The interviewee served a 25-year career with non-government organizations (NGOs) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), primarily providing humanitarian assistance to war-torn Sudan. Once tapped by the Bush Administration to help establish a dialogue between the warring parties, the interviewee contributed to structuring a U.S. relief operation that could bring both the North and the South to agree to a ceasefire. Both parties interpreted the U.S. offer to deliver assistance to all Sudanese affected by famine and strife, not just to those in the South, as a signal for change. The SPLM agreed to a 24-hour ceasefire, and the Government in Khartoum agreed to permit the first flight of food aid from government-held territory to the rebel-held Nuba Mountains region. These first achievements represented the first “test” of the parties’ willingness to work together. Further relief operations helped to build confidence in the dialogue process, which evolved into the negotiation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and is impacting the CPA’s implementation.

The interviewee also cited the unprecedented cooperation of all U.S. agencies and Congress to respond to the sustained call by the American people for an end to the egregious human rights violations and the use of famine as a weapon of war in Sudan. The interviewee helped to coordinate the eventual delivery of 200 metric tons of food aid, and the creation of an unprecedented joint U.S.-Sudan program to eradicate human and animal diseases (polio, guinea worm). These humanitarian and development initiatives were the first to succeed since the National Islamic Front (Salvation Council)’s coup d’état in 1989, which derailed the peace process and UNICEF’s Operation Lifeline Sudan.

All members of the Sudanese “brain trust” that were involved in the negotiations understood that the CPA was in their best interests, despite debates within their respective parties. The North accepted the talks as a way to maintain a unified country; the South as a way to participate in the country’s democratic transformation. The vision of a “New Sudan” proposed by John Garang appealed to both sides and remains an incentive for steady implementation of the CPA’s provisions. However, the untimely death of Dr. Garang, the persistent violence in Darfur, and the President’s current refusal to honor the boundaries set up by the independent commission that would affect the North’s oil revenues are dragging on the progress of implementation. The interviewee believes that these and other challenges can only be overcome by keeping the vision of the New
Sudan in the sights of the parties, and engaging the Darfurians and others to carve their stake in this vision.
Q: We are first going to ask you to please describe the role you played in the negotiation of the Sudan CPA.

A: Well, I come at it from a different perspective than most of the other participants. First of all, at the time, I was with USAID, not the State Department. That’s one. Secondly, I’ve actually worked on Sudan for twenty-some years, so I have a long history and that history was specifically in the South, so I was very familiar with the SPLM. I was head of an NGO and traveled with them quite a bit, before I went to USAID. I specifically focused on sort of the rebel aspects for 25 years or so. So it was a little different perspective than other people in the group. I also will say that what may be unique for me in the study that you’re doing is the view of where AID was coming from and so forth.

So, just to give you a little bit of a picture, how I got into it. I was the head of this NGO for 21 years and was asked by Andrew Natsios, who was the Administrator of USAID, not yet confirmed, to give him a briefing on where I saw Sudan was at that point in time. This is probably February of 2001. I had known Andrew when he was at USAID earlier, during the first President Bush time. He had been the Director of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and became involved in humanitarian issues in the South. I gave him a briefing and we got into a discussion afterwards. He expressed, from his own knowledge of what the incoming Administration was interested in regarding Sudan, which was an initiative to see if the war in the South might be able to be resolved. And the more we talked about it, the more, even though I wasn’t looking for a job, we talked about those possibilities, too. It wasn’t really on my screen at all until that conversation.

And from our perspective, the AID aspects we were particularly interested in were the humanitarian aspects of the situation being dealt with in order to help foster a peace process. So, humanitarian aspects as an entry point into a peace process. So it was a little different take, perhaps, than ultimately materialized at the State Department.

Most people don’t connect the dots in the same way I do, but the first thing that happened as I recall was that, in May of 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell and Andrew Natsios announced a change in U.S. humanitarian policy in Sudan. Up to that point, the U.S. could provide humanitarian assistance to war-affected Southerners. If you were just a Northern Sudanese and you were suffering from drought or whatever, our humanitarian
assistance wasn’t for you, at that point in time. And what the Powell-Natsios announcement did was depoliticize our humanitarian assistance, so that any Sudanese in humanitarian need might be assisted with our assistance. And I was heading what was to become ultimately the humanitarian bureau at AID. So, the Government in Khartoum, we believe, understood that this was a meaningful policy change, that there were political implications -- almost a signal. That might be too strong a way of phrasing it, but almost.

