The interviewee has two perspectives on Sudan: one, as the U.S. President’s Special Assistant for Africa assisting with the deployment of the African Union forces in the Africa Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and, two, as the U.S. Ambassador to the African Union.

The informant sees the root causes of the conflicts in Sudan as power and control of resources, oil in particular. Ethnicity and religion are used to rationalize the dividing of power. Groups are marginalized in order to consolidate power. The willingness of the North and South to negotiate was a consequence of decades of war with a military stalemate. Also international political pressure played a role.

The U.S. played a critical role in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Presidential Special Envoy Danforth, along with African Union key players, was instrumental in bringing about a peaceful resolution. John Garang and Vice President Taha also played a positive role in the negotiations. Ambassador Danforth was recognized and served as an honest broker, seen as neutral and able to create a neutral environment; his moral standing, his intellectual prowess and charisma were key. A skilled negotiator must do the homework, outlining what each party is willing to give up and wants to achieve. General Sumbeiywo was critical as he took the strategic vision and did the nuts and bolts work with his team on how to get to the goal of the vision. Good analytical skills, good writing skills, good communication skills are important.

The negotiations worked because of the multiple tiers in the process: the notable individuals (e.g., the President’s Special Envoy), hands-on people like key members of the African Union, Garang and Taha, regional ambassadors, a Washington core group on a daily basis and good interaction with the United Nations and key allies like the United Kingdom.

Political will is the most important element. Political will is when the parties are ready to move forward with a common objective. Two characteristics of common objective: first, peace; second, giving the people a choice about nationhood—the option of staying together or separating.
On CPA implementation, the process has slowed down; it is much too slow, especially with the loss of John Garang. He had the ability to bring in international support, authority and condemnation; he was a nation builder.

With respect to the AU, it is important to look at its commitment to intervention and to promoting peace on the continent. It is in transition from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) with a policy of non-intervention to the African Union with a policy of non-indifference—a commitment to protect people. The AU’s biggest challenge is its monetary capacity, and it needs support. It is in its formative stages: institutionalizing structures, policies and building its personnel. The AU Peace and Security Council is making an assessment in Southern Sudan and in Darfur. AU manpower is in Sudan as part of a hybrid AU/UN Mission; it needs help financially and with expertise.

As for the long-term outcome, there is a commitment by the North/South parties to move forward. The international community has to be there to help support this process, but it has to be up to the parties to say what they want. A return to war if the South votes in the referendum to separate is the worst-case scenario: what do we do to prevent that?

Lessons learned: operationally, we need to be very analytical, clear-cut support to the AU, greater support to AU/UN deployment of forces, help AU with strategic planning and mobilize the resources of the UN in a timely fashion. Generally, we need to continue a clear-cut political commitment publicly, to provide resources, to encourage all parties that they can only succeed when everyone demonstrates the political will to support a democratic nation state. We must be committed for the long haul. The U.S. under the Bush Administration has demonstrated a clear-cut commitment to Africa.
Q: What has been your association with Sudan and with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement?

A: In two different hats. First, working on Sudan as the U.S. President’s Special Assistant for Africa, we worked with Sudan by assisting them with the deployment of African Union (AU) forces in the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and also I accompanied both the Secretary of State on her trip to Sudan as well as two trips with the Deputy Secretary of State. In my new capacity as U.S. Ambassador to the African Union, we are working closely with the AU in support of AMIS and the implementation as well of the hybrid mission.

Q: Did you have any involvement or association with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) process?

A: Supported, via Washington, in my capacity at the National Security Council.

Q: So, not in Sudan itself?

A: No, I worked primarily in Washington, as the advisor to the President, to support our policy directives for Sudan. I met with Dr. John Garang, and was responsible for his meetings with our Deputy National Security advisor. So we worked directly in Washington with the Sudanese chargé there. Those were my responsibilities, in terms of briefing the President and providing the policy support that way and, as I said, supporting also the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary of State.

Q: This was after the John Danforth mission?

A: I was there during the John Danforth mission as Director for Southern Africa, so Sudan was not part of my portfolio at that time.

