

United States Institute of Peace
Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Sudan Experience Project

Interview # 49 – Executive Summary

Interviewed by: W. Haven North
Initial interview date: December 14, 2006
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The Interviewee is currently the USAID Director for Southern Sudan and Deputy Mission Director on assignment in Juba. He has a long personal history with Sudan going back to 1966 when he was with the Peace Corps in Gambela, Ethiopia on the border with Sudan where he assisted the many Sudanese refugees who had settled there. Subsequently, he traveled over 3000 miles in Sudan filming for NBC and doing research on conditions in southern Sudan for the World Council of Churches.

He traveled with the Anyanya Movement and Dr. John Garang. He was well acquainted with Dr. Garang and Garang's his views, work, and vision for Sudan. Garang's view was that Sudan is an Afro-Arab country; the way to solve the issues of the south and the other disenfranchised groups (the Nuba, the Funj, the Fur, the Beja and the Nubians) is to recognize the rights of all citizens of Sudan to equal treatment in a secular democracy. His vision, brilliance and articulation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) issues were important to the negotiation of the issues between the North and the South. He believed that the CPA would bring peace and stability; it was important for the people learn how to make government transparent and accountable. He was active in promoting and explaining the CPA among the southern community.

The importance of dealing with corruption was promoted by the work of Robert Klitgaard, an authority on the subject; Klitgaard traveled in southern Sudan holding seminars on corruption.

The worldwide attention on Darfur has led to the feeling that the South is proceeding adequately because it has its peace agreement. There are serious issues of commitment to the implementation of the CPA on the part of the Khartoum government, such as the North/South boundary issues.

On the prospects for the CPA and Sudan, the interviewee is hopeful because the foundations are well laid; the need to emphasize the importance of adhering to the implementation and not giving up is critical for the country. If the CPA can work in the South, then it can give confidence for the Darfur Peace Agreement and the Eastern Peace Agreement. The world community should continue efforts to support the South and its development; the levels of expectations are enormous; the constraints to development are also enormous re infrastructure, governance and capacity.

The interviewee concludes that the outcome of the referendum will be overwhelmingly in favor of an independent Southern Sudan. “I cannot honestly remember any single southern Sudanese who has ever said anything else other than that. This means that Doctor John’s exhortation to the North to understand its responsibility to very assertively demonstrate why unity should be attractive was not just to say it, but to live it.”

The fundamental lesson learned has been the importance of putting everything on the table no matter how long it takes, and not to do so in a rushed fashion. The CPA is a magnificent document and provides the way forward. Important issues are the challenge of the “three areas,” and dealing with capacity, governance, and southern infrastructure.

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Q: Tell us about the work you are doing and your association with Sudan and particularly with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

A: I am here as the director of USAID for Southern Sudan and I am also the Deputy Mission Director for USAID Sudan. I have taken up my assignment in Juba a little over three weeks ago, but I have been involved with settling up what was called the Sudan Field Office of USAID in Nairobi since November 2003. Up to that point I was Mission Director in USAID Zambia, based out of Lusaka. In 2003, as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was in the process of being negotiated, and it looked like there would be a successful resolution of the agreement, Andrew Natsios, our Administrator of USAID wanted to bring the various spigots of USAID assistance to Sudan, particularly to the South and to the transition areas, under one management structure. He has been exceptionally committed to Sudan and the issues that are facing this country. By 2003, Sudan was already the largest USAID program in all of Africa. Most of the assistance was humanitarian assistance.

Darfur had not reached the level of crisis that it is today, but there was, even back then, assistance to Darfur. But there was a major humanitarian assistance program to Southern Sudan through the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), an enormous Food for Peace (FFP) program. There was the beginning of an Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) program. All these were under the rubric of the DCHA funding. There was also a significant Development Assistance program (DA) that had been run out of what was called the Regional Economic Development Support Office (REDSO) in Nairobi, which is now USAID/East Africa. There were assistance programs in education, in health, in economic activities and some support for infrastructure and fledgling support for democracy and governance, preparing for the transition of the Southern People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) to the Government of Southern Sudan.

So all of these were managed independently of each other. In preparation for eventually re-establishing a full USAID mission in Sudan, Andrew Natsios, USAID Administrator, wanted to bring them all into one management structure, based in Nairobi, in what was then called the Sudan Field Office. We could not call it a mission because we were outside Sudan, even though we were managing programs from Nairobi in Sudan.

This came at the time when there was an authorized departure in Kenya in 2003. (There had been an incident with the attempted shooting down of an Israeli airliner flying out of Mombasa; there was an attack on a tourist hotel on the Kenya coast, following, several years previously, the embassy bombings in Kenya. Because of the continued concerns about security under those conditions, there was an attempt to reduce the American footprint, which had been significant, in Kenya.) The impetus to create a Sudan Field Office based in Nairobi while everybody else was reducing the size of its staffs was a contradiction that we had to deal with. In the first tranche of people there, in terms of U.S. direct hire, were only two, myself as the director and another official came in as the first program officer.

In fact, the peace agreement took longer to negotiate than we had anticipated at that point. There was belief that by 2004 the peace would be negotiated, and there would be the opportunity to move into Sudan. It took place a year later and so we have been in the process of moving in.

I was asked to take on this assignment, because my personal history is a long one that goes back to 1966. I went to Ethiopia as a Peace Corps volunteer in the summer of 1966, and I ended up being assigned as a teacher in Gambela in western Ilubabor province, as it was called at that point. There were about twenty thousand refugees from Upper Nile, from the first civil war that went from 1955 to 1972. When I went to Gambela as a teacher, my assignment was to work as the first Peace Corps volunteer in that area, at the Ethiopian government school, which went up through the eighth grade. Grades one through six were taught in the Amharic language. I was the English instructor for those lower grades. We had four students in grade seven, where English became the language of instruction; we had no students at all in the eighth grade. There were many, many southern Sudanese who were refugees in the Gambela district who really wanted to go to school.

