

United States Institute of Peace
Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Sudan Experience Project

Interview # 16 - Executive Summary

Interviewed by: Marilyn Bruno
Initial interview date: September 20, 2006
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The Interviewee was assigned to Nairobi, Kenya, in August, 2002, to be the “Sudan watcher,” shortly after the parties had signed the Machakos Agreement. In this capacity, he attended CPA negotiations and, during his visits to Southern Sudan, was able to meet with the local authorities and assess the situation on the ground. The Interviewee observed how both parties to the CPA quickly fell behind in implementing the newly-signed Agreement, because of lack of political will on the part of the North, and lack of organization and experience on the part of the Southern authorities. The resulting slow start up “contributed to some frustration at the local level” in the South, where expectations run high regarding the tangible peace dividends of the CPA.

According to the Interviewee, the Assessment and Evaluation Commission was supposed to fulfill a watchdog role, but it has not had the liberty of operation than people had anticipated. The absence of Kenyan General Sumbeiywo on the Commission has left a lack of continuity between the spirit of the negotiations and the implementation process. “The question now is whether the North will continue with their practice of giving only as much as they need to give, and not necessarily embracing wholeheartedly the process of turning Sudan into one country trying to work together.” The Interviewee contends that it was a mistake for the parties to approach the negotiation with so much optimism, which “took over the negotiations” and made the parties people turn a blind eye to “the impact of having a whole separate internal Southern dynamic that would clearly come into play after the Agreement was signed.” The exclusion of Darfurian and other regional interests was also clearly a serious omission, as was the pressured timetable imposed by the U.S. Government on the chief negotiator and the negotiation process.

The challenge remains to keep the international community and neighboring countries focused on CPA implementation. Kenya very much wants to reap the benefits of a developed South, whether it’s an independent South or part of a united Sudanese Government, but doesn’t want to become embroiled in a situation like that in Somalia, which cost them a great deal financially. The U.S. Government is also perceived as speaking with two voices to the National Congress Party Government. “On the one hand, we like what they’re doing on counter terrorism. On the other hand, we criticize them for what they’re doing in Darfur.” According to the Interviewee, neither voice articulates our third message: the need to implement the CPA. As a result, the Interviewee believes that the South is going to vote for independence, and will remain frustrated that they are expected to wait six years before they can exercise their vote. There has been little effort to build relationships between North and South, or to forge a common Sudanese identity. Therefore, there are few arguments being made in favor of creating a unified country.

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Q: Today is the 20th of September, 2006. I'm Marilyn Bruno. I am sitting with a State Department official currently with the Africa Bureau. Please tell me what your connection was or is with Sudan, and specifically with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

A: I arrived in Nairobi, Kenya, in August 2002, to be the "Sudan watcher" there. The essential core of my responsibilities while I was there was to follow the peace talks that were taking place in Nairobi. In the course of my time in Nairobi, I was periodically pulled off on other activities, so there are somewhat large gaps in my understanding of what happened in some stages of the peace process. For approximately the last six months, I've had minimal contact on Sudan, so my impressions of what transpired in Sudan may have substantially been taken over by events in the last six to eight months.

Q: Okay. When you were in Nairobi as an observer, what were you observing specifically?

A: There were times when I would actually go to sit in on the talks that were taking place, either in Machakos, Kenya, or in Naivasha, Kenya. Much of my time was also providing support to the teams that were coming out from Washington to sit longer term in the talks in those locations.

Q: Did you have the opportunity to travel through Southern Sudan?

A: Some travel, not extensively.

Q: Could you describe what you saw?

