The interviewee is a U.S. State Department Foreign Service Officer who served in Sudan in various positions from 2004 to 2006: Deputy Chief of Mission, Chargé d’Affaires, Consul General in Juba. He was associated with the Naivasha negotiations. He was a member of the Friends of Nuba Mountains group overseeing the monitoring of the Nuba Mountains ceasefire. Thirdly, he assisted with the early implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) from the Embassy in Khartoum and as Consul General in Juba for Southern Sudan.

On the Naivasha negotiations, sticking points included salaries for the SPLA, problems with Abyei, and some minor technical points. These issues were resolved and the CPA was ready to be implemented.

The Nuba Mountains is a transition area, a flash point between the North and the South. The people are almost all Muslims of African origin. It was an area of high conflict. On monitoring the ceasefire for Nuba Mountains, the British chaired and the U.S. funded the Friends of the Nuba Mountains with the Dutch, Scandinavians, Canadians Swiss, French participating. This group supported the Joint Military Command, which was monitoring the ceasefire. This was one of John Danforth’s four initiatives for confidence building before the CPA negotiations. The monitoring operation was very effective -- a model -- with no “boots” on the ground. It was phased out when the CPA was signed and the United Nations Mission in Sudan (AMIS) took over. The U.S. also helped fund the Joint Civilian Protection Monitoring Team (JCPMT) for North/South monitoring, which was phased out and turned over the UN mission with the CPA.

From the start-up phase of the CPA implementation, the interviewee and Embassy staff worked with both sides on North and the South issues, and later in Juba. They helped the SPLA set up its headquarters and served as a go between to resolve issues that slowed the implementation keeping them on the same track.

There was not unanimity of opinion in the North or the South on the CPA and its implementation. In the South many did not agree with John Garang’s idea of a federation arrangement. They cared only about the CPA provision that would enable them to choose self-determination in the referendum. In the North, some believed the South belonged to the North; others believed the South should go their own way -- not worth fighting over --
or have unitary federal state. The implementation moved ahead but in fits and starts; the timetable was extraordinarily precise and quite ambitious. The Audit and Assessment Commission has been set up chaired by a Norwegian.

The Southern Government is making tremendous progress in setting up its ministries and operations considering that they started from a zero point -- no staff, offices, office equipment, cars. The staffing is a mixed bag: some highly professional, others with little or no education or work experience.

The census is underway; the Electoral Commission is established and moving forward on voter rolls. On the referendum, while not a scientific survey, the vast majority of people in the South seem to prefer separation.

The CPA would not have been possible if other groups had been included in the negotiations, but the CPA does give a number of seats to opposition groups, and has shown flexibility in bringing in people from other groups. The Darfur groups are quite fragmented, making it hard to start negotiations. An agreement with the government included the Beja Congress and the Rashaida Free Lions.

When one moves beyond a hot war and ceasefire into implementation, then technicians and experts take over and the broader interest wanes. The Dafur situation has distracted from the North-South issue and CPA implementation.

As for lessons learned: confidence building mechanisms are invaluable; those involved must be creative and flexible with eyes on the ground; there must be a willingness to broker situations as they arise and keep things moving. Once you lose the momentum, it becomes very difficult to get people reenergized. It is important not to become, or viewed to be, partisan favoring one side or the other, but rather, to be working for the best interests of Sudan.
Q: What has been your association with Sudan and with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)?

A: I went to Sudan in August of 2004 as the Deputy Chief of Mission, and then was immediately made the Chargé d’Affaires for about a year, until August 2005, and then came back to Washington for a brief time. I was sent out in December 2005 until August 2006 to open the Consulate General in Juba, mostly by myself but acting as the first Consul General, making contact with the Government of Southern Sudan and being the antenna for the State Department. There were three areas in which I contributed the most or participated the most on the North-South peace agreement. Obviously there was also the management of the bilateral relationship and the Darfur conflict all competing for attention.

However, the first part of it was trying to get Naivasha going, because the peace negotiations did not take place in Sudan. They were Kenya based, with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) support group. When I got there it had stalled. There were two or three points that had not been ironed out but had become stumbling blocks to getting both sides to agree.

One of the first things I did was go in and see then First Vice President Taha and some of the other senior advisors to Taha in the Foreign Ministry and in the Presidency to urge them to return to Naivasha to meet with John Garang and the Southern People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) there and to make a good faith effort to resolve these points.

