

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE STUDY OF PEACEMAKING

Volume 6

A Summary of
Projects Completed by
Grantees and Fellows
1997-99



UNITED STATES
INSTITUTE OF PEACE

Contributions to the Study of Peacemaking

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**A Summary of
Projects Completed by
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The views expressed in this report
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INTRODUCTION

The Institute's Grant Program and its fellowship program, the Jennings Randolph Program for International Peace, are the principal means by which the United States Institute of Peace supports the work of scholars and international affairs practitioners to promote better management of international conflict. The publications summarized in these pages directly resulted from projects funded by these two programs. In many cases these projects are multifaceted and ongoing, and what is summarized here may represent only part of the project's impact on policy and intellectual debates or the resolution of international conflicts. Institute fellows, for instance, often conduct policy briefings and workshops related to their publications, and they write Institute Special Reports and other policy-oriented papers and opinion pieces. Many projects involve conferences, training exercises, Track Two efforts, film and video work, or other products that have lasting impact on both the theory and practice of international conflict management.

Volume 6 of *Contributions to the Study of Peacemaking* summarizes 67 projects completed between 1997 and 1999. We are indebted to Anne-Marie Smith for the exceptionally high quality of the analytic summaries she has produced. As in earlier volumes, the material is organized by the theme and region. Themes include international security, peace operations, nationalism and ethnic conflict, humanitarian emergencies and human rights, and cross-cultural negotiations. To obtain the books, articles, and papers cited in this report, please contact the publishers or the authors; please note that the Institute is not the publisher or distributor of many of these works and cannot provide copies of the materials it did not produce.

The Institute has been funding policy-oriented research on international peace and conflict since 1986. This volume is part of a larger effort by the Institute to disseminate information about projects it has funded. For additional information, readers may consult a database on the Institute's website (www.usip.org) that briefly describes all 1,100 of the grant projects the Institute has funded. A similar database for the fellowship program will be available soon. In 1998 the Institute's press published *Advances in Understanding International Peacemaking*, a volume that gleaned some of the key insights and lessons from grant products over the previous decade. With such electronic and paper tools, the Institute works to stimulate and support the growth of a global community of policy-oriented researchers with ever-growing expertise in the prevention, management, and resolution of deadly conflicts around the world.





We hope this report will expand readers' awareness of recent publications relating to the management of international conflict, as well as recognition of the range and importance of the research and policy analysis undertaken with Institute support.

David Smock, Director
Grant Program

Joseph Klaitz, Director
Jennings Randolph Program for International Peace

1. UNDERSTANDING AND ORGANIZING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

“Nothing fails like success.” The adage provides a relevant warning to the international system in a post–Cold War world. Rather than continue to fight the previous war—or attempt to prevent or resolve it—the international community is challenged to address new threats to peace and security. In handling current crises, too great an adherence to Cold War methods and mindsets may leave the international community with anachronistic analyses, atavistic reactions, and vestigial strategies. Nonetheless, much of the international system remains in place. Powerful nations continue to pursue their interests unilaterally or through existing multilateral organizations. Not all the lessons learned, structures created, or strategies devised during the Cold War years are now to be discarded. The task is to select and apply those lessons that are most appropriate in a changing world.

Several projects undertaken by grantees and fellows provide updated evaluations of the international system. Some identify patterns of behavior and lessons learned during past crises; others seek diagnoses of pending conflict. Several address multilateral organizations, whether examining specific questions regarding their membership, resources, and organizational structure, or broader considerations of their goals, legitimacy, and credibility.

In “Behavior and Learning in Recurring Crises: The Soviet-American, Egyptian-Israeli and Indo-Pakistani Rivalries,” Russell Leng observes that a disproportionately high percentage of interstate crises and wars have involved the same pairs of states in repeated confrontations. Examining their behavior over the course of twelve militarized crises, Leng poses a number of questions about the lessons learned by the policymakers of the rival pairs: United States-Soviet Union, Egypt-Israel, and India-Pakistan. Did policymakers in these rival states learn anything from these militarized crises? If so, what caused them to draw the lessons they did? When learning occurred, did it lead to more or less effective management of militarized crises?

Leng employs quantitative mappings and statistical summaries of patterns of escalation and de-escalation, coupled with qualitative descriptions of perceptions, judgments, and decisions of policymakers. He approaches the data with several caveats in mind: learning is not sufficient to cause a change in behavior; policymakers may draw lessons but be unable to apply them; policymakers may draw incorrect inferences or dysfunctional lessons; and effective crisis management could be defined

RUSSELL J. LENG

*“Behavior and Learning
in Recurring Crises:
The Soviet-American, Egyptian-Israeli
and Indo-Pakistani Rivalries”*

March 1998





either as avoiding hostilities or as serving interests—perhaps through provoking violence.

Of particular concern to Leng is the influence of policymakers' beliefs on their perceptions, analysis, and decisions. Policymakers, like other individuals, seek cognitive harmony or consistency. When strongly held beliefs are confronted by contradictory information, an individual is likely to reinterpret the information in accordance with that prior belief. Leng notes that "in international politics, where incoming information is likely to be incomplete and ambiguous, and where policymakers may have staked their political credibility on the validity of their beliefs, there is both psychological and political pressure to adjust reality to fit existing beliefs" (p. 21).

Across the three rival pairs and the dozen crises he analyzes, Leng sees policymakers' learning as consistently influenced by their commitment to Realism, with its emphasis on power and the pursuit of interest. The *realpolitik* foreign policy that follows from the Realist tradition is concerned above all to demonstrate a state's power and its willingness to use it, as evidenced by negotiating from strength, creating a crisis to encourage outside intervention, or attacking first to achieve military advantage. Circumscribed by their *realpolitik* beliefs, policymakers in the twelve militarized crises could draw only certain lessons. In successive crises, policymakers repeatedly grasped lessons that "encouraged behavior that reinforced the hostility between rival states, and fueled the escalation of subsequent crises" (p. 327). Leng concludes that when learning occurred, it was frequently dysfunctional. Indeed, he writes, "a key factor in perpetuating the three rivalries in this study was the failure of the leaders of the six states to draw lessons beyond the boundaries of their *realpolitik* belief systems" (p. 27).

BARRY H. STEINER

"The Varieties of Collective Preventive Diplomacy: Great Power Approaches to Intrastate Ethnic Conflict"

July 1998

Barry Steiner's study is an assessment of collective great-power responses to small-power intrastate conflict. Examining eight cases from the Belgian Revolution of 1820–32 to the current conflict in the former Yugoslavia, Steiner considers how and when great powers have become involved in small-power intrastate conflict, whether their preventive diplomacy was effective, and whether they could have defused the conflict before it became critical had they been informed earlier.

From his review of early collective intervention into local ethnic conflict, Steiner urges that preventive diplomacy be seen as "an iterative process in which learning from past experience is a key to future success." Such an approach would permit major states "to plan for longer-term intervention while allowing for initial preventive diplomacy failure" (p. 329). Describing early interventionist preventive diplomacy as "at best a very delicate, high-risk endeavor," Steiner makes a twofold recommendation (p. 340). On the one hand, there should be a warning regime to constrain major states from taking unilateral advantage of incentives to inter-



vene. Such a regime would help to insulate small-power conflict as a factor in major state relationships and would serve as a check on great power opportunism. On the other hand, options for independent action should be preserved so that great-power consensus is not pursued wholly for its own sake and so that unilateral power might serve as a check on collective timidity and indifference.

In this fiftieth anniversary year of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), many grantees and fellows turned their attention to changes in and stresses upon NATO and other multilateral organizations. In *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security*, David Yost poses the basic question: what is NATO for in the post-Cold War era? Yost perceives two options that would stem from NATO's current trajectory of territorial and functional expansion. One is to keep "collective defense" as the goal, which would require maintaining NATO's political cohesion and military capabilities to deter coercion and aggression and, if necessary, to conduct military operations to restore the security and integrity of the territory protected by NATO's commitments. The other possibility, which Yost labels "collective security," would entail aspirations for a universally shared responsibility for peace and international order. Yost firmly endorses the first option because it would not sacrifice military effectiveness for the sake of inclusiveness. Maintaining a commitment to collective defense could also encompass some functions in support of collective security, such as cooperating with former adversaries to reduce mistrust and promote a sense of shared responsibility for international security, and preparing for and conducting crisis management and peace operations. Yost argues that to go much further runs the risk of weakening the Alliance's cohesion and undermining its ability to carry out its core traditional mission of collective defense.

The dangerous outcome of an overexpanded and therefore weakened NATO would be the renationalization of defense. As Yost describes this scenario, if NATO were to take on "vague security obligations for virtually all of the Euro-Atlantic region, [then] the Allies, particularly the stronger ones capable of a measure of self-reliance, would start to discount NATO and focus on other means to ensure their national security" (p. 350). Yost argues that NATO should therefore be attentive to practical limits on its expansion and should carefully steward its resources—including its political capital—in order to maintain both its capability and credibility.

DAVID YOST

*NATO Transformed:
The Alliance's New Roles in
International Security*

Washington, D.C.:
United States Institute of Peace Press,
1999



PAUL CORNISH

*Partnership in Crisis: The U.S., Europe
and the Fall and Rise of NATO*

London: Royal Institute
of International Affairs,
1997

In *Partnership in Crisis: The U.S., Europe and the Fall and Rise of NATO*, Paul Cornish puzzles over what is to become of the U.S.-European security partnership after the Cold War. Now that there is no longer a Soviet threat to provide a clear mission and basis for cooperation, the shape of and even the need for a complex and costly security alliance have been questioned. As Cornish notes, in post-Cold War circumstances, “the case for a transatlantic military alliance is not self-evident, but must be deliberately assembled” (p. 30).

Cornish sees the evolution of the defense and security structure for Europe as an incremental process, by no means complete. The ongoing adaptation of NATO to an altered security environment involves “a new strategic framework and rationale, a flexible command structure capable of imaginative and dynamic contingency planning, and a force structure which could offer high-readiness, highly capable forces able to cover a range of contingencies from small, short-warning operations to full-scale collective defense” (p. 56).

According to Cornish, there is broad agreement on five key features of a post-Cold War European security framework: cooperation in matters of defense and security should be intergovernmental; U.S. commitment to European defense and security should be maintained; NATO should remain at the heart of European defense and security; defense and security cooperation by European allies should complement rather than rival NATO; and the Western European Union should help preserve the partnership and facilitate cooperation. Cornish also identifies several potential problems for NATO, particularly regarding the military industry and disagreements over market access, procurement systems, pace and scope of consolidation, cross-border mergers, and acquisitions.

With the end of the Cold War, it becomes possible to contemplate substantial change in or even alternatives to NATO. Without an immediate external threat to provide its *raison d'être*, NATO has become, according to Cornish, an “alliance of choice” rather than an “alliance of necessity” (p. 115).

JAMES E. GOODYBY

*Europe Undivided: The New Logic of
Peace in U.S.-Russian Relations*

Washington, D.C.:
United States Institute of Peace Press,
1998

If Europe were to succeed in becoming entirely peaceful, democratic, and undivided, from Western Europe and extending through Russia as well, how would its security system be arranged? In *Europe Undivided: The New Logic of Peace in U.S.-Russian Relations*, James Goodby foresees two possible configurations. One is collective security, which he defines as the multilaterally sanctioned use of force. The other is spheres of interest, the recognition that big powers “cast large shadows in their own neighborhoods” (p. 198). In the medium term, Goodby anticipates a hybrid of the two. In the long term, however, “as democracy takes root throughout the continent, collective security should become the dominant mode of using force to keep the peace” (p. 171).



Bosnia is the backdrop for Goodby's analysis. There he sees significant failure of leadership. Rules and standards for dealing with ethnic and communal conflicts were available; norms for peaceful resolution of conflict were in place. But norms and rules do not enforce themselves. When local leaders and inhabitants refused to abide by them, an outside leader or organizing agent should have come forward to galvanize the international community to enforce these norms. The failure of leadership and the lack of enforcement ultimately discredited the norms for peaceful conflict resolution.

On the other hand, Goodby does see hope in Bosnia. A far worse disaster would have occurred, Goodby asserts, had Russia, the European Union, and the United States provided armed support to opposing factions in the former Yugoslavia. The avoidance of armed confrontation between Russia and the West at the time can be attributed more to Russian weakness than to a consensus on collective security. Nonetheless, the avoidance of that confrontation does point toward the value of collective security.

NATO could be a core element of a future collective security system if it manages to change and to include Russia, once democratized. NATO needs to make the transition from a military alliance defending a Western—primarily American—sphere of interest to an effective security organization preserving a stable peace throughout an undivided Europe. This will not be an easy task. “The hard fact remains,” writes Goodby, “that NATO's residual function, its legacy from the Cold War, is to act as a hedge against a recurrence of Russian imperial ambitions” (p. 200). Not to overcome that legacy would be a costly mistake. According to Goodby, “if NATO enlargement becomes in practice a series of new demarcation lines being drawn across the map of Europe, each new line leaving Russia more isolated from the rest of Europe, then NATO enlargement will become the antithesis of uniting Europe” (p. 201).

Genocide has become a major challenge to our basic humanity as well as to international security and multilateral organizations. These challenges are not limited to but certainly include Europe. In “How to Prevent Genocide: An Assessment with Policy Recommendations,” John Heidenrich considers causes of and possible responses to genocide around the world.

Heidenrich discards many explanations of genocide. These explanations are based on such factors as overpopulation (but genocides have occurred in underpopulated areas), economic pressure (but then genocide would be as common as business cycles; furthermore, governments continue to commit genocide even when it impoverishes them), group identities (but these are subject to change and are also limited by individual consciences), culture and religion (but this would assign collective guilt, and, furthermore, there is substantial commonality between religions,

JOHN G. HEIDENRICH

“How to Prevent Genocide: An Assessment with Policy Recommendations”

July 1998



with none based on championing mass murder), or thugs who worship hatred (but these individuals cannot commit genocide on their own). Heidenrich sees genocide as the outcome of political calculation and emotional manipulation. It is never simply spontaneous, but neither is it predetermined. As much as we, as individuals and as a species, choose to murder others, we can also choose to rescue them. The opposite of love, Heidenrich remarks, is not hate, but indifference.

How have responses to genocide fared? Again, Heidenrich sees much inadequacy in the range of current practice. Quiet diplomacy is inappropriate or worthless while the killing continues. Warnings are hollow unless backed by credible threat. Symbolic support of an opposition may be ineffective for a catastrophe on the scale of genocide. Material support to an opposition may backfire if it appears to be interference. Domestic publicity in the past has not halted killings (such as Germany's murder of the retarded). The impact of international publicity has been equally weak. The violence in Bosnia and Rwanda "suggests that international publicity is not very effective if the killers do not care much about international publicity" (p. 88). International judicial attention has also not carried much weight in stopping genocides.

What of military responses? Heidenrich sees several limits to multilateral use of force. Practical problems can be daunting: lack of common language; lack of clarity about chain of command; or different training, equipment, operating procedures, and rules of combat. The outcome is a rather motley force, and, notes Heidenrich, "Over the years, this haphazard system has assembled some very haphazard multinational forces" (p. 230). NATO is distinct as "the most cosmopolitan integration of different military international forces ever developed," but it is unlikely to be duplicated in any other existing organizations (p. 239).

Heidenrich therefore turns his attention to the possibility of an international legion of volunteers to protect noncombatants in crises that are already or are potentially genocidal. Heidenrich proposes that such volunteers be combined into a single standing unit available solely to the UN Security Council for rapid deployment in risky, small-scale missions. Long-term training would provide such a volunteer legion with the cohesion that is lacking from temporarily assembled multilateral forces. Accountability would be directly to the UN. In Heidenrich's vision, the participants would be "proficient not merely in combat skills, but likewise in local negotiation skills, foreign cultural awareness, patience in the face of repeated insults, and able to work well with the UN bureaucracy and countless nongovernmental organizations" (p. 265). Such a volunteer UN legion "could serve as a hastily interposed tripwire force to deter acts of genocide through its international presence, its global political symbolism, and the televised attention of the world's viewing public" (p. 269).

Another alternative would be to leave the task of forming such a force to the private sector. "In today's era of privatization and free markets, one option is to establish an inherently cohesive legion that is, also, a non-



governmental organization or a private company” (p. 279). Heidenrich stipulates that such a force would be available for hire solely by the UN Security Council. It could be funded by foundations, private contributions, and governments. In addition to military intervention, its functions could include working with academics and other groups, both private and public, to research, report on, and predict instances of future genocidal violence. “In a world of free markets,” writes Heidenrich, “wherein many governments prefer to hire private companies and nonprofit organizations to perform tasks which governments once did themselves, perhaps the hiring of mercenaries to oppose genocidal violence is what must be done if this is the most effective option that governments will accept” (p. 280).

Democratic security entails democratic stability. The wave of democratization across Central and Eastern Europe after 1989 holds the potential for such stability. Newly democratic nations need support and attention, through such means as inclusion in as many democratic institutions as possible. Heinrich Klebes explores this process in *The Quest for Democratic Security: The Role of the Council of Europe and U.S. Foreign Policy*.

In the 1990s, the Council of Europe has faced a dilemma. By welcoming newly democratized nations, it could help them advance toward democratic stability, but perhaps at the price of diluting the Council’s commitments and identity as a safeguard of democratic values, human rights, and fundamental freedoms. Many newly democratizing nations do not yet meet the Council of Europe’s standards regarding protection of human rights, rule of law, and political pluralism. Even those that do, Klebes notes, lack the support of civil society to make the new laws truly effective.

The Council has responded by making its admission process more involved, with provisional membership and ample tutoring and training for those inexperienced in democratic policymaking. Nations applying for membership to the Council of Europe first have a guest status and accept monitoring and obligations to undertake reform so as to come into alignment with the Council’s legal instruments. The Council also makes available expert missions to review host-country legislation and practices. Officials, lawyers, magistrates, prosecutors, police, prison staff, and journalists may avail themselves of study groups in the countries of the Council of Europe. Training programs have also been established for civil servants; judges; leaders of political parties; and others who work with various aspects of the rule of law, pluralist democracy, and human rights.

Through such programs, Klebes explains, the Council of Europe aims to serve as a long-term “school for democracy” without having to sacrifice any of its own integrity and credibility. Klebes further suggests that the United States should adhere to conventions of the Council of Europe

HEINRICH KLEBES

*The Quest for Democratic Security:
The Role of the Council of Europe and
U.S. Foreign Policy. Peaceworks No.26*

Washington, D.C.:
United States Institute of Peace,
January 1999



**KEITH PAYNE,
ANDREI KORTUNOV,
ANDREI SHOUMIKHIN,
AND WILLIS STANLEY**

*"'Cold Peace' or Cooperation?
The Potential for U.S.-Russian
Accommodation on Missile Defense
and the ABM Treaty"*

*Comparative Strategy,
Special issue, vol.16, no. 2,1997*

**EDWARD A. KOLODZIEJ
AND ROGER E. KANET, EDS.**

Coping with Conflict after the Cold War

Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press,1996

"either because they are intrinsically in the interest of the United States or because such action would extend common legal space across the Atlantic" (p. 55).