Q: Let us go back to the beginning: what is your understanding of the root causes of the various conflicts in Sudan, North-South but also Darfur and others?

A: When you look at both North-South and Darfur, from my perspective and this is not talking in the capacity as a U.S. government official but talking as an academic specialist
on Africa and political science and international relations, the root causes are power and control of resources. Most certainly there are some ethnic components that, again, from my perspective, play into it, but from my analysis it is all about power and sharing of power and controlling. You can use ethnicity, you can use religion, you can use those two factors to rationalize how you divide power.

So when you look at North-South, you can look at the issues of religion. Those are factors in play, absolutely. But when it comes to resources and oil in particular, control of land, then those other issues of religion and ethnicity become the rationalization.

Q: Some people use the phrase “marginalization,” particularly by the Northern Government. Is that a fair characterization?

A: But you have to have a reason to marginalize and then my question would be, “Why would you marginalize them?” You do it because you want to have all the power. So from that perspective, my logic would be: what reasoning would you use for your population, if you are the Northerners, to explain why you should have control? It can be differences because of ethnicity, differences because of religion, to say, “This is why. They are not the same as we are. This is why we must control them.” Or, “This is why they are not equal to us.” You can use race, gender, religion, class as rationales for holding onto power or gaining power or why you would deny someone power or deny them access or equality.

Q: It would be the same motivation just within the Northern areas, between the Khartoum government and the Northern communities?

A: Yes, from my perspective. You have seen it historically, why different groups, whether it is in Sudan or somewhere else, would rationalize why this person should be repressed, or rationalize, as you said, why this group should be marginalized. Because, for the ordinary person, they may not be thinking about power but they can say, “They are different than we are. That is why they should not have this. They are not the same religion, they are not the same race, they are not the same gender, so they should not be equal to…”

Q: If we have this power complex, why would the North and South particularly decide to negotiate?

A: Because from their perspective they knew they were not going to succeed. You had had decades of war. The North were never able militarily to conquer the South. So you had a military stalemate. If the North believed it could have militarily been successful, there would be no reason to compromise. So at some point you have to weigh the costs: should you fight for another decade, can you afford to? There was also political pressure internationally for a resolution. The international community, the U.S. in particular, played a critical role in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Presidential Special Envoy Danforth was instrumental in bringing about a peaceful resolution. The African Union key players were instrumental.
The political leadership of John Garang, who also understood power politics, knew that neither side at this point was capable of winning a war. So his intellect, his insight, his charisma, he was able make the compromise to negotiate the agreement. A large amount of credit goes first to his ability to interface with the Sudanese government at the time. Vice President Taha played a critical role in the negotiation. Those two men were instrumental in getting the compromises that were necessary.

**Q:** What do you understand about the process to get this underway, John Danforth's techniques? We are looking for lessons of experience.

**A:** Absolutely his techniques, first of all you have to give the man credit for genuine moral fiber for being an honest broker, and all sides recognized him in that light. That is key. He was seen as neutral and having an ability to create a neutral environment for discussion. You watched his skills at bringing the players to the table. There is an art to negotiation, so his moral standing, his intellectual prowess, were key and his being viewed by all sides as being an honest broker.

**Q:** But did he use any special techniques to set the process in motion?

**A:** He has the personal charisma; sometimes it takes that. You might have all the right skills but if you do not have that personal charisma sometimes you cannot bring parties together. So I think his ability to communicate well and be seen by others in that light and personal charm. Charm helps.

**Q:** He had something about the four tests that he was applying. It was an effort to build trust and confidence.

**A:** Yes you build on those things, the commonality, you build on the key things that: what is each side looking for? A skilled negotiator has done his or her homework by assessing the situation. What is the outcome you want, and how many different ways can it be achieved? And again, it is about how you distribute power that is going to be acceptable to all groups. So it is a negotiation technique to understand all the different parties, and a skilled negotiator has done the homework and then outlined what is each party willing to give up and what does each party want to achieve? Then you begin the negotiation process.

**Q:** Now about the process of the negotiations, the meetings were strung out across quite a period of time but was there anything that stood out in your mind about how that process worked and why it worked or why it did not work better?

