The interviewee was an informed Southern Sudanese who participated in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement negotiations and was involved in its drafting. His areas of expertise included oil and revenue sharing, and conflict resolution, particularly on a community level.

The observer found that eventual self-determination for the South was the clear stumbling block in the early negotiations, particularly because the U.S. and the North were supporting national unity at all costs. Abeyi also remains an impediment, even though a commission was established by the CPA to establish its borders. Abeyi is rich in oil, and the implementation of the agreement must reach some sort of resolution on this issue as well as on North-South internal borders generally.

The Sudanese informant also noted that of the three major international negotiators, the UK was the least disinterested. Great Britain demonstrated an Arabist tilt toward the North and was an advocate of unity at all costs. The U.S. was distracted by Iraq and Afghanistan, and seemed not to appreciate sufficiently the local context of the conflict. According to the interviewee, the U.S. was also concerned with the regional and international context, and was worried that the historic tension between Islam and Christianity could be exacerbated. Norway, on the other hand, was so understanding that it often acted as if Norway were Sudan’s “colony.”

According to the informant, the main problems of implementing the CPA are threefold. First, a resolution of all internal border issues must be found. Second, an equitable distribution of oil revenues must be established, and, third, the integration of the local militias into the national army must move forward. A proper census has yet to be conducted, and the upcoming elections clearly depend upon credible census numbers.

The interviewee finds that today’s problems in Darfur can be traced directly to the conflict in Sudan’s South. The people in Darfur have “awakened” to their rights, and the violence that is occurring is “good” if it results in obtaining these rights, according to the informant.
Q: Let U.S. start by your describing for U.S. the role that you played in the negotiations of the Sudan CPA.

A: First, I joined Sudan People’s Liberation Army when I was teaching at the University of Jazeera. I was sent out for my Master’s degree, but I decided to join the SPLA at an early stage. I got through it and engaged in combat until I got called back to counter human terror organizations, which is called SRRC, and from there I did my study in Ukraine. I was doing some work on the livelihoods and to create awareness and an early wellness system for the suffering people in the war, and I got a lot of information for which I did some work on the conflict of the war, specifically how people managed their assets during conflict.

Q: Financial assets?

A: Financial, physical, and social assets, including social comity. I looked at the comity that is in the WBA area, conflict coming from the Arabs, and conflict within the community and those exposed to other shocks and to see what happened. And I U.S.ed the year 1998 to see the outcomes of the livelihood strategies and to see the variations in terms of coping with prolonged war. By this time I was doing my research in the institute of development studies, and was called to come and assist the team, my background being as an economist.

I remember it was 2003. I wrote some papers on, to assist the negotiations of {Baigon}, on the {Waells Sweti}, and also on the contract on the oil center. I was also interested in the physical decentralization to see how much, what should be the share of the South of the total revenue if you U.S.ed the year 1998. So in 2003, I became engaged in the peace talks, I spent the whole time, and it went I think about one year. But I was engaged in the wealth sharing of the first year too and in the power sharing and the two or three areas again, southern Kurdufan and {Ronia} and then the ceasefire and the implementation modalities. And then I could say, I completed the last draft of the CPA.

Q: You provided the last draft? That is a lot.

A: That is it. And then I became engaged in the drafting of the international constitution and then also the constitution of Southern Sudan. I was the secretary of the constitution
commission in southern Sudan. I was appointed outside the share to draft the moral constitution for the 10 states in the South.

Q: Did you feel that the U.S. objectives, at the point when you were involved in the CPA negotiations, were the U.S. objectives well matched with those in the South, or did you see differences?

A: You see, I remember there were two [envoys] who participated in the CPA negotiations. In those cases, I could say, they were rather reflecting their opinions—not those of American policies.

Q: Sorry, the U.S. negotiators were reflecting their own opinions and not necessarily U.S. policy?

A: Not necessarily the U.S. policy. But not only this, because I could see some of these envoys who were more concerned with having a peace agreement signed, than pursuing strategic interests. But in the clear case of a contradiction in American policy and the outcome of the CPA, the Americans were more focused on a united Sudan. I remember someone from the U.S. who was especially involved for Sudan.

Q: Danforth?

A: Danforth. I remember he was absolutely, he could not comprehend that the people of Southern Sudan should get the right of self-determination. Not at all. And he made a clear case of American policy for a united Sudan. [He did not want change]—change that would want anything which can be resolved, that is that would stop the suppression of Southern Sudan. There then was a clear case of a lack of [understanding]. I could say that the Americans were not having a very good understanding of the context.