The next thing that happened was in July of 2001, when Andrew Natsios led a delegation to Khartoum. It was the highest-level U.S. delegation in years to visit Khartoum. I was on that delegation, and in the midst of a meeting with the then-Foreign Minister, we proposed that the Government entertain a 24-hour military stand-down on the condition that we could get the SPLM to also agree to a 24-hour military stand-down. This would let us get one flight of food from Government-held territory, from the El Obeid Air Base, to fly it into the rebel-held sector of the Nuba Mountains. The Government would not agree to the UN doing the flight and would not agree to an NGO doing it. But they would agree to the U.S. Government doing it, not because we were all on the best of terms but because it was a government-to-government arrangement. So we implemented that flight. The SPLM agreed, and both the Government and the SPLM were satisfied with the way it was conducted. We immediately requested agreement for the additional delivery of 2,000 metric tons of food, because there was a humanitarian crisis and major difficulties in the Nuba Mountains at that time. Both sides agreed. As we were sorting out the details of how to implement that, the President appointed Jack Danforth, on the 5th of September, to be his Special Envoy. Of course, that was a few days before September 11th. September 11th probably contributed to Khartoum’s interest in working out some kind of rapprochement with the U.S. And then we were off to the races.

So when, if you recall the process, what happened was that Danforth, who didn’t really want to undertake this task but was asked by the President, decided that what he wanted to do over the October-November-December-January period was to test the willingness of both the Government and the SPLM with regard to the potential for the U.S. undertaking a peace process. The way it was structured was that it was to be a working group, that ultimately became the Sudan Programs Working Group, and what we began to do was to structure what Danforth called tests. He was testing the parties to see whether they genuinely had an interest for a U.S. undertaking. Jack went in October and then I’m not sure if he came back at all for the next couple of months, but and I others were the ones who were out there, negotiating with both the Government and the SPLM on these tests. The tests were a mixture of things. Some were heavy duty and some were light duty kinds of tests. For example, one was the maintenance of the ceasefire in the Nuba Mountains.

Nuba Mountains was a bellwether for everybody, because the Government National Islamic Front had declared a jihad against the people in the Nuba Mountains. Nuba Mountains had basically been closed since 1989 to 1995 by the Government and outsiders weren’t really able to get in and out and basically there were lots of reports by human rights groups of attacks by Government forces even on mosques and so forth. The
Muslim population and the non-Muslim population in the Nuba Mountains got along fairly well. It was an African culture as opposed to an Arab culture, and seemed to work. So that became the centerpiece. Test One was the effective maintenance of the Nuba Mountains ceasefire.

There were other humanitarian tests that really dealt with the eradication of certain diseases but would require both sides to cooperate and collaborate. These were not entirely unique to us, but it was a way of facilitating, so polio inoculation had been severely disrupted in Sudan because of the war and basically the Government wouldn’t give permission for UN teams to go into important areas. The issue of guinea worm is also a major problem in Sudan and AID undertook to fund the Carter Center, and that again required the collaboration of both parties to make that work or improve the way it worked. And then the third was an attempt at eradication of rinderpest, which is an animal disease. Cows are big in Sudan and to the best of my knowledge it was certified as eradicated under that program. So there was that and then there were other elements in the testing procedure.

At the end of January of 2002, Jack Danforth went back to Sudan, visited North and South, came back to Washington and produced a report, which our State Department and AID collaboratively worked on. Danforth determined that there was reason for the U.S. to engage and then we were off to the races in what became Machakos and ultimately Naivasha. The core American team, throughout accretions and deletions over time, was the same.

**Q:** And you were also in Machakos with Danforth?

A: Yes, all the way through. The team was a pretty consistent team. I also would come back here and go back out.

