Larry Hines, 52, is a graduate of the U.S. Border Patrol Academy, 1978 with 24 years of service with INS. He has also received degrees and certificates from the Advanced Supervision Course, INS Leadership Development, 1997; and the Executive Potential Program, USDA Graduate School, 2001. He was Section Chief, CID, U.S. INS 1999-2002 until retirement after. He has received INS, National Defense, and Vietnam service medals. In Iraq he was working for the Department of Justice, International Criminal Investigators Training Assistance Program, Baghdad, May-September, 2003.

The Assignment: Larry Hines went to Iraq as the senior police officer of a group of six advisors working in the Ministry of Interior. After arriving, he was designated the lead for all immigrations and customs matters relating to border enforcement.

Organization of the police under Saddam Hussein: Under Saddam Hussein, the police and various functions of border control, immigration, and civil affairs all existed in an extremely decentralized, bifurcated manner. In some cases, such as between the Border police and Customs police, there was little communication or respect between the organizations. It became a top priority for Hines to streamline and centralize these efforts. Another issue that arose was that immigration inspections and passport reviews were the province of the Mukhabarat under Saddam Hussein’s regime. Because the U.S did not want to re-employ the Mukhabarat in these positions, Hines was left without trained people to fulfill these duties.

Responsibility for borders, immigration and customs: Though Hines respects the intelligence of the commissioned personnel, the system by which police were trained and their methods were antiquated and poorly structured. Previously in Iraq, conscripts were used for the border police. This became a problem for Hines because these conscripts fled at the beginning of the war. Thus, he was left without trained men or women to fill these positions, a problem for which he was not prepared.

Immigration and Customs: Training the amount of people needed in immigrations and customs and training them well became an immediate issue. Hines notes that the U.S. military was not prepared to conduct the immigration and customs duties that they became responsible for. He proposes that the military should receive training in these types of areas before another war occurs. Given the situation, short training sessions were organized. Groups of people received limited amounts of training, and then were sent out to spread their knowledge and train others. Not having enough experienced men or women to control the borders, there was very little ability to do so. Despite the serious concern raised over insecure borders, it is only recently (Fall 2004) that there is an effort being made to start training Department of Border Enforcement recruits. One accomplishment in the Immigrations and Customs department was designing and implementing a new passport to curb the effects of phony passports being sold.
Lessons learned: Some lessons Hines learned included the utter importance of border security and having people trained in this area. He recalls that insurgents didn’t need to enter the country by covert means. It was easy for them to drive right through a port of entry or fly into the airport because no one was trained to recognize or stop them. Second, though there was a call for Iraqis to return to work, there wasn’t a place for them. Another issue Hines ran into dealt with resources. In some cases, there was a lack of needed resources. For example, there was only one machine in all of Iraq to create new identifications for the police. In terms of budget, however, Hines had more than he could spend due to outdated Iraqi procedures and their unwillingness to take responsibility for allocating the money. Finally, Hines stresses the need for more people in an advisory role.

Interviewer’s Note: For more information and detail, see Hines’ Powerpoint Presentation: Border Enforcement Issues in Iraq; Ambassador’s Briefing, August 20, 2003 and Draft Proposal to Consolidate Border Police, Customs Police, Immigration Inspections, Customs Inspections, and Nationality & Civil Affairs into a single Department within the Ministry of Interior - the Department of Border Enforcement, undated. These materials will be included as supplemental materials.
Q: Today is October 3, 2004 and the interview is with Larry Hines. Larry, what period of time were you there?

HINES: I was in Baghdad from May of 2003 through September 2003.

The Assignment
Q: And what was your position?

HINES: I went over as a subcontractor with a company that had the contract with the Department of Justice. That company was SAIC, or Science Applications International Corporation, I think. I went over as the senior police advisor, one of the six original police advisors that went over, and within just a couple weeks of being there Bernard Kerik designated me as the lead for all immigration and customs matters relating to border enforcement.

Q: Where was your position in the CPA?

HINES: I was right in the palace at CPA.

Q: And you were reporting to whom?