Q: Perhaps if I may interject an editorial comment, we might be reflecting our own history: the Civil War between the North and South in the U.S. and the whole emphasis on the Union. So it is in our bones to a certain extent.

A: But then here was a clear case whereby the Americans were not expecting the South to get these things, the right of self-determination. Some of them were saying this is a dream kind of thing. But eventually they managed to get it. But then the American policy in a way, they started afterwards, improving understanding of the context, the way the position went, that would help them a lot. Then they stood very firmly, and one of the areas where they really managed to intervene and resolve the conflict is the issue of Abyei, which was a very good concrete way of engaging to overcome the conflict.

Q: Can you describe for the record the crux of the Abyei dispute? The dispute itself, what is the issue?

A: The issue is the historical background of Abyei, the very fact that the colonial authorities in 1905 annexed Abyei from {Bahargazan} in the South to Khurdufan in the
North, without adequate consultation with the people. And that was the course of the injustice by then, because the Arabs were attacking the Dinka, taking their goods, killing them, and also taking some of them for slavery. They found that the best things for you to protect these communities is not to help people in organizations, was for you to combine all of them, the Messeriya, and Dinka, so that you can have one policy for them, but you cannot [overcome] the atrocities committed by Messeriya. Then later on, so that could be the crux of the matter, then what happened is that you have the government, even after the independence, they allowed people the right to be consulted where they could be, by the independence in 1956. So they were given the right to be asked later on what they would like to be. But then you have the Southern government of Sudan, because they singled that out in a very hesitant manner, they declared its level of independence as well in 1955.

The British, they left without properly following what they committed themselves to. So and then you have now the government of National Unity basically from the North. They did not even have the people over there, but even the close allies supporting them, the Arabs in Messeriya, to come and commit moral atrocities, even within the South. That was the one that created a lot of tension, and actually that is why the people of Abyei prospered in the first civil war. And then there was the first civil war, the right was granted to them to be consulted but it was not very specific and the Khartoum government denied this one; that was in 1972. And there was the agreement to disarm and one later one, [leading to] atrocities in the area. And that resulted in the spark, the eruption of the second civil war in Abyei in the Eighties. I was engaged in that one. And that was the beginning of the formation of the revolution, the second civil war. So that is the nature of what I could say about Abyei.

Q: That is clearly very central. In terms of the negotiations and even pre-negotiations, describe for U.S. the most important Sudanese parties, both North and South—well before the CPA, and the process leading up to the CPA itself. Please characterize the northern and the southern interests involved for U.S.. The political parties, the positions, give U.S. the summary of where these elements stood.

A: Let me give you, I think there is a quite interesting revolution in terms of the right to self-determination. You know {Wahubi Ihotec Ummah} party, in DUP. DUP, they came out pretty early. And they joined the NDA, and the whole of NDA meeting was held, not sure about the timing, but it was held in {Asmau}. Before that one, I think in 1994, Sadag Mahdi, there was a rift or division within the Ummah party. {Baragafa} came out, and it was in 1994, of which they signed an agreement between Ummah party and the SPLM of which the Ummah party accepted the right of self-determination for the people of Southern Sudan. Except they did not include the issue of Abyei. And the two that is [inaudible].

And that was the beginning of a deliberate intention to divide the solidarity of the rule in Sudan. That was 1990. I think we held another meeting of NDA leadership. I presume that should be 1995. All the political parties, they came and they met, including all the progressive forces. I say all the more traditional political parties, including SPLM. They
met and they confirmed again, the right of self-determination. So I could see that the other political parties were becoming part of the process. So when we went to the negotiations, it was only the national Communist Party that was left out, and you could see that the SPLM was championing the opposition. And the agenda of the people of Southern Sudan was coming in. Even spearheaded by the UDP and the normal party. So I could say that is the beginning of the change of attitudes, and that is why the National Congress Party was pushing to get into the negotiations.

Q: Of these parties, which ones would you say, played a constructive role, and which ones acted as spoilers?

