This interviewee discusses the U.S. efforts to play a useful role in facilitating implementation of two key provisions of the CPA: the transformation of the SPLA from a guerilla to a conventional army, and reform of the security sector in the South. The goal is to help the SPLA create a military structure that is “accountable, professional, and well-trained,” and that has defense resources management capability, as well as logistical capability. The interviewee cites as two obstacles to progress the U.S. Congressional anti-terror sanctions, which restrict U.S. military assistance to Sudan, and the difficulty in getting approval for the necessary sanctions waivers.

In evaluating the implementation of some of the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) aspects of the CPA, the interviewee notes that the delays in the negotiations actually were favorable for the DDR process. Because the negotiations were so protracted, there was more time to plan this very complex and resource-intensive DDR process, and to sensitize those who were going to be involved to the DDR requirements. For example, the SPLM was persuaded to set up its own DDR committee even before the CPA was completed. The interviewee describes the elements needed for a successful DDR operation, including recruiting people who can act as a bridge between the military and civil society, along with providing the necessary education, jobs, health services, etc. that would enable reintegration. While he states that movements of Northern troops out of the South have occurred at a reasonable pace, the community recovery and reconstruction activities (roads, schools, health clinics, etc.) critical to the DDR strategy are lagging behind schedule.

In addition, the interviewee describes the key role the U.S. and others are playing to establish the International Military Advisory Team, in order to help create a Joint Defense Board (a new Ministry of Defense) as well as Joint Integrated Units so that North and South can cooperate in security sector reform. According to the interviewee, this previously-agreed effort has encountered new resistance from Khartoum.

This interviewee believes that the decision taken by the CPA to allow three military forces – the forces in the North; the Joint-Integrated Units in the North and the South with members from both sides; and the Government of South Sudan army, has been vindicated during the implementation phase as the correct option. Allowing the SPLM to retain its military has made them more trustful of their Northern partners and more self-confident in moving forward. Finally, the interviewee points out the
significance of the Nuba Mountain Agreement, a humanitarian ceasefire that demonstrated the potential for cooperation between the North and South, built confidence between the parties, and provided a model for subsequent agreements within the CPA.

In discussing the impact of Darfur on the implementation of the CPA, this interviewee believes that the transformation of the SPLA would probably be a little further along had Darfur not diverted resources – time, energy, and funding -- and that funding issues could continue to create tension between CPA implementation and implementation activities in Darfur.
Q: You have been involved with Sudan since 1999, is that right?


Q: Okay, we’re focusing the interviews at this time primarily on the implementation phase of the CPA, but obviously you have experience in the timeframe leading up to the signing of the Agreement, so feel free to bring that in as it illustrates what the process of implementation has been like. I think I’ll let you explain a little bit what you’re background is in terms of you’re work in Sudan.

A: Okay. I’m involved in the security affairs aspect. We have a small shop of people here working on various security-related issues in Africa, principally looking at conflict, peacekeeping, security assistance. Sudan has been a major item for the Administration since the early days. I’ve been involved in several negotiations including the Nuba Mountains, in Birgenstock, Switzerland, in the negotiations that took place in Naivasha, and in other places regarding the North/South and the Darfur ceasefire agreement. As well, I’ve been involved in implementing the aspects of those agreements on the logistics-side and the peacekeeping-side. Most of the analysis and work I’ve done has involved the security-side, including security sector reform, ceasefire, and certain DDR aspects.

Q: DDR is decommissioning...

A: No, sorry, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. It’s the process of taking the guns from the militias or rebel groups and bringing their members back into civil society. That’s the end result of a DDR process.

Q: You mentioned ceasefire involvement. Was that in the Nuba Mountains area, and what would you observe in terms of the success?

