

United States Institute of Peace  
The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training  
Sudan Experience Project

**Interview # 15 – Executive Summary**

*Interviewed by: Marilyn Bruno*

*Initial Interview Date: September 7, 2006*

*Copyright 2006 USIP & ADST*

The Interviewee, a former U.S. Government official, summarized the reasons why the implementation of the CPA was not going well. First, the South perceives that the North is not interested in implementing this Agreement and never was. The Southerners believe that the Northerners are also cheating them out of a substantial amount of oil revenues, and monopolizing up to seventy percent of the positions of power in government, the military, and the civil service. Second, the North has not respected the terms of the CPA's side agreements. For example, the North has apparently bowed to Muslim constituents in anticipation of future elections, and refused to return control of the Abyei region back to the Dinkas, as recommended by the Abyei Boundaries Commission. In Blue Nile province, the Governor appointed by the Central Government was almost killed when told an audience of Funji that they would never be admitted in the civil service. Third, without Garang, there is no advocate for a unified Sudan. Fourth, the Agreement is intentionally complicated, to avoid vagueness of past, failed accords, but may be overwhelming the capacity of both parties, particularly the South.

The Interviewee believes that several factors are causing the North to ignore its commitments under the CPA. After 9/11, when Sudan was isolated, the North understood that it was in their interest to negotiate the CPA. Now, with the United States on the defensive in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, the West Bank and Gaza, and with fundamentalist forces resurgent, Bashir has allies that he did not have before. Bashir may also be calculating that, with the Europeans focused on Lebanon, no Western country will send troops to Darfur. He may disregard sanctions from the West, since his new oil wealth relies on relationships with China, Pakistan, and Malaysia. Bashir may also look to garner regional influence by tapping underground water and mineral resources.

The Interviewee recommends that all the donors, Sudan's neighboring countries, and the UN coordinate their policies on Sudan, their support, and their measure to ensure that the CPA is respected and implemented by the parties. By talking to the Sudanese Government, the U.S. can keep dialogue open, and better assess if and when additional measures are warranted, such as imposing a no-fly zone. According to the Interviewee, the real risk is that Sudan could break up, becoming like Somalia or Congo. This would be a catastrophe from a humanitarian point of view. Having the largest country in Africa in chaos would also be very disruptive for the continent, and for the rest of the world, particularly when Sudan could be used as a pawn to advance the jihadist agenda.

United States Institute of Peace  
The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training  
Sudan Experience Project

**Interview # 15**

*Interviewed by: Marilyn Bruno  
Initial Interview Date: September 7, 2006  
Copyright 2006 USIP & ADST*

*Q: Thank you for taking the time to help advance this project. Do you have any thoughts on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, how things are going at this snapshot in time, and certainly how the implementation phase is progressing?*

A: At this particular time, things do not appear to be going very well. There are a variety of reasons for that. One, the perception in the South is that the North is not interested in implementing this Agreement and never was. The person who negotiated the Agreement primarily was Dr. John Garang, who died in the end of July last year. Dr. John had national aspirations. In fact, there's considerable evidence given. He said that four million people, but I think that probably two to three million people, greeted him when he returned to Khartoum after being leader of the Southern revolt for twenty years. And this is when he first arrived back in Khartoum. So there was a massive turnout. It was not just Southerners who were refugees or displaced people who were there. There were Northerners there who did not like the Northern government and saw John Garang as a potential for changing that situation.

The Southerners believe that the Northerners are cheating them out of a substantial amount of money in terms of oil revenues. Oil prices have dramatically increased, as you know, in the last year and yet the Southerners' income from oil, under the Agreement, has declined at a time when oil prices have more than doubled over the last two years. And so it's not an unreasonable assumption that the Northerners are keeping the profits that they're making from the rise in oil prices. They have transferred some money to the South, I think \$803 million last year, but this year it'll be somewhere less than that. So there's a question of good faith.

Two, there are three areas of potential explosion in the CPA that were dealt with separately by side agreements. One of them is Abyei, which is sort of the Jerusalem for the Dinka tribe, the largest tribe in the South. The king, the paramount chief of the Dinkas comes from Abyei, and Abyei had been taken by an Arab Messiriya militia, which had been armed by the Northern Government, as a way of undermining the South. This is sort of a debate over the heartland, the capital of this cultural center of this particular tribe. There was a Commission that was supposed to be established and determine what to do with Abyei. The Commission was appointed, established. It ruled that the Dinka had a right to the city, and that their claims were legitimate. The North has

refused to implement any of it. In fact, apparently one of the Vice Presidents, told one of the leaders of the SPLM that there will never be any transfer of possession.