**Q:** You also laid the groundwork for projects that built political will on working together.

A: Yes, I would say that, from my perspective, the work that USAID did in using the humanitarian entry point were the reason why, once we had an Envoy and a process, that the test process started. The Nuba Mountains became the centerpiece for the whole process. I think that had there not been a ceasefire in the Nuba Mountains, had it not already been tested and worked and hadn’t the two parties already sort of bought into “the Americans are doing something, doing something in the Nuba Mountains, essential to it,” the process probably wouldn’t have been the key point in what became the U.S. strategy. At least that’s my view. The fact that we’d already had some successes made it a candidate for that role.

**Q:** And on the Sudanese side, the counterparts, were they key Government players, minor Government players?

A: Well, let me name what I would say was the Sudan Government key, more or less. There was some variety in it there, of course, as well. In terms of the negotiations
between the U.S. team and the Sudan Government team around these tests, the Sudan Government side was chaired by Chole Deng. Chole was a Southerner, a Dinka, a member of the National Islamic Front and he chaired the Government side in the early negotiations and so forth. I will say that while he was the Chair there were other, heavier-weight parties. They included National Islamic Front regulars, basically Northerners, and they included Sadiq, who’s currently the State Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was at this point was number two on the Foreign Affairs side. It included, Nafie Ali Nafie, who is now the Assistant to the President, a National Islamic Front hardliner. These guys were basically I would say more or less the brain trust behind it. Early on the point person for the Government was a guy named Ghazi Salaheddin, who was the Peace Advisor to the President. He ultimately was sort of sacked in an internal squabble, but he was then followed in being the Peace point person by Vice President Taha. They’re both in the game at this point. Both in the last election for basically the Islamic Brotherhood in Sudan, Ghazi and Taha ran against each other. So they’re both still around and usually Ghazi is seen as closer to al-Bashir. Taha has got his own standing nationally, in part because of the whole CPA thing. Ghazi’s back, sort of sitting next to the president.

Q: Were there any spoilers in this mix?

A: Well, it depends on how you define spoiler. I think one can question the motives of the parties and most particularly, I would say, of the Government party, in terms of their intentions. This is all a matter of interest, not good-heartedness, of course. I could give you some real anecdotes that show you how good intentions don’t fit into this, in a humanitarian sense, but I think there was real dissension within both parties as to this whole process. There are hard-liners and there are less hard-liners, and so forth. I wouldn’t say that there were spoilers who obviously were effective enough to tilt the process, but the debates within the parties were serious. Ultimately there are a lot of people in the hard line end of the Government party that felt that too much was given. The thought of a referendum being held in which the South could choose to secede is really quite extraordinary, and there are lots of people who think too much was given away in that. And one of the reasons the issue of Abyei hasn’t been followed in terms of what the CPA provides for is because the people of Abyei can choose to go with the South, which could secede. Abyei is the center of the oilfields. So there’s lots of dissatisfaction for one reason or another. I think the SPLM probably feels it did pretty well and the Government, particularly Taha and al-Bashir, see the CPA as in their interest, at least for now, but there are some disgruntled elements that are there, clearly.

Q: Were the international organizations playing a role at this stage, UN, the EU?

A: The UN was viewed with suspicion, a lot of suspicion. The Government would not, for example, have agreed to the UN doing that food flight I mentioned to you into the Nuba Mountains. That was because of Operation Lifeline Sudan, which was basically a UNICEF special program. It actually started in January of 1989, and it came about before the National Islamic Front coup occurred in the end of June, beginning of July of 1989. So six months earlier, there was a fledgling peace process that was starting to
emerge in Sudan. The National Islamic Front, on June 30th of 1989, did their coup basically to abort that peace process. Operation Lifeline Sudan was a UN-UNICEF operation already created six months earlier, under an agreement between the Government of Sudan, the SPLM and the UN. This tripartite agreement had already set down the rules of engagement for Operation Lifeline Sudan. The Government was not fully in a position to control the new Government, the National Islamic Front Government, what was then called the Revolutionary Salvation Council or something along those lines. The Government couldn’t fully control the humanitarian programs that were serving the war-affected people in the South because Sudan politicians tend to think tribally. Young male civilians in the SPLM-controlled areas were seen as incipient rebels, and the others down there all supported them. That may or may not have been actually true, but that was the perception. So this new radical Government in ’89 and following didn’t necessarily have the same humanitarian intentions. They saw these as the people who were trying to destroy their view of what Sudan should be. Because the rules of engagement were already determined by predecessors, there was real heartburn between this radical incoming-Government and the UN.