HINES: My first line was a guy named Robert Carr Trevillian. He had previously worked for SAIC, but had been picked up by Department of Justice as a GS employee. I reported to him, and then he reported directly to Bernie Kerik. He used to be the police commissioner of New York City, and then he went over as the interim acting Minister of Interior. So we worked right in the Ministry of Interior. [Trevillian was the DOJ’s International Criminal Investigators Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), with oversight of the contracted Senior Police Advisers]

Q: You were a part of the senior advisory group in the Ministry of Interior then?

HINES: Yes, sir.

Q: Before you went out there, or when you just got there, what was your understanding of the situation generally and specifically in the area in which you were working?
HINES: Before we went over, I was picked up just as one of the six police advisors, not necessarily with the intent on doing anything related to borders or immigration and customs. We went over with the understanding that we were going to first conduct assessments of the various police entities in Iraq, and then after we had conducted our assessments, we were going to make some recommendations as far as implementing police procedures and what kind of training would be needed in this and that. Then the six of us were to remain, kind of morph from assessors into management of whatever programs we devised to put the police back on track.

However, once we got there, we weren’t there a week and we got notified that plans had changed, that we would not be conducting the detailed assessments of what the needs were, but that the demand for policemen was so great that we had to just start implementing and conduct assessments as we go, which is kind of awkward trying to implement before you know what it is that’s needed, but, anyway, we did that.

Q: This was police for the whole country?

HINES: Yes, sir. There were a couple of teams that did go up to [places] like Mosul and conducted some very brief interviews and did some assessments, and also went down to Basrah. But it wasn’t long after we were there that they decided that everybody in the south was going to be handled by the British. So I think we were only there like six weeks or two months when it became a sure thing that the British would take care of everything in the south of Iraq. I’m talking about interior policing.

As far as the borders go and customs and everything, that remained in my bailiwick. We had to determine where we were going to recommend establishments of official ports of entry, because there were a lot of crossing points, but they weren’t monitored, they weren’t controlled by customs and immigration inspections or anything like that.

Organization of the policy under Saddam Hussein
Q: How were the police organized under the Saddam Hussein time?

HINES: To say that it was bifurcated would be an understatement. Prior to the fall, they had the various functions of border security, immigration and customs divided up into four different ministries and the presidential office. Under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, passports were handled and visas and things like that. The Ministry of Finance took care of customs inspections. The Ministry of Interior prior to the fall was responsible for nationality and civil affairs. That’s to give you a point of reference. Here in the U.S. under the Immigration Service, what they call nationality we would have called examinations, people that conduct interviews to determine who was derived citizenship or to grant naturalization. That would have been under their nationality. Their civil affairs was more like what we equate to an estate system of registration: birth, marriages, deaths, things like that; but that was all handled by the Nationality and Civil Affairs Department, which was under the Interior. Also under Interior was customs police, and then prior to the 1990 Gulf War border police were also under the Ministry of Interior. Now, border police and customs police were two separate entities. They had little to do with each other and evidently little respect for each other.
Q: Were there any local police organizations in the municipalities, or were they all central?

HINES: Well, yes, they were divided up. They had their organization divided into, well, like in our immigration service and homeland defense. At the time of my retirement we were divided up into three regions. Well, they had a similar set-up. They [had the] north, middle, and southern, and they all reported to the headquarters, but they had these three regions which, for all practical purposes, ran things.

Q: But there were no municipal police locally hired, or provincial police?

HINES: Yes, but I’m talking about what dealt with border and immigration issues.

Q: Right, I understand.

HINES: Now, sure, they had their municipal police, they had traffic police, they had their pipeline police for the oil pipeline, and they had a police unit that guarded significant buildings and things, institutions. Their whole system was very, well, like I say, bifurcated is an understatement. But my area of responsibility was strictly dealing with borders, immigration and customs.

Responsibility for borders, immigration and customs

Q: Was there a well-structured organization for that work, and what was the quality of the people you were working with on the Iraqi side?

HINES: Well, it depends. I would not say that they were well structured. They were very antiquated. For example, they had something like 230 or 240 border patrol stations or offices along the border, in some cases as close to each other as just a couple of kilometers from each other. They literally patrolled the border in the areas that they considered high risk like Syria and Saudi Arabia, Jordan.

Q: Iran?

