Note: This interview was conducted before the present set of questions was drawn up.

The interviewee served as the USAID representative on a PRT in Gardiz in Paktia Province, from August 2003 to August 2004, although for the last two months of that period he was in Kabul. The PRT had responsibility for five provinces on the border of Pakistan: Ghazni, Khost, Lowgar, Paktia, and Paktika. The PRT included 26 civil affairs soldiers, a military officer from the Afghan ministry of interior, and representatives of USAID, the State Department, Agriculture, and the British aid agency. It had 60 to 80 American infantrymen as force protection.

At the time of the interviewee’s arrival in Afghanistan, AID had more than a billion dollars to spend but not enough personnel to spend it properly. Shortly thereafter, the Quick Impact Program (QIP) was undertaken, with a budget of $40 million. Under that program in Gardiz, members of the team identified projects and proposed them to the mission in Kabul. If a project was approved, it was handed over to the International Organization for Migration for implementation. Elsewhere, some projects were implemented by UN ops. At first the QIP budget was divided among eight PRTs; then the number was expanded to 12, and later to 14.

In Gardiz, the money was used to help local governance, particularly the provincial education ministry and the customs bureau. Drawing on different resources, the military built (or rebuilt) schools, wells, clinics. But there was a difference in approach and philosophy between AID and the army. AID’s approach was slower and longer term. The army wanted to show quick results in order to demonstrate that they were “doing good,” to promote development, and to win hearts and minds. These efforts, however, did not take account of overall development strategy and sometimes undermined the Afghan government. If a school or clinic was built, for example, but there was no one to staff it, that generated criticism of the government. Sometimes wells were dug without proper account taken of the aquifers they tapped. In some cases, however, there was synergy between army and AID efforts, as when they cooperated to build a road. The major school program was a central program that was not conducted through the PRTs.

The interviewee noted the expansion of PRTs to include those from Germany, New Zealand, and elsewhere. He pointed out the different New Zealand approach, in which the commander instructed his PRT to deal directly with the UN and NGOs, out of concern that his direct involvement would upset them.

NGO personnel were generally wary of PRTs and concerned that their presence would “blur the lines.” Although some said they welcomed the wearing of uniforms by PRT members because they wanted the Afghans to see that the Americans were helping them, others wanted PRT members to work in civilian clothes so the NGOs would not be seen as US puppets. By the time of the interviewee’s arrival in Gardiz, all PRT members were wearing civilian clothes. Some NGO representatives indicated that they did not care who controlled Afghanistan and that their only interest was in helping the people. Relations with NGOs in Gardiz improved after the PRT made efforts to coordinate projects with them.

The PRT also took steps to put an Afghan face on its projects by acting through or associating with Afghans, but the local people still knew where the funds came from.

The PRT in Gardiz suffered from shortages in communications, transport, and security equipment. Representatives of its various components did not have the necessary means to communicate with one another and there were deficiencies in the ability to communicate with Kabul.

Security conditions also created restrictions. The PRT was in a joint special operations area,
where an active search for Al-Qaeda and Taliban members was taking place. PRT members could operate within a 15-kilometer radius around Gardiz without the PRT commander having to get clearance. Any travel outside that radius, however, required a 96-hour notice to the army to ensure that PRT members would not enter an area where a military operation was being conducted.

PRT members had to contend with occasional improvised explosive devices and ineffective rocket attacks, but no one was ambushed. The situation in the south was “more dicey.” There was no serious warlord problem in the area, but local governors and military commanders were powers unto themselves to a significant extent. The interviewee commented that in the process of demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration, local armed forces must be co-opted with rewards that they will take seriously.

The interviewee feels that there must be more training to bring into harmony the differing civilian and military approaches to rebuilding a nation like Afghanistan and to develop synergy between the efforts. More attention should also be paid to training in local culture. He indicated that ways must be found to encourage longer tours of duty in Afghanistan for personnel involved in development and that military personnel who return for additional tours should be assigned back to areas with which they are familiar, so that advantage can be taken of their local knowledge.

The interviewee is optimistic about the future of the US role in Afghanistan and believes that the people there regard the US positively. He indicated, however, that funds must be found to continue reconstruction if that positive attitude is to be sustained.
United States Institute of Peace  
Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training  
Afghanistan Experience Project

Interview #3

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy  
Initial interview date: October 19, 2004  
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Q: All right. Where are you now? This is being done by phone.

A: Currently I’m in my office at the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute at Carlisle Barracks at the War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

Q: In the first place, I wonder if you could explain at the time when you were assigned to a civil, was it a civil affairs unit, how were these constituted?

A: I was assigned to a brigade headquarters and the brigade headquarters is completely different from anything that most people in a conventional army think of. Actually civil affairs and psychological operations are under their command, which is called USACAPOC, U-S-A-C-A-P-O-C. It’s actually under the special operations command. For instance, civil affairs brigade is designed or at that time it was designed to support a corps headquarters, so you would have a unit, one brigade headquarters, but have maybe 18 full colonels which of course compared to an infantry brigade headquarters, it’s nothing of that nature. Almost overwhelms the division headquarters. The civil affairs battalion is supposed to support a division headquarters. So, we had subordinate battalions through North Carolina, Tennessee and up into New York State. At that level it’s more of a senior policy. One of the interesting things about going to civil affairs school is the first thing they tell you is you don’t have any assets. You’re a facilitator. You connect A and B to get things done. People get the itchy finger and feet and they really want to make something happen and they can’t make it happen in civil affairs themselves. They have to tie different entities together to make things happen, especially at that time. My unit had some experience. They’d been in Haiti in ’95 and we had a couple of fellows who were in Somalia. They’d had experience. Also at that time there was a standing down of army reserve special forces in all the reserve Special Forces assets that the National Guard continued to have theirs, but the army reserve eliminated those. So, we had a lot of people that came, reserve Special Forces into civil affairs and particularly I think into my brigade because we were in South Carolina, not far from Fort Bragg. We were airborne, so they wanted to continue to be airborne. We had a lot of guys in there that were used to wanting to get things done where traditional civil affairs was being facilitated.

Q: You know, I was going to say, I’ve dealt with Special Forces, and they’re doers. They’re kind of hard to keep under control in a way.
A: Well, I think at times it graded them because when you’re supporting a regular corps headquarters especially at the brigade level there’s an awful lot of staffing at work that has to be done, staff work and it’s not sometimes I think people become impatient with it. So, from there we deployed, we didn’t deploy with the entire brigade headquarters. I don’t remember what the percentage was, but we also deployed with our next higher command which was the 352 civil affairs command in Riverdale, Maryland and they did not take their full staff with them either. We took some of our -- I guess it’s best to say we -- took some soldiers from our subordinate battalions, but we didn’t deploy our entire battalions either. That’s kind of a, you know, you train as a team for years, but then when the contingency happens and the same thing when I went to Panama, you don’t take the entire group with you. You take a portion of it, so it becomes different.

Q: I’m trying to get a little feel for the concept in the military at the time in the mid ‘90s. I mean you have your organization, which is supposed to work with the division, or corps was it? Then all of a sudden it seems that the separate units are yanked out and rather individual in small units used piecemeal having nothing to do with the larger organizations.

A: One thing about civil affairs is that its modular. We have functional specialties, or functional areas where its, we had the civilian supply thing. We had different functional areas. You could take the functions out, but you know there’s something that have been working together. One of the interesting things when we went over there was we got to Fort Bragg for our predeployment training and we were there for a couple of weeks and we got to know people. We did know the people in our subordinate units and the superior command, which was the civil affairs command, but to try to get. You know, there’s a lot of things in life that are just personal relationships and particularly in the reserve. People are in the units a long time together and they know some people or you can make some person’s strength is your weakness and you kind of know whose weaknesses are what and how you can offset it and when the balance is upset, sometimes you have to find that equilibrium again.

Q: Well, then how did, in the first place, the _____ experience, did you find you were drawing on this by the time you got to Afghanistan or not?

A: I think I did. There were a lot of lessons that I learned there that I think. Actually it was things that I saw that reoccurred in Afghanistan and particularly worth working cheek by jowl at civilian organizations. They don’t have doctrine. They don’t have necessarily the robust planning capacity that the military does. Also the military we have what’s called the deliberate, we do deliberate planning. We have a military planning process. In Afghanistan I was a contractor with USAID and so most of the people at USAID are contractors, not Foreign Service Officers. I think as a matter of fact (name of interviewee # 9) who is the Assistant Administrator for the Near East and Asia AID which means he covers everything from the Middle East to Burma or to Vietnam I guess. He was saying that there are about 1,000 Foreign Service Officers in AID today and there were at least 15,000 worldwide during Vietnam. I’ve heard some people say and this is
anecdotal that there were probably more Foreign Service Officers in Vietnam at one time than there are worldwide in AID now. They rely on contractors. These are people that are brought together that are not accustomed to working together that don’t have this shared training that you have in the military where you’ve learned the planning processes as a lieutenant and you add onto it as you move up through the rank. These are people that are put together. First they’ve got to get their sea legs. They’ve got to find out who’s doing what. Also, their staffed usually much more thinly than the military. There will be one person and that person will be the advisor on the entire health care field for the mission.