A: By the time I got onto the job, I believe that I was able to visit many more locations than my predecessor had been able to visit. I arrived in Kenya shortly after the parties had signed the Machakos Agreement. There was a lull in hostilities until approximately October, when there was resumption in hostilities. But then, there was a signing of a cessation of hostilities. So, from approximately October until, well through the end of my stay there, there was much greater accessibility to Southern Sudan than there had been previously. I was able to travel but, at the time that I was there, you always had to go through Rumbek to get to other places. Rumbek was sort of the air hub for other locations in Southern Sudan. I was able to visit towns along the Nile. I had one very brief stop in Northern Bahr Al Ghazal to a town that had previously been very badly affected by slavery. But again, by the time that I had arrived there, they were back in sort of a rebuilding phase. So my experiences were very different from my immediate predecessor's experiences. I understand he spent a lot of his time actually going in after areas had been bombed and learning what had happened in the various incidents reported.

Q: When you say that there was a difficulty in traveling before you arrived, was that because of Government restrictions or just because of logistics, hard to get to places?

A: I think it was a combination of things. People may have had difficulty getting clearances from the Government, or because we would travel primarily to places that were on the Operation Lifeline Sudan authorized list. There was a restriction of what the Government would allow and would not allow. But then there was a second layer that people had to get past, which was what our own security people would allow people to do. If they had some indication that things might go bad in a particular location, then people were not allowed to travel in.

Q: Did you have free access once you were in Southern Sudan to tribal leaders and others you wanted to meet?

A: Pretty much. My visits tended to be very short, so I very much depended on what the people on the ground were able to set up for me. I was being hosted by NGOs (non-governmental organizations), and trying not to stretch their resources too thinly. They were as accommodating as they could be, and would set things up with the local authorities to the extent possible.

Q: How does the CPA deal with implementation? What are the mechanisms contained in the Agreement? What is your opinion on the way this was structured, from a practical point of view?

A: Well, I have forgotten a lot of the details of what went in the CPA, but the details were what they tried to think very carefully about. They actually came up with a laundry list of things that would need to happen to ensure implementation, and spelled them out fairly specifically with calendars and target dates for everything. The Governments, both North and South, and the whole combined mix of implementers fell behind pretty immediately. I think people should have expected that. In particular, there were two things at play. There was, I think, a Northern Government lack of will to really move aggressively on things that they needed to be doing. But, at the same time, they could count on lack of organization and experience on the part of the Southern authorities. The SPLM (Sudan People's Liberation Movement), I believe, did not and still does not have enough qualified people to do everything that they need to be doing. This was particularly evident in those early days after the signing of the Agreement, as they were being pulled in multiple directions. They had to establish themselves as a part of the national Government at the same time that they had to establish themselves as a Government of the South. There were various initiatives trying to be helpful to them, but there were things happening. For example, whole groups of people went to South Africa for sorts of training sessions with the ANC (African National Congress) on how the ANC made its own transition from an opposition movement to an actual Government. All of this is very useful and, I think, it is particularly useful when it comes from an entity like the ANC. But, it pulled key people out of pocket for long periods of time. So, you had this very slow start up at the beginning of the implementation period, which, I think, contributed to some frustration at the local level. The expectations in Southern Sudan for what a Peace Agreement would bring people at the time that I was there were outrageously high. You know, it had been so long since anyone had lived with peace, that peace sort of came to embody everything that they needed. So, it wasn't just a lack of war, but peace meant was having development in a wholly functioning society. So, when the Government came in and tried to take the steps necessary to get itself set up, it was not able to do all of those things that address the various expectations of the Southern population in general.

So, I did get the impression that there was frustration at the grassroots level in the South, who said, “We have peace, but why aren’t we seeing much of a dividend?”

Q: Do you think there was a need for an independent monitoring group to pull or push things along?

A: The Assessment and Evaluation Commission was supposed to fulfill that role. At least when people envisioned having this Commission, that’s what I think they imagined it would do. Again, that’s one of the elements that really fell off my radar screen, but I do know that it was something that was not happening at a pace that people had hoped for. It was falling more under the control of the Government of Sudan than people had anticipated. Control isn’t a good word. The Commission didn’t have the liberty of operation that people thought it should have, and so was not as able to be the kind of watchdog that I think we in the international community had expected that it would be.

Q: Are any of the commissions functioning as we expected?