A: Well, right, a ceasefire was the first one of the four proposals of Senator Danforth. It was seen by many as the one where the rubber met the road to show if the parties would truly be able to abide by a humanitarian ceasefire and see it through, while the rest of the country remained in a state of, you know, low-level war. In fact, the humanitarian community was really pushing this one, and of course the people of the Nubas, who are quite interested in how that might take place. As it turned out, the negotiations was held
in a very disciplined environment in Birgenstock, Switzerland, led by a Swiss and U.S. team, and having six members from both the Government and the SPLM. Most of the SPLM personnel had connections in the Nubas, and the negotiations were led by a General from the Nubas. During that period, we actually came to agreements put together in a relatively short time. Then we went to the process of implementing, which took a lot longer, even longer than we had anticipated or desired, including the parties.

Q: And what were some of the obstacles that you encountered and I guess overcame in implementing that agreement?

A: Well, we worked closely with the Norwegians, who came into the picture. They were willing to put a one-star Brigadier General to the task of leading the Joint Military Commission (JMC) out there in the Nubas, and he put together a plan. We started to put together a team, mostly contractors on the U.S. side, and then some additional military members from the European side of the house. We cobbled together a small monitoring mission with the necessary logistic support and then just deployed to five different sites within the Nuba Mountains. We conducted monitoring activities from there, using helicopter and vehicle assets. That agreement was signed in January of 2002, and we really wanted to get the JMC up and running within, like, ninety days, thirty days, but we really didn’t see a full-fledged mission on the ground until about 180 days.

Q: That's the Joint Military Commission...

A: Yes. The JMC, in the Nuba Mountains. They called it the JMM, the Joint Monitoring Mission as well. -- JMC/JMM.

Q: And that mission continues to this day?

A: Well, in effect, it was wrapped into the UN Mission on January 9, 2005. It was up and running and then it’s vestiges continued for a few months as the UN Mission started to ramp up. Eventually, the UN Mission swallowed the JMM. The JMM went away and the UN Mission stood up.

Q: Right, but the Mission in fact does continue? The work needs to continue?

A: Yes, that’s right. The monitoring activities in the Nuba Mountains continues through today.

Q: Okay, and since you’ve probably had your finger on that, could you say that it’s still a peaceful environment there?

A: Yes. As a result of the special arrangements for the three areas, there’s been a little bit of tensions in Abyei. Well, there’s been a lot of tension in Abyei, but you haven’t seen that in the Nuba Mountains. Is that because of the years of peace that they were able to experience prior to 2005? I think that’s played a role in it, sure. And then they were able
to work through some of the political issues that were creating a strain there during the period of the humanitarian ceasefire.

Q: You make an important point. I did want to ask you about the Abyei boundary issue, and my understanding is the commission has issued its report, but the findings were not to the liking of the North, and so implementing the recommendations has proven somewhat difficult. How do you see the situation in Abyei?

A: Well, I’m not an expert on the Abyei issue. Obviously with oil issues, land reform issues are playing a role. Right there is a key piece of terrain within the North-South Sudan context. It’s not going to be easily resolved. Just like in the South, you’re going to have to seek local solutions as well as regional solutions -- especially local in this case. In terms of mechanisms and processes, this one would seem to, in my mind, be a place where not only the UN but also the AEC could play a role — the Assessment Evaluation Commission. Being a hand-holder to the CPA in terms of implementation, this one may be one where the AEC can play a helpful role.

Q: Now, I know others have discussed the AEC and that it is operational and we’re represented on it. There are perhaps some weaknesses to it. Would you care to comment on the role of the AEC in connection with the Abyei? I don’t want to say enforcement, it’s not the right term.

A: Right. I really don’t have anything other than what I said to you in terms of personal sort of thought that this might be an area for the AEC to gather some momentum.

Q: The AEC was mentioned as one of the key commissions. Actually, I planned to ask a little bit about other commissions too. But if that is one of the key commissions, is it one that impacts what you do on a daily basis?