The way AID works is below that to implement projects they contract with for instance NGOs. When we built a clinic at AID we would put out, we’d have, the U.S. was responsible for certain provinces, World Bank for certain provinces, European Union for certain provinces. We would put out our RFP would be that these many clinics in these provinces and we’re looking for the clinics to be equipped and staffed and we would look for their proposals. Those kinds of things going through the contracting process takes time whereas the military does it more like, let’s make it happen. I’m here for seven months. I want to see things going. Civilians aren’t accustomed to moving that fast necessarily. It was quite similar things in Bosnia where at the OSCE our mission was thrown together. People from different nations trying to find the balance point there and the army guys, for one thing they turned over in Bosnia every six months just about. Six to eight months. In Afghanistan they were turning over I think, it’s a hodge podge in Afghanistan. The army guys generally turn over every nine months there. The air force guys were every 90 days, but now it’s 120 days. I’m not sure about the navy and the marines, how often they turned over. They don’t have much institutional memory.

I was just recently looking at a news article in Stars and Stripes and a soldier in Afghanistan, a provincial reconstruction team soldier was saying, “Wow, we’ve looked at this. We really need to do a hydroelectric power for this town. The civilians are doing that and nothing is happening.” So, I contacted some of my friends at AID and I said, “What’s the story?” They said, “Well, for one, for seven tenths of a megawatt of power we didn’t think almost $7,000,000 was worthwhile. It was more than restoring the damage, cleaning the silt.” It was who’s going to pay for the diesel to run generators in the interim? It was quite a long process. They had worked that out with the previous military fellows, but those guys had left in August and here’s somebody in October coming back with the same idea, so they had a continuity issue with them.

Q: Now, let’s talk about now actually going to Afghanistan. In what capacity and how were you, how did you get into and then we’ll talk about when you were there.

A: I was working as a civilian employee at Carlisle Barracks in Operations. I have a friend who was actually also a reserve retired CA officer who went to Afghanistan I guess in February or March of ‘03 and he was going to work on a provincial reconstruction team. Now, I used to work at the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute. I did a tour here as a reservist for a year and my successor had gone to Afghanistan and he had designed the provincial reconstruction team. I was familiar with it on both ends. I would
get e-mail from my friend, (name) and he would tell me what was going on and I thought this is interesting and I guess I just wanted to go see the elephant one more time. I applied for the openings and arrived there in August of last year. I guess they’d had the PRTs had been operational. Well, the first one had been operational for almost six months. It was a good time for me to arrive.

When I got there my friend, he was tired, he was really a tired guy. They were, he was in the first PRT. They were living rough out there; communications with Kabul were spotty for him. It was a very stove piped kind of thing. He had his AID communications equipment. They had their military communications equipment. The communications equipment didn’t talk to each other. The AID mission was really stressed over there because for one I did not know this before, but they could not order their full time employees to go there. I thought you’re an employee, you were in Washington and they would order you to your next assignment in Afghanistan. It doesn’t work that way. There’s some kind of or at least for practical purposes, there's some job bidding where they post jobs and people choose them. Plus they were constrained because they could only bring over as many people as they could house and secure U.S. government compounds.

The embassy had house trailers cramped inside the little embassy grounds. AID had a couple of houses inside what is now known as the Kabul compound, military compound a few blocks away from the embassy. So, it was pretty tight. It was also a new thing. There were four or five AID PRT reps in the field, they called them field program officers, they were out in the field. This is a new thing for me at AID. Really they didn’t have field representatives probably since Vietnam. They were accustomed to contracting with NGOs for anything beyond the city limits of the capital city. They didn’t know how to support them. The fellow who was managing the field program officers, he was authorized seven subordinates in the headquarters. He had zero. He was just able to scratch the surface on everything he was doing. He’d been a contractor and eventually I think he left there after 20 months so he was a great institutional memory, but so many things he was supposed to be doing, maintaining databases, he was the fellow who knew the ins and outs of the budgets. Quite an experience to find out how AID’s money is often earmarked for certain projects and it can only be spent through certain vehicles. He was just scratching the surface and it wasn’t his fault. It was because he was trying to wear seven hats. The same, when I got there let’s see I arrived in August of ‘03, August of ‘04.

Q: You were there exactly a year?

A: Exactly a year. We had two permanent mission directors and probably three, four or five acting mission directors, so it was in a real state of flux there and they had lots of money to spend, but how do you, lots of questions, how do you spend it within the law? What’s the absorptive capacity of the Afghans? They were not accustomed to working like I say in this cooperative venture with the military so when I went and I talked to them all, what we call sector specialists within AID. We had a health sector specialist, education sector specialist. Most were contractors, or actually subcontractors. They
worked for NGOs. That way if AID contracted with the non-governmental organization to do X, then they would hire the individuals to do that and that was also, there was no requirement that they be housed in secure U.S. government compounds. They were more free to hire people. It was very difficult for me to see them. It was hard for them to get in the embassy and you had to make an appointment. Could you catch them? We all used cell phones in Kabul, the landlines were practically non-existent, so very hard. At the time I first got there I didn’t know to which PRT I was going to be assigned, so I got very general information on what when they were doing nationwide.

Q: Excuse me, but when you went out there, just before you went out, you were coming from Carlisle.

A: Right.

Q: What were you getting back about both the situation in Afghanistan and this is before August of 2003 and what were you hearing about the PRT, the provincial construction team?

A: Generally I was pretty fortunate because I was working in operations in Carlisle. I was able to look at a secure network and to see the daily situation reports from where there were I guess at the time it was probably, maybe it was the tenth mountain or the 18th Airborne Corps I think commander was there. He was senior military, so I could see the reports coming. I could see the sitreps somewhat of sitreps from the PRTs, however, they weren’t posted to their Intranet or their secure Internet as quickly as I would have liked, but I could see something. I think I had a leg up on other people who were coming to take similar positions for me. Then I had my personal friend. I had never worked for him. He was my friend who was in a PRT was sending me his observations.

Q: This was (name).

A: (Name) That PRT at that time, that was the first PRT, I think gosh I think it was like many days per weekday they would get a rocket attack. Sometimes it would be improvised explosive devices, so it was kind of dodgy down there in Gardiz where he was. When I got to Afghanistan, when I got assigned out, I got assigned to Gardiz and I think probably because of the fact that I had been in the military. Very few of my colleagues at AID had ever been exposed to the military much less have been in it. Having been in civil affairs I went to Gardiz. When I got there it was an interesting place. We lived in, forgive me I never learned the spelling on this, but we lived on a compound which is essentially a mud and straw fort that looks like the Alamo. Families live inside of those walled compounds and we had one of those walled compounds for our PRT there. When I arrived at the, the soldiers on the ground, civil affairs soldiers. We had about 26 of them probably 60 to 80 infantry soldiers, which were our force protection. Out of those 26 civil affairs soldiers they were responsible for five provinces. They’d been on the ground I guess for three or four months when I arrived.

Q: When you say five provinces, what area so you can sort of envisage this.
A: Let me see if I can recall what that comparison was, it was.

Q: Well, I mean sort of bound it.

A: Our provinces bounded on the East of Pakistan. We had Khost Province K-H-O-S-T, Khost. We had Paktia, which is Gardiz where we were located. We had partially Lowgar Province, which is a province to the due North between Paktia and Kabul. We had Ghazni Province, which is on the Kabul Kandahar Road. We had Paktika which is a very, as provinces go that one was pretty bare and primitive as far as resources. Let’s see, Paktia, Paktia, Lowgar, Ghazni and I think those were the provinces we had. I wish I could remember the land area size, but people in the specific command out in Hawaii always talk about the tyranny of distance in their area. The same thing applied to us because from Gardiz to Oruzgan where there’s a military firebase, there’s only 70 kilometers, but that would be a seven hour drive often just overland, no roads, just overland. The movement it’s because there are not a lot of air assets in Afghanistan. All our movement was ground movement, ground convoy. You’d spend, to go out and have a three hour meeting or something or go have a one day meeting, your seven hours on the road one way and seven hours on the road back and you’ve only covered a total of 140 kilometers.

Q: Right now we’re in the middle of our own political election time and all. Everything is political, but by the time this gets into the works it will be over and so one of the issues of course is Afghanistan and is enough being done about it. I’d like to get your viewpoint of before you went out you were saying for example, one man was doing the man of seven and you weren’t getting air assets. I mean was there the feeling that we really, our assets were going off to Iraq and you were not given what you needed or was it just that the problems were endemic to Afghanistan?

A: I think it was, that’s an interesting question because I think they could certainly use more troops that could cover more ground. At the time supplies, supplying more troops is a problem because there’s no seaports. Everything is either brought in by air or overland through Pakistan and there’s long delays at the border for bringing stuff in. I think that’s probably a real consideration is how many people can you support there. I guess you could bring in overland through Uzbekistan. It’s just such a remote place. It’d be hard to me to see how we could support that huge body of soldiers, how we could support them just given the location of the place. We definitely from, now this is a civilian looking at the military situation there, the fact that we only had 26 soldiers that were covering that huge area, we were just scratching the surface there. You’d make a visit to X village, but how often can you get back. These are called civil affairs aid teams; these are about a five man team. They would go out. Generally they would go out if they went on a long convoy several days at a time where they’d call it a convoy operation out there. They’d have to take their force protection with them, sleep under the stars or find a building they could sleep in so it was fairly dodgy out there. They could go out.
We had this 15 kilometer circle around Gardiz, around the PRT in which we could operate freely and the commander; he didn’t have to clear it with anybody to send his people out. Beyond that to deconflict any military operational problems, that took like a 96 hour lead time. We had evidence come up where the governor wanted the PRT commander to go with him to settle a tribal dispute before it broke into some kind of shooting. The commander goes, “Okay, let me get permission.” The governor’s like, “I’m leaving in an hour. I need to go.” It’s a hard thing to work like that. That was one of the interesting things.

