Mr. Gonzalez has been invited to offer his neutral, now retired, but knowledgeable, assistance. Towards this end, Mr. Gonzalez will play a facilitation and advisory role in the closed off-the-record plenary session with government officials to discuss the potential for a large-scale movement forming demonstrations on inauguration day – a day wrought in history with violence. Following the inter-governmental meeting, Mr. Gonzalez will continue his mediator role in a large scale summit of all interested parties and will try and help the group draft a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).

Mr. Gonzalez is widely credited as being a driving force in subduing the FARC insurgency and paramilitary forces—to the extent they were subdued—during Uribe's second term. His ability to assemble and manage competent teams that work hard, his
ego, and his ability to run on little sleep are rumored to be the drivers of his success. Now, in his late sixties, Mr. Gonzalez has decided to retire, this summit likely being his last official duty.

Civil Society Plenary Session

**Head of Delegation**

*Alejandro Ramirez*

**Director**

*National Movement of Victims of State Crimes (MOVICE)*

In response to the February 2008 anti-FARC protests, the National Movement of Victims of State Crimes (MOVICE) organized an alternative set of global rallies in March of that year. Focusing beyond the FARC to include the ongoing problem of unlawful killings by paramilitary and security forces, organizers held demonstrations throughout Colombia. Recently, Colombian and international human rights organizations have sought to bring human rights abuses to national and international attention and to demand justice from state authorities. At least 330 civilians were reported to have been victims of unlawful killings by members of the security forces in 2007 alone. Many of the killings were referred to the military justice system, only to be closed without any serious attempt to hold those responsible to account. As a result of their work in exposing unlawful killings and the impunity that surrounds the cases, members of MOVICE have continually been under pressure, receiving death threats and being publically criticized by government officials suggesting their work is part of a guerrilla strategy to undermine and discredit security forces.

Alejandro Ramirez has been the driving force behind the mass mobilization of MOVICE and largely responsible for its recent strategy of attempting to bring together various non-violent civil society and human rights organizations under one tent to pressure the government to put an end to the culture of violence and impunity. His pragmatism and passion has helped MOVICE to attract such large numbers, and place the movement in the position to have the ear of the Colombian government and incoming administration. MOVICE’s following has grown, and as Ramirez ramps up for the Inauguration Day movement, he recognizes he will need to bring all the affected parties together, including former adversaries. With the help of the International Center for Non-Violent Conflict (ICNC), Ramirez and MOVICE will attempt to build on lessons from past successful movements and create a new unified national movement.

**Participants**

*Sergio Rodriquez*

**Director of Human Services**

*Association of Peasant Farmers of Antioquia (Asociación Campesina de Antioquia)*
The Association of Peasant Farmers of Antioquia (ACA) strives to rebuild the lives of Colombian farmers and families that have been displaced from their homes as a result of violence conflict in Colombia. These families are forced to move with very few belongings and have to restart in different cities. Because they have little with which to build new communities, their lives are wracked with poverty and desperation due to disease, hunger, and lack of resources in the crude shantytowns in which they live.

Efforts have been made to bring these families back to the land they were forced to flee. Various human rights and aid organizations, including the Colombian Commission of Jurists, have aided the ACA’s efforts to bring these families to justice, but with little overall success because so many issues surrounding the subject need to be addressed, including security, adequate resources, transportation, and proper government intervention to alleviate legal and procedural pressures.

Director of Human Services Sergio Rodríguez works directly with these displaced families in order to give them the proper national and international attention and to improve their condition. His end goal is that of ACA’s – to help these families go back to their homes and start their lives anew. He has been a trusted and dedicated member of ACA for almost a decade.

