The interviewee has been working on Sudan since 2002, when he was asked to support the work of the Special Envoy, Ambassador John Danforth. One of the key points the interviewee stresses is that the U.S. efforts in Sudan have been “an almost textbook case of effective multilateral diplomacy.” Over time, the U.S. has played an “assertive, high-profile” role that has energized other players, such as the IGAD partners, the European Troika (the U.S., the U.K., Norway), and the EU. In his view, “decisive U.S. leadership” was key to reaching the CPA. He enumerates four examples of this leadership, which included the Abyei boundary agreement, the agreement on wealth sharing (i.e. what per cent of oil revenue would be given to the South), the determination to allow Garang to keep his separate army, and the status of Khartoum as a national capital in which all religions were to be respected. While U.S. leadership was crucial in achieving the CPA, the interviewee emphasized the international partnership in which all the players had an important role. In his opinion, the CPA process is an encouraging indication of the increasing maturity of African organizations, and demonstrates the real potential for the African Union to become a strong organization for conflict resolution in Africa.

With respect to the negotiations, the interviewee believes that it was the correct decision not to include other parties at the negotiating table beyond the two warring parties. Since the signing of the Accords, the other political groups have been encouraged to participate and the process has become quite inclusive as a result. Moreover, the leadership of the National Congress Party (the leadership of the Khartoum Government), while leading an Islamic fundamentalist government, is also very pragmatic. Having signed the Agreements in order to survive, because of international pressure, and because it was tired of fighting, the NCP now wishes to implement the Accords pragmatically, to the extent necessary in order to continue to survive politically. According to this interviewee, very few Sudanese politicians, either in the South or the North, share the vision of National Unity which was the hallmark of John Garang and Vice President Taha, but there is general agreement on not wanting the CPA to fall apart, since that would mean renewed warfare, renewed sanctions, and the loss of billions of development dollars.

Regarding the Abyei boundary agreement, the interviewee stressed the difficulty of this issue and explained that the Northerners have been dragging their feet in implementing it because the findings of the commission are more closely aligned with the
Southerners’ position. In other areas, implementation, while initially somewhat rocky, has progressed. For example, thanks to international pressure, oil revenue transfers are currently underway. The Government has also withdrawn its forces from the South as stipulated under the Agreement, and has adhered to the power-sharing provisions of the CPA as well. Likewise, the Government of South Sudan has been set up and the transition from Garang to Salva Kiir has been remarkably smooth. On the security side, however, there is a troubling delay in the formation of the Joint Integrated Units which are called for by the Agreement, a problem the interviewee expects the U.S. to play a major role in resolving. The Assessments and Evaluation Commission, one of the key commissions, has been set up to monitor implementation and to be a vehicle for working out differences, but to date it has been weak. In sum, with 1,100 items in the Peace Accord that need to be carried out, the interviewee is cautiously optimistic that the process will be a success as long as there continues to be very sustained U.S. and international engagement.

The interviewee strongly disagrees that the CPA laid the foundations for the violence in Darfur. Rather, in his view, long-simmering grievances in Darfur came to a head because the guerilla opposition movements in Darfur saw that the North-South Agreement was moving ahead, and they took the opportunity to get their own grievances on the table. Additionally, the SPLM viewed fighting in Darfur as a “useful second front to keep pressure on the Government while North-South negotiations continued," and consequently provided concrete assistance to the Sudanese Liberation Movement (one of the rebel groups.) While the U.S. objected to that assistance, the “more egregious problem was Government support for the Janjaweed.” As the violence and atrocities being committed against the civilian populations became quite clear in early 2004, the situation in Darfur did become “a shadow over the CPA process.” With the conclusion of the recent Darfur accords, what is needed now is to reenergize the North-South peace process while also implementing the Darfur process.

Finally, an additional significant lesson learned is the importance of “direct, intense involvement” of either the Secretary of State or another principal Deputy. When such “intense oversight” was present, it dramatically broke through bureaucratic logjams. This involvement also brought increased resources, although the interviewee points out that it has proven much harder to get the people needed than to secure funding. He also states that President Bush felt strongly from the beginning about wanting to achieve results in Sudan and to democratically transform the country, and that Secretary of State Rice and Deputy Secretary Zoellick have placed Sudan “right up there with Iraq and Afghanistan in terms of things we want moved.” Further, according to this interviewee, achieving democratic transformation in Sudan is seen by the Bush Administration as not less important than counterterrorism cooperation with that country.
Q: I’m speaking with an official who has been involved in Sudan since at least 2002, is that right?

A: Right, August 2002. I came back from Mali to work with the Special Envoy, Jack Danforth. What we did was start up the special group to support Danforth as the Special Envoy.

Q: Okay, I have spoke to others about the Danforth mission and the Danforth report. What would you say, in what way, the four tests that Danforth laid down, how did those lay the groundwork for the CPA?

A: Well, the four tests I think were crucial, some more that others. What was particularly important was the idea of establishing a ceasefire in the Nuba Mountains and, in effect, to make a long story short, that did work. There were negotiations, an agreement was reached, with Swiss help, actually and a special mechanism was set up by the U.S. to help to monitor that. So that was very important as an initial step in building a degree of confidence between the parties and demonstrating the U.S. ability to sort of, if you will, be an active negotiator and influence the process with results.

Q: In order to give a little credit to the Swiss here, can you describe how their role fit into that?

A: Well, they hosted some meetings, they hosted some meetings in Bergenstadt and in fact the agreement was signed there. They were also helpful with technical assistance. They provided maps and they were very good on that. So, they actually provided very significant support.

Q: Okay, and today, is the Nuba Mountains region still peaceful? The ceasefire is still holding?

A: Yes, it actually held pretty well, continuously. There were breakdowns in the larger Southern ceasefire at various times. Nuba Mountains held pretty well. There was a special mechanism, after the Nuba Mountains ceasefire was established, there was something called the Joint, I think it was, the Joint Military Teams set up in the Nuba Mountains and actually a Norwegian general headed it. Again, it was an international
group, a very small group. I don’t think it ever exceeded thirty or forty people, if I recall correctly, observers, a lot of them retired military, some active duty, who monitored implementation and worked with both sides. Again, the U.S. was part of that. We helped support it, helped stand it up. So that helped to ensure that it held. By and large it did hold.

