The interviewee has had a long association with Sudan and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) going back to the early 1980s. In the 1980s, he was concerned with humanitarian and human rights issues, including a visit to Darfur in 1985 and the writing of the first international human rights report in 1989. He became involved in the peace process in 1998 working with the IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development) focused on conceptualizing how peace could be brought to Sudan.

The concept and approach included two tracks: one engaging the IGAD, saying that “peace is possible” and mapping out how it could be done. This included compiling the “Literature of Accord” which included copies of agreements that had been reached during the 1990s. A commentary organized the documents under the themes of power, wealth and security, and religion and the state. It mapped out thinking on key issues such as self-determination, especially for Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile areas. This dossier became a background document for IGAD and for Senator Danforth’s mission. It helped the IGAD hit the ground running. The agreements were not between the Government and SPLA (Sudan People’s Liberation Army), but among a mixture of groups.

The second track involved calling meetings in 1999 and 2001 to bring civil society groups from the North and South together to discuss what would happen when there would be a peace, and also their role in engagement on policy issues—a very useful exercise in building bridges of trust and getting civil society groups to collaborate on meeting the challenges for the transition. The key issues involved a fair amount of discussion of the national constitution; religion and the state, democratic elections, and the position of the South and the Nuba Mountains.

The interviewee noted that he and his colleagues were strongly of the opinion that there should be roundtable negotiations, which would include not just the SPLM and the government but all the others, e.g., the parties of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and the parties in the South, not just the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement) SPLM.

Senator Danforth’s approach was balanced and tough, and provided guarantees of the long-term outcome such national unity and the continued political roles of Garang and Bashir up to the time of elections.
The key strengths of the CPA itself: a process capably and dynamically led by General Sumbeiywo and the team of special envoys from the United States, United Kingdom and Norway. There was also the patient, low profile process of confidence building between the militaries on both sides led by a British team. The main weakness was that the process was not fully inclusive of three categories of groups: the civil opposition in the North, the recruits in Southern Sudan who were not part of the SPLM, the military groups in the North not associated with the SPLM such as the Beha Congress, Sudan Alliance Forces, etc. The main concern was that Eastern Sudan would flare up and be deeply destabilizing.

The good news is that the Government of National Unity has been formed and that there has not been an outbreak of fighting. The bad news is that what could have been interpreted as legitimate shortcomings in the CPA’s implementation are coming to look like strategic blockages.

A factor endangering the whole process is erosion of confidence between Khartoum and the U.S. Government. It is important to rebuild confidence with the Sudan Government that the U.S. Government believes in the unity of Sudan. The Congress Party should have a role in the governance of country.

The main lesson learned was that the CPA process was consonant with the Sudanese political tradition: taking time and not rushing, being inclusive as possible, having the solution be owned by the parties, and having the internationals giving a clear, consistent long-term message to the parties.
Q: Let us start off by providing a context for the interview. Can you describe your association with Sudan and with the CPA (Comprehensive Peace Agreement)?

A: My association with Sudan goes back to the early 1980s when I was a student and began working on Sudan in the context of the Refugee Studies Program in Oxford; I first went to Sudan in 1984. I first went to Darfur in September of 1985 to do my PhD; I worked mainly on humanitarian and human rights issues. I actually wrote the first international human rights reports on this government in July; the first one actually came out in August of 1989. I became involved in the peace process in 1998 when I began working to help IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development) conceptualize how peace could be brought to Sudan; I did that with colleagues at Justice Africa, both Sudanese and colleagues from the region.

Q: So you were there at the beginning of the CPA process?

A: Yes, we were there helping to shape it. I continued to be actively involved in that until the middle part of 2002. After that, when the heavyweights got involved I withdrew to the sidelines and moved on to other things. I tried to disengage myself from Sudan, which did not last terribly long.

Q: In that initial period, what was the concept or approach that you were laying out with your colleagues in IGAD?