**Pepe Felipe Hernandez**

**Public Ambassador**

*Peace Community of San Jose de Apartado*

The Peace Community of San Jose de Apartado was founded in March of 1997 by a group of refuge farmers from several villages that had been attacked by paramilitary groups in late 1996 and early 1997. Today, it consists of about 1500 farmers, all working toward the common goal of promoting peace and self-sufficiency in the region. They do so by refusing to take part in the country's conflict in any way other than to openly and publicly criticize the war crimes committed by both sides of the armed conflict. They refuse to collaborate with any members of any party involved in the conflict and refuse to carry any weapons. When the community was attacked by Army Soldiers in February of 2005 and 8 of the community members were killed (including four children) the community began joining forces with other Colombian human rights organizations to campaign for peace, equality, and an end to the armed conflict within the country.

Pepe Felipe Hernandez joined the Peace community in 2001, shortly after a paramilitary organization in the region stormed his village and brutally murdered many of the villagers. Since joining the Peace community, he has worked with the other villagers to promote peace in the region and has become involved in the community's outreach program. Although more than 170 community members have been murdered by army and paramilitary groups since the organization's founding, Hernandez was motivated to bring his community’s promotion of peace to the national stage after some higher-profile murders in 2005.
Pepe has come to this conference in an attempt to tell the community about his goals and the goals of the Peace Community and promote the creation of similar communities throughout the country. He also intends to exchange ideas with members of other similar communities and promote inter-community discussion and collaboration—looking to create a community of mutual support among similar organizations.

**Maria Bocanegra**  
**Director**  
*National Indigenous Organization of Colombia (ONIC)*

Otherwise known as ONIC, the National Indigenous Organization of Colombia was established in 1982 as the result of a compromise between the Colombian and indigenous communities at the First National Indigenous Congress. ONIC works to protect the lives, rights, and cultural and traditional values of Colombia’s indigenous people, who encompass less than one percent of the total population. Given that the territory and human rights of the indigenous communities have been largely overrun in the past by the government and multi-national resource extraction corporations, this group advocates on behalf of the land rights, natural resources and local economies of these communities. The indigenous population in Colombia has not fared well for decades, therefore this organization seeks to protect and preserve what remains of this culture.

Recently there has been a string of events that have stirred the indigenous community. The ONIC issued a press release, stating that harassment and threats by armed guards continue to target the indigenous communities of Choca, a stronghold of the ONIC. Repeated instances of harassment, extortion, and abuse have continued to surface. As Director of ONIC, and a member of the indigenous community herself, Ms. Bocanegra is attending the summit in an effort to improve protection for her community against intimidation and violence by armed security forces and paramilitary activity.

**Guillermo Diego Alvarez**  
**Community Leader**  
*Black Communities Process*

Proceso de Comunidades Negras (PCN) was founded by Carlos Rosero to represent the interests of the Afro-Colombian communities. It is a part of a broader social movement that connects a variety of organizations and individuals working to progress the community’s objectives. The Afro-Colombian struggle began when Africans were taken from their homelands and submitted to slavery. In 1851, when slavery was abolished in Colombia, titles to land were given as a form of reparation. The newly emancipated people found refuge in the remote regions of Colombia and learned to thrive despite harsh conditions. Although this land has been largely ignored, it was recently recognized as highly fertile and resource-rich. As such, it is becoming increasingly desirable for economic ventures of the state. The community sees itself as the product of centuries of struggle—for freedom from Spanish colonialism, slavery, and now economic globalization.
Afro-Colombians are one of the groups most affected by the internal armed conflict. Large-scale, government-supported economic operations have seized their land resulting in approximately two million internally displaced persons, of which the Colombian government estimates 30 per cent are Afro-Colombians. Paramilitary groups have identified the Afro-Colombians as ‘defenders of the guerillas’ and therefore view them as military targets. The leaders of the movements, who have the strongest conviction in defending their land rights, have been specifically targeted. Paramilitary groups have continually slaughtered Afro-Colombians and terrorized the survivors. The PCN demands that the Afro-Colombian autonomy be restored and armed conflict halted.

Guillermo Diego Alvarez is a proud community leader known for his fervor in protecting his community. Despite the inherent risks that he faces from the aggressive paramilitaries, he attests that he will not cave into the intimidation and will always continue to fight for justice.