**A:** It worked because there were multiple tiers in the process. You have the heavy hitters like the President’s special envoy, but you had beneath him people who were hands on, on almost a daily basis.

**Q:** You are talking about whom?
A: We are looking at some of the key members of the AU, their special envoys, who were working on the ground. You had both Vice President Taha and John Garang, who were hands on. You had U.S. ambassadors on the ground who were working in Kenya and regional ambassadors who were working together. You also had a Washington core group, a special group on Sudan who were working on a daily basis on this issue. You had good interaction between the United Nations (UN), key allies, like for instance, the UK, who we partnered closely with. So it truly was international, but the U.S. probably had the greatest leverage.

Q: What was our leverage?

A: Our leverage was, many obvious ways, the world superpower, that carries some weight, that we had a Presidential envoy with that kind of status and knowledge, that we also brought to bear, as the process moved forward, our Secretary of State, the interaction of our President, who lent his name, that is key, it does not get higher than the President of the United States. So at that level our ability to use sanctions effectively, but also you cannot just sanction someone, there also has to be a give and take with that kind of relationship.

So here was a chance, too, the end goal was for the Northern Sudanese government to have the recognition of the world as moving beyond war, moving to rebuild. You cannot discount the sheer charisma and intellect of a John Garang. You also had with the Southern People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) a leadership which had a vision of a united Sudan, so that gave hope to the Sudanese government that there was going to be this period of moving forward as one nation state. Let us put it this way: all the pieces were in place, the timing was right, the key personnel was right, everything was in sync. And the political will is the most important element.

Q: What is that?

A: What is political will?

Q: People often use the phrase “political will” and commitment....

A: Political will is when the parties are ready to move forward with a common objective. You can have a common objective, but if everybody does not want it at the same time, you can have all the other pieces, you can have the money, the resources, but if the parties are not willing to have peace or reach particular goals, it does not matter. You can have all the resources of the international community, but if the parties who are in conflict are not ready to move forward, then you do not have political will. Political will is nothing magical, but it is an agreement to move forward and wanting to do it. That is political will. Political will simply means that the parties are now ready to move forward on one common objective and they are ready to now. It is like a marriage. It will not go forward unless both partners want the same thing and have the art of compromise.
Q: That means that the parties have to have the vision of a common objective. Does that come from the outside?

A: Sometimes it does come from the outside, because the parties in this case have been fighting each other for so long that they cannot see that they are actually going after the same objective or that it is possible to have a common objective. So when you bring in someone with Senator Danforth’s vision and you bring in all these other layers of negotiators who are doing the details and they can pull it out in a common language and sit in a room and say, “Okay, you are actually talking about the same thing.” Sometimes you need a third party to say it.

Q: How would you characterize this common objective?

A: I would say there are a couple of characteristics: One, to bring peace to the nation and stop the fighting; two, to move forward for an agreed upon time for an opportunity to have one nation state, to create the conditions for one nation state. But if in that time it is not achievable, the people would have the right to determine: go forward as one nation or separate. So you gave choices.

Q: So the common objective was one that had two characteristics, either as one country...

A: The common objective is peace, first. The big objective is peace, end the fighting. The second objective was to determine the national state, an agreed upon compromise within which you would move forward on integrating and building a nation state, create peace and then people would be given a choice. So first end the conflict and second give people the choice about nationhood and that choice is either to stay as one or to separate, but you gave them the choice.

Q: So agreement on that option is very important?

A: Exactly.

Q: Are you familiar with the process of the negotiation, of how it went? I know that General Sumbeywo from Kenya was particularly important to the negotiations.

A: Oh, he was critical. That is why I said two tiers. You have the special envoy from the U.S. and then you have the general from Kenya. He was the person who did the nuts and bolts every day with his team. You take the big vision, the strategic vision, which is end the conflict and get the right to choice on nationhood. Now to get to that you have to have someone who was sitting there saying, “That’s the end goal, but how do we get there? How do we divide and work with, what is government going to look like in the interim, how are we going to share the wealth and resources?”