A: There were two tracks that we were following. One was the track of directly engaging with IGAD and the first point to make what to state that that peace is possible; that this can be done, while trying to map out how that could begin to be done. We started actually a monthly briefing update, initially to people in the UN, there was really only one working on Sudan at the time, Karen Pendergast always kept an interest in Sudan. As things unfolded we came to focus on specific issues. There were two particular inputs that we had: the first was to compile something that we called the Literature of Accord. During the 1990s, the Sudan Government and SPLM (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement) had between them signed a whole host of agreements, not with one another, but in the case of the Sudan Government they had signed agreements with some of the civilian parties and with breakaway groups from the SPLM. In the case of the SPLM, they had signed agreements with the National Democratic Alliance.
And as we put together this Literature of Accord, which was copies of each of those documents and then a commentary on them organized under the themes of power, wealth and security; also we did one on religion and the state. They were running commentaries, which evolved as the situation changed. It became clear that the parties had agreed theoretically on most of the issues. What they had not done, of course, was agreed with one another, and they did not have the confidence to enter a peace agreement. So that dossier became background documentation for IGAD. In fact, on the appointment of Senator Danforth as the special envoy I came to Washington the first few days of October of 2001 and gave him a copy of that dossier which I believe he found quite useful.

Q: And this laid out all of the issues on which they had reached accords separately but not together?

A: Yes, yes. So it mapped out where the thinking was on key issues like self-determination. We paid particular attention to the three areas, especially Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile and the problems that would arise there. In doing that, it became clear that the major gap was security. The other issues had been talked about endlessly, and a measure of in principle agreement had been reached. In the area of security that had not happened at all; there was very, very little and we felt that security was going to be the key issue, or at least as important as the other issues.

I highlighted that both with Senator Danforth and with the British Foreign Office, and drew up some concept papers for how they could handle security. The initial idea was to have a small seminar with four or five government generals, four or five SPLM commanders and then elders, if you like, from either side and a retired Sudanese Government general who was someone who was supposedly independent but we knew would more or less sympathize with the Government, and a retired officer from the South who had fought in the first civil war who would more or less sympathize with the rebels. We thought having them present would do two things; one, it would bring out the experience of the Addis Ababa Agreement and the successes and, more importantly, the failures of that in the presence of their elders who had reached some sort of accord. Those serving in the forces currently would be a little more respectful of their elders and that would help control and steer the discussion. So a small seminar was convened by the Foreign Office in the UK in either January or February of 2002, which became the focus for a small group that worked with both sides informally over the following three years on security issues. The person I recommended for that, Jeremy Brickell, a former Zimbabwean guerilla, did take a leading role in that. Once that was up and running I actually had no further role in that.

The second track that we had was that, under the rulebook of Justice Africa, we convened a series of meetings of what we called, initially, Human Rights and the Transition in Sudan. The first meeting was 1999, the second in 2001. What we tried to do in those meetings was to bring civil society groups from the North, from the South, and from exile together, to discuss what happens when there is peace, because there will be peace someday, we said. At the moment human rights groups and civil society groups are
involved exclusively in the job of criticizing the Government, but should there be peace, there will be a role for active collaboration on policy issues. So let us begin to be ahead of this game, because historically, the tragedy of Sudan has been the transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule or transitions from war to peace have been a time of great opportunity, and, then, an opportunity that has been missed. So let us get it right this time.

We had two exclusively civil society conferences, but we also invited members of all political parties as observers. In the first one we did not have the Congress Party; in the second one we did. Two books came out of that, one called *The Phoenix State Civil Society and the Future of Sudan*, and the other one, *When Peace Comes* with a similar title, published in both English and Arabic. That effort then was overtaken by the peace process itself and many others getting involved in civil society activities, but it was a very useful exercise in bridging sources of distrust, getting civil society groups on the same page and beginning to lay out some of the challenges of a transition. In some cases, we were spot on and, in other cases, we were off by a mile, but it was valuable.

*Q: But in the first track you talked about, of course, security, then you would say there were some other issues that they did agree on. What were the principle ones?*

*A: If we go back to the Literature of Accord documents and our commentary on them, there was an unresolved debate on the issue of religion in the state with different positions; the Sudan Government had a position, the SPLA (Sudan People’s Liberation Army) and most of the NDA (National Democratic Alliance) had a radically opposite, secularist position. Then there was an intermediate one, which allowed for citizenship to be the basis of rights but religion to inform values, in a nutshell, the philosophy of how it was articulated was much more complex; so there was also clear potential for disagreement about Khartoum. There was a possibility for agreement on a secular South and on religious values informing the North, but the question of a federal capital was unresolved.