Gambela is the last navigable point on the Baro-Sobat river complex, which flows into the White Nile at Malakal. During the dry season Gambela was at the bottom of a 5,000 foot high escarpment, because of Ethiopia's mountainous and enormous plateaus. Ethiopia's coffee from the western provinces would be harvested in the dry season and brought down by either human porters or donkeys, down that escarpment and deposited in very large coffee warehouses that were in Gambela in the dry season. Then in the wet season, when the river would rise sufficiently to allow these great paddle wheeled Mississippi River-type steamboats to come up from Malakal, they would take the coffee out. During the first war, the Anyanya War that ran from '55 to '72, by the early 1960s the Anyanya was attacking the steamboats, so Ethiopia stopped exporting its coffee out through Gambela. In one sense, Gambela became kind of a ghost town, except for the presence of many, many refugees.

At that point there were Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia and there were also Ethiopian refugees in Sudan. Neither government wanted to officially recognize the presence of refugees from the other country in their state, because each did not want to have a large UNHCR program that recognized there were issues that forced people to leave. So there

was not a great response, in terms of UNHCR programs, at that point that could assist refugees in Ethiopia —Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia. But the All-Africa Conference of Churches out of Nairobi was interested in supporting Sudanese education needs in Ethiopia. They had a modest scholarship program in Addis Ababa but that was problematical in some senses, because it was difficult for southern Sudanese to go to school in Ethiopia, given the reception that they often faced in Ethiopia at that point. As I learned about the All-Africa Conference of Churches' interest in supporting education for southern Sudanese, I wrote to them and made a proposal that they rent one of these coffee warehouses and I would turn it into a hostel for the southern Sudanese. They approved the program. Peace Corps had no objection, as long as my primary responsibility as a volunteer was to teach; the Ethiopian education ministry was happy with my performance as a teacher. Peace Corps volunteers are encouraged to engage in community development activities, so this was what I did.

I moved into the warehouse with about 150 southern Sudanese. We had two big rooms. We got some burlap sacks and stuffed them with elephant grass to make mattresses. I had sufficient funds to buy everybody a tee shirt, shorts and pair of flip-flops and school notebooks, and we had money for food. Living with the refugees in the hostel, I was with these folks for 24 hours a day, because I taught them during the day and administered the hostel. I ended up actually extending for a third year in order to encourage the Ethiopian teachers at the school to take over the administration of the hostel, because the hostel was not a Peace Corps program; it was an independent program. In fact, the Ethiopian teachers did take over the management of the refugee hostel. That was in 1969.

As I was completing my Peace Corps service, I was approached by the southern Sudanese from the Anyanya movement, the equivalent of the Southern Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLA) in the first conflict, because many of my students were members of the Anyanya. Some of them had been wounded during the conflict; they came out to Ethiopia to seek medical treatment and in recuperation they took advantage of the fact there were educational opportunities there, because schools had been closed for several years in southern Sudan. So everybody was hungry for education.

They asked what I was going to do, now that I was completing my Peace Corps service and I said I planned to go back and try and go to law school in the States. I was asked if I would come inside, into the bush with the Anyanya, to travel with them, walk with them, in Upper Nile and be a witness to what was going on in the conflict and then be able to provide publicity and to get some humanitarian assistance.

When I finished my Peace Corps service, unbeknownst to the Peace Corps, instead of going directly back to the States I spent ten weeks walking with the Anyanya movement in Upper Nile, from the Gambela area almost to Malakal. I saw terrible things: villages that were destroyed by Egyptian MiG jets, cattle camps that had been raided, the ragtag guerilla army in training. I had my personal camera with me; I took pictures and on my way to the States I stopped in Europe, I went to Geneva to the Red Cross, to the World Council of Churches, to any organization that I thought would listen and told them what I had seen.

At that time, in 1969, the civil war in Nigeria was going on between eastern Nigeria, which called itself Biafra, and the Nigerian federal government. The World Council of Churches had launched the first large-scale ecumenical cross-border humanitarian assistance program. They turned a road into Uli airstrip and brought in significant amounts of humanitarian relief, because Biafra was a humanitarian catastrophe. But they recognized that what was going on in southern Sudan was at least equally as serious, except there was very little that was known. Biafra got the world's press attention, because it was accessible and people responded to the need for humanitarian assistance there.

The World Council of Churches said they were interested in finding out the feasibility of doing something in Sudan. They asked if I would go back into the bush and do an assessment of the Anyanya movement and their willingness and capability of fairly and equitably distributing humanitarian relief supplies. They also asked me to go to Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and what was then called Zaire, to work through the national Christian councils of those countries to ask them to approach their ministries of foreign affairs to find a government that would be willing to turn a blind eye, to look the other way, if a humanitarian relief program could be launched. But because I am an American and the United States has a member agency in the World Council of Churches, which is Church World Service (CWS), the World Council of Churches asked, since I was going back to the States with my return Peace Corps ticket anyway, if I could go through New York and Church World Service would do a contract with me. So I came back to the States and went to CWS. While there I also approached NBC-TV.

Before I went to Ethiopia as a Peace Corps volunteer, I was chairman of the anti-apartheid committee when I was at the University of California at Berkeley as an undergrad and we did public education about liberation issues in southern Africa in the San Francisco Bay area. One of the most effective tools to raise peoples' awareness and consciousness of what was going on in southern Africa was an NBC-TV film that they had made called *Angola, A Journey To A War*, where they had sent in one of their Africa correspondents at the beginning of the liberation struggle that the Angolans launched against Portuguese colonialism. It was a very powerful and compelling film. I went to the producer of that film and I said, "I know that you have done this sort of thing before, because I used your film to teach people about these kind of issues in southern Africa. Here is what is happening in southern Sudan. Why not you do the same thing there?" And NBC became interested in doing a film, so they asked if I would be the go-between, between NBC and the Anyanya movement.

So I contacted the Anyanya and said, "Listen, you want humanitarian assistance and you want publicity. Do you agree that I can come back and assess your situation, to see if it is feasible to launch a humanitarian assistance program and will you answer these questions honestly and straightforwardly for the World Council of Churches? Do you agree that I can bring NBC-TV to do a film?" And they said, "Yes, that is why we asked you come in the first place. So the answer to both questions is "please come back as quickly as you can."

NBC's Africa correspondent had actually been killed the year before in Congo, so they did not have an Africa correspondent anymore. When they asked around the various film crews they could not find anybody who wanted to take on this assignment, so they asked me if I would do the film. I had never even seen a movie camera, this was before videotape, incidentally, so I said, "Thank you for asking but I cannot do that, because I do not know anything about cinematography." There was a program in those days on NBC called *First Tuesday*, which was network television, before CNN, network television's first attempt at a news magazine documentary kind of format; it was two hours on the first Tuesday of each month and they had six, seven or eight different eclectic documentary topics. Subsequently CBS came up with *Sixty Minutes*, which was that kind of format, shortened to one hour, on a weekly basis. But *First Tuesday* was NBC's attempt at doing this.