Now, actually it’s gotten better. The PRTs are stretched; particularly the American ones are stretched from the East I’d say Asadabad over to the West past Kandahar maybe Lashkar Gah. Anyway, toward Kandahar from the East to the Southwest of the country. There’s many, many more PRTs so they have less land area to cover. The PRTs are smaller, but they have less area to cover so I think that’s, in one way that’s been good, for the other though it has really stretched civil affairs assets to get people to all those PRTs. Now even by January of last year after I’d been there almost six months the soldiers were rotating out. The new soldiers who were rotating in, some were on their second tours and some had only left in August of ‘03 and they were back by January of ‘04. One of the interesting things was, everyone who came to my PRT, none while several were on their second tour, none of them had come back to a place where they were before, so any knowledge they gained, peculiar knowledge to that area, they couldn't apply it necessarily because some of them weren’t even in similar tribal areas. I think that would probably be a consideration maybe in the future, but it was I know they were stressed to get enough people there.

On the AID side, if I can, that mission was, I mean we just didn’t have any people there. We didn’t have, without people you can’t do anything. The entire mission in order to be in a secure place was in two or three rooms in the embassy. Totally unsuitable for that. Then six months into my tour they made the second floor of the embassy a secure area for classified reasons for people that had clearances and the bottom floor was for an unsecured area. Well, AID’s modus operandi is to employ lots of the indigenous population, so most of our staff had to stay on the first floor while we were, while the American staff, the cleared staff were on the second floor so that made interesting interaction between them. Eventually they did build a compound across the street where AID could work with their people. They could go back to the embassy if there were security questions and that first year I would say right now in October, 2004, the mission in Afghanistan is doing, is well staffed and they’re functioning like a mission. Before it was still a contingency operation.

A year ago they are today where I think they should have been a year ago. It was all scratching the surface. Scratch the surface. We had so much money over in excess of a billion dollars to spend, but you have to safeguard that and you have to be a good steward of those funds and to do that you can’t do a lot of it without enough people. That bumped down that to be frustrating at times. They just, unless it was a really big project, smaller things you could not get attention and it was nobody’s fault. They were just so harried in their work.
Q: You were in was it Gardiz?

A: Right.

Q: For the whole time?

A: Yes, I’d say 10 months. The last two months I was back in Kabul working on some things.

Q: By the time you were there towards the end you’d had pretty good historical memory in a way compared to other people coming through.

A: I think so, yes, and we could see you know you had people that came up with ideas back in Washington or wherever and until they came there and just saw how movement even in Kabul, you have to travel in an armored vehicle. You don’t have to have part of the bodyguard force, which we called the shooters. You didn’t have to travel with shooters within Kabul, but you had to travel in armored vehicles, very restricted movement. Out in the PRTs we didn’t have armored vehicles, so we didn’t travel in armored vehicles there, but you know you always had your force protection with you. I remember we had a lady who came down from Kabul, a health expert, she wanted to see several things. We had to rework her schedule because what would be easily a morning’s worth of work in D.C. was going to be three or four days just because of driving distance, communications were terrible.

Say for instance you wanted to see a governor in a neighboring province, well, you would get, the easiest way to do it was to get an interpreter, getting taxi fare or get him to take a local bus. He would go up there, see if the governor was going to be in on the date of your intended visit, arrange, make the arrangements and come back. That would be at least two days lost right there just in arranging a visit. Those kinds of things it’s just, there’s nothing routine there. Everything takes extra effort, extra time. Then there’s the security aspect to that. Now the governor I’m thinking of in particular in Lowgar. There’s about one main road between Lowgar and Gardiz to go see that governor. First of all the governor and his staff and other people, now they have probably several, because you can’t make your plan to go, your 96 hour plan until you know he’s going to be there. He’s got approximately, he and any other, anybody else with knowledge of your plan has a six day advance knowledge of when you’re coming. They know pretty much the route you’re going to come. They know what time you’re supposed to meet him, so they know generally what time you’re going to be passing certain points. That’s a security aspect of it.

You go up there and you meet the governor. Then you either have to stay in that spot overnight which there is no military base in that town, so you kind of circle the wagons and that’s what you do or you make the. We didn’t travel at night, so you made the trip back before sundown through the same mountain, rather dramatic mountain passes and overtop of a mountain up at about 10,000 feet I think and then back down to our valley.
That was the kind of thing, that was five days of effort plus any prior planning to bring people or equipment in that you needed for your visit. That was one of the things that and I’ve kind of wandered here, but the point is that it wasn’t business as usual on almost anything.

Q: Well, I’m wondering about this 96 hour business because I mean in a way it sounds almost counterproductive.

A: Well, because we were in what was called particularly for our area, joint special operations area, the special operations people and other government agencies that’s the people doing the real looking for the Al-Qaeda and Taliban. To make sure that we weren’t going to drive in to a place where they had planned an operation. We needed to have that 96 hours to deconflict. When I first arrived the way even the conventional forces worked, they were placed in several large bases. Khowst, Kandahar, Bagram and the battalion might go out or a company plus sized unit. They might go out to a certain area and conduct operations for a week or two and then they would return to their base, Kandahar, whatever. They didn’t have any connection really to any particular land areas. Only the PRTs who knew the governor, that knew the ministry of education representative there, the local elders. That was the only contact and they would conduct their operation and come back. Now, since General _____ has arrived there, the brigade commanders in Khowst, the brigade commander in Kandahar, in Bagram, they have specific real estate that they’re responsible for and the PRT commander instead of reporting all the way back to Kabul he reports to the ground commander there and so that they can tie that in. The battalions that operate, they’ll have a certain slice of the real estate and they’ll get to know the people there so to a more, so they can identify with the people so they also you will see something and you’ll know that it’s out of place because you’ve been there so many times before. That kind of local knowledge they’re now building and I think it’s a great asset whether it’s for military combat operations or whether its facilitating reconstruction or whatever, that’s been a great lead forward I believe.

Q: How did you have a corps interpreter, a group of interpreters and how were they?

A: We did. The interpreters also acted in an institutional memory. We had a couple of interpreters who were just particularly they had been vetted to the extent possible the military intelligence people had down background checks on them. They were really good for the local customs and knowledge. Do I do this? They were great instructionists for just the customs for meeting the elders or the governor. We had one in particular who was very really had mastered in the English language. I don’t think he’d ever been out of Afghanistan. He was an interpreter and he went to a big meeting with us and the UN regional director asked him to translate for him because the UN fellow was French, but he spoke the language somewhat and he just respected this fellow’s ability in translation. One of the British security people with the UN fellow said, “Wow, that American guy has really got this language down.” They thought he was an American. He was insightful really into Islam, well educated in Islam and he would explain why this was done and he would also explain, just like I’m a Catholic, I think many people, many
people that practice Islam, didn’t know why they did it. You know, we do this because this is the way we were taught to do it. He would explain to us this is why it’s done. He would say, “I doubt the people in this village in this rural village I doubt many of them know why they do this, but this is why it’s done and this is where you can have acceptance to this and that.” They were very good. He spoke English good. Usually young men, initially they had been working with the combat troops out there, so they’d probably, they’d been on a lot of combat missions and as we transitioned from combat to more of the rebuilding of the country, some chaffed at it and left because they liked the action of it. Others they were able to make the change and it worked quite well.

We also, initially at the PRT we had a U.S. army, an engineer officer out there with us, but when he left he wasn’t replaced as the PRT number of soldiers got smaller, he wasn’t replaced. What they did was, he held a competition before he left and they hired an interpreter who, gosh I don’t want anybody in trouble, but anyway, he was an interpreter, and he spoke great English. He also had a degree in engineering and they had a competition to hire an interpreter that was an engineer because you needed that interpreter to explain what you were trying to do on the project. He was an engineer. He spent a lot of time engineering as much as he did or more than he did as an interpreter. That was a great asset to have out there was to have an engineer.

The army if I can get into this. We had different kinds of projects. When they first arrived they had what was called ODHA, Overseas Development Humanitarian Action. Humanitarian Action and that was funds and they could do stuff like schools and wells and clinics, rather restricted. It took quite a bit of time because

[END SIDE A]

A: We were in effect only reporting officers. Here we are billions of dollars at this point and we didn’t have a dime that we could spend ourselves. Because our database didn’t exist because we just didn’t have the staffing to do it, they would ask me what is AID doing in X area and my answer was I don’t know. I had this satellite e-mail set up, but it was a very slow download and I could only take very small files. I remember one commander; he was so frustrated with me. I’m sure he wanted to throttle me because he would ask me about a certain bridge that AID was building. It took me three months to find out who within AID which part of the mission had responsibility for that bridge and it was just, it was very laborious. I’ll get back to that in a minute.

Let’s get back to the military CERP project so they could build schools, wells and clinics. When you go to a village, they want a school, a well, and a clinic. Well, if they had had a school before they could reconstruct that, at that time they could reconstruct things. I think just about if there was a brick on the ground they could say they were reconstructing so things went up from the ground.

Q: Were we giving them money to do this?
A: Yes. Well, what they would do with it. The PRT itself, the commander, his AID
team leaders, the engineer, they would put out a request for proposals in effect and say this is the specs and ask for proposals from local builders and then they would review it. They would send it back. I think it was reviewed and the contract was decided, I believe it was decided back in, well, it had to be approved all the way at sitcom level, but I think the contractor or whatever maybe was chosen in Bagram. Then they would get the contractor and he would build it using the great advantage to this was using local methods, local materials and local labor. Of course it was a mere pittance of what it would cost to bring in an international company. One of the things that was different, was it was an earthquake prone area and generally they just, they don’t build anything to resist earthquakes. When AID built a school, our schools were built through this international construction company that had been contracted by AID. We had our problems getting started with the roof design. It was too heavy, but our buildings were required to be seismic resistant because I think back in India, when they had their earthquake there, luckily AID did not build all the schools, but the lesson was that when that earthquake happened, oh, it was during the school day and all the children just about in the town between the ages of 10 and 16 died.

