The interviewee was in Sudan in 2006 teaching English, first in a primary school in the north, and later teaching English to northern and southern soldiers in joint integrated army units and to displaced southerners in Khartoum. The British Council sponsored the English course for the joint integrated units. The aim was to get northern and southern soldiers to become acquainted by engaging and talking together. The joint integrated units were a feature of the CPA. The unit the interviewee was teaching was being prepared for monitoring in Abyei; however, the Northern Government had not agreed to the CPA Abyei recommendations, so the monitoring work had not started. The unit included soldiers half from the Southern Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) and half from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The soldiers were mostly of low rank but some were officers. They had many different ethnic backgrounds. They were happy to talk to each other, and they did learn from each other, but they were integrated in name only. In general, they were not doing very much such as in Juba.

These experiences provided the interviewee with an opportunity to learn about everyday people’s attitudes toward the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and each other’s situations. The southern soldiers were ideologically committed to being soldiers in the SPLA; the northern soldiers saw their service as just a job they had to do to survive. The soldiers had very little understanding of the CPA and the purposes of the joint integrated unit. The lower ranked southern soldiers were eager to get an education; their officers were more educated.

Among the two million displaced southerners in Khartoum, there was some resentment that they had been forgotten and had no rights; money went to the South; many had no home to return to. The children went to schools sponsored by the European Union and Education Action International.

The people in the North are cut off and do not know about the CPA, nor about the upcoming elections. The majority of the people are anti-government, but they are apathetic. People were beaten for opposing the government party. The main objection of the people to the Khartoum government, particularly in the towns, is that they feel ignored. The few powerful people in Khartoum have all the money and none flows to the people.
The Northern government was not doing its part to assure CPA implementation. Almost all southerners queried do not want unity. Some northerners said unity is needed to as to spread Islam. If the South does become separate, the interviewee is worried about the North; there is Darfur, the East and no check on the Khartoum government. There is a tendency to see the Darfur situation in black and white; but the identities are very fluid. Any peace agreement with the South or Darfur will have to focus on the fate of demobilized soldiers.

The international community in the South should focus on education, especially for the former child soldiers. The CPA needs to be publicized in the North, for example, the elections. There should be help to provide more awareness in the North, particularly among the more progressive northerners. A big worry is what will happen to the two million southerners in Khartoum if the south separates.

Re lessons, more attention should have been paid to Darfur in the beginning in the North-South negotiations. The situation and the CPA need to continue to be reported in the world media as well as the Sudanese media. It is important to see Darfur as part of a comprehensive issue, not just focus on Darfur. The CPA is not being enforced; civil war between the North and the South could return. There needs to be more interaction among northerners and between northerners and southerners. The Northerners have very little understanding of what the South has been through and of conditions in the South.
Q: To provide a context for this interview, describe your association with Sudan and with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).

A: We went to Sudan. We were going to be there for a year and a half. We arrived in June 2006 and we started out as volunteers in the north. We were at a small village about four hours north of Khartoum and we were teaching English in the primary school. We were also doing discussion groups, so we talked to a lot of people. We have a pretty good idea of northern attitudes. Then, after being there for six months, we went to Khartoum and I taught at the University of Khartoum for three months in conversation classes.

After that I got a job with the British Council and one of the main parts of my job was preparing for a course for the joint integrated units of the army. The course was to improve the English of the joint integrated units, but the main idea of the course is to get the northerners and the southerners in the same room, doing something together and talking together. So there were three weeks in Khartoum and then we did three weeks in a joint integrated unit in Juba. We returned to America last October (2006).

Q: Do you have any particular knowledge about the CPA process and negotiation? Is that an area that you followed?

A: Probably the most that I know would be the work that we did with the joint integrated units. So not so much the negotiations, but what is happening more recently now with enforcement. What I know most about is just everyday people’s attitudes towards the CPA.

Q: Let’s start out with the joint integrated unit. Describe it. What is it and what were you trying to do?

A: It was part of the peace agreement to have the army integrated, northerners and southerners. The ones I was teaching were meant to police Abyei, but because Abyei had not been resolved, they did not have very much to do. In Khartoum especially, they were integrated in name only. They had separate dormitories. They ate separately. In Khartoum, the commanding officer from the North had a much nicer office than the one from the South.
Q: Who was actually being integrated?