Like multilateral organizations, bilateral agreements also require some adjustment in a post-Cold War environment. The U.S. and Russian authors of "'Cold Peace' or Cooperation? The Potential for U.S.-Russian Accommodation on Missile Defense and the ABM Treaty" consider the chances for mutual accommodation in missile defense systems. This unofficial report provides the following characterization of the current situation.

The United States has shifted its ballistic missile defense away from the large Soviet missile threat and toward the emerging and far more limited threats from regional powers or rogue states. It has taken steps toward the deployment of a national missile defense system with a capability to defend against ballistic missile attack. The United States is pursuing a variety of ballistic missile defense systems in addition to diplomacy and arms control. Russia, in contrast, does not perceive an imminent proliferation threat, lacks the resources for any new military initiatives, and considers its existing ballistic missile defense and strategic nuclear capabilities sufficient for dealing with any menace from a small power or rogue state. It would prefer that potential proliferation be handled through diplomacy and arms control.

The difference of opinion over ballistic missile defense could conceivably sour the already fragile state of U.S.-Russian relations. The authors of this report argue that "an avenue needs to be identified that can satisfy both the foreseeable U.S. requirements for protection against the emerging missile threats posed by proliferation, and Russian concerns about the maintenance of its nuclear deterrent and national status" (p. 123). They see room for compromise and accommodation, perhaps through the deployment of a limited national missile defense system. Failure to generate mutual accommodation on this issue leads to the dismal prospect that the demise of the Cold War will yield nothing more than a begrudged and threatened "cold peace."

Although the Cold War has ended, violent conflicts persist, threatening peace and prosperity around the globe. Contributors to *Coping with Conflict after the Cold War*, edited by Edward A. Kolodziej and Roger E. Kanet, examine how nation-states and other international actors cope with conflict and manage to provide order, welfare, and legitimacy.

This volume takes a dim view of the potential of indigenous solutions to enduring local problems:

[L]eft to their own devices, these conflicts are not susceptible to local solution. They are structured by real and perceived irreconcilable group

differences, resting on uncompromising claims made against each other, and nurtured by accumulated grievances that, for many who are party to the rivalry, can never be adequately compensated. The moral and political incompetence of the rivals alone to resolve their differences, as a consequence of their lasting feuds and their often limitless and absolute claims toward each other, all but preclude the possibility of purely local settlement of their discords [p. 14].

Third-party intervention is therefore necessary, even while self-help remains important.

The aim of providing order, welfare, and legitimacy is approached through a variety of “coping mechanisms.” The best available menu of such coping mechanisms, according to this volume, consists of nation-states, global markets, and democratization. Intervening powers should apply these with care and conditionality, as they may backfire or lead to unintended outcomes.

Accounts of globalization are often exaggerations but are not fictitious. Daniel Elazar begins *Constitutionalizing Globalization: The Postmodern Revival of Confederal Arrangements* by noting globalization’s frequently touted benefits: open markets, free trade, greater prosperity for more people, development of a common world culture, and greater respect for human rights. He also records the negative consequences that are regularly claimed to attend globalization: the weakening or destruction of local cultures and local and national liberties by great international bodies, particularly private corporate commercial bodies, in the name of those benefits. Whether we like it or not, says Elazar, globalization has crept up on us “in the three spheres that count most for human progress: economics, human rights, and communication” (p. 2). It now falls to us to anchor globalization in appropriate constitutional frameworks.

In Elazar’s view, the best way to constitutionalize globalization is via confederalism. He sees this as an option that could take advantage of the benefits of globalization without having to suffer its negative consequences. A confederal system would combine “self-rule and shared rule in such a way as to ensure that shared rule will be confined only to those functions where it is absolutely necessary or clearly more useful to the polities and the people involved” (p. 3). Rather than enlarging states by linking small polities together, the new confederalism would transform states, freeing them from the effort and idea of being totally sovereign and self-sufficient to becoming autonomous jurisdictions within a larger system, with sufficient standing in international law and vis-a-vis other states to be able to protect their autonomy except where they, themselves, have conceded it to some collective of which they are also a part, in which they share in the decisionmaking but cannot act unilaterally (p. 4). A new confederalist model would help ease the transition away from the Westphalian model of nation-states toward something more appropriate

DANIEL J. ELAZAR

*Constitutionalizing Globalization:
The Postmodern Revival of
Confederal Arrangements*

Lanham, Md.:
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1998



**HARVARD ACADEMY FOR
INTERNATIONAL AND AREA
STUDIES**

*Conflict or Convergence on War,
Peace, and International Order*

Cambridge, Mass.:
Weatherhead Center for
International Affairs,
Harvard University,
November 1997

to contemporary globalization with diminished state sovereignty and heightened interstate linkages.

The greatest challenge to this scheme, Elazar acknowledges, is ethnicity. Confederal arrangements promise no panacea for ethnic conflict. Ironically, ethnic conflict makes confederal arrangements both imperative and unlikely. As ethnic groups are increasingly exclusive and exclusionary, focused on seceding and forming separate sovereign entities, they permit little of the flexibility needed for crafting confederal solutions. Calling ethnic conflicts “the greatest catalyst but also the worst enemy of confederal solutions,” Elazar calls for further research on the possibilities of confederal arrangements for handling ethnic conflict (p. 206).

A November 1997 conference organized by the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies addressed the current and future international order. The fifty-seven participants from around the world heard presentations of eighteen papers and discussed elites’ views on the distribution of power in the existing international system, threats to its stability, the legitimate and illegitimate use of force, and characteristics of their preferred international order.

Participants noted that conflict is occurring within rather than between states. Most panelists agreed that interstate wars are becoming increasingly improbable. The security problems facing many states appear to be internal. Secessionist movements have become common. No consensus has yet emerged as to how to deal with intrastate conflict, but one possible approach would be to work toward greater institutionalization of international cooperation in dealing with this kind of conflict.

2. PEACE OPERATIONS

In the aftermath of the Cold War, some aspects of international relations have been turned upside down. International security is now often threatened not by the most powerful states, but rather by the weakest—the collapsed or failed states, as violence and humanitarian crises follow state breakdown and internal conflict. Those designing, analyzing, and conducting peace operations are now far more apt to be addressing conflicts within rather than between states. As the international community seeks to address these conflicts, it must craft ways to provide both peace and order.

The goal of order has generated an expanded role for police in peace operations. There is a need to provide public security in the short term for the duration of the peace operation, and to establish a civilian police force to carry on after the peace operation is completed. The role of the military is also changing in peace operations. Military duties can vary greatly from an original mission of territorial defense or protection of civilians. Military training needs to adjust accordingly. All of these changes are occurring at a time when the legitimacy and credibility of international peace operations cannot be taken for granted. A new post-Cold War consensus on the role of international intervention in internal conflicts is not yet articulated. The media are keeping a close watch and perhaps affecting the debates on international peace operations. Grantees and fellows have prepared analyses, workshops, conferences, and detailed comparative studies in order to generate specific policy recommendations.

International peace operations are risky endeavors. In *Coercive Inducement and the Containment of International Crises*, Donald Daniel, Bradd Hayes, and Chantal de Jonge Oudraat search for a conceptual middle ground that will permit the international community to avoid the shortcomings and failures that have followed from overly ambitious peace operations and yet still meet the moral imperative of intervening in situations of destabilizing crisis. They define that middle option as “coercive inducement” or “forceful persuasion.” Such an operation involves the employment of military forces as opposed to using force *per se*. “It aims to persuade rather than to seize or to bludgeon, and it must form part of a concerted campaign involving a variety of means—politico-diplomatic, economic, hortatory, as well as military—to influence behavior. . . . The coercive side of coercive diplomacy is usually effectuated through the transmittal of latent and explicit military threats, the deployment of massing of forces, their peaceful displays of capabilities, and demonstrative

**DONALD C. F. DANIEL
AND BRADD C. HAYES, WITH
CHANTAL DE JONGE OUDRAAT**

*Coercive Inducement and the
Containment of International Crises*

Washington, D.C.:
United States Institute of Peace Press,
1999





resorts to violence. . . . Military efficiency would take second place to politico-diplomatic concerns, the most important of which is not military victory but change in the target state's or group's behavior" (p. 22). If such an approach fails to achieve such change in the target's behavior, then the next step is either war or humiliating retreat—an eventuality the international community must be ready to face.

Daniel, Hayes, and Oudraat have come to this analysis after evaluating the partial successes and failures in four recent peace operations: Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti. Overall, they identify several factors that contributed to these missions' shortcomings: problems with command and control, insufficient staffing and equipment, and unclear mandates. One specific military shortcoming was leaving UN troops vulnerable to attack or use as hostages or targets. Other errors included the use of air power even when inappropriate to the task, solely to avoid the use of ground troops, and arbitrary exit timetables rather than true exit strategies. These latter errors followed from domestic political concerns rather than the nature of the crisis being addressed. On the tyranny of exit timetables, the authors quote an anonymous UN official lamenting, "None of the political leadership can tell me what they want to accomplish. That fact, however, does not stop them from continually asking me when I will be done" (p. 94).

Daniel, Hayes, and Oudraat then generate several recommendations for future peace operations characterized by coercive inducement. These include maintaining unity of command, deploying with sufficient force, assuming only provisional local consent, and basing exit strategy on measurable progress rather than preset dates. Overarching these particular guidelines must be a commitment to establishing the credibility of the mission. This commitment will have two components. First, the peace operation must have legitimacy, provided by the backing of the international community as demonstrated through a UN Security Council resolution. Credibility is further conferred by a mission's activities being consistent with and appropriate to its goals. The authors observe that the diplomatic leverage of displays of violence "is a function of their credibility, of whether they are physically up to the task of intimidation and whether political leaders are committed to employing them violently if necessary" (p. 18). aaa

WARREN P. STROBEL

Late-Breaking Foreign Policy: The News Media's Influence on Peace Operations

Washington, D.C.:
United States Institute of Peace Press,
1997

Issues of credibility and the impact of domestic politics on international peace missions are further explored by Warren Strobel in *Late-Breaking Foreign Policy: The News Media's Influence on Peace Operations*. In this work, Strobel challenges accepted wisdom about the "CNN effect," or the claim that media coverage (symbolized by the Cable News Network, CNN) is driving foreign policy decisions. His research on media coverage and peace operations in Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia, Haiti, and northern Iraq leads Strobel to very different conclusions. In his study, Strobel found



that the media have an impact on a foreign policy only under certain conditions, that is, when that policy is poorly developed, weakly held, in flux, or lacking congressional or public support. Further, what impact media have is not direct or linear. Media coverage can put something on the foreign policy agenda that policymakers would prefer to ignore, or it can create pressure to come to decisions more quickly, but it cannot determine those decisions. General public response to media images is also a function of the leadership provided by policymakers and their ability to communicate their policy decisions effectively and demonstrate their dedication to those policies. As Strobel notes, “To those who . . . do not have well thought-out policies or cannot communicate those policies no matter how sound they may be, the communications technologies associated with the letters ‘CNN’ are indeed a negative force” (p. 89).

Strobel acknowledges that providing effective and credible leadership is currently no easy task. During the Cold War, invoking national security could be virtually a sufficient argument, ensuring consensus behind a policy among media, public, and government. Interests are no longer so evident, nor military actions so clear. In any peace operation, the identity of the adversary, battlefield, goals, and desired outcomes are often not immediately evident. The legitimacy of any peace operation, particularly one that might include U.S. casualties, requires much greater effort to establish. Leaders’ communication to the media and the public must then be constant, credible, and coherent.

The role of the press in this policy context is also changing. Strobel notes that the media have always been a player—consider, for example, the influence of the yellow press in the Spanish American War. But whereas in earlier wars the media could be restricted to official briefings delivered in military headquarter’s map rooms, the nature of peace operations is very different. The military often needs the media in order to build support, explain engagements to the public, and even gather information. Thus the media always appear as a two-edged sword to those who make and implement foreign policy. On the one hand, they are essential to building a public consensus that cannot be presumed to exist; on the other hand, in the absence of strong and effective leadership, the impact of the media will increase, and public support may move ever further out of reach.

Moving from political legitimacy and leadership to issues of organization and design, several grantees and fellows addressed planning, components, and coordination of international peacekeeping operations.



ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES
AND ABRAM CHAYES

*Planning for Intervention: International
Cooperation in Conflict Management*

The Hague:
Kluwer Law International, 1999

In *Planning for Intervention: International Cooperation in Conflict Management*, Antonia Handler Chayes and Abram Chayes address the process of peacemaking missions. They underscore the bureaucratic rigidity of current operations, lamenting the artificial separation of functionally organized international institutions whose branches communicate poorly with one another. Strict hierarchies in such institutions also restrict transparency. Such factors limit the effectiveness and efficiency of international peace operations. They also impede learning from experience across different organizations. Chayes and Chayes lament that “no state or international organization has invested in an easily accessed data bank of specific experiences in prior conflicts, although libraries and classified files are filled with ‘lessons learned’ from each experience” (p. 44).

The remedy that Chayes and Chayes advocate is planned decentralization, drawing on organization theory and contemporary business models of team building, horizontal communication, transparency, and flexible network structures. Decisionmaking authority is delegated to staff in the field, subject to broad policy guidance from central headquarters. Field staff take autonomous responsibility for achieving specified results and are able to adapt flexibly to changing situations. As peace missions and humanitarian interventions are always characterized by flux and uncertainty, a hierarchical and centralized mode of operation cannot be successful in such contexts.

The building of a genuine team, more than a group of people working together, is essential. Through extensive planning, communication, and consultations, a team comes to share discipline, coherence, and patterns of thinking. Chayes and Chayes emphasize the enormous role of planning both within and among organizations to achieve success via decentralization. Planning increases flexibility and awareness of options; informed decisions rather than static plans or accurate forecasts are the goal of this planning. Ongoing communication is another essential factor, with meetings among the staff of different organizations to share information and build consensus.

While operational decisions are devolved to field staff, central headquarters remains responsible for important tasks. These include initial situational analyses to inform decisions to intervene, conceptualization and overall planning of any mission, and the enormous responsibility of recruiting and training staff. The center does lose a degree of command over the development and transmission of detailed directives, but it gains freedom to focus on the other responsibilities. The alternative to such decentralization and leveling of hierarchies, according to Chayes and Chayes, is crisis management in the worst sense of that term.

In their research they discovered several instances of successful decentralization. They praise the performance of the U.S. military’s Civil Military Operations Center and the reorganization undertaken by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Frequently instances of successful decentralization seem to revolve around one individual in the field who



does a good job of keeping communication open, building consensus, and facilitating coordination. Chayes and Chayes are quick to point out that the key leadership qualities exhibited in these instances are not those of command, but rather “a genuine and demonstrated respect for other participants; the capacity to listen and hear what is being said; the ability to identify and articulate points of crystallization in an amorphous discussion; and humor, but rarely at the expense of others” (p. 195). Such skills should be the focus of training and planning for decentralization in peace missions.

In *Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security*, Robert Oakley, Michael Dziedzic, and Eliot Goldberg examine the role of police in peace operations around the world. They identify three recurring shortcomings in such operations: a deployment gap, with too great a time lag between the decision to intervene and the actual arrival of personnel; an enforcement gap, when tasks of public security fall in between military and police responsibilities; and an institutional gap, when order is established but there is no law because of the lack of a functioning judicial system.

Drawing lessons from many peace operations, including those in Cambodia, Haiti, El Salvador, Bosnia, and Somalia, the authors see the need for clear mandates for the police component of peace operations, strong civil-military coordination, realistic assessment of the likelihood of crime during transitions from conflict, appreciation for the weight of past policing traditions, and the imperative of establishing effective judicial institutions. The authors are most emphatic about the need to approach public security as a whole, including public administration, police, prosecutors, judges, and prison system. “In case after case,” they write, “police reforms have outstripped the impact and pace of judicial reform” (p. 353). The failure of judicial reform undermines police reform; impunity, brutality, and lawlessness return swiftly—regardless of how successful the initial police efforts were.

The establishment of a fully functioning judicial system is complex, with cultural and political as well as technical components: “Reforming or creating foreign police forces is not simply a technical matter whereby international actors can deliver training, deploy a new cadre of police and then leave. It is inevitably a political process” (p. 352). Among the elements to be addressed are attitudes toward policing, among both police and populace. In many situations the very idea of policing as a public service is alien, and physical brutality is understood to be a normal part of interrogation. These expectations must change as part of overall police reform. Political will to transform corrupt and incompetent judicial bureaucracies is also important, for when such political will is lacking, police training programs have had little or no success. And there are technical problems as well—relations between military and civilian police,

**ROBERT B. OAKLEY,
MICHAEL J. DZIEDZIC,
AND ELIOT M. GOLDBERG**

*Policing the New World Disorder:
Peace Operations and Public Security*

Washington, D.C.:
National Defense University Press, 1998



cumbersome regulations that result in delay in or restrictions on aid, exit strategies based on dates rather than accomplishments, and the lack of appropriate personnel.

Attention to the problem of appropriate personnel reveals several concerns. Participants in UN civilian police programs have frequently lacked knowledge of the local language or of English, making communication difficult or impossible. Reports are filed with nothing more than “NTR”—nothing to report. In some cases, required examinations are passed by memorizing answers. In addition, poor driving skills have been a serious problem. Cultural differences regarding food and hygiene have also made cooperation difficult among the different nationalities represented within a UN civilian police contingent. Training the trainers who will handle police reform is a serious challenge.

ROXANE D.V. SISMANIDIS

*Police Functions in Peace Operations:
Report from a Workshop Organized by
the United States Institute of Peace.
Peaceworks No.14*

Washington, D.C.:
United States Institute of Peace,
March 1997

Participants in a workshop organized by the United States Institute of Peace in May 1996 also addressed the role of police in international peace operations. Several of the workshops’ conclusions confirm the observations of Oakley, Dziedzic, and Goldberg. Reestablishing the rule of law is seen as key to stabilizing a society and reconstituting civilian authority. Nations contributing to civilian police contingents of international police operations need to assess whether their project is training police forces or building entire justice systems. Workshop participants noted the frequent lack of a long-term commitment to reconstruct the rule of law in societies where it has collapsed. Workshop participants also identified the disjunctures occurring among the personnel of international police contingents as they come from many different societies, with different standards of public integrity and correct police performance.

**COLONEL J. MICHAEL
HARDESTY AND JASON D. ELLIS**

*Training for Peace Operations: The U.S.
Army Adapts to the Post-Cold War
World. Peaceworks No.12*

Washington, D.C.:
United States Institute of Peace,
February 1997

As the scope and content of police participation in peace operations change, so do roles and responsibilities of the military. Hardesty and Ellis review the need for changes in training to meet these new responsibilities. They begin by noting the distinctiveness of the task, captured in the phrase “operations other than war.” Such operations, with sixteen categories including peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian relief, represent quite a departure from more traditional forms of military engagement.

