The interviewee could be described as one of the primogenitors of the Sudan CPA in that he, along with others on his staff, first described and persuaded Washington to adopt a framework for rejuvenating the stalled IGAD negotiations in order to reach a peace settlement in Sudan. The plan he describes represented a shift from the sanctions policy of the Clinton administration, aimed at the international isolation of the Sudanese regime, to a policy of reengagement. Specifically, the policy called for encouraging then President Moi of Kenya to take the lead in hosting and facilitating the IGAD negotiations with the U.S., the U.K. and Norway, (joined later by Italy) to supply financial, technical and political support to the process. The interviewee singles out General Lazaro Sumbeiywo as one of the “great heroes” in achieving success. Appointed by President Moi, General Sumbeiywo had worked with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) leadership, was closely allied to President Moi, and was able to provide the leadership, direction, patience, tenacity, and initiative required for a successful outcome.

The interviewee also describes his own role in persuading the head of the SPLM, John Garang, to suspend military hostilities against the government of Khartoum so that the negotiations could move forward, a critical turning point in the process -- and one not easily achieved.

This interviewee’s assessment of the Sudanese government during the negotiations provides insights into Sudan’s motivation to move from a pariah state to one which enjoys diplomatic, economic and commercial relationships with the rest of the world, and a greater position of legitimacy within the international community.

The interviewee summarizes the factors that led to success in the negotiations as follows: (1) having an “able, competent, experienced and influential African negotiator in the lead, backed up by a lead African state to whom this person can turn directly for support,” (2) having the principle negotiator have the support of the most influential sub-regional organization concerned; and (3) having “a core group of international partners” lend financial, technical, legal and logistical support.

In commenting on the role of the U.S. Congress, the interviewee notes that Congress was uncharacteristically united across the political spectrum on Sudan, with U.S. religious groups and NGOs largely in accord. Regarding the implementation process, the interviewee indicates that he is disturbed by its slow pace, and that the absence of John Garang creates a leadership vacuum that is difficult to overcome.
Q: We’d like to hear about your role in the Sudan negotiations. I understand that you were working on the Sudan peace process while you were in Washington in 1997 until 1998. Is that right?

A: 1997 to the early part of 1999 and then thereafter when I went out to Kenya in September of 1999 until I left in July of 2003, a period of four years in Nairobi. I watched the evolution of our policy towards Sudan from two different perspectives during two different Administrations pursuing essentially two different kinds of policies. I served in Washington from 1997 to ’99, and while I did not have primary responsibility over Sudan, I was very familiar with Sudan, interacted on Sudan issues, spoke about Sudan policy and participated in a number of meetings within the Department on Sudan. During the Clinton Administration, the second Clinton Administration I am speaking of specifically, the policy was to in effect apply as much pressure as possible on Sudan to change its policies and to work with neighboring states in the region to also apply pressure and sanctions on Sudan. The United States felt very strongly at the time that Sudan had an intolerable and unacceptable human rights record, that it condoned slavery in some parts of the country, that it supported and had supported terrorist groups that had in effect operated against us, and under that premise it is noted that Osama bin Laden had lived in Sudan from approximately 1991 until 1996-97 when he went to Afghanistan, and equally that the terrorists who had attempted to kill the Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak, in Egypt in the mid-’90s had also launched their activities from Khartoum as well. The United States was also concerned about the continuing hostilities by the Khartoum government against the groups in the