**Marisol Fula Guevara Chávez**
**Director**
*La Red Juvenil de Medellín (The Youth Network of Medellín)*

Marisol Guevara Chavez is the director of La Red Juvenil, a network of around 150 Colombian youth who oppose the civil war and instead promote a pacifist philosophy. For over twenty years, the organization has advocated conscientious objection to Colombia’s forced military conscription. It aims to increase awareness for conscientious objection and nonviolence through rallies, music and art, and other programming in the Medellín area. The government requires all men to serve in the military for one year if they have completed high school, and two years upon turning 18 if they have not. There are some exemptions from service, and boys from richer families are usually able to pay a fee to avoid conscription. The right to conscientiously oppose conscription is protected by the Colombian constitution.

Marisol has been personally committed to nonviolence all of her life. She grew up in an impoverished slum of Colombia’s second-largest city, Medellín, and her brother was killed by an explosion after being enticed into joining a paramilitary group when he was only 14. She works to empower youth in the local communities of Medellín to avoid violence and forced military service, as well as illegal recruitment by paramilitary groups. Marisol’s young age enables her to connect to the youth of Medellín and her primary objective is to serve as an advocate for those who do not want to be a part of the violence that threatens the country, and to make the military’s service requirements more equitable.

**Lorenzo Gutierrez**
**Director of Rural Development**
Colombian Environmental Protection Organization: National Rural Development Institute
The Colombian Environmental Protection Organization is a non-profit organization that seeks to protect Colombia’s environment from ongoing degradation perpetrated mainly by multi-national organizations that are buying land to produce primarily African palm oil and bananas. This group claims that this practice is not only destroying the land through deforestation, but the process is also forcibly displacing many Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities that inhabit the land. Their mission is to formulate, coordinate, and evaluate policies that promote competitive and sustainable development in agricultural processes and rural development with a specific emphasis in decentralization, consultation, and cooperation that will contribute to and improve the quality of life of the Colombian people.

As Director of Rural Development, Mr. Gutierrez has been a pivotal part of numerous environmental efforts such as a partnership with Sika Corp. that led to the preservation and re-naturalization of lake ‘Laguna Fuquene.’ He has also recently completed a restructuring process that strengthened technical activities such as agricultural sanitation, access to new markets, and technological advancements for the country’s agricultural systems. In addition, he has worked with national and local government officials to promote and advise on responsible environmental practices.

Mr. Gutierrez is known as a hard and efficient worker with excellent oratory skills – he is also known to possess a true concern for Colombia’s natural environment and its people. He is looking forward to working on policies that will benefit both the environment and improve citizens’ lives.

**Adelina Guadalupe Rodrigo-Vega**

**Director**

*Colombian Women’s Group: The National Network of Women*

This organization began in 1992 after active participation in the National Constituent Assembly of 1991 advocating on behalf of all Colombian women in the legislative processes and also to promote the political inclusion of women in public office. In addition, this national group also supports efforts to protect the rights of women who have been victimized in the internal conflict and include women’s voices into the peace process.

It is extremely important to this organization, and therefore also Ms. Rodrigo-Vega, that feminist values and points of view be taken into account when thinking about human rights. Through the Colombian Women’s Group, women have put together an advocacy strategy that would “ensure an effective realization of the rights of women.” The main objectives of the organization are to influence legislative processes favorable to women, to strengthen the voices and collective voice of regional and local women, to encourage active political participation in decision-making bodies, and to raise awareness of the impact of conflict on women's lives.
Previous press releases from this organization have included forceful statements against violent action that other groups have threatened to involve the Colombian Women’s Group in, as well as statements of organized marches that have protested restrictions on abortion as well as gender-based violence.

**Bishop Gabriel Delmar**  
President  
*Catholic Church Group: Colombian Conference of Bishops*

Colombia’s almost overwhelmingly Catholic population makes the Colombian Conference of Bishops a critical component to any efforts at community organization in the country. However, the group is no stranger to violence. In 2002 Bishop Jorge Jimenez, Bishop of Zipaquira and head of the Latin American Episcopal Conference, was kidnapped for political reasons, and other clergyman have faced harassment and intimidation in recent years. The group is committed to achieving permanent peace through non-violent action, and would like to play a large role in any community driven process.

