The interviewee has a 37-year long career in the State Department, more than three decades of diplomatic experience. He has assigned to U.S. Embassy in Khartoum since October 2005, and continues to be involved to this day. He feels that Sudan’s North-South relations must be understood in the context of the overall complexity of its situation. He notes that because of the changes that are taking place in Sudan, looking at it through traditional ways is no longer feasible.

The interviewee finds this complexity evident not only with the Darfur conflict, but with regards to many different contextual factors in Sudan. There are three large trends that have impact on the whole region: economic and environmental volatility, increased importance of ethnicity, and the overall political structure. The increased importance of economic growth, north-South relations, and the role of the US in this conflict are additional factors that illustrate the complicated road to peace in Sudan.

Sudan has seen great improvement in the economy, with a 13% growth rate. However, being the “gateway to Sudan,” most of the money that comes to Khartoum usually remains in Khartoum. Though Khartoum is not failing, the rest of Sudan needs help urgently. For this reason, Sudan is considered to be the world’s “leading failed state,” as reported in “Foreign Policy” magazine. Much investment has been put in Khartoum, with no risk of a collapse in the economy.

With regards to the ethnic divide, there is increasing importance on ethnicity in the conflict. In this 50 or 25 year war, clearly there is a strong ethnic element with the differentiation of identities through religion, language, and tribes. The power structure itself is controlled by three distinct tribes that are all Muslim. This is critical because in order to make a progressive transformation in government, it must be possible to know who will be in charge, and that is the challenge presented by the existence of multiple ethnicities. Ethnicity may be more important than it ever was 50-100 years ago.

The third important trend, aside from the economic imbalances and the significant ethnicity challenge, is the overall polity or political structure. Sudan is a huge country, being the tenth largest country in the world. Its idea of a nation-state is different from the United States model. Sudan is run on the empire model of a nation, which is not considered as an internationally legitimate organization of a state. It is important to understand that their state is something different and it will act differently. Thus, the structure of government need not
resemble the ideal U.S. model of a democracy. The interviewee suggests Sudan to be a possible prosperous country, if they have different political structures.

On U.S. policies, although it is important for the U.S. to be involved, the ultimate policy goal for the U.S. is primarily humanitarian. It is up to the Sudanese to determine what they want. The Sudanese are capable of designing solutions for themselves. That is where the existence of a political dialogue within the region is an absolute must. The UN and Africa Union have tried to bring parties together to negotiate, however this has proven to be very difficult. Nevertheless, more U.S. involvement is better.

On North-South Relations, the interviewee feels this aspect tends to be overlooked. Despite the relevance of the economic problems and genocide taking place in Sudan, the main historical conflict taking place in Sudan is this North-South divide. After two years of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, much positive change has taken place. Though economically the situation has improved, on the security side, there are much deeper problems and more attention is needed. As far as the elections and census, this will not likely come in time unless the international community becomes active in legitimizing the role of the Sudanese people in making their decision of having a united Sudan. The interviewee is rather skeptical of secession, but strongly believes it is up to the Sudanese to make this decision. If the Sudanese want to pursue a new government, all the above factors need to be taken into consideration, including the growing significance of ethnicity in the region. Overall efforts are heading in the right direction and the U.S. should be concerned with how involved they are currently with these efforts.
Q: Please tell us about your experience, past and present, with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005. You may have comments about the economic underpinnings to the Agreement.

A: Regarding the overall Sudanese economy, the economic change in volatility is on a secular basis. The economy of Sudan doubled in the last 6 years. According to the World Bank, it is going to double again in the next 6 years. Sudan has over a thousand dollars a year per capita income. Now, if you look at the surrounding countries, Sudan is doing pretty well. The economic growth rate is 13%; it is a positive change, but it is still change. This change means that perhaps some of the traditional ways of looking at things and managing things are under stress because some people are getting extremely rich while other people are dying of thirst. In fact, I would say anyone who came to Sudan and traveled around the country would have a very strong impression, because most of the money flows into Khartoum and stays in Khartoum.