Hardesty and Ellis identify some distinctive elements of peace operations, including the lack of clear strategic objectives, reliance on limited intelligence, coordination among multiple actors, constant presence of the press, constrictive rules of engagement, and densely populated urban settings. Such features clearly strain the limits of traditional military training. According to Hardesty and Ellis, the U.S. Army is making changes in its training programs to address these features of contemporary peace operations. Negotiating skills have become a particular focus of the new



training programs. Hardesty and Ellis also note that support branches in the U.S. Army, such as engineers, military intelligence, military police, and transportation, are also adapting their training to be better suited for involvement in peace operations.

A further assessment of contemporary peace operations was made during a conference organized by the Fund for Peace in September 1997. Its focus was the attention to human rights within such operations. The conference both addressed large questions and pursued specific policy recommendation—nineteen in all.

The one central concern is whether peace operations should be aiming for “just peace” (meaning simply the cessation of hostilities) or for “a just peace” (which includes human rights and democracy). While peace processes include elements of both approaches, conference participants suggest that most tend toward one direction or the other. The dominant goal in peace operations in Cambodia, Angola, and Mozambique was cessation of hostilities, while peace processes in South Africa, Namibia, and El Salvador are seen as directed more toward establishing human rights and democracy. The purpose of the conference was to seek ways to bridge these two approaches.

Participants in the conference found that the pursuits of just peace and a just peace are indeed complementary, and that an integrated application of both approaches is essential for sustainable peace. Such a collaboration is more easily achieved, according to conference participants, if human rights are addressed within a broader framework and not merely as a prosecutorial exercise. Their further policy recommendation coincides with many of those articulated by other United States Institute of Peace grantees and fellows. Among the nineteen recommendations are the need for an explicit human rights strategy from the outset, the creation of credible implementation arrangements, wide consultation on human rights issues, coordination of relevant external players, links between human rights and military organizations, coordination of human rights monitoring within the peace process, benchmarks of progress rather than prior-set dates for exit, and data banks of available human rights experts and of lessons learned.

The conference also drew attention to the importance of preserving and protecting all records of human rights abuses, including reports, photographs, forensic evidence, and testimony. Creating a permanent war crimes tribunal is another key means of addressing human rights in peace processes. This tribunal would ensure international mechanisms for addressing human rights abuses and keep the focus on individual perpetrators rather than collective guilt which, according to conference participants, perpetuates antagonisms. Some sort of closure on prior human rights violations is also necessary, whether by prosecution or general

FUND FOR PEACE

How Can Human Rights Be Better Integrated Into Peace Processes?

Washington, D.C.:
Fund For Peace, 1998



amnesty, again to maintain individual responsibility rather than group guilt.

The conference concluded by articulating further questions and the need for more research. What is the appropriate role of the international community vis-a-vis local actors and indigenous cultural norms? How can international support for peace processes be sustained for the time periods necessary for national reconciliations? How may negotiators reconcile the need for political inclusion with the need to bring human rights abusers to justice?

3. NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICT

International relations faces a conundrum. On the one hand, globalization continues to increase. Markets, financial systems, and communication disregard national borders, as do crime, disease, and pollution. The traditional sovereignty of nation-states is said to be eroding. Other actors, such as businesses and nongovernmental organizations, gain power in international arenas. Aspects of state behavior that were formerly considered domestic affairs, such as respect for human rights or handling of emergencies, are more apt to be considered reasonable areas for international action.

Yet on the other hand, there is also a sharp rise in nationalism, ethnic particularism, and insistence on self-determination. Identities are becoming more localized, especially those articulated through ethnicity, even while much is being globalized. Sub-state or cross-state groups demand self-determination while nations seek to maintain territorial integrity. Defiant demands and irreconcilable interests of different ethnic groups have repeatedly led to violence.

Why are both of these trends occurring now? How are they related as contemporary movements? How are they to be understood within a longer historical trajectory? The puzzle of simultaneous globalization and localization is not only a theoretical conundrum but also a practical quandary. How can a claim to self-determination be reconciled with the territorial integrity of a nation-state? If all groups are granted a “right” to self-determination, does this result in a splinter of states too small to be viable, and how are competing claims to self-determination handled? If a sub-state group is granted autonomy, how are minority human rights within that new autonomous entity to be protected? If boundaries are redrawn, how can the problem of population now on the “wrong” side of a border be addressed? On the topics of nationalism and ethnic conflict, Institute grantees and fellows offer theoretical and historical perspectives, report on current debate among policymakers, and describe attempted solutions and their outcomes.

Before her assassination in 1998, Galina Starovoitova had been an ethnologist, a government official in charge of ethnic affairs in the Soviet Union, and then a politician and member of the Russian Duma. As a fellow at the United States Institute of Peace, she drew on her experience, knowledge, and new research to produce *Sovereignty After Empire: Self-Determination Movements in the Former Soviet Union*, which examines contemporary nationalism and a number of current or potential ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet Union.

GALINA STAROVOITOVA

*Sovereignty After Empire:
Self-Determination Movements
in the Former Soviet Union.*
Peaceworks No.19

Washington, D.C.:
United States Institute of Peace,
November 1997





Starovoitova begins by putting the current resurgence in ethnic nationalism into theoretical perspective. She notes that “despite the divergence of their perspectives, both Marxists-Leninists and Western liberals underestimated the political and psychological strength of nationalism. For the Marxists, the triumph of proletarian internationalism meant the eventual emancipation of the peasantry from traditionalism and its associated prejudices. Proponents of laissez-faire economics assumed that the marketplace would overcome atavistic peculiarities of ethnic culture” (p. 3).

The failure of ethnicity to fade into a dim prehistory, despite the predictions of both Marxism and liberalism, is attested to in the numerous conflicts ongoing in the former Soviet Union. Starovoitova reviews a number of disputes involving former autonomous republics, autonomous regions, and newly independent states, including Russia, Georgia, Abkhazia, Adzharia, South Ossetia, Crimea, and Nagorno-Karabakh. From her analysis of these disputes, Starovoitova attempts to build a set of criteria for self-determination that would have to be reconciled with the international legal principle of nonintervention.

Starovoitova continued her efforts by interviewing Mikhail Gorbachev, Margaret Thatcher, Senator Sam Nunn, and Ambassador Jack Matlock on the issue of intervention. She found all of them as ready to engage in the practical question of “will this intervention work?” as in the theoretical question “is this intervention justified?” Both questions have many complex facets. And as Starovoitova notes, even if international criteria for self-determination are established, “the decision to intervene is still a starkly political affair, determined more by public opinion and the national interest” (p. 39).

**ROBERT MCKIM
AND JEFF McMAHON, EDS.**

The Morality of Nationalism

New York:
Oxford University Press, 1997

Participants in a 1994 conference considered contrasting views on the origins and morality of contemporary nationalism—or, as one participant noted, contemporary nationalisms, since there are many different variations on this theme. In *The Morality of Nationalism*, edited by Robert McKim and Jeff McMahon, some contributors expressed the view that current nationalism is not an atavistic return to some premodern mentality or orientation. Rather, they see it as a modern phenomenon, a response to the new demands that the state makes on its populations and to the economic, cultural, and social conditions unique to modern life. Pressures toward economic and political homogeneity existing beside the need for differentiation and recognition are among the factors that give rise to contemporary nationalism.

Other contributors to this volume acknowledge the view that nationalism is an evil to be overcome by cosmopolitanism. But, they explain, it can also be seen as a good. Historically, the development of nationalism has been associated with democracy, autonomy, and pluralism, as cross-class alliances form to defeat or exclude interfering emperors or popes and to eliminate multiple claims to territorial jurisdiction. Further, it can



be argued that a sense of communal membership (ethnic or cultural) makes justice possible, inasmuch as it allows citizens to see the sacrifices demanded by the state as expressions of who they are rather than as arbitrary burdens.

In *Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts*, Ruth Lapidoth considers different conceptualizations as well as practical arrangements for implementing autonomy. Lapidoth admits that she began by aiming to derive a model for autonomy, but over the course of her research came to appreciate the great diversity of different autonomy arrangements. Her book discusses attempts—some successful, others not—to establish autonomy from all around the world, from the nineteenth century through the current Palestinian conflict.

Lapidoth observes the decline of sovereignty in its absolute form, denoting a state's complete territorial jurisdiction within its borders and personal jurisdiction over all its citizens. Such sovereignty also entails a right to be free from the intervention of others, whether over external or internal matters. This strong notion of sovereignty has been weakened by such phenomena as free-trade agreements, common markets, and international communication networks. Legal obligations accepted within a variety of international organizations also limit state sovereignty. A further challenge to traditional accounts of state sovereignty is the rise of ethnic identity. The struggle between ethnic particularism and state sovereignty need not be zero-sum, according to Lapidoth. The solution is to be found in regimes of autonomy. Lapidoth identifies autonomy as “a means for the diffusion of powers in order to preserve the unity of a state while respecting the diversity of its population” (p. 3). The plethora of ethnic groups around the globe makes self-determination utterly impractical; the result would be a welter of tiny states, too small to be viable. The alternative Lapidoth explores concerns “the diffusion of power [through which] the central government and the regional or autonomous authorities could each be the lawful bearer of a share of sovereignty, without necessarily leading to the disappearance or dismemberment of the state” (p. 47).

The extent and scope of powers transferred from the central authority to the autonomous entity varies widely. Lapidoth discusses two categories of autonomy: personal and territorial. Personal autonomy is granted to all members of a group within a state, regardless of place of residence. It is usually limited to matters of culture, language, charity, religion, and education. It may be particularly appropriate where various ethnic minorities are interspersed (such as the Serbs in Croatia, Russians in the Baltic states, Ossetians in Georgia, Armenians in Azerbaijan, and Maoris in New Zealand). Territorial autonomy, by contrast, cedes power to the population of a specific geographical area. It is more widespread than personal autonomy, is generally what is being sought in ethnic conflicts, and covers a greater range of social and economic affairs. Its disadvantages arise from

RUTH LAPIDOTH

*Autonomy: Flexible Solutions
to Ethnic Conflicts*

Washington, D.C.:
United States Institute of Peace Press,
1996



the need to protect the rights of those individuals who reside in the autonomous region but do not belong to the dominant ethnic group (for example, Finns who live in the Åland Islands or Italians in South Tyrol). Physical mobility is also difficult to address within a framework of territorial autonomy, as group members move and the composition of a regional population changes.

Autonomy arrangements can vary widely, encompassing any number of the panoply of tasks undertaken by a state. While national defense and financial management come immediately to mind, as well as provision of physical infrastructure, education, and perhaps health care, there is a long list of other duties of the state that may be transferred to an autonomous entity. These include responsibility for archaeology, environmental protection, postal service, vaccinations, population registry, driver and vehicle licensing, traffic supervision, tourism, and meteorology. Given the number of different tasks, and the range in the content and intensity of ethnic identities, it seems quite reasonable that Lapidoth came to the conclusion of her study of autonomous arrangements with an appreciation for their diversity rather than a prescription for a model. She does note that as a general rule, autonomy should be established before the relations between the majority in the state and in the region deteriorate badly. Autonomy cannot reverse a built-up reservoir of hatred and frustration. She also cautions that autonomy is not a panacea, “but only a tool or framework that can constitute an adequate response if the parties are looking for one” (p. 204).

PAUL WILLIAMS

*“The Modern Law and
Policy of State Succession”*

1998

*“State Recognition:
The Modern Approach”*

1998

In his two papers on state succession and state recognition, Paul Williams addresses some of the legal formalities of political change. In “The Modern Law and Policy of State Succession,” Williams examines such issues as the continuation of international treaties, responsibility for debts and membership in international organizations, and international financial institutions once a state has ceased to exist and has been replaced by new states, as in the cases of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. As the Soviet Union was party to over 15,000 international treaties, these issues are not mere technicalities. In general, Williams finds a tendency for successor states to allow treaties to remain in force, subject to subsequent review. Those reviews were then guided less by legal prescriptions and more by a new state’s policy goals “such as the desire to reduce the cost of recognition, the desire to facilitate integration into the world community, and the desire to preserve the rights and privileges acquired by the predecessor state” (p. 62).

In “State Recognition: The Modern Approach,” Williams contrasts two approaches to state recognition. In the constitutive approach, the rights and duties pertaining to statehood derive from recognition only. A proto-state announcing its statehood does not thereby automatically gain an international personality. The legitimacy of that claim depends more on



the response of the international community and whether its members recognize the new state as such.

The declarative approach, by contrast, turns on the effectiveness of the new state. If that new state can satisfy four objective criteria—a defined territory; a permanent population, which is subject to the government; and the sovereignty and independence of that government—then it must be treated as a state, regardless of how it came into existence.

Williams goes on to say that, as with many bipolar theories, neither the constitutive nor the declarative approach quite captures current practice. Issues of diplomatic formality, law, and objective criteria tend to be superseded by policy considerations when peace and stability are at risk.

The democratic peace proposition asserts that there will be universal peace once all states are democratic, since democratic states do not fight each other. Could this also apply within states? Could intrastate ethnic conflicts, for example, gradually disappear as states become more democratized? These are the questions addressed by Airat Aklaev in *Democratization and Ethnic Peace: Patterns of Ethnopolitical Crisis Management in the Post-Soviet Setting*. Aklaev begins by noting the recent spread of democracy and the concurrent upswing of ethnic conflict and then attempts to specify the relationship between the two. He notes that the uncertainty characteristic of a period of democratic transition increases collective ethnic anxieties and raises incentives for radicalization by elites outbidding each other. But ethnic identity need not be abolished in order for democracy to flourish. To the contrary, Aklaev proposes that democracy may be the optimal means to manage ethnic diversity. Within a democracy, ethnic divides may be handled constructively and peacefully within new institutional frameworks. Multiethnic democracy is then reached in stages with the successful resolution of ethnic crises and management of problem areas. In this way, a mere lack of ethnic violence is gradually transformed into a genuine ethnic peace. Aklaev closes by saying that rather than seeing democratic transitions as part of the problem exacerbating ethnic conflict, democratization should be seen as its solution.

A special issue of *Uncaptive Minds*, the journal of the Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe, explores the relationships between nationalism and communism, and democracy and ethnicity. This issue gathers the contributions made by those attending two symposia held in 1996 and 1997 on the rise of nationalism in the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe.

Participants noted that the aftermath of the Cold War has no historical precedent. The French and Russian Revolutions were a century in the making. Over the decades of struggle, alternative political ideologies and

AIRAT AKLAEV

Democratization and Ethnic Peace: Patterns of Ethnopolitical Crisis Management in the Post-Soviet Setting

Aldershot, England:
Ashgate Publishing, 1999

"The Rise of Nationalism in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union"

Uncaptive Minds. Special issue,
summer/fall 1997, vol. 9, nos. 3–4



social structures were gradually constructed. The Soviet Union, by contrast, collapsed rather than being brought down. In its aftermath, there is some scurrying to preserve past privileges and seize whatever ideologies are most instrumentally effective. Thus, communist elites have turned to nationalism, employing it as a means to distract public attention from economic and political problems, exploiting it to gain or preserve power.

Some participants saw a particular congruence between communism and nationalism, as both are collective ideologies aiming for political homogeneity and a strict hierarchy of power. Others, however, noted that nationalism can also be emancipatory and inclusive, crossing class and political divisions. They cite the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as instances where nationalism has been accompanied by liberalism and tolerance.

In general, those present at the symposia concurred that democracy is the best means for battling the negative manifestations of nationalism and fostering its potentially positive attributes. Free and open mass media were seen as essential to counter myths, lies, and propaganda and to nurture tolerant democracies. As one historian framed the challenge, “the principal requirement is not so much to struggle against nationalism in its various manifestations, but rather to struggle for democracy” (p. 183).

ARUN P. ELHANCE

*Hydropolitics in the Third World:
Conflict and Cooperation in
International River Basins*

Washington, D.C.:
United States Institute of Peace Press,
1999

Rivers take a fairly casual attitude toward international boundaries. Several of the major river systems in the world cross national borders repeatedly, creating international crises—or opportunities for international cooperation—as they flow along. In *Hydropolitics in the Third World: Conflict and Cooperation in International River Basins*, Arun Elhance writes, “While states are inherently inclined to unilaterally exploit the rivers flowing across or along their borders, the hydrologically induced interdependencies in international basins gradually compel them to at least entertain the possibility of cooperation with their neighbors” (p. 5).

Water is crucial in innumerable ways to people, households, industries, agriculture, electrical generation, river navigation, biodiversity, and tourism. Its supply and control can affect many of the prized goals of nations: sovereignty, territorial integrity, national security, economic development, and welfare. Increasing water scarcity exacerbates the potential for conflict between and within riparian states. Regulation of water is complex because its direct and indirect inputs are difficult to measure or calculate. Elhance hopes that new technologies and analytical techniques will permit a more efficient use and allocation of scarce resources. But while a river’s geography and the use of such new technologies may set the overall parameters of water sharing and usage, political will remains crucial to defining the relations between nations regarding the use of this essential but increasingly scarce resource. Elhance addresses these issues through a comparative study of hydropolitics in six major



international river basins: the Euphrates-Tigris, Ganges-Brahmaputra-Barak, Jordan, Mekong, Nile, and Parana-La Plata.

Anthony Marx gives his attention to another fault line that frequently divides nations; that of race. In *Making Race and Nation: A Comparison of the United States, South Africa, and Brazil*, Marx examines the construction and preservation of the state as that process interacted with race relations. His cases are the Jim Crow laws in the United States and the apartheid regime of South Africa, as contrasted with the myth of racial democracy in Brazil.

In both the United States and in South Africa, a major division among whites—whether ethnic or political or regional—was perceived as possible and as ultimately threatening to the existence of the state. The Boer War had put British against Afrikaner; in the U.S. Civil War, North and South were opposed. In the period of state consolidation following those violent conflicts, the victorious British pursued alliances with the Afrikaners, and the Northern elite sought coalitions with defeated white Southerners. Both Afrikaners and white Southerners were seen as a viable threat to the state, capable of continued violent disruption. Racial domination served the purposes of coalition building and state consolidation by those in power. Liberal interest in including blacks was overshadowed by the stronger imperative to unify whites. This dynamic persisted until black opposition replaced intrawhite conflict as the most pressing challenge to the nation-state, via the anti-apartheid and civil rights movements. By contrast, Brazil had relatively little intrawhite conflict and was less pressured to reconcile whites via racial domination. The state in Brazil was therefore able to embrace an ideology of racial democracy even while discrimination continued.

Having explored his thesis regarding race as central to the process of nation-building and nationalism as shaped by race, Marx makes some further observations on the content of U.S. and South African policies. In both instances, order and security were deemed of paramount importance. With whites divided over how to include free blacks into the policy, the solution in each case was built on racism. Marx notes the irony that in both South Africa and the United States, the liberal victors—the British and the Northerners—came to endorse the policies advocated by those they had defeated.