Q: Yes, it was a horrible tragedy.

A: We didn’t want that kind of thing. Our schools were seismic resistant where there were no such restriction to the military and they could throw up a school much quicker for half the price, but it wasn’t seismic resistance. We had two U.S. programs that are not in sync in anyway. It was like that on all the kind of, they would do their projects. One of the things and I really believe this is true and people think I make light of it, but those soldiers were there for seven or nine months whatever. They were going to get an efficiency report. They had to do something. There was nobody interested and I don’t think they had a vehicle at the time or let’s get some money, hire somebody to do a study and do we do 50 small wells or do we do a deep bore well and make a reservoir which is better for using the aquifer. It was guys out there basically that were slapped on the back, told to go out there and do good things. These civil affairs soldiers who were told at civil affairs school, you can’t make things happen. You’re just a facilitator, now they’re told to make things happen. Civil affairs rank structure, the structure of civil affairs units wasn’t conducive to PRTs because generally any captains, majors for your civil affairs AID teams, you need lower ranking enlisted sergeants, specialists, staff sergeants as the team members and that’s not the way civil affairs is structured. It’s structured to support higher headquarters rather than be a doer out in the field. They went out there and they did their doggone best they could.

They were ill served on some things like on the second group that rotated in when I was there. When they came in they were briefed up on what was going on. They were going to be sent out to do good. They only got one, during their training; they got a one hour briefing from AID who had over a billion dollars to spend. They got a one hour briefing on U.S. policy from the Department of State. Then UNAMA, United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan which just about all the money they were running on was American money and most of their programs were funded. They got a one day to brief them. So, these fellows went to build schools, wells, clinics, they had never been informed on what
was the national policy and what was the U.S. development policy for schools, wells, clinics or anything else. While they’re out there trying to do things, sometimes they subverted, we were out there to support the central government of Afghanistan to extend governance to people in the hinterlands that hadn’t been touched by government, to get them to identify as Afghans, to hold the country together. They would build a school or let’s say they’d build a clinic. In effect it was a building with four walls and an empty room. Is it a clinic? There’s no doctor or health worker there. Same with the school. They would build a school and they’d go, you know, those Americans built us a school, but that doggone Karzai, that guy won’t send us any teachers. The policy was, the national policy was, build no more schools than you can staff because schools have been closed for all practical purposes for so long that they had to train the teachers. First you have to make a plan for retraining teachers and then you have to get teachers and you have to train them. That kind of thing takes time. They just; these guys were there for seven months have got to do good, what can I do?

Then in about October of last year we had a program unfortunately named from the AID perspective Quick Impact Program. From AID perspective it was quick impact. You know, AID does 10 or 12 year projects. The military, one of the PRT commanders said he had three levels of projects, short, medium, long term. Short was anything less than 30 days. Medium was 90 days. Long term was something that would take six months. That’s two years to be a short term project maybe for AID. We weren’t singing off the same sheet of music there.

Q: Well, I want to make this clear. You had the army’s civil affairs team was doing their thing and you, the PRTs were doing your thing?

A: The PRT is designed to be an interagency team. Now, most of the bodies come from the military. You’ll have the civil affairs soldiers with a civil affairs AID team. They usually have what’s basically a storefront operation in the town where you’re located and then you’ll have your force protection element and on the interagency side the desire was to have someone from the Department of Agriculture, U.S. Department of Agriculture, USAID, a State Department representative who in effect if he because you’re out there by yourself, he was in effect the political advisor to the PRT commander, invaluable people. Then also at Gardiz we had someone from DFID, I think that’s Department for Foreign, it’s the British equivalent of USAID. We had that also out there with us.

Now, we didn’t have a mission all people all the time out there. The interesting thing about Agriculture, they came as advisors, but with no money. The State guys were there as political advisors and to keep us in touch with what was emanating from the embassy and myself. AID had the programs, but I had no money initially. When they came up with the Quick Impact Program this was the plan. We had 40 million dollars they came out with. The plan was that the AID fellow, the State fellow, the AG fellow, the commander, we would identify projects and any one of us could veto the project. We were working at the lowest common denominator. We would identify the project. We had AID money to do it. We would write up a rather cursory description of the project and it would go back to Kabul and our justification for the project that our director and by
Christmas I think it was we had a fellow named (name) who became the director. An innovative guy, very technically savvy, long experience with NGOs never worked for the military either. He was a contractor. He’d been a PRT rep at Kandahar PRT, but then he moved up to the headquarters. Things started to fall into place when (name) was there. He upgraded our technical, our communications capabilities, he was a very good planner and organizer and so he would look at it. He did a pass the laugh test. No, we’re not building a 50 million dollar runway here for some town in the middle of nowhere. He would hand it over to two different entities we contracted with. One was the international organization for migration, which is an NGO. There’s a lot of construction work.

The other was the UN ops. UN ops is some kind of construction arm of the UN and I’ve never figured out exactly, and they’ll do development projects for anybody that pays. In my area it was IOM. He would send the project to IOM and then from that point on we were out of it. IOM was contracted to; they would do the actual technical assessment beforehand, do the RSP, hire the contractor, supervise the construction and tell us when they were ready to complete the project. Where the military, the strict military funds, that was really depending on the PRT. Some PRT commanders did the same thing in a committee style. Other PRT commanders was this was my money. I’m going to do something with it. They would do the RFP. They would do the design, which when you had an engineer it was good. If you didn’t have an engineer it was shaky. They would do the construction management and that was a problem because they had so many projects, so few people to keep an eye on them. You’ve got first quality control, which should be done, on the project and then the quality assistance. They couldn’t do either well because they couldn’t get out and about to see their projects. So, what we did with our QIP program Quick Impact which that 40 million dollars, first it was 40 million for eight PRTs, then the decision was made to make 12 PRTs. We still had to split the pie again. Then 14 PRTs, so we split the pie again. We started to come up and we decided in our PRT that we thought since we’re here to support central government, we should do things to help local governance. One of the things that we wanted to do was border posts. That turned out to be very controversial things. AID doesn’t do border posts. That’s a lot like police stations. They don’t do police stations either.

Other ministry things whether it was the local education, the provincial education ministry or the customs bureau because you had like border police and customs so we could do things to support the customs people. Those kind of things were our projects. They were slow; quite honestly they were slow for getting off the ground for a lot of reasons. One we didn’t get even though we were pumped up, told to get some project nominations in in October starting in October of ‘03. I don’t think the money actually landed in Afghanistan until January of ‘04. Also, because the location certainly for Gardiz and many other places, not Kandahar and not Khowst, you’re in the high mountains. Your construction season ends in October and it won’t begin again until probably March. We just can’t do anything because of the snow, travel, etc. They don’t use the local contractors don’t use any additives to their concrete so they can pour it in the winter. We did come up with projects.

IOM, International Organization for Migration, I think they got off to a slow start. They
didn’t realize the scale of what we were going to be doing. They’d been doing small projects, but they stepped up and they started hiring architects, engineers, more field representatives and you had. They came up with some nice designs for like a provincial office building to house a provincial government. Everything we did at AID we vetted it through the central government and so that was one of the things that made the military people impatient. One of them in fact told me, I said, he was doing X project and I said, “Now, have you cleared this with the central government through the governmental process of Afghanistan?” He said, “Man, I don’t have time to do that. If I got their approval on my projects, I’m only here seven months, I might not get anything done.” They would do things that maybe again, especially before they were clued into what the national process was and what the development strategy was. They would do things that didn’t in any way fit the strategy. Halfway through their tenure there they got AID had an all day briefing of the different sectors and why we did things the way we did.

One of AID’s problems was that they were slow off the mark on the projects. They hired these large companies that called it project in a box. They had to get their feel. They did a design to justification to building and it was also quite a long process. We were slow. I mean I’m not going to, I don’t want to sit here and throw stones at the military guys wanting to be fast because we all got impatient with it. We wanted things to happen. The major school building program was not a program controlled PRT level, that was the central program. They had to bring in like a construction czar into the mission to try to get a handle on all this. They did and like I said the mission is now probably where it should have been a year ago, but it is doing much better. All these projects.

Then we started to do things to synergize our efforts. Like there’s a road where the army had X amount of dollars. They couldn’t build this road because the travel is so bad. Very important to government there, but we figured out what we could do if the army could afford to pay to have the road graded, compacted and surveyed and everything and then AID with our PRT money would come back and we would do the finishing, the asphalting and paving of the road and then we’d get a road, two different pots of money, but one plan. Once those things started to fall together which they’re doing a much better job now, it worked great. Now there are different PRTs. There was a New Zealand PRT. There was a British PRT. Now there’s a German, maybe two German and some other international ones. The New Zealanders had a completely, they were pretty much completely different approach to it. New Zealanders had the equivalent AID, USAID, British equivalent of AID, U.S. Agriculture rep, I think a State rep and what they did was their commander basically said, “Go on out there and you deal with the UN and you deal with the NGOs because they don’t want to see me anyway, so I’m not going to go out there and upset them. You go out there.” That was one of the things that working with the NGOs.

Like in Gardiz we just didn’t have a lot of NGOs out there, the international NGOs, maybe three, four or five. In Khowst area there were quite a few. Quite honestly the security was probably. Well, security was pretty bad sometimes in Khowst, but the weather was a lot better so maybe that’s why they were there. Jalalabad had just a plethora also of good weather, well, also it didn’t snow. It got to 130 in the summer, but
so we didn’t have so much interaction with the NGOs. The NGOs were initially when the PRTs first went in or when the civil affairs soldiers, some worked in civilian clothes, some were in military uniforms. The NGOs were worrying about blurring of the lines. A lot of that was done based on at that time the regional commanders who we had been working with were in effect the governors of those regions and some said I want you in uniform, I want everybody to see the Americans are helping us. Others said I would like you to work in civilian clothes because we don’t want people to think we’re puppets of the Americans. It was different things for different areas. By the time I got there all the PRTs were in civilian clothes.