A: Yes, my day-to-day work has not been heavily involved in the impact by the AEC at this stage. In terms of the North-South implementation, my focus is of course to provide some oversight on this mandate, the ceasefire, and the DDR aspects of it. But also the biggie for me is the effort to transform the SPLA from a guerilla to a conventional army in the South, and to help facilitate security sector reform in the South. The AEC has a tangential role there and I would think that the AEC could help in working with the GOS to galvanize support for the International Military Advisory Team. I don’t know if you’ve heard of the IMAT during any of your discussions? What we see in a lot of post-conflict processes is that, oftentimes, in the areas of security sector reform and DDR, international technical assistance is vital and critical. In some processes, it’s not as viable. Angola is a case in point, for example. In North-South Sudan, given the anxieties that the SPLM/A had about the security picture in the South post-Agreement, the United States and Secretary Powell at the time signaled to the SPLM that, in signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the U.S. would provide support to the SPLA in the South in standing up. It was a sine qua non for signing the Agreement in the minds of the SPLM. And so, the U.S. at that stage fully committed itself to providing support in this post-conflict period to the process of undertaking that transformation. So I’m giving a
long answer, but the idea here is that oftentimes you’re supporting the rebel parties, or the opposition parties, or the militias. In any of these post-conflict situations, these groups want to see some parts of the international community engaged and helping them work on their critical issue usually early on, which is security. You know, economic development and rehabilitation and reconstruction sometimes come a little bit later, slightly later. But first and foremost, they want their security requirements and needs addressed. Oftentimes, what we’ve seen in working with these rebels, former rebels, and militias in security sector reform, is that we can play a very helpful role. So that’s a key aspect of our work.

Q: Is the U.S. operating alone, or not? Do we have any partners in this?

A: Actually the AEC comes into this. The International Military Advisory Team was something we -- the UK, the U.S., Norway and the Netherlands, the Troika Plus -- had planned on even before the Agreement was signed. We had been planning and plotting together to form an IMAT for a few months, even in advance of the signing of the Agreement. We put together a Memorandum of Understanding on how we would proceed. A whole bunch of meetings were held in London and other places to lay that foundation. We also had gotten the consent of the Government officials during the Naivasha discussions that international advisory personnel were fine to be part of the process of bringing together Joint Integrated Units and the Joint Defense Board. That role was to be defined later, but the principle had been established even prior to January 9, 2005. You see that the Agreement includes a reference to the ability of the international community to provide support to this process of reforming the security sector post-Agreement. Even as we were standing up the IMAT last year, the Government in Khartoum said that it refused to allow the IMAT to become officially established through a “Status of Mission” agreement. In fact, in 2005 and the early part of this year, they actually violated the grounds of the IMAT and started taking property and giving it back and just basically disturbing the whole process. So, the Troika Plus were on the path to setting up this institution to directly work with the Joint Defense Board and the Joint Integrated Units and support the security sector reform of the two parties as they came together, the North and the South. That was very much an international effort.

When it comes to the SPLA transformation effort—

Q: Let me interrupt a second just to ask about the Government of Sudan, because they had agreed to this as part of the CPA and then they decided to make life difficult. Could you explain what you think is the motivation for that?

A: Well, there’s concern by some of the forces in the North that they don’t want any international involvement in any of the sensitive areas of their activity. They are probably concerned about people seeing the way they are managing the whole security sector reform process. They believe that they have the institutional capacity to undertake all of the training and some of the equipping activities for this process of bringing the two forces together. So, their argument is, “We have extant institutions. We should be using
those. Why should the international community be involved here? It’s none of their business.” This is despite the fact that the principle had earlier been established. Regarding the IMAT, they said, “At this stage, we had never agreed to the IMAT.” Now, that one is still, let’s say, slightly alive. We are in appropriate foreign places, raising and re-raising the issue of being to establish the IMAT so that we can work and assist the SPLA and the Government to work together well, and to assist its Joint Defense Board, which is the Ministry of Defense-in-waiting.

Q: In the meantime, before the Ministry of Defense-in-waiting is established, they have already a Ministry of Defense for the North?