A: It is the SPLA and the Sudanese Army; part of the peace agreement was that there would be certain units that were integrated. Mostly they would be in Abyei and then there would be a symbolic presence in Khartoum and in Juba. I was working with the one in Khartoum; it was half southerners, half northerners, i.e., half former SPLA and half Sudanese Armed Forces.

Q: What ranks were they?

A: It was mixed. I had some very, very low people, as well as the officers. They were not very integrated but in the classroom I never had a problem. I thought it was very rewarding for them. They were happy to talk to each other. It was a nice experience. They did learn from each other.

It was interesting to see their different perspectives, because the southerners were very ideologically committed to being soldiers in the SPLA. We had talks about why you became a soldier and the southerners would all say, “I needed my freedom.” Actually, most of the southerners had been conscripted when they were children, but they were very ideologically committed to it, whereas the northerners really were not as much. The northerners would say, “I am just doing this because it is a job and I have to do it; my father lost all his money.” These were the lower ranks saying things like this.

In Juba, they were more integrated. The officers seemed to talk to each other more. Just from my impression, it seemed to be working better. There was one incident in the North, in Khartoum, where some southern people who were former SPLA but part of the joint integrated unit, were arrested for being on the army base, because no one realized that there was an integrated unit. They just thought that they were southerners who were trespassing. That was quite a touchy thing when it happened.

Q: There were units in Juba or in Khartoum?

A: We were in Khartoum when that happened.

Q: And then one in Abyei, or not?

A: They are not in Abyei now. They are supposed to be in Abyei. That has not changed. When I was there they had not gone to Abyei.

Q: Were they in an operating mode while you were teaching them English?

A: No. They were not doing very much at all, because they were meant to be in Abyei and because there had been no decision made on Abyei. They (Khartoum Government) were refusing to accept the commission’s report on Abyei that meant that they were just waiting around, not doing very much of anything.
Q: And in Juba were they doing anything?

A: No.

Q: I have heard people complain that these peacekeeping groups were not doing much of anything.

A: Yes, I think that is definitely true.

Q: Was that because they were unable or unwilling?

A: I do not think it is an unwilling thing. Things that were promised in the CPA, the things they would monitor like Abyei just had not happened.

Q: So how did these groups get along with each other?

A: They keep pretty much to themselves. They really are integrated in name only.

Q: You had them both in the classroom together?

A: In the classroom they got along, and they did appreciate the chance to talk to each other that they had not; a lot of the northerners had not really ever talked to a southerner and it was fascinating for them. But on a daily basis, even though they were an integrated unit, they do not have much contact with each other. It was good for the northerners just to hear some of the stories of the southerners, because so many of the northerners, soldiers but also just regular people, do not have a sense of how much the South has been affected by the war and how long it has been going on, how it affected everybody. And in the classroom, they were able to hear some of these stories and see their perspective a bit more.

It was the same with the southerners. The southerners realized that a lot of the northerners were not that different from them. A lot of the northerners, they joined the army because they did not have a choice. They did not have any money and that was their only way to survive.

So I think it was very good on just the human level of being able to understand each other’s perspectives a bit more.

Q: Were they from very different ethnic backgrounds and what language did you use, mostly?

A: They were from different ethnic backgrounds. The southerners were from all over the South. We taught them at three different levels. One of the levels I was teaching was pretty beginning. It was a tricky thing to set up because the northerners had much worse English than the southerners. So we did not want to do it completely by level, because if we were doing the classes completely by levels then we would have a class of all
northerners being in the bottom set and all southerners being in the top set. So what we did was, we had half of it by level and then half of it a mixed level. In Khartoum, I thought that was quite good for just the confidence of some of the southerners, because they had been oppressed in the North and to be in a classroom situation where those southerners could do something a lot better than the northerners was rewarding and changed things around a little bit.

**Q:** So your objective was not just teaching English, it was trying to create some communication among them?

A: Yes, just to get them actually to do something together and to know a little bit more about each other. The course is only for three weeks, so we were not going to get that much progress on their English; the other objective was definitely more important.

**Q:** Who was sponsoring this?

A: The British Council. It was actually funded by the British Ministry of Defense.