A: I honestly don’t know.

Q: Are any certainly not functioning the way we expected?

A: I know there were tremendous complaints about the Petroleum Commission and I don’t know what has happened with that. Regarding the Constitution Commission, I know things initially got off on footing that they were supposed to, albeit slowly. Again, what has happened since then has fallen off my radar.

Q: What would you say are the principle achievements of the CPA, besides achieving peace, which is formidable and certainly not to be underestimated?

A: Right. In a lot of ways, I think the CPA tried to address what people saw as the shortcomings as the Addis Ababa Agreement. I think the SPLM negotiators were always conscious of where Agreements had gone wrong in the past and how they wanted to avoid their going wrong again. I think they did as well as they could with a written Agreement, and I also think that on a certain level there were some relationships forged in the course of the negotiations that could contribute to a positive working relationship between North and South. I don’t know if that little start is going to really bear out at this point.

I mentioned that the last time I spoke to my colleague, he seemed much more optimistic about the SPLM’s ability to pull itself together and actually get about the business of running a government. That certainly was very different from the impression that I had nine months to a year ago, when the SPLM was struggling in the wake of John Garang’s death to figure out internally what direction they were headed. My concern at that particular moment was the SPLM would get so wrapped around the axel in their own infighting that the whole thing would just fall apart because they wouldn’t be able to hold the South together. But the Agreement itself I think, on paper, has done as much as it could. To be perfectly honest, I think John Garang got much more out of the negotiations than people expected he would be able to get. He got more in terms of share of the oil revenues, for example. I know Southerners have criticized that, saying that they should be getting much more of the oil revenues. But in terms of a negotiation, Garang held out and got more than I think a lot of us thought he would be able to get. Getting an

Agreement on the South having its own military is really a huge deal and not something that you would normally get a national Government to agree to. Yet, the national Government is allowing a semi-autonomous Government to have a separate military. So, I think there are really some incredibly groundbreaking elements of the CPA because the SPLM was so worried about learning from the mistakes of 1972.

The question now is whether there will really be the will, particularly on the part of the NIF (National Islamic Front), the National Congress Party Government, or the portion of the Northern Government, to see the CPA through. Or, whether the North will continue with their practice of giving only as much as they need to give and not necessarily embracing wholeheartedly the process of turning Sudan into one country trying to work together.

I'm sorry, I just lost my thought.

Q: Well, we're talking about implementation, things that worked well. I'm going to assume that there are things that did not work well that we did not anticipate.

A: I think there were things that we anticipated that we didn't really address in the course of the CPA negotiations. Everyone knew that the approach of making this strictly and SPLM-Khartoum deal was problematic. There were repeated criticisms, particularly from the NGO community because they were the ones most often on the ground. The NGOs knew the dynamic on the ground, and they knew the SPLM did not represent all Southerners. So, there was a risk inherent in sort of making the CPA negotiation a bilateral discussion because there were other voices that were excluded. Because it had been set up that way, there was more room for the disgruntlement of the other groups that were not specifically at the table to surface and start bringing back older festering conflicts. So, there has been a kind of upsurge in community-on-community raiding and violence that I think a lot of people did anticipate, but it wasn't really addressed within the discussions on the Peace Agreement itself. In part, I think this was because there was kind of an optimism that took over the negotiations that made people want to turn a blind eye to that reality of things and the impact of having a whole separate internal Southern dynamic that would clearly come into play after the Agreement was signed. There was little thought on the fact that there would need to be some way to deal with it.

Now, you know, different governments tried to do different bits. We in the field tried to coordinate our efforts to get the different communities talking and have some kind of dialogue. We tried to get the different groups meeting and to address these problems even before the Agreement was signed. But part of the problem, to be perfectly honest, was that the SPLM liked to believe that they did in fact represent all of Southern Sudan. If dialogue was going to happen, it was pretty much going to happen on their terms.

Q: How is the SPLM handling this now? Are they reaching out to the other communities in the South?