By and large Sudan, I think, was not only an issue in the United States. It was also an issue in Europe. But I don’t recall the EU, at the initial stage, being all that active. I can even remember when the EU came online strongly later, but you had certain key countries that were very interested early on. Norway was always interested in Sudan and remains highly interested. That was perhaps in part a missionary-related view, but also it was an NGO thing. There are two principal NGOs from Norway, Norwegian Church Aid and Norwegian Peoples Aid that are highly active in Sudan. The UK had interests, obviously, and the Dutch ultimately did, which is why over time you had not only this troika, which is the U.S., UK and Norway, but you then developed a so-called troika plus, which included the Netherlands and also Italy, and so forth. So the way I view it, especially in the earlier period, you had these European countries, but not so much the EU. The EU wasn’t entirely absent but it wasn’t nearly as visible as these particular European countries.

Q: But we were on the same page as our colleagues here? Were they supporting the process?

A: There was a great deal of collaboration, especially with the Brits and the Norwegians. I’m not sure we were out of sorts with anybody. There was a desperate wish to see the war in the South come to a conclusion, on the part of outsiders, an acceptable conclusion. And I can’t remember really strong heartburn. There were always differences on tactics.

Q: So the NGOs would also coordinate through you?

A: NGOs, you know, don’t like to coordinate through Governments. That’s a flat statement, from someone with an NGO background. I didn’t used to pass through an American embassy when I was going into a place where there was a civil conflict. We were much more of a human rights-y kind of NGO. But I don’t think people had any fundamental disagreement from the NGO community with what the objectives were here.
People may have quarreled, in one way or another, but what drives our people and drives our Congress and drives our media and drives our NGO community are the same humanitarian and human rights issues. NGOs never really comprehend the politics of the situation. So I think the whole CPA negotiation was a huge positive. Darfur has become viewed somewhat negatively, since a different kind of dynamic has grown up. But since we’re talking about the CPA, the reaction was much more positive, I think. That doesn’t mean there weren’t some differences here and there, but I can’t think of any real opposition.

Q: From the Sudanese side, beginning working together and so forth, were there any regional players?

A: Sure. You go back into the nineties, before this process began, with what were called the frontline states: Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda in particular. And of course when you get into the actual process that we’re talking about, Kenya was absolutely indispensable. So especially those four that I just mentioned were prominent. Egypt clearly had an interest, had interests of one sort or another. There were security interests in Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda relating to Government of Sudan support for entities in those countries, like the Lord’s Resistance Army in northern Uganda. And there were a variety of other interests, too. Eritrea early on became independent in, what, ’91 perhaps, and then had a referendum. I can remember in Kampala at a meeting of the one of the African organizations that a member of one of the neighboring states said Sudan’s Government was clearly at fault in the war in the South. So they were raising issues about the conflict in a neighboring state, which most presidents in Africa don’t like to do. They usually stay out of that kind of thing, but now one jumped in it feet first. So those four countries were terribly significant, as was Egypt.

Q: So, finally you’re at the point of the negotiations and what would you consider the major turning points?

A: Well I would say, first of all, before turning points, the capabilities of the parties was significant. In many conflicts, and especially in Africa, as was the case on the Darfur negotiations, the capabilities of the rebels were very slim. That was not true of the SPLM. The war had been going on from 1983, and the SPLM political cadre had developed over a substantial period of time. Many of them were very capable politically, and the SPLM had a vision, which, in my experience, many rebel groups don’t have. Others may be disgruntled and they may have complaints and so forth, but the SPLM had a vision. It was Dr. John’s vision of what he called New Sudan. Garang was a unionist. He was probably the only unionist Southerner I ever met. He was always outvoted, 100 per cent of everybody else against him. But his vision, which became the vision, ultimately of the leadership of the SPLM, was that basically you needed to have a democratic transformation of Sudan. Whether the South stayed an integral part of Sudan or separated, it was to the South’s advantage for this democratic transformation to have occurred, because either the South was going to be a part of hopefully a more democratic country, or it was at least going to have a neighbor on its northern border that was more democratic. That was to their benefit. So there are a couple of differences, therefore. I
think. The SPLM was not perfect, and its human rights record was not necessarily perfect, but it did, in my view, at least, change significantly for the better, starting in 1994, when they had their first national convention and they began to call for people who had left the movement to come back. Most of them have come back, actually, over time. People who had gone and become ministers in the Government in Khartoum, ultimately left that Government and came back to the SPLM. So, in terms of vision, in terms of political capability of the leadership to engage the Government politically in negotiations, it was different than a lot of other groups.