I do not remember what they had said their experience was with a domestic group, where it would have been very intrusive for them to have sent a film crew to do the story of whatever this American group was and so they trained some people from that group in Super 8 photography. Super 8 cameras are kind of like instamatic movie cameras, where you just pull the trigger and you do not have to worry about gadgets and stuff. So they showed me a Super 8 camera. It did not have a sound capacity but they said, "When you film with a Super 8 camera, here is a little tape recorder. When you pull the trigger for the movie camera, set the tape recorder on the ground and get the background noise and we will assemble all this together."

So they gave me half a dozen rolls of film and said, "Go out to New York City and shoot some movies, see if you have an eye for a camera." So I went out to Central Park where there was an anti-Vietnam War demonstration and I filmed that. I brought the film to NBC and they looked at it and said, "Okay, you are kind of a natural photographer. Do not use the zoom lens too much, because when you use it quickly it is blurry. Do not pan the camera, because that is also hard to follow. But other than that your technique is pretty good."

So they gave me two cameras and two tape recorders and a ticket back to Africa. I told the church groups about the concurrent film that I would be making for NBC, but I did not tell NBC about the concurrent research for the World Council of Churches, because you do not want to publicize a cross-border humanitarian relief program unnecessarily. So in 1970 I went in through Uganda, after going to Ethiopia, Kenya and Zaire on behalf of the church groups. I spent about another ten weeks walking from central Equatoria, up near the Uganda-Congo-Sudan border into central Equatoria, crossed the Nile and went to Joseph Lagu's headquarters. He was the head of the Anyanya at that point, in 1970.

And what I saw in Equatoria province was very different from Upper Nile. Upper Nile was flat flood plain, pastoral Nilotic cattle camps, people involved in transhumance. Equatoria was much more forested, more tropical, sedentary agriculturalists, mountains, beautiful area but very different from the experience in southern Sudan that I knew between Gambela and Upper Nile. While I was there, I met the commander for Bahr el

Ghazal and he invited me to travel with him to Bahr el Ghazal. I had run out of film at that point and said I had to go back to New York, but, if I can convince NBC to let me come back, I would love to go up to Bahr el Ghazal, because, as he described it, I could understand that it was more similar to Upper Nile.

So when I went back to New York NBC wanted to make a film with the footage that I brought back from Equatoria, but I asked them, "Please let me go back once more, because I will bring some footage that will be even better than this." I spent five months in 1971, walked from where Congo and Uganda and Sudan meet, near Aba, all the way, almost up to Abyei. Altogether in those three trips, I walked about three thousand miles. The Anyanya had no vehicles, as the SPLM/SPLA did, so everything was on foot. As we went up to Bahr el Ghazal, the Anyanya attacked the railroad line and I showed them blowing that up.

When I brought the film footage back, NBC assigned a professional editor to work with me. It was hard, reducing all those hours and hours of footage down to 15 minutes, but that is the primetime television time that I was allotted. My film was shown in September 1971 for 15 minutes. It showed what life was like for the civilian population on the run. We did, by the way, get a cross-border humanitarian relief program, mostly involving medical supplies, through Uganda.

Q: What precisely were you filming?

A: Everything that I saw. What life was like for the civil population where the southern Sudan provisional government in the bush tried to provide simple social services, whether it was a school under a tree where kids are drawing with their finger in the ground or fledgling medical emergency services or these illegal markets that the Anyanya set up or the courts that they tried, using traditional legal systems, to provide some sense of order; and then the Anyanya itself. I was in some conflict situations with them. I showed them blowing up the railroad in Wau, showed them in training, showed their interaction with people, with the civilian population, a helicopter that they had shot down from the Sudanese Army. It was all from a southern Sudanese perspective, because I had no visa when I went in. From the perspective of the Sudanese government, I was in the country without a visa, but I was traveling with the Anyanya and under their protection for the nearly a year that I was with them.

NBC loved the film. They said, "Listen, let us do another film" because they had no Africa correspondent. They said, "If the next film turns out like this one, you have got a job as our Africa correspondent." I got into an argument with them, because they wanted to do a film about the Peace Corps in Africa and I love the Peace Corps. I recruited for the Peace Corps for a year before I went overseas as a volunteer. I organized a Peace Corps recruiting team on the Berkeley campus, where we had 1200 people apply that year from Berkeley for the Peace Corps. I extended for a year in Ethiopia. They agreed with the work that I did with refugees, even though the embassy had said Peace Corps volunteers should not be involved in that. Peace Corps told the embassy as long as the Ethiopian government is pleased, then they are pleased. So I think very highly of the

Peace Corps. But that is an American story. I told NBC I would rather go and spend a couple of months with Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, who is an African hero that people in the United States did not really understand and know enough about him to recognize what a heroic figure he was in Africa. Now, thirty years later I understand Julius Nyerere's economic policies maybe were not the best thing for Tanzania, but he was still a hero; he should have been heard loudly and clearly by us in the United States.

So NBC and I argued about that and before we could conclude that the Addis Ababa peace agreement came in February 1972. Because of my experiences working with refugees and because of the unique experiences I had in the bush with the Anyanya, the World Council of Churches asked if I would go to Bahr el Ghazal, to Wau, to help resettle refugees and help organize the reconstruction of schools and clinics that were destroyed during the war. I told NBC thanks but no thanks. Having seen Sudan in conflict, I would much rather help them in this time of peace, since peace finally came.

Obviously that was the right move, because I met my wife in Sudan. She had been a nurse in Harlem Hospital, in the emergency ward, wanted to serve on the continent. She does not like bureaucratic forms; when she wrote to the Peace Corps, the application was four pages long. Church World Service was one page, so she filled that out. We met in October '72 in Khartoum as I was stuck there for a month before they would let me go back down to the South. She was stuck there for a month, because when she arrived the Ministry of Health in Juba — she was going to be the matron of Juba Hospital — was so eager for her to get there they had not even thought where she was going to live. It took them a month to organize a tent. So we met during that month, we were both stuck in Khartoum. I am glad I said no to NBC News and came to Sudan.