HINES: Yes, and Iran. They patrolled those actually on foot. They did not have our sophisticated means of border patrol, you know, electronic sensors and cameras and the like. They didn’t even have vehicles, for the most part, for the regular guys that were actually out there on the border patrolling. And that was another thing: they used conscripts for the border police. So whenever this second Gulf War started, a lot of them just fled and they were never heard of again. The commissioned officers stuck around, but the conscripts didn’t.

Q: How many are we talking about? What size of organization?

HINES: Pre-war the border police had about 614 border policemen. There were over 3,300 customs police. There were 2,500 customs inspectors, 3,000 immigration inspectors. Then they also had what they called border guards. It’s kind of a misnomer. They didn’t actually patrol the border or guard the border from anybody making entry. They were there to guard the compounds that housed the border operations like customs inspections. They actually had dormitories
because the ports of entry there are so remote. They’re not near cities or anything, so it’s not like the United States at El Paso or McAllen where you’ve got a city at the port. These are just out in the middle of nowhere, and they actually build compounds for their ports of entry. So the border guards were just here kind of there to oversee the operation of the port itself.

Q: How was the quality of the personnel? What kind of capabilities did they have?

HINES: I never met a border guard. I don’t know what happened to them, so I can’t tell you. So, obviously, not very good.

Q: What about the others that you worked with?

HINES: The commissioned folks, some of them were pretty sharp. All police graduated from the same academy, whether they were municipal police or pipeline police or border police, customs police; they all went to the same police academy, which was like four years of college. So they all graduated from the same thing, and then once they graduated they were designated where they were going to go to. Sometimes they stayed where they started, and sometimes they would kind of shift around, particularly between border and customs. There were a couple of times where a couple of the people I interviewed had been with the pipeline police. I think I got off track, though.

Q: I was talking about the quality and the capability of this group.

HINES: Like I say, everything was just ancient in style. It wouldn’t have surprised me if they had camels out there. Just getting back to that original thing, the other ministry was the Ministry of Defense, which obviously included the military, but from the 1990 Gulf War until February of 2003, border police was also in that, and they were actually more of a military-style unit. My own observations were that the border police, the hierarchy of the people that I interviewed from the border police, were much more sophisticated, just a lot sharper people than the hierarchy of the customs police. The border police, as the name implies, were actually out on the border.

The customs police, my take on it was, all they did was they sat at the ports of entry, and then if a customs inspector found somebody that they thought was in violation of a customs regulation, they wouldn’t make the arrest themselves. They said, “That’s not our jobs.” They wouldn’t do any arrests, if they found a violation. They would signal for one of these customs policemen to come over and make the arrest. So the customs police, they weren’t necessary sharp; they just didn’t mind making arrests and they didn’t mind taking bribes. The customs police were pretty corrupt.

Then, the other part they had, not a part of the border, was the presidential office. From February of 2003 the presidential office took over control of the border police up until the time when we actually went in.

Q: Why was that?
HINES: I think they just wanted more control over the border police and more hands-on. Now, also under the presidential office, which had almost always been this way since Saddam anyway, the immigration inspections were under the presidential office. When we got there and were getting ready to establish the ports of entry, the first land port that we were going to open up was from Jordan into Iraq and then, of course, another one that was high on the priority list was reopening the Baghdad airport. Well, we found out we didn’t have any immigration inspectors, because the immigration inspectors were all part of the direct security guard of the DSG and the Mukhabarat, the secret police. Of course, they were all invited not to come back to work, and so consequently, we didn’t have anybody in Iraq that knew how to renew a passport or a visa that we could put at the ports, whether it was airport or land port. So that was one of the biggest challenges.

Training for immigration and customs police

Ambassador Bremer wanted the Baghdad airport opened up right away, so that was my top priority, to get immigration and customs inspectors at the airport. So we brought in a team of people from Homeland Security to do a quick down-and-dirty training of a select few people that we designated to be immigration inspectors at the international airport. I think we had like 30 people that we designated, and then came in and trained them. Right about that time was when we started getting all the mortars hitting the airport and everything. I don’t know to this day if the airport is officially open for commercial traffic...

Q: I don’t think so.

HINES: ...because of all the rockets and everything. So, at any rate, that was the only training.