The Conference wishes to focus on the important aspects of social assistance for displaced people within the country, who have not been served by the government for political reasons, as well as continuing to make overtures for a peace that is both stable and effective. Notwithstanding the personal injuries that have been sustained by the Conference, the community would still like to push for peace through nonviolent action.

The group has noted that, “In the period between 1985 and 2008 over 4.5 million people were forcibly displaced in Colombia, the equivalent of 10 percent of the population of the country. Colombia also has suffered high rates of forced disappearances, massacres, selective assassinations, and a largely hidden epidemic of gender-based violence and other crimes.” Therefore, the Colombian Conference of Bishops has called on all the non-violent groups at the conference to sign a National Accord for Peace and Reconciliation in order to ensure that there is a united front asking for peace in Colombia for all.

**Reverend Benitio Delgado**  
Pastor of The Holy Virgin Church in Barranquilla, Columbia and Head Community Organizer of Barranquilla.  
*Evangelical Church Group: PlantingPeace (SembrandoPaz)*

PlantingPeace is a peace and development initiative of Protestant churches on the North Coast of Colombia facilitated by Mennonite peace leader, Ricardo Esquivia. Launched in May 2004, PlantingPeace began a peace and development initiative in one of the poorest, most conflicted, and culturally diverse areas in Colombia. PlantingPeace is helping Protestant churches to form a network of income-generating projects to rebuild communities torn by violence and displacement. To date, 230 churches from 29 denominations have joined the initiative, forming 130 local associations, benefiting nearly 4000 church members and the surrounding communities. In July 2005, Montes de
María, a mountainous region on the northern coast of Colombia, was designated a "laboratory of peace" by the European Union.

As a member of this group, Rev. Delgado wants to start a ground up grassroots movement. According to Delgado each person is unique and has a right to life, but individual rights are protected by ensuring rights for all, which is done by fostering a strong community. This growth stems from the church and from projects that support group activities. The Reverend believes that when people work together on something, they have a vested interest in the future and will be less likely to destroy it.

At the conference, Rev. Delgado seeks to show that individuals can make a positive change in Colombia, but only by being united and working towards a goal. He believes this goal should be institution building. He realizes it is harder to change ideologies than the environment so he seeks for Colombians to build schools, churches, and day care facilities. Planting peace holds that violence is a result of misinformation, and will diminish with education and projects that encourage team building within both rural and urban areas in Colombia.

**Diego Fernando Del Mar**  
*Union Organizer*  
*National Union of Food Industry Workers (Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Industria de Alimentos, SINALTRAINAL)*

As a union organizer for SINALTRAINAL, Diego Fernando Del Mar represents the interests of trade union workers in Colombia’s food industry and is responsible for organizing against the unfair business practices of multinational companies employing large numbers of low-wage Colombians. In July 2001, he worked with the United Steelworkers of America and the International Labor Rights Fund to file a lawsuit against Coca-Cola, accusing it of connections to paramilitaries who have repeatedly carried out acts of violence, torture, and assassination of trade union leaders in Colombia. In 2003, the U.S. District Court dismissed the charges against the company, and conditions for workers remained the same despite the increased attention. Gonzalez has pushed for safer working conditions in Coca-Cola Company’s bottling plants for over a decade, on occasion taking cases to court on the grounds that organized violence against union workers carried out by paramilitaries was supported by the executives of these companies.

Membership in SINALTRAINAL has dropped by more than half since 1995, when Isidro Segundo Gil, a member of the executive board of SINALTRAINAL, was killed by paramilitaries and his workers were forced to disperse. Del Mar continues to push for greater rights and fairer working conditions for trade union workers, has no investment in an anti-FARC movement, and is instead focused on ending the paramilitary-corporate crimes against those workers.
Oscar Morales  
Creator and Director  
One Million Voices Against FARC/ No Mas FARC Movement

In February 2008, hundreds of thousands of Colombians, calling themselves the No Mas FARC movement, protested in Bogota against the continued existence of the Marxist FARC rebels. The group was aiming to increase awareness of kidnappings and people who had been held in captivity for months (sometimes years) without any charges or proper trials. Although the problem was a widespread one, the issue had never gained enough momentum – until Morales and the advent of his Facebook group entitled “One Million Voices against FARC.”