In Southern Sudan, there are approximately 15 miles of paved roads. They probably have more asphalt on the runways of Khartoum airport, than in the midst of southern Sudan. So, you have this economic change taking place. However, it is also true that in many places in Sudan, even as the economic opportunities grow, the challenges are great. So you have this enormous economic growth, but too often, though it is a growth of 13% a year, the benefits are very unequally distributed. That of course, like with environmental change, is the stress of the traditional ways of coping in the overall country.

Q: Would you care to comment about ethnicity as a source of Sudan’s problems and also potential solutions?

This is also a trend you see elsewhere. You have the increased importance of ethnicity. It is just in the air of the world that we live in. So we have a 50 or 25-year war, however you want to count it, between the North and South, and there is a certainly strong ethnic element to that. There is also some differentiation of identities by religion, or language, and tribes. You have in Darfur itself, about 30 tribes, all Muslim. Some are predominantly herders, some are predominantly farmers, and any farmer still has a goat. But as for the farmers, I myself cannot make this distinction, I do not know if they are African or Arab in Sudan. I do not have the ability to sense that, but they know, because that is how they prescribe their ethnicity. The herders are more likely to see themselves as Arab, and the farmers are more likely to see themselves as African.
At the Arab League Headquarters in Cairo, there is a large map of the Arab World. And there is a line across North Africa and Sahara, which they think is the difference between the Arab and African world. Incidentally, none of the lines on the map are intrastate lines, it is very interesting because these are different cultures and they have names of the capitals, or names of the countries. Incidentally on some maps they would include Indonesia, the Appalachians or Piedmont. So, that is an entirely legitimate view of the world. However, it is not ours. But you can imagine that there are people who see the world like that. So ethnicity can play a very important part in the overall context of the situation in Sudan.

It is understandable that the gateway to and from Sudan is Khartoum. This is the place that has the Nile, the airport, the government, and railroads. Not surprisingly, the tribes in the Nile valley are very important in Sudan, for the big power structure. There is a party that came into office, in the late 1980s, the National Congress Party. I asked my staff for a list of two dozen people in the party.

And I then asked them to identify what tribes they are from. It turns out that twenty-two of the twenty-six are from three tribes: the Dunblo, Janaveen, and the Shakia. These are tribes that are along the Nile Valley, North and South of Khartoum. That is the traditional power structure. They are also a very high percentage of income to Darfur. But that power structure is also reflected in the military and security services.

I point this out because people say that we should just change the government. That is “easy.” But who is going to be in charge? What are the odds the other people in charge come from the same tribes? They’re probably pretty high. And what is the assurance that they would do anything differently than the people already in power. I don’t know. That is not something that could automatically escape. So ethnicity plays a very important role there and we live in an age where, if anything, maybe not so much in the United States, but in other parts of the world like this conflict, ethnicity may be more important than it was 50 or 100 years ago.

We should not be after allusions because we are probably going in a slightly different direction than every place else in the world has been, particularly places under stress.

The third overall factor to keep in mind, after analyzing that there are three tribes, Khartoum, the entire infrastructure there, the money comes into Khartoum, the government sends the money out of Khartoum. Now, what kind of polity or structure, politically, are we looking at?

Q: How do you see civil society functioning in today’s Sudan?

A: I grew up in this country, we all have our myths, that the whole United States was sort of like Vermont, and we had town meetings, PTAs, schools boards, and other things. But we all knew where we belonged and the whole country was like that and we had elections, and every part of the country had somewhat of an equal statehood. And the power arose from those local political structures, and this country has state political parties and local candidates rising from that and sustaining the situation in Washington. That is not the model in Sudan. This is a huge country; the size of half the United States. Ruled more or less historically by three tribes, all from the
center, just like an empire. But it is more like, when you think of Darfur, and Khartoum, and you have the Vermont model in your head, not nearly accurate. I am not saying that the Moscow Chechnya model is accurate either. But some place between the two of those, you probably find the reality.