Then we also completed kind of a canned training guide where we trained a few military policemen in the immigration and customs procedures, and then they were to go back out and train their own people. It was kind of a train-the-trainer. They were to go back and train their own MPs and then turn around and try to train some of the Iraqis that they had already vetted in their respective areas to take over the function. But that training program that we gave them was like three hours in duration.

Q: That’s all?

HINES: When I went to the U.S. Border Patrol Academy, I was in the Border Patrol Academy for four months and then had almost another year of post-academy training. Then you were in a kind of a rookie status, if you will, for another two years. So in the U.S. before you’re actually what they call a journeyman border patrol agent, you’ve been on the job for three years. So we were trying to train military in three hours to know how to do border patrol and particularly the immigration inspections procedure, which is the review of documents, which is something that before somebody becomes real proficient at it, they’ve probably got five or six years on the job. So, at any rate, that’s what we did there.

Q: What was the main substance of the course? What were you trying to do in three hours?
HINES: Teach them how to look at a document, try to determine if the person was who he was representing himself to be. We emphasized imposter training. Because there wasn’t any government, there were no visas being issued to come into Iraq, but we had to set up some interim regulations as to who could come in. We also had departure control, who could leave and who couldn’t, because they were still looking for the regime members.

Things were really in a mess. As an example, I went out to the airport one day and stopped by the terminal they use for the non-government organizations, the NGO terminal, and they had one Air Force Reserve staff sergeant trying to direct the exit of people from NGO aircraft and other military aircraft into a terminal to inspect them, and, at the same time, trying to keep them from commingling with the passengers that were going to depart. There were a lot of horror stories of people going out on airplanes that weren’t identified; they were all bandaged up and nobody knows who they were because nobody could look at them. So things were a mess out at the airport. When we first reported that, Ambassador Bremer just shut the whole thing down for a few days until we kind of got it straightened out and got a system in place and got some MPs out there to control the movement of arriving and departing passengers on those NGOs and some of the military flights. One of the regular military flights was coming in from Jordan. They were helping out with security at hospitals and stuff like that.

So, when we got there, things were in a mess and there was no control of the borders. One of our recommendations was to consolidate all of those various functions into a single department, and that’s what the ambassador signed off on, the creation of the Department of Border Enforcement, and under that came all of those things that I just described to you as far as customs and border police. We merged the border and customs police into a single unit, much like what we did here in the United States with the Homeland Security Department.

For new recruits, they were to go to the basic police academy and then, while at the academy, the people that maybe were a little sharper than the others would be the ones that would be called out to go through further immigration customs-specific training. Well, that didn’t happen like that. Once the police academy got started for recruits—you know, it was established over in Amman, Jordan—all they were sending them was the municipal police. I, just within the last couple of weeks, have been made aware that they are just now getting ready to start training Department of Border Enforcement recruits.

Q: Just starting?

HINES: Just now starting. Now, with all the hoopla about how insecure the borders are, you would think—well, maybe it’s my prejudice—common sense would dictate let’s get the borders controlled first so we can keep the terrorists and other types from coming in.

Q: Do you understand why it was so delayed?

U.S. Military Police

HINES: There were just so many demands and, of course, all the chaos that was going on inside the bigger cities [such] as Baghdad and Mosul and Basrah. You know, they had to get the police up and running, too. It was just too much for the military police to handle everything. Let me go
on record as saying the military police are fantastic. I’ve never seen such an enthusiastic bunch of people.

Q: These were the Americans?

HINES: The Americans, right, and the Brits too. They were just all enthusiastic. I’d be in meetings with what they called MSCs (Major Subordinate Command). Anyway, these young majors and captains, if you just thought something out loud about, “Well, this would be a good idea. Have we thought about doing this?”, they’d come back the next week and they’d already implemented it. They were full of piss and vinegar, but they were great to work with.

Q: But there probably weren’t enough of them, according to what we’re hearing. Was this a problem or not?