Q: Okay and the situation today then is

A: The situation today in the Nuba Mountains is good. Again, what happened is, ultimately, after the Nuba Mountains ceasefire was negotiated, there was a subsequent ceasefire in the larger South that was negotiated, much later actually. I’d say the Nuba Mountains has been a success story, basically, since then.

Q: We should well publicize that.

A: Absolutely.

Q: It isn’t often we get to read good news!

A: What’s interesting about that, too, it actually signaled I think a very important theme, right at the outset of the efforts and that was a very strong multilateral effort. It always strikes me as interesting that the U.S. is often criticized for going it alone, but in fact all of the efforts on Sudan have been in my view an almost textbook case of effective multilateral diplomacy.

Q: Could you expand a little on that? I’ve heard some details, as well, but for the record?

A: Well, I think, the way it was effective in terms of multinational diplomacy, first of all IGAD, the Intergovernmental Authority for the Development of East Africa, was prepared to reenergize the Sudan process and we encouraged that. One of the things we did after naming an envoy to demonstrate support for that and also to see if in fact resuming the negotiations would be viable was to send Danforth out to talk to a number of the allies -- the Brits, the Norwegians and the EU and others. So he made the swing through Europe. He made, in the course of his time as Envoy, quite a number of swings. Again, to enlist broad support for this. Specifically, there was something called the Troika that was established, which was the U.S., UK and Norway, because we were the countries that had the most direct role. The UK, of course, as the former colonial power, Norway because of a special relationship that had developed over the years between Norway and the SPLM, the Southern group fighting for independence. Beyond the Troika group there was broader involvement of the EU and European countries, and African countries through IGAD. The assertive and high profile U.S. role helped to energize the other actors that formed together and then as we look at the process, there were very specific things that came from that multinational cooperation. It wasn’t just words. First and foremost was this Nuba Mountains Agreement but then throughout the
process there were a lot of contributions in terms of money and personnel from other countries.

*Q: To what degree would you say that the peace process was a contributing factor or laid the foundations for the violence in Darfur, which happened not so long afterwards?*

*A: I wouldn’t describe it in any way as a contributing factor. What I think happened is this: as the North-South process became real and started to move ahead, long-simmering grievances in Darfur sort of came more to the fore. The ethnic groups in Darfur that were concerned about their historic marginalization, and efforts by the central Government to “Arabize” the region came to the fore, and two actual guerilla opposition movements were formally established and started carrying out actions in 2003 in Darfur. And I do think that the reason this came to a head is because they saw their opportunities: the North-South is moving ahead, this is the opportunity to get our grievances on the table. In fact, these groups made efforts to get to the negotiating table on the North-South, arguing it should be a country-wide deal, something which we and IGAD resisted. The Darfur opposition groups wanted to get to the table for this North-South negotiation. They wanted to become part of this North-South negotiation as well but that’s something that we and IGAD and everybody else resisted, because it would excessively complicate the process and make it impossible to get a deal.

There’s also another dimension and that is the SPLM certainly had clear links to one of these rebel groups in Darfur, the Sudanese Liberation Movement. Of course, that almost sounds like the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement. John Garang was very close to one of those SLM leaders, Abdelwahid, and while I’m not sure I’ve ever seen definitive information on this, it is generally believed, I think with good reason, that the SPLM provided concrete assistance to the SLM. Clearly the SPLM saw this fighting in Darfur as a useful second front to keep pressure on the Government while the North-South negotiations continued.

*Q: That’s an interesting point. Did the U.S. or the international community react to this stance by the SPLM?*

*A: Yeah, we did. We pressed Garang repeatedly not to support the groups. Of course he always denied that he was providing any support to the groups. So, we raised that but, of course, at the same time we were raising with the Government their need not to support the Janjaweed militias, not to commit atrocities, etc, in Darfur. So frankly the onus was more on the Government. If there was support coming from Garang to the rebels, it was certainly limited. The more egregious problem was the Government support for Janjaweed and actions against the civilian population. But we did, we were certainly pressing all parties from an early stage to end the violence in Darfur.

*Q: At least in the run-up to the signing of the CPA in 2005, those efforts were pretty successful? How would you characterize that time period?*
A: No. The whole Darfur issue is very interesting. What happened is that the rebels first came to the public attention in a big way in 2003, when they attacked the main provincial capital of El Fasher and destroyed a bunch of government aircraft on the runway and all that. I think that was also a wakeup call to the Government on what had been happening. What happened particularly after that was that the Government armed and organized the Arab militias in a very clear way, with a lot of support, to carry out actions, as a counter-insurgency tool. And the counter-insurgency tool was aimed at particularly clearing civilian populations off the land, terrorizing civilian populations, to deprive the rebels of any area in which to operate. So that was happening, and the SPLM certainly maintained it links to the SLM. So I wouldn’t say that efforts to dissuade the parties had much of an impact with what we saw during 2003 and 2004, in the lead-up to the CPA, as the violence seemed to get progressively worse. One of the problems was that, as Darfur became a shadow, in a way, over the CPA process as the negotiations progressed, the full dimensions of what was going on in Darfur were not clear in 2003. We were aware of the attack on El Fasher and the aircraft. It was unclear how big these rebel groups were. It was unclear to what extent the Government was using these Janjaweed militias.

The fact that there were sort of massive violence and atrocities being committed against the civilian populations, in my recollection, really only became quite clear in the beginning of 2004. There was some intelligence on this. There was some information. That intelligence and information prompted a senior level group, including myself and a senior official at AID and others to go out to Darfur in February of 2004. We flew over and around Darfur to different locations in a small WFP plane that flew pretty low. It was at dusk one night when we could literally see, as we flew over a section of Darfur, flames shooting out of the earth as far as the eye could see. It was like a scene out of Armageddon. And these were villages being burned as we watched. That really galvanized that mission, I think. We had a series of discussions with the Government and local people and all of that, and there are a lot of stories out of that. But the fact of the matter is that that mission certainly galvanized us to greater action. Even while that mission was underway, I called back to the Department and urged in the strongest terms that this would have to be something that should be taken to the UN, that we should insist upon UN action. Sorry to get diverted here on Darfur.