Working with the NGOs, some NGOs we could find common ground. Most of the NGOs out there were funded through one way or another through USAID money at least in my area. The UNAMA was, their charter was to coordinate the reconstruction. We had an excellent relationship with the regional director. My mind has gone blank with his name. He was a French guy, very easy to work with. We worked well with him. Oh gosh, (man’s name). That was his name. (Woman’s name) was the UNHCR rep there. We worked well with her. We had, one of the interesting things about communications like I said I had communications back to AID, not secure of course, just open. Then the army guys they had regular Internet, but it was only for the morale purposes. When they first went out there nobody thought that there was any need, but how do you talk to the UN, how do you talk to the NGOs if you don’t have the Internet? That was lots of our problems. We didn’t have a communications person there for six or eight months. This was a civilian job and he did it as a sideline trying to keep it up. Lots of various problems.

We didn’t have any radios to talk to UNAMA, that worked out easily. They gave us a couple of their radios that we kept in our operation center at the PRT. The military had communications, secure communications. They could voice and data through their communications device of PSC5, but they of course couldn’t communicate in civilian agencies or NGOs or UNAMA. Here we are talking interagency and we had to tie it together. Now, as we speak now, they have AID and oh, the State Department fellow who was in the PRT, he had his own communications equipment, too, not secured either. He could make communications to the embassy, but not through the SIPRNET. We didn't have any access to SIPRNET, which is the classified network. An interesting thing about that. One time there was a thing that went out on locally fabricated launchers for rockets. If you see any of these in the local metal shops we need to know and they had a picture. Unfortunately, not having access to the military secure intranet, we never saw a picture of the locally fabricated device. The people that were out in the field actually they could see that. It went over a year without any secure Intranet. We had secure communications through the PSC5 so the State fellow had his own commo, I had my own commo, the military guys had their own commo. The Agriculture guy, he was hooked under the State commo. He brought his laptop from D.C. which neither one of our computer guys back in Kabul had access to fix when he had a problem. Now AID through Nick’s, I mean, through Nick’s motivation I guess, we’re spinning our wheels here. AID will just provide equipment for all civilians in PRT. Beyond that we put in Intranet connections in all the PRTs to which the military and all the civilians could hook.
up. We contracted for the satellite dishes. Actually we went in half with State. You put in half the PRTs, we’ll put in half, but everybody was connected to it.

Then we had this device that I got called a Bgan, B-G-A-N. It’s a little Internet dish and I think one of the news reporters that I talked to told me that this had just really come on the market during the Iraq war. I could take that dish and I could set up my dish on the hood of a car in the middle of nowhere, take photographs of proposed projects, send it back to Kabul and say, here’s this or here’s some damaged, here’s a building long in disrepair that we want to rehabilitate and send it back from the middle of nowhere. That was expensive, I think it was $11.00 a megabyte or something, but that was a great boom to facilitate, it had a large capacity so we could send pictures. We could send large files back and forth. A great idea that (the USAID Director) had. That really helped us.

He upgraded just our civilian equipment. The body armor I had was state of the art in 1995 when AID was in Bosnia during the war, but it was heavy, uncomfortable. We got new body armor. When we got the new, going up to like 14 PRTs, (the USAID Director) was an excellent salesman for his cause, he convinced the USAID powers that not only he was keeping all these bombs in the air in Kabul, working with combined forces command in Afghanistan, but he convinced them that they also needed a representative in each brigade command besides having somebody in the PRTs because the brigade commanders were somewhat out of the loop on what was going on. They are well on their way now if they haven't it’s being stepped up to 19 people. I think the quality of the old program representative is much higher than when I was on the staff. They’ve got a young fellow, (name) a great guy, a former, I guess there’s not anything such as a former marine, but he was a marine officer. He was an infantry officer, excellent guy. People, one of my colleagues, (name) he had been in CORDS in Vietnam. He had long experience in that. We had several women that had lots of development experience, trained in development education. One woman I think and I won’t say her name since I’m not sure she’s onboard yet, but she has a degree in international development from I think it’s American University, plus she had been a CA team member as a civil affairs officer, so she brought great experience there. I think that’s going to be, they’ll bring the institutional memory. They stay longer on the ground. It’s a one year contract. They stay longer on the ground than the PRT commander. They can help them build a lessons learned. It’s going along much better, but it’s been a painful process, but if you look back and say this hasn’t been tried since the 1970s, early 1970s you had to learn it from somewhere.

I think there’s also a new mindset, a new culture that kind of has to be developed within USAID and that culture exists now in office of foreign disaster assistance. These guys watch the news. They’re contractors and if they see hurricanes coming, they packed their bags, they start canceling dental appointments and they know they’re going to be called to go. Within the same thing now, _____ not or very little if any _____ is present in Afghanistan two years hence, but we still need the expeditionary type body or expeditionary type thing that can go to live rough and to be or work with the military and hopefully we’re going to have people pre-identified or people who have been working before so that we can some way or another pay them to bring them in, bring them in for
two weeks of an exercise working with the military in X, Y and Z. But it’s beyond the triage of some of these things. People say oh, we’re going to do this, X, Y and Z in the first 90 days. Here we are people still working heavily in development into two years. The initial entry roughriders from the foreign disaster assistance aren’t there and we have to have people that are ready to continue to do this coordination with the military. It’s also working on a course here for the spring War College introducing them to development theory. Why we do it, what way we do it, what’s the value of doing the study before you go out to undertake it like in Afghanistan we found that the aquifers are getting punctured from all these numerous shallow wells. Can we come up with a strategy? Now, AID they’re developed an overall development strategy for the country. That strategy wasn’t there at first because it was just thrown in, but that’s the challenge for the future. Interagency coordination.

Q: What about certainly the PRTs I understand there was quite a bit of opposition from the NGOs who were some of them had been working with us and others I don’t mean to be derogatory, but sort of blithe spirits. They want to go out and do their thing and don’t want anybody to bother them.

A: I think there’s a lot of different ways to look at this. One, for years the NGOs performed all the governmental services in Afghanistan and now they’re chirping a bit because the military was doing development, the government of Afghanistan wants to do the governmental services of Afghanistan. So, there’s resistance there. Second, they have people that are development professionals. They’ve been in this business. They’ve been in some really dicey places before, never seen a uniformed military person in the world now military uniformed people show up. I think that one of the things with the NGOs is it’s a long education process. The PRT is not in doctrine. They’re looking to see if it should be in doctrine, but it’s a provisional thing. You know, we have to feel our way.

Another is if you look at it another way if the NGO is not funded by me and I don’t write the efficiency report of this NGO worker, why is he going to be responsive to me because he’s going to be responsive to his higher headquarters. Some of them honestly it’s pure idealism. I worked here the whole time the Taliban was here. They never bothered me and we’d say yes and you weren’t a threat to the Taliban now. Now you’re educating girls, you’re a female, you’re head of this project and some of them get it, some of them don’t. It’s while they thought they think neutrality is a shield. I believe that neutrality now in the changed world, neutrality just means they’re easy pickings. Why do you have to go down and try to penetrate all these rings of security around the U.S. government agencies? We’re not just going to park the car on the street in front of an NGO office building. They’d blow it up. Our NGOs in Gardiz actually moved inside of the UN compound. They were aware of it. Some of the projects, too, like IOM when we first got started, they were very standoffish, they didn’t want the military to go after the projects. Well, a lot of it is personality driven and some of its driven in other parts of the world, but anyway, we’re funding this thing. We’re AID. The U.S. government’s funding it, we’re going to go, you know. Sometimes they didn’t want to be seen, it got much better. They would go out to the project site with us or come to our compound. Usually we used
to meet them on neutral ground. The UNAMA compound. Eventually we got some to come out to see us. We didn’t all have three heads.

We had a couple of soldiers. We had one particular warrant officer that was really, he was a little, I don’t know what the right word is. He was a little flaky. Maybe that’s why he got along with them, but he could see their point of view. He just would come up with innovative ideas and if you’re doing this, keep me posted, I want to know what you’re doing. Where are you building a school? What are you doing? I want to post it on my map so I don’t go to the same town because you will have these elders playing sometimes playing two organizations off against the other. Maybe it’s because they don’t know which one is really going to come through with the school, but then he came up with this really great idea. He called it his provincial reconstruction office, the PRO where previously _____, the storefront operation was housed in the same building with the governor and often the governor was like I don’t have any money, go see the Americans down the hall. We actually had a colonel from the ministry of interior assigned to the PRT. He lived in the PRT with us. The word was well; we have an Afghan face. The Afghans were sharp. They weren’t fooled. They knew the money was coming from the U.S. government pocket. So, what he did was with his provincial reconstruction office was, he got a generator, he brought in computers. At that place the different ministry offices could come and use the computers so they could be; he had classes for them to learn how to use computers taught by one of our interpreters who was very good at it. He put interpreters. He put the engineers, he put all these Afghan faces, most of them worked for the PRT, but also, government, provincial representatives in the same office. If a citizen had something that they wanted to try to get like that or something, they would go to that PRO office and they would see nothing but Afghan faces. They’d speak to nobody, but an Afghan.