A: That I honestly don't know.

Q: We know that the North has not totally done its share of talking to the parties bordering the North, including Darfur.

A: Right. There were a couple of efforts at very high level, such as two dialogues sponsored by the Moi Institute in Kenya. Neither of them were particularly pretty. There was a civilian one and a military one. At the military dialogue with Garang, a new Northern air commander, whose name I can't remember but who had for a very long time been fighting the SPLM and had been a kind of government proxy, stood up and started talking about how he didn't see how the North could be talking about reconciliation with the SPLM, after the SPLM had massacred so many in the airfields. It just looked like it was not going to be good at all. But, there were some initial results out of that conference. In fact, Garang's death and Salva Kiir's rise to the Presidency may have helped more in that regard because Kiir did have connections that Garang did not. In that respect, Kiir was able to reach out to some of the new air commanders who had traditionally been more aligned with the Government and draw them into his camp. But there is always the problem that the commanders don't necessarily speak for all of their underlings. The underlings will break off into their own factions, and the Northern Government is always ready to exploit those divisions. The SPLM likes to say that the Government sparks the divisions. I think they're in a bit of denial. I think the divisions are there to begin with, and the SPLM and Southerners in general need to figure out how to work through the divisions and not let the Northern Government exploit them. In many instances, the South is offering up an opening, and then the Government moves in and just puts a spark here or there, and events unroll.

Q: Well you were on the ground. Could you comment on the role of the international community, whether you were all coordinating? Secondly, could you comment on the role of Kenya and how they perceived this implementation phase?

A: The international community worked fairly closely, but it was a very small core group. It was us and the Norwegians and the British and the Italians. The Kenyan role was somewhat 'iffy' at first. At a certain point in time, there were questions about corruption within the leadership and their ability to lead the process. My understanding is that the international community made a sort of concerted approach to get Sumbeiywo back on the job. He had apparently made a previous attempt at one point in the past, but had not been particularly successful. But this time around, he had the strength of leadership to pull it together for the parties. His was an interesting dynamic. I am told that, when they finally signed the Machakos Agreement, they'd had a set period of time in which to get this done. When they had gotten down to the last 24 hours and didn't quite have it there yet, Sumbeiywo shut the two sides in a room and said, "You're not leaving until it's done." He had the force of personality to do that. But, he also understood his limitations. He built a team around him that overtook those limitations, and the international community provided the money to pay for those people around him. So he didn't pretend, and he didn't try to be a constitutional expert. He worked with the people who had that expertise, learned from them, and would defer to them in meetings. But when they needed a hammer, he would crack down on the two sides. I think, he was also good at reading the two sides. In the final days, just before, at the very end of December, 2004, it had taken much longer than anyone had hoped to get to that point where they really were, at the last few issues before having everything hammered out and done. Sumbeiywo said he thought, in the end, that it was good that they had all of that time to work together. The long process had forged relationships at the uppermost level, the Garang-Taha relationship, and also at the worker bee level. I think they were able to get past seeing each other as enemies, and seeing each other as partners who could actually work together.

Q: Is there a current role for Kenya in the implementation phase?

A: If there is, I don't think that Kenya is really paying attention. It was interesting to watch. Sumbeiywo remained very interested and involved to the extent that he could be, but I got an immediate sense from the rest of the Government of Kenya that they felt, "Okay. That's done. It was a success. Let's move on."

Q: Do the Kenyans perceive themselves as having a stake in the success of the CPA implementation?

A: I don't think they've looked that far ahead. Also, I think the Kenyans made a misstep in not sending Sumbeiywo to be part of the Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC). That appears to have been a simple Kenyan ethnic calculation. They kept Sumbeiywo on because they knew that he was doing the right job until the Agreement was signed. But then, in terms of following through, he was considered a Moi person. He was affiliated with the Moi regime. That baggage seems to have worked against him in spite of the good that he could have done as providing continuity, and making sure that the AEC was following through or being the conscience of the sides in terms of implementing the Agreement.