Q: Darfur, unfortunately, is part of the story up until the present.

A: So, I suggested that we seek a Presidential statement for the Security Council to call attention and to urge, obviously, that it be stopped and to express outrage. In fact, the U.S. did seek such a statement and that was the first international action, as I recall, on Darfur. And then subsequently President Bush issued a statement in April of that year, and sort of the drumbeat got started on Darfur action. So all of that was happening as the negotiations on the CPA were proceeding. It was really only after the signing of the CPA that things calmed downed in Darfur, I don’t think as a result of the CPA but as a result of all the other actions that we took on Darfur.

Q: Okay and you look at the negotiations and the signed Agreement, were there any lessons learned for the negotiating phase itself? You mentioned that it really was a fine
example of multilateral cooperation, but maybe there were some things that you wish we or others had done a little differently that you want to commend for the record.

A: As you look at the negotiations, which of course went on from 2002 to basically January 2005, the end of 2004, it was a long slog. There are a whole bunch of things one could point to, from the small to the large. The effectiveness of a multilateral effort played a major impact in getting that Agreement. There’s no doubt about it, but within that multilateral effort, decisive U.S. leadership was key. The other thing I would say about the decisive U.S. leadership, within that, what that means is not just rhetoric but action. Decisive U.S. action at several points in the negotiation was crucial to moving ahead. There are multiple examples of that, but one is the Abyei part of this Peace Agreement. Literally, the parties were stuck on it. The U.S. developed what we thought would be a reasonable approach to handling the Abyei issue. We discussed it with Danforth. He then went out to the parties to present it and he literally walked in the room with the Government and said, “This is the compromise proposal on Abyei. It’s not open for negotiation. We expect you to sign it. If not, we’re out of it.” Effectively, that’s the way he put it. We did the same thing with the SPLM. Within a matter of three or four hours, both sides had signaled they accepted, even though it went against everything they’d been saying before that. Again, a decisive moment. And there were others like that. There were four points in the North-South negotiation where we intervened decisively. The others, without going in the whole story, the others were on wealth-sharing, exactly what would be the per cent of oil revenue that would be given to the South. We basically set that percentage number and told both sides, “This is the way it’s going to be.” Security arrangements, the concept that Garang would be allowed to keep his separate army. We were the ones who sold that to the Government. And the forth was the status of Khartoum, and how to handle Khartoum as a national capital where all religions are respected.

I say that to point out that it was a multilateral effort, but there were key moments where the U.S. had to lead the way and go in there and put something on the table. So the lesson I draw from that is that in these negotiations, decisive U.S. leadership is absolutely crucial. Now the other lesson I think can be taken from that is, while U.S. leadership’s very important, we shouldn’t minimize the role of others. And our ability to work with others particularly. This is something that’s close to my heart, so I’ll put it this way. I think the tendency is perhaps not to take African organizations, and frankly most African countries maybe with the exception of South Africa, terribly seriously. But in fact, for all of its faults, IGAD did bring this off. They provided the framework. They’re the ones who constantly hectored the parties. Yes, we played a huge role in helping them make it happen, but it was a real partnership.

General Sumbeiywo, who was leading this effort for IGAD, was no pushover. He simply didn’t do what we told him. We had discussions but then we would jointly map out a way forward. He would sometimes take initiatives on his own to move the process, sometimes good, sometimes bad. So they played a real role. They were real players at the table. To me, that is a very encouraging indication of sort of the growing maturity, if you will, of African organizations. And I think as we look at that more broadly, and this
is getting off the track, but the potential for the African Union to develop into a very strong regional organization. So I think we’re seeing something there that is very positive in terms of conflict resolution in Africa.

But on a couple of smaller points, maybe I would mention that one problem that we have, and the other big lesson learned on something like this, is when we’re in a high profile foreign policy effort and one that I would say is crisis-driven, it is absolute essential to have a Seventh Floor principal, whether the Secretary herself or another Seventh Floor principal, controlling this. I don’t mean in just sort of a general way. I mean in a very intensive, almost day-to-day manner. I have enormous respect for Secretary Powell and his Deputy, I really do, but I would argue that that kind of intense oversight was somewhat absent during their tenure. They would become involved as necessary, but what that meant is that when quick action was needed at very senior levels it took more time. It took time because you had to write the papers, you had to re-educate people and the process took longer. The other reason you have to have that Seventh Floor attention is to break through bureaucratic traps and bureaucratic hurdles in order to get the kind of support literally that you need to support a negotiation like this. There were a number of time we were hamstrung on that because we couldn’t get the Seventh Floor involved quickly enough. So to me that’s a key lesson. I also drew that conclusion when we were dealing with the Cuba issue. We would have the Under Secretary at the time who’d literally have meetings two, three times a week, and he would help to push through things, because he would say, “Here’s the decision on this, this and this.” We were missing that in terms of the Sudan thing.

Danforth didn’t play that role because Danforth, remember, was not continuously involved. He was, but he was essentially back in St. Louis or wherever he was. He was not full time on it in that sense. His involvement was crucial, because he was a very strong voice with the parties and within the U.S. Government and was, of course, close to President Bush. So he could move things when necessary, but again, we had to use that very judiciously. So I think it’s important when you have a crisis-driven issue or extremely high policy priority issue that you have the Seventh Floor active engagement.

Q: Did that situation change, then, with the new Administration? The Seventh Floor became more actively

A: I was going to say, as the Sudan issue has progressed, it’s just gotten hotter and hotter from the domestic political point of view. So it’s just been constant ever since 2002 and it was already hot then. But, yes, the next team that came in did handle it differently in that the Secretary basically said, “Look, this is an important foreign policy issue. I want you, Deputy Secretary Zoellick, to take this on.” And he did. But by then, his involvement was basically related to Darfur, because we had already signed the CPA at that point. But Sudan writ large -- take it on. And in fact, one of the more extraordinary things that ever happened to me was when he said, “Well I’ll consider taking it on, but I want to be briefed on it.” We basically had three different briefing sessions with him, for about six and a half hours total, where he just about exhausted my knowledge of Sudan before he even agreed to sort of take the issue on. And then he’s had regular weekly,
almost, Sudan meetings, with a very small group. And, again, it’s helped to break through because he’ll say, “This is the way we’re going to do it.” Then there’s no debate between a bureau with AF. You move ahead, and since he’s so steeped in it, when you need to take an issue to him you don’t need to educate him. You simply need to say, “Hey, here’s the issue, what do you want us to do?” So it works, actually, extremely well.