Through Facebook, Oscar Morales managed to achieve what very few had been able to do before. The movement started out small – but, soon, over 250,000 people had joined the group, and numbers continued to grow daily. Though not involved with the government or with “traditional” protestors in any form (Morales was a 33-year-old engineer), he brought a large portion of Colombia together over an extremely divisive issue.

Morales originally started his Facebook group as a personal statement of his political beliefs, but the movement soon took greater shape. The Facebook group began to balloon. Colombian expatriates learned about the movement from the Facebook group, leading Morales to eventually call for an international movement and multiple marches in several countries around the world. Although some people thought the statements made by protestors were too divisive and violent (“No More FARC” was also the battle cry of the movement), the event was a symbolic example of not only the power of social networking to increase awareness of important human rights issues around the world but also to organize visible protests in the real world rather than being limited to the virtual world alone.

Mayra Sofia Torres  
Chair of the General Assembly, Colombian Commission of Jurists  
Advisor to the UN, Colombian Commission of Jurists (CCJ)

The Colombian Commission of Jurists (CCJ) was created in 1988 to utilize legal measures to promote respect for human rights, democracy and peace in Colombia. The work of the Commission contributes to the development of international human rights law and international humanitarian law in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and the full force of the Colombian state’s social and democratic rule of law. While the CCJ is a non-government, non-partisan organization, it does maintain advisory status with the United Nations. To achieve its goals, the Commission collects and analyzes information about human rights, making it public in order to promote awareness and the effective use of international legal instruments that protect these rights.
Mayra Sofia Torres is the Chair of the General Assembly of the CCJ. She is a lawyer by trade and has been working to promote and protect human rights in Colombia for nearly two decades. Well-aware of the travesties that have ravaged the country, she is seeking to expose these abuses and thus force the Colombian government to take responsibility for its actions.

**Luis Fernando Santos**  
**Director**  
*Foundation for Security & Democracy (FSD)*  
Established in 2002 and located in Bogota, the Foundation for Security and Democracy (FSD) is led by a Board of Trustees of former Colombian government Ministers, academics and journalists who seek to promote security and democracy in Colombia. The FSD is an independent, non-partisan, academic entity established to influence policy making and to amplify the public debate on themes of security and national defense. Areas of focus include the armed conflict, urban security and policy, narco-trafficking, regional and international security, institutional and political security, and legislative support. The Foundation publishes and widely distributes articles and bulletins that put forth analysis on Colombian democracy and security with sections on variables FSD deems most relevant to the situation. The recipients of these publications are influential members of the political, economic and social leadership of the country, as well as stewards of security sector public policy, academicians, journalists and members of the Colombian Military Forces and National Police.

Luis Fernando Santos is the Director of the FSD and a retired Colombian military officer. After his military service, he worked in the private sector as an economic security adviser for international businesses for several years before joining the Foundation. He will be interested in how this summit will support Colombian public defense and national security through the proposed march.
Government Plenary Session

Head of Delegation
Beatriz Valentina Yepes Guzman
Chief of Staff for the Transition Team of the President-Elect of Colombia
Presidential Transition Team

When the president-elect officially takes over as Colombia's president in the August inauguration, he will be relying on his transition chief of staff, Ms. Beatriz Guzman, to ensure that he is ready to hit the ground running. As president, he faces the daunting task of taming the largest guerrilla movement in the hemisphere, something his predecessor Alvaro Uribe made dents in but did not accomplish, and now must be carried on. The job of the transition team leading up to and through inauguration, is to get the president's momentum going so that he is already in full swing by his first day in a decision-making role. To do so, the transition team relies heavily on close coordination with the outgoing administration as well as with various civil society organizations and constituency base groups to begin to formulate the new administration's policies. A priority will be given to those that need to be addressed immediately, namely what the official approach to ending the violence in Colombia will be. The incoming administration may also need to have a response to any civil unrest at the ready as well.

