What triggered the Inter-Governmental Agreement on Development (IGAD) and Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) negotiation process? The interviewee pointed out that the IGAD had a long gestation, depending on the ebb and flow over eight years of the battlefield conflicts. There was a confluence of three factors: one, the split between El-Turabi and Al-Bashir in late 1999-2000 and a concern that the Northern Government’s power was diminishing and thus, the desire to enter into more cooperative regional relationships and a better relationship with the U.S. and also to reposition itself to take advantage of its oil resources; two, the SPLA’s concern that the balance of military power was shifting with the flow of oil revenues to the North; and third, the IGAD partners were looking for an opportunity resolve the conflict and end the war. There was also the change in U.S. Government policy as a result of the change in administrations and the influence of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report and Senator Danforth’s appointment. Also President Moi and the Kenyan Government took an interest in pushing the negotiations forward.

The key features of the negotiation process were the following: the international partners played a significant part; the permanent secretariat was important in building on previous rounds and providing an institutional memory, and the Kenyan Government and mediator General Sumbeiywo rejuvenated the other IGAD partners.

With regard to content, one of the key successes was the conscious decision to limit the negotiations to the two main belligerents and exclude other parties with the view of then opening up space for other political change, which in itself would be a dangerous game. This decision could have been naïve, because in retrospect, the specific concerns of those who were excluded should have been specifically addressed.

The Machakos Protocol in July 2002 changed the premise of a secular Sudan and adopted the two systems approach: secular law for the South and Sharia law for the North. The success of the binary state for the North and the South led the Government of Sudan to accept the right of self-determination—the right to a referendum. This protocol set the scene for all the other protocols.

Regarding implementation of the CPA, the interviewee stressed the need for some consistency among the international community on important implementation issues such as the elections. The kind of Sudan-wide political reform that the CPA envisioned, and which was John Garang’s aspiration, seems to be dramatically waning. Until the Darfur crisis is resolved with 20-25% of nation’s population in the throes of war, one cannot remotely expect to have national
elections, and without national elections, one cannot move forward through the CPA’s six years of interim government and a referendum.

The Government of the South has the challenge of creating a complex decentralized, inclusive, stable government. In the North, the CPA has very successfully entrenched the National Congress Party (NCP) for a period of time that exceeds most democratic terms; the effect of that is to compromise the capacity of the CPA to deliver political reform.

Overall, there are a lot of positive and negative lessons. The CPA should be considered a very successful international effort at conflict resolution and peacemaking; the criteria that were set up to achieve were largely achieved. One needs to consider the ramifications, spillovers, and unintended negative consequences of the particular process chosen. In hindsight, the other conflicts and the interests of the other groups excluded should have been foreseen and managed more effectively. There are the challenges facing the Southern transitional government from a rebel movement—do they have enough time and support for the transition? Also are the terms of a peace agreement and its protocols capable of being implemented? There can never be enough anticipation and planning given the complexity of the implementation.
Q: Let us start off with a brief statement about your association with Sudan and with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement so we have a context for the interview.

A: I worked in Sudan in 2003 to 2004 with an NGO (Non-Governmental Organization), a U.S. humanitarian agency, International Refugee Committee (IRC) as their program coordinator based in Khartoum. I was also involved in Sudan before that as part of the post-conflict development initiative within International Refugee Committee, a technical unit concerned with how IRC was doing post-conflict programming. I came to Sudan with that specialist hat on, concerned to look at their post-conflict programming. Subsequent to 2003-2004, when I was both involved in programmatic issues and some policy work with IRC in Khartoum, I have been a researcher at Oxford University, looking at peacemaking in Sudan and particularly looking at the conflict in Darfur and its relationship to the IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development) process.

Q: Let us go back to the earlier period because it sounds like you were involved in some interesting work on the conflict resolution issues. What were you doing in that work?

A: We were looking at how IRC could develop both its technical capacity, its operational capacity and its strategic capacity to transition from doing humanitarian relief in conflict settings to transitional developments in post-conflict situations, focusing on community recovery strategies, etcetera.

Q: Are there any specific ideas that came out of that work?