I was in Wau from 1972 to 1974, during that postwar emergency relief and rehabilitation period. That was a time when peace first came to Sudan at the end of the first conflict. I had the good fortune of being in Sudan at that time. It was thrilling to see peace after 17 years of conflict, where there had been one and two million people who perished during that civil war. There was the second war that started in 1983.

Q: Let us talk about the beginnings of the CPA negotiations. What led to the being of the CPA?

A: Let me back up, because it is important to understand what the Addis Ababa peace agreement achieved and what it did not, and the objectives of the Anyanya conflict and the SPLM approach to the same issues, because it is all part of the same fifty years of history between North and South. The Addis Ababa agreement ended the conflict. It established a regional government in the South. But it was negotiated very quickly. The subsequent peace agreement that became the various protocols that formed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement after the second war took a great deal of time to negotiate and issues were identified and hammered out in far greater detail than they were in the Addis Ababa agreement.

The Addis agreement established a regional government, but it really did not deal with economic issues. There was not any real revenue generating authority that the regional government had. They relied on handouts and allowances from Khartoum, which I guess was okay until they discovered oil.

Several years after the peace agreement was signed in 1972, by the mid-Seventies, after I left in 1974, oil was discovered in the South and President Nimeiri's response to that was to try to redraw the borders between North and South. He carved out the area where the oil was in Unity state and said, "This is now part of the North." The southern Sudanese said, "Maybe that is not completely ours, but you cannot just redraw the borders like that, because, the borders at January 1, 1956, when independence came, were clearly defined and Unity is in the South, it is not in the North."

So they protested and in response Nimeiri shredded the peace agreement. Then, he eventually dissolved the regional government and, of course, people protested that. He slapped on sharia as the basis of law in Sudan and things went from bad to worse. By 1983, when the mutiny at Bor took place, very clearly things had deteriorated in the years since independence. John Garang, whom I had met as an Anyanya officer, a junior officer, late in the first civil war, was a very high-ranking officer in the Sudanese Army, from Bor himself.

When I was in Wau, during that two year post-conflict cooling off period, one of the major differences between the Addis Ababa agreement and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was that the Addis agreement saw the integration of the Anyanya into the Sudanese Army, whereas the Comprehensive Peace Agreement at least during the interim period recognizes two standing armies and joint integrated units, but the SPLA and Sudanese Armed Forces are equally Sudanese military. That was not the case in the Addis agreement. But they also recognized it would be pretty hard to completely integrate immediately, so there was a two year cooling off period. For example, in Wau, which was then capital of Bahr el Ghazal, the Sudanese Army units from the North were on the northern side of the city and 12 kilometers south of Wau, at a place called Busseri, an old Catholic mission station, were the Anyanya units.

At Busseri, there were schools and clinics that were destroyed during the war, so the Sudan Council of Churches had organized reconstruction teams and we were repairing those facilities. I would go down to Busseri every Friday to make the payroll and I would see John Garang there. I had met him before the war ended and so we would talk for a couple hours every Friday when I went there. I remember one time he said, "Next time you come to Busseri you are going to see a difference here." I said, "What are you talking about?" He said, "You'll see next Friday."

The subsequent Wednesday, before the next Friday, there was a very bright full moon and in the middle of the night, when you could see clearly, John Garang and the other junior officers there, who were very disturbed by the fact that for each former Anyanya rebel soldier staying at Busseri, there were probably 15 to 20 extended family hangers-on who came to eat. They were lingering there because the Anyanya people were being

given food handouts by the Sudanese Army, north of Wau. The people came as extended family to benefit from that. John Garang was upset by this, because, he said, "There is peace. There is no reason for people to be here. They can go back and cultivate their own fields. That is what they should do." But nobody was doing that, so he and the other junior officers woke people up, got them out in the fields, pulled these weeds up to prepare the fields for cultivation in the morning. In the morning people were saying, "We did not come here to work. We came here to eat. If we have to cultivate fields, we might as well go back to our own areas and plow our own fields." That was his point. And they did; they left and the Sudanese Army saw what was going on.

Garang got each of the Anyanya units that remained there with the soldiers to compete to see which unit could grow the best yields of sorghum in these fields that they could now cultivate. So they pulled him out of there because they thought that he was being a rabble-rouser and sent him somewhere else. Wherever they sent him he did something like that, because he is a charismatic person. He was concerned about issues of self-reliance with people working for themselves. So they moved him all over the South and wherever he went he did something like that. Finally, they ended up moving him to the North and he did that there, too. By 1977, they ran out of places to move him.

When I had first met John Garang, after he had just joined the Anyanya movement in 1970, he had been offered a full PhD scholarship to go to the United States, I believe it was Berkeley and he had come into the bush to say goodbye to friends and family and they told him, "Oh, you are going to go off and be an educational refugee and we will never see you again. We need people like you here in the bush." He heard that. So he wrote to the university and said, "I appreciate the scholarship but I cannot accept it. There is something I have to do." And he joined the Anyanya movement.

When the Sudanese Army could not find any more places to move him around, they said, "Didn't you want to get a PhD at one point?" And he said, "Yes." So they said, "Well, let us send you off for long term training" and he went to Iowa State University and he got his PhD there. That was the same year that, in 1977, I joined USAID. He heard that we were in Washington, so and he and Rebecca, his wife and their firstborn son, Mabior, came and spent Thanksgiving with us. Our firstborn also has a Dinka name. He is now in his last year of medical school in University of California San Francisco (UCSF).

Rebecca at that point spoke no English. She had never been out to Sudan or out of Africa. And Mabior was a couple of months older than our firstborn, but Washington in November is pretty cold and my wife could see that she was not sure about how to take care of a baby in a cold climate. She showed her pointers. We had a good time with them. They went on to Iowa, where it was a lot colder than Washington and during the short time they were there he got his PhD. They had another child. Rebecca learned English, took courses to get a GED high school equivalency and was admitted to Iowa State University herself. Just as smart as he was. They were an amazing couple.