Q: What was the objective of the Naivasha agreement?

A: With the Naivasha negotiation, the objective was the CPA and it was all pretty much done after very long and difficult negotiations, three sticking points on which neither side wanted to move. And so we were pressuring both sides to go back to the table and to find some way around this, which they did.

Q: What were the three sticking points?

A: It had to do with paying the salaries of the SPLA was one of them. There were still problems with Abyei, getting everybody to agree on the formula to do that. There was
one other minor technical point. Anyway, they went back to the table and they did resolve these issues. Of course, when they resolved them the CPA essentially was ready to go.

The second thing I did, probably much more of a contribution, was: they were in the ceasefire mode when I was there, between the North and the South, which in a number of these areas where there had been heavy conflict and among these were the Nuba Mountains. The British had taken the lead as far as chairing; we had taken the lead in financing the Friends of the Nuba Mountains, which were mostly Europeans and Canadians.

Essentially what we had done was set up a body known as the JMC, the Joint Monitoring Commission, which brought in a number of military observers who moved throughout the Nuba Mountains, both in vehicles and in rotary wing aircraft and one fixed wing aircraft for resupply. They had communications and went out and investigated any violations of the ceasefire. There were a number of things. For instance, if you were moving heavy weapons from one point to another, you had to inform the other side as a confidence building measure. If there was abuse of civilians by either side, the Joint Military Command (JMC) was to go out and look at this.

We had an *ad hoc* group called the Friends of the Nuba Mountains. The British ambassador chaired. I was in the group along with the Dutch; the French, the Germans, various Scandinavians, and the Canadians were there, the Swiss also. Once a quarter we would have a meeting, biweekly or weekly, and discuss budgets. Both the government and the SPLA had agreed to the formation of this and they sent requests in on a policy level. One time they wanted us to extend the mandate into adjoining areas; so we had to get together on a policy level to say, okay, are the resources there, would this undercut the mission in the Nuba Mountains and decide one way or the other. Then once a quarter, the group of us flew to visit various towns in the Nuba Mountains. We would go to the headquarters of the JMC and then usually take a helicopter to visit towns, sometimes have public meetings, town hall meetings, just as another presence out there, showing that the larger world was watching.

This was before the CPA.

*Q:* *This was part of John Danforth’s four initiatives?*

*A:* Right, this was pre-CPA. As soon as the CPA was signed, then we began a phase-out for the handover to the United Nations, to the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS).

Essentially it worked very well. It had been a high conflict area: a lot of fighting, a lot of violence, people moving with arms. It really worked, the confidence-building angle worked to the point where you just did not see people moving around with arms, civilians or what have you.
Q: Could you characterize the basis of the conflict?

A: You mean in the Nuba Mountains?

Q: Right.

A: The Nuba Mountains was a border area where people are almost all Muslim, but it is somewhat like Darfur, most of the people are of African origin, their native tongue is not Arabic, they do not consider themselves Arabs, although they are Muslims, somewhat like the tribes in Darfur, who are African tribes. It is a borderline area, so you had a lot of incursions from the SPLA driving up and you had a lot of support for the SPLA among segments of the population and the government driving back down. So it was a flashpoint, a transition area from North to South. And it was one of the more difficult areas because there had been so much conflict. There is a good book written recently by Phillip Caputo dealing just with the Nuba Mountains and the arming of people: fiction, but an interesting book.

Q: Why did they come to an agreement?

A: The agreement was actually part of the ceasefire that was agreed in Nairobi, but the whole idea was making the ceasefire stick and that is why these mechanisms were created, to have a presence there to give confidence. If things looked like they were going to return to conflict to have somebody there to quash it.

Q: Was the monitoring effective?

A: Very effective. It was a model operation. It was one of those felicitous multilateral things that for a limited amount of money, (because it was relatively low budget) you get tremendous results.

Q: Were there military boots.

A: Absolutely not. There were no boots on the ground, in the sense of a protection force. It was run by a Norwegian general, and he had British and other officers. No one was armed. We provided the logistics, in the sense of doing meals, medical care, communications, generating electricity, everything having to do with keeping this up. We provided some vehicles. And then various other people paid for salaries for the people that were there, hiring local people to do translation, what have you. It was a relatively low budget, relatively small footprint. When the UN followed, they came in with a heavy footprint, with a heavy protection force; it literally went from hundreds to thousands. Again, it was just a very felicitous mechanism. It worked very, very well.

