Simulation on
Colombia: The U.S. Response to the Changing
Nature of International Conflict

This simulation provides participants with a profound understanding of the political agendas, options, and dynamics at play within the U.S. foreign policy apparatus when prospects of foreign intervention by the U.S. military are under consideration. Participants grapple with a scenario of increasing political and economic crisis in Colombia, and debate the decisions that U.S. policy-makers must consider in defining an appropriate American response to help bring stability to that country. Simulation participants role-play officials from the Executive and Legislative branches of the U.S. Government, members of human rights organizations, and journalists representing various U.S. media. In representing their particular positions in these challenging negotiations, participants will have ample opportunity to consider the broader implications of the scenario on U.S. foreign policy and international conflict in general.
Simulation on Colombia:  
The U.S. Response to the Changing Nature of International Conflict

Table of Contents

Introduction ...................................................................................... 4
Materials ............................................................................................ 5
Scenario ............................................................................................ 6
Background ...................................................................................... 8
  Presidential Letter .......................................................................................... 8
  Patterns in U.S. Foreign Policy ................................................................. 9
  U.S. Foreign Policy in Colombia ............................................................. 12
  Colombia:  Past and Present .................................................................... 18
    Colombia’s History after Independence .............................................. 18
    The Indigenous Peoples of Colombia .................................................... 19
    Colombian Revolutionary Movements and Guerrilla Groups .............. 20
    The Monroe Doctrine ............................................................................. 23
Roles ................................................................................................ 25
  Executive Committee Roles ...................................................................... 26
    Vice-President.......................................................................................... 27
    National Security Advisor ..................................................................... 28
    Secretary of the Treasury ...................................................................... 29
    Director of Central Intelligence Agency ............................................... 30
    Secretary of Defense ............................................................................ 31
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff .................................................. 32
    Secretary of State ............................................................................... 33
    Attorney General................................................................................ 34
    U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations ............................................. 35
Legislative Committee Roles ...................................................................... 36
  Senate Foreign Relations Chair .............................................................. 37
  Senate Foreign Relations Ranking Member ........................................... 38
  House Appropriations Committee Chair .............................................. 39
  House Appropriations Committee Ranking Member ............................ 40
  Senate Majority Leader .......................................................................... 41
  Senate Minority Leader .......................................................................... 42
  House Majority Leader ........................................................................... 43
  House Minority Leader .......................................................................... 44
  Senate Arms Services Chair .................................................................... 45
Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Roles ........................................... 46
  Representative of Demilitarization for Democracy (DFD) ...................... 47
  Human Rights Watch Lobbyist ............................................................. 48
Introduction

The simulation role-players are to be divided into two sub-groups which should meet in separate rooms. One sub-group will be an “executive” committee and the other a “legislative” committee. Floating between these two sub-groups will be students playing members of the media.

Each person in the simulation will play a role in which he or she helps define US foreign policy objectives and helps shape a policy for the situation in Colombia. The executive committee members are tasked with the US government’s response to events in Colombia and determine American foreign policy objectives. Legislative members oversee the executive branch’s actions and policies and strive to influence the American response. The media representatives will be able to influence foreign policy by informing the public of events and decisions in the United States and Colombia. The media will conduct interviews, monitor the progress of each committee, report on information heard in the committees, and report on information from around the US and the world. At the same time, policymakers and legislators can use the media by issuing press releases, holding press conferences, and providing the media with information and opinions.

Participants will be given instructional materials covering the situation in Colombia, the specific scenario in which each will act according to his or her assigned role, and descriptions of all the players in the simulation. Individualized sets of guidelines or suggested strategies written for particular roles will also be distributed.

Each participant is asked to assume the identity of someone involved in the decision-making process of the US government. Players must try to act as they think their roles would, given the circumstances of the simulation scenario. All the roles are hypothetical. Participants should try to stay true to the roles they have been assigned.

At the end of the simulation, there will be a debriefing to give participants an opportunity to reflect upon what transpired during the simulation and what they have learned. This provides an occasion to analyze the actions and arguments of your colleagues and discuss the consequences and implications of what happened. In addition, the debriefing is a time to think about and discuss how the simulation was related to their broader knowledge of the subject matter as well as general theories and propositions participants may hold about such topics as US foreign policy, conflict resolution, international relations, or the influence of domestic politics and the media.
Materials

Each participant should receive the following materials:

- The Scenario and Background Documents (pages 6 – 24.)
- A simulation role

Teachers may wish to provide the following items for this simulation:

- A classroom or conference room and sufficient breakout rooms or additional space for any needed teamwork
- An overhead projector or multimedia data projector and an overhead screen.
- Flip charts (one per team) and flip chart paper (or white boards) and markers
- 1 pad and pen per student
- Several computers with printers
- Internet access for additional research or access to a library.
Scenario

It is the summer of 2001. The Republican Party controls the White House and the House of Representatives. Democrats control the Senate. There have been two major foreign policy issues in the news: the flow of drugs from South America and the responsibility of the US in responding to international conflicts. For years, the Clinton Administration attempted to aid President Pastrana in the drug war in Colombia, but to no avail. All the while, drugs continued to flow into the United States. Along with the threat that drugs pose to US citizens, international illicit drug trafficking will increasingly threaten the stability of some governments by providing immense sources of revenue to organized criminal elements worldwide and to coincident insurgent and terrorist groups. The trafficking-induced climate of violence and corruption in these countries will inhibit normal economic, social, and political development, exacerbating instability over time.