Q: Do you think we have any influence to seek Sumbeiywo's support to join the Assessment and Evaluation Commission? It seems that Kenya has a stake in the outcome for several reasons: the refugee camps; and, should the South vote for independence, they are planning to transact most of their business through Kenya. Is that correct?

A: Yes, the South plans to transact business through Kenya, through Uganda. They'll find whatever way out they can, and that's what Kenya is focused on. I mean, they very much want to get the proceeds of a developed South, whether it's an independent South or a united Sudanese Government. They just don't seem to have made that connection that they need to remain engaged with the Peace Agreement. Part of Kenya's baggage on this is not so much on the Sudan process, but on the Somalia process. They feel somewhat burned by the international community. There were all kinds of bills racked up, again and again. There were questions about corrupt deals on the Somalia process, so the international community would not come forward and help the Kenyan Government. As much as the Kenyans want to do what they can to address the problems in their neighborhood, because they recognize that they have an impact on them, they don't want to get embroiled in anything that is going to cost them. I think there is just not really a willingness to engage on that. Perhaps there is also little understanding of the need to engage on these interim steps to ensure that Kenya gets the good deals that it could get.

I also think, to a certain extent, that Kenya has fallen victim to what Southern Sudan could well fall victim to. To a certain extent, Kenya has already fallen victim to the quote unquote "investors" who want to come in quickly to Sudan, which they see as going to be a land of riches. But they're not necessarily the most reputable investors. They're people who are in it for a quick turnaround. They're not necessarily going to invest in infrastructure, in social welfare and social development projects. So you may see sort of a quick burst of energy and a quick infusion of cash, but in the long run it's not necessarily the best thing for Southern Sudan and it's not necessarily the best thing for Kenya. It may be the best thing for a few select individuals, but not for the economy as a whole.

Q: I would think that Kenya would be building a road or a railroad to Southern Sudan, and getting transportation links in place.

A: You would think. There has been a lot of talk, but not a lot of action. Part of it is Kenya's own internal political problems. You know, they are focused on their internal political rivalries. So, the business of government is being done a lot at the technical level and not so much at the policy level. When you need to reach a major policy decision, like whether to build a railroad that goes up and meets the railroad in Sudan, people aren't looking at it. The people who need to look at it aren't looking at it.

Q: How would you characterize the attitudes of the various parties, in this case, the North and South? Of course, personalities played an important role, but is there any particular problem that you can see where we should be intervening to help, together with the international community? What else can we do to make this process be a success with a view to the elections and referendum? 2011 is really right around the corner.

A: Yes and the difficulty since January 2004 has been how to deal with Darfur and how to make sure Darfur does not wipe out any attention to the North-South Agreement. I don't think anyone has found a really good way to strike a balance. Clearly, it is a positive thing that the North and South have this Agreement. We need to do everything that we can to try to push both sides to work together. But at the same time, we can't countenance what the Government is doing in Darfur. The SPLM has had its own difficulties trying to get its voice heard on the issue of Darfur. And you know, people have said, "Well the U.S. Government is speaking with two voices to the National Congress Party Government or portion of the Government." On the one hand, we like what they're doing on counter terrorism. On the other hand, we criticize them for what they're doing in Darfur. People forget that there is a third element. We need to be working with them in some way on what they're doing with the South to implement the CPA. That just complicates things even more. It's an awkward and unmanageable triangle. In some ways, until you get Darfur sorted out, we're not really going to be able to do as much as we can and should be doing on supporting the North-South Agreement.

Q: Well who are the players in the Darfur decision making? Is it the North? I mean, does Salva Kiir have any input in this?

A: Salva Kiir has tried to have input and has tried to have his people included in negotiations. Again, this is something that fell off my radar, so I don't know where they left it, but it was a battle for him to get his own people included in those negotiations. I can't see how he can have influence when, at this moment, it seems pretty clear that the Government is ramping up its activity in Darfur rather than backing off.

Q: And there are other regions where there is also potential conflict.