ANTHONY W. MARX

*Making Race and Nation:
A Comparison of the United States,
South Africa, and Brazil*

New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1998

4. HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND NGO RESPONSES

The past fifty years has seen a more formalized commitment to universal human rights, although understanding of and defense of those rights continue to shift. International responses both to human rights violations and to humanitarian emergencies have also gone through many changes. One central place to observe those changes is in the relationship between nation-states, multilateral organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The scope of NGO action has expanded greatly and come under substantial strain as NGOs come to fill gaps in the states' implementation of human rights policy and delivery of humanitarian aid.

WILLIAM KOREY

*NGOs and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights:
"A Curious Grapevine"*

New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1998

When the UN charter was adopted in 1945 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights approved in 1948, there were but a handful of NGOs. As William Korey traces in his book *NGOs and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: "A Curious Grapevine,"* the original few pioneering NGOs have swelled to the thousands and become a core component of international monitoring and protection of human rights. As he states unequivocally, "Those who have played a decisive role in transforming the phrase from but a Charter provision or a Declaration article into a critical element of foreign policy discussions in and out of governmental or intergovernmental circles are the NGOs" (p. 5). NGOs have been involved in conceptualizing, reporting, documenting, monitoring, lobbying for, drafting legislation on, publicizing, and organizing volunteers for human rights. Within the United Nations, there has often been a failure to take responsibility or action on human rights, to devise implementing machinery for human rights agreements, and to even accept and make available human rights reporting. Indeed, Korey writes, "The basic truth which knowledgeable officials at the UN clearly understood was that without NGOs, the entire human rights implementation system at the UN would come to a halt" (p. 17).

Korey also explores criticisms and shortcomings of human rights NGOs. Chief among these is their generation of enormous amounts of information with virtually no attention to its use and impact. The amount of work that goes into human rights reporting, Korey notes, is far out of proportion to thinking about whether and how this information is received. Human rights NGOs need to develop the effectiveness of their communication and not simply let their reports "sink into a public and media black hole" (p. 50). There is a need for applied policy research and substantial policy development.





NGOs are not the only ones whose policy development may be lacking. In this study on responses to humanitarian emergencies, Michael Bryans, Bruce Jones, and Janice Gross Stein argue that state policies on humanitarian emergencies are not merely inadequate—they are often nonexistent. NGOs therefore find themselves in policy vacuums, trying to address a succession of humanitarian emergencies that are no longer captured by traditional accounts of such events.

One of the most disturbing aspects of recent humanitarian emergencies is that they have no noncombatants, no civilians deemed neutral. When an entire population becomes a target, traditional approaches to coping with these emergencies are no longer quite suitable.

A gruesome logic arises from understanding the new face of conflict in complex emergencies. If the causing of distress to certain groups through whatever means are handy—classic terror-by-example (Sierra Leone, Algeria), deliberate starvation (Somalia), systematic rape (Rwanda, Bosnia), forced displacement (Bosnia), even genocide (Rwanda, Zaire)—is what delivers political and military power to those employing the techniques, then from their perspective any attempt to counter or mitigate the intended impact must constitute an unfriendly act (p. 8). Humanitarian aid in this context becomes another source of economic extraction for aggressors, whether through direct theft or indirect manipulation of a population. NGOs find little help from nation-states, which seem to be abdicating their responsibilities, not only leaving the task of providing assistance to NGOs but not even providing these organizations with security.

The current situation presents NGOs with several serious dilemmas. At the practical level, questions arise of how to operate under such circumstances. While there has been a movement toward “refugee self-management” as a means of maintaining indigenous leadership within refugee populations, the use of this “best practice” in eastern Zaire left refugee camps under the control of those responsible for the genocide in Rwanda. NGOs were faced with an empty choice: to remain and be exploited by those who had committed genocide, or leave and abandon the civilian population that was being used as a strategic resource.

NGO involvement in humanitarian emergencies also raises political and policy questions. Is humanitarian aid and NGO involvement serving as a substitute for commitment and involvement from nation-states? Are NGO humanitarian operations being used to fill (although partially and unsuccessfully) a policy vacuum left by inaction on the part of responsible states? The authors of this study find this to be the case, arguing that by directing their resources to emergencies created by failed or genocidal states, NGOs are “in effect acquiescing to a deepening neglect of political and security responsibilities by the major powers and international institutions” (p. 20).

What is to be done in such a situation? The study offers three proposals for consideration. First, NGOs could withdraw, developing a new ethic

MICHAEL BRYANS, BRUCE D. JONES, AND JANICE GROSS STEIN

“Good Works in Mean Times: Adapting the Humanitarian Imperative for the 21st Century.” Report of the NGOs in Complex Emergencies Project

Toronto: Program on Conflict Management and Negotiation, Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto and CARE Canada, October 27, 1998



THOMAS G. WEISS,
DAVID CORTRIGHT,
GEORGE A. LOPEZ,
AND LARRY MINEAR, EDS.

*Political Gain and Civilian Pain:
Humanitarian Impacts of
Economic Sanctions*

Lanham, Md.:
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1997

that presence is not the only answer and that withdrawal, if it provides an opportunity to regain leverage, is correct, particularly when coordinated with other NGOs and international agencies. A second option is to consider the privatization of security through an independent volunteer security force unaffiliated with any nation. If nation-states are no longer willing to furnish the “public good” of security for those providing humanitarian aid, then it may be time to privatize the security function. A third proposal is to substantially enhance NGOs’ policy analysis and policy development skills, raising them to a level commensurate with the expanded mandate and responsibilities that have been thrust upon them.

One of the major ways that nation-states have come to respond to threats to international peace and security in the 1990s is through economic sanctions. In *Political Gain and Civilian Pain: Humanitarian Impacts of Economic Sanctions*, contributors consider political and humanitarian implications of economic sanctions. Conventional wisdom assumes that the imposition of economic coercion will create sufficient hardship such that citizens in the targeted country will exert political pressure to force either a change in the behavior of the authorities or their removal altogether. Although many analysts have long labeled this view naive, the use of sanctions only increases. That increase may be attributed in part to the ease of imposing sanctions. Nations that agree on little else can often agree to impose economic sanctions. Sanctions can also be applied with relatively little domestic political cost, certainly far less than that needed to send troops. And their failure brings little loss of credibility. But they often do fail.

The editors of this volume, Thomas Weiss, David Cortright, George Lopez, and Larry Minear, note that after a year and a half of collaboration, they “are not unanimous on the advisability of economic sanctions as a policy instrument” (p. 8). They are, however, committed to establishing methodologies that permit real measurement and comparisons of sanctions’ impacts—sorting out how to calibrate “political gain” and “civilian pain.”

Four cases are given extended attention: South Africa, Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Haiti. None of these is necessarily representative of the use of economic sanctions. Indeed, the editors note that there is no single international sanctions regime but rather “a set of ad hoc arrangements, managed by improvisation, with little consistency from one setting to the next” (p. 218). Further, in each instance studied, observed political changes—or the lack thereof—could be attributed to multiple causes and points of resistance. There is not only an interaction between diplomatic, military, and economic policies but also a variety of other factors particular to specific nations (South Africa’s apartheid, Haiti’s poverty, Yugoslavia’s transition to a market economy, Iraq’s ten-year war with Iran) or more general (bizarre weather patterns bringing droughts or



floods, global recession, or currency crises). From this study, the editors can say, “In no case were sanctions the definitive factor in bringing about political change; but in each instance economic coercion played at least some role in generating pressures for negotiation or compromise” (p. 218). Sanctions also often played some role in causing harm to civilians or generating other unintended political and economic consequences.

In some cases, rather than weakening the government in power, sanctions have served to arouse greater support as citizens “rally around the flag” in response to perceived outside interference. In other cases, political opposition has been disempowered—for example, opposition radio stations ceasing broadcasting because they lack spare parts or electricity. Criminal practices, such as black markets and smuggling, may thrive under economic sanctions and then be difficult to dismantle afterward. Sanctions also have serious effects on NGOs engaged in humanitarian action. For them, sanctions have produced “the worst of all possible worlds.” As the editors explain,

By their mission, emergency relief and human rights agencies are thrust into situations of exacerbated and acute human needs and physical peril. At the same time, they are expected to cushion the additional impacts of sanctions among civilians, a task well beyond their means. Their responsiveness is impaired by the strictures of sanctions, even though improvements have been made in the exemption process. Their integrity is called into question by recipient populations, who associate humanitarian organizations with the purveyors of sanctions, and by sanctioners, who perceive relief efforts as softening the bite of sanctions [p. 231].

No organization is caught more directly in this bind than the United Nations, entrusted with the contradictory mandates of enforcing sanctions and providing humanitarian relief to their victims.

The editors see a great need for accountability in the imposition of economic sanctions, with proper attention to their humanitarian implications and other unintended consequences. Postsanction evaluations and outside reviews should become routine and should include nuanced and systematic calculations. In pursuit of this goal, the editors advocate the creation of an “independent ‘Sanctions Watch,’ which over time would develop expertise and objectivity in both political and humanitarian spheres” (p. 237).

In “Networking Dissent: Burmese Cyberactivists Promote Nonviolent Struggle Using the Internet,” Tiffany Danitz and Warren Strobel examine the impact on grassroots organizing of the revolution in telecommunications. Their case is BurmaNet and the other Internet networks dealing with news about and opposition to the current regime in Burma. An extended grassroots network that operates primarily through the Internet has succeeded in convincing U.S. and European companies to stop doing

**TIFFANY DANITZ
AND WARREN P. STROBEL**

*“Networking Dissent: Burmese
Cyberactivists Promote Nonviolent
Struggle Using the Internet”*

1998



business with Burma, convincing local legislatures in the United States to pass laws on selective purchasing (for example, no contracts with Pepsi because of Pepsi's business presence in Burma), and convincing President Clinton to sign federal legislation banning any new investment in Burma by U.S. companies (subsequently challenged in the World Trade Organization).

What is so distinctive about these efforts is that they succeeded despite the lack of a constituency in the United States. In roughly similar cases such as South African divestiture or lobbying on the situation in Ireland, African-Americans and Irish-Americans formed natural relevant constituencies here. Individuals concerned about Burma, scattered all around the world, were transformed into a network via their computer linkages: "The Internet, because of its ability to create geographically dispersed *networked* communities, created the constituency necessary for action" (p. 19, emphasis in original).

While concerned individuals and activists have been able to gain immediate access to news from Burma and to organize opposition, the regime in Burma has had the same access to these Internet sites. Danitz and Strobel note that the regime has subscribed to BurmaNet and has paid an American company to create a website for it (presenting tourism and business news, but not mentioning politics). The regime's ability to counter the use of the Internet by its opponents internationally is limited to monitoring public Internet discussion and trying to publicize its own point of view. Inside Burma, it uses heavier tactics: fines and imprisonment for owning an unregistered modem or fax.

Danitz and Strobel note several disadvantages to the use of the Internet. Information transmitted is unmediated and can be of questionable accuracy or a product of outright sabotage. Dependence on the Internet can also create a division between the information haves and have-nots, underscored by a need for not only a computer and Internet account but also a knowledge of English in the case of many international networks. Advantages include the speed with which information can be made available and replicated. The Internet also facilitates decentralized organization. In the case of Burma, Danitz and Strobel perceive a further potential benefit: Should the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi be allowed to take office, the Internet will have served as a "school for democracy." Those involved in Internet opposition will have gained some experience in political action and be better equipped to formulate checks and balances on a new government and to establish a civil society.

5. CROSS-CULTURAL NEGOTIATION

In undertaking cross-cultural negotiation, negotiators face a twofold challenge. The first is to take seriously culture's impact on negotiation. The second is to determine how to incorporate that awareness into one's approach to the negotiation process. While a consensus has been building regarding the importance of culture to negotiation, there is not yet comparable agreement on the definition of culture, an explicit causal analysis of its impacts on negotiation, or its role in international relations relative to interests and power. The United States Institute of Peace has established an initiative to explore these issues. The Cross-Cultural Negotiations project encompasses broad conceptual works, comparative analyses, and several country-specific studies.

One way of defining something is by saying what it is not. This may be a particularly advisable strategy when a concept has many competing and flawed previous definitions. In *Culture and Conflict Resolution*, Kevin Avruch identifies common errors to avoid in defining and studying culture. Culture should not be seen as homogeneous, having no internal paradoxes or contradictions. It should also not be treated as though it were an actor in its own right, capable of action independent of an individual agent. Culture is not uniformly distributed among members of a group, nor does an individual possess but one culture. One person's multiple cultures might include national, confessional, ethnic, organizational, and occupational cultures. Culture is not superficial etiquette or custom. Finally, culture is not timeless and stable, but changes. It is responsive to situational change, environmental contingency, and uncertainty. Culture must be reinvented and revalidated in each generation. Errors such as these once led to the now discredited studies of national character, positing such portraits as "overbearing Russians," "inventive Americans," or "disciplined Germans."

In reviewing approaches to culture within international relations, Avruch also detects a tendency to assume that cultural differences in themselves are sufficient to cause conflict. As Avruch writes, "The mere existence of cultural difference is rarely a cause of conflict. This hardly diminishes culture's importance to conflict analysis or resolution, however, because it is *always* the lens through which the causes of conflict are refracted" (p. 30, emphasis in original).

How is culture to be incorporated into international analysis? Again, Avruch finds it useful to counter some commonly held perspectives. Realism, with its positivist epistemology, focuses on power and interests (understood as given and permanent) of states that are seen as rational

KEVIN AVRUCH

Culture and Conflict Resolution

Washington, D.C.:
United States Institute of Peace Press,
1998





actors maximizing utility. Avruch argues instead that culture itself shapes identities and interests, and that there are modes of reasoning and decisionmaking imperatives other than rationality. Power is central but is not self-evident or straightforward. Power, writes Avruch, “is never fully divorced from questions of legitimacy, and the bases of legitimacy are always cultural ones” (p. 54). In its sociopolitical manifestations as force or coercion, power itself is culturally constituted.

How can such insights be used in negotiation? Avruch suggests negotiators should remain aware that any actor carries multiple cultures whose behavioral and motivational relevance is situational and changeable, and that cultures are both socially and psychologically distributed and not uniform. Negotiators should also avail themselves of both actor-centered analyses that remain rooted in ongoing social practice (such as the sociological location of this individual), and transcultural analyses attending to some observable scalable behaviors (such as levels of risk-taking). Doing so yields both context-rich “thick description” and a set of variables that permit comparative analyses.

Better cross-cultural understanding will not make problems go away. “[E]ven after mutual recognition,” Avruch reminds us, “Israelis and Palestinians will still have water rights to argue over for years to come, and some resources (like water in the Middle East) will always be scarce” (p. 100). But understanding will help reduce distortions in negotiations resulting from mutual incomprehension across cultural divides.

RAYMOND COHEN

*Negotiating Across Cultures:
International Communication in an
Interdependent World*

Washington, D.C.:
United States Institute of Peace Press,
rev. ed., 1997

Raymond Cohen has produced a new revised edition of his *Negotiating Across Cultures: International Communication in an Interdependent World*. He couples a conceptual framework for understanding the place of culture in negotiations with analyses of particular interactions between the United States and Japan, China, Egypt, India, and Mexico. In Cohen’s definition, culture is a quality of societies, not of individuals. Any notion of the existence of innate personality type or national character is fraudulent. Culture is acquired by individuals within their respective subcultures (family, school, religious group). And each culture is a unique complex of attributes. All of this informs but does not determine negotiation. “Negotiators can draw on a repertoire of approaches according to need, partner and subject matter,” writes Cohen. “Negotiating style may be best thought of as a family of possibilities rather than a rigid and invariant preselection” (p. 16).

To frame his examination of particular negotiating events, Cohen uses a process model to divide negotiations into several phases: prenegotiation behavior, opening moves, intermediate negotiation, end game, and implementation. His goal in these analyses “is not deciding whether cultural dissonance impinges on negotiation, but determining when it may be more or less salient.” An example of this is Cohen’s comparison of U.S.



dealings with Mexico over the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the United States' relationship with China.

The more committed the political leaderships of the parties to any course of action, the greater their convergence of interests, and the greater the power differential, the less likely are cultural factors to hinder talks. The North American Free Trade Agreement negotiations between Mexico and the United States are a case in point. Conversely, the lower the level of political engagement, the more troubled the relationship, the greater the power symmetry, and the more ambiguous the interests at stake, the greater the scope for cultural antinomies. U.S.-Chinese negotiations in recent years over an entire range of matters exemplify this tendency [pp. 21–22].

Culture influences negotiating goals and behavior, and negotiating styles may be broadly predictable. Circumstances, interests, and the distribution of power are also of central importance and vary from case to case and from one period to another. There can be, therefore, no recipe for smooth cross-cultural negotiation. Cohen instead provides some guidelines for intercultural negotiations: study an opponent's culture, history, and language; try to establish warm personal relationships with interlocutors; do not assume that what you mean by a message—verbal or nonverbal—is what representatives of the other side will understand by it; be alert to indirect formulations and nonverbal gestures; do not overestimate the power of advocacy; adapt your strategy to your opponents' cultural needs; flexibility is not a virtue against intransigent opponents, so avoid the temptation to compromise with yourself; be patient and resist the temptation to labor under artificial time constraints; be aware of emphasis placed by your opponents on matters of status and face; and do not be surprised if negotiation continues beyond the apparent conclusion of an agreement (pp. 225–226).

A further contribution to the United States Institute of Peace's Cross-Cultural Negotiations project is Chas. Freeman's *Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy*, in which this experienced diplomat sets forth some observations about power and the practice of effective diplomacy. In Freeman's definition, "Diplomacy is the expression of national power in terms of tactfully intelligent suasion and peaceable coercion. Diplomatic persuasion is the art of convincing other states that their interests are best served by taking actions favorable to the interests of one's own state" (p. 121). The tasks of diplomats include advocating their nation's policies and perspectives, reporting accurately, counseling their governments, stewarding their nation's interests, and being an agent for their government. Commenting further on agency, Freeman writes:

Diplomacy embraces these general demands for effective performance of agency. It adds to them the special requirements of international and intercultural communication. Empathy with foreign interlocutors presup-

CHAS. W. FREEMAN, JR.

*Arts of Power:
Statecraft and Diplomacy*

Washington, D.C.:
United States Institute of Peace Press,
1997



poses understanding of their nation's history, culture, and mode of discourse. Verification that communication is precise requires knowledge of their language. A diplomatic agent must have a sophisticated grounding in the history and culture of his own nation. This is necessary to help his foreign interlocutors understand and accept the validity of the viewpoint of the state he is representing [p. 112].

JERROLD L. SCHECTER

*Russian Negotiating Behavior:
Continuity and Transition*

Washington, D.C.:
United States Institute of Peace Press,
1998

With the fall of the Soviet Union, it might be expected that U.S. negotiations with Russians would substantially change. While there are differences between the Soviet, post-Soviet, and even the earlier czarist periods—notably a chaotic context of political uncertainty and institutional breakdown—nonetheless there are also important cultural continuities. This is one of Jerrold Schecter's themes in *Russian Negotiating Behavior: Continuity and Transition*. Schecter writes of an “inertial hold” of the Bolshevik Code, which was itself shaped by cultural patterns from prior centuries, and of these being the “twin inheritances” that infuse current negotiations (pp. 8, 10).