- South that were seeking greater independence and autonomy, so there were numerous reasons why the U.S. was concerned about Sudan. The Clinton Administration felt that the Sudanese Government was a very conservative Islamic fundamentalist government that endorsed practices which were inimical to its citizens North and South, but also a destabilizing element in the region. But as a result of these policies, the Clinton Administration had progressively sought to impose a whole host of sanctions on the government of Khartoum to change those policies. Washington, by the time that I had arrived, was in the final stages of imposing comprehensive economic sanctions on that government which precluded all kinds of economic and commercial transactions: no money could be transferred, no investments made, no profits repatriated, no trade undertaken between U.S. and Sudanese entities; airline connections were severed, and the continuing policy was to try to isolate the regime. The U.S. also sought to carry these sanctions into the international arena as well by getting the UN Security Council to adopt these same comprehensive sanctions towards Sudan which the U.S. had put in place. In some instances the UN did act and in others they didn’t. They did not, in fact, impose comprehensive trade sanctions, nor did they impose sanctions limiting international air carriers from going in and going out. We worked with Sudan’s neighbors to get them to be more vocal in their criticism of
the human rights violations and other deprivations that were going on there, and also to the extent possible, impose sanctions.

This policy continued up until the end of the Clinton Administration. Of course, during that policy the U.S. withdrew, but did not close down, its diplomatic mission in Khartoum, but most of the operations were run out of Nairobi, where we had a Charge d’Affairs and a number of embassy officers who traveled increasingly infrequently into Khartoum. The nadir of the policy occurred shortly after September 11. I shouldn’t say that. Shortly after the bombing of the embassies on August 7, 1998, when the Clinton Administration launched air strikes against a pharmaceutical plant outside of Khartoum that was thought to be a place that was manufacturing precursors to chemical weapons. Following the bombings in August of 1998, August 7, 1998, I was placed in charge of the interagency taskforce that managed the crisis response to the bombings in Dar and in Nairobi.

Q: Now, during this time you were in Washington - and you’ve given a good description of the overall U.S. policy towards Sudan - how did you play a role in the ongoing peace negotiations, the IGAD process, which began in 1993?

A: There were effectively no serious IGAD negotiations going on during the years of the second Clinton Administration, and the level of negotiation, if any, was minimal. Our policy was one of isolation, pressure and sanctions, with a door left open for the government in Khartoum to acknowledge its errors and reform its ways, but it was not so inclined to do so at the time. There was no IGAD process of any significant nature during that period.

When I went out to Nairobi while the Clinton Administration was still in office, I in effect had an opportunity to see firsthand the nature of what our policy was or was not accomplishing, and we had very few real contacts in Khartoum. Our access to senior officials was limited, and we were not making very much headway, as it appeared to me by simply pressuring and isolating the Sudanese authorities. Moreover, our European colleagues at the time, who had missions in Khartoum and who frequently came to Kenya, always reflected a different optic about the nature of the government, the nature of the opposition and the problems that needed to be confronted. Because they were there and talking to people, they frequently brought a different optic and point of view than we had.

The Clinton Administration left, elections occurred here in this country, and the Bush Administration came in. At that period, after being in Nairobi for over a year, I participated in the drafting of a number of telegrams - I think they were three in number - which outlined a different direction or approach in Sudan, fully recognizing that Sudan had an enormously bad human rights track record, that the government had supported terrorists in the past and probably had ongoing relationships with terrorist groups and terrorist organizations, that it was primarily responsible for the serious deprivations and human rights violations, the pillaging and raping and the destruction that went on in the South, and that it probably was engaged, too, still was closing its eyes to continuing slavery in some parts of the Southern part of the country. But I felt that it was important that if, in fact, we wanted to change the nature of the relationship and bring an end to the hostilities, negotiate an end to the hostilities between the North and the South and to effectively pressure the government to alter its ways, that we needed to have a different kind of a policy. And I argued for one of reengagement, putting in place a new ambassador back into Khartoum with a small mission, establishment of a special envoy to handle the negotiations that
would be necessary to undertake to strengthen the IGAD process, and to put in place a small
group of likeminded countries who would support an African-led but U.S. and internationally-
supported and financed peace process. These cables were sent back to Washington outlining that
policy by the end of January, first part of February 2001. Those cables, I think, set the direction
for what came later.

Q: Well, what happened next?