Towards this end, Ms. Guzman will be co-leading a closed off-the-record meeting with government officials to discuss rumors that a large-scale movement may be forming and intending to demonstrate on Inauguration Day – a day wrought in history with violence. Following the inter-governmental meeting, Ms. Guzman has agreed to attend a large scale summit of all interested parties as the official representative to the president-elect, though she does not yet hold an official role in the incoming administration, just its transition team. She will be joined by the outgoing Senior Domestic Policy Advisor to President Uribe, Manuel Constantine Gonzalez who will act as a facilitator and advisor to the process.

Ms. Guzman played a critical role in the election of the incoming president, having acted as campaign manager in the final months leading up to elections. Her previous experience includes having managed the campaign of former president Uribe, and multiple key communications roles within the former administration. Ms. Guzman is a native of Bogotá.

Participants

Silvio Enrique Gutierrez
Mayor
City of Bogotá

Bogotá is the capital city of Colombia. With over seven million residents within the city limits it is also the largest and most populous city in the country. Silvio Gutierrez has served as the city’s mayor since 2007. He was elected to fill big shoes, replacing a mayor
that was widely regarded for transforming the city from a polluted, crime-ridden mess, into a clean, functioning metropolis, improving transportation, increasing green space, and reforming public services such as the public library system. Bogotá is a source of pride for many Colombians due to its rich heritage, impressive architecture, and scenic beauty. The former mayor’s administration changed a derelict downtown avenue into a grand pedestrian boulevard, and a slum near the presidential palace into a 36-acre park. Crime fell 35 percent during his two years in office. Nearing the end of his first term, set to conclude in 2011, Gutierrez has been criticized recently by the media, members of his own political party, and a large portion of his constituency for his lack of results in city security, maintaining transit systems, and unfulfilled promises made during his campaign regarding economic growth based on a continuation of the previous mayoral administration’s city rejuvenation initiatives.

In addition to being the capital, Bogotá is Colombia’s largest economic center. Most companies in Colombia have their headquarters in the city and it is home to the majority of foreign companies doing business in Colombia as well. Bogotá’s downtown commercial centers, restaurants, businesses, and nightlife generate a substantial amount of commerce and wealth for the Colombian economy. Ensuring that this commerce runs smoothly and safely is a top priority for not only the city, but the national government as well.

With the upcoming inauguration and impending demonstration, Gutierrez is looking forward with both hope and trepidation. Hope at the prospect of the additional commerce and spotlight the inauguration event will bring for Bogotá and his primary donor base, and trepidation that those prospects might be disrupted by tens of thousands of protestors descending on the city causing chaos and deterring tourism. Gutierrez is a member of the opposition Independent Democratic Pole (PDI) party, a more left-wing social democratic party in Colombia. While the IDP is able to work with the current administration on a number of social and economic issues, the party’s major difference is it’s unwavering support for a negotiated political settlement with the country’s rebel insurgent groups. However, regardless of party politics, many speculate that Gutierrez has his eyes on re-election and building political strength, and that when the when the national and international spotlights shine on Bogotá for the inauguration they will see a city and a mayor in lockstep with the previous and incoming administration.

Cesar del Toro
Assistant Director
Administrative Department of Security (DAS)

The DAS is the principal agency responsible for enforcement of laws relating to national security. This organization has a national role similar to that of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the United States. The formal responsibilities under the DAS's mandate included investigating crimes against the internal security of the state, fraud against the state and its financial institutions, breaches of the public faith, and crimes affecting individual liberty and human rights. The DAS is also responsible for screening and maintaining records on foreigners who enter the nation and for enforcing
immigration laws. The DAS had both investigative and intelligence-gathering responsibilities.