A journalist and former member of the National Security Council, Schecter aims to provide a “road map” that would be of use in any type of negotiation, whether it is about strategic arms reductions, financial assistance, oil drilling rights, private investment, or living arrangements in Moscow. Using his knowledge of Russian history and language, his experience in government, and current observation, Schecter identifies certain continuities in Russian negotiating styles. These include a wariness or suspicion of foreigners, an aggressive and mistrustful approach to negotiation, a winner-take-all mentality aimed at dominating or destroying an opponent, and an emphasis on hierarchical authority.

While particulars will vary in any particular set of negotiations, Schecter anticipates common problems and offers general advice. Given the current disarray in Russian policymaking institutions, Schecter cautions that Westerners will find it difficult “to know with whom to reach agreement and, after it is reached, whether the agreement will be implemented” (p. 115). Among the cautionary steps that negotiators should therefore follow are establishing problem-solving mechanisms to be implemented at an early stage, and insisting on agreed-upon and detailed rules and procedures with an ongoing verification process as part of the terms of any contract.



Training programs for diplomats and other negotiators also address the challenge of cross-cultural communication. Three workshops held in 1996 and 1997 by the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution incorporated empirical studies of past negotiations as a basis for training, thus providing a bridge between academic theory and diplomatic practice. Participants were presented with several case studies and asked to take on three roles as analyst, strategist, and trainer. Certain themes recurred in the presentation of all the cases, including effects of experience, time pressure, information exchange tactics, tactical use of rewards, constraints on flexibility, third-party effects, and the impact of culture.

In their report on these workshops, Daniel Druckman and Victor Robinson note that while a number of studies have shown that perceptions of fairness are sensitive to cultural differences, “we also discovered that the longer parties negotiated with each other, the less cultural differences influenced their behavior” (p. 7).

Given the complexities of culture, misunderstanding within a culture or between subcultures is always possible. Mary Boergers, Hugh O’Doherty, and Paul Arthur are confronting these issues in their effort to train leaders in Ireland. Their focus is on young mid-level leaders who are “less likely to be trapped in old stereotypes or constrained by the rigid ideology of incumbents. They are also more likely than grassroots community leaders to eventually secure the political power to effect positive change” (p. 1).

The training program addresses some unspoken assumptions that can limit communication: that one’s political views are self-evident, or that repeated statement of one’s views shows persistence, while opponents’ repetition of their views demonstrates inflexibility. It also examines some features of leadership and the different goods that people expect from leaders, such as solutions, security, or meaning.

The effort to awaken leaders to the impact of cultural assumptions on their work does have risks in specific political contexts. This training program, say its organizers, “walks a political tightrope. On the one hand, the program’s goal is to help participants overcome old stereotypes and prejudices and to change. Yet participants can’t move too far out of the political mainstream or they won’t be able to secure the leadership positions and power needed to effect new policies and programs essential for lasting peace” (p. 1).

**DANIEL DRUCKMAN
AND VICTOR ROBINSON**

*“From Research to Application:
Utilizing Research Findings in
Negotiation Training Programs”*

Fairfax, Va.: Institute for
Conflict Analysis and Resolution
George Mason University, 1997

**MARY BOERGERS,
HUGH O’DOHERTY,
AND PAUL ARTHUR**

*“Leadership and Conflict
Transformation: A Training Manual”*

1998

6. EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

VJEKOSLAV PERICA

“Deadline Doomsday? Yugoslav Religious Organizations in Conflict, 1981–1997”

Washington, D.C., 1998

In “Deadline Doomsday? Yugoslav Religious Organizations in Conflict, 1981–1997,” Vjekoslav Perica addresses the role of religious elites in the Balkan conflict. In the last decade of communist rule in Yugoslavia and the subsequent war, Perica sees substantial evidence of religious intolerance and extremism fostered by the hierarchies of the Serbian Orthodox church and the Croat Catholic church. He argues that “[t]o a large extent, religious elites conducted religious and nationalistic mobilization consciously as part of their ethnic and religious rivalry, coupled with the traditional clerical quest for social influence” (p. 14).

Perica juxtaposes three public celebrations held in the 1980s. The 1984 Winter Olympic Games in Sarajevo were carried out with the fanfare and symbolism of unity and fraternity. Two religious commemorations contrast with this. The Catholic Church held a National Eucharistic Congress marking the anniversary of the thirteenth-century evangelization of the Croats. Meanwhile, the Serbs memorialized the loss of life at the Jasenovac death camp during World War II, where the fascist Croatian Ustashe killed many Serbs. While the Olympic festival sought to celebrate unity and tolerance, the two religious events asserted irreconcilable claims to their own superiority and exclusive legitimacy as the national religion. Perica sees animosity between Catholic Croats and Serbian Orthodox as having a long history and showing no signs of abating. His account of the past is projected into the future as well: “No common state of the Yugoslavs managed to acquire religious legitimation because the two national churches had never normalized their mutual relations and failed to reach at least a minimal voluntary inter-confessional consensus about themselves and their country” (p. 28).

MARIANA LENKOVA, ED.

“Hate Speech” in the Balkans

Athens:
International Helsinki Federation for
Human Rights, 1998

In 1995 the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights began a project to monitor hate speech in the Balkans. The aim was not a systematic academic study but rather a collection of experiences and anecdotes from the media gathered by members of the media and human rights activists. The purpose was to capture the nature of this hate speech and gain some idea of how widespread it is. Through 1995 and 1996 instances of hate speech were gathered from the media in Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, and Slovenia. The volume *“Hate Speech” in the Balkans* presents summaries of this material.

Within this project, hate speech is defined as speech that produces or reproduces the opposition between “self” and “others.” Collective generalizations present negative images of a whole people and foster intolerance.





In her introduction to the volume, Nafsika Papnikolatos notes that “all pejorative terms used by the media may have multiple meanings depending on when and where they are used. The significance must be sought always in the historical and sociopolitical context within which stereotypes are produced” (p. 12). The volume records a range of hate speech involving class, religious, sexual, and ethnic slurs against many identifiable groups in the Balkans and about foreigners and Westerners as well.

The volume points out that while many of the Balkan nations have in common a background of communism and controlled media, this is not true for all. Greece figures largely here, with extensive attention to the Imia/Kardak incident in 1995–96. A small event on this islet almost became an international incident once it was seized on and exploited by politicians and the press. This study records some of the “absolute frenzy” of the press regarding this incident. In the end, under pressure from international organizations, a conflict was averted. But the hate speech that had been delivered in the press was not retracted, no changes were made in the behavior or standards of the media, and there was no evidence of lessons learned.

Relations between Greece and Turkey founder on the status of Cyprus, boundaries of territorial waters in the Aegean Sea, ownership of small islands, and control over Aegean airspace. A 1996 workshop convened by the United States Institute of Peace addressed prospects for de-escalation, reconciliation, and resolution. Tozun Bahcheli, Theodore A. Couloumbis, and Patricia Carley share the results of that workshop in *Greek-Turkish Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy: Cyprus, the Aegean, and Regional Stability*.

Greece and Turkey do agree on the need to settle the Aegean issues peacefully. While neither nation favors the use of violence, they disagree over the character of the conflict and the correct methods for resolving it. Greece asserts that all the Aegean issues are legal matters that can best be arbitrated in international courts. Turkey, on the other hand, perceives them as political matters requiring bilateral negotiations. A further obstacle to peaceful progress, particularly regarding the dispute over Cyprus and also recently concerning possession of the small island of Imia/Kardak, is the exploitation of these issues by politicians in both Greece and Turkey for domestic political gain.

While relations between Greece and Turkey can be highly charged, their disputes could be peacefully resolved. Both nations have political incentives to reach such a resolution. Greece would gain a substantial measure of stability in the region and a reprieve on arms spending. Turkey would also benefit from calm in the region and from an improvement in its relationship with the United States and Europe, particularly regarding its chances for membership in the European Union.

**TOZUN BAHCHELI,
THEODORE A. COULOUMBIS,
AND PATRICIA CARLEY**

*Greek-Turkish Relations and U.S.
Foreign Policy: Cyprus, the Aegean, and
Regional Stability. Peaceworks No. 17*

Washington, D.C.:
United States Institute of Peace,
August 1997



AKSEL KIRCH, ED.

*The Integration of Non-Estonians
in Estonian Society:
History, Problems and Trends*

Tallinn, Estonia:
Estonian Academy Publishers, 1997

Current legal debates on citizenship in Estonia occur against a background of a difficult history. During the Soviet period, there were mass deportations of Estonians to Siberia and a major influx of Russian immigrants as part of a Soviet strategy to colonize Estonian territory. With the fall of the Soviet Union and the reestablishment of Estonian independence in 1991, how are the Soviet-era immigrants to Estonia to be treated? Issues of citizenship are the focus of *The Integration of Non-Estonians in Estonian Society: History, Problems and Trends*, edited by Aksel Kirch.

Estonian law automatically grants citizenship in the restored Estonian state to any who were citizens before 1940 and to their descendants. Others need to fulfill a residency requirement and pass a language exam. Since 1992, 50 percent of Estonia's Russians have become Estonian citizens, and more are expected to do so in the future.

According to academic opinion, the Estonian law is divisive. By not putting Estonians and Russians in a similar position for acquiring citizenship, the law "has invited criticism from scholars who view it as a tool for disaffecting the minority community and as a possible impetus for societal polarization" (p. 120). Such polarization is not, however, occurring in Estonia. Despite predictions of conflict, Estonia remains peaceful. Contributors to this volume suggest that while legislation is one factor shaping minority attitudes, it does not occur in a vacuum.

The success of Estonia in valuing each citizen as an individual rather than as a member of a group will depend on many factors. As the contributors to this volume see it, ethnic peace and integration and the loyalty of both citizens and noncitizens will arise from the overall stability, prosperity, and democratization of Estonia. These, rather than a correct formula for citizenship, are the preconditions for ethnic peace.

ANATOL LIEVEN

Ukraine and Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry

Washington, D.C.:
United States Institute of Peace Press,
1999

In *Ukraine and Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry*, Anatol Lieven examines the quality of Ukrainian national identity and the impact of Western policies on relations between the Ukraine and Russia. Current Ukrainian national identity is not highly developed and is characterized by little of the ethnic chauvinism that has emerged in other successor states. Relations between Ukrainians and resident Russians are relatively stable and peaceful. Russians in the Ukraine speak Ukrainian and feel comfortable there. While both the Ukraine and Russia have made progress in holding and respecting democratic elections, both still have far to go in institutionalizing democracy, establishing civil societies, and achieving effective economic reforms and stable economic progress.

The policies of the West will influence this process. According to Lieven, some Western analysts and policymakers would like to use the Ukraine as a "buffer state" against Russia. Fearing a resurgence of Russian imperialism, these policy advocates would seek to strengthen Ukrainians'



ethnic nationalism. Lieven foresees grave consequences to such policy choices:

[A]n attempt to turn Russia's neighbors into a cordon sanitaire against Russia—especially if this had the result of fostering anti-Russian nationalism—could have the result in Russia herself that we all ought to fear the most. This would be to create a reaction in Russia and the Russian diaspora which would turn Russians from their present largely non-ethnic definition of their nationalism to an ethnic one, which would sharply differentiate itself from other peoples, both within Russia and in neighboring states [p. 158].

The *Challenge of Regional Cooperation in Central Asia: Preventing Ethnic Conflict in the Ferghana Valley*, by Anara Tabyshalieva, is a study of social fragmentation in Central Asia and the repercussions for future regional cooperation. Tabyshalieva portrays the difficult situations in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan as arising from overpopulation, chronic decline in living standards, ecological crises, regional and clan-based competition over economic resources, and ethnic and religious divisions. Tabyshalieva notes the multiple fault lines of religious conflicts between traditional religions (Islam and Russian Orthodoxy), between them and newcomers (Protestants, Jehovah's Witnesses, Bahais), and within religious groups (Islam as it was established in the more egalitarian Soviet period and as it is espoused by the strict Wahabi sect, which seeks to increase control over women's lives and restrict their rights).

Tabyshalieva sees the political polarization that occurs in much of the former Soviet Union as particularly acute in Central Asia. Political parties operate with limited social bases. Nongovernmental organizations are presumed to be anti-government rather than intermediaries between government and civil society. In an ideological vacuum, leaders with strong personalities can have large effects. Indeed, according to Tabyshalieva, the situation is only made worse by the actions of political leaders: "Instead of attempting to seek more unity, some national leaders have frequently politicized distinct ethnic identities in order to divert attention away from current hardships" (p. 25).

The essay concludes that it is up to the West to step in and reverse Central Asia's social fragmentation. As Tabyshalieva writes, "The process of internal fragmentation and criminal anarchy could be stopped only if the West devotes serious attention to the region. Five years of civic crises and armed conflict have demonstrated the inability of the post-Soviet establishment to resolve the region's conflicts" (p. 64).

ANARA TABYSHALIEVA

The Challenge of Regional Cooperation in Central Asia: Preventing Ethnic Conflict in the Ferghana Valley.
Peaceworks No.28

United States Institute of Peace,
June 1999

**DAVID BLOOMFIELD**

*Political Dialogue in Northern Ireland:
The Brooke Initiative, 1989–92*

New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1998

Occasionally, apparent failures in peace processes are later seen as having provided the groundwork for subsequent successes. This is the case of the Brooke Initiative, the political talks on Northern Ireland held from 1989 to 1992 and bearing the name of the British secretary of state for Northern Ireland, Peter Brooke. David Bloomfield's *Political Dialogue in Northern Ireland: The Brooke Initiative, 1989–92* is an appreciation of these preliminary negotiations.

Brooke's efforts have been the subject of substantial criticisms: that he underestimated the difficulty of the task, had unrealistic expectations, was insufficiently firm, demonstrated a lack of resolve, and allowed the agenda to be subverted. But, suggests Bloomfield, Brooke was "in the end, crucial for reinventing a process of negotiation that had been effectively inoperative since . . . the early 1970s" (p. 183).

Despite its failure to reach a successful conclusion, the Brooke Initiative demonstrated to all the possibility of negotiation following decades of violence, confrontation, and protectionism. As Bloomfield writes, "The public knew it could be done: it would be much more difficult in future for any of the politicians to justify a policy of nonengagement to their electorate" (p. 166).

Participants in the Brooke Initiative gained vital experience in prenegotiation, preparing them for more effective involvement in later stages of the peace process. "Of course," notes Bloomfield, "it was not consciously approached as such by the participants at the time: they entered the talks in the present tense, understanding what they were attempting to do as a full negotiation process. Blessed with hindsight, however, the Brooke talks have their greatest relevance in terms of this preparatory role" (p. 192).

7. MIDDLE EAST

The essays collected in “Prospects for Crisis Prevention Within the Framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership,” edited by Roberto Aliboni, explore the political and institutional potential for collective security arrangements and conflict prevention in the Near East and North Africa. Thus far, that potential is slim, and many obstacles to cooperation among the Arab nations remain.

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was organized at the initiative of the European Union at a conference in Barcelona in November 1995. It was envisaged as an inclusive association that would hold regular multilateral and bilateral consultations aimed at achieving common measures and policies on security; economic development; and such issues as human rights, racism, xenophobia, education, international crime, terrorism, drug trafficking, and migration. These plans have not come to fruition. Interstate and intrastate conflicts continue in the region.

According to contributors, Westphalian-style Arab states suffer from a lack of authenticity and possess little political legitimacy. Pan-Arabists would like to see the borders between them dissolved. Islamic universalists, by contrast, seek to make all obedient to Islamic law. If the Islamic universalist approach were to succeed, the issue of borders would become irrelevant, as all would have the Sharià in common. The nationalist elites and armed forces presently in power do not have the strength to counter either pan-Arabism or Islamic universalism. But neither do they have the power to achieve a different project of legitimation. What would be required for such a shift would be democratization, good governance, and expanded popular participation—but these seem unlikely as well. The situation has domestic and international implications. In their essay “The Middle East Experience with Conflict Prevention,” Gamal Abdel Gawad Soltan and Abdel Monem Said Aly write, “After decades of bloody conflicts, hatred and radicalism, the legitimacy of the ruling elites in the region became tied to pursuing hard-line foreign policies toward regional conflicts. In regions where regimes’ achievements in the areas of economic development and democratization are, at best, modest, hard-line foreign policy is particularly important in consolidating regimes’ legitimacy and survival” (p. 17).

Looking at the region as a whole, contributors to this collection see little grounds for optimism. In “Managing Security in the Mediterranean Region: Problems, Tools, and Institutions,” Laura Guazzone notes the diverse and divergent security policies of the various Mediterranean countries that are not part of the European Union. “These countries,” she writes, “face common problems but lack a common reference, be it a common security institution or a common enemy. The result is a frag-

ROBERTO ALIBONI, ED.

“Prospects for Crisis Prevention Within the Framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership”

1998





**GEOFFREY KEMP
AND JEREMY PRESSMAN**

*Point of No Return:
The Deadly Struggle for
Middle East Peace*

Washington, D.C.:
Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 1997

mentation of security conditions, which range from the relative stability of countries such as Morocco or Syria, to domestic strife (Egypt), to insurgency and semi-civil war (Algeria, Turkey) and open interstate conflicts (Arab-Israeli; Greek-Turkish)” (p. 3).

The premise of *Point of No Return: The Deadly Struggle for Middle East Peace* by Geoffrey Kemp and Jeremy Pressman is contained in its title: the peace process in the Middle East has passed a point of no return and will proceed, regardless of future setbacks. The authors examine both the conflict between Israel and each Arab state, and the potential for a comprehensive Middle East peace, including not only the issues concerning the state of Israel but also the broader problematic asymmetries throughout the region.

As negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians turn to final-status issues (control of Jerusalem, the Palestinians’ right of return, the future of Israel’s settlement activity, configuration of final borders, and the status of the Palestinian Authority), Kemp and Pressman recommend a little “intentional obfuscation” and “deliberate introduction of some ambiguity” in order to smooth discussions (pp. 45, 52). For example, the Arabic name for Jerusalem, al-Quds, could be used to rename a part of Jerusalem that might come under Palestinian control. Another example is the election of Yasser Arafat as *raes* of the Palestinian Authority. “Does this mean he is the chairman or the president of the Palestinian Authority? It depends on whether one asks an Israeli or a Palestinian official. Further *intentional* linguistic ambiguity could help make future arrangements palatable to both parties” (emphasis in original, p. 52).

Regarding a comprehensive Middle East peace, Kemp and Pressman see several obstacles. Economic inequality within and between Middle Eastern countries inhibits their capacity to achieve stability or to cooperate with each other. The region is also divided by multiple ethnic and religious schisms. The lack of political legitimacy in many states in the region further “helps to explain why peaceful channels have not been found to deal with many regional asymmetries” (p. 189). Many challenges to Middle East peace remain.

