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Interviewed by: Barbara Nielsen
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Executive Summary

This interviewee was located in Baghdad, where he was in charge of the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office for a year; the National Coordination Team, which provided direct guidance to the PRTs, was a part of IRMO. At the time he was in Baghdad, there were 10 PRTs; the embedded PRTs had not yet come into existence.

This interviewee stressed that the role of the PRTs was not to build things for the Iraqis, but to build Iraqi capacity to use their own considerable resources. This mentoring role was necessary because Iraq was operating under a new federal system, unfamiliar to the population and its leaders. Relying largely on the skills of classical diplomacy, the PRTs encouraged local leaders to organize Provincial Reconstruction Development Councils, with government representatives, NGOs, business leaders, etc., The goal was to help these Iraqi leaders learn to set priorities, work with each other, use parliament effectively and become familiar with other democratic processes. Thus, in the view of this interviewee, at least as useful as the projects the PRTs undertook was the exercise in helping the Iraqis establish democratic institutions whereby local governments could establish priorities and come to consensus.

This interviewee also stressed the uniqueness of each PRT in terms of its specific objectives and dynamic, depending on the personalities of the individuals present and on the particular circumstances in the province. The most successful PRTs, in his view, were those in which the division commanders provided high level guidance and gave the PRT mission a very high priority; in such cases, he observed excellent cooperation between the military and the PRT.

On the theme of PRT-military cooperation, the interviewee also described the resolution, by means of key Memoranda of Understanding, of the fundamental issues of providing PRT logistical support and movement security. During an initial, transitional period, those PRTs established on military bases had to rely on the good will of the military at the bases; this sometimes worked well, but sometimes it did not. The MOUs resolved the issue by spelling out specifically the responsibilities of the State Department and of the Department of Defense, depending on whether the PRT was on a Forward Operating Base or on at a regional embassy office. The interviewee was very impressed by the ability of the PRT personnel, in almost every case, to form very productive teams, able to face challenges with creative and innovative adaptations. He cites as just one example

the creation of traveling courts in Mosul, which involved cooperation from the local Iraqi government, the Iraqi central government, the military, the Iraqi army, the Department of Justice attaché and the PRT.

Interview

A: The Iraq Reconstruction Management Office at the time that I was there had various divisions or subsections, most of which were headed by a senior consultant. There was a senior consultant for electricity that worked with the Ministry of Electricity, a senior consultant for oil who worked with the Ministry of Oil. Similarly, there were senior consultants for health, another one for education, transportation, communications; there was a senior consultant whose responsibilities were to work with the Ministry of Planning. There were various parts; one of those parts was the National Coordination Team, which was the Baghdad home office supporting the PRT operations in the field. There was also an office of the chief financial officer which when you are running a 22 billion dollar program is a pretty hefty office, and he had an information management unit whose job was to track progress on projects as well. The whole organization had about 250 people in Baghdad. At the time I was there, at the time I left Iraq, there were 10 provincial reconstruction teams.

Q: So you left before the creation of the embedded PRTs?

A: Yes, I did. The provincial reconstruction teams at the time that I was there were in fact all working with provincial governments, they were not yet working at the sub provincial level, which the embedded PRTs subsequently did. But I have no first hand knowledge of them. I have first hand knowledge of the existing PRTs having visited all of them.

Q: I do have some notion of what their main purposes were, but I'd like to hear how you saw the various objectives of the PRTs while you were there.

A: The primary and overarching objective of the PRTs was to enhance the capacity of the provincial governments to use Iraq's substantial financial resources that were allocated to the provinces, to help them build the capacity to mobilize those resources into projects and activities that demonstrably improved the living standards of the Iraq people. I can recall frequently very often hearing the expression that our job, the job of the PRTs was not to build things for the Iraqis but to build the Iraqi capacity to use their own resources, and those are considerable resources and significant amounts of which were actually allocated to provinces for projects in those provinces.

Q: The PRTs worked a lot with governance issues, and apparently the local officials that the PRT would mentor in this regard were relatively inexperienced. Is that a correct characterization? That the original, the other Iraqi officials who might have existed originally had left after the invasion, so the government that we were working with had inexperienced officials?