**Q:** There was no government sponsorship?

A: No, there was no Sudanese government sponsorship. The British had just reinstated their military attaché and this was one thing they could fund with a clear conscience in Sudan. You do not want obviously to give a lot of help to the Sudanese Army, but this was a good thing because it was not military training, it was something else that had a peace objective.

**Q:** Was this something just the British sponsored or was it part of the CPA or some other, larger plan?

A: I do not think it was stipulated as part of the CPA to do English classes. It was something that happened more recently.

**Q:** I mean the joint integrated arrangement?

A: The joint integrated units, yes, that was part of the CPA.

**Q:** And so they had been formed and you were adding the English language to that but they had already been established.

A: They had already been established.

**Q:** What understanding did they have or indicate about the CPA and what it was trying to do?

A: The regular soldiers did not have much understanding. They pretty much just had to do what they were told. And it was incredible how little control, how little knowledge
they had about their own lives. They had been told the day before, “Okay, we are all going to go to the South now.” They had had less than 12 hours notice and, for most of them were kept in the dark about the kind of larger meaning of things.

Q: Did they understand why they were part of something called the joint integrated unit?

A: Very limited understanding.

Q: Is there some other aspect about the joint integrated operation that we have not touched on?

A: One of the sadder parts was that the southerners were pretty low in rank. There was a huge difference in rank. The higher ranked southerners had had an education and had been able to travel. The lower ranks were so eager to be in a classroom. When I taught them, they would sit there at the very front and it did not matter what I did, they would just sit there grinning, like this was the most thrilling thing for them to be in a classroom. They had not had any education. They wanted that more than anything. And it was hard for me, because our class was only for three weeks. It was not going to give them the education they dreamed of, but they saw us as, “Oh, great, now we are getting our education. This is going to change things.” And then to have to explain to them over and over again that, no, actually it was only going to be for three weeks. That was tough.

Q: Was there no follow on to this program?

A: Not yet. They are doing other joint integrated units, because we only did two; now they are doing ones in different places. A more comprehensive program, a start in education would be something that would be really worthwhile.

Q: Was there some other part of the program, apart from English, that they were participating in?

A: At the moment, it was only the English classes.

Q: What did they do the rest of the time?

A: Not much. They were very, very bored.

Q: There was no military training or military exercises?

A: For a very small part of the day they would have military exercises. They went home. The ones from the North, a lot of them actually lived with their family. The southerners were just in Khartoum, were stuck in this very dry, middle of the desert, not really doing much of anything.

Q: There was no effort to build an integrated unit?
A: No. There was very little going on.

Q: Very curious. What was the objective then of having these units, apart from teaching them English?

A: It was part of the CPA. Part of the objective was a symbolic objective that we are going to integrate our armies and then they were also going to monitor these problem areas like Abyei. Because Khartoum has been so difficult about Abyei and has not accepted the international commission’s recommendations; this means that the joint integrated unit does not really have a purpose.

Q: So this is an idea but it does not seem to be exercising much influence?

A: Yes.

Q: Moving beyond the integrated units, what other dimensions have you observed and worked on that would be important to understand about the situation there?

A: In Khartoum, we volunteered in a school for displaced children, not children, really. A lot of them are young adults and teenagers. All of them had these horrific stories; you hear one story and you think it is just one person’s story about having to flee from the South and walk all the way to Ethiopia and then the time in the refugee camp and seeing their family die. You just think it is one person, but then you talk to more people and you realize every single person from the South has had this horrible experience.

So we worked in the school in Khartoum, which was serving these people; it was very interesting working there. Talking to the teachers, one thing that concerned me was how they were saying that they were losing a lot of the funding after the CPA was signed, because even though they were working for southerners, people were now saying, “No, we have to put all of our money for the South and the southerners should return home.”

A lot of them did not have a home to return to in the South and it is not a secure place to return to at the moment. There was some resentment, like people had just forgotten the southerners in Khartoum. So that is something that definitely needs to be addressed.

Q: I understood that once the peace occurred, a lot of the southerners moved from Khartoum back to the South.

A: A lot of them did, but there is still a very, very big majority of the southerners who have stayed.

Q: They were there because they fled the war, is that it?

A: That is right. Some of the younger ones were even born in the North. There are two million southerners in Khartoum. It is true, they are to some extent being forgotten and they do not have any rights. The government is constantly harassing their schools. They
are coeducational schools so they get in trouble from the government for being coeducational.