REX BRYNEN

*A Very Political Economy:
Peacebuilding and Foreign Aid in the
West Bank and Gaza*

Washington, D.C.:
United States Institute of Peace Press,
May 2000

Foreign aid to the Palestinians is complicated, both the giving of it and the receiving of it. In *A Very Political Economy: Peacebuilding and Foreign Aid in the West Bank and Gaza*, Rex Brynen reviews some of the disappointments and failures since the 1993 signing of the Oslo Accord’s Declaration of Principles. Substantial promises were made then of foreign aid for the Palestinians; many of those promises have not been kept. The impact of the aid that has been received has been blunted or undermined by errors and inefficiency.



On the donor side, coordinating aid has been very hard. The assistance program for the West Bank and Gaza Strip involves more than forty countries, over two dozen UN and other multilateral agencies, a score of Palestinian ministries, and hundreds of Palestinian and international NGOs. Beyond the numbers, the wide disparities of organizational cultures between international organizations, state bureaucracies, and NGOs are very difficult to surmount. As Brynen writes, “While donors, UN agencies and international financial institutions alike have increasingly recognized the critical role of NGOs, accommodating disparate NGOs within formal coordinating structures has proven an extremely difficult task” (p. 9).

There are also obstacles to the delivery of aid, once it is provided. Palestinian absorptive capacity is limited. Structural constraints include underdeveloped infrastructure, heavy economic dependence on Israel, weak and fragmented public sector, and unresponsive private sector. Particular bottlenecks arise from the limited capacities of the local construction industry and financial services sector. Israeli restrictions on the free movement of goods and people are a further obstruction.

In utilizing the aid, other issues arise. The allocation of assistance is tricky. Straightforwardly economic and social projects also have political impacts. Efforts to consolidate the state may also strengthen current power-holders. Recipients sometimes have agendas of their own. Patronage and corruption are problems. Brynen concludes that there is still a lot to learn about the political economy of peacebuilding.

In *Jordanians, Palestinians, and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process*, Adnan Abu-Odeh explores the complex and interconnected relationship between Palestinian-Jordanians (Palestinians who became Jordanian nationals after the East and West Banks were unified in 1950) and Transjordanians (Jordanian nationals of Transjordanian origin). He traces the history and dynamics of the relationship; its impact on local politics, regional relations, and the international arena; and its role in the evolution and expressions of the often competing Jordanian and Palestinian nationalisms.

A Palestinian-Jordanian with years of experience in service to the late King Hussein, Abu-Odeh examines the evolving political identities and loyalties of Jordanians over the past seven decades, addressing such key issues as Palestinian representation; the shifting relationship between the monarchy and the Palestinian Liberation Organization; and tactics, strategies, and policies toward Israel—a critical component in the Jordanian-Palestinian-Israeli triangle.

Abu-Odeh also examines how the relationship between Transjordanians and Palestinian-Jordanians has been shaped by the Arab-Israeli conflict, including such watershed events as the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the Palestinian Uprising or Intifada, and Jordan’s Peace Treaty with Israel.

ADNAN ABU-ODEH

Jordanians, Palestinians, and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process

Washington, D.C.:
United States Institute of Peace Press,
1999



Closely tied to this relationship and the concept of Jordanian identity is the debate in Jordan over “Jordan’s regional role” both vis-à-vis the peace process and more broadly in the region. Abu-Odeh points out that, contrary to post-World War I notions describing Jordan as merely “a land link between two strategic linchpins (Iraq and the Suez Canal),” Jordan has a critical role to play in the “transformation of the adverse triangular (Jordanian-Palestinian-Israeli) interaction into an integrative trilateral effort where cooperation and rewarding partnership replace hatred and conflict and where parity and comparability have a chance to grow.” If handled carefully, this transformation could also have a palliative effect on the uneasy relations that have long existed between the Kingdom’s Transjordanian and Palestinian citizens.

JOHN CALABRESE, ED.

The Future of Iraq

Washington, D.C.:
Middle East Institute, 1997

The *Future of Iraq*, edited by John Calabrese, comprises papers presented at a May 1997 conference that examined the past and present of Iraq in order to discern its likely future. While different contributors express competing viewpoints regarding Iraq’s political and economic fortunes, none expect a smooth transition or positive democratic change once President Saddam Hussein is gone.

Iraqi politics also continue to be highly personalized. Great weight is given to Saddam himself rather than the institutions of the state. Strong intermediate associations, such as trade union or independent political parties, do not exist. Following the Gulf War, Saddam has emphasized traditional lines of organization, particularly subnational ethnic and sectarian identifications, at the expense of the Ba’ath party and its nationalist ideology. Some see a “retribalization” of Iraqi society. In this context, whatever transition occurs may be chaotic. As Adeed Dawisha writes, “It is unlikely that Saddam’s successor will institute a liberal, pluralist political order. The succession process is bound to be violent, and Saddam’s replacement is likely to be a seasoned conspirator, a predator. The violent takeover of power, moreover, will occur in dangerously unstable crisis conditions where a number of competing centers of power exist” (p. 15).

Economically, Iraq’s recent past offers little hope for a strong future. The major factors affecting Iraq’s economy are of course the destruction of the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War and the restrictions of continuing UN sanctions. Before that, however, the Iraqi economy was in poor shape. Oil wealth was not used wisely; state enterprises performed poorly; and Iraq became increasingly dependent upon imports, not only of military hardware but also of industrial inputs, consumer goods, and even food. The government itself provided many jobs. Isam Al-Khafaji reports that when the state civilian payroll and pensioners are added to military and security services, 40 percent of Iraqi households directly depend on government payments (p. 21). Little in the economic situation bodes well for the future.



International sanctions are having both political and economic effects, not always as intended. Several contributors note that, contrary to their intent, sanctions may actually be strengthening Saddam. Although the state is operating with fewer resources, it may have become more, rather than less, central to Iraqis' survival. As Abbas S. Mehdi explains, the sanctions have severely limited the availability in Iraq of the basic necessities of life. Iraq's government has responded to this situation by instituting a system of rationing. To meet its survival needs, the population relies on this system. Thus, while the Iraqi regime has remained a captive of UN sanctions, it can also be argued that, partly as a result of these sanctions, the Iraqi people have remained captives of the regime (p. 115).

Will Saddam Hussein continue to rule Iraq? What are some of the international and regional factors affecting this? In *The Struggle for Iraq: Saddam and After*, H. J. Agha and A. S. Khalidi argue that external developments in 1996–97 strengthened Saddam and enhanced his prospects for survival. They cite the United Nations' "oil for food" decision in May 1996 and the growing awareness of the humanitarian impact of the UN sanctions on the Iraqi people. Improved relations with Iran, Syria, Egypt, and China have also contributed to Saddam's standing.

Agha and Khalidi further contend that Saddam has benefited from the protracted stalemate in the Arab-Israeli peace process, and more particularly from inconsistency in how the United States treats Israel and all the other nations in the region. Regarding Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction, they argue that U.S. opposition to these weapons is undermined by its simultaneous tolerance of Israel's weapons of mass destruction and refusal to comply with internationally agreed-upon safeguards and inspections. Further, they note that the United States was not as concerned when Saddam used weapons of mass destruction against his own people in 1986–87. According to Agha and Khalidi, "the current Arab stance against Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs is more of a consequence of Iraqi aggression in the Gulf War than a principled position against the spread of weapons of mass destruction in the area" (p. 268).

Whatever the fortunes of Saddam, Agha and Khalidi assert that the current degree of international isolation of Iraq will simply not be a viable option in the future. "The diverse, interlocking, complex and interactive nature of the emerging Middle East map indicates the difficulty of separating out any of its major components and treating them in isolation of the others" (p. 238).

H. J. AGHA AND A. S. KHALIDI

*The Struggle for Iraq:
Saddam and After*

New York:
Macmillan, St. Anthony's Papers
(forthcoming)



**NEMAT GUENENA
AND SAAD EDDIN IBRAHIM**

*"The Changing Face of
Egypt's Islamic Activism"*

Cairo:
Ibn Khaldoun Center for
Development Studies,
September 1997

Where do Islamic activists come from? In the case of Egypt, Nemat Guenena and Saad Eddin Ibrahim offer their answers in "The Changing Face of Egypt's Islamic Activism."

Islamic activists are recruiting their members from slums and shanty towns. These slums have been neglected and ignored by successive governments, which have failed to provide schools, hospitals, piped running water, urban sanitation, electricity, or police. Stepping in where the state has failed or refused to act, Islamic NGOs and activists have gradually established a substantial presence and parallel institutions. They provide basic social services as well as emergency aid, such as leading relief efforts for the victims of the 1992 earthquake. In providing education, health, and welfare, Islamic service institutions flourish where the state has retreated.

Islamic activists find their recruits among the people for whom they provide services. Youths typically begin as messengers and informants. Once active with an organization, a member relies on the group's protection against the police or state security. Increasingly violent acts undertaken as ordered by an Islamic group make one increasingly vulnerable to harsh state punishment, and therefore more inclined to remain with the group. Refusing to carry out an order can bring severe punishment; desertion can mean death. According to Guenena and Ibrahim, "the typical militant becomes a 'hostage' in the hands of the Islamic Group and a wanted 'fugitive' by the government. The iron-clad double bind has proven to be a crucial method of membership control in militant Islamic groups" (p. 85).

Undoing that double bind may take several steps. In addition to religious, political, and ideological elements, there is an economic component as well. As Guenena and Ibrahim see it, "A large-scale project to economically rehabilitate militants is an effective and rhetoric-free approach to a problem that is ultimately based on deficient resources and inequality" (p. 107).

**RALPH H. SALMI,
CESAR ADIB MAJUL,
AND GEORGE K. TANHAM**

*Islam and Conflict Resolution:
Theories and Practices*

Lanham, Md.:
University Press of America, 1997

The goal of Ralph H. Salmi, Cesar Adib Majul, and George K. Tanham is to acquaint the West with Muslim contributions to international law. They present their case in *Islam and Conflict Resolution: Theories and Practices*. Siyar is the part of Shari'ah that deals with issues of war and peace and other aspects of international law. Based on the Qur'an and ordinances derived from it, siyar addresses such issues as the initiation of hostilities, conduct of war, treatment of prisoners, and termination of war. It also addresses how to deal with non-Muslim minorities within the state, apostates, rebels, and non-Muslim states.

With changing world conditions and the division of the Islamic world into many independent sovereign states, many concepts of siyar in its classical form are no longer relevant. But, according to the authors, many of its principles remain valid and reflect Islamic universalism. For exam-



ple, because Islam emphasizes individual responsibility, *siyar* prohibits communal or collective punishment and the killing of noncombatants and the innocent. Because all human beings have individual rights by virtue of their humanity, *siyar* recognizes that the enemy has certain rights, whether in a Muslim land or not.

Siyar antedates the Geneva Convention by about twelve centuries. In the view of Salmi, Majul, and Tanham, “issues such as treatment of non-combatants and prisoners, the granting of security or quarter to enemies asking for it, and the conscious effort to minimize destruction in war, are all areas where Muslims have predated the West in documenting and requiring the human treatment of adversaries in times of war” (p. 85). With so much in common, why is cooperation difficult between the West and Islam in international law? The Western concept of separation of church and state is, from an Islamic perspective, the major stumbling block.

In *The Arab Shi’a: The Forgotten Muslims*, Graham Fuller and Rend Rahim Francke study the social and political status of Shi’a as compared with Sunni Muslims. The Shi’a are a stigmatized minority, poor and uneducated, an Arab underclass that has been subject to discriminatory practices of governments from the Ottoman empire through the present. Their cultural identity is full of folk prejudices—that they have tails or spit in their food or similar charges. By their veneration of the Twelve Imams, belief in the power of intercession, and sacrifices at their shrines, they are religiously distinct.

The Shi’a are a significant minority in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Oman; a plurality in Lebanon; and a majority in Iraq and Bahrain. Fuller and Francke assert that all Arab Shi’a live in Sunni states: Sunnis are the dominant power, and their political culture, traditions, and interpretations of Islamic history prevail. Even where the Shi’a are a majority, in Iraq and Bahrain, the overriding political culture is Sunni.

How should the Shi’a articulate and defend their interests? Even asserting identity is highly problematic. Shi’a is but one among multiple identities in their self-definition, often ranked below their identity as Arabs, Muslims, or citizens of the nation in which they live. If they claim minority rights, as Christians and Kurds can, they risk formalizing and solidifying political and social distinctions between themselves and the Sunni. Highlighting their differences would increase Sunni suspicions and minimize prospects for true integration. On the other hand, not asserting their identity allows the perpetuation of established order, unequal distribution of power, and Sunni predominance.

Fuller and Francke wish the West to recognize that its image of the Shi’a as fanatics is an inaccurate stereotype. They would like the United States to advocate greater integration of the Shi’a into their societies and not condone discrimination and violence against them.

**GRAHAM E. FULLER
AND REND RAHIM FRANCKE**

The Arab Shi’a: The Forgotten Muslims

New York:
St. Martin’s Press, 1999

8. AFRICA

I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, ED.

*"Traditional Conflict 'Medicine': Cures for
Modern Conflict"*

1998

A vision of communal harmony, in part apocryphal, in part substantiated, inspires much interest in traditional modes of conflict resolution in Africa. As modern methods of conflict management have frequently proven ineffective in recurrent violent conflicts on the continent, analysts and practitioners reexamine traditional approaches. They seek practices that might be reclaimed, adapted, or combined in response to current conflicts. The sixteen contributors to "Traditional Conflict 'Medicine': Cures for Modern Conflict," edited by William Zartman, identify and critique some customary means of addressing conflict and assess the possibilities of using these under contemporary circumstances.

Traditional African modes of conflict resolution are described as being centered around the concept of communal harmony. Harmony is the normative goal of the community; an integrative ethos shapes the conception of conflict as well as the manner of resolving it. Disputes are understood as being between an offender and the community rather than between two parties. Conflict resolution methods are conciliatory and inclusionary, aiming to restore unity and communal harmony. Resolution is expressed through reconciliation ceremonies. Mobility or departure is an important means of conflict avoidance, as a part of a community may leave to form a new social unit. For individuals, the greatest possible punishment is formal ostracism, a grave step in a context where inclusion in community is highly valued socially, economically, and psychologically.

While most contributors to this volume endorse that description, others are skeptical. They challenge this description both as a view of history and as a model for conflict resolution. Rather than extolling holistic communal relations, they demand attention to the exercise of power, whether in local communities or centralized states. Village elders, they suggest, may have political agendas of their own, and poor litigants may be at a disadvantage in both traditional and contemporary settings. As conciliatory techniques may be fair only under conditions of equal power, traditional methods may not result in successful resolutions to ongoing conflicts and power struggles in Africa.

Others contributors to this collection see different limitations on an approach to conflict resolution based on harmonious communal relations. They explain that such an approach to conflict resolution can be applied only when there actually is a functioning community that shares and upholds normative values of harmony. Absent that, these approaches have no ground for effectiveness. Without a sense of collective responsibility, reintegration of an offender becomes irrelevant and no social regulation can operate. Traditional methods of conflict resolution are there-





fore said to work for disputes within the community but not to address attacks against the community.

While a communal conciliatory approach is seen to function, if at all, only at a local level, at the national level often nothing seems to be functioning at all. Contributors note that formal courts and legal systems have not had sufficient strength or legitimacy to resolve disputes successfully. Many African states have not yet developed or consolidated a framework for regulating relations that is effective, reliable, and legitimate.

Some contributors suggest that legal pluralism is the practical accommodation in this situation. They see evidence of coexistence and even respectful cooperation between different legal systems, as when police or the courts refer a local-level dispute back to a village council. Others find conflicts about jurisdiction and argue that these disputes can be even worse than the original conflict. Some contributors also suggest that the term “traditional” is a misnomer in describing what is actually syncretic, a mixing of old and new and a constant adaptation to current circumstances. They also caution that traditional and grassroots should not be confused, as the latter includes NGOs and women’s groups, by no means included in traditional village councils.

Some suggest that no one universal paradigm exists for conflict resolution in Africa, but rather there is a continuum of different approaches tailored to each particular situation. Others suggest that only with standard formal mechanisms will dispute resolution be insulated from power plays. Many would agree that no method of conflict resolution can guarantee peaceful solutions if its executors lack integrity. As Aghosa E. Osaghae writes in his essay “Applying Traditional Strategies of Conflict Management to Modern Conflicts in Africa: Possibilities and Limits,”

The relevance and applicability of traditional strategies have been greatly disenabled by the politicization, corruption and abuse of traditional structures, especially traditional rulership, which have steadily *delegitimized* conflict management built around them in the eyes of many, and reduced confidence in their efficacy. . . . [T]he invention and manipulation of tradition is a major plank of the neopatrimonial strategies of African leaders. The co-optation of traditional rulers as agents of the state, and their manipulation to serve partisan ends, which dates back to colonial times, not to mention the corruption of modern traditional rulers, have considerably reduced the reverence and respect commanded by this institution, and therefore, the ability of traditional rulers to resolve conflicts [p. 451, emphasis in original].



**HUSSEIN ADAM
AND RICHARD FORD,
WITH ALI JIMALE AHMED,
ABDINASIR OSMAN ISSE,
NUR WEHELIYE,
AND DAVID SMOCK**

*Removing Barricades in Somalia:
Options for Peace and Rehabilitation.*
Peaceworks No.24

Washington, D.C.:
United States Institute of Peace,
October 1998

In a 1998 Peaceworks report entitled *Removing Barricades in Somalia: Options for Peace and Rehabilitation*, Hussein Adam and Richard Ford, with Ali Jimale Ahmed, Abdinasir Osman Isse, Nur Weheliye, and David Smock, argue that conflict in Somalia is not apt to be resolved through the reestablishment of a centralized state. In part, such a structure does not follow from the strong patterns of decentralization and power sharing in Somalia's history. Further, the gross abuse of power during Siyyad Barre's dictatorship only deepened Somalis' distrust and fear of centralized authority.

Rather than a strong centralized state structure, the authors propose a much looser and more dispersed organization of governance. They point out that many political and economic institutions have emerged despite the absence of a conventional centralized state. Governance is organized at the regional and local level, including regional parliaments and local elections. While central economic planning and financial management are lacking, the economy is functioning. Financial flows and the supply of consumer goods continue; telecommunication capacity and international flights are increasing.

Unfortunately, the United Nations, other international organizations, bilateral agencies, and donors often insist upon negotiating with and channeling aid through centralized authorities. The objective of their peacemaking activities has often been signed national agreements or formal treaties—neither of which may constitute real progress in this situation. As the authors of this report assert, "Future donors need to understand that earlier forms of aid through the center were part of the problem of the old regime and that Somalia's future well-being lies in seeking balance between center and periphery" (p. 11).

One alternative they suggest is to restructure the financing of development and rehabilitation. They propose that local projects be funded by a three-way alliance. Equal shares would come from traditional donor groups, the overseas Somali community, and in-country entrepreneurial elite. Self-financing through such an alliance would demonstrate Somalis' commitment to peace and development in their nation, diminish dependence upon outside donors, and be effective despite public incapacity to collect taxes.