Q: Whom did they report to?

A: They would file reports that went to virtually everyone: all the Friends of the Nuba Mountains, the SPLA, the government, certain other embassies; I do not know about the
Arab League, but probably the Arab League embassies, really anybody who was interested in seeing them. They would do reports of violations; they would do periodic reports of the situation in various zones.

**Q:** If there were violations, how were they acted on?

A: They were allowed to adjudicate those, and they were brought to the attention of both sides and one side or the other would be told: “Okay, it is your fault. You moved three tanks down through here. You did not announce to either us or the other side that you were moving heavy armor. You must rectify this by writing a full report explaining what you are doing.”

**Q:** In other words, the two sides had to work it out between themselves?

A: Right, and as confidence built, they did. You had things that in the past would have led to shooting. Or one side could say, “We did tell this commander we were moving this artillery back there. Unfortunately, he never reported this to his people in the field. They are trying to block it in some village.” We could fly out in a helicopter and say, “We are aware of this movement. Your headquarters has approved it and so stand down.” Things of this nature, defusing situations as they came up.

**Q:** Was there a moderator between the two groups?

A: Yes, each group had people attached to the JMC. There were SPLA representatives; there were national government representatives and they would be taken along on patrols; they would be taken out to where these situations were. So they were represented there, just to give confidence, to make everything transparent, nobody is doing anything behind anyone’s back.

**Q:** Then who headed this operation?

A: The commander out there, with the various other officers seconded to the operation. We had a few people that were retired military that were hired. The UK ambassador chaired it. We had quite a bit of influence because we paid I would guess sixty per cent of the total costs.

**Q:** What happened to that process?

A: We disbanded it. It was meant to be a six-month process. It was extended several times, for four, four and a half years, but the idea was not to create permanent structures. When the CPA kicked in and the UN forces engaged, then there was no longer any need for it. Now some of the people involved wanted to go up to Khartoum and set up the training for the Joint Integrated Units. That did not work out for various reasons. I was gone by then. But the whole idea was not to create a permanent structure. This was a temporary mechanism to bridge the ceasefire into the beginning of CPA implementation.
Q: And then it was taken over by CPA implementation?

A: Right, CPA implementation, a part of that, of course, was a UN force coming in, and the UN force took over those duties.

Q: How effective was that?

A: As far as I know, there have been no real problems in the Nuba Mountains. The whole thing had a very happy ending.

There was also another thing that we funded, the U.S. funded bilaterally, it was called the Joint Civilian Protection Monitoring Team (JCPMT). This was run by, again, a contractor that had a headquarters in Khartoum with a headquarters staff. They had one fixed wing aircraft. They had a small base located in Malakal with probably ten to twelve monitors, all on contract. Some were Americans; some were Kenyans, Canadians. Malakal was a garrison town, held by the government. They also had one fixed wing aircraft, short takeoff and landing that you can put into almost any short field. They had another similar base in Rumbek, which was held by the SPLA. There was agreement on both sides that they could fly across the border. Effectively the South was cut off from the North.

If you wanted to go down to a place like Rumbek, you would have to fly to Nairobi, overnight and then catch a flight up to Rumbek. If you tried to come in to Rumbek from the Sudanese government side they would shoot you down and the government would not allow anything from the South to fly into any government-held airport. They agreed to waive this and over a much larger territory than the Nuba Mountains, ten times as large, with a much smaller group it was a little bit of a band-aid approach. But what they could do, they were empowered, any time there was a report of military, of any stripe, abusing civilians, to fly out, to land nearby, they even had boats to go up and down the Nile, if there was no airstrip they would land at the nearest one and walk in and then they would interview all the witnesses, they would take depositions and then they would write a report and indicate what had happened, to the best of their ability to ascertain and who was to blame.

Then they would publish the report; the headquarters would give it to the government, to the SPLA, to a whole bunch of embassies, various Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), the United Nations. Again, the whole idea was that those who had been abusive were aware if word got around they would be having this team coming in. If they were from the government, they would realize that their government had agreed that this team could do this and they could not just run them off and the same for the SPLA.

Q: Did both parties have a chance to review the report or comment on it?

A: Yes, both parties could review the report but they could not necessarily change it. They could say, “We disagree.” For the most part, they did not. What I saw in the reports that I read, most of the abuse tended to be highly localized and not necessarily driven by orders from on high. So very often they would identify a platoon of people, a local
military commander, a local guerilla officer, who was taking the law into their own hands. And, of course, this became a disincentive to doing that if you knew these people were lurking in the background to come in and look.