A: In relation specifically to the IGAD presence, some of the key ideas that we focused on was the concern with ensuring that peace and the early stages of peace translate to local community levels and that humanitarian agencies are equipped to provide that kind of transition when they otherwise were providing basic service delivery. It is a shift towards empowering the community to take greater ownership of early stages of peace, especially because, in Sudan for example, the capacity of agencies on the ground before you got to the peace agreement was very, very limited. There had been a withdrawal of assistance to especially Northern Sudan in the period up to the peace process. So there was a concern that, of course, once the peace process was through, there would be a clamoring of organizations interested in doing post-conflict recovery and reconstruction but with very little experience with the communities and the complexities in Sudan.

Q: And was there that reaction, after the CPA was signed?
A: Certainly. It was very evident to all of us who had been there before and afterwards that there was a marked increase in that kind of presence. Here I would base my comments specifically on my secondary research. I have done quite a bit of research into the IGAD process and peace negotiations in Darfur. Perhaps not going as back in as much detail as to what triggered the IGAD process, one of the things to keep in mind is that the process had a long gestation dating back to 1993 and depending on the position of both the SPLA (Sudan People’s Liberation Army) and the Government in the battlefield conflicts had its ebb and flow over a period of eight years.

What triggered its rejuvenation is a confluence of three factors. The first, on the Government’s side I do not think one can discount the fact that the crisis in the Government in Khartoum, the split between El-Turabi and Al-Bashir in late 1999-2000 motivated a significant shift in the approach of the remaining or prevailing Bashir government. Perhaps out of concern that its power was slightly diminished in the earlier stages, but also because it was refashioning itself, it sought to entreat more regional support; it entered into more cooperative regional relationships and also sought out a better relationship with the United States. It did this in part by showing that its Islamist Fundamentalist characteristics of the ‘90s because of Turabi was now gone. This provided an entry point for both European and U.S. leaders to reformulate their relationship with Sudan. That was an important aspect from the Government’s perspective.

Now, as to what its actual strategy was, is a different story, but certainly that the relationship improved it began to look at cooperation on issues like counter-terrorism even before September 11. So there was a movement towards greater reentry into the international arena. That also has to be linked to the fact that the oil was now flowing from 1999 onwards. The Government at least thought to reposition itself to make the most of the opportunities that flowed from its industrialization of its oil resources. That is the first slant, which looks at the Government and its interest to push things forward on that level and reenter the international arena.

The second factor, as far as the SPLA is concerned, and John Garang’s idea of where the SPLA’s program could go, must be that the balance of power militarily was slowly shifting toward the ultimate. The SPLA was quite strong at this time, but it certainly had achieved to open up an Eastern front in the late 1990s, which was extremely powerful for the SPLA. But, nevertheless, with the flow of oil revenues to the Government, it must have been concerned that the balance of power militarily was shifting back towards the Government overtime, so that it needed to consider what other options it had outside of the battlefields. That was a second important factor.

The third and final one is the international community. From about 1998 onwards when the Government in Khartoum showed some reformist tendencies, the IGAD partners, (the international partners to IGAD except the United States, which at that stage under the Clinton Administration still had an isolationist policy on Sudan) were already looking for an opportunity to resolve the conflict and support the IGAD process by focusing on the Southern problem; first, focusing on just ending the war in the South and dealing with the issue of self-determination of the Southerners. The U.S. at that stage still had an isolationist policy and supported the National Democratic Alliance. In 1998, the U.S. was open to negotiate a compromise with the Government in Khartoum. However, this changed by 2000-2001. The most influential policy document in that respect was the CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) report co-chaired by Francis Deng and Stephen Morrison. That report had a significant influence on the Bush Administration’s policy; it is worth remembering that Senator Danforth’s appointment by
President Bush actually occurred just before September 11. Nevertheless, the shift in the U.S. policy occurred in 2001 and focused upon a negotiated solution of the war between the Government and the SPLA. There was a large amount of international backing for that process to take it forward. It was a rejuvenation by 2001, because of these three factors. I would not also finally discount the fact that President Moi and the Government of Kenya took an earnest interest in pushing this forward.

Q: Let us turn to the negotiation process itself. What were the key features of it that made it possible to come to an agreement?