HINES: I can’t speak to the numbers of military, whether it was adequate or not, but I can tell you that the military was not in a position, our military was not in a position, to conduct immigration and customs duties they were obligated to do. One of the ports that I did tour was the land port between Jordan and Iraq, and one of the sergeants that was the day shift supervisor of all the people at that port, he said, “We don’t even know what we’re looking at when we look at a manifest or when we look at a passport.” He said, “We just look at them and wave them through.” They had absolutely no training to do either function. Now, the Brits were a little better because their military actually does get some; I don’t know if it’s in their boot camp or secondary training. They do actually get a little bit of training in immigration and customs procedure, so they were a little better prepared than the Americans were as far as border enforcement. But ours had absolutely no idea what to do, so the military was very anxious to get them trained, but everything was in such a hurry, they just wanted something down-and-dirty and they wanted to get them back out there and have their people that we trained in three hours go out and train the rest of the military and then also their own local contingents of Iraqis that they decided to let come back to work.

Q: This was training for the American group, right?

HINES: Yes, sir.

Q: Or for the Iraqi?

HINES: Well, both. We gave that three-hour course of instruction to the military police.

Q: The Americans?

HINES: Yes, and then they in turn went back and trained their own people under that train-the-trainer program, and then also were going to act as trainers to the Iraqis until we got a permanent training program in place out at the academy, which is just now starting.

I think, as far as looking into future episodes where similar things may come up and if we’re going to be doing what it appears that we’re going to do—and I personally think is the right
thing, going after these countries that encourage terrorism—if we’re going to be invading them, then we’re going to be taking them over, the military needs to be trained before they get there. I broached that subject with some of the colonels before I left Iraq: how do we go about making a proposal to train your military before they get in the theater so that when they hit the ground they already know what it is that they’re going to be expected to do, if they’re assigned to a border or to an airport or seaport. It wasn’t met with any enthusiasm.

Q: It was not?

HINES: I don’t know. I think it’s just that they’ve got so many responsibilities, and this is the first time that the military has been called on to do it, so it just wasn’t in their mindset to even think of it as a military responsibility.

Q: That related to the looting problem too, I guess, didn’t it?

HINES: Well, everything. You know, the MPs, from my perspective, were running the country when we first got there. As far as taking a hill, our military was great, and they were doing a pretty good job of just running things as long as they ran them, but they were not prepared to do border security and they certainly weren’t prepared to be training Iraqis in something as sophisticated as immigration and customs inspections. In municipal police, the MPs are probably fine for that because they get good police training when they’re trained as MPs, but they don’t know anything. I shouldn’t say that, because there were individuals within the military reserves that came from immigration and customs backgrounds here in the States. However, they weren’t being used for that function in Iraq, which was kind of frustrating. I came across a couple, in fact, one that worked for me when I was the section chief in Atlanta, a special agent up in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, and I bumped into him. He was a major in the reserves. I asked him what he was doing, and he was building swing sets. I did my best to get him assigned to me to help me out but to no avail.

Q: What was the effectiveness of the ability to control the borders?

HINES: They didn’t need to be worrying about patrolling the desert. This is coming from the book of Hines, now. From my perspective, the military did not need to be concerned patrolling the remote areas of the border between the ports, because anybody that wanted in could just drive in their Mercedes right through a port of entry and nobody would have stopped him, simply because they didn’t know what to look for. We recommended establishing, as far as Class A land ports, I think, 16 land ports is what we recommended finally be set up, and that’s for all seven countries that surround Iraq. Then there was going to be three international airports and two international seaports. But, anyway, the military just wasn’t set up for it. I still say that, based upon the training that I know that we gave the military, if that’s all they ever received and if the military is still performing the immigration customs inspections at those ports. When I was there, still the only land port that had been officially opened for traffic was the one for Jordan.

Q: In trying to implement your program, what are some of the major recommendations you made? You’ve touched on them, I’m sure, but let’s look at it more carefully.
HINES: Okay. Again, the first thing was to centralize everything from the decentralized way it was before, including the presidential office, five different points, and we broke that down into a single Department of Border Enforcement. It is my understanding this recommended organization is still in place. Underneath that Department of Border Enforcement are three specific bureaus. One is the Bureau of Border and Customs Police, and then under that Bureau of Border and Customs Police was going to be the Patrol Division, like our border patrol, an Investigations Division, which does those reviews of people seeking admission into Iraq of passports and visas, and then a Detention and Deportation Division.