So the events in Darfur are probably more fully recorded in the Washington press than in the Khartoum press. One of these people said, get out there, we do not care so much, it never been used to ruling it closely. When the British ruled Sudan, they had a Sudan group and worked with British and Sudanese, organizing those countries, they had 56 people on the syllabus. So, this is the country, which outside of Khartoum in many ways gets used to a lot of the local initiatives and other stuff.

To finish up the part on the context, you have that traditional system which is being eroded because the world does not consider empire to be a legitimate organization for a state. This is not a nation-state, it is not a state like Vermont, and it is not a nation-state in a way we assume it to be. It’s something different. And it acts differently.

Q. What appear to be U.S. objectives in Sudan?

A: Darfur has a population of six million people; two million of them are internally displaced. Another million depends on international relief agencies for their survival. Sudan overall has six million internally displaced people, the country with the next highest distributor is Columbia, about two million. So being internally displaced is a very serious issue.

I believe our newer policy goal in Sudan is a humanitarian goal. We spend about a half billion dollars a year in Sudan, on the operations; by far the largest donor in Darfur. That situation is in part improved; malnutrition is down, people are eating better than before; infant mortality is down, because in the camps you can get medical care.

However, it is very very fragile. In the first two years of the crisis, there were government humanitarian workers; and last year about fifteen were killed. This year there have already been attacks by the rebels, the humanitarian workers set out for Darfur. I would say this is unacceptable police action by the government on humanitarian workers also. So there is an ongoing problem, chaos, and it is more fragile to get the aid to people.

You cannot fix the place just by feeding people. The refugee program and the humanitarian program suggest that you have to address the security aspect of the issue. For that, the African Union has about 5,000 troops there; there are 2000 other people associating with the Africa Union Peace Keeping Mission. There are at least monitors. Now we are told that they cannot be expected to do this. It is just very difficult. I think acknowledging the people who show up at the area of crises, is important.

Q. How does the Darfur crisis affect the overall situation in Sudan, and can the African Union handle it?

A: I would say that the level of chaos and destruction in Darfur is far beyond the capacity of the African Union. The UN with Kofi Annan had the plan with three parts to it; it helped the Africa
Union out there. The first part is called the light option or the “light package.” One hundred and eight-five people will be deployed in the light option. There are supposed to be 185 people, but six weeks later, there are less than 80 people deployed. They have to recruit; they have some 80 people who are largely capable for the peacekeeping operation in Southern Sudan. That is not adequate. Darfur is in the sea of all Africa and it is tough. But I think if it takes the UN six weeks to get 100 people deployed, it may be a while before it is fixed. We have got to be better. Their attempt is to get 200 deployed. I am using mostly people who help the staff functions, with coordination and planning and so on.

Then we have the “heavy package,” which is where we are really dealing with chaos, we really need these people; cannot get an agreement with somebody just like that, we have an agreement to get by, we need peacekeepers. The heavy package is two to three thousand people, of course being deployed between the beginning of March and end of June. I would simply say that they are going to have to step up that tempo a little bit, if they are going to get that done. But I would say in all fairness to the AU and all fairness to the UN, and fairness to the people in Darfur, another 2,000 people are not going to change the fundamentals there. In and out, there is going to be more on the logistic side, communications side, and things like that, to make the peacekeepers out there better equipped and more able to get around, more mobile, with better intelligence, but that is not going to take too long.

The third plan is called the “hybrid” plan. There will be some African Union forces and some UN forces that will work together. This still has to be sketched out, but this number is about 20,000. If there are only 100 deployed a month, it is going to take a long time to get to 20,000. Fifteen years or something, so it is really important to get this stepped up. You have to understand how difficult this is. It takes four months. If you normally say that I need a camp, good; you have to get the water, if there is no water, there is no food, there is nothing, there is no way to get there. Okay, so if you want to put 250 people at the campsite and feed them, feed them healthy. How long does it take to put up a campsite? Three to four months, and you cannot go 20,000 the same week, or just 15,000. So probably to get that number out there, I believe it would be enough to provide a different political environment in Darfur, to create more security and make it more likely to go home. That would probably take a year, when the UN has done its job.