Many things were beyond the staff’s ability to make decisions on, but they would bring back at night in the evenings to a staff meeting and say we talked to these fellows about X, Y and Z and then the commander could say, okay, I want my CAT 18 to go to this village to check this out and see what the condition of the school is, or see what the condition of their well was. It was really innovative, like some Afghans weren’t stupid, they knew where the money was coming from. Oh, we’re here because President Karzai asked us. Yes, like President Karzai doesn’t have a billion dollars either. They knew, but they had this whole Afghan operation where they didn’t see anything. Now if they wanted to. He would go down there from time to time, a warrant officer, and shake hands and say hello to everybody. If there were particular people of interest, he had a tent set up outside of the PRT, but within kind of a secure perimeter there. He had pillows. He had carpets on the floors and they came in and they sat down Afghan style. If there was like a, say there was a delegation from some village or something, he would sit them all down there in their style, feed them green tea and have an exchange with them. A very clever guy. Very clever.

The NGOs I mean like we told, I remember one of the PRT fellow said, “We are here to support the central government, to reach the central government, bring the government to people here.” One of the fellows from the NGO said, “I’m not, I don’t care if Osama Bin
Laden was president of the country. I’m here for humanitarian purposes only. I’m here to treat sick people.” At least we knew where we stood with him. In that way we could say here’s what we’re doing for health care for these people. One of the things that they and I think often our military people, they were doing humanitarian things, but it was also for hearts and minds purposes. To win them over, to having a favorable opinion of us. Sometimes if we would just acknowledge that that we were, that this is part of our hearts and minds campaign, I think that would have gone somewhat of a long way, but the NGOs, you know, their theory was, look, we won’t hunt bin Laden and you don’t do humanitarian work and we’ll get along just fine. I think the people there have to have confidence in their government if their government is going to do things for them. Their government is going to protect them, that’s why we were trying to extend government so they didn’t passively support. Now, not that they supported some bad actors, but they didn’t report what they were doing or they didn’t report that they found a cache of weapons or something of that nature. It’s all for the same thing, but quite often the military guys would do something in the short term and it was good. It was part of the hearts and minds kind of thing, but it didn’t fit any kind of long term development strategy. At times you may need to do that. At times you need to explain to the NGOs why we’re doing certain things.

In Kandahar they had an idea and it had its ups and downs, but it divided the province there. At the most risky areas that’s where the military would operate. They got the NGOs because nobody was in these parts. They got the NGOs to accept a bit more risk to work in a certain area. That was the whole thing was let’s all work together. They had a rather competent governor. I think it was governor Pashtun, was the governor of the province and he had his staff, who wasn’t so competent, but he was, so that he could understand getting everybody together. He was quite a forceful guy. Other provinces we had governors that their plus mark was that they didn’t oppose Karzai, not that they were administrators and not that they had any idea what they were doing, but particularly Paktika Province, they had a great young technocrat. We saw that guy the week after he got there. He was shell shocked. He lived in the only house I’d ever seen in Afghanistan without a security wall around it. It looked like, it’s a one lane town, the capital of Paktika which of course escapes my memory right now. It had one strip in the whole town that looked like actually Dodge City.

It had a very nice hospital which we got on the bad side of probably people there had been funded by an Islamic NGO, the U.S. cut their funds off because of ties to terrorism. They had this very state of the art hospital and doctors it went away. At AID, the PRT it took a long time because AID is not into operating, not necessarily into operating funds. We said, look, we just need a bridge fund here until we can get these guys into the national health program, get doctors and everything assigned. We eventually got that done so the hospital could up and running. A beautiful building. Of course as soon as we got all that done somebody put a RPG through the front door because it was now identified with us, but the doctors and everybody were happy about it that they had their hospital running again. Just the quality of administrator, administrators varied and that’s, part of its a function of training people. They tried to get expats to come back. Quite a few people in the senior levels of the government that are American citizens who worked
for a long time, worked in Virginia, California, sometimes that was a problem. They wanted to build something to a Southern California standard when a good two lane paved road would be great. We don’t need the Pacific Coast Highway or we don’t need the freeways and four lane highways, things like that.

Q: One of the things you were saying that you know, sort of the three basic or maybe four things or five, bridges, roads, wells, hospitals and schools. I mean these were sort of the areas in which seemed to be a concentration, but when you’re talking about hospitals and schools, you need teachers, you need doctors and staff and particularly for hospitals, you need lots of equipment. Were these being tied in, or have we been putting up quite a few empty schools and hospitals?

A: In the area of hospitals, the national policy there is to push health care. They can save more lives by pushing health care farther out into the provinces and staffing health clinics. Midwives, health workers, people of that nature. It’s uneven. AID, EU, the World Bank, they divided the provinces up. Different organizations are having more success than others in getting that done. I think AID is doing a pretty good job. The hospitals, there’s a new fund now that the army has started I guess I want to say March April timeframe called CERP, Commanders Emergency Response Program. The commander has the discretion to spend up to $25,000 and in our area the brigade commander initially told him save your receipts and told me what you did, don’t ask my permission so they could make an impact right on the spot. You come to a town, the well’s dry, they don’t have anything. He could look around and say, find me a well digger. Okay, Mr. Dig A Well, I’ll pay you for it. How much you going to charge? He could do like that. More and more money came into this. They started to do it to support hospitals and hospitals of course you have to have doctors, you have to have equipment, you have to have, as you said, you have to have quite a bit of real estate for a hospital. That’s a long term project, too because of staffing. We can only do so much. They didn’t know, the soldiers weren’t told until March why if AID is building clinics in this province, how come I don’t see any? Because we had the RFP to look for NGOs to do it. We wanted them to sign up to staff it, to furnish it and everything.

Whereas the schools generally the good part on the schools is the military guys spent a lot of time rebuilding schools so if there was a school there means there have been teachers. At AID we wanted to build schools for girls and boys. The army guys weren't so adamant about that, but they did a lot for girls. They particularly, not because of any policy, enough of them had daughters that they wanted to build girls schools, too. If they’re rebuilding the school, you had a teacher, you had a school. The school, not that instructions there are road learning, repeat back to me, huge classes. At the highest level they’re teaching, the instruction the teachers are teaching a whole new generation of teachers.

Then building new schools, that was a really hard problem. One, we didn’t want to build schools at AID unless they were blessed by the minister of education. Quite often there would be schools out there that the military had built, that the minister of education were already being built. They would put that on our construction list. Those things had to be
deconflicted. There’s not a whole lot now of empty schools. Clinics got started, but pretty quickly the military said, look, we’re getting out of the clinic business. There’s just too many problems. There were some empty ones, but it took care of itself when they realized at the higher military levels that it was, there wasn’t a coordinated effort. Now it’s getting much better. When I left Gardiz we had, there was a plan for the hospital. There wasn’t any AID money for that hospital. It was merely a small little district hospital, but it was being used as a regional hospital. The plan was to make it a regional hospital. AID was able to fund a steady to see how to do that and what the requirements were, but this year there wasn’t the money for a hospital, but the commander had in his CERP fund, he was able to start to build a regional hospital. Some of the buildings necessary, not all. AID promised to try to tie that into their program next year so that it was just getting much better synergy. It was just part of the communications, part of it was, just literally the communications. Initially I could not tell anybody what we were doing. They would come up with an idea and I would say, well, okay, I thought AID was doing this. My answer embarrassed, I don’t know what we’re doing.

To get to Kabul, if you were in Kandahar, if you were in Khowst, there was actually transportation between those places. In Kabul there was no fixed transportation between Gardiz, so it was by convoy. I was at the mercy of their schedule. If they were going to Bagram, they could drop me off on the way to Kabul and I could coordinate, but then when I got there where the people I needed to see in town. One of the things about the contractors, not the contractors of AID, but subcontractors working with the NGOs. They were given quite a lot of leave time and so one sector specialist in particular came up to Kabul once a month or I think they went on leave once every six weeks. Whenever I got there she was never there. She was always away. My trip back to the hinterlands was by the next PRT convoy going South and if I missed. One time I became ill I missed by PRT convoy and I ended up staying another two and a half weeks in Kabul because there wasn’t any transportation down there. The embassy transportation very thin. If you liked to go out beyond the city limits of Kabul, you had to take a bodyguard, four shooters. You had to have so many armored vehicles and to sideline them for a day, they were needed in town was very hard. In the ‘04 budget, AID got more, they paid for some additional shooters, so that we would have an additional bodyguard force, things like that, so that we could move about. Security considerations besides the distance, security considerations were quite onerous.

Q: Let’s talk a bit about security. Who was, you were along the Pakistan border, but I mean who was shooting and what was the sort of situation in your area?

A: In my area there were, you know it’s a very funny thing. The PRT and of course the civilians couldn’t, the NGOs and stuff, they didn’t differentiate. These guys are wearing U.S. army uniforms; they’re out here to hunt bin Laden. That wasn’t their main job. There were other people that did. We didn’t always know what they were doing. They would show up. These guys would show up in the PRT and we’re on a mission, can we spend the night here. We had no idea they were in the area. There was initially I think when I first came, there was more grouping of the Taliban or Al Qaeda type forces where they would, if they could find them, they would find a large body and they could engage
them. Then the enemies’ tactics, techniques developed so that they realized that if they were in large bodies they were much more easily attacked.