A: Yes, yes. Which is what the Government fears. I think Garang may have had a strategy of using those as different pressure points on the Government. But I think the Government looks at the South as the camel's nose under the tent and Darfur as the rest of the head trying to get in. I think the Government is fully aware that the East could go bad, and the North could go bad, and they could find themselves just set upon from four different fronts. That may be why you see such a virulent response to the events in Darfur. The North may have the sense that they have to beat it down, and not let another one go, rather than seeing it from the angle of responding to the needs of these regions, otherwise we're going to be out of jobs. It's the very old school mentality of clamping down on it to make it go away, rather than thinking in terms of addressing the root causes of the problem and potentially gaining a longer legitimate life in politics.

Q: Was this something that eluded the international community when they were devising the CPA negotiations? The inclusion of all the different factions?

A: Well, yes. That's why it goes back to the argument made by the NGO and think tank community that you needed to have more voices than just the SPLM in those negotiations.

Q: And today in the implementation?

A: Yes. Now, there is a downside of that. I think our philosophy and that of the other internationals was that if you tried to bring in all of those other voices, there would be no way that you would have had a CPA today. You may have still been in negotiations if you were lucky, but there's no way that you would have had it wrapped up. So, you know, I don't know where the correct answer lies. Clearly, there are problems with having gone ahead with just the SPLM.

Q: And the CPA tried to accommodate the four regions, including Abyei, the Blue Nile, and Nuba Mountains, right?

A: Yes, and even that, those were not perfect Agreements. I think there was a bit of a sense of betrayal, certainly from the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile side. I think they were hoping that they would be able to get the same deal that Abyei got: that at the end of six years they could vote for independence or vote to go with the South. But the problem was that there was no historical precedent. They had no other leg to stand on. Abyei had specifically agreed to go with the North at a particular point in history, where as the others had always fallen within that Northern realm of control.

Q: Are we coordinating today with the international community? We put so much effort in. Are we still coordinating with the Norwegians, UK and Italy on this or?

A: I honestly don't know. At the point at which I stopped following the issue, the UK had a person permanently or semi-permanently located in Southern Sudan. From our side, because Khartoum was able to more easily access the South. I fell out of that dynamic. I am sure that the Norwegians have increased their presence. They were establishing a semi-permanent presence in Rumbek, and I'm sure that it has moved to Juba. In terms of regular coordination, I honestly don't know what happens and what doesn't happen.

Q: Is that something we should be recommending or looking at as a lesson learned? Do you recommend that there be international coordination and follow up?

A: It's certainly worth a recommendation, yes, yes.

Q: Darfur of course is a complete distraction at this point. Is this a question of just needing more dollars and more donor focus?

A: On Darfur or on Southern Sudan?

Q: On Southern CPA implementation, building an infrastructure-

A: I don't think the answer can actually be more dollars. I think that the Southerners just don't have the means to cope with much more than what they are getting now. And they are getting, certainly from the U.S. side, a considerable package. I think if you were to try to do any more, they would be overwhelmed. They would try to do as much as they could with it, but I think you would end up with mismanagement either because there are so many resources there that people would be tempted to pull from the till. There could also be mismanagement simply because the people don't have the experience dealing with these sums of money and the sizes of these projects. So I think what we are trying to do in terms of assistance to Sudan at the moment is as much as Sudan can absorb. Frankly, these amounts are probably as much as we can administer reasonably anyway. Certainly, there should be room for growth, and if everything proceeds as it should, I see no reason why we couldn't plus up and allow things to grow. But I think we need to be a little careful about putting in more money than they can realistically work with.

Q: Well looking at your tealeaves, what do you see as the outcome of the referendum?