So you worked with him and our Sudan group also and with other members of the international community: the AU, the UN and key partners, to then work on what would
be the steps to get to the end goal. There were many layers in this process; many people who made it possible. That is important in negotiations, the right kind of leaders and those who can be trusted but then the technical skills to translate the strategic vision and end goals into the process to achieve that.

Q: Were there any special procedures or techniques that the General and his staff used to keep the parties moving on this?

A: Remember, I am watching this at a distance but when you look at the process, one was, again, trusted individual, the General was seen as trusted, objective. He knew all the players, so part of that is an awareness of the players. His strong communications skills, the ability to take each party’s thoughts and vision and then to be able to translate them into an agreed upon language were also important. So good writing skills, good analytical skills are a major factor.

Let us say you might have the Sudanese government articulate something one way: how are we going distribute the resources? Then you could have the SPLM say, “Well, we are looking at this also.” A skilled negotiator knows, with a good team, how to take that and translate that into language that is acceptable. So good analytical skills, good writing skills, good communication skills, are key.

Q: That was the general and his team. He had a good team?

A: Yes and having a strong team that has all those skills. So the General has to have it, but if your team does not have those skills then you are by yourself. So it is assembling a team that can think analytically, that can write well and that has the ability to translate the parties’ two visions into a common vision that is placed on paper in language that is acceptable and the ability to be perceived as neutral and objective. That is also key, because if any one party sees any hint of favoritism to one side then you lose trust. So you have to also have the ability to create a trustful environment. It is sometimes hard when you are in it, but you have to first step back and take it apart. What are the key elements that are needed in negotiation?

Q: The agreement had a lot of protocols and a lot of separate provisions. Maybe we can get onto those and talk a little bit about the implementation of the agreement. Do you have any general views on how it is going, in terms of how it is being implemented?

A: Unfortunately, the process has slowed down and it is much too slow. With the loss of the key leadership of John Garang, you cannot reduce a movement to one person, but this man had such a strong personality and was seen as a charismatic, intellectually brilliant and he had also held together the coalition of this own party. But he was also perceived by Northerners in the same way. I was in Khartoum for the inauguration of the new government and the swearing in, and you had Northerners who were as enthusiastic about John Garang as Southerners, which is an amazing thing. He had the ability to bridge and they all saw in him a future. Were there going to be problems, yes, but they saw him as an honest broker.
Q: He was not seen as a threat to the Northern leaders?

A: The leaders were smart enough, even the hardliners, maybe later when it came down to a vote, but even the leaders saw him as holding Sudan together. He may not have been the next president, but you could see he could have won a sizable vote. This is all speculation, but he could have won a large number of votes in northern Sudan. Many people saw him as the future. Were there going to be problems with implementations? Absolutely. But this individual, Garang, had international status and so he had the ability to bring in international support, international authority, international condemnation. My interactions with John Garang were not as long as many others’, but the times I had the opportunity to meet with him, I saw him as a nation builder.

Q: On the implementation, you said it has slowed down. Is there any part of it going ahead?

A: There are some parts going ahead and, again, I have not been hands-on with this, but it has still been slow with getting the appointment of key people to positions, slow in providing the resources and money. Darfur most certainly has had an impact on implementation of the CPA.

Q: How would you characterize that?

A: Time and resources that should have been going to implement the CPA have been diverted. Again, one can speculate. John Garang would have probably pushed in a different way on Darfur, given his sheer moral authority. There is probably less accountability. Also Salva Kiir, or anyone who would have come after John Garang, would have had a challenge.

Q: Some people imply that the Northern government really does not want to implement the CPA and is dragging its feet.

A: That is probably mixed. There are probably some who want to move forward. There are probably others who think they do not have to move forward right now. So it is never quite so black and white. There are shades of gray. Probably more gray than anything else. When you look at power dynamics, everybody has their own interests and how do you leverage them over someone else’s interests?

Q: One of the protocols of the CPA was setting up an Audit and Assessment Commission. Does it function at all?

A: They are working. The challenges sometimes are access, the ability to evaluate. It is important to have this mechanism and to use it as a check and balance. It is important that it exists.
Q: I have found it difficult to find anybody that can tell me whether it is working and what it is doing.