Now to be fair to the UN, the UN now has deployed about 100,000 troops abroad. How many are in Iraq? 130,000, right? Isn’t the Pentagon a little more capable than the UN for this? That is a long term issue that does not relate to Sudan, but I think you if have to live in a chaotic world, you have to stabilize the situation before it turns against you.

The third part of the challenge in Darfur is the political dialogue. Even if you had not thought that they hate each other, and they will not talk to each other, you got a problem. Now, again, maybe this is the hardest part. There was a peace agreement negotiated last year, and one party says, “I don’t want to sign it” on the last day. And since then, the situation frankly got worse, and has become more atomized; it is very hard to know if somebody is going to say “I’m a commander, I have a hundred guys who run around with me,” why don’t you work with them. It is not that sense of hierarchy; again, it is a different society. And it is very difficult to break out of this. The government tries to do the right thing by going to get ‘onezies’ and ‘twozies’, but I
do not think you ever get political or emotional closure. The masses of people in the camps are more and more disaffected and the eternal socialist things are more at edge.

The UN and the African Union are supposed to help bring parties together for mediation. There are efforts being made at this all the time. I tell my staff, I want you to do anything you can to help them get these amenities together and it is a group of staff they say probably on Thursday for a meeting. They all look at me and say; they all think the meetings are just three days away. And this has been going on now for a couple of months. So it is just difficult because it is an atomized society and we lost that sense of judicial authority that you can say if I had to get in touch with Europe, who do I call? Can you imagine in Darfur, please?

Q. Let us move on to the North-South divide in Sudan, and the process leading up to the CPA.

A: The main historical challenge in Sudan is not Khartoum and Darfur, it is Khartoum and the South. It is the North-South divide. And this is a war that went on mostly 50 years. It is certainly gone on for the last 20 years from 1980 to 2000, with 100,000 people almost every year. That is 2000 people.…..

This is ridiculous. We say Darfur is genocide. We never say southern Sudan is genocide. I am not trying to get anything changed in history. I do not understand it. I just don’t. So, that is a really major conflict, and President Bush, at the beginning of his administration made a decision that he would like to have his administration try and negotiate a solution. And he appointed Jack Dansforth and four years later, they have a peace agreement. And whatever happens with it, I think that it was courageous and it was right that we did this not alone; we did this with Sudanese North and South and we did this to solve a severe crisis.

Q: How do you see CPA implementation advancing?

A: It has just been two years after the peace agreement, and a lot of things are better. In Southern Sudan, finally we are starting to see economic change on a very low basis. The Southern Sudanese are getting a share of the National Revenue from the government there; the first two years have been a billion dollars a year. Less probably even likelier to get out of the grievance, that is because of the large border problems and sanctions, because the borders must have been delineated in the areas of dispute they had gotten the sanctions from the areas of dispute. It happens that a lot of the oil that are in the areas of dispute.

So, there has been a lot of change in the South on the economic side, which is largely positive. On the security side there are more problems. There have been some things that are positive, the North has about 75% of its troops down in the south; it is something like 73%, so they are working on that. The North is supposed to fully evacuate the South by this summer. It is out of most of the garrisons in the deep South. But there are some areas that are problematic; both sides, to some extent, continue to support militias. They are not supposed to do this. The North is a more active supporter for militias than the South. They are supposed to form joint integrated units, that is, battalions that will have some in the North, and some in the South. By and large, they are formed, they are just separate but they are formed, created as units.
So on the security side, I would say, they are a little bit behind schedule, but it took so long to negotiate that and Washington to negotiate as well.

On the political side, again, formally they have done what was agreed to on the structures that have governed the national unity. In Khartoum, they have new state structures as well as in the South in the Government of South Sudan. But for the road ahead, I have questions. Because, the next thing that is supposed to happen is there is supposed to be a census in the North and South, which will lay the basis for the national elections, no later than January 2009. That is probably what they are doing and the AU as well as other international agencies are suppose to help. But there is still not a major effort to fix it.

Q: Do you believe scheduled upcoming elections are on track?