A: I really think that the South is going to vote for independence. I was never convinced that Garang did a good job of selling his vision to the general population in the South. In any conversation that you or any NGO would have in the South, there was a sense of frustration that they actually had to wait six years before they could have their vote. Even though, between the SPLM and the National Congress Party there may have been some development of relationships, there has been no further development of relationships. No, I don't get of sense of a common Sudanese identity, and I don't think six years is long enough to convince Southerners that it's more to their advantage to be part of a large common country than it is to do their own thing. I think part of that is an unrealistic expectation about what they will get out of oil. I think oil makes them better off than someplace like the Central African Republic, but it is not the answer to all of their problems. Oil doesn't help overcome the fact that they would be a landlocked country in the middle of Africa. The examples of that are not positive. I tried to make that argument to people, and it would not resonate at all. They were convinced that they could find a way to make independence work. They really just wanted to be rid of the Northerners and have a chance to do it on their own.

Q: Well this is where the Kenya insight is so very interesting.

A: Yes.

Q: Because you would think that Kenya also would ...-

A: Would want to seize the opportunity.

Q: Well they would want to see a successful referendum. They wouldn't want to see the South collapse.

A: Right.

Q: Which seems, given the lack of infrastructure that this is another element of this picture to consider.

A: Yes.

Q: So from all your expertise, would you consider the CPA as a model for conflict resolution and for resolving other conflicts? Do you see the CPA as successful?

A: I think there are elements that you can take from the exercise. I think it is like looking at how countries go about their different democratization efforts. I think there are positives that you can pull out of it. As a complete package, clearly the CPA does have shortcomings. But I think some of the shortcomings came as a result of trying to address the needs of the moment. I think you are always going to have that to a certain extent. It is always going to be a somewhat imperfect process. But I do think that there are lessons that you can draw from the process. I do think it's unfortunate that things had to get to the stage of Garang and Taha doing so much directly. I think both the delegations on both sides should have been more empowered by their leaderships. Unfortunately, you were dealing with two entities that were not democratic on either side, and the SPLM would take grave offense at that. But Garang made the decisions. In one instance, he publicly chastised his lead negotiator for having given away too much. After that moment, I think no one in the SPLM was willing to put their head on the block in the negotiations, which is why it got to the point of having to be Garang and Taha having the discussions themselves. But ideally, in negotiations, you should have more of a working-level discussion on the details, and then be able to refer things back to the top leadership. I think the process may have suffered somewhat from having such high-level personalities really dealing with the nuts and bolts of things. Garang, I think, personally thrived on the give-and-take. I think he liked pushing the Government to the brink. I think Taha was worn out by that process. I'm not sure that that was the most effective way to go about it. Ultimately, the SPLM did get a lot out of that approach to the negotiations.

Q: Today, within the SPLM, do you think there's leadership to delegate and prioritize?

A: If they have a chance of continuing on as the leaders of the South, they need to be performing now and doing the best job that they can to get some institutions in place. You know, the SPLM is incredibly thin on the ground, but I do think that they have qualified people who should be able to pull this together, make a good run at it and leave something positive behind, or withstand the test of elections and stay on. I think they really didn't know what to do when Garang was killed, but I think they have figured out that there is an organization in place, they have certain commonalities, and they just need to find some way to pull that together and let themselves move forward.

Q: Any final thoughts? What could we have done differently, long-term or short-term? Or did we do our best?

A: We did our best. You know, there were times when our desire to see the process move quickly may have lost us allies, even in that small international group and with Sumbeiywo. We tend to want to see momentum go and move as quickly as possible forward. There was a lot of fairly slow deliberation, which I think Sumbeiywo was comfortable with as long as it was going in the right direction. I think he wanted to see things done correctly, and not just done so that they met a certain deadline. And you know, our American approach tends to be too impatient for that, so we did occasionally knock heads with Sumbeiywo and the people around him about the pace at which things were going. I think we need to learn a little more patience in that regard. Sumbeiywo was the head of the process, and there was a tendency on our part to want to push him. This was, you know, a failure to read his personality and read how he could be pushed and

how he could not be pushed. I think our relationship with the mediation could have been better if we had worked that relationship more carefully.

Q: Well, this has been a wonderful interview. Thank you.