A: Several, well, I think what comes rapidly on the heels of it, a new Administration, a nexus of
concerns about this issue, the appointment of Senator Jack Danforth as the Special Envoy for
Sudan, I think a couple of days before 9/11 if I’m not mistaken. He worked and put together an
effort to begin what was an ongoing process that eventually culminated in the CPA agreement
(Comprehensive Peace Agreement) some four years later. It took a long time.

Q: You might say it only took four years, though, I mean, if we’re talking about a rejuvenation of
the process beginning in 2001 with your telegrams, and the appointment of John Danforth, it
was really quite rapid. I’m impressed that it only took four years, let’s say.

A: Yes. Anyway, there was a lot going on in Kenya at this time, too. But let me just say that the
advocacy, I think, and the interest that those telegrams provoked, made them a catalyst. They
represented, I think, some real strategic thinking on our part that reflected our, certainly reflected
my, understanding of the issues.

Some more specifics were that we encouraged, and I did personally on my own and at the
request of the Department of State, President Moi, who was then the President of Kenya, to take
the lead in negotiating between the North and the South, take the lead in bringing IGAD together
to support this negotiated process, and to take the lead in hosting the IGAD negotiations in
Nairobi or outside of Nairobi. President Moi did so, he did so willingly, he did so as a friend of
the United States, and he did so as a man desirous of seeing the hostilities between the North and
the South end, and because he had maintained a very good relationship with President Bashir of
Sudan as well as with the leaders of the South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM), the SPLM
(Sudan People’s Liberation Movement), and the SPLA (Sudan People’s Liberation Army).

Q: How was he able to do that actually?

A: President Moi has always had a foreign policy which has been benign and non-aggressive in
the region, and he has always focused his policies inward rather than outward. And because he
has not been aggressive in the region, people did not look at him as an adversary or a potential
threat. His concerns have always been mostly domestic, and because they were mostly domestic
they were clearly non-threatening. But President Moi initially appointed a former Kenyan
diplomat who had been the former Kenyan ambassador to Sudan to be the Special Envoy. I
cannot now remember the Kenyan ambassador’s name. I can see him in my mind, but he in fact
did not work out well at all. He was lacking in energy and initiative and new ideas, reluctant to
call on the support of President Moi, reluctant to corral and bring together the IGAD
ambassadors in their country, and reluctant to embrace more aggressively, talk to the Egyptians,
which was also an important factor.
There’s a footnote here. During that period from roughly the early part of this there were actually two Kenyans who were put in place by Moi to serve as the IGAD lead official in the negotiations. The first two turned out to be totally unacceptable. One was there for a very, very brief period of time, who was more a politician than a diplomat, and the second one was a diplomat and did not work out -- the person I just mentioned whose name I may recall in a few minutes. And the third person turned out to be an absolute super star. At our urging, President Moi removed the diplomat who had been charged with leading the negotiation, and replaced him with someone far more effective. That person was the head of the Kenyan armed forces at the time, the head of the Kenyan army, not the chief of the general staff, but the head of the army, General Lazar0 Sumbeiywo. General Sumbeiywo turned out to be one of the great heroes in this process. He came with all of the right skill sets necessary to lead a facilitation. He was closely allied to President Moi. He was a Kalenjin, from the same ethnic group as President Moi. President Moi trusted him implicitly. He had great confidence; he had been army commander for a number of years and before that had had responsibility for running the intelligence services within the Kenyan forces. He had worked with and negotiated with the SPLM leadership, particularly the military side, and he had worked with the late John Garang. He worked with Salva Kiir, who’s now the first Vice President of the North and the President of the SPLM, with Nial Ding, another senior military leader, until he knew the SPLM leadership extremely well. He was assured and self-confident enough to work with the donors, particularly the U.S., the UK and the Norwegians, and he was confident and strong enough to work with and corral the IGAD once he had a mandate to do so. And so he was a perfect interlocutor for the U.S. and the IGAD partners. And I, certainly working under instructions from the Department and certainly working on behalf of my own initiatives, because we were pushing this and pushed it from the very beginning, but largely under instructions from the Department, we spoke frequently with President Moi, with General Sumbeiywo. In effect, we said we will work with you to make this a successful process, and we will create a layer of support where Kenya is the principal facilitator and negotiator leading an IGAD group of ambassadors from Nairobi, backed up by a troika of U.S., UK and Norway, providing the financial support to undertake these negotiations and the political support to bring the players to the table.