A: Yes, for the North. We are working in the South to help the SPLA transform its nascent rebel headquarters into something that’s more akin to a professional military.

Q: Okay, let’s look at that aspect a little bit. What were the circumstances that you found to work with in order to make this transformation? I don’t want you to back guerilla forces, but—

A: You’ll become an expert now. Well, as a result of Secretary Powell’s commitment, and advised by this office and others that that would be a good commitment to make, we proceeded with the process of identifying with the SPLM the key things that they needed to have supported in the near term to transform and support their guerilla forces. We told them that we were interested in a comprehensive approach to this transformation process. That is to say, not just building them barracks and feeding food to their soldiers, but rather drawing upon the U.S. military capacity and resources to help the SPLA create a structure from the top all the way to the bottom. We offered to help build a structure that was accountable, professional, well-trained, with budget accountability, with good processes for defense resources management, and good logistics to ensure that they can meet the security interests of the Government of South Sudan. That has been what our approach has been, and we have been working with the SPLA until this point in time to basically help them set up some barracks, get some vehicles, and do a few other items. We haven’t been able to do the big-picture stuff yet because of anti-terror sanctions. We have not yet gotten a waiver to proceed here. On June 28, 2006, we do not yet have the authority to engage in a more comprehensive ballistic approach because of the terror sanctions that Sudan is under. The United States not authorized to provide any military capacity building to a Terrorist State. And South Sudan, as a result of the CPA, is a part of a Terrorist State. As a matter of fact, for the lawyers, that’s the case. Now as a result of discussions with the Hill, we have gotten certain legislative carve-outs that allow us to do some things in the South. As I mentioned to you, we are rehabilitating some barracks and headquarters locations, we’re providing them with some commercial, civilian vehicles, and some commercial, commercial civilian radios, But it’s not wholesale reform that we’re undertaking by any stretch of the imagination, because we are held back by these sanctions.

Q: If you wanted to have some kind of political education for the people who are part of the SPLA -- I don’t know how well-educated they are in general, but no doubt they would
need some understanding of what the rule of the military is in a civilian society – would that be the kind of peaceful endeavor Congress would support?

A: Yes, and in fact, Congress supports us on the Hill. They will be very supportive of this waiver package as it goes forward. The reason we are here in late June 2006 without the appropriate waivers having been submitted is because there were early on linked with the Darfur Peace Accountability Act that looked positively toward allowing a carve-out. A carve-out would obviate the need to go forward with 40J, L6J section 40, and 6J waiver packages so that we could proceed with this sort of training. We could probably do training with regard to civ-mil relations, but anything’s that’s been suggestive of enhancing the military in a very direct way has been taken off the table, including defense resources management. Again, even as we’re acting on this waiver package which will include a defense budgeting piece, we’re going to see if we can’t get an early start and work with the lawyers and see that is allowed to occur.

Q: Other countries, I guess, don’t have those restrictions. So if we were to have funding from the UN or whatever—

A: Some other countries don’t have those same types of restrictions. For example, the Kenyans are willing to go in and provide some military training, and they’re a very professional military in Africa, and we think that would be a good idea if the SPLA wants it. Yes, you are correct. Early on, we had tried to work with members of the Troika to see if there was an interest there in providing some support to the SPLA in the security sector transformation plan, and to this point in time we have gotten some curiosity, but no major interest. So, the Troika Plus is working on the IMAT. In the South, we didn’t have quite the level of international interest. Interestingly, quite recently there seems to be a changed attitude and perception from perhaps London and others in potentially working with us on that.

Q: Towards the South, would that be the Troika involving itself?

A: Well, probably not the Troika, but various individual countries. That’s right.

Q: You mentioned the DDR program as well, and no one has spoken about that in this project to my knowledge. It would be helpful if you could address some of those aspects, and then the CPA and what we’ve seen happen so far.