Cesar del Toro is a career DAS agent and has held the Assistant Director position since 2008. He is known throughout the Colombian security sector for his pugnacity on the inter-agency battlefield and his loyalty to the outgoing Uribe administration. The Colombian intelligence sector remembers him as a former standout agent and a master of intelligence tradecraft. Mr. del Toro considers himself a soldier both in the War on Terror and the War on Drugs and will likely be suspect of the inauguration protests because of the security threats any gathering of that magnitude pose in Colombia. Combating the threat of a terrorist act will likely be first and foremost on his agenda.

**Ximena Camila Hurtado Ortíz**  
**Ombudsman-elect (Public Defender)**  
Ombudsman’s Office of Colombia (Defensoría del Pueblo)

The Ombudsman’s Office of Colombia (Defensoría del Pueblo) is the national government agency that is charged with overseeing the protection of Civil and Human Rights within the legal framework of the Republic of Colombia. The Ombudsman, or public defender, is an official appointed by the President, and elected by the Chamber of Representatives, or lower house of Congress, of Colombia, to head this agency. While the Ombudsman’s Office is officially adscribed an official government oversight body, the Inspector General’s Office, it operates independently in administration and budget and often garners far more notoriety.

Ximena Ortíz has been appointed by the President-elect, however, is still waiting for congressional approval, something she will likely not have a problem doing due the high favor she enjoys among the Chamber of Representatives. Ms. Ortíz leaves her position as chair of the department of public law at the National University of Colombia to take up this post. She has over 15 years experience in human rights law – which she received throughout Latin America, and includes a brief junior stint at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), before returning to her home city of Bogota.

While still in transition, and not yet official, Ms. Ortíz's role in the summit will be to advise the President-elect in areas concerning human rights as if she were already in office. Her overall mandate areas include the ability to investigate human rights violations, mediation among conflicting parties, and the overall education of human rights – something the Ombudsman's office must carry out through official state media channels only. Without the power of implementation, and often relying on reputation and prestige to get messages across, Ms. Ortíz faces the formidable challenge of being new in office, not to mention the fact she is a woman.
Germán González Reyes  
Incoming Minister of Communications  
Ministry of Information Technology and Communication (MINTIC)

The Ministry of Technology and Communication (MINTIC) defines and promotes information technology policy in Colombia; assures the access and content of communications, both in substance and delivery means to the people of Colombia; guides citizen, business, and government use of media communications; and is responsible for the development of the communications industry both in technical capacity and political management. MINTIC’s vision is to be a model entity promoting public inclusion and access in the increasingly digital world, make a positive impact on the policies and development of the communications and technology sector and improve the provision capacity of information to the people of Colombia.

His Excellency Dr. Germán González Reyes, received the appointment of Minister after serving as Vice Minister under Her Excellency Dr. Martha Pinto de Hart during the Uribe administration. During that time, he gained some public notoriety for cooperating with the No Mas FARC movement in 2008 in the dissemination of their anti-FARC message through various telecom and internet channels. A scientist by training, Reyes has only been involved in the policy movement for the last 5 years. Originally from a small village outside Medellin, Dr. Reyes is also one of Colombia's home-grown class-climbing success stories, having achieved his education entirely in Colombia and through the receipt of competitive government-sponsored scholarships, without which he would not have afforded his studies.

Ramon Escobar  
Chief of the Directorate of Public Security  
National Police of Colombia

The National Police of Colombia are a component of the Ministry of Defense. Unlike provincial police forces in Colombia they are a military armed force, and are the largest police force in the country. The Force’s primary charge is to handle common crimes and its major responsibilities include narcotics interdiction, some counterinsurgency work, participation in civic action in rural areas, and riot control in the country’s urban centers. Other duties included enforcement of traffic regulations, supervision of public recreation areas, provision of security at gold and emerald mines, provision of security in the transport of valuables between government banks and on the national railroads, and administration of and provision of guards for the country's prison system. The forces history has been a bumpy one. There is deep-seeded public distrust for the National Police, and over the years there have been instances of collaborating with guerrillas, extorting narco-traffickers, human rights abuses, and political corruption. Under the Uribe Administration the force began to transform but public opinion has been slow to accept any real reformation.
Ramon Escobar has been the Chief of the Directorate of Public Security for the past 7 years. Based out of Bogotá he oversees operations in narcotics interdiction, criminal investigations, riot control, and some counterinsurgency work. He is known in Bogotá for being more political than operational, and is closely aligned to the Mayor of Bogotá, who was a childhood friend and college roommate. Throughout his career in the National Police, Escobar has fought off allegations of political corruption and racketeering. He is well connected in the elite circles of Bogotá, and is adept at navigating the political backchannels of the city to maintain his power. The National Police do not have a stellar record when it comes to riot control in Bogotá and all eyes will likely be on he and his men in crafting a response to the impending march and protest. Minimizing instances of police brutality will be essential to maintaining stability.