Q: Was this an unusual role for Norway, just out of curiosity? I know Norway is generous.

A: Norway has always -- they have a very, very young, dynamic politician who has served on two occasions in several governments as the Minister of Development, a woman by the name of Hilde Johnson; very young, probably today not much more than her late 30s. She lived and grew up in Northern Tanzania when her father was a development worker for the Norwegian government. And she had very deep and strong commitments to East Africa, and to help them to solve the problems of North-South in Sudan. She was personally and professionally committed to it, and she brought along her own energy and the enthusiasm and financial resources of her government. The Norwegians had a succession of very able ambassadors; they had a couple of people who were experts on the Sudan that they brought in. They had a superb ambassador, a career ambassador, who had been here, who later went on from here to Finland, from Washington to Finland, who was a Special Envoy on Sudan. So there were a lot of Norwegian connections. But it was Norway, the U.S., Great Britain, and then later Italy, which provided most of the financial and technical support. The U.S., Norway, and Britain always had representation at most of the IGAD meetings, a lot of it supplied out of our own Embassy. But initially one of the things that we did was to propose to Lazaro Sumbeiywo that we would bring in U.S. technical support for him. Initially, we were going to bring in two people, one to be
assigned to our Embassy and one to be on his personal staff. And indeed we did end up keeping the one person who was on his personal staff -- an American, a lawyer in the legal section at the Department of State. She worked on General Sumbeiywo’s staff, under his guidance, under his leadership, under his mandate, for nearly four years. And she did an absolutely superb job in supporting General Sumbeiywo, the Kenyan and the IGAD effort. It’s probably one of the most useful ways that I’ve seen an American being assigned to do a useful task. And it may come as a surprise to all, but it should be said that, while she was an American and the salary was being paid by the U.S. Government, she worked for General Sumbeiywo and she did not take orders from me or from anyone else in the Embassy. She made it work because she was an effective international worker, working on behalf of General Sumbeiywo in what was an initiative in which we all had a common goal, and that was to end the conflict in the South.

Q: Was his staff extremely large?
A: No it was not. He had mostly Kenyans on his staff, mostly Kenyans.

Q: Well, what’s the size of the group that -
A: I would say probably no more than a half a dozen.

Q: And the role of the UK? Maybe you could give a little flavor on that.
A: I think they had a senior diplomat there who had come out of their Middle Eastern office. Sudan, in fact, is handled in the British Foreign Office, not as an African country but as a part of the Middle East department within the FCO (Foreign and Commonwealth Office). But they had someone there, as did the Norwegians. The Norwegians had a couple of very good people there all the time, but it was Lazaro Sumbeiywo who provided the direction and the leadership, the patience, the tenacity, the initiative and the willingness to move forward on this.

Q: Did he remain in place?
A: He remained in place. Let me just say just two other things: one could spend an enormous amount of time but I’m just going over the broad outline. You say I’m the first person, and maybe what I’m doing is helping to set a stage because there are, in things like this, many actors with many optics, with many roles, all of them important and contributory towards the deeds and the good deeds and we all play a part. But the stage is important to set here in all of this.

Let me just go back a little bit on this; one of the other broad things that we did in Nairobi was to maintain an ongoing relationship and dialogue with John Garang, who was the head of the SPLM and who was based, along with the principal leadership of his organization, in Nairobi. I saw John Garang alone with Washington visitors, with a number of people, senior people, on numerous occasions throughout the four years that I was in Nairobi. I had known John Garang for some time before I got to Nairobi, known him and his wife as well. One of the odd facts of life is that John Garang had actually gone to Grinnell College in Iowa many years before. That little factoid had come up and it was always a source of linkage actually.