*Q: So it's a breach?*

A: It's a breach, from the perspective of Southerners. I haven't heard the Northern perspective. I frankly think the reasons the Northerners refused to implement is because the Rizeigat, the Messiriya militia from the Rizeigat tribe, who are Arabs and supporters of the Central Government, basically said, "We will go into open revolt if you attempt to implement this." And so implementation of this would undermine the sagging level of support, even among the Arab tribes, for the Central Government. So I think there are political reasons in the North why they have not implemented. They don't really care, I think, personally. It doesn't affect their interests. It affects their political base in anticipation of elections.

*Q: You said that the CPA dealt with three issues, Abyei being one.*

A: Yes, the CPA dealt with three regional areas that were explosive. The Nuba Mountains, where the Agreement seems to be actually implemented. There are tensions, there's some conflict, but it's being implemented, basically. In Blue Nile province, there have been very provocative statements by the Governor appointed by the Central Government, who was almost stoned to death at a rally. If the SPLM army had not been there he would have been killed. He told the people who were from the Funj kingdom that none of them would ever enter the civil service and that the Government would not fire any of the Arabs. They were going to keep the Funj people out. Why he would say this to a group of people in front of him is beyond my comprehension, but he apparently did it and there was a riot, and he was almost killed. So there are still hard feelings, but even in Blue Nile the Agreement is being implemented.

So of the three areas, Abyei is still a problem. A lot of the commissions that were supposed to have been created to deal with other issues have not been appointed. I'm not sure it's because of bad faith on either side, particularly the North. I think it's because they're just not priorities. I might also add that part of this is deep suspicion, after years of civil war and a lot of people being killed, by both sides of each other. So I think there's a question of trust.

Three, I think that slow implementation is a function of Dr. Garang's dying. He negotiated the Agreement. He was the only real leader in the South who believed in a unified Sudan. Everybody else believes the South should separate. And with his death, there is no advocate for a unified Sudan.

The fourth conclusion you could reach from all of this, is that the Agreement is extremely complicated. Garang negotiated, he told me, to avoid all of the weaknesses of the last agreement that led to a temporary end to the civil war, the Addis Ababa agreements in 1978 or '79. Garang was involved in the *Anyanya* rebellion that was ended with the Addis Ababa agreements. He knows all of the weaknesses in those accords and so he told me he was going to make sure that these agreements were comprehensive enough to

cover the areas that led to the collapse of the agreement the last time. But what he did by doing that was to create an extremely complex document, in a country where the systems of governance, in the North and even more in the South, are fragile or non-existent. And so the institutions needed to implement all of this may not be in place. It's not all a function of just sort of good will. Good will is not sufficient. But then when you have all of these benchmarks that are important to one side or the other and they don't get met, then suspicion increases and it makes things worse and worse.

So I think the CPA is at risk right now. That could change. Darfur is making it worse because the Government feels under more stress from the international community. President Bashir has been using rather jingoistic language. He has been in contact with Ahmadinejad of Iran. They have invited forty Shi'a leaders to visit, to provide technical assistance. Osama bin Laden has been making statements saying that, "We need to oppose the CPA and send holy warriors to Darfur to oppose UN peace keeping troops." So the Islamic movement, on the Shi'a side and the al Qaeda side, are both now making public statements about Sudan, which is not helping. It is alarming the Southerners, who see themselves as a wall against the encroachment of Islamic fundamentalism into Africa.

*Q: Which had disappeared for a while?*

A: No, it never disappeared. It was altered in terms of the senior leadership of the government, in terms of their pursuit of it outside Sudan. They'd never given up their pursuit of that in Northern Sudan, but Turabi saw Sudan as a base of operations for the Islamization of Africa. Other African leaders also thought that that's what their intention was, and saw the rebellion in the South not just as a conflict in one country over one set of issues but an issue that had to do with all of Africa. In fact, John Garang received help from as far away as Southern Africa and many of the neighboring countries supported him as well.