A: Well, DDR is oftentimes one of the most complex and difficult, yet most important, processes that take place in post-conflict scenario. Unfortunately, it is very complex. It involves multiple agencies and multiple pots of money, and requires an advanced level of sophistication and understanding on the part of the parties to the conflict. So, when it’s not properly executed and implemented, it often ends up being an area where conflict reoccurs. In this case, we had a slight advantage because the negotiation process dragged out so long and because some in the international community —I think it was London in this case—hired a DDR expert to be part of the negotiations process with IGAD. I think they had more than one person, but one in particular was involved in sensitizing all sides...
to the DDR processes in post-conflict, not only within the negotiations of the Agreement. He said, “There are DDR mechanisms that need to be put into place, and there should be some basic DDR essentials addressed in your Comprehensive Peace Agreement. More importantly, you have got a number of implementation activities post-Agreement on the DDR side that are, again, very complex and require that you have adequate resources and attention to that.” In this case, we had that period because talks kept getting delayed, and so people had put money into DDR sensitization. This expert was able to sit around and actually work with the SPLM so that they established their own little DDR committee. Even before there was an Agreement, their little committee was being stood up unofficially. Members had been selected and they were working together along with the Government on some of the DDR early planning that actually went on.

*Q:* For the officials who would be chosen for that kind of task, from the Sudanese side, the North and the South, what kind of individuals would you recruit?

*A:* Very good question. At first you say, “Well, let’s get former military because they understand what it means to carry a weapon, work under a chain of command, and to be at a point where you either disarm or retire as part of a process.” But you also need people who understand community, reintegration, recuperation, and reconciliation. If you don’t have that mix, then the link between demobilization and reintegration will be a tenuous one at best. So you have to have on your little DDR arrangement or setup or commission people that can bridge between that world of the military and civil society. And sometimes, it also helps if you have realistic sorts of thinkers that also understand the economic, developmental, and community recovery aspects. Because again, without a community that’s recovering and looking more prosperous at the end of your reintegration pipeline, you’re not going to have success. Refugees are going to return to the communities and they won’t have the jobs, they won’t have education, they won’t have the health services that they think they deserve because of their long effort in this war, and it will make things much more difficult in bringing them back into their communities.

Also, the communities are looking for a peace dividend. Again, if you have sufficient resources and you bring those two together along with conflict mitigation strategies on the peacekeeping side, as well as community recovery and reintegration strategies at the local level, you’re going to be able to take those soldiers that were part of a large force vying for power and actually bring them back to civil society and reintegrate them in the best way. If you don’t have state resources, a goodwill plan, a proper institutional framework, then you will bring it down. That’s an advantage we had here, in some ways. We have not reached the stage of DDR we had hoped to be at as of 9 January 2005, but we can say that a number of the Joint Integrated Units are in their locations today. That’s the military side of it. They’re where they should be. Not all of them, but most of them.

*Q:* And by integrated, that means...

*A:* They’re not integrated, they’re jointly located, let’s put it that way.
Q: They’re co-located, they talk to each other?

A: Exactly. They’re not training together yet, but they are co-located and, in some cases, they are talking to one another. In most cases, the Government in Khartoum is providing resources to those forces so they can at least get through the day. It’s not there yet, but we’re getting there.