Q: The Iowa connection. I guess you’re from Iowa as well?
A: John Garang was one of the principal players in all of this, and certainly I met with John and constantly encouraged John to participate fully in the negotiating process honestly and fairly in the negotiating process, and to set aside some of his hostilities and his suspicions and try to move toward the settlement. I think that I have much of the responsibility for having secured John Garang’s decision to suspend military hostilities against the government of Khartoum at a very critical place in the negotiations so that we could move to the next level, something that John always resisted very, very stoutly because he felt that once he stopped fighting it would relieve the pressure on Khartoum to make the kinds of changes, to make the kind of deal, that would be necessary for selling -

Q: Do you remember when that was that he agreed to a ceasefire?

A: Oh, I think it was probably some time in 2001. Sorry, early 2002, probably March 2002…would have to be March 2002. He agreed to have his people not undertake any more aggressive activities against the Government of Khartoum, but would in effect respond if attacked, but would not initiate any attacks, which was one of those confidence-building measures which was necessary at the time but as I said, one that he felt very strongly about. He always felt that if he stopped fighting then the government would stop negotiating and would be under no pressure to move forward. Equally, he was concerned about an army, his own army, losing some of its military sharpness if in fact it was not engaged in combat operations.

Q: Did that amount to a turning point then?

A: It did. It was one of those key confidence-building measures that pushed the process, pushed the process forward at the time. General Sumbeiywo did, I think in classic style, do some very useful things, and that was to break down the negotiations into very segmented parts -- parts that were focused on wealth-sharing, on religion in the state, territorial boundaries, and on disputed areas -- so that each of these things could be handled as discreet entities, negotiated and then locked up, so they could move to another area. If a particularly thorny issue became an impediment, people could drop that particular set of negotiations and move on to issues that might be more easily resolved. And he did this, I think, quite effectively. The U.S. Government, the Embassy, supported it, brought in experts from time to time to hold seminars on issues such as wealth-sharing for the benefit of the government, as well as the SPLM, brought in experts to help work through compromises when particularly thorny issues -

Q: And the Sudanese Government was willing to listen to these experts?

A: Yes, yes they were. I think that the Sudanese Government was a very stubborn and tough negotiator on many of these issues, reluctant to give very much ground, constantly concerned about the precedent these things would have and the damage it might do to their political constituency in the North. The negotiations required a great deal of tenacity, persistence, patience, good management and good leadership, and that came from General Sumbeiywo. I guess if you were looking for some broad conclusions on some of this I would say that, in trying to resolve these kinds of crises, it is absolutely important to have an able, competent, experienced, and hopefully influential African negotiator in the lead, backed up by a lead African state to whom this person can constantly turn directly for support and assistance. Secondly, it’s also critical that the principal negotiator in the lead country have the support of the most influential, important regional, sub-regional organization backing that state and that person.
And, I think, thirdly, it’s important to have an international dimension, and that international dimension is formed by a core group of international partners who form a core support network. In this case you have the United States, Norway, Great Britain, and later Italy, providing that core support group, international core support group, on which the sub-regional group could rely on for resources, logistical and monetary, technical assistance and legal resources, legal expertise, as well as technical expertise, as well as diplomatic and political clout in the UN, in the EU, in the Security Council, to help bolster the position of the lead negotiator in the sub-regional authority.

By structuring this kind of an elaborate mechanism one is able to draw on the strengths of all of the groups involved. Without that kind of an arrangement you have weaknesses in the process that can undermine the negotiations. These negotiations were successful because of the effective vertical integration from top to bottom, from the focal point of the crisis all the way to a broader global arena, a set of players who were woven into the process, committed to it. Basically, that was one of the things that we argued initially in our telegram, was to have this kind of synergistic relationship throughout the process. It was effective in getting where we got.