On the power sharing issue and self-determination, all the documents that had been signed indicated that there was a consensus on self-determination. Now, one can argue that the Sudan Government had signed its commitment to self-determination, which it signed in the Khartoum Agreement of 1997 with breakaway SPLM factions, under duress, but nonetheless, it was there in black and white, and so there seemed to be a very clear consensus on self-determination and on the need for an interim period of anywhere between 12 months and 10 years.

*Q: But that was essentially the core of the power sharing question? Were there any other side parts to it?*

*A: There were some quite important other key aspects. One was the importance of elections and everyone had, on paper, agreed on free and fair multi-party elections. The most controversial issue was around the three areas, especially Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile; what was to be their status. There was quite an interesting divergence here; the*
SPLA was, on the whole, refusing to be pinned down to this, but the core position of the SPLA was that these were not part of the South.

Q: They were not part of the South?

A: They were not considered part of the South, although in fact they were actually. It was interesting; the positions the SPLA was putting up front were that these areas should have the option of joining the South, but in analyzing the documents, it was clear that actually the SPLA was ready to sign documents that excluded the right to self-determination from Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile. Abyei was different; there was always a demand for a separate referendum on Abyei and, in fact, the formula that was arrived at in the CPA was the formula that we identified as the consensus position back in 2000. Both parties had at one time or another agreed to that when they had discussed Abyei, that seemed to be really the only sensible option. The Government, meanwhile, was also insisting, on the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile issue, that there would be no self-determination for these areas.

One of the things we tried to do was to get a real discussion going on Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile, but neither the Government nor the SPLA was really ready to let that happen. One of the foreseeable problems of the CPA is that the Nuba and Blue Nile really feel that they have been shortchanged in the power sharing agreement.

Q: And this was associated with the boundaries issue?

A: It was; the boundary issue is the key one for the NDA. For these areas, there was never much serious discussion in any of the documents on redrawing the North/South boundary. What there was in fact was on carving out autonomous regions for Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile, and the notion that those regions could have an autonomous status with powers comparable to those exercised by the Government of South Sudan. Some Nuba activists, in particular, did agitate for the option of these people being able to join the South. There was nothing in any of the documentation in support of that. This was a purely empirical reading of what was in the documents and we fastened onto the Nuba and Blue Nile case as the critical area in which agreement would be most difficult.

Q: Was the wealth sharing a part of this earlier period?

A: It was.

Q: That included the oil area, too?

A: Yes.

Q: And then there was a question on a national constitution.

A: Yes.
Q: That was in there too?

A: There was a fair amount of discussion of the national constitution. The key issues are the ones that we have discussed already, namely religion and the state democratic elections and the position of the South and the Nuba Mountains.

Q: So this early work you feel laid a foundation or a momentum for later negotiations?

A: What it did was it enabled the IGAD mediation to hit the ground running, to be able to be well informed about what the parties had already committed themselves to so that it was easier for them to steer the discussions.

Q: Now you said they were easier with these accords, but these accords were not between the North and the South; is that right?

A: Yes, that is true but what they did was, for example, when the Government delegation would say well self-determination is a contentious issue, the mediation would be able to say well, according to this document that you solemnly signed in 1997 that was incorporated into the 1998 constitution you have agreed to self-determination. If you have agreed to it already and you have already put it into your constitution, what is your reason for taking it off the table when you are talking with SPLM? And so on. And so with SPLM and the fact that they had already in the Asmara Agreement of 1995 agreed on various issues like the boundaries of the South, on the Abyei issue, the Abyei would not be just a part of the South, but there would a referendum.

Q: You probably mentioned this, but these agreements were not between the North and the South but between the North with some party; who?

A: They were a mixture. None of them were between the Government and the SPLM.

Q: That is what I understand. But who were they with?

A: The key ones: the agreement between the Government of Sudan and the breakaway factions of the SPLM, the Khartoum Agreement of 1997, which was then incorporated in the Constitution of 1998, and between the SPLM and the Northern opposition parties, the UMA Party and Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and so forth and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) in the series of agreements and the central one being the Asmara Agreement of 1995.

Q: So these provided a foundation for IGAD to get started?

A: Yes.

Q: What triggered getting started on the CPA negotiations?
A: There were a number of debates that were swirling around about exactly how the CPA negotiations should be constructed. Myself and my colleagues, particularly my Sudanese colleague, were very strongly of the opinion that there should be a roundtable negotiation; that we should include not just the SPLM and the Government but all the others should come in too.