The illicit drug trade will adversely affect legal economies by inducing people to work for illegal enterprise rather than for legitimate business. Drug-related corruption will exercise a corrosive influence on the stability of democratic government, as it has in Colombia and in Mexico. Additionally, traffickers and drug-funded insurgents/terrorists in some nations will threaten US citizens working for international businesses and US official personnel supporting highly visible counter-drug efforts, particularly in the Andean cocaine source zone and, increasingly, in some other significant drug trafficking zones such as Southwest Asia and portions of the Middle East. The possibility of the rise of more powerful criminal cartels, supported in some measure by drug-trade profits, must be considered a threat to vital US interests.

In addition to the problems with drugs, Colombia has been beset for decades by challenges from revolutionary groups, some of which are linked to drug cartels. One such group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces in Colombia (FARC) is calling for unity among all revolutionary forces in order to resist US intrusion into Colombian affairs. The call for unity is directed at the rival National Liberation Front (ELN). The ELN and FARC have been divided for many years over operational and doctrinal issues. They have also been divided by the fact that FARC has become closely tied to Colombian drug cartels, serving as security forces for growing, processing, and transportation operations. ELN, on the other hand, has been relatively more active against more conventional revolutionary targets, and has been particularly effective in hindering the efforts of oil companies such as BP and Occidental to develop oil fields and build pipelines.

There are two important implications of this call for unity. First, the conflict between the guerrillas and the government has been intensifying in recent months. FARC has scored some major successes against government troops, in one recent incident decimating the government’s 3rd Mobile Brigade at El Billar in Caqueta Department. The ELN, on the other hand, suffered a major loss with the death of its commander, Miguel Hernandez, apparently from hepatitis. The loss of Hernandez, a former priest and relative moderate, has created a power vacuum in the ELN leadership. By most accounts, Cristobal Rodriguez, who is expected to take ELN on a much more militant course, is filling this vacuum. Were FARC and ELN to combine, it is not at all clear that the Bogotá government could defeat the guerrillas.

This leads to the second important point. The United States currently deploys 200 publicly acknowledged military advisers in Colombia, whose purpose is to help direct the Colombian government’s counter-narcotics program. Since FARC is deeply involved with the drug lords, it follows that these advisers are advising Colombian operations against FARC. These operations have not been going well. The United States is clearly facing a crucial strategic decision. The current level of deployment is insufficient to stabilize the situation and roll back the guerrillas as well as challenge the drug cartels. The United States must either dramatically increase its forces in Colombia, moving from an advisory to an operational role, or it must accept its inability to
control events inside of Colombia and establish a cordon sanitaire around the country in order to block drug shipments.

As important as FARC’s call for unity is, FARC’s open declaration of war on the United States is even more important. Late last month, FARC kidnapped several American citizens who were on a bird watching expedition near Bogotá. FARC continues to hold several of the Americans and there are reports that they have been moved to a holding area in the south where a large number of government POWs are being held. FARC is clearly feeling good about its capabilities following its military successes and reports out of the Pentagon indicate that the US government is unsure that Colombian government forces can defeat the guerrillas. Thus, by simultaneously proposing unity talks with the ELN and openly challenging the United States, FARC is throwing down the gauntlet to the US.

Traditional distinctions between drug interdiction and political counter-insurgency have little meaning in Colombia, and will have even less if ELN joins with FARC. The US strategy of resisting the drug lords but avoiding involvement in political conflict has become untenable. The guerrillas, well-financed from their work as mercenaries for the cartels, are clearly a match for the Colombian Army. A withdrawal of advisors at this point might well bring down the Bogotá government. Moreover, establishing a blockade of Colombia would be an air-land-sea operation of enormous proportions. On the other hand, remaining in Colombia at the current level is an invitation to disaster, as it is only a matter of time before FARC decides to engage American forces directly, on their terms and in their own time frame. Increasing US forces modestly will not begin to address the problem, and the introduction of a brigade or divisional level forces would neither guarantee victory, nor provide a national security benefit proportional to force levels.
Background

Presidential Letter

In the changing landscape of global affairs, the decisions we make on America’s role in the current world order are fundamental to our future national stability and strength. The 20th century presented challenges and dilemmas that Americans had never previously faced including the threat of nuclear weapons, acts of genocide across the planet, and the tremendous increase in the number of civilian victims of war (about 90% by the century’s end). On the other hand, we have witnessed greater economic prosperity in almost all corners of the globe, the spread of democracy, and efforts to institutionalize human rights. The 21st century promises to be just as challenging.

I am gathering a group of my key advisors to confront these challenges responsibly and knowledgeably. We will meet in June to discuss the civil unrest in Colombia. Rising tensions and increasingly difficult policy dilemmas have made dealing with Colombia a source of conflict within my own administration. As you know, the guerilla warfare in Colombia and the implications such unrest has for the drug trade and Latin American relations have been of great concern for foreign policymakers. It is time to approach the topic with the full attention it deserves, and to formulate a comprehensive policy outlining a broader strategy and set of priorities about how the administration should address such issues.

Democratic principles elsewhere, as well as in Colombia, are integral to our understanding of America’s identity, as well as its role in the international system. We are in a prime position to encourage the development of democratic institutions in other nations, without resorting to the tactics of the Cold War. We have seen in the 20th century that democracy works, and we should be ready to assist those nation-states that are struggling for a representative government in the same way that we did over two hundred years ago. It has become apparent that one of the best ways to foster such democratic institutions is through our extensive economic influence in the world. By spreading and encouraging recognition of the free market system and trade liberalization, we will create an environment in which democratic principles will flourish. This will also allow us to safeguard our own economic interests while we are in the position to do so. I am certainly concerned about the different aspects of the crisis in Colombia, but our priority right now should be to consider what is in the best interests of the American people and democracy at large.