Q: How do they exist? What do they live on?

A: The schools are sponsored by Education Action International and the European Union (EU); they used to get government funding but that was cut off.

Q: But they are in refugee camps?

A: Yes, the kids are all from refugee camps. It is actually not in a refugee camp, the school. They take a bus to get there. A lot of the camps are not so much camps anymore. They have become more permanent than a camp.

Q: But they are provided with food and other resources?

A: Some of them are.

Q: I wonder how they exist.

A: All of the kids that I was teaching were in an afternoon school. So they would work in the morning and then come to school.

Q: What kind of work would they be doing? Farming?

A: No, more construction.

Q: More broadly, what was your impression of the CPA as a peace agreement and how it is working?

A: One of the problems is the North does not have any knowledge of the CPA. The people we talked to when we lived in the North did not know about it. We were there when Garang died and we first heard of it, just rumors and then the riots in Khartoum afterwards, not on TV at all. People had relatives in Khartoum; they would hear it that way. People in the North are very cut off and do not really know about the CPA and they do not know there are supposed to be elections. They have no knowledge of this. If the CPA is going to work, you need to get everyone, including the North, to know about it.

People think that the North is this monolithic place that is very pro-government; that definitely is not true. I would say the majority of people in the North are anti-government. There are student elections at the universities in the North. That was a very big event, because it was the only chance people had to vote and participate in the democratic process. In Shendi, which is where Bashir is from, they did not vote for the government party, even though the government was very intimidating; they put a lot of resources. The government party in the Shendi University bought them cars, bought them loudspeakers. People were beaten for opposing the government party. But even after
doing all that and really, really trying very hard to rig those elections they lost. If the
government cannot even win the University of Shendi, that shows how shallow their
support really is in the North. And it was the same for all of the northern towns where we
were. The government did not win in any of the university elections there.

**Q:** What is the main objection to the government that you hear from these people?

A: They feel ignored; they feel like it is just a few powerful people in Khartoum who
have all the money, have all the resources and they are not really seeing anything of it.
Where we were in Ed Damer, a big portion of the men were in Saudi Arabia working and
sending money and that was really the only money that was coming into this place; the
money from outside. So they just felt frustrated that there was not more going on where
they were. Even though people are against the government, there has been an apathy that
is constant, in that “This government is bad but all of the governments are bad, so we
cannot do anything about it” was the general attitude.

**Q:** There is been quite a lot of construction going on in Khartoum but...

A: Yes, it is very different in Khartoum. In Khartoum people are very wealthy and doing
very well. I do not think that has spread to anywhere else, though.

**Q:** Outside of Khartoum?

A: Yes, people in Khartoum live in the same country and even like the students at
Khartoum, they were going to the same university but their perspective on the Sudan was
just so completely different. You talk to people from Khartoum, who are from relatively
wealthy families, and they did not understand when people characterized Sudan as a poor
country. They had no knowledge that Sudan is one of the poorest countries in the world.
They had no knowledge of the war. What they knew was Khartoum and Khartoum is
getting very wealthy now.

**Q:** How would you describe the political characteristics of the northern government?

A: A very small group of people holding onto power whatever way they can. They will
do anything to hold onto power. They have gone through so many, in recent years, so
many transformations, from including Turabi and being very hardcore Islamists to
accepting Garang. That just shows that they will do anything to hold onto power.

**Q:** Is it a pretty unified group or are there factions?

A: You mean the people in the government, are they unified? It is hard to say.

**Q:** Did you have any sense of what is happening in the South, in terms of building up a
government?
A: Most of my interactions were just with regular people, so I cannot really speak about the higher-level government.

Q: What about implementation of the CPA? It is a very complex and elaborate agreement, has lots of protocols: the wealth sharing protocol and the power sharing protocol, which was related to these integrated military units and then there were protocols for a census and then an election and then a referendum.

A: The impression I have was that the Northern government was not at all doing its part implementing any of these provisions; maybe if Garang had lived, things would be different now. If Garang had lived they would have maybe made more of an effort. When they signed the CPA with Taha, there was a good relationship between Taha and Garang and they signed it with the agreement that Garang would sell the idea to the South and would sell the idea of unity and they could campaign together in the North. And when Garang died that vision died and the North responded by not fulfilling what they promised to.