A: I have to apologize because, again, not being as hands-on with this and especially now in my latest capacity

Q: Let us turn to your specialty, the relationship with the AU. How would you describe their role, their makeup, how they were motivated to do something?

A: It is important to look at the AU commitment to intervention and to promoting peace on the continent. The transition from the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which had a policy of non-intervention, to the AU, which is about five years old now, is the policy of non-indifference. That is to say the commitment, when a people’s lives are challenged or a government fails to respond to its people, then the AU has made the commitment to protect people. So the AU has a political heart and, again that word, political will.

Now their biggest challenge is the sheer monetary capacity to support a mission. So the U.S. was instrumental and still is the largest donor both to AMIS and to the humanitarian efforts on the ground. The U.S., when I was still at the National Security Council (NSC), made the decision that the AU was ready but they did not have the capacity to airlift their troops and we put forth an interagency proposal to say, “We can do this.” Then, we went to our allies, the UK and NATO, to say, “We can do this.” This is where you have political will and political heart in the AU, but we need to support them.

They are still challenged right now, in terms of the monetary support to sustain their program. The U.S. built most of the camps in Sudan. We continue to provide resources; the European Union (EU) provides resources to support them and other individual partners do so as well. The UN is beginning to work closely with them now for this hybrid mission and at the AU we have worked in terms of strategic planning. We continue to provide resources and build camps. So I, as the U.S. observer to the AU, work closely with our Sudan group, who still have the main lead. We support the special envoy, Andrew Natsios, who is our lead on policy and engagement. These are the ways we are working closely with the AU on Darfur and we are working with the AU to help them on the implementation of the CPA in the South.

The AU is very concerned to make sure that movement is made on implementation. They have sent members of their Peace and Security Council just recently to do an assessment in southern Sudan as well as in Darfur. We have provided some money through our preventative diplomacy grant.

Q: Apart from resources, how would you characterize the capability of the AU and its staff, its understanding of problems and issues?

A: I would make the comparison to the League of Nations, to the building up of the UN. The OAU would be the League of Nations. Remember, it was a loose configuration of
states and the process in time that led to the UN as we know it today, the AU is now going through that process. At its next upcoming summit in Ghana, Accra, they are reevaluating their structure. The staffing is still small. Money and resources come primarily from a few nation states: Egypt, South Africa, Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Algeria, Libya. Those are the main contributors in terms of resources to the AU. They carry the bulk of the load, just as a handful of nation states carry the dues and payments of the UN.

On peacekeeping, the UN has only in the last decade moved to the level and sophistication that we know today. It was not always like that.

So the AU is in its formative stages, institutionalizing the kinds of structures, policies and building its personnel. And the AU is only as good as its member states are willing to support it, just like the UN.

**Q: That would be my next question: what kind of consensus is there for supporting the AU, or do they have a lot of fragmentation?**

**A:** It is not a lot of fragmentation. It is called money, resources, personnel. The same thing the UN has. It is in its infancy, it is evolving. I listed the key member states who are financially supporting the bulk of it. So now it is about ownership and that is communication, explaining to members “If you cannot contribute money, you can contribute personnel. It is about sending your best and brightest to staff it. It is about making it important, shaping it.”

So this is a process and we, the United States, in creating our fiftieth mission, have communicated that we see this organization evolving and it is important for us to have a dedicated ambassador and it is part of our transformational diplomacy. So we are in there in the formative years of the organization to support it.

**Q: Do they have difficulty agreeing on a common political agenda of what their priorities are?**

**A:** I would not say that it is difficult. We have 53 countries in the AU. Morocco has opted out over the issue of Western Sahara. But you have 53 member countries. Think about the EU, with 27, with more resources and a few stages ahead of the AU. So the AU at its upcoming meeting will say, “Time to evaluate. What do we want?” It is like anything else, when you have reached the final point you are in trouble, because you should always be evolving, changing, reacting to changes. So the AU is conscious of lessons learned the last five years, because it is not just peace and security. It is political development. It is economic development. It is science and technology. So they now need to sit down and say, “Is our structure the best structure right now for where we want to be in the next phase of our evolution?” And any good organization, any good business, will reevaluate and reassess. So I see this as positive.
I tend to see the glass half full. Not through rose-colored glasses, I do not think they are bad but they have not looked at. “We have made the change from OAU to AU. Now where are we going in the next five years or the next ten years? What kind of personnel? Have our objectives changed? We have two major missions. How can we respond? What do we need? How do we interface with the UN? How do we interface with NATO? How do we work with China, EU? What is it that we envisage that we want to do now? Maybe it is time to map out the various phases of this.”