Q: I was wondering what kind of things you argued would be in the interest of the Government of Sudan in resolving the -

A: Absolutely. Yes, absolutely no question that there had to be carrots on the table for the Sudanese, for during the last four years of the Clinton Administration there had been certainly lots of sticks and brickbats in the process. And, I might add, some quite deserving, some quite deserving. You know, it’s not without its problems, as we see Sudan today with the problems of Darfur, with the continuing problems of the North-South implementation, with the problems in the Northeast in the Bajur region along the border, and with the continued lack of respect for human rights and religious freedom that exists in that country. So it’s not to say that some of these things weren’t necessary, but what were the attractions for the Sudanese, and these attractions still continue in some part to be out here: one is the full reestablishment of diplomatic relationships, putting in place an embassy with a full-time ambassador and a large staff; the end to economic sanctions that would allow for trade and commerce to resume and U.S. investment to flow in; the resumption and reopening of transportation network; the resumption of aid flows, not only for the South, but also for the North; the ability of American oil countries to go back in and to explore and to develop some of the numerous potential oil reserves that exist there; an end to the UN Security Council sanctions that were in place; an end to some of the EU sanctions that were in place; and the removal of the dark cloud and the pariah status behind Sudan; and the ability of Sudan to function and to be seen as a legitimate, respectable and responsible state in the international community; and a lifting of a cloud of Sudan being a State Sponsor of International Terrorism -- and it remains on our list today as one of six State Sponsors of International Terrorism; and the removal of the cloud that it is, in fact, part of a limited network of states that have been engaged in supporting terrorism. All of these things were carrots, and it was clear that some in Khartoum clearly wanted to see Sudan as a more respectable and responsible state actor. So there were carrots to be given. In a way, the vindication for the Clinton Administration policies may be that they, in their rigidity and harshness, set the stage for allowing the Bush Administration to be able to come in and promise the ratcheting down of these so that it was enough of an inducement for them to want to negotiate seriously. So these things are not without their continuation and I’m not, I don’t want to be, you know, partisan here in one way or another on this issue because I work for the U.S. Government in different
Administrations, and I work for the Constitution and for the nation, and basically the objective was to end the North-South hostilities, move Sudan to a more responsible and respectable place in terms of getting rid of its support for terrorism and improving its human rights, and moving toward more responsible and respectable government. Those were the goals, and I think both Administrations would argue that, you know, this would be the necessary outcome that we were seeking.

Q: I guess I'll appear very naïve with this remark, but it seems that the Sudanese Government didn't much mind being considered a terrorist state or harboring terrorists. It had the welcome mat out for Osama bin Laden for a long time and accepted as a guest Carlos the Jackal. Was there some change in government figures or just a critical mass of people in the Sudanese Government who said, “Well, we really don't want to be this kind of a pariah state?”

A: You know, there was in fact a tug of war going on within the Sudanese establishment between those who sought to have better relations with the U.S. and the West, those who were conservative and fundamental Islamists, and over the last four or so years, those who have wanted to have a better relationship with the West, and to remove the pressures have won out. The one central figure in all of this drama was none other than a man called Hassan Turabi. Turabi is one of the conservative fundamentalist figures who supports a much more conservative line of Islam, more of the kind to be found in Saudi Arabia than to be found in Egypt, Libya or Morocco. And it was his effort to overreach and to push Khartoum into a more conservative Islamist posture that ultimately resulted in his political fall from grace. His fall from grace also allowed for a greater opening to the West. But the government in Khartoum is still a very conservative government, a very cautious government, even with the absence of a Turabi, it’s a very cautious government. Yes, there were people there. The Sudan is a place where we, the U.S., have been the victims of a number of terrorist incidents. The modern slaying or assassination of American ambassadors, you know, has it roots in Khartoum, and I think it was back in 1971 in the home of the Saudi Arabian ambassador, that our Ambassador and DCM were killed by PLO terrorists.