The drug industry in Latin America has been draining American capital and resources for decades. The conflict in Colombia makes that process even more dangerous and volatile. The United States is in a position to be a powerful economic presence in Central and South America. We should take this opportunity to protect our influence and position within the American region, not only for economic reasons, but also for the national security of the region below our southern border. American relations with Latin American states have had varying degrees of amicability. The war in Colombia has continuously raised concerns for Latin America and the United States in the 21st century. The situation requires clarity of thought, definition of goals and priorities, and vision for the needs of America’s future. I thank you in advance for joining me in the endeavor to preserve America’s future, and to extend assistance to a nation that is struggling for its own democratic institutions and liberties.

Sincerely,

Katherine B. Dirks
President of the United States of America
Patterns in U.S. Foreign Policy

Before addressing the particular challenges faced in Colombia, it is important to keep in mind certain elements and patterns in the making of U.S. foreign policy, especially in response to international conflict. In the turbulence of the post-Cold War world, American security policy has become difficult to characterize. As it attempts to respond to the changing nature of international relations, the United States has often responded to various events in world politics in dramatically different ways. This variance is partly a result of the challenges facing the American government: the demands placed on the makers of foreign policy are not only very complicated, but frequently contradictory as well. Determining how to prioritize the interests of the United States when responding to international conflict is certainly one of the more intricate and fascinating aspects of an administration's policy. Such interests and factors may include such varying issues as:

- National security
- Regional stability
- Commitment to international law and treaties
- Humanitarian intervention
- The protection of basic human rights
- Domestic political pressures
- U.S. economic interests
- The individual personalities and interests of lawmakers and executives

Combining these elements into one formula for the U.S. response to international conflict is nearly impossible, but examining them holistically does provide a valuable foundation for understanding our general approach to our role in international affairs.

A fundamental aspect of U.S. foreign policy is determining when American forces will intervene in international conflict. U.S. and international policymakers for decades have long faced questions of intervention, especially since the creation of the United Nations in 1945, which attempted to formalize certain norms within and obligations to the international system. The existence of these norms and obligations, however, do not prescribe what is the proper reaction to conflicts between other nations. Additionally, this has become more complicated in the past decade because of the great rise of intra-state conflicts and civil wars where questions of outside intervention often conflict with the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states. In the case of a military conflict, for example, one cannot consider only international law or humanitarian aid. If a nation's own soldiers are to be engaged in a conflict, issues of national security and domestic politics instantly materialize as priority factors in the decision. And since policies and policymakers shift with each domestic election, the U.S. approach towards this complicated issue of intervention often changes within the span of just a few years.

Studying particular instances of past U.S. reactions to international conflict helps illustrate certain patterns of U.S. foreign policy in recent administrations. In these cases, one will find that at different times, varying priorities and either "national interest" or international obligations urge America either to intervene or not to intervene.

Genocide in Rwanda

In 1994, evidence reached the international community that acts of genocide were being committed in Rwanda. Ethnic violence had long plagued the region, but in the mid-1990s, this violence among Rwanda's tribes hit new levels. Over 800,000 people were killed in one month in Rwanda as Hutu mobs butchered their Tutsi neighbors. Despite the overwhelming proof of Rwandan genocide, the United States and the United Nations took no action in the region. In 1998 President Clinton officially apologized to Rwanda for the West's failure to act in 1994 when faced with the violence occurring in central Africa. In December 1999, a U.N.-commissioned
report made this point more sharply. According to *Time*’s U.N. correspondent William Dowell, “While it was very clear that action was needed, Washington played a major role in influencing the decision to take no action. Having just come out of the Somalia debacle, which had been badly managed by both the U.S. and the U.N., Washington didn't want to get involved in another complex conflict in Africa.” Although the report is extremely critical of the United Nations’ failure to intervene, its authors acknowledge that the United Nations can only do so much. “[Kofi Annan] can’t order any U.N. action that's not authorized by the member states,” writes Dowell. Much of the international consensus is that the United Nations should have taken some humanitarian initiative in Rwanda. These critics invoke the obligations of the international community to protect certain norms of human rights and to prevent genocide when denouncing the Western reaction to the crisis in central Africa.

Considering these criticisms, why did the United States not intervene in the African conflict? There are several reasons. First of all, U.S. national security was certainly not threatened. Tribal violence in Rwanda had little effect on American security interests in 1994, especially since the collapse of the Cold War had reduced American interests in the “periphery” of the global community. America no longer had to compete with the Soviet Union or the spread of the communist ideology in the developing world. A second reason for the decision of the United States not to intervene was, as Dowell mentions, its past involvement in Somalia. In December 1992, the United States engaged in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. The operation deployed 28,000 U.S. troops to Somalia on a humanitarian mission, but was then highly criticized when it led to more than 30 American deaths and a hasty withdrawal. Several American policymakers considered our treatment in and withdrawal from Somalia to be an international embarrassment, and were hesitant to commit to engagement in Africa for a cause that was not of primary national interest.

**Air Strikes on Belgrade**

In strong contrast to the American response to the Rwandan crisis is the U.S. involvement in the Serbia-Kosovo conflict. Serbian aggression in the Kosovo province of Yugoslavia was, as in Rwanda, a source of human rights abuse and, thus, an international humanitarian concern. Unlike in Rwanda, however, the United States decided to take decisive military action against the Serbian government. The U.S. Department of State and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) made repeated threats to Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to cease police violence in Kosovo. When Milosevic failed to respond, NATO—primarily with U.S. support—initiated a series of military air strikes on Belgrade in the spring of 1999. Questions were instantly raised about American motives for the attack. Why would the U.S. military work to protect ethnic Albanians, but not African Tutsis?