Q: How do you see their role, particularly in relation to the Sudan? What kind of role do they think they can play?

A: Because they are the manpower on the ground and they are all members of the UN, but they are here as a hybrid AU/UN mission; they are key. They are the entire contingent. This is new and innovative, not just for Africa but across the board. We have a major continental multilateral organization providing the primary force. So how do we financially support them? They are there for the long-run, but we need to help support it financially, bringing in the expertise, complementing the expertise using the structure of the UN, which we are all members of and pay dues to, to complement the AU.

Q: Other people I have interviewed have said, “They are on the ground, but they are not doing much of anything, in Abyei or in Juba or in Darfur.”

A: The UN is in Juba, not the AU. Whatever is taking place in Juba has been the challenge of the UN to recruit contributors. Very different from what is taking place in Darfur. We have roughly seven thousand troops on the ground. It would be a challenge for any nation state or any coalition, when you look at the sheer size of the area; and it also requires the political cooperation of the host nation state and the political will of the parties. Look at southern Sudan, you had the political will of the two major parties involved and you had very sophisticated political movements. When you look at Darfur, you have a much more divided and splintered movements, not all of which have evinced the same level of political will. That is the challenge. So you can have the AU, you can have the government, the UN, but if the parties are not willing to move forward on a common agenda then it is difficult.

Q: What is the AU’s role in trying to help promote a common agenda for the different parts of the country?

A: Their role is... they played a key role in the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), in the talks there, but, again, you have to have the parties willing to move. Look at the ability of Danforth and the Kenyan general and his team. The parties had a clear cut outcome in mind; and they had made the decision that they were going to work on getting there. You need those same dynamics in place in Darfur and they are working on it. It is a challenge. We put our senior-most person, Ambassador Zoellick, on it and he was working. You can put your best and brightest there but the parties have to decide that that is what they want. That is key. That is political will.
Q: Is the AU involved?

A: The AU is involved in part but, again, this is a complex one. I am so glad we have smart, bright people working it. I am trying my best to provide support, but some other folks know this situation intimately, are key to working with these parties; it takes time. That is part of it, too.

Q: Is the AU involved with the eastern rebel situation, the Beja and others, that conflict?

A: I am not aware of it but they may be. I am less familiar with that particular one.

Q: What is your view of how the implementation of the CPA is going to go forward? Let me add more detail. There is supposed to be a census and then elections and then a referendum. Is anything being done to prepare for those, do you know?

A: You mean in terms of the AU?

Q: Is the AU is helping with those; but also within Sudan, not specifically the AU.

A: I cannot address that one. Sometimes you have to know what you know and what you do not know.

Q: There are elections coming up and then there is going to be a referendum.

A: That will come on the AU’s radar but I am not intimately aware as to what steps are being taken right now in that process. Right now I would say the AU involvement is probably limited. I would have to wait to see what assessment was made from the Peace and Security Council team that just came back. Those issues will be discussed at this summit in part.

Q: When do you expect their assessment to be available?

A: I do not know. I am trying to see what kind of report or statement they are going to issue.

Q: Would you care to hazard speculation about what you see as the long-term outcome of the situation in Sudan?

A: Because I am an eternal optimist, I do believe that, in terms of North-South, there is a commitment by the parties to move forward. There are going to be many obstacles and many challenges, absolutely. I do not think it is going to move as fast as I would like to see it. It is going to be one where the international community is going to have to be there to help support this process and that includes the AU and all the members of the international community, collectively, have to continue to be supportive. It is going to be challenging. We will continue to see this level of peace. There will be some hiccups, absolutely, yes.
Darfur is going to require all of us to work together to move forward and to have the patience and the political will of the government of Sudan, that is collective, North and South, to be supportive to bring about a peaceful process. But it can be done. Political will is key in both areas. Without it, then one would be a little less optimistic.