Q: Who were the others?

A: They were the parties in the National Democratic Alliance, essentially. Also we wanted the parties in the South that were not a part of SPLM to be part of the negotiations. Our fear was that, if it was an agreement just between Khartoum and SPLM, the interests of the other groups would not be taken care of and the wars, internally in the South and internally in the North, such as the Eastern Front. We did pay a little bit of attention to Darfur though not enough.

Q: But they were not included?

A: The Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance was included so we had in our civil society discussions quite a strong Darfurian representative. At that time, and this was before the SLM and JEM (Justice and Equality Movement) had been formed, the Darfurian opposition was the SFDA (Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance).

Q: And then the other Eastern rebel groups were?

A: The Beha Congress was the key one.

Q: We were talking about what triggered the CPA negotiations?

A: The key thing that got it together was the Senator Danforth mission; his approach was remarkably astute. In the history of this, he is a much underestimated figure; his approach was balanced and tough; it was balanced in several ways. One, he was tough on both sides and particularly in telling John Garang he could not have everything his own way but obviously very tough with Bashir. He allowed something to happen what was absolutely essential, which was that he gave an assurance to the Government that the agreement was to be a Sudanese agreement, that there could be some international monitoring and guarantees, but this was a Sudanese agreement to be policed, monitored, implemented by the Sudanese and that the most important thing was for the Sudanese should have a common vision of their future.

What President Bashir wanted, his core concern, he wanted the best possible chance for national unity. He was arm twisted into conceding the option of secession, but Senator Danforth made it very clear that the U.S. was in favor of national unity and, in fact, the inclusion of the self-determination option in his own report and in the CPA was reluctant. The only way of making peace was to guarantee the continued political roles of both John Garang and President Bashir up to the time of elections and even after elections. So in providing those long-term guarantees, he put both parties in a comfort zone. What that
meant was when he came with his four tests about bombing, about the Nuba Mountain ceasefire, etcetera, etcetera, he was in a position of having a long distance carrot, something that the parties, especially the Sudan Government, which was the more difficult party, could really agree on, and really something common to work towards and a clear objective test of their goodwill. Those tests actually worked and the pressure around the tests worked.

This is a very important lesson to be learned now in the light of Darfur, because there is a lot of loose talk about sanctions and pressure, but sanctions and pressure only work in the context of two things. One: very, very concrete steps that you are asking the Sudan Government to take. Second, a common understanding, a mutual confidence about what the long-term outcome is. Both those things were present. Now there may be specific things that are being asked of the Sudan Government now, but there is no confidence, there is no mutual confidence at all between the U.S. Government and the Sudan Government about what the long-term outcome is going to be.

**Q: In terms of maintaining a united Sudan or what?**

A: …In terms of maintaining a united Sudan and in terms of the stability of the regime. One of the reasons why Danforth was criticized by many advocates and activists in the U.S. was precisely because he said we must deal with this regime; it is not going to be removed except with the will of the Sudanese; we must, therefore, guarantee it in power, provided it will meet these various conditions. Bashir now thinks that the U.S. is on the regime change agenda. He sees the international forces, etcetera, in Darfur as a mechanism for that, and until that issue is cleared up, there is not going to be progress.

**Q: Let us return to the CPA itself. How do you view the CPA negotiating process itself?**

A: I thought it had strengths and weaknesses. The strengths were greater than the weaknesses.

**Q: Let us go down each of those.**

A: The key strengths were that it was capably and dynamically led by General Sumbeiywo who made it clear that he was the mediator, and that the agreement was to be reached by the Sudanese. He minimized artificial deadlines; and he gave them the opportunity to talk, to disagree, and to come back together. The other strength was that we had a team of special envoys, especially from the troika of U.S., UK and Norway, who worked more or less permanently there. The U.S. was the weakest in that regard in that the personnel circulated in and out too frequently; there was not enough continuity. But that level of consistency, that level of high level, fairly autonomous representation was very useful and it generated a lot of confidence.

The time was critically important, chiefly because it allowed the very quiet security arrangements team to do its job. One of the things about the CPA was that almost always in these negotiations, it is the security arrangements that trips you up, because it is the
one that is closest to home or closest to the bone, I should say, for both sides; this was the
dog that did not bark; it did not happen in the CPA negotiations and that is because there
was a very patient process of confidence building between the militaries on both sides,
which was very low profile, leisurely if you like, but things in Sudan have to go at a
leisurely pace and it worked.