The other thing, though, that when you look at a negotiation like this and this is both before, I would say, both Administrations here at State, under both Secretaries, it’s extraordinary to me how this is supposed to be one of our highest foreign policy preferences, and yet it is difficult to mobilize the resources. The President in 2001, before I ever got here, reportedly said, “This is something I really want to make happen.” He appointed Danforth before September 11th. The story goes that, within two days of being elected, one of the first things he said was, “I really want to move on Sudan,” apparently partly because the religious constituency had talked to him about the importance of doing this and all that, but he felt strongly about it. He appointed Danforth. And yet it was a Herculean task to get the resources to support this thing. The Sudan Programs Group was formed to support Danforth. We were doing an enormous amount of work, supporting Danforth, supporting his travel, generating negotiating ideas, working all the other Sudan pieces. It was incredible. Over time that has expanded, but it’s expanded slowly and it’s been very difficult at each stage of the way. Now, with Zoellick up there managing it, it did give a boost to that and it did help to obtain more resources. So the situation has somewhat improved but I will tell you, because of that Seventh Floor involvement, we have seen a definite impact. But it’s still interesting to me that I don’t think we have all the resources in terms of people and funding that we need. A lot’s been accomplished, mind you, but to really, really, do it right, of course, we don’t live in an ideal world but the Secretary and Zoellick have both said the Sudan issue’s right up there with Iraq and Afghanistan in terms of things we want moved.

Q: That’s an interesting statement in and of itself because it would seem, only by putting it in that category, would you be able to command the resources you want. The budget people are going to say Iraq and Afghanistan are absorbing x percent and there is very little left.

A: Well, they have said that. They said it’s right there with the top five or six issues. They mention it in the same breath with those issues as North Korea and Iran and the others. It is up there, and part of that is because of the President’s interest, but part of it is because we’ve declared a genocide. The only situation in the world, the only situation in history where a government labeled an on-going situation a genocide. Every other time it’s been after the fact. So, there’s a lot of pressure to say, “Okay, you’ve declared a genocide, you’ve got to stop it.”

Q: Now your office currently is the Sudan Programs Office and therefore you’ll be backstopping the negotiations.

A: Absolutely.
Q: That speaks to the resource question you’ve been talking about, but let’s turn our attention to the implementation issues and you alluded earlier to the Abyie agreement. I know there is an Abyei Boundary Commission report, but has that been implemented successfully? If not, what are the gaps in that implementation and what do we need to be doing?

A: Yes. Well to go back to the resource thing, again, I think that we’ve seen and I want to say this because I think it’s important, it gets back to my lessons learned thing, that with the approach of having a Seventh Floor principal control this, we’ve seen a dramatic increase in resources, particularly on the funding side. It turns out to be a lot harder to get people to work on things, but on the funding side, we’ve seen, we are relatively in good shape on the funding side to support implementation of various agreements. And the U.S. went to the donor’s conference for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. We were the largest donor at the table and we pledged $1.7 billion and all that. I think the amount of aid going into Sudan in now among the top, probably, half dozen programs in the world. So it’s a lot of resources going into Sudan. Now, you mentioned Abyei. I don’t know if that’s the best example, but it’s a fair one. We did help to broker it; we didn’t help to broker it. We did lay it down on the table and said, “This is the solution.” The Abyei Boundary Commission is one part of that. The Abyei agreement is a two-page piece of paper basically that says, “This is the way it’s going to be. It’s going to be an interim transitional authority appointed. You’re going to work out the boundary. There’s going to be a referendum on Abyei at the same time that you have a referendum on North-South, on Southern succession, and all of that.” Now, Abyei was one of the most difficult, if not the most difficult, issues in the negotiations, given the sensitivity, because it straddles the historical North-South boundary. The historical North-South boundary is a line that the British drew that delineates North and South. Abyei is sort of right North of that line but it’s ethnically more part of the South, in the sense that you have the Dinka who have lived there for a long period of time. You also have Arab nomadic tribes, the Misseriya, who move through there with herding and all that. The point is, it was a very contentious issue because the Southern position was this needs to be made part of the South as part of the Agreement. The North said, “Of course that’s unthinkable. We can’t break that North-South boundary line.” So what we brokered was particularly sensitive and difficult. So we always knew that implementing that would be one of the more sensitive and difficult elements. Now, it’s not so much a question of resources as it is, I think, political will and brute pushing the parties to do this. And we haven’t given up on that. We are pushing. We did support the Abyei Boundary Commission with resources. They came out with their report. We are doing things like drilling bore-holes and things like that to ease tensions between the herders and the sedentary population and all that. So we are putting resources in, but ultimately it’s going to require political muscle. And we are putting pressure on both sides, but the main problem right now is the Government dragging its feet on elements of implementing it. So it’s something that we’ll continue to push.
Q: Right, I gather the parties, that maybe neither of them was very satisfied with the Agreement. They felt they had to agree to it, but in fact both of them had every reason to drag their feet because they’re not very delighted with this.

A: Well, I think it’s more the Government. I say the Government, of course both sides are part of the Government, now but the Northerners have more reason to drag their feet, because the Abyei Boundary Commission decision that came out basically gave all of Abyei to the South, said that, look, really all of Abyei is Southern ethnic. The tribes, the Dinka, the history of the Dinka goes back, and so it gave the larger part of Abyei basically, said it really is Southern. That’s important because if there is a vote, there will be a vote in 2011 on whether the South will secede. The Abyei agreement says there will be a vote by the people of Abyei whether they want to go with the North or the South and what goes with the North and the South is the territory as defined by the Abyei Boundary Commission. So it was the Northerners who were dragging their feet about delimitation. They were very unhappy with the Abyei Boundary Commission report. The Southerners, of course, were overjoyed with Abyei Boundary Commission report, because it validated what they’d been saying all along, which is Abyei really is Southern.