When they came back in the early Eighties to Sudan, now the army had this southerner who also had a PhD and they did not know what to do with him. So they sent him to

work at the University of Khartoum, to set up a masters degree program in political economy and he worked there with Brian D'Silva. He and Doctor John were putting together this masters degree program in political economy in the spring of 1983. John and Rebecca were going to go down to Bor, where they were going to prepare their fields for cultivation and, in fact, Brian and his wife were going to go with them, as well. At the last minute they could not. When John went down to Bor, the Bor mutiny took place and he was asked by the Sudanese Army to try to quell this thing. Former Anyanya units were very upset and had taken up arms. Doctor John approached them and they said to him, "We bit off more than we could chew. You are the only one with the smarts to think this thing over. Take up the leadership of the movement." And he said, "On one condition: we change the terms of the argument."

The Anyanya War, which he was part of, had been a war of liberation, for the establishment of an independent black African southern Sudan, separate from the North. They did not achieve that. They fought to a stalemate and the result was the Addis Ababa agreement.

He said the terms of the argument needed to be changed. He said the issue is not really North versus South. If it is the North versus the South, the North is a larger portion of the country, has greater population. It would be difficult for the South to completely win that argument. He said, "So, therefore, what we do is look at the demographics of the country; 61 per cent of the Sudanese are Africans, 39 per cent are so-called Arabs. Sudan is clearly not an African country; it is not an Arab country, it is an Afro-Arab country. If 61 per cent of the country is African and the South is only a third of the country, where are the rest? "

He looked to the Nuba Mountains, to the Nuba people, to the Funj in southern Blue Nile, to the Fur and he was saying this in 1983, to the Fur in Darfur, to the Beja in the Red Sea hills, to the Nubians up near Egypt. He said, "All of these are African peoples who are just as disenfranchised as southern Sudanese. If their issues in the other parts of Sudan are as serious as the issues in the South, the way to resolve all of these issues is to recognize the rights of all citizens of Sudan to equal treatment in the country. So secular democracy is what we should be fighting for and that will ensure southern Sudanese, as well as all African peoples in the North, as well. So if you want me to lead the movement, this is what we will fight for a new Sudan. This did not resonate brilliantly among the Anyanyas, who were strongly separatist, but he said, "This is the only condition under which I will take over the movement" and so they swallowed hard and said, "Okay, that is what we will fight for."

And in fact, the concept of a New Sudan is what is behind the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The leadership and the vision and the brilliance in laying out all the various protocols that together came to form the CPA are due to his vision of Sudan and his ability to articulate these issues in a fashion that enabled them to be negotiated as they were.

Q: Why do you think the North decided to negotiate?

A: By that time, I was in Zambia when they did the Machakos Protocol. I heard about it and I was amazed that, in fact, that was negotiated and agreed. That was the principle behind the CPA, i.e., the recognition of the right of self-determination, which Khartoum had never recognized, up to that point. Because the SPLM was not defeated, because they had fought this thing to the stalemate that it was at, the realization by Khartoum, that given what was happening internationally and given the strength of the SPLM movement and the SPLA as an army, they had to do something. When they came to the principles of the Machakos Protocol that gave enough confidence to move forward and develop the security protocol, the wealth sharing, the power sharing and the transition areas protocols as well. I wondered at the time, when I was in Lusaka and heard the news about the Machakos Protocol, why they were talking about six years from the negotiation of what became the Comprehensive Peace Agreement through the interim period to where the referendum would be held. I thought, "Why not just start off with that and let people choose?"

In fact, in May-June of 2004, little more than six months before the signing of the CPA, when most of the protocols had been almost completely negotiated, and you could see what shape this agreement was going to be taking, Doctor John traveled to SPLM-controlled areas. I traveled with that group and observed as he held these enormous public meetings in town squares of each of these towns and explained in great detail what each of the protocols that had been negotiated up to that point were; what all the provisions were. He explained for a couple of hours in each place all of this, so that people understood what the SPLM was negotiating on their behalf. He declined a translator. As so many Sudanese are capable of, he would start a sentence in English, the middle of it would be Arabic and the ending would be Dinka or another local language and the syntax would not miss a beat; it would be perfect and then he would say the same in mixed languages, so that everybody understood the points that he was making.

He answered questions. Every question that people had, he answered very thoughtfully. He also used that opportunity to explain the transition that people were going to have to go through; the transition that people would go through as they went from war to peace; the transition of the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement as it went from being a guerilla movement to being a legitimate democratic government; the transition that people would have to go through.

His words were just amazing; he challenged people to recognize that they needed to learn how to hold the government accountable to them. He said, "We have been fighting in a struggle; it has been a military struggle, but the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is going to bring stability and peace and a peacetime government. It is so important that people learn how to hold that government accountable to them, because it must be a transparent government; that they have to deal with issues of corruption, because there were so many examples all around them in neighboring countries and even in the North of the lack of transparency, of corruption. With the wealth sharing provisions, southern Sudan is going to benefit greatly from revenues from their oil resources and their other resources, and they have to be very vigilant to ensure they do not fall into the trap of

corruption. The North needs to do this, as well. It is not enough for the South to insist on clean government, because if the South tries to do that and it is not dealt with in the North, that would bring everything down.”

He said the North has an additional responsibility, and he talked about the referendum. He said, “There will be a vote six years after the regional government is established in southern Sudan, a vote on self-determination. We all know which way the vote will go if the vote were held today, but in order for there to be a choice, the responsibility that Khartoum has is to make unity attractive. They must understand that it is their responsibility. We are doing our part, but they have to make unity attractive because, if they do not, the result of the referendum will be a foregone conclusion. One of the first litmus tests of whether they understand that challenge is what they do in Darfur.” This was in the spring of 2004, two and a half years ago. It was very, very perceptive. The CPA reflects so much his vision of what Sudan could be.

Q: Are you familiar with how the negotiations actually were carried out and the atmosphere?

A: I was not involved in the negotiation process at all. I was managing the USAID program out of Kenya. The negotiations were taking place in Naivasha. I visited Naivasha a few times.

Q: But do you have any sense of how the negotiations were carried out and what was the influence of the different groups?

A: I know that the IGAD process and our own government was very supportive of helping people think through the issues and persisting until they came up with what was finally accepted, but I was not involved in any of those kinds of meetings. The only time I spent any time in Naivasha was in the spring of 2004, before Doctor John’s speaking tour around the liberated areas of the South that I mentioned. I arranged to bring Robert Klitgaard to Sudan. Robert Klitgaard is a world-class expert on corruption. He has written books like *Tropical Gangsters*, *Corrupt Cities*, *Fighting Corruption*. I met him in France in 1990, between my Swaziland and Guinea-Conakry assignments, where I went for one month of French language brush-up. He was in the same class I was. I had not seen him in 2003, when I went to a USAID Mission Directors’ conference in Washington. Andrew Natsios invited Klitgaard to come and speak to the Africa Mission Directors.