A: The major effort is for the Sudanese to have elections before having a census, which is what is been done, it is good; life is not perfect out there. That is important to realize. But I do not think you can get either the census on time, or elections on time, or the decision not to have a census, unless the international community tries to legitimize the role of the Sudanese. I think the global community is very important, because if there is going to be an alternative to this, we need to determine the process of which that might happen. Again, by 2011, there should be, the Southerners have the right to a referendum to decide whether or not they would like to be united part of Sudan.

Q: What will be required for the scheduled 2011 referendum actually to take place?

A: If you do not have an election in two years, what are the odds you do not have the referendum in four years that meets a peaceful solution in one way or another? In two years, it is pretty important and my own view is, if you needed help to negotiate something, don’t you need help to implement it? Isn’t it easier to implement it than it is to negotiate it? I don’t think so. I think usually it is harder to actually give something money. So I think there may be some more attention needed.

Q: What will be the most productive role for the U.S. to play in the time leading up to elections?

A: Sudan is important. It is a country in that part of the world that doubled its economy in six years. “Foreign Policy” magazine last year selected Sudan as “the world’s leading failed state.” It might be failing in Darfur. It might be failing in Juba. It is not failing in Khartoum. And sure it has the highest growth rate of any country in Africa, except a few; certainly it has a better growth rate than any of its neighbors. Why, if you are worried about stability, would not you want Sudan to be successful? Because it has the ability to be a success. Now I think that’s important to recognize in a dangerous volatile part of the world. Take Somalia, or Ethiopia, or Eritrea. Sudan has the ability to be more stable, the capacity to be more stable, if it gets some things set in place.

This administration, particularly President Bush’s speech to the Union, promotes the idea that democracy is a value everywhere. In Sudan, regarding the prospects of democracy, if the North and the South stay in the same body politic, it is good. Why? Because then they have to deal with each other. There has to be an effort for an adherence to rules and to tolerance for others,
allowing the larger political body to be successful. This is what John Garang referred to as “The New Sudan,” his vision of a new Sudan. And this is the policy that President Bush addressed to our government; I don’t know if it will be successful, but it is the right policy to back.

There are other policies. There are people in Sudan and I think there are probably some people in Washington who would like a two-Sudan policy. They say “I like Sudan so much, why can’t there be two of them!”

I don’t know. I am an American. I think secession has its issues and I think it would have issues in Sudan too. But that is a decision for the Sudanese. And there are people who say well, “I like Sudan the way it is, but I don’t like that government.” They want a new government. Then you’ve got to go back, when are you going to get this new government? Is it going to be a new government that excludes the people from the three tribes that provide 75% of the officers of the government now? I do not believe in that world, I’m sorry. That would be a nice idea for the government that is there, I am just saying what is the realistic story?

And of course, you can take the Chinese for instance. You can say “it is none of my business.” I think that’s very hard for the United States. So, I would just say, in the end, in my own remarks, no matter how difficult it is, I am completely comfortable with what we are trying to do is correct. I think, at times with the demands for success, we don’t manage to deliver the means for the demands, but I think the efforts are in the right direction.

Q You have described the resolutions and the policies of the John Garang process. If the process does not prevail by 2011, what would be your recommendation of how to proceed?

A: By 2011, the Sudanese will have spoken, and by that time they should help them find out the means, to patch together or something. I think the true question is how involved are we now and what are we going to do now? I would go back to the agreement, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. They negotiated it for two and a half years, it is an important document, but it is not the Quran, and it is not the Bible, it is a document negotiated by people. If anything in it is all right, it is up to the Sudanese to make all the decisions themselves, but I think it is fair just as people help them get to the altar, but sometimes friends stay around. I think it is in our interest to see whatever happens, happens peacefully. And I think that there is still a long way; there are a lot of things to do, it is not about the things. It is whether or not, however they make their decisions, such as defining the borders and having an understanding with what happens to the oil revenues, both sides have an interest in negotiating things on security questions. So I think our main role should be to be involved again and not to make it at a technical level, it is too difficult for dealing with the issues there.

Q. Within the diplomatic community in America in general, do we have an adequate understanding of the ethnic differences, do you have a sense that we are as educated as you might want us to be?