Q: So this is a lesson learned.

A: Oh, very much so.

Q: Was this the SPLM’s idea? Were we influential in forming the SPLM?

A: Actually, I would say no, but yes, and let me say what I mean by that. Many in the leadership of the SPLM, including Dr. Garang, were trained in the U.S. Garang went to school in Ames, Iowa, at Iowa State University, Grinnell and so forth. Over a period of time, a lot of the key political leaders have done the same, either short term or long term. So, did the U.S. influence the formation of the SPLM? Absolutely in my view, but it was influenced, to some degree, before these talks.

Q: So, it was influenced in the heartland.

A: Yes, very much. You know, Garang would come to the States and often go to Iowa, where he was viewed as somebody. And he would get professors from Iowa State and Grinnell who would volunteer to work on Sudan issues, including in Sudan. So there was a U.S. preparation element that I think turned out to be very important. It was his putting this vision of New Sudan, which people all over Sudan still talk about, that I think was clearly his own -- but its roots were clearly in the United States. It was an American-fed vision. I continue think that this idea of offering educational opportunities for leaders in developing countries, while sometimes it doesn’t pay off, sometimes it pays off big time. And I think that was the case here. So the leadership of the SPLM, which was, for a while, viewed as what some of us used to call airy-fairy socialists, which means these were African leaders who were talking with socialist rhetoric but they weren’t necessarily hardened socialists. They weren’t like the Red Terror in Ethiopia, for example, earlier on and that kind of thing. It was a much softer sort of thing, and ultimately it was a philosophy that it left behind and they viewed the U.S. positively. They invested a lot of their own efforts in the U.S., not only because there were Sudanese here, but also because they welcomed members of Congress and journalists into Sudan. And there were criticisms of them because they were doing things wrong, or some people within the movement were doing things wrong. But it didn’t really turn them against the U.S.

Q: Besides Garang, were there any others of negotiators or the leaders at this time also the beneficiaries of our educational system and also shared this exposure?
A: Yes. I don’t know the history back that far to be able to say how all that materialized. If you’re interested in that aspect, there were people from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, seconded to AID, who actually went to school at Iowa State with Garang and then began teaching at Khartoum University in 1980 and subsequently were involved in a lot of efforts at getting people from Sudan into U.S. universities in one way or another, for short term or long term kinds of things.

Q: They sound like some of our angels behind the scene.

A: I would say absolutely and I traveled with them quite a bit. They are very much field persons and been in the trenches for 25 years or so. So, yes, they are among those invisible people who were very, very valuable in laying the foundation for what became a lot of what we’re talking about now.

Q: That is some good insight. We see how they began with the tests and then they evolved into commitments for implementation.

A: Well, they were learning to work together. I also saw this in Darfur, by the way but that’s another matter. You know for example, many U.S. officials were more focused on the security aspects—AID was more focused on humanitarian and human rights aspects, and development aspects—but the collaboration was a good one. It’s not always good. In this case it was a very good one and, I would say, mutually supportive one.

In this building peace process, I found in Darfur—as was also the case in the South—that mapmaking was one way that to get the militaries dealing with each other. It’s like “I don’t want to show you mine until you show me yours” kind of thing. But obviously if you’re going to have a ceasefire and it’s going to be managed, we need to know exactly who’s where and both sides need to know who’s where. And to get to that point, you have to build the confidence of the parties and it has to be confidence that can be shown on an actual piece of paper with pen and pencil. “Okay, I’ve got 100 guys right here.” That kind of thing is a confidence builder. It’s the beginnings of a teamwork kind of effort. It’s a real meaningful element in the process and on the Nuba Mountains that’s exactly what happened. I can tell you the day we Americans, talked through a lot of provisions for the Nuba Mountains. One of the first things we did was to get a big map out and start engaging the parties. Ultimately the Swiss were very helpful, by the way, on mapping. The parties went up to Switzerland and actually did that kind of mapping exercise.