*Q: So, is there some monitoring going on?*

A: There are peace keeping troops that are in the South now from the UN. There are massive changes going on in the South, good changes, in the economy. A road has opened up. Juba food prices have dropped. Thousands of people and vehicles and business have opened up in Juba. The population of Juba, the Southern capital, has probably swelled to around 400,000 people. The NGO and contractor community and UN are moving in. They're rebuilding the infrastructure of the city. There are traffic jams. A lot of money's being invested in reconstruction privately. As a result of that, you're seeing changes in the South, The peoples' expectations of improvements in their lives are very high, and I'm not sure they can be met.

*Q: So what's diverting the implementation process is general lack of capacity and infrastructure of institutions to implement.*

A: Well, there's a difference between the reconstruction of the South and the CPA. The CPA's not a reconstruction plan, it's a political settlement with certain sort of

frameworks. But, yes, part of the problem with the implementation of the CPA is weak institutional capacity, in both the Northern Government and the Southern. It is mutual suspicion, deep suspicion of each other's intentions, particularly the South of the North. It is the larger context of the Arab world's, view of the West and the pan-Islamic fundamentalist movement, which has now seized Sudan as a battleground. It's the death of Dr. Garang. It's the complexity of the CPA, just in terms of what is required by it.

*Q: So, a lot of this could not have been foreseen. The Garang death was key. Apparently, Darfur was not foreseen. But do you think some of the marginalized groups that were not included in the Agreement should have been brought in?*

A: No, depends on what you mean by that. There were three areas that were outside, geographically. Southern Sudan, Abyei, Blue Nile and the Nuba Mountains, were included, as side agreements. So they were dealt with and not ignored because Garang insisted that his coalition would be at risk if he didn't deal with these other areas. There is still a problem with the Northern government providing arms to militias in the South. There's one group, the LRA, which is in Northern Uganda but is causing chaos in Southern Sudan, which has been funded and supported and provisioned by the Northern Government for many years. Among the worst atrocities in Africa have been committed by these people and that is really upsetting Southerners.

*Q: Did the Darfur problem arise because the Darfurians felt marginalized?*

A: Darfur is separate, now, but it is related in the sense some people think Garang encouraged the rebellion in Darfur to sort of keep the Northern government off balance. I think it would have happened with or without Garang, but Garang certainly did, early on in the conflict, support the rebellion. And there are rumors that some people in the South are still providing support to the rebels in Darfur. I don't know if that's true or not, but I've heard that. And of course there's a rebellion in the East, with the Beja people. They have rebellions all over the country and the essential reason is that there's a perception, which is supported by some evidence, considerable evidence, that a small group of Arab tribes from the Nile River valley north of Khartoum have basically dominated the Central Government since 1956, when the country achieved independence from Britain. There are four tribes that make up about six per cent of the population of the country, but that constitute sixty to seventy per cent of the senior civil service, senior military officers, cabinet ministers, deputy cabinet ministers, and all of the powerful positions in Sudanese society.

*Q: So the four tribes hold a majority percent of all the positions of power.*

A: Sixty to seventy per cent. There's a study that was called *The Black Book*. It came out in Khartoum, and was roundly attacked by the Central Government, for obvious reasons. It is published in English and in Arabic. I've read it, and I've asked some Sudanese scholars, "Is this true?" They said, "Yes, it is true." So the perception is that this is a war between the North and the South or between the center and Darfur. It's

actually a set of rebellions across the country. I think in terms of the four tribes, they will deny this is all true. They get very upset when you say this.

There is another question, as well, of identity and race. Books been written on this by Francis Deng and other people. There are actually very few Arabs anywhere in Sudan. They're all "Arabized." If you meet them, you will see that racially they are not Arabs. They are Africans who have been completely absorbed by Arab culture and they regard themselves as Arabs. They get very upset if you say anything otherwise. But, from a genetic standpoint, they're not Arabs. They're all Africans. But there are these questions of what language you speak, what's your religion, what tribe are you from, where are you from, what's the pure Arab identity of the country? Way up on the border with Egypt is a tribe called the Nubian tribe. The Nubians were Coptic Christians until the 18<sup>th</sup> Century. Islam came to Sudan late. The two original Muslim kingdoms were not Arabs. They were from the Funj kingdom, who are Africans. The Fur are in rebellion now because they're an African tribe. They're not Arabs and they don't want to be called Arabs. They have their own language, and it's an African language. The Fur kingdom converted to Islam in the 16<sup>th</sup> century, before the Arabs even came or other groups were "Arabized."