A: There is only one correct answer to this question. I do not know, I admitted that when I met a Sudanese, I could not tell if they were Arab or African. I appreciate, I should say that it is important for them, but that does not mean I adequately understand it. I think I would be
cautious in assuming that I have to be responsible for designing solutions for the Sudanese, I think Sudanese are capable of designing some solutions for the Sudanese. If again they are encouraged, given us an aspect of some of the context in which that would become more feasible. But I also wonder, do I want to live in a world where the average American has to understand those things? No, I would rather live in a world where the Sudanese can understand those things, and does not end up in “Foreign Policy” as a leading failed state, does not have six million people who are internally displaced, and live in a happier environment. That is what I would aim for. But more understanding is better, yes.

Q. You have commented about ethnic divides, can you comment on the gender factors in the political makeup of the country?

A: We are not getting any of the results we aimed at. So, I might not be the right one to say what I think is the right thing, or you might think it is the right thing, I think the openness in society, like in a society like Darfur and Khartoum, to come together again in a peaceful dialogue, is good. But that should not mean that we should not be trying to do peaceful things to empower people to be involved in their own dialogues with other people in the society. To help them find their own way home without insisting on what the consequences are. I think there are just some things that are right to do, values that are not offensive to others, and you should do them without getting the opportunities of failure.

Q: It seems that the government, particularly the Government of President Bashir is resisting outside guidance. Without actually having troops in Sudan, how will we get past that kind of a hurdle?

A: I recognize the people of Khartoum, they are all mostly on the side of the mind. They do not like the idea of foreigners coming in. Now, in Darfur, if you get the opportunity to be there on a regular basis, the people in Darfur are not part of the power structure, the people in Darfur love the idea of people there. So when you are asked if the Arabs would like to get more Africans. You don’t want Africans when you are in Africa. No! You want Japanese or Americans to come in.

Now, how do we get them in? Well, let’s go back to the failing state structure. You have to get them in by getting President Bashir to think they are not a threat to him. This makes it a little more difficult. If your main goal is purely to put people under sanctions, no, because you are making it more difficult to give aid to people who are actually stuck there. This is just a personal thing; I’m a little more for peace immediately than justice. And if you have to make it not threatening, I think that the UN, frankly, they have not arrested as many people from the North than in the South, I do not see it as a threat. Fear is not one of the more rational emotions, so you have to acknowledge if somebody has a fear, they do have the right to fear. I would often refer to the UN coming in with a main goal. If you look at its power structures, the UN helps states; the members of the UN are states. The members of the Human Rights Council are states. They are not farmers. They are concerned about power; states need to be people more than the rights of people being the states. That is the way the UN works. I wish President Bashir understood that. I think from his standpoint, he sees the UN being in New York, New York as being in the United States, and he sees it as a cover of a neo-colonial enterprise. He has said that he would accept
whatever number of troops the African Union and the UN agreed on, because of technical assessments, not if the inter-government provided the technical.

He has said that he would accept troops doing any support functions, he also said that he would only accept a system that would form battalions, in other words battalions that suggest that you have this particular neighborhood to take care of in Africa.

What would I do? I would make an effort to get the UN to extradite the deployment of forces, that way you could get up to maybe 10,000, maybe 20,000 troops from Africa, and maybe 4,000 would be in the support category. We have adapted 16,000… At this point we’re up to 14,000 and better off than before.

So, we could insist on solving all of those problems before we do anything, and that would be more convenient for us. But a hell of a lot harder.

Q: Could you address the China issue a bit more? Here we have a country that extensively had a lot of influence in Sudan; it is the biggest importer of Sudan’s revenues. And yet, China does not seem involved in anything that is going on inside the country. Do you hear any differently from Hu Jintau’s visit to Khartoum in the last year? Does the United States expect China to do anything more than important oil?