Q: You haven’t mentioned any of the NGOs or any religious groups. I don’t have any particular in mind but -

A: In the field, they don’t play a role. In Washington they play an enormously powerful role. Sudan is one of those issues in which you can have the far left on the political spectrum in the United States and the far right on the political spectrum in the United States working towards common interests, and it was probably, for awhile, one of the very few interests where you had someone like a conservative Republican, a senator like Jesse Helms, espousing the same kinds of viewpoints as somebody who was a part of the Black political establishment, like Jesse Jackson, and Al Sharpton, whose position on Sudan was not differing at all very much from that of a Billy Graham. And I think that it was the unity on both the Democratic and the Republican political spectrum, as well as the religious spectrum across the board in the United States that resulted in the pressure being applied to Sudan so forcefully. And I think it probably was the influence of the evangelical church movement in the United States allied with and supported by, and certainly not contradicted by, people across a broader political spectrum that led to the kind of push on Sudan that we’ve gotten here in Washington. I think that was pretty powerful. Not very many people across the political spectrum here, and across the spectrum of religious perspectives here, would differ very much on Sudan.
Q: In terms of a negotiated accord, it would appear that the folks around the table were representing governments or international agencies and multilateral entities, but were there some NGOs that were negotiating at the table?

A: No, not of significance. They were not a significant player, nor was the UN a significant player in this.

Q: You’ve really covered everything quite brilliantly. I’m just looking to see if there are any gaps.

A: Oh, there are lots of gaps. I haven’t gotten into the intricacies of all this. And as I say, there are many others who played roles, but as I say, we had a role and we certainly, I think, tried to shape what came, and I certainly feel very strongly that we helped to shape the outcome that followed.

Q: As you watch the implementation -

A: I’m disturbed.

Q: What disturbs you?

A: The pace at which the CPA will be implemented has been shattered by the death of John Garang. John Garang’s departure removes a domineering, towering figure from the leadership of the SPLA/SPLM, and it creates vacuums in the leadership at the top. It also requires a period of consolidation, healing and recovery, reestablishment of leadership, authority and demand, and it needed him at this critical time to take it to the next level. His departure leaves a gap. I think there’s no question Salva Kiir is committed to the process, that John Garang’s wife, Rebecca, who has turned out to be a very strong figure, is committed to the process, but John Garang’s absence at this critical point is missed. It’s clear that the implementation process is moving very, very slowly. Some of the commissions that were written into the Agreement have not been formed, others that have been formed have been slow to undertake the kinds of deliberations and programs that they were set up to run, and it’s just not moving as quickly as it should be. I guess I’m being a little bit diplomatic here, but I don’t want to be stridently critical, and hopefully this will go much better, but it is not in fact moving as smoothly and as efficiently as I thought it would be.

Q: Not only the absence of John Garang, but other leaders seem to have disappeared or not stepped forward?

A: Well, since it’s ongoing at this point, I’ll reserve judgment. I think there’s probably a more comprehensive analysis to be made, but I think that the death of John Garang is clearly a setback to the process. I think that the conflict in Darfur has distracted attention from the implementation process. I think the problems in Darfur today probably command more of the attention of not only the government of Khartoum but the international community than before implementation of the CPA, and that there is a need to not lose sight of the time -- six-and-a-half years-- that is out there to make this process work, and it’s not; we shouldn’t lose sight of the need to try to ensure that the hopes and the aspirations of the people in the South who signed on to this are not...
shattered and destroyed by disillusionment and lack of success in realizing their dreams and ambitions. But Garang’s death and the multiple issues that Darfur raises are a distraction.

Q: You did mention our leaders in Congress during the negotiation period who were more or less speaking in one voice: Jesse Helms and Jesse Jackson on the same page and it worked, metaphorically. What about Congress’ passage of the Sudan Peace Act of October 2002. Was it an important event in the process?

A: I think it ratcheted up the pressure on the government of Sudan to reach a successful conclusion. It signaled broad U.S. support for a fair and equitable agreement and put pressure both on the Sudanese government and on the U.S. Government, on the Executive Branch, to push the process along and to keep the process moving.

Q: Have you written some articles?