STEPHEN R. WEISSMAN

*Preventing Genocide in Burundi:
Lessons from International Diplomacy.*
Peaceworks No.22

Washington, D.C.:
United States Institute of Peace,
July 1998

Interethnic violence in Burundi since 1993 has claimed over 150,000 lives and threatens peace and security throughout Central Africa. Stephen Weissman's proposal in *Preventing Genocide in Burundi: Lessons from International Diplomacy* is that greater international support should be given to regional efforts to resolve this conflict.

Seven regional states—Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda, Zaire, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Zambia—in conjunction with the Organization of African Unity have demonstrated, in Weissman's view, an unusual degree of cohesion and determination in pursuing negotiations that include all parties to



the conflict in Burundi. African diplomatic efforts have not received sufficient support from the West, and indeed have been hampered at times by parallel international initiatives.

Weissman envisions a political settlement as including some form of democratic power-sharing that provides sufficient protection for minority interests, a method of addressing past crimes, and an impartial outside military force sufficient to control the Burundian military. Such a settlement is unlikely to develop without substantial international pressure and assistance. That assistance, however, should support rather than displace regional African diplomacy. The best scenario, according to Weissman, would be “to combine greater Western and UN support for regional policy choices with greater regional consultation of external powers to gain the benefit of their broad experience and detachment” (p. 6).

In *Angola's Last Best Chance for Peace: An Insider's Account of the Peace Process*, Paul Hare recounts the fragile political and military situation in Angola before and after the Lusaka peace agreement in 1994 and the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation in 1997. The relationship between the MPLA government and the UNITA rebels was characterized by crippling mistrust. Hare, as U.S. special representative for the Angolan peace process from 1993 to 1998, consistently observed “a disjunction between what had been achieved at the formal level and what was actually happening in the countryside” (p. 144).

In every aspect of negotiations and agreements—whether on demobilization of fighters, collection of weapons, control of diamond mines, or extension of government administration—there was reluctance or outright refusal to implement negotiated agreements. Military attacks and partisan propaganda continued, and each step toward progress was followed by some deterioration in the situation. From 1995 to 1997, Hare notes that a cease-fire “basically held” but that there was nonetheless “a nagging sense of incompleteness and of suspension between war and peace” (p. 129).

In reviewing his experience in Angola, Hare draws forth two lessons. First is the importance of a single strong mediator. Hare argues that while regional and other actors contributed to the peace process, the United Nations played the key role. Indeed, the involvement of regional actors in Lusaka made those negotiations more difficult, as it gave the appearance of a separate set of parallel talks. Further, with implementation so different from what was agreed to in negotiations, Hare argues for the importance of maintaining some continuity of personnel from one phase of a peace process to the next. Those directly involved in negotiations will have the benefit of institutional memory and some appreciation of the nuances carried between the lines of formal agreements.

PAUL HARE

*Angola's Last Best Chance for Peace:
An Insider's Account of
the Peace Process*

Washington, D.C.:
United States Institute of Peace Press,
1998



PETER P. EKEH, ED.

Nigerian Federalism

Buffalo, N.Y.:
Association of Nigerian Scholars
for Dialogue, 1997

The Wilberforce Conference on Nigerian Federalism, held in 1997, addressed the decline of federalism in Nigeria under military rule. As recorded in *Nigerian Federalism*, edited by Peter P. Ekeh, participants agreed on the need to revitalize Nigerian federalism and rescue it from the overcentralization instituted by military governments. They complained of the states' loss of autonomy and the general misrule and mismanagement of the military regime. The military has seized funds and appropriated assets and responsibilities that should have been in the hands of the states. The Nigerian police force has also been centralized and politicized. The central authorities have a complete lack of accountability.

Participants noted that for all their ethnic and religious divisions, Nigerians share a desire for a return to genuine federalism and less centralization. Within the conference, there was unanimity on the importance of reestablishing federalism but great division on whether the military should be included or completely excluded in a dialogue toward this end. This became the most contentious issue at the conference. In concluding the conference, participants could generate no consensus on this matter. They did, however, come to two agreements: that the military government should know of the anger and bewilderment it has caused, and that it should be aware that people compare its rule negatively to colonial rule.

**ERNEST UWAZIE,
OLAWALE ALBERT,
AND G. N. UZOIGWE, EDS.**

*Ethnic and Religious Conflict Resolution
in Nigeria*

Sacramento, Calif.:
Center for Africa Peace
and Conflict Resolution,
California State University, 1997

Ethnic and Religious Conflict Resolution in Nigeria, edited by Ernest Uwazie, Olawale Albert, and G. N. Uzoigwe, is a collection of papers presented at another 1997 conference on Nigeria. The most populous nation in sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria is experiencing a rise in internal ethnic and religious conflict. This conference focused on sources of and responses to increasing ethnic and religious riots and other forms of violence in Nigeria since the 1970s.

In some of the twenty-two major riots in the past two decades, particular instigations can be identified. For example, in 1977–78, Muslims were angered that a national debate on the creation of a court of Islamic law resulted in the rejection of that proposal. Later, Christians felt betrayed that the government surreptitiously joined the Organization of Islamic Countries. Religious leaders have also manipulated people's acrimony and intolerance to serve their private ends. The government, for its part, has attributed unrest to foreign agents or local elements trying to make the country ungovernable. Military governments have successively increased centralized authority, eliminating or substantially limiting channels through which people could share their views and discuss differences.

In such a context of heightened tension and fewer means of channeling demands, conference participants did not find the rise of religious riots surprising. As expressed by Iheany M. Enwerem, "that the country witnessed such a high number of religious riots need not be construed to mean that Nigerians are incurably prone to religious intolerance or that



they love their country any less. It simply means that religion became the most handy and meaningful mobilizational tool within the easy reach of the people to express and, if possible, secure their interests” (p. 24).

The protracted conflict in the Sudan has many dimensions; so may attempts at resolving this conflict. In “The Indigenous Peace Process: A Case Study of the Jikany-Lou Nuer Conflict and Its Resolution,” Wal Duany, William O. Lowrey, and Julia Duany examine the role of religion in handling a breach of peace among the Jikany and the Lou. A conference held in Akobo in 1994 and a subsequent peace agreement depended largely on the material resources of religious organizations and on the moral authority of religious leaders and precepts.

During the conference, local religious organizations (both indigenous and Christian) handled logistics and communication. For the four months of negotiations, they also provided food, laundry, and mosquito netting for those sleeping outside. They also provided a “bush telegraph” of travelers delivering messages to distant groups. Religious rituals provided ceremonies and symbols to mark and strengthen the acceptance of final agreements.

Duany, Lowry, and Duany see particular significance in certain aspects of Nuer religious belief that provide a normative basis for Nuer political structures. In particular, they cite the prominence of egalitarianism. Harmony and equality rather than hierarchy are central to the Nuer conception of the world. Analogously, forms of political organization that emphasize hierarchy have been ineffective in this setting. Given Nuer religious commitments, it seems that weak hierarchical ordering, quasi-voluntary compliance, diffusion of self-governing capabilities, and mutually productive relationships are attributes of peace accords that are most apt to succeed in this context.

In *Ethiopia and the Middle East*, Haggai Erlich provides a chronology of Ethiopian history from the seventh century to the present in order to examine the Middle East’s perception of its neighbor, which appears to be both a distant African nation and an “Oriental sister.” In his review of Ethiopian history, Erlich “attempted to shed light on the single most enduring issue of the Middle East—the region’s ability to deal with its own diversity” (p. ix).

As he approaches the twentieth century, Erlich sees in the Middle East an uneasy competition between the legacies of Islam, modern Arabism, Egyptianism, and Zionism. Ethiopia, for its part, has had some movements toward “political modernity” but has not yet had a definitive struggle resulting in political pluralism. While it has received overtures from Middle Eastern states, Ethiopia has not yet become their partner. Erlich sees both promise and danger in their future relations. As he writes, “After

**WAL DUANY,
WILLIAM O. LOWREY,
AND JULIA DUANY**

“The Indigenous Peace Process: A Case Study of the Jikany-Lou Nuer Conflict and Its Resolution”

Workshop in Political Theory
and Policy Analysis,
Indiana University,
Bloomington, Ind.,
June 1997

HAGGAI ERLICH

Ethiopia and the Middle East

Boulder, Colo.:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994



more than fourteen and a half centuries of exclusion one can only hope that the great potential may one day be realized in the economic, cultural, and political spheres for Ethiopia to be a bridge between the worlds of the Middle East and Africa. But the threat from the Middle East is not less than its promise. It comes from the very force that threatens the region's diversity: radical Islam" (p. 186).

**MARCO IMPAGLIAZZO
AND MARIO GIRO**

*"Algeria Held Hostage: The Army and
Islamic Fundamentalism: History of a
Troublesome Encounter"*

1998

Opposition to the military government of Algeria is immensely diverse. It includes Islamists, secularists, nationalists, communists, labor groups, human rights activists, and westernized elites, among others. These categories are further divided into many competing factions. Some are violent terrorists, committed to armed victory. Others favor nonviolence. In "Algeria Held Hostage: The Army and Islamic Fundamentalism: History of a Troublesome Encounter," Marco Impagliazzo and Mario Giro discuss the plethora of groups in opposition to the Algerian government, which has exercised violent repression against them.

Impagliazzo and Giro also discuss the efforts of the Community of St. Egidio to enable some sort of dialogue among these groups and with the government. The fruits of these efforts were two meetings held in Rome in 1994 and 1995. The purpose of the meetings was not to begin negotiations or develop a program but simply for the participants to meet. The Algerian government remained completely opposed to this effort. It sought unsuccessfully to scuttle the meetings, declared them outside interference, and expressed formal complaints to the Italian ambassador. Militant Islamic groups also opposed the meetings. The meetings did go forward, however, and included a remarkable range of participants from the opposition: Berberists, Islamists, nationalists, communists, and human rights activists, among others. The outcome of the meetings was a statement denouncing violence as a means to gain or maintain power and calling for negotiations toward the reestablishment of a democratic political system in Algeria.

9. ASIA

In *Korea and Its Futures: Unification and the Unfinished War*, Roy Richard Grinker sets aside the economic, administrative, and public policy questions that attend the unification of North and South Korea in order to concentrate on the political culture or “conceptual contours” of this event as articulated by South Koreans. Grinker identifies a difficult paradox: While unification is an almost sacred goal to South Koreans, it is also a profound threat.

As Grinker explains, the informing theme of South Korean political culture is homogeneity. For South Koreans, unification with the North is envisioned as assimilation. Division and heterogeneity will cease as the North is absorbed into the South. The flaw in this myth of recoverable homogeneity is the identity of North Koreans. So long as North Koreans have no identity or agency, this story line works. South Korea tends to attribute all agency in North Korea to the state, and has “virtually erased” the people of North Korea from its discussion.

In reality, unification will include many stresses and social costs. Making comparisons to the unification of Germany, Grinker asserts that unification may bring massive unemployment, discrimination, political clashes including revenge attacks, and an overburdened legal system handling land claims and other disputes. If, like Germany, Korea frames unification solely in economic terms, it will fail to prepare for the broader social costs and challenges of unification. South Korea has yet to address the long-term and fundamental issues of social and political integration.

If unification permits a return to an earlier identity of one Korea, it will also rupture the current identity of a divided Korea, in which the South defines itself largely in contrast to the North. As Grinker writes, “a unified Korea . . . threatens much of the only world most Koreans have ever known, a world in which they are a divided people whose paramount goal is to be unified” (p. 47). The question Grinker frames is whether South Korea will be able to abandon the quest of assimilation of the North in favor of some form of integration and appreciation of difference.

Where might a new wave of democracy begin in China? While many observers might expect the answer to be in urban areas, Anne Thurston’s research reveals that it may be getting established in China’s rural villages. In *Muddling toward Democracy: Political Change in Grassroots China*, she clarifies that the push toward democratic elections is not coming from the peasants themselves but rather from central officials. After substantial debate, a critical core of central officials became con-

ROY RICHARD GRINKER

*Korea and Its Futures:
Unification and the Unfinished War*

New York:
St.Martin’s Press,1998

ANNE F. THURSTON

*Muddling toward Democracy:
Political Change in Grassroots China
Peaceworks No.23*

Washington, D.C.:
United States Institute of Peace,
August 1998





vinced “that democratic elections were essential to stability in the countryside and to the preservation of [Communist] party authority” (p. 5).

The village-level elections vary enormously. Thurston’s field research covers a variety of village elections. In some, initial efforts toward democracy coexist with economic development; in others, with economic impoverishment. Some yield democratic participation, others new conduits for patronage. Thurston emphasizes that variation among China’s million villages is very great. No broad generalizations can be made based on information from only a few cases. Reliable data do not yet exist on how widespread or how well run village elections are.

Thurston can, however, identify five factors that may determine how successfully competitive elections can be introduced into Chinese villages. Thurston points out that the most successfully democratic villages are those that have received the greatest attention from higher level officials committed to making village democracy work. Genuinely competitive elections also are more likely in villages characterized by pluralism, where neither economic nor political power is concentrated and where villagers belong to many different associations (religious, social, familial, etc.). A third important factor is training. Village elections can be successfully undertaken only where local officials have received proper training. Elections also need to be seen as a learning process. While the rural villagers may not get it entirely right the first time, they are certainly ready for democracy. And finally, Thurston suggests, foreign cooperation can provide a positive influence on the democratic process.

Thurston suggests a U.S. response consisting of cooperation with the Chinese government, as that is the only way to influence this process. She argues that assistance may help avert the risk of political disturbance and possible violence in this period of change. Thurston also notes that while currently imperfect, these elections are better than none. Eventually, higher level officials may also be elected.

NGOs are interested in contributing to the establishment of democratic elections at the village level. Thurston identifies several potential tasks for NGOs: identifying reform-minded leaders at the provincial and local levels, tailoring training programs in local-level governance and election procedures, and funding collaborative policy-oriented research into the problems facing rural Chinese. With over a million rural villages in China, Thurston sees no danger of overlapping efforts.



China's emergence as a prominent world power may be problematic. In *The China Challenge in the Twenty-First Century: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy*, Chen Jian asserts that this "should be defined as a 'China challenge,' with which *both* the Chinese people and the rest of the world must cope through mutual understanding and cooperation, rather than a China *threat*, against which the rest of the world must form a strategy in a well-planned collective effort" (p. 3, emphasis in original).

Chen argues that reforms may bring economic prosperity, social stability, and democracy to China. China will then be able to become a fully integrated member of the international community, apt to observe a broader range of international legal norms and regulations. If, however, the reforms fail and China disintegrates, it will be too weak to pose a threat. Then, Chen asserts, there will be an entirely different type of "China threat": the country's nuclear arsenal out of strict control, the collapse of its environmental protection efforts, the mass out-migration of millions of Chinese.

Preventing this scenario is in the best interest of the rest of the world. Therefore, according to Chen, the United States should follow long-term and consistent policies that will facilitate the success of reforms in China.

Relations Across the Taiwan Strait: Perspectives from Mainland China and Taiwan incorporates two essays on relations between China and Taiwan. In "The Taiwan Strait Crisis: Causes, Scenarios and Solution," Chen Qimao of the Shanghai Institute for International Studies discusses Taipei's efforts to gain state recognition and membership in the United Nations. This includes its "vacation policy," with the president "from Taiwan" visiting foreign heads of state while ostensibly on vacation. China's actions in response have included blocking Taiwan's attendance at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation ministerial meetings and at the Asian Games. The most recent tense period was in March 1996, when China conducted military exercises and missile tests quite near Taiwan while Taiwan conducted presidential elections.

These crises do not occur, Chen asserts, because of differences in ideology or in social or political systems. Indeed, trade and cultural exchanges have been increasing. Rather, the dispute between China and Taiwan concerns the international arena. Taipei wants international recognition and the continued separation of "two Chinas." Beijing insists upon reunification and wants "one country, two systems," in which Taiwan would become part of China while maintaining its capitalist market and exercising autonomy in certain areas.

According to Chen, "Peaceful reunification of China is the sacred mission of the Chinese nation" (p. 29). In his view, both sides need to make some concessions for this mission to become reality. Chen suggests that China consider ways to fulfill Taipei's desire for some form of international recognition.

CHEN JIAN

The China Challenge in the Twenty-First Century: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy
Peaceworks No.21

Washington, D.C.:
United States Institute of Peace,
June 1998

CHEN QIMAO AND YUNG WEI

Relations Across the Taiwan Strait: Perspectives from Mainland China and Taiwan

Washington, D.C.:
Atlantic Council of the United States,
1998



Yung Wei of the Vanguard Institute for Policy Studies in Taiwan offers additional suggestions in “The Taiwan Strait Crisis: Taipei-Washington-Beijing Relations.” Following the March 1996 episode of China’s military exercises during Taiwan’s presidential election, Yung sees a new potential for this dispute to become a violent conflict. Avoiding that possibility may require concessions from both sides. Yung suggests that Beijing try to find a middle position between its “one country, two systems” policy and Taipei’s commitment to “one nation, two entities.” Taipei, for its part, should cease to make formal UN membership its highest priority and pursue other practical forms of inclusion in the international community, such as joining the World Trade Organization; strengthening bilateral ties with many nations; and joining international organizations of a cultural, educational, or scientific nature.

Yung also draws attention to the possibility that China’s strong stance against Taipei’s UN membership may be not only a response to Taipei’s initiatives but also a gesture directed toward an internal audience, specifically the People’s Liberation Army. The Army’s dissatisfaction with the military budget and with its reduced role in the power structure since the Tiananmen incident may have been assuaged by the bold military exercises in March 1996.

HUANG YASHENG

*FDI in China:
An Asian Perspective*

Hong Kong:
Chinese University Press, 1999

Foreign direct investment (FDI) in China is quite high, relative to East and Southeast Asia. This is considered to be a result of a large wage gap, with labor in China cheaper than in the rest of Asia, and China’s rapid growth and large potential domestic market. In *FDI in China: An Asian Perspective*, Huang Yasheng argues that these explanations are insufficient to explain the degree of FDI in China. He posits two other important factors. One is policy: China’s policies of encouraging or discouraging FDI have had an impact on investment flows. Huang also points to China’s economic institutional ties—in the form of joint endeavors, technology transfers, and banking—as another factor affecting FDI.

Regarding this last factor, Huang sees U.S. emphasis on the bilateral trade deficit with China as misleading. Huang suggests that because of economic institutional ties, the whole of Asia should be seen as one region, and particular countries should not be singled out for measurement of bilateral trade. As an example, the United States is selling to Hong Kong, Hong Kong is selling to China, and China is selling to the United States. Looking at the entire loop presents a picture of balanced trade; examining the U.S.-China trade relationship in isolation distorts the picture. “In effect,” writes Huang, “Hong Kong operates as a trading corporation that contracts out production units in China—through the provision of product design and materials—and purchases and distributes the finished goods worldwide” (p. 79). Similarly, labor-intensive goods previously bought from Korea, Taiwan, and other Southeast Asian countries are now increasingly produced in and purchased from China.