A: Actually, we prefer to say that it was a new federal system. In fact, no one in Iraq would have had good experience from the old regime, would have had experience in decentralized responsibility, and true federalism where the provincial authorities got significant resources from the central government, and then were made responsible to actually mobilize those resources and to create benefits for the local citizens. Even had you had experience as a governor in the Saddam era, it would have been more to receive and carry out orders as opposed to under the new Iraqi constitution, which was to determine what the most pressing needs were, to allocate resources, and to mobilize resources into services for the population.

Q: The preparations of the folks that are the PRT's Iraqi counterparts,the Iraqi counterparts, are most of them technocrats? I'm thinking their job is somehow to be good public administrators. Do they have education and preparation that would equip them? Or are they from some other fields?

A: It is a federal system; it is also a democracy; they are elected leaders. The provincial councils are elected, and the provincial council then selects the governor. It's not a direct election of the governor, and the directors general, who are the ministry representatives in the province, the provincial director general for electricity, for transportation, for education, for health, and so forth. Those people are appointed by central ministries. That said, and you may have to sort of check the Iraqi constitution to see if I'm exactly right on the numbers, but they can be removed by a vote of the provincial government, and I'm not sure if it's half or two thirds. So it's a funny situation where there is a centrally appointed person, though the Directors General in the provinces are often from the province.

Q: Okay, that makes sense. A director general is responsible to whom?

A: His own ministry, but can also be removed by, I believe, a super-majority vote of the provincial council, which has actually happened.

Q: So this was a whole new system then for the Iraqis, and in practice, as you observed, apparently sometimes they did put it into operation. What would be some circumstances where someone was removed?

A: I don't recall the specific case, but I recall there being a case. First of all, it was very rare. I only know of a few cases, and I would actually have to look at records to figure out who it was.

Q: Could you speak about the structure of the PRTs? As I understand it, the original ones had about 80 people. They were a mixture of civilians and military, and the army civil affairs were represented, USAID, State officials, and I guess there would be some specialists, perhaps a USDA person. How were they constituted, what was the proportion of civilian versus military, and then how would you describe the working relationships between the civilians and the military?

A: It was a new program; the working relationships probably weren't exactly the same in any two PRTs. Those PRTs that were most successful, you had a situation where both the PRT leader and the local military leader who covered that area, both saw it as a priority, a Department of Defense, Department of State joint mission, which is how it is defined. The deputy team leader of a PRT is always a military officer from the local unit. The most successful ones that I saw, I'll take one particular example, was where the commander took his executive officer, basically his number 2, and put that executive officer as the deputy team leader of the PRT. He took someone with whom he had great trust and confidence, and by putting that person there, there were excellent communications and cooperation between the PRT and the military unit with which it worked. It can be very personality driven, certain commanders value what the military refers to as the non-kinetic things, the non-war fighting pieces of counter insurgency strategy differently from others. My general sense was that in most of Iraq, most division commanders gave high level guidance and gave the PRT mission a very high priority and that was reflected in what the local brigade commanders did. I had extensive experience in the north, actually in the north and the west, and in both of those cases, the division, well also in Baghdad actually. In all of those cases, the commanders gave the PRT mission a very high priority, and cooperation was excellent between the military and the PRT.

Q: The commander of each PRT would be physically located…

A: The team leader of the PRT…

Q: The team leader of course is at the PRT, and that would be the State person. And then it is the military commander who would appoint…

A: Who would cover that area.

Q: Who would be in charge in the whole area and would have direct lines probably to his military person who was second in command. The military commander would be physically located elsewhere?

A: Not always, actually. In Anbar the PRT leader for Anbar, his office was next door to the office of the division commander. In Diyala it was that way, I believe Mosul as well. They were actually often co-located, which actually made for communication. They were sometimes co-located, and when they were co-located it certainly facilitated communications and interactions.

Q: Were you involved at the point where State and DOD were defining their cooperative roles?

A: That was actually largely negotiated in Washington, not in Baghdad.

Q: Not in Baghdad. Alright, so that affected you?

A: It affected us, but it was actually done here.

Q: What were some of the issues that needed to be resolved as you observed them in the field?

A: Probably more than anything, logistics support and movement security.

Q: Two big items, of course. How would you describe the need for logistics support? That is, initially the PRTs were left to, I don't want to say fend for themselves, but, how were they making do without logistics support?