Because of the large amount of territory, less accessibility because planes could not get into everywhere, obviously it did not have the coverage and the effect that the JMC had. Nonetheless, I think it was a valuable contribution and it made the various security forces aware that there could be ramifications, negative ramifications, if they continued business as usual.

_Q: Was the same approach used by the UN mission, when they took over?_

_A: The UN mission, yes, but the UN mission had rotary winged aircraft, they had protection forces; they had four-wheel drive vehicles. The UN forces were just a much more robust bunch of 20,000 people and you are talking about 25 people for the JCPMT and you are talking a hundred and some people for the JMC.

There was a third unit funded by the British, they had no fixed or rotary winged aircraft and spent most of their time in Nairobi. It was very poorly funded. I tried to go see them when I was in Nairobi one time on consultations, and they were not there at the time. But I do not think they were very active, and their activity tended to be more along the Kenyan border.

I had to engineer the phase-out of both of these operations. We turned over the various bases and headquarters to the UN, so they would have some logistics initially, going in, because there were just no logistics. Logistics in the South were extremely difficult. And then there was it issue of disposing of the old vehicles to various humanitarian NGOs and radios and generator sets to hospitals, making sure that these things did not go astray. Once the CPA kicked in, the UN had come in and these organizations were no longer needed.

The third thing that I did was more in Khartoum. It was done obviously with the help of the embassy staff, especially the political section. We had some people who worked North-South issues. What we had to do was start working both sides to get the SPLA up into Khartoum and to start doing the various steps that needed to be done to meet the CPA timetable, because this was a clockwork thing: at thirty days, this was to have been done; sixty days, this was to be done. Forming the various commissions, and such.

_Q: This was on CPA implementation?_

_A: I did travel to the South on a couple of occasions to meet with Southern Sudanese. We met with them as the first ones began trickling in to Khartoum, setting up the SPLA headquarters there, which they were allowed to do. They were all coming in and we would meet with them, see what we could do to help and assist them and, as we needed to, approach the Foreign Ministry and other government officials to say, “Okay, this issue has come up. What can you do to work with them to work with them to resolve this
issue?” just to see that this came off smoothly. And this went on until the time that John Garang came.

I remember when Garang came, there was a tiff that they were supposed to be able to move so many SPLA forces from Kassala in the east in as a protection force in Khartoum for him and they had been stopped at a roadblock. I had to go and intervene with various Sudanese officials, saying, “You committed to allowing these forces to come in here and you are going to derail the timetable if Garang does not come because he does not feel that you have honored your commitment on protection forces. This could be a real setback.” Just trying to work through various issues like that, many of them quite mundane. Just to keep everybody, again, on the same page and try to deblock anything slowing things down. A lot of us worked on that: USAID, the State Department, various people, just to keep the process rolling.

Q: What was the attitude of the Northern Government in trying to follow up on these commitments?

A: Sometimes it would be something like a local official who just was not with the program. You had the same with some of the SPLA people who did not come to Khartoum as soon as they should have. They got delayed, much later than the timetable. You really had to go and say, “Okay, you agreed that you would be there and have these people in these positions to help set up this whole thing and start the implementation mechanism working. They are not here. Where are they? When are they coming?” Just to keep this thing rolling at as close to timetable as possible.

Q: These are more operational issues, rather than policy differences or blockages?

A: Yes, they tended to be more operational. The CPA is an extremely long, complex document. Because of the way that they approached it, especially, Garang in the negotiations, they did not leave a lot of loose ends. The policies were pretty much set out: who was expected to do what, when. So that was not the issue. The question was, why were they not doing it? Operationally, what is the hold up here? Identify the holdup, try to work through it and get people back on track.

So, in sum, that is the contribution I made and my staff made during this period.

Q: Is that continuing, that process?

A: Yes, at this time, they have now, they have formed a new government with the inauguration of John Garang, John Garang became the First Vice President; Taha became the Second Vice President, and they got a number of minister level or deputy minister level positions within the central government.

Also, the revenue sharing kicked in, whereby petroleum revenues were shared between the North and the South on those petroleum reserves being generated below the borderline. We also worked with the Abyei Border Commission, which came in to give
its final findings report to the government, saying, “This is where we think the Abyei border should be.” This generated some problems and controversy because President Bashir announced that they had overstepped their mandate and it was unacceptable. As far as I know, that remains something that has not been fully resolved.