[END SIDE B]

[END TAPE 1]

A: The most common occurrence would be we would find out about IAD or ID and be discovered by locals who would find out. We did have some people in July who ran over in IAD in Paktika Province. Generally we’d have rocket attacks which were almost always highly inaccurate. If they got within 300 meters that would be a good job. We did have one actually, let’s see, we did have one that landed right in the compound. It did some damage to a tent and we had one that was a dud that hit the compound and skipped over it. Generally that was the only kind. We didn’t have any frontal assaults or none of our people were ambushed. We had near us, we had a Special Forces unit and they were charged with actually looking for the bad guys. They would go out and have, actually when I first got there we had an A team as part of the PRT and they were in a big engagement, I think it was in September or October of last year, a pretty big engagement. We didn’t have that kind of stuff. Different PRTs, some like Asadabad, that PRT, they initially had a very difficult time getting out of their compound because the security situation. Every place is different. Herat over near Iran, they were hooked up to city water, had a water meter, didn’t have to move about town. Like sometimes we would move out of town with two vehicles and maybe six or seven soldiers. Other times we would move around town with security, when particularly quite a few IDs were found or there were some warnings we’d move about just within the town with three vehicles. It all depended on where you were geographically. Particularly in the South it was more dicey. That was something where I was there as the AID fellow, but as far as anything on security I was under the direction of the PRT commander. He made the security decisions.

Q: Were you getting good information from your Afghan contacts, but then I wouldn’t go on that road at such and such a time, that sort of thing?

A: You know, we had our own, what did they call it. Tactical, we had a tactical, a tactical psyops team and a tactical human team. That human team, their job was.

Q: Human intelligence.

A: Right. Their job was actually force protection was to develop that kind of information and they were pretty good at it. We had different teams. We had, the team that probably was with us the longest were the reservists or guardsmen, I believe they were guardsmen, spoke the language pretty well. I think they were pretty good at information. They got along well with the local officials. They got along well with the people. Maybe that’s why we didn’t have any real serious incidents while they were there. We had other THTs that did the same and they were always out with their ear to the ground. I think that was probably why we had so few incidences. I know at one time
our THT was producing about 80% of all the THTs. Maybe there were eight or nine THTs out there. Our THT were producing about 80%. I wasn’t so involved in that. The AID rep was, at that time my clearance was only up to the secret level. I’m not sure what they discussed with the commander.

Q: How did you find your relations with AID in Washington? Did you feel it was going through a learning curve as everyone else was?

A: I think so. We had, you’d have people come out from Washington for a week or two and they’d have a schedule they wanted to meet. The first time out was learning for them and no, we’re going to do that tomorrow, but we can’t set it up in one day. Then we had I think one valuable thing was to have somebody from Washington to come out and do 60 days temporary duty because then they got in the swing of things and realized that the frustrations over communications were moving about, or just trying to hold a meeting of all our different contractors that were outside of the U.S. government compound trying to get them to get into the compound, get them together, do Internet connections. That was good, but you know, initially I think the ones that didn’t come out and were back in Washington and it was very hard to get to Afghanistan because we could only house a certain amount of people. They just couldn’t get there to see what it was like on the ground and as more of them came out and definitely as they, if they stayed for two months they definitely got the flavor of it so that when they went back home, they were our missionaries saying okay, I want these guys. They’d say, well look I’ll put them on it, but they have lots of requirements out there and I’ll try to, we’re trying to minimize any kind of administrative work that we can. That was good.

I think it helped (an officer) who is now is the Assistant Administrator for Asia and the Near East. He came out as acting mission director for a while. He got the real flavor of how the mission director. I wouldn’t have that job. Those guys are bombarded day and night with all kinds of issues. The ambassador is always calling them on this and on that. They are harried. They luckily, there’s nothing to do there, so you can spend 18 hours a day in the office and checking your e-mail. We didn’t work on Fridays because that was the Muslim holy day, but you had to still needed to feed the beast back in Washington because they wanted. Saturday was a great day because you didn’t have anything. You didn’t have anything. Sunday you had to get ready to start feeding the beast for Monday in Washington. It was and you would get all kinds. There’s just all kinds of requirements. Each mission director, (name) came, when he was there as acting, he’d actually done civil military research and stuff in the past. He had a good idea of what was going on.

We got a guy named (name). The acting director came out there and said, “Look; I’m coming out here to be collaborative. I’m here an inclusive person. We want to work with the military. We don’t want to stiff arm them and tell them to get out of our business.” That helped and we were still so severely undermanned that we were still scratching the surface, but he was out there, don’t tell them automatically no. It’s a dumb idea. Smile and see if we can’t come up with something some compromise that will meet your goal. When he left, (name) came out, a very organized fellow and laid back and he
also had the luxury of getting a larger staff and a larger compound. I won’t say the luxury; he had the advantage of that. Now he’s the one that’s pulling it together like an actual, what’s going to be our strategic vision. He’s doing all that. He’s got the people that have time to sit and think. We didn’t have people that were available to think things out. It was so much do, do, do. Now it’s, but I think they’re in a learning curve now and those of us that have been there and were hoping that, we’re working with them now to get a USAID officer assigned here to the peacekeeping and stability operations institute whose going to teach a course here, an elected course at the War College, but more importantly, he’s going to work in here, he or she, in here with us so when we’re working on military initiatives and national buildings, stability operations, whatever you want to call it, they’ll bring in this professional development perspective and say, you know, let’s look at this in the long term. We don’t want to do something right now that at first blush seems like a great idea, but it’s going to shoot us in the foot in the long term. To get their perspective in here and they’re willing to do it and they’re looking to identify the right person now and we’re waiting with baited breath for them to arrive.

There’s some other guys like (USAID Kabul Director). He’s not a professional; he’s a contractor. He’s a professional, but he’s not an employee of AID. (Another name), again he, I think of those two guys in particular. They’re guys that are pretty good thinkers. After they leave Afghanistan, hopefully they can get into a position where they can do some thinking and expound on it and come up with some ideas on how things can work, how AID can adapt to this because it’s a whole new thing. They’re making their adaptations. Often we just in the military we can just overwhelm people. We can show up and we have great planning ability, but we show up and there’s six planners and one guy and he’s charged with, one civilian is in charge of six different sectors. Well, he’s got six planners and each one of those guys want to plan one of the sectors. They don’t know anything about it. He doesn’t have time to spend with them and they end up making what’s the right word? Unfounded assumptions or improper assumptions in their planning where if there were civilians who had enough staff so they can tell the military planner this is what I want planned, help me with this. Then the military using their planning process, deliberate planning, they could say, if we need to do this by next year in August, we need to have these deadlines met, that’s the value, the high value that we can do as an interagency.

Sometimes we have to hold our horses in the military. We want to make something happen, but we need to get experts on it, but in that we can take our expertise and synergize it so its. I remember one time there were some people in planning in CFC, Combined Forces Command Afghanistan. They sent an e-mail to our senior democracy advisor, it said, we’re working on plans regarding the post election something or other. Not knowing what they were really, they were working on how is this going to be implemented or something like that. He wrote, would you be interested in being involved. He wrote back and said I’m working on plans for close air support. Would you be interested in being involved? It’s that kind of thing where civilians they just, the spin agencies need to bulk up. They need to have somebody, two or three guys on an issue, rather than one and that was the same when I was in Bosnia. We would have one person. I remember one time General, what’s his name? J.B. Burns, no, maybe it was
the S4 commander said, okay, he looked at my boss who was a German ambassador and said, get your planning staff, blah, blah and General Burns who worked with us, said wait a minute sir. He said, these five people this implementing staff, this is his planning staff. That’s all he has. We need to help him out. It’s that kind of thing.

Also note contingency planning for civilians it’s very hard. Military people have a lot of plans on the shelf and never execute them. First of all you learn the planning process about planning. You’ve foreseen problems that could come up. Often when I was in Bosnia we were going to do some contingency planning and the civilians were like, are you crazy? You just spent three months planning this and now this bad incident didn’t happen, you’ve wasted three months. There’s just not that same mindset. It’s in the professional government, too. They don’t think if we in our interagency now, Ambassador Pascal has a group called the, it’s the coordinator for the reconstruction stabilization. If we could get everybody in the agency and I’m not saying use the exact military planning process, I’m saying lets civilianize this and use it as everybody civilian, military, all accustomed to planning the same way. To try to synchronize our terms so that when we all pull together we’re accustomed to it.

Q: One of the things, I’ve interviewed people who have served in Iraq and one of the themes that has come out is that plans would be made, economic plans we should do this and that to help the economy and all, but by the time they would get translated or moved out to the various military districts where we would have a colonel or a general running an area responsible for it they were seeing things in immediate terms, so they were cutting deals with tribal sheiks, with local people in order to make things easier for them to run their area at that time which often ran counter to general policy. These were short term arrangements. Did you see this as a problem?

A: I did in my little development area, they would come up with ideas of being short term, and then maybe have a problem in the long term down the line. That's one of the things I was saying is that’s why they need the development professionals, not only at the highest levels, but like the PRT, at the brigade commander level, at the level explaining why in immediate terms this idea is workable, but in the long term we’re going to shoot ourselves in the foot because of X, Y or Z. This is not going to build on something. This is going to build an instability or this is going to circumvent the actual elected government. That kind of thing to show them why, show them to get them to take the longer perspective. Quite often you’re fine with your civilians in these things. They’re going to be there longer than the military people. Like I say I was in Bosnia, one year in the military, three years as a civilian. The military guys come in and I’m going to get this done and we’re working seven days a week and the people say, you’re working seven days a week. I’ve been here three years and I’m happy if I make 20 feet of progress and you’re wanting to jump a mile here. But the same on the other side of that coin, sometimes the civilian people are slow to act and so that’s why we’ve got to have more of this interagency not only operations, but planning. We can’t wait until the contingency happens to throw everybody, we’ve got to have people with continuing relationships with a common set of terms and points of reference and so the guy from State will come in and say, did you know that this tribe such and such connected to this and most of the guys
would go, do you know of a guy who can do that? No, we didn’t know. Yes, he said, so if this tribe’s a problem, that tribe’s going to be a problem, not because anything you’ve done to them, but because they’re related. If you can smooth out something that satisfies both of them then we’ll be another jump down the road. We had no idea. That kind of regional knowledge and culture and just, I mean most of the military guys on the ground, they had no concept of what really was mandated in the bond agreements, like a strong central government. Everything is decided in the central government and it flows down. Probably our best thing is to facilitate it and to get help the Afghans get their message back up to their own central government so that it looks like the government in effect it is I guess responsive to the people on the hinterland. That’s so, if you’ve got a political advisor like the U.S. Department of State representative, he can explain why we have to do it this way because this is the way the law in this country requires it or we are trying to establish such and such a procedure in this country and if we circumvent it. I think it’s accomplished and they want to have a quick effect. They’re operators they’re accustomed to having effects. Quite often they’ll have people who are more thinkers than they are doers.