Q: Who was doing that?

A: This was this team that was set up by the British, headed by Jeremy Brickell.
The team deserves a lot more recognition that it has got.

Q: That was going on on the side?

A: Yes. It was going on on the side, and it meant that when they got to the security
arrangements on the agenda, the principals had to bring in their security experts and their
generals, a lot of the issues had been resolved. More importantly, there was a lot of
confidence between the parties; they knew who they were.

The main weakness I saw in the process was that it was not inclusive enough, that the
algebra was simplified down to Congress Party/Government of Sudan and SPLM on the
other side and that was not sufficient.

Q: And who were the main ones left out?

A: The main ones in three categories are left out. There was a separate set of concerns for
each of them. There was the sectarian or the civilian civil opposition in the North, the
DUP, the communists, etcetera. Our main concern there was that these people still had a
good chance of winning a plurality in a free election.

The history of Sudan is that in 1972 an agreement was made between Jaafar Nimeiry as
president and Joseph Lagu as Anya Nya. Five years later Nimeiry brought in the sectarian
civilian parties in a national reconciliation. These parties came in and they said the Addis
Ababa Agreement had nothing to do with us. They immediately began to agitate for it to
be revised. After some six years, it was completely abrogated. Our concern was that
something similar might happen, especially, if there were elections and a new
government had to be formed in the North and that this new civilian government in the
North would say look, this CPA has nothing to do with us, and start undermining it. We
thought they had to be part of the process.

Number two was the recruits in Southern Sudan who were not SPLM. We were fearful
that what would happen would be that John Garang would use (of course, at that time we
did not know it would be called CPA, let us call it CPA in shorthand) the future CPA as a
mechanism for the consolidation of power exclusively in the hands of the SPLM
leadership. This would be likely to generate new wars, particularly in Upper Nile.
Our third concern was that the military groups operating in Northern Sudan, not associated with the SPLM, were also not adequately represented. That included Beha Congress, the Sudan Alliance Forces (SFDA) that was not really militarily active in Darfur but had some military pretensions. Related to this was also our concern over the under-representation of the Nuba and Blue Nile people. We were worried that the lack of representation would mean that a North/South agreement would be accompanied by continuing conflict in the North. Our main concern, actually, was Eastern Sudan; we thought that Eastern Sudan could flare up and that would be very deeply destabilizing.

Q: You said this was one of the chief weaknesses of the CPA. On the other hand, was it possible that these people could be included?

A: Once it became clear that this was going to be the formula, what we tried to do was to involve the political parties in the process of recognizing that any such agreement would be a work in progress and that their best bet was to look forward to the elections scheduled for midway through the transitional period, trying to do as well as they could in those elections and gain power through the ballot box.

Q: Is there anything on the actual process of the negotiation, the atmospherics and the role of the international parties?

A: I was not actually involved in that. Once the process got going I was on the margins. I was actually dealing much more with the groups that were excluded. One plan that we had, which in the end, of course, came to nothing, was to try and have a series of conferences to relaunch the civil society process immediately after the signing of the CPA, so to have a big conference of all the civil groups and political, civil political parties.

Q: This was all over Sudan or just in one part?

A: No, this would have been all over Sudan, the idea was to have this immediately, once peace had been agreed to to try and corral these groups.

Q: And inform them of what it was all about.

A: Yes, exactly.

Q: Did that happen?

A: It did not happen. It did not happen for a couple of reasons, the main one being that such a conference takes a lot of organization and the signing date of the CPA kept getting put back and back and back, so we were not in a position to raise the funds. That was simply a fundraising issue. The second was that by that time Darfur had made such a thing impossible.

Q: People were not willing to come together and the international issue had moved on?
A: Exactly, yes.

**Q: What is your understanding about the implementation of the CPA now that we are in that phase?**

A: It is not going so well. The best news is that there has not been any outbreak of fighting, that the Government of National Unity has been formed, that the withdrawal of Sudan Army from the South is proceeding, albeit behind schedule, but it is going ahead. So the CPA is still alive, that is the good news.