A: From my perspective, I look at three things: the institution, the content because I think they are important. The form and the institution: there is no doubt that the international group of friends paid a very important role in giving leverage to the IGAD’s process because without the international backing it was always going to be hard for the IGAD forum themselves alone to apply the kind of pressure upon the negotiating parties to make them stick to their word and stick to their promises. A very important factor was the international partner’s forum. That said, I do not think one should overstate that factor at the expense of, in particular, President Moi and the Government of Kenya and the mediator himself, General Sumbeiywo. The difference is that by the time the IGAD process was rejuvenated the other IGAD partners, especially Eritrea and Ethiopia, were so embroiled in their own problems, they had taken more of a back seat to the IGAD process, so it was both the Government of Kenya and the international partners, the Western partners, who played a significant role.

In terms of the institution of the forum, it was extremely important to have a permanent secretariat to drive this process forward. There was a concern that there was a lot of forum shopping with the Sudan peace processes. There had been many in the 1990s and one of the problems was without an ability to build upon previous rounds of negotiation and build up an intellectual-institutional memory to work upon and a sophistication in the mediation resources, it was very hard to build on past moments or turning points. The permanent secretariat in that sense played an important role. I would leave it at that at this stage.

I just turn to the content. One of the most important pieces in the puzzle was that one of the successes, very conscious successes, was to limit the negotiations just to the Government and the SPLM (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement) with the belief that, if one can resolve the grievances between the major belligerents in Sudan, then one can open up the space for other issues to be resolved thereafter. That was a very conscious decision especially backed up by the IGAD international partners, especially the U.S., the UK and Norway. Consciously IGAD did not include the National Democratic Alliance as Northern opposition parties nor any other groups such as the Southern militias or other groups such as regional groups in the Eastern Sudan or Western Sudan. Out of a concern that, if you brought too many parties to the negotiating table, the process would go nowhere. There is no doubt that the Government of Sudan would have resisted all kinds of representations from other groups, especially because it had quarantined the Sudan problem as being only a Southern problem, so itself, as legitimately representing the North, it only required a deal with the SPLA to resolve the Southern problem. There is no doubt it would have been resisted and also that the Declaration of Principles, upon which the IGAD process was based, were principles based on these two parties, the SPLA and the Government. The room for expanding the negotiations to other groups was limited, but nevertheless it was
consciously the strategy of the backers of the process to make it an exclusive process, because that would get a result and the result would then open for further political change.

Now that can be seen as both a success and a failure. Insofar as it was a success, it allowed for the process to go from the Machakos Protocol in July 2002 through to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement— actually a peace agreement and an end to very long war. There is no doubt that that was a success. However, viewed from the other side, the exclusive nature of the process had meant that other groups were excluded from raising their concerns in the process of negotiations and that was always going to be a dangerous game. That is related, then, to the dimensions of the conflict in Darfur and the dimensions of the conflict in the East of Sudan that followed the CPA process. One has to take a step back and see the other concerns of Sudan in the context of the exclusive nature of the IGAD negotiations.

Q: So you do not think it would have worked if they had been included?

A: It is hard to say. It is an effect that we cannot really talk about. It would have been very difficult, no doubt; if there was a lot of inclusion in the process. One of the grave errors of the IGAD process is that having chosen an exclusive approach to the negotiations. Very little effort was made to appease the concerns of those groups who were not part of the negotiations. There was, a far as I have been able to ascertain, very limited effort to share information, to address the concerns of those groups, nevertheless, through the process of negotiation. There was a general belief that, oh well, if we achieve this peace process and it results in democratic institutions and elections and opens up a civil society space, then everyone will be happy and so we can go ahead. That was slightly naïve insofar as the very specific concerns of groups that were excluded from the process needed to be addressed specifically and not generally.

Q: There was not any thought given to a follow-on process that might then be more inclusive?

A: Certainly in the sense of constitutional processes, yes; a constitutional commission could address some of these groups’ interests. There was also the view quite early that the SPLM represented or got authority to represent the NDA, so the National Democratic Alliance, and even formally the NDA granted some kind of representation to the SPLM in the negotiations. So there were parts of it that showed that there was more sophistication going on. The concerns of groups that were excluded were voiced quite loudly around the time of the Machakos Protocol in July 2002 and thereafter. There was a bittersweet sensation on the part of those Northern opposition groups, in particular, that were excluded and knowing that this was a good agreement for the country, but feeling that exclusion from the process might not be in their interest.

Q: Do you have any particular comments about the content of the CPA agreement? There were several protocols, as you know; does anything stand out in your mind about them?