The Nubian people kept their Coptic Bibles and I am told they still worship privately as Christians. They all converted rather than be slaughtered. And a very funny story is told about a senior Muslim fundamentalist leader, who was from up in the Nubian area. The Muslim leader was so proud that Islam entered Sudan through the Nubian tribes, and was so proud that Islam's birthplace in this country was in Nubia. And an old man stood up and said, "Yes and we hope it will exit Sudan through the Nubian tribe also, so we can go back to what we were before, which is not Muslim."

So you have all these tensions, and there is a sense of insecurity, I believe. Even though they won't admit it, among that six per cent of the population that runs the country, I think the Central Government has moved away from the purely Islamic, jihadist, internationalist agenda of Hassan Turabi, to one where they wish the North to be Islamic and they wish to maintain power. Turabi was sort of the theologian behind all this jihadist agenda, but is now alienated from the Government..

And the reason that power is so important now and it wasn't important 22 years ago when the rebellion started is oil. There's now something you can lose. They've all become enriched by all of this. I don't mean necessarily stolen money, but you can see the oil wealth at work. When I arrived in Khartoum in 1989, it was dilapidated. It's now much richer, much wealthier. New buildings are being built because of the oil revenues. And so these four small tribes that control the country wants to maintain power because I think they want to maintain wealth and power and position in society. I think that's what this is about, fundamentally.

*Q: Does the international community have any influence? How can we increase our influence?*

A: This is very sensitive. I think Bashir sees that the United States is on the defensive in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in Lebanon, in West Bank and Gaza. Fundamentalist forces are resurgent, and he now has allies that he did not have before. He was isolated after 9/11. He is no longer isolated. I think that's why the North made the decision to negotiate this Agreement. They did not want to be international pariahs. Well, now they have company. I think it's empowering them to have us perceived as being on the defensive in the Arab world. Not in the whole world, I mean just in the Arab world. I think because the Europeans are now focused on Lebanon, Bashir probably thinks no one is going to give any Western troops to go into Darfur. So, he can sort of stonewall that because everybody's focused on Lebanon. I think he's made a set of calculations and he's now carrying that out.

*Q: And what impact would that have?*

A: The psychological impact. I think they changed their strategy of how to deal with this stuff.

*Q: So we don't have the credibility to go in and threaten sanctions? We don't have the ability to exert pressure?*

A: We already have sanctions in place. We've had sanctions in place for ten years. They have used their oil wealth to get China on their side, as well as Pakistan, which also has an oil company that does business there, and the Petronas Oil Company of Malaysia. So they have support beyond the Arab world, in the Muslim world and in China. China is a very powerful force which is in the Perm Five in the UN. The Africans have been unwilling to have a massive confrontation, although they did deny Bashir the presidency of the Organization of African Union, which was orchestrated by the U.S.

*Q: So how do we remedy this? More negotiations?*

A: I think first we need to make sure all the donors, the neighboring countries and the UN are all on the same page diplomatically. We need to outline what we need to do, what steps we need to take, what the policy should be, and how we're going to handle it. The reason we have the North-South Agreement is because the neighboring countries and the UN and the three big powers that supported the negotiating team, which is Britain, the U.S. and Norway, all were united. The Northern Government has a history of divide and conquer. They constantly manipulate opinion. They will go to the French and make a deal there, go to the British and make another deal. They'll go to their oil company friends and make another deal, and divide everybody up, because they don't want a unified world against them. And they've been very effective at it. I think it's going to be hard to do because the Europeans may not want to be as confrontational as some people in the United States. Although I have to say that when the old government was in Germany, the memory of Hitler was so central to the Foreign Minister's world view that he took the genocide issue as a very serious issue. I don't know where Chancellor Merkel is on this, or her government. With Tony Blair's political problems in England, I don't know

how far they're willing to go. I'm going to study British public opinion on this, because their alliance with the United States is at risk because of the unrest in the Labour Party. The French are cooperating, but they had a real concern with the potential collapse of Chad, which would require them to send troops in, in their view. I think they also have business interests, which they have denied to me. But I think there are business interests involved in this as well.

I didn't know all these years, but also found out that the largest underground water aquifer in the world is in Southern Libya, Southern Egypt, Darfur and part of Chad. It's the size of Germany. It's a thousand meters down. It's prehistoric water. Gaddafi has spent \$24 billion building an underground river to move the water to his population centers along the Mediterranean coast, which have run out of water. He chose to do that rather than build desalinization plants. I don't understand, and perhaps no one understands, exactly how the Libyans see that water in terms of the rebellion in Darfur, because a lot of it is in Darfur. The Libyans are funding part of the rebellion in Darfur.