I had lunch with him and talked to him about Sudan, which he had never had an experience of, and asked him if he would be interested in coming and talking to the SPLM, because I knew they were concerned about issues of corruption. He said he would be, so I approached Doctor John and said, “Listen, this guy is willing to give you two weeks of his time and he is an amazing resource. Would you want him to come here?” So Klitgaard came and I traveled with him in southern Sudan and in the Nuba Mountains. He held an interactive seminar for a few days in Rumbek with the Sudan People Liberation Movement leadership council. Then he came to Naivasha, and I attended that

session with him. We did not really get into issues of CPA negotiation, but Klitgaard engaged the SPLM negotiators in the importance of trying to set up transparent systems and to prepare for the issues that they would face on the side of corruption. Subsequently, he also held a session in Nairobi, I asked him to come and speak to the donors where we also invited the SPLM to come and hear how we describe these same kinds of issues amongst ourselves when we address the issue of how do you program assistance in a way that will do no harm when faced with these issues.

Q: Do you have any sense of the acceptance of these remarks by the SPLM?

A: Oh, yes. It was something that resonated with people, because they understood the importance of the issue to John Garang. There are issues that the southern Sudanese are facing now, and I am sure that there will be lots of temptations as they do have, compared to most countries coming out of conflict situations, far more resources than others in similar circumstances would have. But, yes, they listened and they certainly were engaged; they stimulated Bob Klitgaard's thinking as well.

Q: Let us turn to the implementation of the CPA. What is your understanding of how things are going or not going?

A: There are some fundamental issues here. Certainly, with the enormous tragedy of Darfur, there is, rightfully so, worldwide concern about what is happening in Darfur. But I am under the impression that with so much attention on Darfur there is perhaps the feeling that "Oh, the South is okay. They have a peace agreement. What we really need to focus on is Darfur." Certainly the human tragedy and the scale of need for humanitarian assistance and access and all of those issues have to be addressed. But what people might fail to understand or sufficiently appreciate is how critical it is that the CPA works, because there are some serious issues of commitment, commitment by the North to proper implementation of the CPA. The CPA has spelled out many things that have to be done on a timetable and systematically and seriously.

Some fundamental issues include the delineation of the border between North and South, which was very clearly laid out before the British left on January 1, 1956. There are so many provisions of CPA implementation where what is the North and what is the South has to be clearly laid out. As I described, Nimeiri tried to say that the borders between North and South were changed with the Unity province being in the North, the basis for determining what the oil revenues are depends on where the oil wells are. Where oil is developed and exploited in the South, that forms the fifty per cent share that the Government of Southern Sudan should get. But if the border keeps going further and further south and more and more oil fields are determined to be in the North, that affects the foundation of the wealth sharing provisions.

There is supposed to be a census that takes place, actually the pilot census was supposed to be last month with the full census in 2007, in advance of elections and in advance of the referendum. If the border between North and South is not delineated, how do you

determine who you count in southern Sudan and who is not in southern Sudan? There does not seem to be any swift concern for addressing that issue.

The redeployment of troops, Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) to the North and SPLA to the South, what is North and what is South, if the border has not been defined? That is such a fundamental issue.

The CPA set up the Abyei Boundaries Commission and its findings were to be accepted. The findings of the Commission have not been accepted, because there is oil in Abyei. Because there is a referendum that Abyei itself will go through, concurrently with the referendum that the rest of southern Sudan will go through in 2011, there is concern about what happens if Abyei decides to join the South and what happens if the South decides to go for independence. So the North has not accepted the Abyei Boundaries Commission report.

There is the whole question of how the wealth sharing should function. Another provision of the CPA was that either the Government of National Unity Ministry of Finance or Government of National Unity Ministry of Petroleum Resources would be SPLM's. President Bashir said, "I don't think so, neither of those. The National Congress Party (NCP) will retain both of those."

I was in Khartoum very early this year and I went to mass at St. Michael's Cathedral and Salva Kiir, who is a devout Catholic, came to mass and at the end of it he spoke to the congregation. This was at a time when it appeared that neither the Ministry of Finance nor the Ministry of Petroleum Resources would go to the SPLM, and he said to the congregation, "Let us not return to war over this particular issue. Actually, while that is what the CPA says, we also know that the National Petroleum Commission is going to have oversight responsibility and that is where we can ensure that our interests are protected. People should not take to the streets, if it looks like we are not going to get either of these ministries that the CPA promised us."

That was eight or nine months ago, and they only just are starting the National Petroleum Commission now. Let us see how it is implemented. Southerners had no access to fundamental information on how oil is exploited, the wells' production, the sales. They just have to take the North's word on it. This does not give one a lot of confidence that these things are being handled in the way that they are supposed to be handled. As you look at these fundamental issues in terms of implementation of the CPA, there is cause for concern.

The week before last in Malakal there were terrible incidents, security problems, between other armed groups and the SPLA; there were many, many people killed in Malakal and many more injured, both civilians and military. In the CPA, it states very, very clearly that by January 9, 2006, 11 months ago, the "other armed groups" that were neither SPLA nor Sudan Armed Forces had three choices: they could disband and disarm, lay down their arms and become civilians; or they could join the SPLA; or they could join the Sudan Armed Forces. There were no other choices, except those three. The people

who initiated this conflict in Malakal are clearly backed by the Sudan Armed Forces and Salva Kiir went to Malakal. He has laid down an ultimatum that these remaining “other armed groups,” these militias that have been the proxies for Khartoum’s military for some time have until January to disband or the SPLA will do it for them. He has laid this out very clearly to President Bashir. It should not have come to this. They should have done this in January of this year, not January 2007.

It is a very serious concern, because there is continuing insecurity in the South. Now there is talk about, oh, it is the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) that has been causing the problems in and around Juba. But there is growing concern and appreciation that it might not really be LRA, but it might be these “other armed groups” that are supported by those powers in the North that do not want to see the Comprehensive Peace Agreement succeed. Because the concern is if implementation is not going to go forward, if all of these steps and measures that are laid out as markers in the implementation of the CPA do not go forward, there might not be a referendum. There is precedent for that.