A: On the Machakos Protocol, the very first protocol in July 2002, I have a couple of other comments about wealth and power sharing. My comments about the Machakos Protocol would be that one of the interesting things that happened is that it focused on the Southern areas under SPLA control— the areas south of the independence borders from January 1956. It focused on that area. It changed the Declaration of Principles of 1993 premise of a secular Sudan. It changed that and adopted the approach that Senator Danforth’s report, as well as the CSIS report, have suggested which is to take a one country, two systems approach. In the interim period before a
referendum there would be a secular approach to the South, but, in the North, it would still be
run under Sharia law. So it set the scene for a polarization of the issues of the North and the
issues of the South; one, because the area such as the Nuba Mountains and the Southern Blue
Nile and Abyei, which were partially under SPLA control and, who had long standing
grievances, that are very similar to those of the Southerners, were actually not included in the
Machakos Protocol, and, two, because it set up a very clear distinction between the political
structure of the North and the political structure of the South in the interim period. The effect of
that was to create a binary path between the North and the South; the success of that was that it
was on that premise that the Government of Sudan finally accepted a right to self-determination
of the Southerners and the right to referendum.

It was on that premise that this central issue could come to some kind of conclusion. On the other
hand, the effect of the protocol was to jeopardize the new Sudan position that at least some of the
SPLM held to quite strongly including Dr. Garang but also other senior leaders in the SPLM
such as the leaders of the Eastern Brigade, also the leader of the SPLM Nuba, Malik Agar, who
is the leader of the SPLM Blue Nile. These leaders, at the time of the Machakos Protocol, were
left in the lurch and so they required a lot more work to then get the three areas in particular back
into the negotiating process. Why I focus on the content from in the Machakos Protocol in my
comments here is: because the Machakos Protocol then sets the scene for all other work that
comes out whether it is specifically about power or wealth sharing or security arrangements,
etcetera. The Machakos Protocol sets the scene for those subsequent protocols; in a very specific
way it sets the architecture of the process going forward.

Q: And on those particular protocols, wealth sharing and so on, is there anything distinctive
from your point of view?

A: Yes, I have less to say about that. I am sure there are others who are much more qualified to
talk about them. I would say that one of the challenges was to open up enough space for other
groups. I do not know whether that has been successful or not, but the reluctance and the
slowness of Northern opposition groups such as the UMMA Party and the DUP (Democratic
Unionist Party) that they had had to the CPA’s great detriment—to the CPA’s effectiveness in
opening up political space in the North. The CPA has very successfully entrenched the National
Congress Party in the North for a period of time that far exceeds most democratic terms and the
effect of that is to compromise the capacity of the CPA to deliver political reform in the North.
We see this in the fact that even today the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) or the DUP at
least and the UMMA Party have failed to take great steps forward in the opportunity provided for
opening up their political space in the North. That will be to the detriment of Northern political
reform in the elections. On power sharing, specifically, it was the result of the fact that there
were two dominant groups at the negotiating table and they divvied up the power largely and
greatly to their own benefit; something that perhaps would have been hard to avoid, but certainly
is not necessarily a great positive. There is a lot of sophistication in the protocols that is
testament to the fact that a lot of effort went into them and that they are very strong.

Q: How is the implementation of the CPA working out?

A: That is not something that I personally have followed in great detail. The main issues are such
things as the key ministries that mattered were not sorted out beforehand—the challenge that
faces the SPLM, especially after the death of John Garang. Broadly about the politics, the
greatest concern is that the kind of Sudan-wide political reform that the CPA envisioned, especially with the influence of John Garang in Khartoum and his own aspiration to try and push for a constituency that was national but backed him in any leadership elections; that aspiration of the CPA seems to be waning dramatically. There is great concern that the SPLM in the North is in retreat or in decline, and that is of concern.

_Q: What about the monitoring of the implementation? Is there anything being done that is effective?_

_A: You can never have enough monitoring, because the implementation is what really matters and there is enough history in Sudan of peace agreements on paper that do not really translate on the ground._

_Q: You mentioned the role of the international community as being key in the beginning. What kind of role should they be playing now?_

_A: One has to remember that with a massive UN mission a lot of this should be within the discussions of the UN mission and the context of that. The mission’s effectiveness needs to be the biggest focus, because they are the group that really should be pushing things forward. The international community has to speak with one voice as much as possible. That has been one of the problems in the past with Sudan. The mission plus the key international countries, the UK, U.S., Norway, France, Germany, China (which is a harder one to pull in) need to be able to speak on the implementation when issues become sensitive and complex, when issues like the timing of elections come up, as no doubt they will come up as a contentious issue. There needs to be some consistency amongst the international community on speaking to these issues, and that is going to be a big challenge.