Q: The other items that the North has been dragging its feet on I guess include some of the wealth-sharing provisions in the agreement. Would you react to that a bit?

A: Sure. Well again this where I think, I keep coming back to the multilateral diplomacy point and the U.S. leadership point, the two are coupled together. This is a classic example of that. The wealth-sharing provisions call for a percentage of the oil produced in the South to go back to the South, for development purposes in the South. The Agreement is signed and implementation starts in mid-2005. But by early 2006, nothing had happened on the transfer of revenue. And everybody knew this thing was going to be rocky, and things would slip and all that. But basically we put a major push on that, with the Norwegians, with the British, with others on the need to actually get something started on revenue sharing, at the same time that the Southerners were obviously pressing the Northerners. And it was that international pressure that, I think, forced the Government to move ahead with implementation of that provision. I wouldn’t say that was the sole reason. They probably would have done it anyway at some point, but they were dragging their feet a bit on that. And so that’s been largely resolved. They did transfer most of the revenues that were due to the South under that Agreement. It seems to be actually underway now. The Government has also implemented things on a number of other fronts. They’ve withdrawn a good number of forces from the South, as they are supposed to under the Agreement, and they’ve given the South ministries in the government as they’re supposed to.

I think some of the more problematic elements of implementation are, for example, some of the security provisions. While the Government has withdrawn some of its forces, there’s been nothing happening in terms of the Joint Integrated Units that are supposed to be formed between the Northern and Southern forces jointly, even while the South gets to keep its separate army. There’s been no movement on formation of those Units, and both sides are kind of pointing the finger on that. So we’re pushing on that as well. We’ve
offered to work with the British and the Dutch and others to help support formation of those Units, which is another case where the U.S. role will be very, very important.

Q: And the other countries have openly helped --- the British, the Dutch?

A: With the British, on this one, we’ve informally divvied up lead on different issues, and they’re supposed to have the lead on this. As we look at implementation, the implementation process of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, most of the U.S. focus, and this was known from the outset, most of the U.S. focus has been, including the $1.7 billion that we pledged in Oslo, most of the U.S. focus is going to be on humanitarian assistance, but also on development assistance for the South, because of course we’re restricted by a whole network, a whole grid of sanctions. We couldn’t, even if we wanted to, provide much aid to the North. So most of our focus is on the South, and we’re helping the South implement provisions of the Accords, like standing up the government of Southern Sudan, professionalizing its separate armed forces in the South, to a whole program on that, helping it stand up ministries, its Southern Parliament, and supporting reconciliation among groups in the South, development projects, and social projects. So we have an enormous amount going on in the South.

Q: A number of observers have said that one defect in the Accords is that it doesn’t represent most of the parties, the political parties of the Sudan, and in the implementation phase that makes it more difficult. How do you think some of the other parties could be brought into the process although they weren’t at the negotiating table?

A: That was, of course, one of the issues we faced almost from the very outset. Again, we, in concert with the IGAD and everybody else, unanimously agreed that the other parties could not be brought to the table. It would hopelessly complicate the process and we took the position that only the warring parties should be at the table, and the only warring parties were the SPLM and the Government. And in fact that proved the effective way to go about it. We got an agreement between them. They were the ones who had forces on the ground. I think that decision was validated in a number of ways. The other political parties in Sudan didn’t have enough power to block that agreement or cause problems for it or anything. We did encourage both sides, from an early stage, to reach out to the other groups -- the Government to reach out to other Northern parties, the Southerners to reach out to other Southern groups -- as a way of laying the groundwork so that once an accord was established there would be a basis to work with them, to make it an inclusive process in very precise ways, to bring some of these groups into the government, for example, and obviously encourage them to participate in the democratic political process and in the elections scheduled under the Peace Agreement. And by and large that’s worked pretty well. What we’ve seen is that now, in the South, most of the Southern leaders who were being used by the North to lead militias against the SPLM in the South, have now joined the SPLM. There’s been a lot of reconciliation between Southerners, the South-South reconciliation process. So that process actually seems to be working well there. Most of the political groups in the North are saying the right things about being willing to participate in the political process. There’s something called the National Democratic Alliance, which has been around a long time and is composed of
opposition parties in the whole country. The SPLM is actually a member of the National Democratic Alliance. So the other argument really is that the SPLM, by being the negotiating party, was in effect representing the National Democratic Alliance, because they are part of the National Democratic Alliance. So, again, I think that things are looking fairly positive with respect to prospects for an inclusive political process.

Q: It would sound like that would be the case, certainly. The National Congress Party, which I guess is the traditional ruling party in the North, are they feeling that the CPA is more in their interest to support than they did in the beginning?

A: The way I would describe it is the National Congress Party has various tendencies in it. There’s no doubt they’re not all of one mind. In the lead-up to the signing of the Accord in January 2005, there were vigorous, tough debates within the National Congress Party about it. But in the end, the leadership of the National Congress Party, which is effectively the leadership of the Government, I think have a very pragmatic streak. We describe this as an Islamic fundamentalist government. The bottom line is that these people are awfully pragmatic and their overall goal is to survive. So they signed the CPA, even though they had some doubts. They signed the Darfur Peace Agreement. I don’t know that they’re feeling better about it. I think the view probably, if I had to read their mentality from the analysis I work from, is that they signed these agreements to survive, because of international pressure, and because they were tired of fighting. But I think it’s open to question whether they have any intention of actually implementing them to the full extent because, if you actually implement the North-South Peace Accord completely and fully in good faith, it will lead to the democratic transformation of Sudan, which likely means their demise. So I suspect that their tactical approach is to implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to the extent that it needs to be implemented, in order to sort of keep things moving along.

Q: But they would also have been able to see that result in the future, that it could lead to their demise and by that I guess we mean not just the separation, the secession of the South but the party would be left not as the governing party of the Sudan.