That was probably the worst issue. You had some other things, like the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile which had historically — although they were peopled by African, very often Muslim, tribes — never been part of the South. And you had clamoring from those people, who wanted the same deal as the South, to be able to determine whether or not they would secede and go with the South, rather than be left in the North. So there were issues that came up from time to time.

When I went on to Juba as the Consul General, again a lot of what I did was work from that end on CPA issues, because they had set up the Government of Southern Sudan and in effect this blended into the central government, but it was not really a federal arrangement, because you had constituent members of the central government in Khartoum who were also SPLM bigwigs. Working with people on various operational things down there, again, to see that the CPA continued to move forward. Is the financing with the oil revenue sharing working? If it is not working, what is your complaint?

So people in Khartoum were then aware of what the issues were or if I could communicate messages from Khartoum: “This is what has been said up there.” Just to keep everybody, again, clear on what everyone else was saying.

Q: I have the impression from others that the implementation of the CPA really has not progressed adequately, that it has been slowed down or blocked by the Northern government. The Southern peoples’ representatives in Khartoum have not been able to be effective. What is your view on that?

A: Let us put it this way, you did not have unanimity of opinion either in the North or the South on this. John Garang publicly stated that he believed the best thing for the South was to go into a federation arrangement with the North, and that Sudan should remain a single state, perhaps federal in character. A lot of Southerners disagreed with that. Among a lot of Southerners, after many, many years of war with the North, the view was that “We cannot trust them, we do not like them, they have historically abused us since they came here and we want to go our own way.” And the only thing that a number of people cared about the CPA was that they would be able to choose self-determination at a given moment in a referendum.

You also had people in the North, some of them, who were hard line, who did not like the fact that greater Sudan, which they believe really belonged to the North, had been put up for grabs the way it was, and people were wanting to sabotage this. However, you had other people in the North who believed that if the South wanted to go their own way they should, because it was not worth fighting over anymore. And you had another group of people who wanted to see a unitary but federal Sudan, anything to avoid conflict.
So the hardliners in Khartoum, obviously, that is where decisions are made mutually on CPA implementation and some people have not played along and have been obstructive.

Q: But is it progressing? Is the implementation proceeding?

A: Yes. The timetable was extraordinarily precise and quite ambitious. From day one certain things slipped. Other things moved ahead on time and generally it has gone ahead in fits and starts but it has moved ahead. Now, I have not followed CPA implementation closely since I left Juba last August and even in the South I followed it much less, I looked at Southern things much more than Khartoum things. And so I am really dated on where the CPA is. When I was in Khartoum, however, in the beginning it was moving ahead in a satisfactory manner.

Q: In another element of the CPA, there is something called an Audit and Assessment Commission, but nobody seems to be able to provide any information about whether it has been set up and whether it is functioning. Do you know anything about it?

A: Yes, it was set up. That is the thing run by a Norwegian who had great Sudan experience and he headed it. I do not know how effective they are. They came down one time to Juba when I was there but they actually set up and began working in Khartoum after I had left.

Yes, it is functioning. We have a representative on that. Before they sent me to Juba there had been in fact some talk about sending me out to be our representative on that, but instead I ended up in Juba. But I have not, again, kept up closely with it because I was out doing other jobs.

Q: Let us go back, do you have any views on what worked or what did not work, that brought about the CPA agreement? I understand you were not directly involved.

A: I was strictly in Khartoum. I did not even go down, when they finally signed it in January 2005. Everybody came from Washington. I never set foot in Naivasha; for me to speak to that would be irrelevant, because I do not know.

Q: Then let us turn to your association with the Southern government. How is that being structured and is it making progress?

A: Yes, it is making progress. When I got down there, the Southern government, the ministries had no power. Some of them had been gutted. These were buildings that had been built 25, 30 years ago by the Yugoslavs after Anyanya One, after the first round of fighting. They were totally dilapidated; they had no furniture. It is 110 degrees, there is no air conditioning, no electricity; the plumbing did not work. People did not have offices. A lot of government ministers, generals were living in tents along the Nile.