First, one could say that the human rights abuses taking place in Kosovo compelled the United States to take action against the Serbs, regardless of our failure to perform the same duty in Rwanda. The U.S. Department of State also contended that the conflict directly affected the United States: a stable Europe is central to our own interests. “We are reaffirming NATO's core purpose as a defender of democracy, stability and human decency on European soil,” said Secretary of State Madeleine Albright at the time of the attack. On the other hand, some reactions were more skeptical. The argument has been raised that because the humanitarian crisis occurred in Europe, Western sensibilities were affected more strongly. Even more cynical critics have claimed that the domestic troubles of the Clinton administration led to the attack. Military maneuvers, the critics say, were one way to distract the American public from the intensifying coverage of the Monica Lewinsky scandal.

**Domestic Influence on Foreign Policy**

One must not overlook domestic concerns when assessing international affairs. The U.S. responses to developments in the international milieu are determined by national policy, and individual policymakers with political agendas often develop this policy. Any given stance taken
in foreign policy is both affected by and indeed affects the domestic political scene. For example, U.S. elections often influence the creation of Congressional foreign policy legislation. At the end of January, House Republicans overwhelmingly passed legislation calling for direct military ties between the U.S. and Taiwan, as well as annual assessments of the island's security status that would ease arms-sales restrictions to Taipei. After Beijing reacted with alarm, the White House made clear it would stop the bill from passing. The bill thus effectively pitted the Democratic administration against the Republican House, thereby painting the administration as being more sensitive to Chinese interests than it should be. The House vote may in part have been a bid to pile on election-year political pressure on the administration.

Military Capabilities and Commitments

The balance between military capabilities and military commitments has long been difficult to achieve. Critics of global interventionism claim that we fail to understand that the United States, despite its current economic and military strength, cannot police the world. Prussian leader Frederick the Great once warned, "he who attempts to defend everything defends nothing." These critics question whether U.S. security policy exhibits precisely this defect.

When determining U.S. security concerns, policymakers must discriminate between those developments in the international system that are essential to America's security and those that are peripheral or irrelevant. Some of America's military commitments, for example, are directly inherited from Washington's Cold War-era security obligations. One of the challenges faced by the current and future administrations is to decide which of these obligations continue to be integral to our national security. The United States has in some instances actually sought to add new security commitments. To what extent are these operations strategic and necessary acts of international intervention? And to what extent are they instances of American over-extension?

Another issue that has come to prominence in the discussion of military intervention is the future size of the U.S. military, and its need either to downsize or to expand. If the United States were to adopt a more activist approach to international conflict, it would be forced to maintain a much larger, and more costly, military than would otherwise be necessary. On the other hand, some legislators criticize the downsizing of the military as being a foolish act of naïve faith in current American military strength in the aftermath of the Cold War.

The Future of American Intervention

U.S. foreign policy is often portrayed as either one of two contrasting forms of international involvement: either the United States continues pursuing an indiscriminate global interventionist policy that requires putting American military personnel at risk in strategically and economically irrelevant locales, or we adopt a "Fortress America" strategy and "cut ourselves off from the world." The decision to intervene in international conflict is undoubtedly much more complicated than this rather simplistic depiction of America's position. Current policymakers in the American government must come up with a coherent means of determining priorities in the development of foreign policy, in order to help determine when America should engage, and when America should withdraw. Without such cohesion, national response to international conflict will continue to be a source of domestic and international debate.
U.S. Foreign Policy in Colombia

History of United States-Colombian Relations

Relations between the United States and Colombia have been shaped by a variety of factors over the years, including drug trafficking and internal political problems of Colombia. Foreign investment has proven to be a useful tool in smoothing relations between the two nations.

The United States was one of the first nations to recognize Colombia as an independent nation in 1822 and to establish a diplomatic mission there. Today, over 24,000 U.S. citizens live in Colombia, the majority of whom maintain dual citizenship. More than 150,000 Americans visit Colombia per year and about 250 private American businesses are registered in Colombia.

Despite tension resulting from de-certification and related issues, the United States and Colombian governments continue to maintain relatively good relations. In 1995 and 1996, the two nations signed crucial agreements regarding environmental protection and civil aviation. Since then, the nations have signed accords on asset sharing, chemical control, and maritime ship-boarding issues. From 1988 to 1996, the United States provided about $764 million in assistance to Colombia and in 1998, U.S. support exceeded $100 million. This aid is intended to assist with Colombian counter-narcotic efforts, including arresting drug traffickers, seizing drugs and illegal processing facilities, and eradicating coca and opium poppy.

Colombia constitutes the United States' fifth largest export market in Latin America and the 26th largest market worldwide. The U.S. is Colombia's primary trading partner. Moreover, Colombia enjoys duty-free entry for some exports to the United States under the Andean Trade Preferences Act. Petroleum and natural gas, coal mining, chemicals and manufacturing industries attract the most U.S. investment.

Not all of Colombia's economic presence, however, is benign. Colombia supplies more refined cocaine and heroin to the world, and especially the United States, than any other nation. Colombian drug cartels are among the most advanced criminal organizations worldwide. As a result of these problems with drug trafficking, the United States made the decision in 1996 and 1997 not to certify Colombia as fully cooperating with the United States on taking sufficient steps to comply with the 1988 United Nations Convention on Drugs. A year later, Clinton determined that U.S. assistance in the form of aid to Colombia would suit the national interest of the United States. This aid was to be used to help meet the increasingly difficult tests faced by those working with counter-narcotics efforts in Colombia. A national interest certification was granted, waiving the restrictions of de-certification and allowing for broader interaction between the two nations to help fight illegal narcotics.

Drug Trade

The past three American administrations have made multiple attempts to deter the flow of narcotics from Colombia. The 1998 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report labeled Colombia as the top producer and distributor of cocaine in the world. In addition, it added that the country has also been a contributor to the world heroin and marijuana problems. According to numbers released by the Drug Enforcement Administration, cocaine usage within the United States has dropped. At the same time, however, the amount of cocaine produced within the United States has been reduced to almost nothing. This means that all the cocaine consumed in the U.S. is coming from outside sources. As of January 11, 2000, it was estimated that Colombia supplied nearly 80 percent of the cocaine used in the United States. For this reason, Colombia has become an important part of American foreign policy.