A: No, what I’m thinking is that there are two possibilities. One is sort of complicated, it’s interesting. I think, it would lead to their demise in the sense of there being a real possibility when there are democratic elections, which is going to happen before June 2011, that they could lose power at the national level. And those elections will be national elections. They won’t just be elections in the North or the South. So it’s conceivable they could lose power. Not guaranteed, but it’s conceivable. Plus, they don’t have a background of involvement in democratic politics, so it’s not their instinct to participate in the election process. I think partly because they don’t like this democratic transformation channel, that there’s an increasing sense in the North, among National Congress Party members, that it would be good if the South seceded, so that it would be clear then. They would retain power in the North, clearly. The SPLM would no longer be a problem. They’d be in the South. I wouldn’t say that’s a unanimous view, but I’d say that’s a view that is being more discussed in circles in Khartoum.
Q: Are there some leaders who have publicly identified themselves.

A: No, not publicly. No, but I think that you basically need to look at a figure like Vice President Taha, who negotiated the Agreement with John Garang. I think he negotiated in good faith, with the view towards trying to make a united Sudan. I think Taha has the vision to appreciate that, even in a democratically-changed Sudan, the National Congress Party would have the opportunity to retain power, potentially. It would take the form of a coalition and all that. It would be a long shot, but it wouldn’t be out of the question. Or to live with the consequences. I prefer to think of Taha as a fairly principled individual. I think he wants peace for his people. I’ve gotten to know him a bit. I’m not naive about that or, for that matter, about John Garang. But I do think that Garang and Taha shared a vision and a real partnership. As a result, it didn’t start that way, but I think that’s the way the negotiations ended. They were probably the two most visionary and nationalistic leaders in the country. But I’m not sure everybody else in the National Congress Party would see it Taha’s way. In fact, I very much doubt if they would. In fact, that actually makes Taha quite a courageous figure in terms of looking at how the negotiations were, and Garang as well. It’s very interesting, this is fascinating, in the sense of Garang and Taha in some ways are mirror images of each other. Clearly, Garang’s people did not share his vision of a united, democratic Sudan. Their view was to default immediately to secession, despite that Garang consistently said, “No, we have to go for the national agenda, we have to go for the national approach.” And Garang clearly saw a unified Sudan as the future of the country.

So, I think that we’ve seen since the accession of Kiir to the leadership is an evolution and a growth in him. He was a military guy, an enormous role was thrust upon him and Garang’s shoes were huge to fill. Garang was one of the most brilliant people I’ve ever met, plus with tremendous charisma. So huge shoes to fill. Salva Kiir’s a very smart guy as well and a very savvy guy. I think what we’ve seen in him is an increasing sophistication in approach, an increasing appreciation about the complex realities, and I think that there is a chance that he will evolve towards a more nationally-focused agenda, to pursue democratic change at the national level. I don’t think we’ll ever see him become as committed to that perhaps as John Garang, but I think he is starting to understand that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement potentially enables his party and other opposition groups to take power at the national level and therefore to transform the whole country, rather than just bank on secession.

Q: And you mentioned Vice President Taha also as a visionary, who you believe was negotiating in good faith. His boss, President Bashir, how would you describe him and his vision for a unified country?

A: I think Bashir, in some ways is probably closer to Kiir than Taha, in the sense that Bashir is a military man as well, has been his whole life. Generally, I think Bashir has probably been a real skeptic of the whole negotiating process from the outset, but clearly endorsed Taha in seeking that Agreement, came down in favor of it in the discussions inside the Government, and I think he still has a tremendous skepticism about it. I think I would put him in the category of someone who wants to implement it probably not
terribly enthusiastically. I think part of his interest comes from the fact that he does listen to the military. The military were clearly tired of fighting. They knew they couldn’t win that war. They wanted it to end. So Bashir did not want to see the Agreement fall apart, but I don’t know how enthusiastic he was about implementing all the various provisions of it. Taha has got more of a personal engagement in it and, frankly, his equities are higher in it because he did literally negotiate all of these different provisions with Garang.

Q: And the leverage the South ultimately has is whether they choose independence and the North, are the leaders convinced that it’s such an oil rich part of the country that they would be better off having the entire country under their governance?

A: No, I’m not so sure. I think part of it is that Southerners of course are thinking the North’s never going to change and we’ve been oppressed for basically the entire life of the country, this is all hopeless, too many people died in this war, etc. It’s an awful lot of history to overcome, although Garang, as I say, had a vision. And not just Garang. There are others in the South that have the vision, but not many. But I think what you have is that the Southerners see the potential to have their own state where they’re not going to be oppressed and all that. It’s ethnic, it’s religious, it’s not wanting to be “Arabized,” and all that. I think the Northerners are of two minds. On the one hand, yes, there’s a little bit of concern because most of the oil, not all of it, is in the South. You’ve got the principle of unity, do we want to lose part of our country? So there’s that. Would war break out again? But on the other hand, I think they would probably feel comfortable that, if the South were to secede, they would negotiate some kind of a special dispensation on oil. They would negotiate some kind of agreement on that, because the South will have enough interest in preventing another war. With Northern troops coming over the border again, quite frankly, they probably would negotiate something on the oil. But, again, that’s all speculation. That’s never been discussed. That’s all speculative, but I suspect that’s part of the Northern calculation.

Q: Right, we won’t digress too much on that, although it’s fascinating to try and figure out what they would think is the best outcome for them. But sticking to the implementation itself, some observers also have suggested that some of the commissions that have been disbanded should be reconstituted, that it would facilitate implementation to have the National Constitutional Review Commission and the ad hoc North-South Boundary Commission. All of these apparently are not functioning at the moment but what would be your view as to how they might be helpful?

A: The Agreement is really complex. It calls for I think 12 or 13 different commissions to be set up. Nobody ever thought that this was going to work perfectly the way it was laid out. Our perspective is that, my perspective, our perspective, you’ve got to focus on the core issues and you’ve got to get moving on those. You’ve got to, you had to set up the Government of Southern Sudan. Obviously, that was a big one. You had to get the revenue-sharing underway. That’s a big one. You’ve got to get the Northern troops out of the South. That was a big one. You’ve got to focus on security provisions in general, which means getting these joint integrated units stood up. Okay, you’ve got to get the
most contentious issues resolved, which means Abyei as one of them in particular. Yes, the commissions are significant. They are important, but they are not primary. I think the primary focus is getting results. Now the commissions can be a means to that end, but they’re not the end in themselves. They all do need to be set up, but they’re not the absolute highest priority. The highest priority in terms of commissions is the Assessment and Evaluation Commission, which is, the Peace Accord calls for that to be set up between the parties, with international observers, to be the vehicle to monitor implementation of the Peace Accord and to be a vehicle for working out differences as they arise. So that is absolutely crucial.