The role of Abyei is one example. It is one of the transition areas in the current Comprehensive Peace Agreement, but the history of Abyei goes back a long way. Abyei is north of Warab state, north of Bahr el Ghazal, it is part of Southern Kordofan, but it has been part of Southern Kordofan, because before independence the British had a quasi-referendum. They did not let the people vote, but they let 11 chiefs of Ngok Dinka—all the other Dinka peoples in Sudan are in the South—decide, as independence was approaching, are you going to be part of Kordofan or are you going to be part of Bahr el Ghazal? Eight of them, eight of the eleven, elected to be part of the South but the paramount chief, who is Francis Deng’s father, had more authority than the other chiefs and he and two other chiefs voted to be part of the North.

Shortly after independence when all the factors that led to the creation of the Anyanya Movement and the frustrations of the South that were articulated in that first conflict, there were many people from Abyei who became part of that Movement. In fact, some of the intellectual leadership of the Movement came from Abyei, because Abyei, the Ngok Dinkas are not northerners, they are southerners and they want to have their rights, too. The Addis Ababa agreement itself, in 1972, included a referendum where the people of Abyei would be allowed to choose. Of course, that referendum was never held. But with the recommendations of the Abyei Boundaries Commission not being accepted, Abyei has no functional government. At least in Kordofan, the Nuba Mountains area and in southern Blue Nile, there is a functioning government that the SPLM and the NCP are partners in, but they cannot even agree on the foundation of that in Abyei. And so it is not just a little backwater issue there, but one that could a spark that will, if not resolved.

Q: Some people are saying that one of the mistakes of the CPA was that it did not include the other groups, it was just a North-South exchange. What do you think about that?

A: Since I have moved here, it is such a delight to be living in Juba. Managing this program from...although Nairobi is closer to Juba than Khartoum is, it is a world of

difference trying to be there and function here. The other day I went to the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly. There was a political party training. USAID was not doing the training, but we were invited to observe that. There were several other political parties that were part of the session there, not just the SPLM. Each of their representatives spoke and they appreciated the opportunity to have some political party training. But every one of them, including southern Sudanese who were NCP members, talked about their support for the CPA. It was very inspiring, whether they are the Union of Sudan African Parties (USAP) people, United Democratic Front (UDF), FANU, the Southern Sudanese Democratic Forum (SSDF), every one of them talked about their support for the CPA, even if they were not involved in the negotiations itself, including the southern Sudanese who is an NCP member. It was inspiring to hear that. They did not say, "Oh, this does not belong to us." There was ownership of the CPA by the southern Sudanese themselves. I was very pleased to hear that.

Q: What do you see as the way forward? One can get very pessimistic about prospects.

A: I am normally a very optimistic person. I am not necessarily an optimist about this CPA implementation, but I am hopeful because the foundations are there; the CPA is laid out very well. It is a matter of trying to emphasize the importance of adhering to the implementation, even if, take two steps forward, one step back. Not give up on it, because it is not only important for the South but it is critical for the rest of the country, as well.

Q: And would it help resolve the Darfur situation?

A: If it can be shown that the CPA can work in the South, it can give confidence that whatever weaknesses there are in the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and the Eastern Peace Agreement (EPA), that if the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between North and South can be demonstrated to work with commitment by both sides, then that will demonstrate that this is the way out.

Q: What can be done to move it forward, to make it work?

A: The world community, our own government and others that are supporting the South, should continue our efforts to do that. It would be a mistake to assume this is all working and we do not have to continually see what is happening, to try and provide support. We have structured our assistance to try and address those issues that are threats to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Certainly, the level of expectations here is enormous. People have been through fifty years of conflict and so their sense of entitlement, that we have been through such suffering that now we should be rewarded for this in some way, is an impediment. One, because it is unrealistic; the constraints here are enormous. However we define what our strategic objectives are, in the aid sense, the fundamental issues here are infrastructure, governance and capacity.

Q: You are talking about the South, now?

A: The South. In all of those areas the levels of investment that are needed are enormous; but if we can show the benefits of peace by addressing incrementally what can be done in each of these areas... Providing, for example, support to key ministries: finance, labor and public service, legal affairs and constitutional development and supporting the concept of a 200 day action plan, where each of the government ministries defines what they can realistically expect to accomplish in 200 days and then invite people to hold them accountable to that, where there can be some confidence that schools can be rebuilt and infrastructure can be built, in most cases roads, not reconstruction but built, because they have deteriorated so badly over time. If this can be demonstrated, it can help people recognize, yes, it might take longer to do all these things but something is being done.

Q: Is there some progress being made?

A: Yes, there is. I was in Juba thirty or forty years ago. In some cases it looks the same, but there is a vibrancy now that was not here a year ago. The market is flourishing. There are some security issues here that everyone is concerned about. While Salva Kiir is not being the kind of leader that John Garang was, he is an honest man, a good man and one who is well respected. The marker that he has laid down about the importance of addressing the security concerns, I hope and pray that his definition of "January things with the 'other armed groups' have got to come to a stop," if that is adhered to that will be a very, very big step forward, because without security this whole thing is going to be a tragedy.

Q: My impression is that there are problems with the northern leadership not wanting to let the CPA work. Is there some role for the international community that can bring some pressure to bear that would move it along?

A: I know that our former Administrator has been in Sudan. I have not seen any reports on how his talks have gone but I am glad that he came back. I hope he has made some headway on this. I believe that he was in Malakal earlier this week. So he must be engaging on these issues. I cannot see that from here, but I am very pleased that he came here.

Q: Is there anything we have not touched on?

A: I just want to mention one aspect of the program that I have some hopes about and that is getting the diaspora involved in coming back here.

Q: Who are you referring to?

A: The southern Sudanese who have been trained or gained experience while they have been away, whether it is the near diaspora in East Africa or the diaspora from the United States and Australia. We have a pilot program going, just started in June last year. We have brought back altogether, at this point, about 84 volunteers. They have come from anywhere from one to three months. A large number of them have already extended. Some of them have come back. I met one of them at the training center in Yei where we

had a week's orientation. He is now the Minister of International Cooperation in the Government of National Unity. He went from being a volunteer diaspora, dealing with education issues in southern Sudan, to minister in the national government. There is another who was in the fourth group in September. He is now the Minister of Education in Jonglei state. These folks are like the tip of the iceberg, in terms of people who want to come back, whether they are from the United States, Australia or Kenya, to come back and help to rebuild. The way that I have seen them absorbed and embraced is very hopeful, because not only do they bring the skills that they have acquired when they have been overseas but they also bring a different attitude.