A: If I remember correctly, there was a period when they were stood up and did not yet have an operations budget, so they didn't have money to buy things like pencils and desks and that sort of thing. That was relatively brief, the logistical tail caught up. In some PRTs, well, I think in all of them for a brief period, well I take that back. Some of them were set up at regional embassy offices and so there was an infrastructure there to take care of them. But those that were established on military bases before they had operational funds - this was a transitional period - very often relied on the goodwill of the military at the base where they happened to be. And sometimes that worked well, and sometimes it didn't.

Q: The security issue would be, I would think, even more crucial, because if the PRT members are going to go out and interact with their counterparts, they can't do so without a military escort.

A: Well, actually, at PRTs that are on regional embassy offices, as a part of the memorandum agreement that you were talking about, PRTs stood around regional embassy offices rely for logistics and movement security on the Department of State, and those that are located on FOBs rely on military movement teams. There was a separate agreement on security that was signed by, I believe the deputy chief of mission and the chief of staff that outlined what military movement team support PRTs could expect, and that was negotiated as I say, I believe between the deputy chief of mission and chief of staff. There is a specific memorandum of agreement on military movement teams' support of PRTs.

Q: I believe that MOU came to pass in February of '07.

A: That sounds approximately right. We can look up the date, I don't know if I have it handy, but it's a public document I believe.

Q: I'm sure it is. I haven't had anyone before make the distinction between the regional embassy offices' PRTs and then those that were located on forwarding operating bases.

A: Actually if you look at the agreements, I'm not sure whether it's in the MOA or in the security MOA, there is a clear distinction between support and movement on REOs,

Regional Embassy Offices, versus support on FOBs: military movement on FOBs, with Department of State providing security and logistics at regional embassy offices.

Q: Okay. In terms of the programs that you were trying to supervise and help define, was the role of IRMO more one of providing guidance to the PRTs?

A; Well actually, the NCT was part of IRMO, and NCT provided guidance to the PRTs.

Q: Okay. Apparently the PRTs did have quite a bit of flexibility in defining the programs, and it's of interest to know how the PRTs generally were able to find ways to address what I understand were the political and economic components of counter insurgency. From your vantage point, how did they manage to address those?

A: Part of it simply was classical diplomacy, reaching out to a broad spectrum of political leaders and opinion makers in their area. They had several other tools to work with. They had the provincial reconstruction development fund, PRDC, Provincial Reconstruction Development Council Fund. These were funds that were especially critical before the Iraqis started actually making money available to the provinces. We made relatively small amounts of money available to the provinces, certainly quite small compared to what they eventually got from their own government. We used this small amount of money to encourage them to organize these provincial reconstruction development councils that had government representation. We worked with NGOs, businesses, so forth, as a way to help them learn how to set priorities and work with each other and use parliament, and democratic processes for establishing priorities so that more projects would be funded. It was also useful in the sense that what they built were useful projects, but at least as useful was the exercise in helping them establish institutions, democratic institutions, whereby local governments could establish priorities and come to consensus.

Q: Classical diplomacy, and it would have been supplemented with?

A: It was also supplemented with the local governance program which was again, a capacity building program that was there before the PRTs but once the PRTs were established it became associated with them. This is the RTI contract.

Also of course, you mentioned different particular experts; there are small business experts, agricultural experts, veterinarians. Each PRT is in a different area and has different things that need to be worked on. We recently were advertising for Najaf, for example, which is a big pilgrimage site for Shia from around the world. The PRT there asked us to a recruit a tourism specialist for the PRT in Najaf so that they could work with the local government so that they could maximize what their local comparative advantage was, and in Najaf that happens to be tourism. But again, in some places its agriculture. USDA has provided some very impressive people; we've hired people with a great variety of skills. The PRT gets there; they see what makes sense. They see what particular things are needed in their area. Iraq is a large and diverse country; there isn't a cookie cutter approach to it. They've got to get there and see in what way the PRT can bring resources, particularly capacity building and human resources that are going to

make sense in their area. Because of that, it is really quite diverse, what they do. In some cases, we've done over the years a very successful bee-keeping project; there are demonstration plantings of vegetables. This actually came about after I left, but I worked on it; it's a program I'm familiar with, is the Quick Response Fund, so that's another tool that they have. Again, when they work with their military colleagues, their military colleagues also have access to the CERP program. So they do have modest resources to work with.

Q: I have the sense that money is not really the problem. There are lots of different programs, tools that they can have access to?