Q: And that, does it exist?

A: It does exist. A Norwegian is leading it. We’re on it. We provide a couple of million dollars to support the starting up of that. It does exist. But the problem with that, as with a number of the other commissions, they do exist but they are not, really functioning effectively. They do meet. The Assessments and Evaluation Commission meets, but part of the problem is neither the Government nor the SPLM have put their best people on the commission. The Commission hasn’t proved to be a real serious vehicle for discussing different social problems and implementation. But we’re absolutely determined to make it work. This is kind of a make or break thing. It does need to work. It needs to be a vehicle by the parties to be their mechanism to monitor implementation. So that’s our primary focus in terms of commissions. The other one that’s really important is the North-South Boundary Commission, to sort of look at the whole map again. Even though there’s a line on paper, obviously it varies by great distances in some places and there are debates over it. So that’s an important one.

Q: And that one exists, also, but it needs some more technical assistance or …

A: Well, I think that they all kind of exist on paper. I don’t know if members have been appointed to that one or not. Again, it hasn’t been my highest priority to look at it right now. What you’ve got to look at instantly, quickly, up front, you wanted some quick victories on implementation. Revenue-sharing was a quick victory. You needed to get the Assessment and Evaluation Commission up. You need to focus on these security issues and of course Abyei. You can’t let Abyei fester because, if you do, it becomes a real volatile, real point of volatility in the process.

Q: And in your vie, what are the most important things have been accomplished or are being accomplished?

A: Well, the way I’d put it is, in my view, there have been some very important steps, some big steps forward on implementation. Withdrawal of Northern troops from the South is proceeding, revenue-sharing is important. They’re big ones. The Government of Southern Sudan has been set up. And we shouldn’t lose sight that smooth transition between Garang dying and Salva Kiir stepping up and being appointed Senior Vice President. That proceeded remarkably well and that was a big boost for implementation.
But what I would say is, though on quite a number of fronts the process is moving too slowly, and there is the threat that sort of the whole process starts to atrophy, despite these major steps that have been taken on revenue-sharing and security issues. So you have to be pressing on a broad front but you also have to be focusing, I think, at each step on a couple of key things that you need to make happen. You don’t want to lose your focus by looking at the Peace Accord. We checked and we actually have a chart of this. There are 1100 items in the Peace Accord that need to be carried out. But what you need to do is at each step of the process take two or three of those that are the most important and push through on those and then take the next two or three big ones. And in the process of doing that, you do build progressively greater confidence between the parties and you start to build the mechanisms and the interchanges that are going to make these commissions real and are going to make the process work. But you’re only going to do that by getting some concrete progress on specific issues. So I’m cautiously optimistic that this is going to move ahead. But it’s only going to move ahead with very sustained U.S. engagement, with the rest of the international community, in pressing, pushing and pulling at every stage of the process.

Q: And that’s the mandate you leave for your successor, when you go off to your next post? That person has to continue what you’ve been doing.

A: Yes, I think where we are from a policy point of view. The other thing here, of course, too, is that the Darfur problem did overshadow the CPA. So we proceeded, we negotiated the CPA, and signed it January 2005, right? However, the Darfur problem continues to be a huge issue. In Fall 2004, right before January 2005, we declared a genocide. So particularly after the signing of the 2005 North-South Accord, the reality was that we had to focus everything we had on resolving Darfur. And so the CPA did languish. No question about it, it did languish. It suffered from lack of attention by us and others. We didn’t completely ignore it, but, sure, it did suffer lack of attention. So what we’ve said now, in the wake of the signing of the Darfur Peace Accord, is that we have to refocus attention and try to reenergize the North-South peace process while also implementing the Darfur process. So it’s a huge agenda, and we are right now charging ahead on implementation of the CPA, with a lot of different issues there, while also moving to implement this Darfur Peace Accord -- and there are a whole lot of aspects to implementation of that Accord, as well as ending the violence on the ground, before you can even do that.

Q: And is the capacity of the Khartoum Government sufficient to move ahead on both those fronts?

A: Well, yes, I think it is. The capacity is there. Again, I think the political will is probably somewhat questionable, but I think we have gotten enough will to work with because, again, I think what makes it able to work with Khartoum is that, as I say, ultimately they have a quite pragmatic bent about them. And so they know if the Darfur Peace Agreement falls apart, they’re going to be subject to even more sanctions, and God knows what kind of interventions and all the rest of it. And they know if the North-South thing falls apart, there’s going to be another war, and the next war’s going to be uglier
than the first war because in the next war you’re going to have practically all Darfur on your hands and the South, and God knows what else. So they don’t want these things to fall apart. The Southerners, meanwhile, have their own interests. They don’t want the Agreement to fall apart. They don’t want to see renewed war. They’ve got hundreds and hundreds of millions, billions of dollars going into the South in terms of development. This is a real opportunity for them. Plus, they don’t want the Darfur Accord to fall apart because they know if that falls apart, you jeopardize the North-South Agreement, because once again it overshadows it. So I think both sides, both the North and the South, have a real vested interest in making this thing work, to a point, as I say. And the question is: to how far a point.

Again, I don’t think you can ever answer those questions up front. Salva Kiir hasn’t plotted out everything to 2011, neither has the North. That’s not the way real life works. The way it really works is that both sides are kind of sitting there figuring out, well what can we get away with? And Salva is saying, “How much of this Peace Accord do I really have to implement in order to satisfy the Americans and the international community and get the development in the South that I need, and lay the groundwork for secession, in case I can’t take political power through the democratic process?” The North is thinking, same thing: “How much of this thing do we have to implement to keep the Americans and the international community off our back, keep more sanctions from coming down on us and all that, and keep war from breaking out again, and to keep ourselves in power?” Both sides almost on a day-to-day basis are making calculations, and the calculation right now pushes them both in favor of implementation. I think they will continue to do so, but the crunch points or the crisis points will be in the democratic elections that are going to be taking place in 2009, and then of course ultimately the vote for or against secession. And what you will see is that the elections in 2009 will almost be a pre-vote on secession because, unless they’re really credible elections and the opposition makes a real impact, I don’t know that they have to take power but they got to make a real impact, then I think secession will be a foregone conclusion. If the elections really are for real so that the SPLM makes major gains, say, in the Parliament, then they will say to themselves, “Maybe we don’t want to secede, take the whole thing.” But the thing to be positive about, and the thing U.S. policy has achieved a very, very important result is to put in place agreements on both Darfur and North-South that create a process, that give both a chance to work and that build in certain safeguards, and then address the interests of both sides in a pretty creative way to keep them engaged.