The three challenges— I am sure there is many more are: one, the Government of Southern Sudan is in a very difficult transition from a rebel outfit but not very institutionally robust in trying to develop a complex decentralized state or regional authority. Whichever way the future goes a successful and inclusive and relatively stable, ethnically inclusive Government of Southern Sudan is essential. It is essential to a South that it succeeds; it is essential to a Sudan that stays together. If that does not work out, there will be grave problems: that has to be a major focus, but it is not necessarily one that I have seen to be so far greatly successful and there are a lot of issues in the South coming up now that are of grave concern.

The second issue is that elections in Sudan are now slated for 2009, the national elections. I find it hard to believe that these are going to be possible without an enormous amount of change in political awareness and political openings of political parties, especially in the North. While Darfur is not resolved, the ability for there to be effective national elections is greatly diminished. While 25 percent of the nation’s population or 20 percent of the nation’s population is in the throes of war, one cannot remotely expect to have national elections and without national elections one cannot move forward through the CPA’s structure for six years of interim government and then a referendum at the end. So a political solution to Darfur is essential and remains elusive.

_Q: What about the role about the non-governmental organizations?_
A: It is a very big, complex issue. On post-conflict reconstruction, there is a lot of money that is certainly poured into these organizations. A concern is how much coordination and concerted effort are they able to produce in what is a very chaotic environment? I do not think I would say anything new that has not been said before about the ability for them to open up civil society space, empower communities to be able to feel they are in greater control of their destiny and, thus, participate in simple decision making. A lot of work has to be done to build up political parties and representation and constituencies. If that does not occur before the elections, the elections will not succeed in the way that we would like them to.

One thing I really would like to stress is that the situation in Darfur cannot be read out of the CPA; it has to be read back into the CPA and the way the CPA is working. The CPA’s schedule or timeline is greatly affected in multiple ways by the crisis in Darfur. Without the same kind of backing for a political situation in Darfur as there was in the CPA, which involves a different set of organizations, the same level of concerted effort, it is going to be very difficult to see that the CPA will achieve its own promise; that is of grave concern.

Q: Is anybody trying to bring that about?

A: Oh, yes, certainly, there is a massive amount of international attention on Darfur, but one has to wonder why there has not been at the highest level an emphasis on a political solution in Darfur like holding nothing back, not just because it is of great importance to Darfur, but because otherwise the whole enterprise with the CPA is jeopardized. I do not think anything can be done until there is actually a solution in Darfur; there can be no holding back in terms of effort.

Q: What are your views on the prospects for the implementation and the success of the CPA program?

A: It has yet to be seen; where there are so many intervening complexities and dynamics, it is hard to make a simple prediction of what will happen. The prospects, as far as I see it now, are that there will be a lot of resistance to national elections in 2009 because of the slowness of implementation of the CPA. There are the challenges that the Government is facing in the North because of Darfur and its wariness of the election results. In the South, for the Government of Southern Sudan, the challenges that it is facing, the challenges between ethnic groups as well as militias and the instability that is being produced at the moment in this period weighs against an appetite for democratic elections.

These elections, both national ones as well as elections in the North and the South are inherently part of the way that the CPA understands its process of political transformation. Given that there will be a lot of resistance to both elections to take in a reasonable timeframe and that the international community will also feel that the situation is not sufficiently stable enough or evolved enough for elections to take place, the first casualty is going to be the elections. As a result, all other issues will be put back including the referendum in the South. The great challenge is to work out a roadmap to get to national elections and including before that the kind of regional elections that are envisioned by the CPA. If there is not a clear roadmap and there is not a clear sense that this is being achieved to get to those elections, the distrust of the CPA will grow greatly among Southerners and among Northerners and that will jeopardize the outlook or the prospects.
Q: The elections are a key to having the referendum?