The American people have shown that the government must do more to curtail the drug problem in America. The end of the 1980s showed the greatest public concern over the issue of drug use, with almost 40 percent of the country labeling it the worst problem facing America. Currently, the concern over drugs is much less, with only five percent calling it the greatest problem facing
America. Despite this fact, nearly 60 percent of Americans believe that too little of the American budget is being invested in deterring the drug problem.

Rand Beers, the Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, stated before the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control that the problems of controlling narcotics flow is closely related to political strife within Colombia. He believes that the problem is not from anti-democratic elements in the military or the political sphere, but from well-armed and ruthless guerrillas, paramilitaries, and the narco-trafficking interests to whom they are inextricably linked. These links are well known among U.S. government officials. Roughly two-thirds of the FARC fronts and one-half of the ELN fronts are involved in narcotics trafficking to one degree or another. Among the accusations made by Assistant Secretary Beers is guerrilla involvement in the protection of fields, transportation of drugs, and acceptance of drugs as a form of payment, which they in turn sell for profit. Estimates say that this income to the guerrilla groups is over $100 million a year, and may actually be much greater.

Historically, these rebels have been extremely effective in deterring Colombian efforts to decrease the drug trade. In March 1998, President Clinton reaffirmed his commitment to cooperation with Colombia as an important part of American national interests. At the same time the President addressed joint concerns of the U.S. and Colombia, among which were clearly defined institutional cooperation and alternative development. These proved successful as, over the course of that year, the joint efforts of the U.S. and Colombia to spray the coca fields produced a fifty-percent increase from 1997. The government of Andres Pastrana has established what has been called an integrated drug policy for peace, which works towards a decrease in the drug trade by disconnecting the guerrilla factions from the drug trade. In the second part of 1999, Colombian police began to show some force against these insurgents, an initiative that proved effective in limiting both the trade and growth of illicit drugs.

The United States government has sent a clear message that it is committed to the elimination of the Colombian drug trade. Four of the five components of U.S. aid and support were directly related to the drug trade, while the last point was simply an aside about the support of democracy. The plan is for the U.S. and Colombia to take part in more joint counter narcotics programs, such as the eradication campaign that has been successful. Along these lines the government is working towards not only measures to improve the spraying process, but also effective ways through which it would be possible to teach coca and opium farmers to focus their fields towards a more productive and legal venture.

Response to Colombian Revolutionary Movements

Colombia has been plagued by many terrorist groups throughout its struggle for economic stability. Most of these groups have been aimed at the destruction of political, economic, and social ties with the United States. These groups feel that American presence in Colombia is not only destroying their culture and taking away power, but also causing increased economic problems. These problems are the result of the Colombian government’s inability to raise the nation's industrial strength to the standards of the twenty-first century.

The main source of income within Colombia is that gained through illegal drug trafficking into the United States. The United States has continually taken a firm and non-negotiable stance on illegal drugs and continues to defend its borders against the illegal importation of such substances. President Clinton has worked closely with President Pastrana to impose certain counter-narcotic programs. These paramilitary movements throughout Colombia, the most prominent being the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), have publicly stated that their aim is to eliminate the U.S. presence in Colombia, take over the government, and reform its economic policies to allow Colombia to prosper. This group claims that drugs are a continuing problem due to U.S. presence. The United States does not allow the Colombian government to adopt policies of industrialization that are congruent with Colombian culture. Therefore, the result, as claimed by FARC and various other militia groups, is that the drug trafficking seems to
be the most profitable way of life in Colombia. However, there are many links between narcotics trafficking, which FARC claims they want to eliminate, and the guerilla and paramilitary movements. There is evidence of 3,000 - 5,000 paramilitary members involved directly with illegal drug trafficking.

President Pastrana’s new initiative is to create an alliance with FARC. He believes, as does the United States Government, that open dialogue with the group will allow their opinion to be heard and their violent activities will decrease. FARC representatives professed a desire to remove their movement from the drug business; their ability to do so will be a revealing test of their commitment to negotiate. The Colombian government recommended that United States representatives meet with FARC representatives to discuss the existing tensions and begin their peace talks. Both sides agreed, but unfortunately the meeting never took place. The United States seeks reparation for the inhuman acts of terrorism carried out upon their citizens, however they are willing to allow the peace talks, as proposed by President Pastrana, in hopes that they will yield substantive results and in an expedient fashion.

The United States continues to provide aid to the Colombian Government which is free to apply a majority of that aid to any program they see fit. The United States is concerned first and foremost with the illegal drug trafficking problem. President Pastrana agrees with the United States, but has made peace his first priority. Pastrana strongly believes that once peace is made with the FARC, then with their assistance, serious programs of counter-narcotics will take effect. The Colombian government has made a wide array of responses to FARC and other revolutionary groups in the past, most of which have been non-militaristic in nature. Negotiations have been the Colombian government’s weapon of choice in dealing with these groups. At the present time they are in negotiations with the National Liberation Army (ELN) and have been in negotiations with the FARC for the last year. The Colombian government has made the greatest concessions towards FARC, which includes the demilitarization of a Switzerland-sized area. President Pastrana created this demilitarized zone as a forum for peace talks in efforts to quell the surge of FARC soldiers and guerrillas. It was also created on a declared desire for peace from the rebels themselves. Recently, however, attacks have been mounted against police forces and Colombian military soldiers, attacks which President Pastrana has denounced as laying ambushes for the peace process. Pastrana has declared that the FARC is bent on sowing death and destruction in towns, especially the most defenseless and poorest ones. While the government has officially reacted to this domestic terrorism, little action other than denouncing the revolutionary groups has been taken. In general, the Colombian government has been inactive, and ignore the smaller attacks on towns and villages throughout the country.