A: I think it was very clear that, no party was not constructive, but rather highly opportunistic. In fairness, they did not understand what they did. You know what happened that year. Sadag Mahdi came out, and it was a very big boost for the opposition parties. And he was coming with a noble mentality, not to the end of African leadership. Now Sadag was seeking to join a big fit into the Arab agenda. Even though he came he wanted to join the [inaudible], not only this, the eastern Sudan, before it was called the new Sudan Force, so then you can take the agenda of the new Sudan and their struggles from the eastern Sudan. Sadag Mahdi, when he came, he started even dividing the forces of NDA along the lines from what is called new Sudan today. Along the line of the [inaudible] and this mentality of the Arab, Northern Arab, Northern Sudanese. And he felt himself that he was a leader, emerging with an agenda for the majority of Sudan. But agenda of the Africans in the Sudan. And he was feeling himself really becoming, subject to the leadership of the {Lidatutiyo}. And that is why he did not stand, and decides that it was better to go to Khartoum.

The UDP, because they stood firmly, even in teams, they were really very supportive of the peace process. A sheikh, Mulana Berdani, he came even several times and visited U.S. in Navaisha and he was giving a full support to the person. He invited all the religioU.S. leaders to come to Naivasha and for them to know what is the main thing being discU.S.sed. So I was saying, the UDP played a very subtle position in terms of the negotiations of the agenda of the new Sudan. Other progressive parties, like the Congress Party, really they did not live up to the agenda. Because some of the progressive elements even in the northern Progressive Party, did not show up; we thought the agenda of the SPLM wanted progress in terms of changing Sudan. And we were expecting the progressive parties, especially the Congress Party to join U.S. but they did not. Because I think, the team was raveling or unfolding the real tension. Because it was becoming an issue of Africans, spearheading the liberation. And it is not based, it not had been that they were not fighting on the basis of values. So I could say or pick out that the UDP was very consistent, but National Congress Party would have been opportunistic. It was only the most courageous political party on earth. By being convinced of the strengths of the SPLM, you can believe they could not win the war and they were very vulnerable. Whatever the reason, they were very courageous to accept the right to self-determination of the people of Sudan. But the SPLM was courageous enough to accept Shariah to prevail in the North.
Q: Shariah to prevail in the North only of course. If we could shift now to the role of the international organizations and the CPA process, how would you characterize IGAD and its role in terms of moving the negotiations forward?

A: I could say, Kenya played a very good role. Kenya, you know what was good with Kenya, given the fact that most of the IGAD, they are part of helping them, in terms of the regional instability. If you take Uganda, or Ethiopia, or Eritrea, you will not gain the confidence of the two parties. At least for U.S., you are the best bet. But for the North, they are very worried about that. That is why it came as one position, being or taking a very clear support, again in the context of the two parties. But I think what also matters so much, I think the Arabs were very good in terms of supporting people like Kolumbo, they were very good in terms of their involvement and engagement with the peace talks. And I think Sumbeioyo was very good, was first having the full support from the [inaudible] himself. And he really really dealt a real way to the [inaudible]. Somebody committed and he managed to grasp the context of the problem, he managed to move around to all these places. I see somebody who really had a real initiative. I give big credit to the guy. Financially, they did not contribute a lot. I want to pick out IGAD. But then you look for others in the international community: Norway [in particular].

Q: But first I want to start with the international organizations. So you found that the UN, the EU, OAS, AU, were secondary players in terms of getting the negotiations going?

A: Oh yes.

Q: But we will get to the individual countries in a minute. What non-state actors were involved in the process? I am referring to NGOs and religioU.S. groups, what was their role in terms of the CPA negotiations?

A: During the peace process, when you decided to do it, I know for example, they were not engaged per se in the process. But they picked up and they started putting forward their opinions. I know for example, the Southern Sudanese NGO--the NGO is called MSEI--subcommission of all the leaders organizations. And I think they consistently have been coming and meeting with U.S. and making a point, writing their own positions on the specific areas. At some level, they helped. And I think also they would in a peace talk make a certain demonstration and also seek to meet with [inaudible]. So collectively, they managed to be engaged in the process and to be part of the peace talks.

Q: But their influence was felt during the negotiations?

A: In a way, they were envisioning the process in that way. Yes, this is what I could say, because I think they started even during the middle of the negotiations also, we the SPLM, decided to go and have an outreach to the communities. For example, we managed to go to the mountains and let people be aware of the peace talks, updating them, letting them be aware about these peace talks. In the middle of the negotiations we received so many committed notes from Blue Mountains, from Southern Burna, from
Abyei, and we were actually engaged in staying there. And we held a meeting to meet with all the key players. With the IGAD--I mean the mediators—with the SPLM delegation and the NCP delegation. It helped a lot. So people might have even listened to them.