Now, at the time I was there, the Iraqis did not have an investigations division per se. If there were any kind of fraud or anything like that suspected, fraud documents or alien smuggling or anything like that going on, if it was investigated, it would have been by the secret police, the Mukhabarat. So they didn’t have any investigations division. They had no detention and deportation division. A gain, that was something that was done under the auspices of the presidential office, secret police. So the Investigations Division and then the Detention/Deportation Division are brand new to Iraqis. They’ve had no training in that at all. This bureau that was going to be under the Department of Border Enforcement, was the Bureau of Border Inspections, and then that also would have three divisions. It would have an Immigration Inspections Division, a Customs Inspection Division, and then something that was unique to Iraq because of where the ports of entry are located, a Port Security Division. The Bureau of Nationality and Civil Affairs, and each of the bureaus has three divisions within it. They haven’t caught on yet. Other than that, the Passport Division and then the Nationality and Civil Affairs Division, which [deals with] vital statistics, the birth records. And then the final division, the Immigration Division, which are the people that review applications for people that want to immigrate into Iraq.

Q: Did you have to set up all of this?

HINES: Yes.

Q: Did you find people to staff it?

HINES: Well, as far as I got, yes. That was also going to be determined, you know, through everybody except the first two bureaus, the Bureau of Border and Customs Police and then the Bureau of Border Inspections. Their recruits were all from basic police academy. The Nationality and Civil Affairs Bureau is not a police force. They can’t perform arrests and things, so they would not be going through the academy. As far as I got in making appointments, my recommendation for director of the overall department was a guy who had been both general border police and he was designated as the Director of Border Enforcement. We also got the bureau chief administrator actually through the Bureau of Nationality and Civil Affairs. We got him selected, then appointed. The bureau chiefs for the border and customs police, the bureau chief for the Inspections Bureau had not yet been appointed by the time I left. Then beneath them, of course, you’ve got the regional head. The region concept is where there would be regional people in each of the divisions that would then manage their respective programs throughout their region. The selection of those people had not been started when I left. And I don’t think it has, just based on the correspondence I’ve had with people who are still there.
Q: What were some of the major problems that you addressed?

Seriously undermanned
HINES: The first and foremost was the fact that, not the military, we were so undermanned as far as advisors. When I first got there, when I first was designated as the lead on the border and customs and border police, immigration, all that, I was the only person assigned to that for the whole country. Any one of those divisions probably could take 15 or 20 people. So we were very undermanned in trying to make assessments and then recommendations and then actually implementing them. Now, I was subsequently augmented with some people. We ended up having some people from Great Britain. About six weeks before I left, Spain finally provided some people to come in and help us on border issues. But up until then I was kind of like the Lone Ranger.

What we ended up doing was in that restructuring we went from a total of over 45,000 people pre-war in those various entities that had some function either with immigration or customs, and with a total layout of personnel it would have gone from 45,000 people down to just around 20,000. At the same time increased the way it’s laid out. Border police and customs police pre-war only numbered about 3,900 people. Now, according to the plan, just to patrol those police missions beneath the Bureau of the Border Police, that’s going to have over 6,600 people. The number of customs inspectors will remain the same, around 2,500, and immigration inspectors are going to go from like 3,000 Mukhabarat down to 2,500 actual immigration inspectors.

Then Nationality and Civil Affairs police, all they did before was harass their citizens. They actually went out and rounded people up that were deemed undesirables, mostly because they didn’t like Saddam. They rounded them up and loaded them on a truck and took them down to the Iranian border and [threw them out] across the border. We recovered information while I was there that there were some 300,000 Iraqi citizens that were deported from their own country, and then administratively the Saddam regime stripped them of their citizenship, and when they did that, of course, they took all their properties. A lot of those people were trying to make their way back to Iraq after the war. So there’s a big problem there. We did locate where the files were to back that up, too. See, that in itself would have been a full-time job for a considerable-size team to look at, identifying those people who had their citizenships stripped, but we just couldn’t get to it.

So the biggest problem was in the manpower as far as advisors go, and I’m not speaking about the military here. Like I say, I don’t have a clue whether they’re adequately staffed, or if they’ve got enough or too many or what. I’ll let politicians figure that one out. But as far as advisors, we were way down.

Q: What other major problem did you face? Were the ministries destroyed?