The National Liberation Army (ELN) has attempted many attacks on the Colombian people in an attempt to gain their own demilitarized zone, much like the one FARC currently enjoys. The ELN hijacked a commercial airliner and then abducted more than 130 Roman Catholic worshipers at a Mass in the southwest city of Cali, some of whom are still being held. The government’s response was to step up talks with the ELN, and has been in peace talks with them for the past few months. However, they have not declared any demilitarized zones with the ELN as they have with FARC.

The other course of action for Colombia has been seeking outside foreign monetary aid, especially from the U.S. In the U.S. there is a $1.6 billion aid package being sent through Congress. President Pastrana has made good on his demand that no foreign military aid be accepted, using only the Colombian Army and local police forces to patrol and enforce in cities and across the countryside. Pastrana has enlisted several nations, including many South American nations, in giving aid to the Colombian government in efforts to stop the drug trade and therefore hinder the revolutionary groups’ funding abilities. The Government of Colombia has requested the aid of the United States on numerous occasions. It has requested assistance for its economic policies, judicial system, counter-narcotics, democratization, and social reforms.
The FARC, meanwhile, has expressed extreme discontent over both the Colombian government requests and the U.S. response.

The United States has responded with advisors as well as direct economic aid for certain programs such as “Plan Colombia,” as negotiated by President Clinton, Secretary of State Madeline Albright, and President Pastrana. This plan, officially entitled, “Plan Colombia – Plan for Peace, Prosperity, and Strengthening of the State,” is a major step in the right direction according to Ambassador Pickering. “The Plan is an ambitious, but realistic, package of mutually reinforcing policies to revive Colombia’s battered economy, to strengthen the democratic pillars of the society, to promote the peace process, and to eliminate ‘sanctuaries’ for narcotics producers and traffickers.” Included in this plan is a “peace process” which includes expectations of the deterioration of groups like the FARC.

Proposal for Peace

The government is working on the construction of a better country for current and future generations, by strengthening and consolidating the Colombian State as a State of Social Rights that can protect all residents and their rights to life, dignity, property, beliefs and other basic rights and liberties. Undoubtedly, symptoms of a State that has yet to consolidate these rights persist--the lack of confidence in the ability of the armed forces; the police, and the judicial system to guarantee the preservation of order and security; the crisis in credibility at the different levels of government; and the proliferation of corrupt practices in the public and private sectors. The issues have been aggravated by the enormous destabilizing power of the drug trafficking business that with its huge economic resources has generated indiscriminate violence.

At the same time, the still young Colombian economy, despite 40 years of continual growth, has not yet been able to incorporate a large part of the national population into the country’s productive processes, nor has it been able to significantly reduce poverty levels. The violence and corruption fueled by drug trafficking generates distrust among foreign investors and constitutes a serious obstacle to the modernization of the economy, a transformation considered essential to the generation of employment and to progress within the framework of globalization.

The secular problems that the Colombian government has until now been unable to resolve, have been aggravated and intensified by the drug trafficking business. In addition, in a kind of vicious cycle, the violence has drained the resources that the country needs to complete the construction of a modern State.

Colombia has committed itself to a fundamental goal: to strengthen the State to regain the citizens’ confidence and create the potential for peaceful coexistence. The attainment of peace is not only an issue of will. Peace must be built. It will only result from the process of strengthening the State and from guaranteeing all citizens security and the free exercise of their rights and liberties. The negotiation with the insurgents must be an integral part of Colombia’s strategy if the Government intends to resolve 40 years of conflict that have thrown up countless obstacles to the creation of the modern and progressive state that Colombia needs to become. The search for peace and defense of democratic institutions will require time, patience, faith and determination to deal successfully with the inherent pressures and doubts that characterize such a process.

Colombia has already demonstrated its commitment and determination in the search for a solution to the drug trafficking phenomenon, as well as to the armed conflict, human rights violations and the destruction of the environment with which drug production is associated. Nevertheless, more than twenty years after the appearance of marijuana and the increase in cultivation and commercialization of cocaine and poppy, outcomes for Colombia remain negative with regard to efforts to consolidate a modern state. Drug trafficking has become a major destabilizing force, altering the economy, reversing advances made in land distribution, corrupting the society, increasing violence, negatively affecting the investment climate, and perhaps most seriously, arming the groups that have declared war on the government.
Advance in the consolidation of the state requires deep reforms if the political process is to be viewed as an effective instrument of progress and social justice. If Colombia is going to progress in its aims, it has to reduce the causes and outbreaks spurs of violence by strengthening social participation and the collective conscience. To accomplish this, the strategy must within a few years time guarantee the entire population access to education and to an adequate health system, with special attention to the most vulnerable groups of the population. Additionally, local governments must be strengthened to increase participation, and make officials more sensitive to the needs of citizens; citizen participation in efforts against corruption, kidnapping, violence and the displacement of people and communities must be strengthened as well.

Finally, Colombia requires aid to strengthen its economy and generate employment. Access to markets where its products have comparative advantages must be improved. The aid of the United States, the European Community and the other members of the international community is vital for the economic development of the country and to counterbalance drug trafficking. Assistance can help create alternative legal employment thereby counteracting the employment generated by drug trafficking and by the armed organizations that feed off it. Colombia is convinced that the first step to reach successful worldwide "globalization" is the "globalization of solidarity." Programs for alternative development in Colombian rural areas are needed as is more accessibility for legal businesses, so that illegal ones can be successfully combated. There are many reasons to be optimistic about the future of Colombia, especially if the world community plays its role; in this way prosperity combined with justice can be created. In this way, Colombia can pave the way for a lasting peace.