A: Just actually, a wonderful book that was published…that we've given to the PRTs. The Guide to Economic Resources in Iraq, and it's, I don't know, how many pages that is, 28 pages or so, and it outlines all of the various military and civilian programs the PRTs can draw on. It's really quite impressive. They are there locally and they can tap into national programs. They have the QRF and PRDC funds exclusively for use by the PRTs, but they can tap into national capacity building programs, national microfinance programs, national agricultural programs.

Q: Some of the national programs must now be funded with Iraqi resources?

A: That particular brochure is only, is mostly American programs, but clearly, the emphasis during the time that I was there and I believe this could only have accelerated, is for us to be catalysts and capacity builders to help the Iraqis mobilize their own resources. In that sense, reconstruction is somewhat of a misnomer. They really are provincial capacity building things more than anything else.

Q: I was trying to get a sense of where on the reconstruction versus development spectrum they are in Iraq. Of course in Afghanistan, reconstruction was a misnomer; it really meant development. In Iraq, I'm sure there was a higher level of economic development, but maybe…

A: The largest number of dollars and largest projects done on reconstruction were done by the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office. The decisions on those projects had largely been made, overwhelmingly been made, before the PRT ever really existed.

Q: That's a good point.

A: I believe that the name may be in some sense a carry-over from Afghanistan. But they were never primarily sent to the provinces to build large infrastructure projects. They were largely for capacity building.

Q: That still sounds like classical development in some of its aspects, though, because even USAID got away from the big infrastructure projects many years ago, and put emphasis on human resources, trying to develop capacity. It would seem that is what we

are still trying to do, in a way. You mentioned RTI; how do they fit into the PRT scheme, if they do.

A: As I say, my understanding that they were there before the PRTs and then became associated with the PRTs. It's an AID contract for provincial capacity building. As the PRTs geared up, they became a part of the PRT team. I don't know what more I could say about it.

Q: If we're going to have approximately 80 people on the PRT team, and we know the core group is the State, AID, Army person, and the Iraqi cultural advisor, then you need quite a few others to make up the group, some of whom are the military civil affairs. Are any of these civilians supplied by RTI?

A: The PRT is a mixture of personnel. There are some Foreign Service people; there are some 31-61's. 31-61 is a chapter of U.S. law that allows for creating temporary organizations and hiring people in temporary organizations. IRMO, now ITAO, has that authority, and they hire a number of specialized people on temporary appointments to work in the PRTs. There are detailees from different agencies. Agriculture sends some people. Justice has some very impressive role of law people from the Justice Department who do just spectacular work out there. They come from a variety of backgrounds. There are no PRTs that face the same situations; there are no PRTs that have exactly the same economic and development opportunities, that have the same degree of closeness with their local government.

The reason that we have seasoned, experienced, senior people out there is precisely because as much as we're encouraging decentralized decision making by the Iraqis, we really give great scope to the PRT leaders to adapt and to further the U.S. objectives in their area in reaction to the vastly different circumstances that they face, not only by place but over time. The PRT leader today faces a completely different situation, than was faced a year ago. The leader went from visiting in one of the most dangerous places and least permissive to one of the safer places in Iraq, whose local government was not able to get out and mix among the population very much to one now that is out doing Iraq's projects and has even gotten extra money from the federal government to do more. It got a supplemental, a perceived supplemental, if you will. Each is dynamic, each one's unique; it's different in place, it's different by time. That is why it is we have these senior people who, by definition, if you've been around in the Foreign Service a long time, one of the things you learn to do is to adapt quickly and to make a contribution in something that is very different from what you were just doing a short time before.

Q: You mentioned the other day you were going to be addressing some people at FSI, which brings to mind the whole aspect of training. Even if you bring senior people, very adaptable and creative, what could you say about training for PRT service? Did you observe it to have been adequate, or in need of improvement? What would you recommend there?

A: I was part of the panel on the last day of their training, and one of the things that they do on that last day is give them a set of circumstances and they divide into teams and have to present what you would do as a PRT if you were faced with this set of circumstances. I've been doing this for a while, and each time we go over there, I'm more impressed with a week's worth of training, what they come up with. Very sensible, tailored, realistic approaches to what they would actually do out there. I'm not sure how they do it in a week, but I can certainly testify on the basis on what passes for the final exam, that by the end of that week, they have gotten a very good background and a very realistic sense of what they should be doing out there.

Q: Maybe the courses evolved as people have come back with feedback and so on. The area of public affairs also is one that comes up and is important. I don't know if IRMO had any role in PRT public affairs or whether each PRT does public affairs in its own way?