Now, that’s the military side. At the same time, the UN DDR Unit and the National DDR Commission established in Khartoum, with activities in Juba, of course, and other places, have begun a process of bringing in some of what we call the low-hanging fruit. You know, bringing in some of the older veterans, some of the child-soldiers, some of the women affected by conflict. Some of those activities are ongoing. You’ve seen some people demobilize as a result of that, in some cases formally. But, you have not seen the UN or the international organizations or a lot of donor support. We’re not yet at that point. We are supporting the DDR or the demobilization of large numbers of soldiers, from the South especially. The reason for that is the South is holding on to this security blanket in maintaining the additional forces. That’s the case right now. So, let me add one more good, happy thing. At this stage, we’re moving along fairly well in the movement of Northern forces from the South to the North. The UN has verified this. The Government has claimed they’re on track. But, how close is it between the UN saying, “Yes, some or most of these people have moved from South to North,” and the degree to which the North is meeting the requirements of the CPA? That is a question mark. The CPA timetable was a quick-ending one, so we’re definitely not in line with the pace of the CPA right now. But we’re fairly close. I’ll have to say, on the military side, some things have happened that suggest that we’re going to need to line up soon to make sure that the DDR strategy can take hold. Community recovery and reconstruction activities are critical for that. In the South, we’re still behind the eight ball, but the numbers of roads we hoped we’d have built—or being built -- the number of schools being repopulated, the number of health clinics reestablished and properly resourced, are not yet where we need to be for that DDR strategy to really have its full impact to take hold and be successful.

Q: When you say reestablished, I guess in some cases—established for the first time?
Not to make a fine point on it, but we’re doing development where there was no infrastructure.

A: Absolutely.

Q: You mentioned the Southern forces moving towards the North—

A: I’m sorry, Khartoum—GOS military forces.

Q: They’re supposed to leave the South?

A: That’s right, by the Agreement.
Q: Making their way North?

A: They’re making their way North. Yes.

Q: Okay. There are large numbers of forces that have not been demobilized, leaving aside the old men, the women, and the children. Does the Darfur conflict have anything to do with the rationale for keeping a large force mobilized?

A: Interesting. There are indirect impacts on that question from Darfur. The South has a different view of Darfur, and our sense now is that they believe it’s gotten too much attention. Has the fact that the North maintains a sort of belligerent position caused the South to be concerned about its own stake in North-South peace? Should there be confidence placed in the North to fruitfully move forward? That was a problem, I’d say, about a year ago, six months ago, even. I think less today. What we’re hearing a bit more is, “Why aren’t you paying more attention to the North-South? You really need to move forward with community recovery, construction and reconstruction activity. We want to get those resources that seem to be focused on Darfur. We really need a few more of them to be focused on rehabilitating the South.”

Q: Would you say that there has actually been a shifting of the same resources that would have gone to the South going to Darfur?

A: There’s been some. Yes. Nobody can tell you with a straight face that there’s been no impact on Southern activities based on Darfur. Think about it: you’ve got bureaucrats, like me, whose job in life is to push certain issues. I would dare to say that, had Darfur not occurred, the priority would probably have been to make more progress in some of the areas that I’ve been working on as a bureaucrat. For instance, the transformation of the SPLA would probably be a little further along if we could add more time and energy to it. And of course, the budget lines. We’ve had to scrape by and move some of the funding — not on my side of the ledger, but certain other sides of the ledger — to Darfur. And there’s going to be a post-conflict recovery and reconstruction, and those sorts of activities are going to happen in Darfur. Unless the funding lines are raised — and it’s possible they will be, I should say — there will be a bit of tension between implementation in Darfur and implementation North-South.

Q: I can understand why that would be so. From the point of view of an outside donor sending funds to Sudan, they may not really care if it goes to the South for reconstruction or to Darfur for reconstruction. In terms of the SPLA’s attitude towards reconstruction of the South, didn’t they also play a role in supporting some of the rebel forces in Darfur, and thereby creating this situation that doesn’t help them?

A: Yes. There were certainly links between the SPLM and the SLM. Those links had been, I think, stronger in the past than they perhaps are today, since the SPLM is now a member of the Government of National Unity. In some cases, SPLM members of the GNU have made statements that seem to be more supportive of Khartoum’s intent than the standard SPLM position with regards to the concerns of the SLM and other parts of
civil society in Darfur. So, there is going to be, I think, continued tension in terms of what you see the Southerners articulate at the elite level and at the grassroots level. I mean, there’s a lot of sympathy and empathy for what many of the Darfurians are feeling from the activities of the Janjaweed, other militia groups, the Government, and, in some cases, the rebels. The SLM hasn’t always behaved well either, as we all know. So, it’s been one of these things where emotionally, certainly, there’s some attachment to the plight of some of the Darfurians. But in terms of the process of post-conflict, the South definitely hunts resources. They want more assistance. They want more attention than they’ve gotten today.