*Q: Water is the basis of survival not only of Africa, but the world.*

A: It is. So I think we have miscalculated in not understanding that the Libyans have an economic interest in this. It's a matter of survival. They've invested \$24 billion and this water is how they are going to survive for the next fifty years. I don't see any other reason. Do they think that chaos is good for them? So they think stability is good? Do they want the rebels to continue? I don't understand how they see the calculus of this or whether they would even admit that they have an interest. But they have an interest.

And the Egyptians, of course, believe they've been left out of all of this. They have an interest in seeing, of course, that there's a stable government in Sudan because, if the Nile River waters are ever diverted or if there's chaos in Sudan, it could endanger the existence of Egypt. Without the Nile River and the flows through the Nile, there is no Egypt. The four countries to which they send their best diplomats are the United States, Sudan, Ethiopia and the United Nations. Why is that? Because that's where the Nile River comes from. So they have a vested interest.

So it's very complicated in terms of getting unanimity of opinion on what to do. The Government knows that and they play on it to give themselves more room to operate.

*Q: So, looking back, we see a complicated Agreement, problems of political will, problems with the institutional capacity to implement. We're doing as much as we can and we're pretty much working with our partners, burden sharing. Transparency of oil accounts has to straighten out.*

A: There isn't going to be any transparency, because it's very hard to calculate what's actually coming out of those oil wells. And, frankly, I suspect that a lot of the advanced military hardware that they're now using against the rebellion in Darfur and that they used against the Southerners, helicopter gunships, weaponry they never had before, was



bought on credit with future oil revenues. I've heard that. If that's the case, then that annoys the Southerners even more.

*Q: Whom did they buy it from?*

A: I think they bought it from Eastern Europe or from China, but I don't know that. I think the Czech munitions factories. I think maybe some of it's Russian. I don't actually know.

*Q: Yes, countertrade. Well, it's the way that it's done. All our major defense vendors do countertrade the same way. That's the name of that multibillion dollar game.*

A: It's a big game, too.

*Q: I've heard that the oil revenues are not as large as both sides seem to represent, that it's actually not a huge oil reserve, and it's very hard to extract from small pools.*

A: Yes, and I think it's also the case that it's got a lot of sulfur in it, so it needs a lot of refining. But, again, I'm not an expert on the oil industry.

*Q: Oil is largely being seen as the panacea of the country.*

A: It's not the panacea but, for a country of 38 million people that was among the poorest countries in the world. it was nor irrelevant. There are also large mineral deposits. There's gold. There are some areas with diamonds that have never been mined. The gold has not been mined. Most importantly, there's a stone that's used in cell phones and it's very expensive, and the only two places on earth where is found is in eastern Congo and in Sudan. It has never been touched in Sudan. There are large deposits of it. So the South, if there's peace and if they properly manage themselves, has the potential of using its natural resources to get a lot of money to build their society.

*Q: So they can move beyond gum arabic, which is an interesting commodity in itself. So what are the real lessons learned? What can we avoid doing in the future that we have here? Are there any lessons learned, or are we just trying our best, fending off unforeseen circumstances? Do you think we underestimated the complexity? One of the things that is so interesting was your comment that Osama bin Laden has called a jihad.*

A: Apparently the jihadist chat rooms on the Internet are all enflamed now over Darfur and Bashir's working that up. He's made two dozen statements in the last week alone, saying, "We're not going to allow these Crusaders to come in here." The fear they have is that, if the UN comes in, they're going to arrest the Northerners for war crimes and send them to the ICC, because they saw what happened in Bosnia. So that is apparently motivating some of this rather exaggerated rhetoric that Bashir is using. There's a fear that there are going to be war crime trials. And the UN has this list, we have a list, the ICC has a list. Who knows?

*Q: But what's interesting is that U.S. policy seems to have a different approach towards anything with a terrorist rubric on it.*

A: Well, that's another complication to this.