A: To be fair to the Chinese, they have peacekeepers there in Sudan. The Chinese policy is basically a classical foreign policy. They deal with states at stake, and not only with their imperial interests, they respect the South to develop their state. That is a very classical policy, good power is more or less the interest of the state. I think the world we live in today is the opposite policy. And I think that in the case of Sudan, the Chinese have shifted to some extent. They were in Sudan in November and they came up with a proposal and agreed to it. My understanding is that they mentioned the issue to some extent, but I would say more on the guise of counseling the Sudanese friends as to what they think is a sensible way to do things and not to make everybody mad, not to refuse everyone!

That is more like that than it is with our policy, where we have sanctions against Sudan. We have no credit in Sudan, that is our problem. I do not think that we can stop our trade so that others cannot eat food, but we are not stopping anything. So we have very limited influence in some ways on the policies there. The Sudanese supposedly have shifted their economic strategies overseas so they focus on having trade and investments from Malaysia, India, and China. The South represses their own on the subject of sanctions. There are sanctions policies that repress the Sudanese from the opportunity to get out of country. But since they have a 13% rate of economic growth, they are not that irritated because it is not failing.

Q: Are sanctions effective as a rule, in altering governments’ behavior and policies?

A: This question is speculative. You cannot do a laboratory experiment without taking off the sanction. I do not think it is significant of taking the sanctions off a year ago; the South would be in a different place. If you’re sitting in a course on a boat doing navigation, and one course has you sailing off to a twelve o’clock, and the next course has you sailing off to one o’clock, in and
out, it does not make much difference. One to two or three years makes a difference. And I think that is where I am sure that the lack of US and military comes into play.

I am meeting with some of these people, and before I came back, one person inquired “Can you explain this to me? I cannot get land rover for a good price anymore. And I went to a land rover and they said that they have been told by Ford that they cannot buy anything.” But they said that the land rover is made in Canada, there not made in the U.S., I’ll check. It violates no U.S. law to export cars from the UK to Sudan. So I went and I asked and they said, Because we were told that the SEC was going to launch an investigation in Sudan. Because they thought that allowing land rover to sell cars in Sudan causes volatility in the crisis. It is completely legal. And they said, we are in the South. We would than stop selling any land rovers. Okay, if they are pestered with politics like this, Oxfam would be able to get parts for full a year. Not just for a British ambassador. The U.S., what they do, is that they go and get somebody in Saudi Arabia to buy.

Why? I do not know the answer to this. Why does Coca Cola sell Coke or Pepsi products? Or the Caterpillar? Why should the Sudanese Government be granted to look at the possibility of exemptions for the sanctions for railroads and motor parts and increase whole capacity of general locomotives? This was rejected. It was the easiest way to increase imports to Darfur and the South. The Sudanese make up to 90 locomotives from the Chinese. The Caterpillar is coming to them.

These things have a negative influence, of course they do, because they create; look at the Ford company, any American would admit, even though they file legislation, that the Congress gets the pick on legislation; the administration and the regulations aren’t sure of anything. But think of all that insecurity. Who is going to investigate the money? The idea that somebody at the SEC would publish some article; I think it has a significant impact and I think this election will also be very significant.

Q: What are the prospects for the future?

A: Sudan is a huge country. They have used only a fraction of water coming from the Nile River. The South is a huge area. I think there is a limit of how many cows they have in Darfur. But if you view it in the macro-level the entire country is close to a spark plug for the current time.

They also invest a lot in education. I think there are twenty different universities in Khartoum. I think the South has a long way to go, but I am clearly not struck by the idea that this is not possible; this is a possible country, if they have different political structures. So, to be fair, I am not saying something that would be alien with a conversation in Khartoum. There are people in Sudan who are more closed, and do not want to be a part of a larger unity so much; they want more traditional style of life. But there are also many people including many elites, who sense that they can be the elites in a truly successful country. And they sense if only we can solve our internal problems and be somewhat more open. They see that the growth in their economies come from the fact that they trade with others. So you have multiple different occurrences going at the same time. The challenge for the Sudanese politicians, or Americans who come to Sudan,
highly accentuates the positive, and that is the challenge. I do not see their economy collapsing. They invested, particularly via Khartoum, and trade has never been blocked.