Now when I left after about eight months, they had rehabilitated most of the ministries; they had put in generators; they were redoing some of the others, just completely
rebuilding them. They had begun rehabilitating houses and building houses. They had graded the roads, hired civil servants. In the beginning there were no civil servants. You would have a minister, maybe there was a permanent secretary but there might not even be a secretary. They had to hire, from top to bottom, people to staff the ministries. There was no Government of Southern Sudan.

So, yes, they are making tremendous progress. Obviously it is a very long and steep slope, because of from where they are starting. But it was impressive in many ways. Some of the ministries were doing quite well, considering that they started from a zero point, with people that did not even have a typewriter, let alone a computer. They did not have telephones. Some of them did not have cars.

Q: And the capability of the people that were there?

A: A mixed bag. A lot of your more senior people had, not all, but many of them had been on the outside, Nairobi, England. You had a number of people that had PhDs, law degrees, former medical doctors, barristers. Others had been, ministers, had been essentially guerilla fighters. So it was mixed, what you were dealing with. It was very difficult to staff people at the intermediate and lower levels because the educational system had been so neglected and formal employment in the South was almost nonexistent. So you had people who had never really worked in formal jobs and had no training or no experience. That is a challenge that will take a long time, probably a generation, to overcome.

Q: Coming down the road is a census and then elections and then a referendum. Do you know whether there is anything being done to prepare for a census or the elections?

A: The census was underway when I left, and the UN was handling that. A lot of people had put a lot of money into it and they had made pretty good progress on it, was my understanding. But it was a daunting job, again, because no census had really been done in 25 years. Nobody really knew how many people were there, in parts of the country.

Q: This was just in the South, or was it also happening in the North?

A: It was worse in the South. How many Southern Sudanese, for instance, were actually living in the North, in Port Sudan and around Khartoum? This was open to different opinions. 

Q: And the elections? Are any preparations being made?

A: Yes, again, a lot of money was put in, the Electoral Commission established. I do not know exactly where this stands now but, yes, they were moving forward because they had to do voter rolls, etc. But, again, it was something that was going to be quite daunting in the South because there was zero mechanism and zero experience.
Q: Do you have a sense of how much the South understands the CPA, and what is being planned?

A: I do not really know. I would guess once you left the towns, they did go around and do a sensitivity campaign after they signed the CPA. John Garang, in fact, flew around and addressed a lot of the towns, traveled throughout the South. Other people did it as well, to drum up support for the CPA. Now it is a huge document. I cannot believe that a lot of southerners know many of the details. You would have to study the thing for a couple of days to really understand all the ins and outs.

Q: And then there’s the referendum in 2011. You have any sense of how that is going to come out?

A: The only sense that I would have is talking to people and saying, “What is your view on what should happen here?” And the vast majority of people I spoke with seemed to prefer separation. Now, again, that is totally unscientific but on personal experience, that is the only basis on which I can make a judgment, the only thing you could say is that the CPA created this mechanism and we support the CPA because if you do not have the CPA you do not have anything. So, however, this comes out it will be the choice of the South, because you have to honor this mechanism.

Q: One of the comments about the CPA was that it was just an agreement between the North and the South and there were a lot of groups that were not included in the negotiations.

A: It was not just an agreement between the North and the South. It was really an agreement between two political parties. If you look at the people that signed it, John Garang was the had of the SPLM and, of course, Bashir of the National Congress Party, who also happened to be President of the Republic, but, in many ways, this was not two governments or two regions. It was two groups. You had a lot of opposition people in the North, in Darfur. You had the al-Mahdi people. You had other big political families there who were not included in this and in the wealth sharing, political representation, anything else.

Q: Some people say that was a failing of the CPA or maybe there was no alternative?

A: I do not think you could ever have done a CPA if you allowed everyone who wanted to be in there to be in a blocking position. You would still be sitting in Naivasha.

Q: Does the CPA provide some sort of basis for including others?

A: Yes, it does, it does. It gives a certain number of seats to opposition groups. In the South, for instance, some of your historical opposition parties have been brought in. And, then, they have shown quite a bit of flexibility by bringing in people who were either proxies for the North or opposed to the SPLA by giving them positions, by incorporating parts of militias in to the southern army, the SPLA.
**Q: Does it have relevance for the Darfur situation, for example?**

A: It could. The difference in Darfur, at least in my view— I am by no means an expert on Darfur, because Darfur was really pretty much managed out of the State Department. We had our hands full on other things. The rebel movements in Darfur are so fragmented at the moment; in the South, you did have one major movement with the SPLA. You had some other significant militias, both aligned with, at times, or in opposition to the SPLM, but you really had one central person and group with whom you could negotiate. In Darfur it is much more fragmented. That has always been an issue.