The bad news is that what could have been interpreted quite legitimately as logistical, practical implementational shortcomings and delays due to many things like the death of Garang, the organizational weakness of the SPLM, the destruction of Darfur, etcetera, are coming to look more and more like strategic blockages. It is not so much that the Government of Sudan has all along planned to sabotage the thing; it is that indeterminacy is the structural condition of Sudanese politics. Every political actor has to have many different options open and the Government, as the most powerful actor, has to have the most options.

If Plan A, which is a smooth implementation of the CPA achieving the strategic goals of the Sudan Government, which are number one, national unity and number two, the Congress Party staying in power, if those are not likely to be achieved, then its Plan B is to stall and to use a combination of military might and financial patronage to keep the CPA just as a flag and go ahead and do its own thing and not let the elections or a referendum go ahead.

**Q: Have there been any preparations for the elections part?**

A: It is very interesting here to follow the career of Majzoub al-Khalifa because Majzoub was tasked with getting the Congress Party to win the 2009 elections. He is a presidential advisor. He was also the chief negotiator on the government side for the Darfur peace talks and that is not a coincidence, because getting Darfur votes, or getting an electoral pact with the strongest parties in Darfur is an integral part of securing the electoral future of the NCP.

Now, having failed in Darfur with a political strategy, Majzoub has actually now been removed in this last week. There are two readings of what is going on at the moment and probably both of them are valid in their sort of structural sea of Sudanese politics. Reading A is the pessimistic one, which is that if the Government is not going to win Darfur politically, it is going to have to win it militarily, and winning it militarily means that the 2009 elections cannot go ahead because the Government will not be confident of winning those elections. If the elections do not go ahead that means the CPA is basically doomed, because without those elections there is not going to be the political legitimacy or space to allow the referendum to go ahead in the South. Then, in anticipation of that, the Southerners will agitate, will demand the referendum.
Q: You said something about that the political solution of Darfur. What does that refer to, rather than the military solution?

A: The political solution is a peace deal, which involves some sort of electoral pact. Whereby the Congress Party would say to the SPLM, “we know you are going to win a whole bunch of seats, we are going to allow you to organize and we will probably even help finance you in return for which you will support us on A, B and C.”

Q: Is anybody working along that direction?

A: This was Majzoub’s time. Now, the failure of the CPA means that that approach is, at the moment, moribund. The optimistic reading of what is happening now with the removal of Majzoub is they are putting in place someone who may be able to revive a similar strategy. It is very unclear whether there is any chance of that working out.

Q: So in your view of the future of the CPA is what?

A: It is in balance at the moment. It could still work. My view is that what is needed for it to work is to get back to the type of approach adopted by Senator Danforth five years ago. The most important thing is to rebuild some confidence with the Sudan Government that the U.S. Government believes in the unity of Sudan and believes that the Congress Party should continue to have a role in the governance of Sudan, a leading role. If those are assured, then a dialogue can begin on the steps towards that end. I would strongly advocate the sorts of steps that were in the recent Op-Ed in The Washington Post web site, not on the printed version, by Chet Crocker and Steve Morrison, start with a ceasefire.

Q: So you see it pretty much as up to the initiative of the U.S. Government to move this thing along?

A: The breakdown in confidence between Khartoum and the U.S. Government is probably the key factor that is endangering the whole process at the moment.

Q: And the appointment of a new representative that has just taken place is…?

A: Andrew Natsios gets it. I hope that he has the political clout to pull it off. I suspect that with a new Democrat Congress, it is going to be more difficult because the Democrats are going to be agitating among the line of what Anthony Lake and Susan Rice have been calling for, which is very tough actions for a military intervention, which in my view is a complete dead end. Number one, it is impossible to make it work and number two, even talking about it is destabilizing.

Q: Are there any other points that are important that you think should be emphasized?

A: Those are the key points now.
Q: Just to wrap up the interview: though you have mentioned this several times, what do you see as the key lessons learned about what worked or did not work or what should have been done?

A: The key things about the CPA are that what worked was what was consonant with the Sudanese political tradition, which is that things take time, they must be as inclusive as possible and the solution has to be owned by the parties, and that the role of the internationals is to provide a clear, consistent long-term message to the parties to help move them along. If the CPA had tried to rush things, push things down their throat, had it been megaphone diplomacy, it would have failed.

Q: It has been a very helpful interview and I appreciate the insights you provided; they are going to be useful to the group. Thank you.