**Q:** Is there a role for the international community in bringing about this political will or encouraging it?

**A:** We can encourage it. It has to come from the people themselves. It ultimately has to be their decision. If they decide yes, then this can move forward. It will not be easy. There will be challenges. But as long as they want to move forward to have peace, then I think they are in such a unique position to have the international community want to support them and we will continue to be there. But it truly is up to them to say yes, that is what we want. They are in a unique position. There is support.

**Q:** Are you able to characterize the Northern government, which seems to be the one that is holding things up and not following through on agreements?

**A:** I am inclined to say that there is enough blame to go around. I will say everyone bears responsibility and in order for it to succeed those in Darfur, the movements there, have to be willing to move. Those in the South have the political will to move. There are challenges in the North, but everyone bears the responsibility.

**Q:** Some people suggest that the referendum in the South, as many people expect, will be a vote for independence and separation and that it will mean a revival of the war, that the war will come back again, that people are arming

**A:** That is the worst case scenario; one always has to be prepared but right now you keep that in mind and you know what you may have to do but you do everything now to avert having that. So if you know that is the worst-case scenario, then I would work backwards: what do we need to do to not make that happen? It is easier to spend time, from my perspective, on saying, “Oh, this is not going to work and this is how it will end.” What are we doing to prevent that? That takes more energy. It is easier to give the doomsday scenario. You have to know about doomsday, in order to prevent it.

**Q:** On the Southern side, they are in the process of creating a government. How do you see that evolving? What is being done to create an effective government in the South, because they have a lot of factions; a lot of differences.

**A:** If they were all one party we would accuse them of being a one party state and there would be problems there. So now that they have multiple factions or movements, that is not necessarily bad. Sometimes it generates good ideas. There are many programs, from the U.S., the EU, the UN, money and resources that is available. So there are many programs on the ground. The AU and others, nation states, trade between Uganda and southern Sudan and Kenya. There are lots of good news stories, roads being built,
training of personnel and training of police. There are things going on. We just tend to not get the good news stories out. Even though we want to hear them, nobody writes about them.

Q: Are they being effective in creating a new government and providing services, though it is a long way to go?

A: But there are many committed people. We see people returning. We see Sudanese who are American citizens and European citizens and from other parts of Africa going home with their expertise. Forming a nation state takes time. We did get to be the U.S., the way we are today, without great sacrifice, without mistakes. Democracy is a process. It is ongoing and democracy for southern Sudan and all of Sudan will not be an American democracy, because we have a different history. It will be unique.

Q: What is the role now of the international community in trying to move things forward? Some people say, “They worked hard on the negotiations and they got the agreement but the international community does not seem to be as heavily involved or as committed”

A: We are heavily involved. We may not be writing about it. It may seem mundane when you are training people and when you are building schools and building roads and feeding people. That is the day-to-day part of national building.

Q: I am moving on to the overall situation in Sudan, in terms of moving the implementation of the CPA.

A: That is part of the implementation of the CPA. Again, we are not citizens of the state. There is a logical role we can play, but we cannot do it for them. You can support it. You become something else when we go in and do it. It requires ownership and you can make recommendations of what needs to be done and you can support it but you can only move as fast as the people themselves are willing to move. Otherwise, it is not ownership, from my perspective.

Q: How does the international community move the Northern government, particularly?

A: You can support them, we provided the program and money and resources. We also have to have enough people with the technical skills. You cannot want it more than someone else wants it. You have to move at the pace that a country is able to move. You can give more resources than a country can absorb, or a people can absorb. We, as Americans, believe it should have happened yesterday. When we are ready to do it, we are ready to do it now. Our attention span is short. Sometimes it is more challenging and frustrating for us than it is for others. I am not saying that they do not want to move on it but we have to understand the political culture and norms and socialization. I am not making excuses for slowness. But they have to want to do it, too, at their pace. We can encourage them to do it and if they are ready, then we can support it.