**Q: There is no single leadership?**

A: In the beginning you had a group of leaders that were all sort of under the SLM and then the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) but since then, I have seen a chart of how many different groups there are now, people that I had not heard of when I was there, to be honest. I have no idea of how many troops do they have, what sort of constituency they represent. It is really quite fragmented and obviously it is very hard when you have to start negotiating with this broad range of groups and factions.

**Q: ...and similarly, the groups in the east, the Beja and others?**

A: Apparently that is going again. I have not followed that closely since I left, but after I left they did sign the agreement with the government that included the Beja Congress and I think the Rashaida Free Lions. And so it appears that that is holding pretty well, as far as I know, in the east.

**Q: Is there anybody that is voicing a vision of a united Sudan, in one form or another? I believe John Garang had that vision.**

A: John Garang had that vision.

**Q: But is there now any group or person from within the country or the outside that is trying to voice the idea of a united country?**

A: You have a few supporters. Garang was the great champion in the South for this and with Garang’s passing… he was the galvanizing force for this. In the North, you have a lot of people who paid lip service to this but again I do not know what their vision is for it.

**Q: Can you characterize the Northern government?**

A: It remains rooted in what it came out of, which is the National Islamic Front (NIF) and religion and Islam. They are still the only government on Earth that has Sharia law and is avowedly an Islamic government. Still many of your central players came out of the NIF and that philosophy, the mixture of Islam and governance.
Q: Is there any area we have not touched on?

A: The North-South thing, most of the heavy lifting got done in Naivasha. We played our part. A lot of our part was more procedural, rather than policy and making sure that Washington was aware of developments as they happened. So we were not driving the policy. We were watching it and trying to steer it at times.

Q: There is a view from some now that the level of interest in the United States and outsiders on following up on implementation has waned quite a bit from the days of negotiation of the CPA and that there is not quite the same preoccupation with it. Is that the case?

A: Yes, when you move beyond a hot war and ceasefire, in the implementation, then the technicians and the experts take over. The broader sort of interest does wane. That is true. You could say the same of Liberia; you could say the same of Sierra Leone; you could the same of Rwanda. When they are in flames everybody is looking. Maybe it is a good thing if interest wanes somewhat. I do know significant resources continue to be committed, seeing that this remains on track. And obviously what happens in Darfur has distracted from North-South issue. If Darfur had not erupted in conflict, there would have probably been greater attention paid to the South and CPA implementation.

Q: One of the interests of the Institute of Peace has been looking back over the negotiations of the CPA and its implementation. What stands out in your mind as major lessons that you view from this, in terms of what worked or what did not work?

A: I can only comment from the very narrow perspective I had in Khartoum, and one of the things is confidence building mechanisms are invaluable. You need to be very creative and flexible in getting, not boots on the ground, necessarily, but eyes on the ground. I saw it work, especially in terms of the Joint Military Command (JMC), which was very effective.

The second thing is the need to urge all parties to show some flexibility. The CPA was a very complex document, spelled out a lot. Still, you get back into areas that were not defined and you have to be willing to broker situations as they arise and keep things moving out of the way. You cannot allow it to bog down. Once you lose the momentum on these things, it can become very difficult to get people reenergized. So you cannot afford to bog down.

I guess those would be the main lessons that I would throw out, off the top of my head.

Q: Any practical ones, related to the actual work you were doing yourself, in terms of being an intermediary?

A: The one thing— it is kind of self-evident —when I went there some people had very strong and very partisan feelings, either for the South or against the North. And one of the
things that I did is try to go in there and create as cordial a relationship as I could with the North and the northerners in government, given the circumstances and the instructions that I had to deliver, so there would not be personal animus, but I could go in there and they would perceive that I was operating and searching for the mutual best interests for all of Sudan. I tried not to be partisan, because once you go in there and make critical statements, especially publicly… I stayed off the record; I felt that Washington was doing a wonderful job, saying what they wanted to say, passing messages to Khartoum and about Khartoum, thus there was no role for me to get involved in this. So I ducked it.

Q: That is a very useful point. Is there anything we have not covered?

A: That is about it. I had a bit part in this.

Q: This has been immensely helpful. Thank you.