Q: So we laid out the map, got the parties to the table and let them work together.

A: Yes, but it was a very collaborative thing. I know this was a U.S. exercise, but it took the two parties and it took, in this case, the Swiss and the other troika parties, for it to work. It was a very collaborative kind of engagement. The U.S. was the indispensable element, though.
Q: In addition to the security angle, you were also contributing in humanitarian ways at this point?

A: Yes, but, as I said, the humanitarian issue was clearly AID’s bailiwick, whereas the security issue was clearly in the State Department’s bailiwick. We got to comment on things there and they got to comment on things on the humanitarian side, too, because everything humanitarian is also political, everything.

Q: It public opinion driving the humanitarian work?

A: It’s the public opinion, but it goes to the root of the motivation of the parties and whether it’s admirable or not admirable, and all those kinds of thing. NGOs like to pretend that what they do is non-political, but it isn’t. Politics runs all the way through the human rights and the humanitarian stuff. But once again, the point I’d like to make because I don’t think it happens often enough, is that it was a very collaborative effort between the State Department and USAID, and I really think that was one of the strengths from the American side. Other strengths from the American side were the personal interest of the President, which was indispensable, and this constituency out there. The constituency played a key role.

In my personal view, there hasn’t been a constituency for a single African country since apartheid like the one that existed for Sudan, which continues to exist. It was very, very broad and very, very activist. So there were plenty of elements. This wasn’t just the case of some diplomats able to pull this off sort of in a vacuum. The whole context started to come together and we, for our part, would work with the constituency, even while some of us might think they get in the way, the Congress would do things that keep the pressure on the parties and especially the Government party and so forth. So there were all these swirling elements in it.

Q: It was a very interesting dynamic to have the political peace process and the public outrage and demand for resolution of the humanitarian conflict.

A: That is absolutely correct. And the truth of the matter is that the South is the most destroyed place in the world, for all practical purposes. I’ve seen them all, because I headed the humanitarian work for so long, both in and outside of Government. Southern Sudan was the most destroyed, when you talk about two million people dead and four and a half million displaced in the immediate area, both in the country and over into Ethiopia. I think these numbers are staggering kinds of numbers. They explain the passion of the constituencies and so forth, which was high and I think turned out to be very important. It was negative on the Government and it was positive on the SPLM, but that began and was reflected in our legal framework, the kind of restrictions the Congress would pass on appropriations, how we would act at the UN, and so forth. That constituency was always a factor and sometimes we might feel it got in the way but personally I think it turned out to be a real asset.
Q: And from a development point of view, wasn’t it true that a lot of the destruction of roads and railroads in the South was simply to obliterate the ability of rebels to organize, but it also created a situation of famine and humanitarian crisis?

A: Absolutely and very intentionally, frequently, very intentionally. You get famine as a weapon of war. You could see it at certain points in time: January, February, March of 1993, when the Government shut down Operation Lifeline Sudan in certain areas where things were already on the edge, and it pushed the population over the edge and there was massive death. Then ultimately they let Operation Lifeline begin to function again but it was very targeted. Or you would have Government bombers who would follow World Food Program flights when they were going to do a drop, because people would gather for those food drops and then they would bomb them and things like that. It was really egregious kind of stuff.

Q: What this spoke to is the challenges of the negotiation and you did overcome those, leading to the implementation phase.

A: The challenges were overcome. I would say, again, it was ultimately judged by both parties to be in their interest. The South feels like they got a very good deal in the Machakos and CPA provisions. I think the Government feels that it was an acceptable deal and it preserved them intact and they still had choices. They could choose to go one way or they could choose to go another. And in fact I would say that they both rather well implemented the provisions of the CPA, which is not to say there aren’t some egregious exceptions.