Q: Describe a bit, if you would, the role of the regional states and where although we touched on this through IGAD, which ones did you find to be the most significant, in terms of the CPA process?

A: Which ones, international?

Q: No, the regional states surrounding Sudan. Which basically are the IGAD countries who were the major players?

A: I think I could pick out Kenya in a way. Because of their neutrality, they managed to be able to get themselves into the {private seats} and then civilized by the Sombeiyo. Which they did a very [inaudible]. The other members were with it directly; they were very good at exerting pressure on Sudan. So these are very strong supportive forces. Given the fact that, well Kenya played a role in mediation, but the regional players, whether it is Mauritania, Ethiopia, or Uganda, they were really good for U.S., in terms of sending the right signal to the national political party. On the level, if peace talks were to fail, we were going to see a regional coalition to support the SPLA, in order to prevail. So that will have a look, hell of a look, the tension that existed between the Sudan government and the members of the region was good.

Q: As in a creative tension, you are saying? But there were military activities going on as well, and how would you characterize those activities?

A: Yes. That was quite helpful, by the way, I remember the Machakos. The Machakos agreement, the first one, was concluded after a big defeat of the National Congress Party. The plan was actually to just wipe out the SPLM. And when they were really repulsed, it was a big blow. Which led, actually the NCP, to accept the Machakos agreement. And I could say that the defeat came as a result of a regional coalition to support an issue of apology, with another party to be really having a feeling that it was prevailing on the other side.

Q: Now maybe we can turn to the role of the UK, Norway, and the U.S., in terms of their influence on the negotiations. I think you started to mention Norway.

A: Let me start with, we were having a big disappointment from the UK. It was either a foreign policy [issue] or because of the personality of the negotiators. I think, the UK, we were expecting a lot from them, given the history and its colonial legacy. Because we believe whatever we suffered as people of Southern Sudan, it is because of the colonial decisions, we were wronged, which were decided in the wrong time in the rush hour. And you know very well, in the very fact that the close decision was when to let the South be left behind and he hurriedly left this earth and the united Sudan. Not only in terms of
Sudanization, it was very cumulative. So I can say the attributed elements, to the colonial apology. And we were expecting it would be better for Britain to pay back and to stand up to correct the past. We were having some issues very lukewarm, we were not very clear on some issues. They were not very accepting. And center, they were calculating that survival would be the Arab leader.

Q: So would you say that there at least initially was an Arabist slant to UK policy? An Arabist tilt?

A: Yes, a tilt. Very clear, very competitive about their interest in the region. Not about what people in the Southern Sudan want. Now, it has come to the U.S. The U.S., as a government, was aware, they were equally interested in the regional politics. They wanted to, given the fact that this incident, which I do not know by then we were having issue with Afghanistan or having an issue of Iraq: And they were being forcefully engaged in the tension between Islam and Christianity, which is not healthy for foreign policy. It is not something they should have pursued. And they felt that Sudan could be a good case, whereby you can reach an agreement and promote the coexistence of different ethnic groups and different divisions. And also to tell to the Arab world and to the Islamic world, that in fact the American government were very keen to, if not to support, they were very keen that they could support any process they can with [a principle of] coexistence. In Sudan, they take it as it is. America was very clear also on the strategic interest in the oil and in the region of the Arab world.

But they were unlike Britain. Because given the fact that we have a limited knowledge, I think at the last minute, Bush started getting into the peace talks. Very forcibly, the issue of Abyei was a big credit to the U.S. The minute we intervene. I think it is the exerted increased pressure on Sudan, very forceful and its clear messages. I think by then Colin Powell came through, though they were not that heavily available at this time, but they exerted a very good pressure in mobilizing the alternative committee to exert pressure on Sudan. And not only Sudan, but the SPLM were in crisis. So I could see U.S. started gaining the momentum, and seeing through, and exerting the right thing at the right time. The country, which came out very good, was Norway. Unlike other mediators, Norway was not having any interest except solidarity with the marginalized people of Sudan. Especially, they were very clear, people like Hilde Johnson, she was great. She was coming with a clear mind, not having any other interests. So it is a country, which I think in contrast to the U.S., even we saw them as if they were eager to work [matters out], and they were even as if they were our colony.