Designed a new “passport”
HINES: There was a big problem there at first of phony passports being sold. A lot of them had been stolen by former employees of the Mukhabarat and then they were on the black market, so they had to come up with a new, well, it wasn’t really a passport, it was considered a travel
document because there wasn’t any government and only a bona fide government can issue a passport. So we had to come with the design of the new passport. We designed and finally got delivered to us from the States immigration and customs inspection stamps to be used so that we’d know what was legitimate and what wasn’t. There was just a lot of chump.

Lack of consideration for border security
The biggest thing was, I don’t think, as far as police work, that anybody had really given much consideration to border security, and it’s simply because in the past it had never really been an issue anywhere, whether in Panama or even Kosovo and places like that. They’d really never experienced this kind of a problem where you had to go in and set up that part of the government too. So it was just a fluke that I was even selected. I was the only person that had any federal background of the six advisors. All the others were state and local but very talented, but their expertise was in municipal policing. Then when we got over there and found out that we had to also take on this border enforcement, the immigration and customs, all the people that were previously employed there was as great or greater than the number of all of the police. There’d just never been any consideration given to it, and I guess it’s because it’s just never been experienced. Whoever the people were that were planning for this post-victory assessment and everything had just never really given it any consideration. I think they will in the future, or I hope they will.

I think one of the biggest problems is that the military is just not prepared to do this kind of work at all. If I were to have the ear of somebody influential, like the general in charge of all the military, one of the things I’d ask him is please try to get a training program, if nothing else, at least for your military police, where they have a segment of training that’s pretty exhaustive dealing with immigration and customs matters. Who knows what’s next if we have to go into the Sudan and take that over. The same thing would be cropping up, and again the military just wouldn’t be equipped. They can guard the borders and patrol it in a defensive way, in a military way, but as far as doing admissions and looking for fraud documents and things of that nature, they are not trained, period. They just can’t do it.

Other lessons learned
Q: You’re getting into the lessons learned. That’s one of the things you’ve learned from this experience. Were there other things that come to your mind about lessons that you could pass on?

HINES: When we first got there, there was no place for the people. You know, we put out the word for people to return to work as long as they weren’t members of certain levels of the Baath Party. We asked them to return to work. Well, they were ready to return to work, but we didn’t have any place for them to return to.

Q: So the ministry was destroyed?

HINES: Well, the Ministry of Interior building had been destroyed, and then various little outposts, at least within the confines of Baghdad, most of those buildings had been destroyed. People, displaced families and everything, had just taken up residence in a lot of the government building, you know, squatters. So there were logistical things like that. I don’t know if that’s
anything you can prevent, though. I guess that’s to be expected in a war environment, but just be prepared to know that it does happen.

We had a big problem there with a lot of the people that we had to terminate. Some of the command of the border police and customs police were probably pretty good people. I met some of them, but because they were at that cut-off level of membership in the Baath Party, you couldn’t keep them on. I’m not convinced that they were particularly Saddam loyalists. It’s kind of like in some places in the United States, if you want a good job, you’ve got to be a member of the unions. You don’t necessarily agree with the union, but you want the money. I kind of think that that’s what it was there for some. Now, no doubt some of them were Saddam loyalists that we’d gotten rid of, but I think that we were maybe a little too vague in our vetting process to where, if you were this, then you’re out.

Q: Did you have practical problems of paying these people?

HINES: Yes, but that wasn’t something that I was directly involved with personally. Military took that role on, and actually they did a remarkable job. You talk about chaos. All those personnel records and payroll records and finding out who really was who. There were people claiming to be policemen that weren’t, wanting to get paid and wanting to go back on the streets, and they never were in the police: sorting through all of that. That was something done by the military, and they did a remarkable job actually.

There were other things that we had problems with like creating new identifications for all of the police. There for a while we only had one piece of equipment in all of Baghdad to make identification badges for all law enforcement, so we advisors had to take turns of calendaring the use of this piece of equipment that would make these ID badges. It was an ID where the photograph of the respective person was embedded right into the document. So there were little things like that that we just didn’t have enough of.

Q: Not with doing it in thousands, I guess.

HINES: The two biggest users of it were the advisor who was over traffic police and then myself. I never did get everybody, just in Baghdad area of the border and customs police, I never did get them all issued IDs before I left. Logistical things like that were real hassles.