Q: From what you’ve said, it does give us reason to be optimistic and the only negativity that I can think of is that we see, I guess I’ll put it this way, the Khartoum Government doesn’t appear to be the most peace-loving government in the world. You’ve explained what their interests are that might make them accept peace but it seems natural not to want war, we would agree on that and yet they have used the Janjaweed as instruments of war, for political purposes and have we reached a point where they’ve said, “We’re going to stop doing this because it’s in our interests?” That would be the question.

A: I think the answer to that’s more or less yes. I think what’s happened is, they signed the peace accords, Darfur Peace Accords, because it was in their interest and there was
tremendously increasing international pressure and threats of intervention. Now, I think the Janjaweed is a bit of a situation now. They unleashed this unit from above. It’s a monster that they created, there’s no question about it. They created this thing systematically, so it is fully on their heads. The question now is how do you get it back under control? I think they do have a game plan to do that. Whether they can get it done in the time frame required, which is allegedly by the end of October, I think it’s open to question. I think it’s going to be awfully messy, but I think they want to try to do it because they know it’s crucial to keeping the Accord together. For the reasons we’ve already discussed they want to keep the Accord together. They’ve got a complex game plan for doing it and part of it is to incorporate Janjaweed into the Popular Defense Forces. They’ve already done a lot of this, but by incorporating Janjaweed members into the Popular Defense Forces, they can say, “What Janjaweed? There are no Janjaweed. These guys are PDF members.” The other part of it is of course dealing with the Arab sheiks who run these things, the Musa Hilals and Kajamis of the world, and saying, “Look, if you want to continue to be part of the elite group, if you want to continue to have benefits and all that, you need to get your folks to stop it.” What I think in the end of the day you will find is that some of this Janjaweed stuff will melt away because some of it will be, probably most of it, will be incorporated into the thing, there’ll be enough influence from the elders and all that to kind of make it stop. I think you might well see some rogue elements, some elements that aren’t subject to control that’ll have to be dealt with militarily. It’s not going to be as neat and as clean as the North-South Agreement but I think it’s do-able.

Q: One final point and then I’d like to sum up, if you have any other recommendations for the future, but with respect to international assistance, from the U.S., to what degree are we linking funding to the different benchmarks and would it be a good idea to make a more precise link between funding and improvement in the process?

A: Of course we and other donors all have different ways of doing that and measuring that. AID, as it fashions its programs, always has their own benchmarks and such and all these things have to be laid out in program plans. But the bottom line is that we obviously condition our assistance on continuing implementation of the Peace Agreement. Salva Kiir knows that if it breaks down through his fault in any way, that money’s going to dry up, he’s going to lose out. So I think we’ve made some pretty clear benchmarks with the SPLM. Most of our money’s going into the South. We’ve said, “You have to have a democratic process. That includes the process in the South. We’re going to be looking for that. We’re looking for indications you’re not going to let corruption run rampant, that you’re implementing the Peace Accord in good faith.” And we have worked out, among ourselves, internally, some measuring sticks for what does all that mean in terms of specific measures. We have, we’ve actually given a lot of thought to that and that’s been within our interagency process. That’s involved AID and State and others.

Q: Well I thank you for taking the time to really give an exhaustive overview of what you’ve been doing in Sudan. It’s really one of the most optimistic interviews we’ve seen but also one of the most comprehensive. Thank you very much.
A: Thank you. Again, I think that U.S. policy has achieved real, major results here. The one other thing I want to tell you is that it’s interesting that I was only in one direct meeting with the President on this. That was in the Fall of 2002, and Danforth took me to the meeting. There were only five or six people in the room. It was a small meeting and it was for Danforth to brief the President on what he was doing. Those kinds of meetings are scripted largely, but the President actually kind of went off script, started to talk to Danforth about the whole thing. He said, “Look, one of the reasons I’m so intently focused on this, it’s a terrible problem and all that, but, you know, if we democratically transform Sudan;” I forget the exact language that he used but he basically said, “That will have an impact on the greater Middle East.” So he saw this in broader strategic terms. I think when you look at Sudan in that regard, as a democratic transformation, our agenda from the outset on Sudan was not driven solely or even primarily by counterterrorism. It was driven by the democratic transformation goal, and I think this is something that people don’t realize. Again, Danforth, remember, was appointed five days before September 11th. So the goal from the outset has always been achieving democratic transformation of Sudan. Now obviously maintaining close counterterrorism cooperation has been a key element of that, but our policy didn’t change after 9/11. And at a number of junctures in this negotiation, there were decision points. Do we push the Government on this, Abyei, whatever? Do we push the Government on this? Do we pass a resolution to sanction on the Security Council, whatever? And of course the implicit question was, will this affect counterterrorism cooperation?

I will tell you that, in all those sessions, there was really never thought to pull our punches in any way with the Government in terms of the negotiations or pressures in order to preserve counterterrorism cooperation. Yes, counterterrorism cooperation is very important. Yes, we want to continue it. But part of that was the calculation that I’ve laid out before, which is the Government is fundamentally pragmatic. So that I have argued that you couldn’t put too much pressure on the Government because they would blink – because they would seek the pragmatic way out. So, I think that’s just a point that I hadn’t touched on and I thought it would be good to.

Q: Well, it’s good to emphasize, and it really is a story that is getting short shrift, I guess, in the public domain, in the media and maybe even within the Administration it hasn’t been out front that much in speeches by the President, for example, or in speeches by the Secretary but there really is a complex story. Maybe that’s why it’s hard to get it out. But it really is one that merits people being much more aware than they are. I commend you and thank you for all you’ve done in moving that forward.

A: It’s been fascinating, a lot of fun.