Q: Do you have an impression that anybody has a vision of a united Sudan these days, or is it mostly fractured groups?

A: Almost all southerners I talked to do not want unity. They want separation. And the northerners, for the most part, they also want separation. The northerners did say things like, “We need unity because that way we can spread Islam.” That was not what everyone was saying, but the people who were saying they wanted unity it was not a nice unity where we respect everyone’s rights, it was. “With unity we will be able to spread Islam.” So I do not really see a future for a unified Sudan.

Q: So the northerners are not...

A: There was more support for unity among the northerners than the southerners. The southerners have just had enough. They are the ones who have been through this horrible war and they were like, “Okay, we want freedom. We want separation.” A lot of the northerners were more pro-unity and not just because a few of them wanted to spread Islam. There were also things like some of the more liberal northerners would say things like, ‘If we lose the South, we lose any kind of check on the government.” A kind of well-informed northerner would say something like, “We have the CPA. We have some kind of promise that they are going to respect the rights of different religions and different kinds of people.”

If the South does become separate, I am worried about the North. There is Darfur; there is the East. There is no check on the Khartoum government, if they do separate.

Q: How has the Darfur situation impacted on what is evolving there?

A: In the North, when we were living in this small town, again, people were very ignorant about the situation. They were kept in the dark; they had no concept of it. In
Khartoum, I saw a lot of students from Darfur and so I heard about Darfur through them; the Darfurian students were pretty active. They would protest the government and the government would beat up the students from Darfur for protesting the government. When we were there, a lot of anti-UN protests and anti-American protests. The impression I had of these protests is that the government would always report them as being these huge protests and then you would see them and it would be mostly police. It really was more police and government people than anyone else. They failed in getting people excited about being anti-UN or anti-America.

Q: What is your understanding of the Darfur situation? I gather the people are not united there or have much leadership. What structure do you see within the Darfur?

A: It has been oversimplified in the media. There is this tendency to see things in black and white, the evil Arabs against the innocent Africans. First of all, the identities are fluid. It is not clear-cut who is an Arab and who is an African. That changes by generations. People assume different identities. It is not as clear-cut as people think. There have been some pretty horrible human rights violations on both sides and we do tend to only focus on the government ones. Definitely the government’s violations are bigger than the rebels’, but it is important not to see it with total blinders.

It is the same with the South and the same with Darfur. Any kind of peace agreement is going to have to focus on what are you going to do with these soldiers, how are you going to reintegrate them into society. With the British Council, there was at one point when, the first agreement in Darfur; Minnawi and his people came to Khartoum, there was some talk of having English lessons for these people so I interviewed a lot of the SLA soldiers and one thing that really struck me was: one man I talked to who was pretty high up in the SLA, I asked him what he thought about the future. His story was that he had been part of the Sudan Armed Forces, and he was a retired officer and then he joined the SLA. And he said, “Now my future is really good, because before I was nobody, I was just a retired officer and now I am in the SLA, I have a high rank and they are going to give me my rank back in the Sudan Armed Forces. So I am going to have the same rank back.”

So it was definitely a very personal motivation. It was not “I am bringing freedom to Darfur.” No matter how unjust the place is, the people who can start a revolution are going to be the people in the army and, if you do not address how to keep people like that from just perpetrating war, then you are just going to have an endless cycle.

Q: Is there any unity of leadership in Darfur itself?

A: I do not know.

Q: Looking at the way forward, the referendum is not for several years, 2011. Are we going to get to that point; will be allowed to happen; how do you see things unfolding?
A: If there is a referendum, the South will overwhelmingly vote for separation. It is really hard to tell whether the referendum will happen or not,

Q: You think there is possibility of going back to war again?

A: It is possible they will go back to war.

Q: What do you see as the role of the international community, what role can they play to help move things forward or to some resolution?

A: In the South what they have to do is focus on education, because it just is not there, at all and if you do not have that then there are going to be problems. And especially education of the former child soldiers and not just child soldiers but soldiers. Education is what these people want more than anything and if they do not have that, then, they will just go back to war. A lot of thought needs to be put into what are you going to do with these boys who do not have any skills; they have not done anything apart from fight for the last twenty years. There needs to be a lot of effort into thinking of alternative things for them to do to support themselves.