As far as resources, about halfway through I was given a budget for rebuilding the various buildings that needed to be done or buying uniforms or other equipment and stuff. I had plenty of money; there wasn’t a way to spend it, mostly because of the Iraqis. They were starting to take control of the finances, and the procedures that they had in place, they were so used to their old way, they weren’t ready for a streamlined process for getting this money turned loose, and they were so worried about accountability that they were overly worried about it. I was given a $5,000,000 budget, and, in the time I was there, I didn’t even spend a half a million.

Q: That’s because of the procedures?
HINES: It’s because of the procedures. We knew what we needed and we wanted to get it in place, and then getting companies to come in and do the work, whether they were Iraqi or if it was something that we were going to have to have a big company like KBR or Halliburton or something like that do, it was just getting all those people lined up. The minor stuff, there were enough Iraqi companies where we could get it done pretty quick, but the system that the Iraqis had in place in the Ministry of Interior to turn money loose was just real cumbersome and they couldn’t move as quick. Again, the military was great.

I’d go to weekly meetings with those at MSC. They’d come in from all over the country, and they were doing the assessments for me as far as what their various ports of entry, what kind of rebuilding they needed to have done, what the cost would be, and they were very good about giving me detailed reports. But there again we just couldn’t get the money spent and to get them unstuck.

Just to build on it was the lack of advisors. I needed border patrolmen from the States, or some other country if they’ve got a unit that’s as well trained, to come and do assessments out on the border and to be advisors then to the Iraqis. You know, the business of patrolling a border by having people stand shoulder to shoulder for 2,000 miles of border—you just can’t patrol borders that way. So I guess my biggest, I don’t want to call it a complaint . . .

Q: The biggest lesson learned.

HINES: Yeah, the biggest lesson would be that you just need to have more people in an advisory role there, advisory/management role to do the immigration and customs work. Like I say, I was just overwhelmed, even when the British came in. There were two Brits that came in to work inside the Ministry of Interior with me in management capacities, and then eventually wound up with three Spanish guys, but that just wasn’t enough. The military, they did assign a lieutenant colonel to me that came in, and he was just super. He had organizational skills that were just phenomenal. He was a reservist who in civilian life is an Assistant U.S. Attorney there in Washington. By the way, if you wanted to talk to somebody, he’s a wealth of information. He actually took over for me when I left then.

Q: What’s his name?

HINES: His name is Ed Burley, and if he’s back in the States, he would be at the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Washington, DC. I know he worked a lot of high-profile cases there. He was an SES or AUSA, so he’s a pretty high-ranking Assistant U.S. Attorney. He and I were the ones that made the presentation to Ambassador Bremer.

Q: Of course, one of the big questions is the flow of insurgents across the borders. Did you have any sense of that?

HINES: I don’t think anybody can say, because, like I say, they didn’t need to come in a Jeep or on a camel across the remote parts of the border. They could drive right through the ports of entry, and there for a while they could have been flying right into Baghdad International and nobody would have known, and the same in reverse as far as people leaving Iraq.
The time I went out to the Jordanian border the traffic was backed up literally for miles and miles and miles, as far as you could see, and I was in a helicopter. It’s like people trying to leave New York City or something. Anyway, there were all these trucks wanting to come into Iraq with the supplies and everything. They didn’t know what to look for. They didn’t know what to look at. There weren’t just trucks, there were sedans as well. Like I said, there were a lot of people wanting to come back to Iraq that had been deported or had just happened to be out of the country at the time the war started and they couldn’t get in. Then there were other things you had to deal with, like all these religious holidays with people having to go to their holy sites, and not just from Iraq. These people were coming in from Iran and from Saudi Arabia and from Syria to make their holy trek.

So there were just a lot of things that here in the West we don’t think of. But the biggest thing was that nobody was prepared to have to take over border functions. You know, we would bring the Iraqis back to work to do that, and that was one thing where they did not go overboard by not allowing any of the Mukhabarat back. They shouldn’t have. Everybody that did immigration inspections and reviewed passports and visas, they were all Mukhabarat. There wasn’t any non-Mukhabarat doing that. And I don’t think anybody knew that until we got in there.

Q: Are there any other major areas we haven’t touched on?

HINES: Not that I can think of right off the top of my head.

This has been great, a very interesting interview.

HINES: Okay.

Q: Thank you so much.

HINES: You’re sure welcome.