Q: Not much we can do to motivate them?
A: We can continue to motivate, but they have to decide that they want to. You can motivate only as much as a person wants to be motivated. We believe individuals who are ready to move and go, you support them and that is what you do and you hope that they are ready to do it as well. I think you are right. We must continue to motivate and encourage and also to provide the right support. A real friend will critique you and tell you honestly what you can and cannot do.

Q: Some people suggest that Sudan has become lower on the agenda for the U.S., particularly.

A: That is not true. The President talks about Sudan every time he is out in the public. The Secretary of State is on board. It does not get higher than the President of the United States. We have the Sudan special group; we have a special envoy; and we are still the lead in terms of resources. Tell me, how have we lost support?

Q: We have covered a lot. Are there any important topics or areas that we have not touched on, or things that you would like to emphasize?

A: I want to emphasize that the U.S., in terms of the Bush Administration, has demonstrated clear-cut commitment to Africa. The President has engaged with African heads of state. Both Secretaries of State Powell and Rice have been hands on in Africa. They have been on the continent. We have given $15 billion in HIV/AIDS support and now doubled it. We have provided for malaria, we are providing for democratization, we established a dedicated mission to the African Union, the first non-African dedicated ambassador to the AU. No other non-African nation state has. And we are about to set up our Africa Command. That is commitment. Americans can be proud of what we are doing for Africa. Is there more? Yes, but we are leading and so the bar is set high for the next president.

Q: Looking back over your observations and experience with the Sudan situation, the CPA (we are looking for lessons). Are there things that stand out in your mind that should have been done or should not have been done, in terms of the process of negotiations or bringing about movement on CPA implementation?

A: There are things that we need to continue to do as lessons learned: to continue the clear-cut political commitment publicly, continue to provide resources. We need to continue to encourage all parties that they have a stake and that they can only succeed when everyone demonstrates the political will to support the nation state, a democratic nation state. We need to continue to encourage the Sudanese to be committed, to be willing to make the compromises to create a democratic nation state and we need to continue to echo that the only way forward is a peaceful one.

So, as lessons learned, there are things as I see them: we have taken many of the right steps but in order to move forward we have to have continuity and maintain the
momentum with the commitment that President Bush has demonstrated at the highest level and we must be committed for the long haul and cannot be stopped.

Q: Are there lessons at the practical level, some things that did not work out so well, at the operational level?

A: Operationally, we need to be very analytical. It is a real live experiment. It is not a textbook. So from that perspective, I would say lessons learned are clear-cut support to the AU, support greater AU/UN deployment of forces, help with strategic planning for the AU and to mobilize the resources of the UN in a timely fashion. Those to me are the key things, on the practical level to make this work.

Q: There wasn’t anything that you thought was a bad idea, probably should not have been done, not just the U.S. but generally in the situation there, that gone off on the wrong track?

A: Timely deployment of AU forces means timely release of resources. That to me is the one thing that we have been slowest on. The rest is conditioned by the parties on the ground and that we do not have any control over. If we are going to ask the AU to deploy forces then we have to, in a timely fashion, be able to release money and resources to them.

Lessons learned: we are supporting them now by strategic planning, by standing up a mission here that is dedicated. So we have learned lessons and we are trying to address that. And the AU, too, has to be willing to get its forces ready to be deployed in a timely fashion and to also provide, money and resources not just come from the U.S. and the West but from Africa itself and giving the troops is a big contribution.

We saw countries stand up like Rwanda right away, like Nigeria, who put resources there. We need to applaud that. Other African countries have to react in the same way.

Q: What about at the political level, apart from the military?

A: At the political level, again, having personnel and having the right staffing, that takes time for an evolution from OAS to AU, from League of Nations to the UN. Getting that process institutionalized is what they now need to do.

Q: Is there any last comment you would like to make, a major point you would like to emphasize again?

A: I would say from a U.S. perspective the last point is that we must continue to build a strong partnership with all of Africa and a strong partnership with the AU.

Q: That is a good concluding remark. Thank you for this interview.