One of them concerns Abyei. There was a commission set up. That commission was an independent commission. It rendered a decision as to where the boundaries of Abyei should be, but the President of Sudan refuses to implement that provision. Why? Well, because basically it would change the border. What are the implications of that? As I said earlier, Abyei is in the center of the oilfields. So there are huge monetary implications to that.

But by and large the peace has held. There’s no real war between the SPLA and the Government forces. There’s violence that occurs because of the impact of what’s happened over the last 25 years or so, but fighting between the Government forces and the rebel forces in the South just doesn’t happen anymore. The peace holds. It’s not perfect. Like I said, the Abyei thing is probably the most egregious problem. But it is holding, yes.

Q: If the U.S. could have done something differently, what would you think that might be?

A: I honestly can’t identify something. Maybe I was too close to it, but there are small things, there are personalities, like the monitoring of its implementation is in the hands of something called the Assessments and Evaluation Commission. I would say the person we pushed for, who actually got that job, turns out to be far more passive and bureaucratic than we could have wished and, as a result of that, the monitoring of the
CPA’s implementation suffers a bit. But that’s not a strategic difference and everything. I think, while we may have not known entirely what we were doing, the choices and the approach turned out not to be a bad one. I can’t say we visualized it all at the beginning the way it went. I wish we were that bright. I think it’s a model, frankly, but it’s not the model that’s going to be applicable everywhere.

Q: For the implementation, then, we need to press for more monitoring?

A: Yes, I would say that where the CPA has suffered because two real things happened that undermined it. One is Darfur. The CPA wasn’t signed until January of 2005 and then the interim Constitution went into effect in July of 2005. But in February of 2003, the war in Darfur began. And so this other war, which by the end of 2003 and the beginning of 2004 became so egregious in the way it was being done, it began to overshadow and distort the picture of the CPA. That’s one thing that has really hurt.

The second thing that really hurt is the death of Dr. Garang. The dreamer dies, does the dream also die, you know? And for him to get killed as he did in that helicopter crash dramatically changed the picture and we’re all trying to sort out the aftermath now, still. When he went into Khartoum in early July last summer, the estimates go as high as six million people came out to greet him. Those were not all Southerners. Those were also Northerners who bought into the accomplishment of ending the war in the South, and also by and large bought into the dream of New Sudan. Northerners also want a more democratic society, it isn’t just Southerners. I don’t mean to make too much of Dr. John because he was another man, so to speak, but he had the cachet in the North, which is why so many turned out. And the Government actually started to close the bridges because there were buses coming from all over. I don’t know how many people were actually out there, whether it was six million or something less than that, but it was a huge, huge, huge, welcome. Nobody disputes that. And so what you had was a level of hope and optimism for all the people of Sudan, North and South, for the CPA. If you had been there, this is one of those “if you had only been there you would know.” And so you could see the New Sudan potential in the population. And when Dr. John died, days later, the punch in the gut politically and psychologically was there. And then you get all of this kind of second-guessing. Did this enable the National Islamic Front, now called the National Congress Party, to recalculate its objectives? Is its commitment the same while the SPLM is weak as it was when the SPLM was strong and Garang was a national hero, not just a Southern hero? And so forth. Is the SPLM, which the U.S. viewed as the mechanism for democratic transformation in Sudan, given what’s happened over the last 11 months, able to actually perform that role? What has happened within the SPLM is not just a new leadership, but also a new leadership, which has really had its difficulties. And so, for example, I came home a week ago Sunday and I was on the plane with one of the negotiators for the SPLM, who was leaving because he thought the dream was gone, that the SPLM post-Garang has significantly weakened.

Q: Leaving?
A: Leaving Sudan, yes, going to live in the UK, where his family is. And we have others who don’t plan to go back and so forth. So this has to do with the sort of deterioration within the SPLM and, some people would say, with the recalculation by the National Congress Party of what the possibilities are with a partner in the CPA that doesn’t have the strength that that partner had a year ago. And that is another whole kettle of fish to discuss. But there are divisions and there’s corruption that has taken root and there’s, some would say, manipulation by the Government and so forth. So it has deteriorated, no question.

Q: It’s of course the speculation of foul play.