I think another problem is it’s very difficult to get the right people out there in civilian. People cannot, since they can’t be ordered out there, its pretty much volunteer, whereas somebody might volunteer for six months or something, there’s not going to be a lot of I mean with governmental people, it’s not going to be easy to get them out there for a year and a year and a half. Things like that. I guess that’s my point. Yes, I think there is a friction there. The army guys want to make it happen one way or the other and perhaps a little hesitancy or maybe wanting to think about it a bit more and we’ve got to find that happy medium. That does happen I think.

Q: What was your impression in your area of the Afghani governors, their staff and the warlord problem?

A: We didn’t have a particular warlord problem in my area. We had a minor commander and he was kicked upstairs to the ministry of defense, but every time he came to town we had to have an increase of IEDs and troublemakers in town. Like one time I think the mayor or the police chief said, well, why don’t you arrest him, we said, well, we’re not really authorized to arrest an Afghan government deputy minister. In some areas I mean in other areas they had a really tight grip. Somehow I mean in some areas they provided the security for the PRTs so you had to stay on their good side. That’s starting to weaken. Ismael Khan who was a governor of Herat had trashcans, people threw trash in trashcans, they had streetlights, they had water meters. He ran it with an iron hand and he collected taxes. They never got it back to Kabul. He has accepted this post now as the minister of mines or industries or something. He was actually the governor, he was appointed governor of that area, but he has given that up. Part of that I think is the fact that the American military is there. The Afghan army who has been sent to pacify some of these areas is doing a good job and are well respected and when he changed his position, there was only like one day of violence which is probably as good as you could expect for something like that.
In other places the commanders they are smart guys, they just don’t control the army or the local militia, they control the pocketbook, too. Everything goes to their pocket. You have to find a way during DDR, disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration. You’ve got to find a way to co-opt them. Then something that we realized after DDR started, you have to find something more than a sack of flour and a hundred dollars for their battalion commanders and their lower commanders because a man with 85 soldiers, has, you know, strong arm people on the road if I want to rob them or I take over somebody’s house and now you give me a sack of flour and a hundred dollars. We had to find things whether it was something they could do in government whether it’s higher level retraining. It’s been a challenge, what to do with those guys, but its slowly coming through. I think the local commanders were more of a real, I don’t know what the word is, but it’s far beyond nuisance, but more of an irritation than the local people were for us.

Q: What about were you in a poppy growing area there?

A: We had some on the edges. There’s a lot of poppy out there. It’s one of those crops where you can actually get money up front to grow your crop. Somebody will loan you the money and you can grow the fertilizer and grow the crop and then sell it and put money in your pocket where there’s not a lot of other farm credit for things like that. Trying to start it and trying to look for alternative crops because I heard General _____ speak the other day, he said they think 40% of the economy is funded by poppies right now. I have a friend; a British friend working there in the narcotics control program there in Afghanistan was telling me that it was a bumper crop. A great crop this year. They’re almost looking for solutions for next year and they’re just going to have to just, you know, they’re overwhelmed this year. It’s out there like I say. You can’t destroy it. Just going out and destroying it, you’re destroying their livelihood. What are they going to do, some poor farmer starves to death. The real challenge is to find that alternative crop that can produce money, the same kind of money, saffron, which turns out there is an international Saffron cartel or something that pound for pound Saffron, heroin or opium or something sell for the same. It turns out that this tightly controlled cartel that they’re not going to be able to break in on. That’s challenges for Agriculture. A lot of things that AID did and Agriculture we were working on farm to market and trying to large scale agriculture so it could support people.

At the PRT level, the commander, generally they don’t have a background so they’re more interested in subsistence agriculture, which for the dollar wise may be where you can really make your money. The Agriculture guys is they came in, the ones that were former extension agents were golden. They could help subsistence farmers greatly and had great little ideas to help them align their irrigation trough with rocks so they don’t use so much through seepage and things like that. Very good ideas. It’s a great challenge. Forty percent or 50% of all their exports before the Russians invaded was dried fruits. Now the challenge is one, get the market back because Iran and Pakistan usurped the market. Two, they’ve got to have a way to export their dried fruits because the road system, the U.S. is building what’s been called a ring of roads that’s going to encircle the entire country. Kabul, Kandahar Road was speeded up, increase the cost, maybe speeded up three times as much and increased the cost five times as much last year, but it took
what was once a two day trip and has now turned it into a six hour trip. We’ve got to help do that.

We’ve got to help them with their agriculture, preventing disease to their fruit crop. That was a great big crop. Last year, I guess it was last summer, they had a bumper crop of wheat, but they had no way to really export it because of the road network. We need to help them rebuild flourmills and things of that nature. It’s a huge; we just can’t eradicate the poppies and say that we’ve done our job because that’s a huge source of income for the people. If they can make, I don’t know if they have to make the same money, but if they can make almost as much money, I don’t think they’ll care. It would come to AID and say, hey, you know that super duper fertilizer and seed you gave us last year? Yes. Well, we’d like to have some more of that fertilizer to hold the seed. They’re out there working. They’re hardworking people. They’re hardworking people, no doubt about that. So, if we can find some alternative that lives in that climate and is viable I think it will go a long way.

When we did what the soldiers do, they interdict something; they either destroy it or turn it over to the Afghan government for destruction. Our PRT was probably one of the first ones that did that and there was kind of a gulp, and noise like you did what? There were a lot of fellows whose civilian jobs were policemen. They had like truckloads of hashish. They convinced the local police chief that they should have a big ceremony and burn it and so actually I think that was a pretty good idea. If you turned it over to the chief I’m not sure where it would be the next week. They had a big ceremony and burned it and that did seem to make everybody happy. The chief got some pictures. Things of that nature. Agriculture is a big thing. It’s an agricultural country. For Anthrax vaccinations it turned out that their visional plan was to piecemeal it and we’ll do this. The experts said that you can’t do that, that’s not the way you do it. You have to have a massive program, quite expensive and they’re undertaking that now. Sometimes you just, the things are so mind boggling, people think if we could break it into little pieces we could do it like that. That Anthrax thing had to be done all within a certain time period to make it worthwhile.

Q: I think we’ll probably at the end now for this. This has been great. This gives a wonderful picture of the problems and all. I take it you do feel you mentioned it again and again that you feel sort of answers are coming out. The system is beginning to produce results. Are you optimistic about how things are coming?

A: I am. The answers I think are bubbling up instead of coming from the top down. They’ll work it out when they get out there in the field. I am optimistic about it. The good thing about Afghanistan is most of the people want us there. I guess one of the plusses is not having so many soldiers. We don’t have a soldier on every corner, so it’s not this overwhelming presence. They’re hardworking people. I think we’ve done pretty well generally because they’ve, all of their daily life and I was talking to the chaplain about this one. Their religion is just tied throughout their daily life and I don’t think we’ve done any major horrible things that have offended them. They want their children to be educated, maybe only to the sixth grade with girls, but at least they want some
education. We can build on that. They know they need help. They've been through a horrible series of wars. They've been through this horrible drought that's just beyond, that's beyond everybody's control and they want all this stuff so they like us. They like what we're doing for them. I think one of the things though is that we raise expectations when the civil affairs unit rolls into a village. Even if you say, look, I can't do anything for you. I'm looking to see what your problems are and I will try to find persons or people that can do things for you. They immediately go wink wink, yes, thanks. That's what they said last year when they built the school, thank you. We have to be careful when raising the expectations. It's a very long term project. Where in Iraq I think they're rebuilding things. I don't think they're rebuilding anything particularly in Afghanistan. It's all from scratch. These people, it's the most the closest I'll ever see the biblical times. Their association with the land and the coolness of the mountains or the streams. You can see why it is important to them in living in a very arid country. I'm very positive. They like us there. It is very interesting because they would all tell you, no, we didn't, no, we didn't have much day to day contact with Al Qaeda, but they knew when the Arabs were in town. They don't particularly care for Arabs. They think Arabs treat them like second class Muslims.

The Taliban, I think they miss some of the security the Taliban provided. There was pretty swift justice there for thieves and stuff, but they were just so whatever the word is. They couldn't do anything. They just don't have that grudge against us and as long as we keep doing it the right way I think we'll be okay. The biggest problem to me is how long will the American people fund something at this level? When can we get other international actors involved? We just had a donor's conference trying to really collect on previous pledges. They just had, I think it was a successful election operation there, but they wanted the UN and the U.S. being hard charger wanted to do more, but we international community wise we could not, we did not have the money to do additional things. We had to pare down our plans and aspirations because the money is just not coming in. Hopefully if we could keep the pipeline of money coming it won't have, it won't be a failed state. I mean I don't think we're building the next Switzerland, but if we can get up to the next level that would certainly be a jump.

[END INTERVIEW]