A: Yes, they are. It would be very, very dangerous for Sudan, if one did not achieve political transformation and legitimacy of government in both the North and the South before the referendum. The reasons are, firstly, that a referendum in the South without elections in the South plays into the concerns of non-SPLM opposition in the South or groups in the South, whether they are formalized political groups or ethnic groups. There are many of them and there are many that will come and go and wear the hat of the SPLM when it suits them but will jettison it as well when it suits them. The lack of elections in the South will greatly diminish the credibility of the SPLM to take forward such a sensitive issue as the referendum. The SPLM will probably think it is in the best interest of all Southerners to do that, but it will have to be very successful in being an inclusive and transformed and representative authority. At this stage, I do not think that is so obviously going to happen.

The first concern is how that happens. Also just for the SPLM’s own sake, the SPLM cannot hope to transform into a sovereign state from a rebel group without political transformation, if possible through an election process. One has to see the elections as instrumental to the kind of transformation the SPLM needs to be about. The elections also would be very destabilizing, so there is the trade-off to be made. But from the pure point of the legitimacy of the governing authority that would take the referendum forward, one would think it is essential.

The second point is that a referendum in the South is extremely politically explosive in the whole of Sudan. It is not something that various constituencies in the North are going to look at favorably, especially if the South decides to secede. One of the great concerns in the Addis Ababa agreement of 1972 was the exclusion of the UMMA Party, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the precursors to the National Islamic Front (NIF). The exclusion of those parties meant that they were not brought into the outcome of the Addis Ababa Agreement and that was one of the criticisms of that agreement. Now that will be the same thing if there are no elections in the North prior to a referendum in the South. It is very hard to see that these very large Northern opposition parties will be happy to accept the results, if it just means that the National Congress Party stayed in power throughout Sudan for the last 22 years and there is a referendum and then the South secede. They will be very reluctant to accept that outcome unless they have had a role to play in offering to Southerners a different vision of Sudan where they would stay in the country and not secede. So there is a great concern that excluded groups may not view the outcome of the referendum with favor.

A final concern would be that without elections in the North or elections nationally the kind of political transformation that would be necessary to sustain the tumultuous moments of the referendum outcome; that kind of political transformation would not have occurred and the danger of a return to conflict is much higher without the kind of political transformation that the CPA originally envisages.

Q: Are steps being taken to prepare for elections?

A: Steps are being taken; I do not know much about them in detail, but one has to really question whether the 2009 tentative date for national elections is remotely feasible as we get to the end of 2006. This is of great concern if one looks at comparable cases. Sudan is a very large country, censuses have not taken place for a long, long time; political representation has been very limited
for a long, long time; even in the Congo, there was a lot longer period. I imagine and I think everyone imagines that the elections will be postponed, but one has to ask how long they will be postponed and whether it becomes then in the interest of those who want to postpone the elections to maintain the kind of instability that means that the elections do need to be postponed. So a complex kind of dynamic might arise that will prolong and postpone the kind of transformation that one is hoping for.

Q: Is there any key point that you want to make that we have not touched on?

A: One of the interesting things that is less analyzed is what were the motivations for the internationals actors backing the CPA and the IGAD process: what motivations drove them towards driving the kind of process that we have been seeing — one that was exclusive in nature and one that did focus on the Southern problem as a separate problem? Was there enough sophistication in considering the other groups that were excluded from that process and, in hindsight, has there been enough attention to the linkages between the conflicts that did subsequently arise in Darfur and Eastern Sudan and the CPA?

Q: That leads to the last point about what you see as the lessons that stand out? You have touched on some of those already, but what stands out in your mind as some of the lessons of this experience of what worked and did not work?

A: Yes, I have touched on them along the way. There are a lot of positive lessons and a lot of negative lessons. The CPA should be considered in many respects a very successful international effort at conflict resolution and peacemaking within certain boundaries, within certain criteria that were set up to achieve and those were largely achieved.

One needs to then question, however, whether there were ramifications, spillovers, unintended negative consequences of the particular process chosen that, in hindsight, needed to be anticipated and managed more effectively. They include: the other conflicts and other groups that were excluded; they also include the kind of challenges that face the Southern transitional Government from the Northern incumbent Government in Khartoum that has a lot more experience at being a government; the kind of transition the Southern group, rebel group, has to go through institutionally and whether it has enough time and enough support to make that transition; whether the terms of a peace agreement and its protocols are capable of implementation. It is not good enough to say the implementation became more difficult than we planned it to be, because there can be never enough anticipation and planning for the complexity of the implementation.