A: Actually the public affairs office had someone whose job it was to work with the PRTs.

Q:There at the embassy in Baghdad?

A: Right there, in the Green Room at the Embassy. So its part of the big huge PAO operation. There was a person who was dedicated to working with the PRTs.

Q: Okay, I know that you would want that kind of awareness, would want the Iraqis to know what's going on in the PRTs and perhaps a different kind of awareness for the American public back home. Hopefully, the Iraqis were getting accurate information about what the PRTs were doing. Do you have a sense of that one way or another?

A: Well, the PRT members get out a lot. They have the QRF. I actually just spoke to someone this morning who returned from Muthanna and said that because of the QRF projects, which are very small, very short term. By short term I mean they are done quickly, not that their impact is short term. His estimate was that perhaps less than 50% of the people even knew there was a PRT in Muthanna before they had the QRF program and he suspects that it's more like 90% now because even if it's just building a foot bridge or adding two rooms on to the local school, which are not huge multi-million dollar infrastructure projects. These little things, where the PRT goes out, talks to the local folks, and then again works with them to establish what their priorities are, is having a disproportionate visibility because its small and quick impact.

Q: In most places they're able to do this without the negative, the downside that they have become targets; I guess that was a concern at some point.

A: Obviously security is an issue, but security has equally obviously improved rather dramatically since the surge. All the quantitative indicators of violence have gone down, and that has allowed the PRTs to be out more and therefore to do more.

Q: It's certainly encouraging to see that, and that's what you would hope. The goal presumably is a normal country where we can travel without an armed convoy?

A: Yes, indeed.

Q: The Army Lessons Learned Center has posted a PRT playbook. I haven't seen it, but I understand that not all of the agencies who participate have cleared it, if you will. Is this a useful item?

A: I find it useful if for no other reason than it's the only published companion to follow the documents about PRTs. It actually has, I have a copy over there, it has all the MOUs, and it has all the different documents.

Q: Here it is, and this would be given to every PRT?

A: I don't know, I don't run the course. It deals with PRTs both in Iraq and Afghanistan. I've never been to Afghanistan, but I understand they are quite different in structure, role, function. It's been a while since I've actually gone through that. If they cleared it with other agencies, I'm unaware of it.

Q: In working with the military, working closely with them as you would have done in Baghdad, are there some fundamental differences in approach between DOD and State that you found you had to work around or work through?

A: I would say it's more individual than institutional. There are some exceptionally sophisticated senior military officers who look at counter insurgency through very much the same lens as someone with a more of a Foreign Service background, who recognizes the importance of what the military refers to as all lines of operation. LOO, Lines of Operation. I would say I have the extreme good fortune when I was there of working with a very gifted and sophisticated group of military commanders who appreciated the importance of the political and economic as well as the security lines of operation. Maybe that's the way you get to be at that level, precisely for having that dimension of seeing things like counter insurgency and all other dimensions.

Q: Counter insurgency is, I would think, a familiar term for the military and maybe one that sits less easily on the shoulders of the State Department officials that you worked with. Did you find any, not resistance, but was that an obstacle for some people to overcome, thinking of themselves as counter insurgency tools, as opposed to diplomats?

A: The military uses the term force-multiplier, and I'm not sure most diplomats like to be considered forced multipliers. (laughter)

Q: I guess I would rather be considered a force multiplier than counter insurgency…

A: There is a certain amount of self selection. I mean most of the civilians in Iraq, virtually everybody in IRMO, was a volunteer.

Q: Sure.

A: Many of the people in the PRTs are there because they want to be. Because they think they can make a contribution. Overwhelmingly, I believe that my State Department colleagues, and particularly the people at the PRTs, develop very strong, close working relationships with their military colleagues. Again, they are humans in human organizations. Were there times when some of them didn't get along, of course, but overwhelmingly they were out there doing something they thought was really important. Most of the people I know that went to Iraq believe that it was the most important thing that they have done in their career. In terms of clash of culture, yes, certainly, they come from very different backgrounds. What was very impressive to me was, they get out in some isolated base which was a foreign environment to all of them and somehow they, in almost every case, formed very productive teams. What was interesting to me was that these are not people who necessarily interact much in the United States. But thrown into that, proved adaptable, creative and faced some major challenges, and came up generally with some creative, innovative, adaptations to a very difficult environment.

