The Compressed Negotiations

Article 1. *Aims and principles*

Compression of the negotiations aims to secure, at one go, political agreements to:

a. Coordinate an end to the armed conflict and to every act that violates the rights of the civilian population, under United Nations verification, subject to the approval of the Security Council; and

b. Establish the guarantees and conditions needed to reintegrate members of FMLN into the civilian, institutional and political life of the country in absolute legality.

Accordingly, all the substantive items on the Agenda would be negotiated and settled prior to the end of the armed conflict. This will mean a cease-fire of predetermined length, short and dynamic, during which there would not be any substantive negotiations but only the measures necessary to put the agreements reached into practice.

This implies that the Agenda approved at Caracas should be reshaped to take account of the above aims and of the outcome of the negotiations conducted since then.

Article 2. *Subjects for negotiation*

The matters to be negotiated are as follows:

I. Armed forces

This item includes:

1. Doctrine.
2. Training system.
3. Purification.
4. Reduction.
5. Waiver of impunity. ³

6. Public Security Forces: ⁴
   - Establishment of the NCP. ⁵ Doctrine. Juridical regime.
   - Disbandment of the National Guard and the Treasury Police, as Public Security Forces.
   - Personnel of the NCP. Vetting of National Police personnel. Enlistment of new personnel. Pluralistic and non-discriminatory selection and training system.
   - Profiles and training.
   - International advisory services and support.
   - Transitional regime.

7. [sic] Intelligence services: ⁶
   - Disbandment of the DNI.
   - Establishment of the OIE. Doctrine. Juridical regime.
   - Personnel of the OIE.
   - Monitoring.

8. Rapid deployment infantry battalions.

9. Subordination to the civil power.

10. Paramilitary entities:
    - Civil defence.
    - Regime of the Salvadorian Armed Forces reserves.
    - Eradication of illegal groups.
    - Regulation of private security.
    - Monitoring.

11. Suspension of conscription.

12. Preventive and promotional methods.

13. Relocation and reduction.

II. Judicial system


III. Electoral system


IV. Ratification of the constitutional reform

This item is inferred from the Mexico agreements of 27 April 1991. It is an indispensable prerequisite for the concretization of other political agreements, such as many of those referring to the electoral and judicial systems, as well as the agreement relating to the National Civil Police, for example. Consequently, progress should be made in that direction without further delay.

V. Economic and social questions

VI. Conditions for the cessation of the armed confrontation

The work that has been done with regard to this question will have to be adapted to the arrangements for the cease-fire described above, and particularly to its dynamic character, the consequence of the compression of the negotiations.

VII. Political participation by FMLN

VIII. Verification by the United Nations

IX. Timetable for implementation

New York, 25 September 1991

Representing the Government of El Salvador: Representing Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional:
(Signed) (Signed)
Dr. Oscar SANTAMARÍA Cmdr. Schafik HÁNDAL
Col. Mauricio Ernesto VARGAS Cmdr. Francisco JOVEL
Dr. David ESCOBAR GALINDO Cmdr. Salvador SÁNCHEZ CERÉN
Cmdr. Eduardo SANCHO
Cmdr. Joaquín VILLALOBOS

Alvaro DE SOTO
Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations

1 Most of the sub-items under this point are fairly advanced on the basis of the working document prepared by the intermediary.
2 The question will be considered within the scope defined by the New York Agreement.

3 See "Comisión de la Verdad" (Truth Commission) in the Mexico agreements of 27 April 1991. The working paper on the Armed Forces sets forth the connection between the subject and that Commission.

4 This question has also reached an advanced stage, on the basis of an additional document prepared by the intermediary.

5 In view of the complexity of the task and the time required to carry it out, the process of organizing the new National Civil Police needs to begin immediately, i.e. without awaiting other political agreements or the cessation of the armed confrontation.

6 This question has also reached an advanced stage, on the basis of an additional document prepared by the intermediary.

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