*Q: So this could open the doors to policymaking against a terrorist threat and unleash other things that have heretofore been out of the Sudan picture.*

A: We also have a relationship on counterterrorism, which they have facilitated that. In fact there's a rumor that the head of their secret police is now in Washington, just as this second genocide is beginning, to give us more information. It's a critical point. The five year anniversary of 9/11 is about to take place, but we're not going to send him back and tell him we're not going to talk to him. So, they are playing every card they have to neutralize us and to cause problems in the interagency process in the United States over the terrorism issue, the issue of the South, and the issue of Darfur. It's very complex.

*Q: So, to sum up, we can say that the CPA negotiation was a success to a certain degree*

A: Yes, because Bashir made the decision, with Taha, that they needed to engage with the West instead of being at war. Both sides made a calculation.

*Q: But now we're looking at a referendum in three years and frankly there's no reason to have a united Sudan if there's so much suspicion already and monopolization of government positions and so forth.*

A: The real risk in all of this is that Sudan could break up. It could become what Somalia is now, or what the Congo is. This would be a catastrophe from a humanitarian point of view, and counterterrorism point of view, because Sudan is the largest country in Africa, geographically. It's the size of the United States east of the Mississippi River. It's a massive country, and having it in chaos would be very bad for the neighborhood, for Africa, for the people who live there, and for the United States. But it could happen, it could happen. And that's the real fear I have, that the centrifugal forces tearing the country apart could get out of control and strengthen them inadvertently so much that we might have a collapse.

There were demonstrations yesterday or the day before yesterday in Khartoum, in Darfur. The military put them down but they dragged out an Islamic editor, an Islamicist editor of a newspaper and the extremist elements beheaded him in the streets of Khartoum. So there are forces at work inside the country that are really disturbing.

*Q: Well, let's step back and look at some history of Africa and colonizers drawing dots in sand. We've seen this particularly in regions bordering between cultures. And is this just one more example of the clashes of cultures.*

A: There may be something, but we've gone through decolonization and now it's history. It's interesting to know it. It's useful to know it. But history is not going to help us determine policy, I don't think.

*Q: The U.S. seems to have been ambivalent on recommending and end result, a federation or separate countries.*

A: We have an Agreement. There are people in the United States who think the CPA is flawed and think it should be renegotiated. I think that's madness, myself. We have an Agreement. It's the only one we've ever had, since the Addis Ababa accords, and the CPA is certainly much superior to the Addis Ababa accords. I don't think we can go back and renegotiate that. We should just try to make it work. They agreed to it. They negotiated. That's it. So having a long discussion about fix this thing or that, we can't open those negotiations up again or advocate doing it.

*Q: Well, should we say our favored outcome is a federation?*

A: Absolutely not. We should say, "Whatever the CPA is." It is a federation, that's what the CPA is, with a quasi-independent Southern state. But whatever it is, it is, and we should accept it. And any talk of renegotiating it would be, I think, just crazy.

*Q: And are congressional constituencies putting pressure in any direction or another?*

A: The advocacy groups in the United States are the most organized and militant they've been since the apartheid campaign of the Eighties. Churches in rural Maine know where Darfur is and know where Southern Sudan is. People in Colorado know where it is, and know what the issues are, when they couldn't tell you anything about any other African country. So this is a domestic issue now, a very powerful force, on the Left and the Right. And that means we can't make policy without considering what the impact of all this is. And that's not easy. The advocacy community's divided between people who are militants and want military intervention now regardless of what the consequences are. Some are extremely militant. One professor who, I think, is dying of cancer is writing a book on this and he is also a very partisan Democrat. He regards everything we do in the Administration as compromised. He's a purist. However, there's a big debate going on in a large portion of the advocacy community. I've seen their emails saying, "We cannot go in there unless the Sudanese Government agrees to it. No more regime change. No more military intervention without host Government approval."

*Q: They won't even let the UN in.*

A: No, but the point here is, the community is very divided, very divided, over that issue.

*Q: So the way forward is dialogue with our allies, dialogue with the UN, speak with a common voice, along with Sudan's African neighbors*

A: We've got to talk to the Sudanese Government. They won't tell us overtly, but they may give us some hints in these conversations as to where they're going. If they're going

a certain way and there's nothing that can be done to change that, then we may have to take a very aggressive policy. I don't mean military intervention necessarily, although there are some things we could do in terms of the no fly zone that might be very powerful, in order to change the dynamic. But it's not going to be easy and things are flying apart, in my view.

*Q: I am totally grateful to you. And if there's any other thoughts you have, please do let me know.*

A: I will.