The CPA needs to be publicized in the North. If people knew that they were supposed to have elections in the North, that would be something they could be really excited about, a lot of people in the North, because the North is not universally behind this government. If there was just a little more awareness in the North, then that could be a very important tool.

Q: Do you think the international community could provide this awareness?

A: I do not know if the international community could do that. There are some people doing very good things in the North. The University of Khartoum has a very good peace program. There are some very progressive northerners, but because of sanctions they are not allowed to get any aid. That is a big problem. We need to recognize that it is not this blanket thing, with everyone in the North being this evil Arab. We need to start looking at it a bit more subtly and helping the people who are doing progressive things in the North.

Q: Good point.

A: Another important thing to remember is and I am really worried about it if they separate: what is going to happen to these two million people in the North. At the moment they are being oppressed, but if the South separates that would just give an excuse to the northern government to oppress these southerners even more who are in the North.

Q: You mean the two million southerners in the North?

A: Yes. The two million southerners who are in and around Khartoum. It is important that the international community not forget these southerners who are in Khartoum.
Q: Is that an issue that is not being addressed?

A: Yes. The international community needs to support things like schools, because there are a lot of educated southerners who have set up these schools and who are working really hard to improve their community among southerners in the North and they are getting some international aid, but most of the aid now is going to the South. It is important that the international community keeps on supporting these local organizations in Khartoum.

Q: Working through the NGOs, particularly. That is a major part of their role, right?

A: Yes, a major part of the NGO role.

Q: Trying to think about the impact of these rebel movements, the eastern rebels as well. The issue with the others is essentially the same as for Darfur?

A: Yes. It goes back to what I was saying about how it really is only Khartoum which is benefiting from the current government and everybody else, it does not matter where they are, feels marginalized.

Q: If you look back over your experience and what you have been talking about (this of course is one of the objectives of these interviews) is there any lesson that stands out in your mind of what should have been done or was done and worked well?

A: In terms of what they should have done, it is tricky. A lot of people said they pursued this North-South agreement and ignored Darfur and they should have paid more attention to Darfur in the beginning. It was a milestone to get this North-South agreement and they did stop the war. It is very tricky to think about what could have been done better.

Q: What did they do that was not a good thing to do? Some people say that exclusion, I think that is what you are saying, exclusion of many parties from the CPA, that was a mistake. On the other hand, you may not have had an agreement.

A: It is a tradeoff, because you could say, well, we should have included more of the parties, but it is hard to know what would have happened, if they would have been able to have the agreement if they had done it differently.

Q: Do you have any thoughts about what might be the next steps that ought to be taken?

A: …by the international community?

Q: Yes

A: The situation and the CPA need to continue to be reported more in the world media, as well as the Sudanese media, to have them on the tops of people’s minds. The
international community knew about the North-South five years ago because that was in the news, and now that has just been completely forgotten, they just think about Darfur. They need to see it as more part of the same issue. It would be useful if there had been more comprehensive studying of the issue. They need to try to put pressure on Sudan about Darfur but they cannot forget the South; they need to also put pressure on implementing the CPA. So there is a danger that people have just totally forgotten about the CPA and they have started thinking about Darfur. You look at the CPA; it is not being enforced. It could very easily go into civil war again. That needs to be something on the forefront of people’s minds.

Q: *Any other thoughts?*

A: In order for there to be peace in Sudan, there is going to have to be some more, just on a person-to-person level, some more interaction between northerners and between southerners and northerners; they have been so much in the dark for so long and been so isolated for so long. It is not their fault, the news has been so controlled. But the northerners do not understand why the southerners are so angry and want separation. They say things like, “The South is very green. The South has oil. They are very rich and we live in the desert.” They really do not have an understanding of what the South has gone through. So any kind of program that is aim at bringing northerners and southerners together would be something that would be worth supporting.

Q: *Is anybody doing that, apart from your English classes?*

A: There are some northern NGOs who do that. The Peace Institute, which is part of the University of Khartoum, has done stuff like that. I have heard anecdotes about someone who did a play, a drama, between northerners and southerners. Things like that are very worthwhile.

Q: *Perhaps this is something the NGOs and the international community should be taking up to promote this more.*

A: Yes.