While the U.S. trade deficit with China has grown, the U.S. trade relationship with the Asian region has remained steady. Huang urges the United States to keep the regional picture in mind and not misinterpret the figures of its trading relationship with China.

“The coup d’etat of July 5–6, 1997, finally brought home to a largely unsuspecting world the failure—or at the very least the failings—of the Cambodian peace process, long promoted as the most ambitious and successful of the various post–Cold War attempts to settle protracted civil conflicts” (p. 49). This is the assessment of David W. Ashley, one of the contributors to *Cambodia and the International Community: The Quest for Peace, Development, and Democracy*, edited by Frederick Z. Brown and David G. Timberman. The essays collected in this volume seek to understand what went wrong with the multiyear, multi-billion-dollar UN Transitional Administration in Cambodia (UNTAC).

Unrealistic assumptions on the part of the international community played a part. Total faith was put into the electoral process as the key mechanism for solving the problems of Cambodia’s conflicted society. Other aspects of UNTAC were subordinated to the central objective of creating a legitimized government through the electoral process. As Cambodia’s political elite had not accepted the need for political coexistence, and as the results of elections did not correspond with who actually held power, they were mostly ineffective in inculcating democratic norms and behavior.

A second faulty assumption was that power-sharing could work in Cambodia’s highly conflictual and zero-sum politics. The result was not genuine sharing of power but rather a false political accommodation, the creation of parallel governments, the crippling of decisionmaking, and an increase in bureaucracy, corruption, and politicization of the military. Power-sharing can’t succeed where political elites are not committed to it.

A final failing of the international effort to help Cambodia was the assumption that political development would follow naturally from economic development, and therefore all effort should go there. Once the elections were held, at enormous expense, further investment in political development stopped. Funds for economic reconstruction flowed, regardless of government performance. Multilateral aid should have been contingent upon such achievements as bureaucratic reform, reduction of the army, or cessation of timber cutting.

Cambodia has and continues to face a daunting agenda of reconciliation, reintegration of refugees, and postcommunist transition to a market economy. If not a success, UNTAC did make some contributions to helping Cambodia handle these challenges. In Michael Doyle’s assessment in his contribution to this volume, “UNTAC achieved many successes, but it also missed some significant opportunities to reform and assist the Cambodian state” (p. 87).

**FREDERICK Z. BROWN
AND DAVID G. TIMBERMAN, EDs.**

*Cambodia and the International
Community: The Quest for Peace,
Development, and Democracy*

New York:
Asia Society, 1998

10. LATIN AMERICA

CYNTHIA McCLINTOCK

*Revolutionary Movements
in Latin America:
El Salvador's FMLN and
Peru's Shining Path*

Washington, D.C.:
United States Institute of Peace Press,
1998

In *Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador's FMLN and Peru's Shining Path*, Cynthia McClintock defends a startling thesis. With the end of the Cold War, she argues, revolutionary movements in Latin America are not apt to disappear, and the United States should adjust its policies accordingly. McClintock pursues this thesis through a comparison of revolutionary movements in El Salvador and Peru in the recent past.

According to standard theory during the Cold War, exclusionary authoritarian regimes were the key variable in the emergence of revolutionary movements. This pattern is neatly exemplified by the situation in El Salvador. It is contradicted, however, by the pattern in Peru, which was holding free and fair elections involving a full range of political parties during the very period that the Shining Path revolutionary movement established itself. In this case, McClintock sees two other key factors: an economic debacle so severe that it threatened the subsistence of many citizens; and the shrewd, savage, almost faith-based revolutionary organization of the Shining Path. McClintock's point is not that this is the new revolutionary formula to expect in the post-Cold War era, but rather that the interplay of various factors cannot be projected based on Cold War history and patterns. "At the threshold of the twenty-first century," she writes, ". . . revolutionary conflict of the kind that emerged during the Cold War is over; revolutionary conflict is not" (p. 299).

How should the United States adapt its policies toward the new situation? As each revolutionary movement will be different, each policy response will have to be attentive to the particular case. McClintock sees two broad areas where U.S. support would help prevent the emergence of future revolutionary movements. In economics, the United States (and the international community) should do more to ease the transition to free-market economies, including supporting progressive taxation, microenterprise development, enhanced education, improved infrastructure, and property titling projects. Efforts to address regional inequality within nations are also important. Short-term emergency food aid should be available, and the international financial institutions should do more to prioritize poverty alleviation, along the lines of social sector lending by the InterAmerican Development Bank.

A second policy area where U.S. support would be helpful is the strengthening of democracy. Too often the holding of elections is seen by U.S. officials, journalists, and scholars as conferring instant democratic status, but elections are often not perceived as free and fair by the populace. Even when they are, they "may enable the circulation of elites, but not their displacement" (p. 301). McClintock argues that U.S. policies should be doing more to help Latin American democracies become more





robust, effective, and legitimate. Areas to be addressed would include the redefinition of the role of the military and the enhancement of civilian political institutions, such as the judiciary, legislature, political parties, unions, and media.

In “La Transformacion de la Seguridad Publica: Resistencias, Dificultades y Desafios: Naciones Unidas y la Creacion de la Policia Nacional Civil en El Salvador, 1990–1997,” Gino Costa takes a hard look at police reform in Latin America, using the case of El Salvador as the base from which to draw four lessons applicable to other contexts. Under authoritarian regimes, public security is militarized and police tend to become instruments of political repression, subjecting the civilian population to abusive and arbitrary practices. The first lesson in undertaking police reform is to appreciate the depth of this pattern and realize that simply putting the police under official civilian control will not undo the failings of the police.

The second lesson is to do a very thorough assessment of the reforms that are needed. These will include changes in police doctrine as well as structure of police organizations and chain of command. Demobilization of past police and training of new recruits must also be addressed. The period of transition should be handled carefully.

A third lesson that Costa discusses is realizing that police reform is fundamentally political reform. It will no doubt confront serious resistance from vested interests. Preparing for police reform therefore requires building a broad consensus behind the reform and ample citizen support for it.

Finally, Costa calls for international support for police reform, including technical advice, instructors, financing, and political and diplomatic support. International financial institutions and donor nations should recognize that police reform has several benefits. It enhances citizen security, which is an ingredient of development. It also is one means of attacking corruption and providing for the more efficient use of public funds.

Police forces are formed by historical processes and interact with their political contexts, observes Hugo Fruhling in “Reforma Policial y Consolidacion Democratica en Chile.” They become part of and are affected by larger political changes. During democratic periods, they tend to emphasize public service. In authoritarian periods, they become more repressive. In the authoritarian 1930s in Chile, the police were guilty of arbitrary and abusive practices. During subsequent democratic administrations before the 1973 coup, police continued some repressive practices, including repression of labor, but also became involved in community policing and literacy campaigns. Under General Pinochet’s dictatorship,

GINO COSTA

“La Transformacion de la Seguridad Publica: Resistencias, Dificultades y Desafios: Naciones Unidas y la Creacion de la Policia Nacional Civil en El Salvador, 1990–1997”

Lima, Peru, 1998

HUGO E. FRUHLING

“Reforma Policial y Consolidacion Democratica en Chile”

1997



the pendulum swung back toward greater repression. The police in that period also advanced their institutional autonomy.

With the return to democracy in Chile, the police are again facing pressure to become public servants. Because of their institutional autonomy, however, they have successfully fought attempts to move them from the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of the Interior. Municipal governments have not succeeded in gaining formal control over the police. Local governments have, however, devised ways to influence the police by offering additional funds, vehicles, and other resources to the police. While the police still report to the Ministry of Defense, municipal governments have gained some power over the police through the disbursement of funds. This has increased the accountability of police to local governments, even when the formal lines of authority continue to bypass local officials.

ADAM ISACSON

*Altered States:
Security and Demilitarization
in Central America*

Washington, D.C.:
Center for International Policy
and the Arias Foundation for Peace
and Human Progress, 1997

Peace and democratization have come to the seven nations of Central America. Public security belongs under civilian control. Border conflicts and territorial claims are minimal and can be handled diplomatically. No existing security threat demands a military response. This moment therefore holds an opportunity for historic change, argues Adam Isacson in *Altered States: Security and Demilitarization in Central America*. According to Isacson, it is time for Central American militaries to be significantly reduced or abolished.

However, these armies are disproportionately strong in a region of impoverished democracies. The numbers of troops and size of budgets of Central American armed forces have decreased in recent years but remain above their pre-1980 levels. In Isacson's view, continuing fear of the military inhibits the exercise of democracy and restricts political discourse. As militaries increase their holdings in the private sector, they become more independent from civilian authority over budgets. And there are links between armed forces and crime, drug trafficking, and corruption.

Isacson argues that Central American militaries should have no internal security role. Any threat of external aggression could be handled through collective security arrangements. Provision should be made for demobilized soldiers. Effective civilian police forces should be established with attention to structures, doctrines, and training distinct from that of militaries. Particularly important are a thorough grounding in respect for human rights, the presence of internal monitoring bodies, and an ethic of community service and public trust. Isacson proposes that the United States, long the patron of Central American militaries, should back such reforms rather than encourage the expansion of these militaries into policing drug trafficking. Isacson also suggests that Central America be seen by the international community as a laboratory for peacebuilding and democratization initiatives. Reduction or elimination of armed forces and construction of effective civilian police forces are reforms that could



be replicated in other countries emerging from authoritarian rule or civil war.

In *Militarization and Demilitarization in El Salvador's Transition to Democracy*, Philip J. Williams and Knut Walter consider the obstacles to democratization in El Salvador that follow from the immense role the military has played in the country's political past. Given the extent and nature of that role, Williams and Walter argue that specific benchmarks of demilitarization are insufficient to truly transform the position of the armed forces in El Salvador.

From the 1930s through the 1992 peace accords, the military in El Salvador at times directly controlled the central government and also attained an enormous degree of institutional autonomy and an extensive network of social control in rural areas. While the 1992 peace accords made progress toward circumscribing the military's prerogatives, Williams and Walter assert that they did not go far enough. For example, the accords did not address the military's administration of several state institutions and regulatory bodies, including the offices that oversee telecommunications, land and transport, port authority, water and aqueducts, statistics and census, customs, civil aeronautics, and the postal service. The military also remains heavily involved in national development and reconstruction projects—work that could be channeled through the civilian government. The military's large reserve system gives it a continued significant presence in the countryside. The accords also do not touch on the process of internal promotions within the military, and while they make it "possible" for a civilian to be minister of defense, they do not make it mandatory. Thus, according to Williams and Walter, "although the accords laid the groundwork for a significant reduction of the military's prerogatives, they did not go far enough in ensuring civilian supremacy over the armed forces. The military's realm of political action was greatly circumscribed, but it retained much of its autonomy intact" (p. 169).

Chetan Kumar's *Building Peace in Haiti* discusses repression and impoverishment on this island nation, with attention to the sometimes perverse role played by the international community. In the aftermath or on the verge of any conflict, the challenge is not to define a basket of goods or activities to be undertaken to build peace but rather to initiate a self-sustaining process that can preempt violent conflict. Rehabilitating basic infrastructure or providing basic amenities may gain international support, but they will not necessarily lead to a durable peace in Haiti.

As Kumar sees it, Haitians are engaged in an effort to construct a lasting polity and economy for themselves. "Into this struggle," he writes,

**PHILIP J. WILLIAMS
AND KNUT WALTER**

*Militarization and Demilitarization in
El Salvador's Transition to Democracy*

Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997

CHETAN KUMAR

Building Peace in Haiti

Occasional Paper Series, International
Peace Academy. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 1998



“the international community has brought its own understanding of a functioning Haitian state . . . as one that is constituted through direct elections and favors a free-market economy. . . . Since the international community has vigorously pushed this understanding of the state against contending understandings, it has become a participant in the struggle to define the Haitian state” (p. 32). Kumar’s point is not that Haitians would necessarily oppose elections and a free market, but that they have not yet been involved in the process. The international community’s perennial search for exit strategies and quick fixes—particularly in the form of elections—can reinforce political polarization and electoral populism but cannot achieve reconciliation and power-sharing.

What Haiti needs, in Kumar’s view, is a new social pact built on substantive dialogue that includes all sectors and political tendencies. This might take the form of a coalition of progressive elites and popular organizations. Kumar cites the examples of the African National Congress in South Africa and the Indian National Congress guiding their nations through crucial moments as they emerged from periods of domination. Opportunities to build such a coalition in Haiti have been violently destroyed. But this approach, argues Kumar, would go much farther toward “creating the civic culture required for democracy than any short-term doctrinaire insistence by the international community on the structural forms of democracy” (p. 78).

BETH A. SIMMONS

*Territorial Disputes
and Their Resolution:
The Case of Ecuador and Peru
Peaceworks No.27*

Washington, D.C.:
United States Institute of Peace,
April 1999

Of several longstanding territorial disputes in Latin America over the past half-century, that between Peru and Ecuador was the only one in which deadly conflict had repeatedly occurred. Beth Simmons turns her attention to this case in *Territorial Disputes and Their Resolution: The Case of Ecuador and Peru*. In 1998 all factors appeared to point to a resolution of this conflict, from which both nations would gain. A solution would save the direct human costs of the violence, end the diversion of resources from social development to military uses, and expand opportunities for trade and economic integration. Indeed, on October 28, 1998, despite the obstacles to settlement that existed in the domestic politics of each nation, President Jamil Mahuad of Ecuador and President Alberto Fujimori of Peru initialed the Brasilia Presidential Act resolving the remaining impasses to their countries’ border dispute.

Simmons notes that several factors contributed to the favorable prospects for a settlement of the Peruvian-Ecuadoran border dispute: commitment by the political leadership in both countries, a change in popular attitudes in both countries, and the role played by the four “guarantor” nation-states (the United States, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile) under the 1942 Rio Protocol. Under the Rio Protocol, the “guarantors” are legally obliged to mediate such disputes as that between Ecuador and Peru. While they have no power to render a legally binding decision, the four guarantor nations made suggestions and conciliatory recommenda-



tions on the path to peace. Contrary to the view that international law is ineffective in the absence of a supranational court, Simmons finds that border disputes in the Western Hemisphere have been markedly responsive to formal and quasi-legal processes, such as adjudication and arbitration. She nonetheless cautions that the circumstances that led to success in the Ecuador-Peru case may be difficult to replicate in other disputes.

The essays collected in *The Post-NAFTA Political Economy: Mexico and the Western Hemisphere*, edited by Carol Wise, explore the impact of NAFTA on Mexico and the reasons why momentum toward the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) has largely ceased.

The track record of NAFTA in Mexico has different components. NAFTA has triggered growth and productivity gains in the globalized sectors of the Mexican economy. But adjustment costs (job displacement, wage compression, haphazard restructuring of small and medium-size firms) have been very harsh on the population at large. Data also indicate an increasing polarization of income distribution and asset holding over the past decade, in both urban-industrial and rural-agricultural sectors.

These economic results alone neither compel or obstruct progress on FTAA. They tend to be overshadowed by news of Mexico's political and social problems: drug trafficking, money laundering, violent guerrilla insurgencies, violent repression of insurgencies, political assassinations, kidnappings, illegal migration, and so on. "While most of the economic news related to NAFTA has been good," writes Wise, "it is the continuous flow of bad political news that has dominated the debate over the expansion of hemispheric trade in the United States" (p. 32). In this context, swift progress toward FTAA is unlikely.

What are the sources of violence or nonviolence in human society? Through their research on the Waorani of Amazonian Ecuador, Clayton Robarchek and Carole Robarchek have come to discard material or sociobiological explanations and to focus instead on culture. As reported in *Waorani: The Contexts of Violence and War*, this indigenous group has been one of the most violent societies known, with homicide accounting for over 60 percent of deaths.

The Robarcheks trace the sources and meanings of this violence through Waorani culture, which sees the world as largely under human control. Human beings are understood to be capable, effective, autonomous, and self-reliant, possessed of adequate knowledge and technology. Society is simple and egalitarian. Since the world is under human control, any misfortune is the result of deliberate human actions. That misfortune is understood as an infringement on one's autonomy. With no social institutions or mechanisms for dispute resolution, or any hierarchy of authority to enforce peace, the infringement of one's autonomy creates

CAROL WISE, ED.

*The Post-NAFTA Political Economy:
Mexico and the Western Hemisphere*

University Park, Pa.:
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998

**CLAYTON ROBARCHEK
AND CAROLE ROBARCHEK**

*Waorani:
The Contexts of Violence and War*

Fort Worth, Tex.:
Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1998.



a sense of helplessness and powerlessness. This generates rage great enough to compel homicide. Wielding poisoned spears and committing homicide restores a sense of autonomy and control. It also elicits blood vengeance and the constant fear of retaliatory attacks. This is the cultural framework within which the Waorani gained the distinction of one of the most violent societies on earth.

Periodic attempts by Protestant missionaries or other outsiders to contact the Waorani resulted in the murder of these outsiders. On occasion Waorani individuals would flee the area, seeking to escape violent retaliations of homicidal cycles. In the 1950s, two Waorani women had fled independently and lived for a time in a Quichua settlement. They saw for themselves the tools, medicines, and other goods available there and came in contact with two female missionaries. The two Waorani returned to their village and the missionaries came with them—in less danger because they accompanied the Waorani. The missionaries introduced what was adopted as a rather shallow version of Christianity—a few Bible stories and a belief in a God who deplores killing.

In their different ways, these four women introduced alternatives to the Waorani's cultural construction of reality. As the Robarcheks write, “[The returning Waorani women], having experienced a different world, were able to imagine alternatives, to envision new options, and to communicate these to their relatives in terms they could understand. What they provided was new cultural knowledge—new information and new perceptions of reality—that allowed a reorganization of both cultural and individual schemata” (pp. 156–157). Within a matter of months, the homicidal cycles that had gone on for generations were abandoned and remained abandoned for decades.

The Robarcheks emphasize that this transformation occurred in the absence of any other substantive changes, either within or outside Waorani society. “They were not conquered, the ecological situation had not been altered, the subsistence system had not changed, nor were there other significant changes in the material context and content of their lives. All that had changed was the information that was available to them” (pp. 157–158). Other factors were also involved: the short supply of potential spouses (sharply constricted by family vendettas) and the availability of a range of goods, tools, and medicines through contact with outsiders. But the Waorani “conscious social will” was what the Robarcheks see as paramount: “the *decision* to abandon warfare was primary, the *sine qua non* for everything that followed” (p. 158, emphasis in original). The Waorani were ready to rid themselves of the violence and constant fear. The alternatives introduced by the returning Waorani individuals and the missionaries enabled them to envision new formulations of autonomy and effectiveness.

This is not the end of the story. The area of Amazonian Ecuador where the Waorani reside is in great flux. Already having made vast changes in their behavior, the Waorani now are having to rapidly devise ways to



interact with a great many new actors: oil companies, settlers, government officials, environmentalists, and other missionaries. This may generate new patterns of violence, and indeed homicides have increased, although committed primarily against outsiders rather than other Waorani. While the nature of future interactions cannot be foreseen, the recent past demonstrates that a self-perpetuating culture of violence can be brought to an end.

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