A: Yes. Personally I don’t believe that, nor does Mrs. Garang, who’s by the way now in London in a hospital, coming up on the one year anniversary and she’s been distraught about the internal dynamics of the SPLM in the last 11 months and so forth. I’m not saying I think she’ll leave. I think she will go back, but the strain on her is really quite substantial.

Q: Dr. Garang’s death was just a quirk of fate?

A: If you read the transcript or at least what has circulated as the transcript, yes. I don’t think it was a conspiracy and all that kind of stuff. Some people do. I don’t tend to think that but the impact is still there.

Q: Last question, relates back to Darfur. To what extent did the peace process between the North and South lay the foundation for violence in Darfur? Is it a contributing factor?

A: Yes, I would say that when we embarked on this, I can remember Garang saying to me at a certain point in time, he said, “You know, you need to so to see the people in the East, because they’re worse off than we are in the South.” And he had his connections also in Darfur. I really hesitate to say what I’m about to say but I’ll say it anyway. We probably would have done things a bit differently if the original paradigm hadn’t been North and South but was more along the lines of people who are in and people that are out. That may be too much to ask. In other words, the whole lead-up to what became this initiative at that point in time was focused on the South and there was an awareness that the people of the South tended to be different. They were African, they were non-Muslim and so forth, and the tendency was to look at the North as Muslim and Arab in culture. And maybe the finer gradations that Garang was trying to tell me about when he’d say, “Go up here to Darfur in the North, and see those people are worse off than we in the South.” Maybe it was sort of conceptually a bridge too far, but the case can be made and is made, clearly, that while, I’m not sure this is a hundred per cent true but the discussion is that some people in Darfur saw themselves as being left out. Some people who believed in the New Sudan, maybe. But the CPA deal wasn’t for them. It might have changed the whole country, but the actual construct was a construct between the Government and the SPLM, and while the SPLM saw the Government as their opponent, there were people in the North that also saw the Government as an opponent. And so
when the deal was being made between the Government and the SPLM, those people in the North were left out. Did that cause the Darfurians to do what became their signature attack on the airstrip in El Fasher in February of 2003, which became basically the beginning point of the war in Darfur? I don’t know how to answer that exactly. Maybe that’s said after the fact. I don’t know.

Q: But to fully implement the CPA, bringing the Darfurians into the picture is necessary.

A: Yes, there was certain sort of framework issues for Darfur and for what we’re calling now the DPA. One of the issues was, you don’t change the interim Constitution with the Darfurian Agreement. Well, the interim Constitution was a product of the CPA. And you don’t change the CPA. So when it comes to the interest of power sharing on the part of the Darfurian rebel parties, they’re sort of hedged in, not a hundred per cent.

Q: There’s a road map.

A: There’s a road map that already exists, that basically says, like we were talking about our Congress or our Senate, there’s a hundred senators and the CPA is, basically defined the percentage of power between the Government and the SPLM. So where’s the power for the non-Governmental Northerners? And what they basically said was, “We’re going to add slots, temporarily, until an election so the left-out parties can be built in, but after that it’s all up for electoral grabs.” Well that sounds like a step in the right direction. It’s a political bridging mechanism, so that the outies can be innies temporarily, and then the people decide in a vote. Sounds like a step towards New Sudan. So maybe at the beginning of the process it was not comprehended how complicated it was going to get. But the way it’s worked out, while imperfect, it does take you to heavy leaning on an electoral framework -- the interim elections and then the bigger elections that come further down the road. So the dream of New Sudan isn’t dead. It’s still there. It’s imperfectly being implemented. It’s still there. My challenge, within the discussions around here, while we’re trying to focus and so overwhelmingly focused on Darfur because of the nasty nature of what’s occurred there, is how do you keep the dream of democratic transformation of Sudan alive? That’s what this has all been about, ultimately. At least, if you’re an idealist.

Q: Well, you’re the big picture man.

A: I think that was the U.S. position. What we’re after is democratic transformation of Sudan. It’s a way of changing a state that’s on our State Sponsors of Terrorism list, but doing it in a non-violent way. It can still work. It’s just a lot tougher with the changed circumstances of the loss of Dr. John and the erosion of the SPLM and the impact of the war in Darfur.

Q: Anything to add? I think that’s a wonderful conclusion, keep the dream alive.