Q: Huh?

A: Because they came in with a passion, with a very good understanding and were seen [as not having] any interest except peace.

Q: They were a completely disinterested party, we can say.

A: Yes.
Q: What point, do you feel that the U.S. in particular became more actively engaged in the negotiations? The U.S. has been accused, if not, of foot-dragging at some point, so of not being fully committed to the process, when did you begin to see U.S. commitment?

A: I feel it became really clear after we finished with Machakos, whereby we gave the right to self-determination to Sudan, and [the principle of self-determination] became a reality. And then they became very engaged when we talked about power sharing. But they picked up properly on the issue of Abyei. And that was a big relief. Without the intervention of the U.S., it could not possibly have happened. The friction started coming within the [inaudible], for the press of [inaudible], and the government by then, exerted more pressure in order to tell to the South sometimes you got what you wanted. It should not be the issue of gain, [it should] not allow you to get your rights. And that was going to be a big issue. And U.S. came in very forceful. And I think I heard also, I forget the time, I felt that Bush was engaged personally with Bashir.

Q: Do you feel that that was the critical stage in the process, the personal engagement?

A: It was personal. Yes. It was inevitable, at that time, inevitable, [that we] became appreciative of the role of U.S..

Q: As one of the negotiators, what would you say was the greatest challenge in terms of achieving your objectives?

A: You mean in terms of what?

Q: In terms of reaching a final agreement. What were the challenges you faced?

A: You see, being from Abyei, I think the issue of Abyei became a breaking point and knowing that there is a need for peace in Southern Sudan. The people of Southern Sudan, even they needed this peace through Abyei. Also, the people of Abyei sacrificed so much; they started the liberation; and we were going to see peace without Abyei being defaulted. And I could see it was divisive; some voices started coming up from the SPLM that we should forget about Abyei. On one level the tribunal was not sleeping. I remember when the Americans came with the proposal, read it, and then it was given to the NCP, and after that certain texts were written by the Americans. I remember saying “I could now sleep.” It was the biggest challenge.

Q: Did you find that the differences that you had with other negotiators whether they were from the North or even from the South, that issues were always at the forefront, or were personalities also shall we say part of the problem?

A: Oh, personalities. Very clear. And even you can see dealing with the negotiations, it is nothing, it is personalities. I know. But it is good in a sense that having different people at different levels, you get people who are really extremist taking the extreme position, and then you have people somewhere in the middle, having the personal scheme but all
schemes of how you can move around. I think that could help a lot from both sides. But even the art of drafting sometimes carries certain issues that we had to overcome. So the drafting itself was so important besides everything else. The National Congress Party, got so divided, and even the SPLM, and you can see well at any level that there were certain bad points, where I think personality really mattered so much in the negotiations.

Q: In hindsight, how would you have changed either policies or practices of the U.S., in terms of the negotiations? What would you like to have seen the U.S. do?

A: I think it would have been better for the U.S. to engage with the follow-up analyses of the context. Having a better understanding of the history of the context to guide the policies, so at least you have a solid basis of understanding of the context, not only of your own foreign policy. I think what was driving the process was, you have a very clear foreign policy, which is having difficulty to adapt itself to reality. And I think to what level the foreign policy could have reached. [But] the reality could not reach that foreign policy. And I think that at some level you only become reactive… The people of Southern Sudan, one day they will decide to work for secession. It is not in the circle.

Never could you comprehend that the South will secede. So even with the agreement giving the people of Southern Sudan the right of secession, I think the American feeling is that the best thing for the people of southern Sudan is a united Sudan. And that seems to be the one driving asset. And I think as much as you want to have a global whatever, the most important thing is to see the context. So I think it would have been better for them to get into the better understanding of the context, and have a better, clearer indication of the foreign policy. I remember I came here in 2003 or 2004, and as a newcomer I was asking [these questions]. There was someone from the State Department, he said, some of them came as groups, and they were asking what about intellectuals who were engaged in the peace talks, and they were asking if you are to go [to elections] today, how would you vote? And some of U.S. said, definitely, with the position today, secession. Then someone would say, what interest would the American people support? Because we know the best outcome for U.S., what we would be supporting, [but] we are very tiny, and the region is bigger.