Q: I guess the Janjaweed militia is operating in Darfur. But just imagine that they could be part of your reintegration target audience. How does that play out in the scenarios that you’ve worked with?

A: If you talk to the Government, they say, “We have plan. It will take time to disarm the Janjaweed, but we have a plan. We can do it. We had just had a display of Janjaweed disarmament a week ago in Darfur. It’s definitely in the press. The Janjaweed such as it is, is an ephemeral target. It is difficult to disarm them because they are oftentimes integrated neatly into their larger societies.” The SLM will say, “These individuals have been inspired, encouraged, armed and equipped in many cases, by the Government in Khartoum. Therefore it is the Government in Khartoum that can and should take action against them to prevent their continued operations. The decision that we’ve worked out is that, as a result of the agreement in Abuja.”

Q: The Abuja agreement, I gather, is not part of the CPA?

A: Yes, the CPA provides a larger framework that the Darfur Peace Agreement was not to divert from. But the Government was supposed to come up with a real plan that they’d present to everybody outlining how they are going to disarm and neutralize the Janjaweed. So we will see what happens as a result of that. What you had in the 2004 Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement, and the subsequent May 28th Agreement, was a basic direction that the Government would follow. The Government would be responsible for neutralizing the negative militias. And for two years, nothing. So we’ll see. It’ll be interesting, now that it’s standing, to see what happens as a result of the Government’s plan, what it looks like, and when they actually put it on the table and start to seriously implement it. As a result of that, what will happen if the Government is serious, is that the SLM will be placed in a position of needing to abide by its signature. That being that, the SLM will start having to reduce the scope of activities for their personnel, eventually to condone them, and either reintegrate them into civil society or integrate them into the GOS military or police forces in Darfur. That’s a year and a half down the line, or two years down the line.

Q: Well, that’s a timeframe that’s not so outlandish.

A: No. It will give the Government a bit of time—if they’re truly serious. It will take a little time to get the Janjaweed to a point where they’re either disarmed or they are placed
in an institutional framework, and held in check for any negative and conflict-producing activities. It’s going to take some time to get to that stage. I mean, the SLM could be honest with us and say, “We understand it’s not going to happen overnight.” But they wanted to see some positive movement first. We’ll see if that happens. If you get positive movement, if there is a sense that a different approach is being undertaken by Khartoum, then I think you’re going to see a bit of pressure being placed on the SLM to abide by its part of the Agreement. And that means they’ll start to have to eventually be bringing their personnel into assembly areas and preparing for the next steps in the DDR and the military integration process.

Q: Right, okay, yes. Military integration. And that takes us back to the SPLA/SPLM. From their side, once they’ve been demobilized, they would take care of the SLM and then enter this structure, the Joint Integrated Units? Is that where they should eventually end up?

A: You mean the Darfurians or you mean just in general North-South?

Q: I would say, the Southerners.

A: Yes, the Southern forces, because the CPA is very unique in that regard. In most agreements you tell the rebels, and the rebels agree, that they’re going to be part of a national military. Because of Machakos, of course, you had this six-year rule that put a vote of unity or separation at the end of the six years. The SPLM was taking the position that, if they’re going to be a separate state, they need to be able to have flexibility. Should they vote for separation, they need to have flexibility to stand up for their own security institution. So, that’s what you have. Uniquely, you have not one, not two, but three militaries inside of Sudan.

Q: That’s correct. But would the agreement to let the South have its own military, and I can see why they would argue for it, was it the only thing that could be done?