Q: Is there anything that can be done to prepare for the elections?

A: The elections will come in 2009. Certainly, there is political party training, the establishment of voter rolls. There is an urgent need for communications here. With the enormous rate of illiteracy, we are trying to expand the distribution of radios, getting windup and solar powered radios widely dispersed in the countryside so that messages of this new government can get out to people.

I will give you just a couple of technical areas where the importance of messages is critical. There is going to be a currency conversion in January, where a new Sudanese pound will be issued and people will be given a few months in 2007 to bring in their dinars and their old Sudan pounds to convert them. There has to be a public education campaign about that, because when you mess with people's money they need to know and have confidence in what you are talking about. The census itself needs a public education campaign, because traditionally, particularly among the pastoral people, you do not tell people how many kids you have, that is culturally not an accepted idea, but if a census is to mean anything it has to count everybody and people need to be encouraged to cooperate with that. Those are two technical areas where communication is needed.

What I have seen here, also, in my few weeks in Juba now, is how critical it is for the Government of Southern Sudan to get its vision articulated and widely disseminated, so that people understand, in fact, what is the CPA, why it is relevant to them and what the Government of Southern Sudan is trying to do to implement that. That is an enormous task. We, in USAID, have a role to play. There are other donor partners here as well, and we need to collaborate with them and ensure that we are all providing our assistance in the most effective way possible.

It is a thrill to be here; although I may have my questions as to how committed both sides are to the CPA and its implementation, the chance to see people trying to recover from a half century of conflict is a privilege and an honor to be here.

Q: What do you think the outcome of a referendum might be, or is it too soon to know?

A: It will be overwhelmingly in favor of an independent southern Sudan. I cannot honestly remember any single southern Sudanese who has ever said anything else other than that, which means that Doctor John's exhortation to the North to understand their

responsibility to very assertively demonstrate why unity should be attractive, not just to say that but to live that. That means taking the implementation of the CPA seriously and it means taking the South seriously. That is where I am not an optimist. I am hopeful that if the SPLA in the elections down the road between now and the referendum can continue to articulate Doctor John's vision for Sudan, then, that political message might be recognized as not just a southern point of view. If that happens, then I think there is a lot more hope.

Q: Is there anything the international community can do to further that vision?

A: They can provide capacity, training and resources for them to address these issues.

Q: Looking back over this long perspective you have had of the situation and maybe it is implicit in what you have already said, what would be some of the lessons of experience that you have had that stand out, or things that should have been done or not been done, that worked or not worked that might be relevant to other conflict situations?

A: The fundamental lesson of 1972 has been the importance of, no matter how long the negotiation takes, put everything out on the table. Do not try to do this in a rushed fashion. I have enormous respect for Dr. John Garang. There was a leader in the first conflict, Joseph Akwon Oter, who was the commander of the Anyanya in Upper Nile. He is the one that got me involved in all of this and encouraged me to go into Upper Nile in the 1960s. He had the same kind of vision as Doctor John. I met Akwon for the last time just a few weeks before the Addis Ababa agreement. I met him by chance in Nairobi, on his way back into Upper Nile. He died a few weeks after that, just before the Addis Ababa agreement. I do not know what he would have thought about the Addis agreement as it was finally negotiated. I suspect he would have not been so pleased with it, because it did not deal with all of these issues. I am so sorry that he lost his life before the peace agreement was signed. In fact, I gave his name, Akwon, as my son's middle name. What they were able to achieve through the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was going through every single issue of conflict between them, whether the security protocol, sharing wealth, sharing power, the implementation details, which one might think were too detailed, but, in fact, because Dr. Garang understood the importance of getting everything down, that is why there is some hope.

One can be optimistic or pessimistic about whether it will be implemented, but, as it is negotiated, it is a magnificent document and it provides the way forward. So not to be rushed into resolving the issue, even if it takes two to three years to negotiate it. It is better to take that time. That is the single lesson I would say I have seen from this, having seen the Addis agreement and having seen the CPA. I hope and pray that it remains a guiding light for the Sudanese to find their way out of this wilderness they have been in for such a long time.

Q: Anything else stand out for you, at more operational levels?

A: The challenge in those three areas that I mentioned. The need to deal with capacity, especially since there have been generations lost without education. To recognize the importance of governance, not just the transformation of the SPLM, but the whole panoply of issues, including corruption, around governance. And in the southern Sudan, the importance of infrastructure, where you have such an enormous, enormous country where you essentially have no roads, no way of communicating and the importance of serious investment in infrastructure. John Garang had a vision for what the infrastructure in southern Sudan should look like and his wife, his widow, who is an amazing person, is trying to carry that forward. When he passed, she stepped forward and told people not to go to war over his death. She said when she closes her eyes she does not see him, she sees his vision for New Sudan. To hear this amazing woman have the strength of character to take that kind of viewpoint and bring comfort to people and give them a voice to move on is amazing. She understood what he was trying to do in terms of infrastructure and how important all that was.

Q: Do you have any observations on the Darfur situation, because that is disrupting a lot of the implementation process?

A: Yes, I had visited Darfur once, early in the year. I do not have the kind of experience and perspective on Darfur that I have for southern Sudan. So I do not have a lot to contribute about that, but as John Garang saw the centrality of the marginalization of people outside of Khartoum as the central issue that defines the weaknesses in this country, that is where the relevance of the CPA and the relevance of the dream of a New Sudan is to both Darfur and to the east, as well as to the transition areas. One must not forget the Nuba, the Funj, the people of South Kordofan and southern Blue Nile, as well. Either Sudan will deal with this, or it will be an island of wealth in Khartoum and misery in the rest of the country that will eventually effect even Khartoum.

The investment that is going on there, in Khartoum, is absolutely amazing. I first visited Khartoum in 1968 and it is being transformed there in a way that you would never know everything else that is going on in Sudan, in Darfur, in the east, in the South, compared to what is going on in Khartoum. But that cannot be sustained if war resumes, because the oil will be affected by all of that. So there has to be attention to this.