Q: Well, as I said to your colleague, we Americans may also be looking through the lens of our own civil war, where, clearly North-South issues, including slavery, had a stake. It is an issue in the South of Sudan as well, and you may find we are looking through that lens. If you could, could you describe the impact of the U.S. Congress passing the Sudan Peace Act of 2002? Did that have any great impact as far as you were concerned in terms of the negotiations?

A: I think that one was very [effective]. We started seeing the American foreign policies changing, exerting a very focused [influence]. Though the NCP did not support it, but for U.S. it was quite symbolic that the American foreign policy was changing to the context, geared toward the context and it was really appreciated. And [it was] one of the things that was used a lot in the peace talks and was even a good signal for the National Congress Party by then.
Q: Now, if we can turn to implementation, what do you feel are the primary shortfalls in the CPA, involving implementation?

A: I think from the outside I could say we have done a lot. Sudan today is not the same Sudan before the peace, it is different. Even in terms of stability and security. We have gone ahead in most things. [inaudible] are very clear, I mean one, the issue of Abyei. Individual attention to the [inaudible] the connotation, or nobody will accept the interest of oil by the National Congress party. Very selective, they are very selective in the ruling, the implementation on key disputed areas, because of their interests. One, Abyei. Oil. It is nothing except oil. About 20-30 percent of the oil produced is from the Abyei area. [But] the area defined by Abyei commission, they do not have anything. Any legal constitution, or even in terms of peace, [must] implement Abyei.

Second, the issue of the North-South Border, a clear thing, which is geared towards the issue of interest of oil. That is why they do not want to demarcate the North-South program. And this is affecting the current transformation in terms of the census population census, which is the issue for the elections. The issue of deployment of forces, the issue of determining the oil fields, which is quite critical for the South, in terms of the ….So there is a deliberate intention to further economic interests. The third part is the militias. We are clear, we provide [for it] in the agreement, but they are using them as a way to weaken U.S. and for the South not to reach for the ultimate goal of the right of self-determination. So they justify the dismantling of the South and the weakening of the South. And then to justify the [inaudible] infraction of the oil for their own behalf. So these are the three….

Q: Would you say that there are any current circumstances that really could not have been foreseen by the CPA?

A: No, we are aware. We are aware that there were going to be militias, and that is why with one of the things that actually, we said it during the peace and during the first 6 months, they be allowed to exist, and they were persistent to extend it even beyond, and that is why we put one year as limit on the militias we were going to use.

Q: So the militias would continue?

A: Will continue. We are aware also that the issue of the Abyei, we are going to put a [inadubile] on, and so it was not a big surprise. But not all it is. What helped us, we are aware within the NCP there were some forces within the CPA and their strategy was actually to sign agreement, what you need to do, get to the South and SPLM and threaten them, weaken them, water down them basically. Well, actually they did not conclude the issue of…

Tape change….
When we went to the implementation modalities, there were certain things that were not clear. And that is why we spell them out clearly. Yes, there could be certain things we could have done. Now as usual [the agreement] is not complete. But I think it was very clear to many to have as much detail as possible to make things easier and simple.

Q: Some have said that the North-South disagreements, military engagements, and more actually laid the foundation for violence in Darfur. Is that something that you believe? That it laid the foundation for the violence in Darfur? What happened between the North and the South that provided the conditions that we now see in Darfur?

A: I think, let us put it a different way. The SPLM, unlike the first civil war, whereby the South was [inaudible], in this one the agenda was very clear, the agenda of rural Sudan. I was engaged at a certain stage, in 1990, as the SPLM was sending its first forces to Darfur and they went after [inaudible]. But then we were not having a very good engagement, very good rapport with the population there. And the idea was to make sure that the people of Darfur stand up and gain the center. But the conditions were not [ideal] by then. Unlike, the case of Nuba mountains, where everything worked; we sent the first force of Southerners. But the military picked up and mobilized the area, mobilized the Nuba people. The same thing happened in the eastern arc, in the Blue Nile, whereby we have a very good political web, which resulted in having a very good leader. So what I am saying is probably that what happened in the South awakened people to know their rights. No one could imagine that the people who really helped the National Congress Party, to reach the things they have today, these are the people of Darfur. The conflict in the South was awakening people to rise up. You should not see it in terms of violence. You should see it in terms of people knowing their rights. And for me, it is good to have violence for you to get a solution.

Q: Well, thank you very much for giving me your time.

A: Thanks.