Arturo Calderon
Incoming Deputy Minister
Colombian Ministry of Defense

The Colombian Ministry of Defense is responsible for the internal and external defense and security of Colombia. The ministry is comprised of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and National Police. Since 1991 a civilian has headed the defense ministry. The Commander-in-Chief of the Colombian Armed Forces is, by law, the President. The Minister of Defense, however, is granted significant power in the day-to-day administrative and operational control of the armed forces. Throughout the history of the armed conflict there have been numerous recorded cases of human rights abuses perpetrated by the military; however, since the late 1990s as the connection between the paramilitaries and the military continues to exist and in some cases expand, the military has been responsible for a growing number of atrocities against civilian non-combatants deemed as rebel supporters.

Arturo Calderon is an Army General and has a prestigious service record for the Armed Forces of Colombia. Prior to his current position he was the Chief of Staff of the Colombian Army. Calderon was promoted to Deputy Minister after this predecessor resigned in 2008 when the then Minister of Defense and current President elect, left his post to run for President. He has a reputation for both his vehement anti-FARC rhetoric in the media, and his former tenacity when facing them on the battlefield. Additionally, Calderon’s connection to the President elect goes far back, having known, worked with, and fought beside the current President elect. His loyalty is likely unshakeable. He has been selected to represent the Armed forces of Colombia, but many suspect that under the new administration that will initially be little more than an extension of the will of the president.

Pablo Zuniga
Director of the Department of State Modernization & Good Governance (DMEG)
Secretariat for Political Affairs of the Organization of American States (OAS)
The Organization of American States (OAS) is comprised of all 35 independent states of the Americas, including Colombia, and is the world’s oldest regional organization, having been created in 1890. The OAS was established to achieve among its member States stronger solidarity and collaboration in the region and to defend their sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Department of State Modernization and Governance (DMEG) works to promote democratic governance within the OAS member States. The Department promotes cross-cutting strategies and initiatives, and policies for greater transparency, access to public information, public financing, and technological modernization. An Ecuadorian native, DMEG Director Pablo Zuniga will be interested in the long term initiatives that will promote stability in the region through good governance and institutional enhancement. In particular, he will focus on addressing issues of civic engagement and Colombian government performance within the Inter-American system.

**Paulo Sergio Pinheiro**  
**First Vice Chair of the Board of Officers**  
*IACHR*

Created in 1959, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) is one of only two bodies in the Inter-American system for the promotion and protection of human rights, along with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The IACHR is an autonomous organ of the Organization of American States (OAS) and is made up of seven officers, all member State representatives. The IACHR has the principal function of promoting the observance and the defense of human rights throughout Latin America. The Commission receives and investigates individual petitions which allege human rights violations and reports on the general human rights situation in the member States. The IACHR also stimulates public awareness of human rights in the Americas, including measures to ensure greater independence of the judiciary, the activities of illegal armed groups, and the rights of minors, women and indigenous peoples. Paulo Sergio Pinheiro is from Brazil and has served on the IACHR Board of Officers for several years. He has investigated many cases of human rights violations during his time with the Commission and is well-aware of the issues facing many Colombians. At this summit, he will look to secure the protection of human rights in Colombia and to receive assurance that all parties will promote these rights in the journey towards peace.
National Peace Essay Contest 2010 Awards Program
The Effectiveness of Nonviolent Civic Action: Simulation on Colombia