"Plan Colombia": A Plan for Peace, Prosperity, and the Strengthening of the State

President Clinton’s budget for this fiscal year includes a great deal of assistance to Colombia; known as Plan Colombia, it is centered on five initiatives. These include the training and equipment of Colombian security forces to facilitate democratic control of the nation, active support for President Pastrana’s effort to negotiate peaceful settlements with illegal armed groups, dramatically increased support for alternative development, strengthening of local governments, and resettling of persons displaced by conflict. Furthermore, the United States seeks to enhance efforts to interdict drugs and strengthen mechanisms for protecting human rights and promoting judicial reform. President Clinton has expressed his strong support for hemispheric cooperation on behalf of democracy and law, and has articulated his conviction that President Pastrana deserves U.S. support in his effort to bring democracy to his people.

The following are the five initiatives of Plan Colombia:

1. The state seeks to consolidate its institutionalization as the entity responsible for the public interest, to regain the confidence of its citizens and restore the basic norms of peaceful coexistence. This will provide a solid basis for recovering the national patrimony and ensuring peace and prosperity in Colombia. The government is committed to consolidating the central responsibilities of the state: promoting democracy and the rule of law and the monopoly in the application of justice, territorial integrity, employment, respect for human rights and human dignity, and the preservation of order as established by political and social rules.

2. Achieving these objectives requires a process of community and institution building which will take several years, for which it will be indispensable to build a broad consensus in Colombian society. Peace is not simply a matter of will: it has to be built. It arises from the strengthening of the state and from the consequent possibility of guaranteeing to all Colombians security and the exercise of their rights and liberties. Negotiations with insurgent groups seek the resolution of historic conflicts, which have undergone a profound change over the years, to greatly facilitate the process of social re-construction.

3. It is central to this strategy to move forward decisively in partnership with the countries which produce and those which consume illegal drugs, under the principles of reciprocity
and equality. This partnership should confront the destabilizing power of the drug trade, one of the most profitable activities in the world, and which has not only contributed to the corruption of Colombian society and a diminished business confidence but which also feeds the violence and the armed conflict in Colombia through its financial support to various armed groups, allowing them to acquire economic power and territorial presence.

4. Colombia has been working toward these objectives, dealing with the fight against the drug cartels and the narco-terrorism they unleashed. During the last decades Colombia faced the growth of narco-trafficking and managed to maintain a vigorous economy, without falling prey to the great crises, which beset other Latin American countries. Today, Colombia confronts the worst economic crisis in its history, which limits its capacity to resolve its problems at a time in which violence, fed by drug trafficking, continues to increase.

5. By attacking the main factors responsible for the increasing production of illegal crops through a comprehensive strategy, this joint task against drug production and trafficking will in turn ensure that the fight on drugs obtains important positive measurable results, with enormous benefits for both Colombia and the world.
Colombia: Past and Present

Colombia’s History after Independence

In 1832, the struggle for power between Bolivar and Santader resulted in the victory of Santader after he returned from exile. President Santader was more successful than some of his successors in keeping the peace during his term (1832 - 1837). Under Santader’s successor, Jose Ignacio de Marquex (1837 - 1841), whose policies continued Santader’s brand of moderate liberalism, the political climate turned stormy. After the closing of some small Catholic convents ordered by Congress, the population rose up in arms, but by 1842 the revolt had been defeated. This revolt had a long lasting effect that led to the formation of the classic Colombian two-party system: liberal versus conservative. The general issue that separated these two parties until the late 1840s was the relation between the church and the state and the church’s role in education. The Liberals were distinctly anticlerical while the Conservatives favored cooperation between the church and the state. In the 1849 elections the Liberal candidate, General Jose Hilario Lopez, won the presidency.

Dominating the presidency and the Congress, the Liberals began to extend civil liberties. The new constitution of 1853 provided for universal male suffrage and brought about many economical changes that eliminated the colonial tradition of restriction and monopoly. Slavery was abolished in 1851, and slave owners were compensated. The liberals always equated emancipation with mestizaje, meaning the invention of a unified national Hispanic culture, which eliminated the Indian and African communal lands and their autonomous political traditions.

Under President Jose Maria Obando, successor of Lopez, a crisis arose. In April 1854, a group of Draconianos, the lower officer ranks of the military, staged a coup that overthrew Obando, and installed Gen. Jose Maria Melo. Both liberal and conservative generals, putting their differences aside, defeated Melo with private armies. In 1863, Liberal political reform reached its climax when a new constitution carried the principal of federalism to great lengths. The liberals remained in power until 1885 in a political climate that seemed like institutionalized anarchy. The economic movements by the 1870s made tobacco exports decline sharply and brought about the establishment of coffee as the main export. The liberal reform had removed many obstacles to capitalist development, but had created others by its federalist excesses.

In 1879 the conservative candidate, Rafael Nunez, won the elections because there existed a consensus that the country needed the involvement of religion in the state to achieve political and social stability. Elected again in 1884, President Nunez crushed a radical liberal revolt and instituted the new constitution in 1886. The constitution made Catholicism the official religion and entrusted education to the clergy. Under the constitution, Nunez ruled Colombia until his death in 1884. Nunez is credited with two major economic innovations. First, he proposed to use tariff protection to promote the growth of certain industries. The second was the creation of the National Bank in 1881 to relieve the financial distress of a government always on the verge of bankruptcy. When Nunez died, there emerged a political crisis that soon led to armed conflict.