A: Interesting. During the negotiations, there actually was a bit of play between the negotiating team and Washington on this. At first, we took the position with the SPLM that it would be better to integrate into one, inclusive army, and that we would help them to make sure that the army had a very inclusive balance and understanding of equal opportunity and other important principles. That didn’t hold, and we soon found ourselves with an SPLM that said, “No. We were burned back in 1972, and therefore we do not want to return—we do not want to go back to the future.”

Q: Was this made part of the Agreement?

A: Yes, it was eventually made part of the Agreement and, again, this is what makes this a unique agreement in that regard. Essentially, you have military forces kept in the North, the Joint Integrated Units that are in the North and the South and including members of both sides, and the army of the Government of South Sudan in the South.
Q: I’ll just ask you one final question. You have brought a lot of the interesting insights regarding the security side of the CPA, many of which I had not heard before. But in terms of lessons learned in the area that you worked, are there some things that you wished we had done a little differently and would recommend for future agreements?

A: Yes. Off the top of my head, in terms of implementation -- not the policy here, but the implementation -- points that may be useful from my view are that clearly we need to be able to streamline our budget processes, like some of the other agencies, to be able to deliver more quickly. When we see fast-moving diplomatic arrangements and activities, we should be able to respond to those in a manner that helps to encourage and positively reinforce success in these processes. And when we say to someone, “Oh I’ll be there to provide training, or equipment, or a peacekeeping force, or a monitoring element,” or whatever the case might be, you would hope we’d be able to do that within a span of days and weeks, not months and years. Probably years is a bit of an exaggeration, but in some cases it has taken us months. Some of the delay just has to do with our internal bureaucratics -- how you get things approved. Some delay has to do with the interaction between the Executive and the Legislative branches of the U.S. Government. Other delays have to do with contracting, which is sort of internal but with an external impetus. The way we do contracting in the U.S. Government can be onerous, to say the least. So all of these things come together to produce results that are not sufficient to support our diplomatic initiatives. That’s one thing we’re seeing, and I could go on forever, so I won’t, I’ll leave it at that.

I think the jury is still out, but from a policy perspective, the U.S. took the exactly correct position. I guess this isn’t really a lesson learned, but it could be a lesson learned for the future. If you took the correct position allowing this third military force to be established, we’ll see at the end of six years whether it’s unity or not. Allowing the SPLM to retain this has given them slightly more confidence in their partner in the North, and confidence in themselves to go and move forward in the future. The SPLA will become part of the problem, rather than part of the solution if we don’t reform them—if there isn’t thoroughgoing reform, as you mentioned. You know, there’s no relations training, or human rights training, and what about equal opportunity, what about defense resources management? If we don’t get those principles well established in the SPLA, it will result in a less than positive outlook. So, those are a couple of lessons learned, or lessons to be learned perhaps.

There are a few others I definitely could signal to you. Ah, okay, one more, real quick one. The Nuba Mountain Agreement ended up being a really small bite of the apple, and yet it provided the modalities and a set of principles for working towards that you saw throughout the CPA. And those have fallen onto the DPA work that we’ve been doing. So, here we have this little ceasefire agreement in a conflict-ridden sea, a stormy sea, and this little island of stability here, if you will, and it emboldened the process and moved it in a positive direction. Looking back, there just could be no doubt. As a result of the Government’s support of the humanitarian ceasefire and the international community’s playing its role that it did, a little bit of confidence was given to the SPLM to say, “Yes, we don’t need to continue in conflict. We can work with these Northern people, difficult
as it may be at times. Let’s see if we can’t come to a potential agreement.” And I think that, looking back, at the time it didn’t look like it was going to be as significant as it might be. In fact, some believed that, if we didn’t achieve that comprehensive agreement, within six months after the Nuba Mountains Agreement, the whole thing would collapse. And in fact, it held its ground. We ended up not getting the agreement in six months. We ended up getting it a few years, but it still held together. And, by the way, the approach of the Nubas was referred to over and over again in Naivasha as the key to the ceasefire elements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. So there’s a good lesson learned from there.

Thank you.