Q: To bring our conversation to a close, can you think of a nice example of one of these major challenges, where the team did come together and solve a difficult issue, which is what the PRT is supposed to be doing.

A: There was a situation in Mosul, where the judges were being intimidated, and they knew if they convicted terrorism suspects, that there would be retributions against their families. So the PRT, in this case it was the Department of Justice employee who came up with this idea, and was the real motivator of it. He came up with the idea of traveling courts, that is they would bring a bunch of judges up from Baghdad, defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges and they would come up and they would stay in a protected facility. The military helped set up this protected facility, worked with the Iraqi army to provide the security for the visiting judges when they were there, so you had the cooperation between the local government, the local Iraqi military unit, the local American military unit, and the PRT. They brought these judges up, because the military was very frustrated. What was happening was they would arrest somebody and then the judge wouldn't convict them and the military would find themselves fighting the same enemy the next week. This truly was a joint activity all around, and it has been a dramatic success. The judges have been up and back a number of times; they've held a large number of trials. They are not obviously all convicted but there is a significant number of people who are convicted to significant jail time and who are not back out on the street. It really had every one of the essential players, the Iraqi local government, the Iraqi central government, who was willing to send judges up, the military who was willing to take them up and provide the facility, the Iraqi army which was willing to protect this facility, the PRT whose idea this was, the Department of Justice attaché at the embassy who worked with the chief judge in Baghdad. So this is one of these things where there is just a really cooperative success by getting everybody together to do something.

Q: Very good example. You think about judges in Iraq. That has to be a very dangerous profession.

A: At the time I'd left, 18 had been assassinated.

Q: Hopefully it's a little safer for them now, but still... In any event, that's a good example. Do you have another one?

A: This one's also from the north. One of the keys to making federalism work in Iraq is to have a strong linkage between the provinces and the central government, because, as I mentioned, the ministries are represented at the provincial level, and a lot of those ministries actually do projects and provide services out in the provinces. It was, when I was there, very dangerous for those guys to travel. So we had a sort of helicopter diplomacy, where the commander of the MND North, the Multi-National Division North, helped bring governors down to Baghdad, we worked with the Iraqi government to get them appointments with the Finance Minister, the Transport Minister, the Minister of Water, the Deputy Prime Minister so that they could come down to Baghdad and actually make the rounds of these ministries and do things, get cooperation from them for specific activities in their province. I can recall going into a dining hall once and meeting with about 20 people from Kirkuk, including the governor, the head of the provincial council, the Deputy Governor, and sat down with them for a while. They mentioned that they'd been in to see the Minister of Health, who agreed to finance the hospital; they'd been to the Minister of Finance who agreed to release a certain amount of money, and so forth. This is getting everybody involved in this transaction. The Multi-National Division North who actually brought them down, the embassy and I worked initially to make the appointments and eventually the deputy prime minister for economic affairs took on the function of making appointments for them when they came down. The governors themselves came down, which required the cooperation of the various ministers. It was one of those things, it was done in cooperation with not only with Multi-National Division North but all five PRTs that were in their area. So it's PRTs, it's Multi-National Division North, it's the Deputy Prime Minister's office, it's the ministries, it's the embassy and the senior consultants at IRMO who would also help out with contacts with the ministries with whom they work on a daily basis. I would offer you that as another example of the way it should work.

Q: The way it should work, indeed. The idea of going to see the central government representatives had to bubble up, that is the Iraqis weren't in the tradition of doing that.

A: It was all new, it was all new. With a new federal system, it hadn't really been worked out.

Q: But in the past if they wanted a hospital built in a district, wouldn't they still have had to appeal to the Minister of Health in Baghdad.

A: When you are in a combat zone heading down to Baghdad…

Q: Of course it would be hard to do it; but, I'm wondering whether the idea of meeting the ministers, personally, in Baghdad was new.

A: The big difference was they were appointed; they weren't elected by the local population to represent the local population's needs. They were appointed officials of the central government. They were not provincial officials with the realm of responsibilities to their various constituencies.

Q: As a result, learning needed to go on at all levels, I guess, with these folks figuring out their new responsibilities and then pressuring the central government to follow through after they got the commitment. I do want to thank you for sharing your expertise and your experience, which has been quite informative. I understand from your staff that there are some other studies of PRTs going on, so I hope we're not competing with one another and haven't impinged on your time.

A: I understand there are, but thank you very much. It's an excellent program.