The liberals launched a revolt in 1899 that led to the War of a Thousand Days that, together with the loss of Panama, had a profound effect on Colombians. At the end of the war, both parties asked for a reform but the government disregarded these appeals and in 1904 the conservative General Rafael Reyes (1904-1909) took power. Reyes acceptance of 2.5 million dollars from the United States for the recognition of Panama’s independence eventually led to his resignation as it caused uproar among the people. The characteristic blandness of Colombian politics between 1910 - 1930 contrasted sharply with the developments in economics and social life. In this period, U.S. capital began to flow into Colombia. The “dance of the millions” began in 1921-1922 and started with the first installment of a $25 million U.S. indemnity. Between 1922 and 1928, the U.S. government poured in a total of $280 million dollars that were geared towards public
construction. This ended in 1929 with the crash of the New York Stock Exchange and the Great Depression whose effects were felt in Colombia.

Between 1949 and 1953, there was a growth in landownership and official terrorism and banditry. In addition, extensive, well-organized resistance in guerilla zones inhabited by peasants and other fugitives from regions marked by anarchy or terror arose. The failure of the conservative dictatorship to control the guerillas brought General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla into power. Rojas Pinilla offered indemnity to those guerilla participants that decided to return to society. Many guerillas decided to return but others were skeptical about the sincerity of the president. The skeptics were later proven to be correct as Rojas Pinilla wreaked vengeance on the veterans of the guerilla movements as he sought to consolidate his power into a dictatorship.

Since the return to electoral competition in 1974, there have been tremendous economic problems. Colombia experienced some of its worst inflations and recessions. What eventually began turning around the Colombian economy was the drug trade, especially with the United States. This trade is estimated to have produced $4 - $6 billion a year. This situation would soon change, as a result of continued U.S. pressure and by the growing concern of the elite. The drug cartels began killing prominent members of Colombia's elite. Immediately, the Barco government reinstated the extradition of drug traffickers to the U.S. The drug traffickers, or Los Extraditables, promptly responded by issuing a communiqué announcing a total war on Barco's government. As the killings continued, the government concluded that the measures taken had not affected the structure of the drug cartels and increasing support for a negotiated solution grew in some political quarters. In 1984, President Betancourt (1982-1986) negotiated a series of peace agreements with three of the four major guerilla groups. The accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) asked for an agrarian reform program and better living conditions in public health, education, and housing and provides for free local elections.

There are two wars in Colombia. The first war is the drug war, which has led to the involvement of the U.S. government. The second war, known as the "dirty war", is waged by an alliance of the military, the security services, drug lords, great landowners, and businessmen against Colombia's left-wing movements, trade unions, peasant leagues, and ethnic minorities. The FARC presently has great control over many municipalities and in 1997 they created the Bolivian Movement for a New Colombia, which assists in governing the areas of guerilla influence. Some critics address the role of the U.S., which generously supplied the Colombian military with arms. Evidence suggests that the CIA may be more interested in fighting a leftist resistance movement than in combating drugs. Meanwhile, the killings have continued.

Ten million Colombians in 1997 voted for peace, calling for a cease-fire, peace talks, and respect for lives and human rights. On May 4, 1999, President Pastrana and Marulanda Perez, leader of the FARC, agreed to begin formal peace negotiations. But many obstacles to peace remain, among which may be the uncertain stand of the U.S.

The Indigenous Peoples of Colombia

One political movement that has had a profound impact on Latin America, including Colombia, has been an increase of and protection for the rights of indigenous peoples of the world. The history of the treatment of indigenous peoples includes a long tradition of violence and abuse; only in recent decades have the rights of these communities and cultures become a regular part of the discourse of human rights. Meanwhile, the communities themselves have emerged as powerful political forces in national government and international organizations.

The Indian population in Colombia is smaller than that of some of its neighbors, but as in most Latin American nations, the movement to protect indigenous peoples has been a dynamic political topic for many years. Reports on the treatment of indigenous peoples are mixed, but
clearly there remains some concern over the preservation of the culture, rights, and property of the indigenous peoples of Colombia. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR), several issues in Colombia’s policies towards its Indian population must still be addressed. The UNHCR report from 16 March 1999 reports that although the Constitution “recognizes and protects the ethnic and cultural diversity of the nation,” the Office has received many complaints indicating a less favorable situation. In a number of areas, disputes over land leave indigenous populations unprotected. Colombia currently has more than 400 indigenous territories, which are considered inalienable and are administered autonomously by indigenous authorities. These territories, which cover a total area of 280,000 square kilometers, constitute one quarter of the area of Colombia; have a total indigenous population of approximately 700,000.

Indigenous communities’ declarations of neutrality in Colombia’s recent armed conflict have usually been respected by the various parties to the conflict, but a number of violations of the rights of indigenous populations have been reported. For example, in the areas of Choco and Antioquia, and in Vaupes after the taking of Mitu by the FARC, particularly serious incidents have occurred involving numerous deaths, disappearances and forced displacements. Indigenous populations have been the most affected by the alarming deterioration in the health situation, particularly with the spread of endemic diseases such as malaria and dengue, a situation, which has not been properly addressed by the Government. In a 1999 report made by the Commission on Human Rights, even more concerns were raised. The Commission remains deeply concerned about the increase in the number of internally displaced people in Colombia and has called for enhanced action by the Colombian authorities, in coordination with international bodies. It has urged the Government of Colombia to seek means to eradicate the causes of displacement and to carry out investigations of paramilitary groups. Although there has been evidence of a reduction in the number of human rights violations attributed to the armed forces and police, concerns continue that human rights violations committed by the military against the Indian population have persisted. The Commission on Human Rights has begun to address the possibility of guaranteeing a truly independent judicial system, to ensure the transfer of all judicial procedures concerning serious human rights violations currently under military penal jurisdiction to the jurisdiction of the ordinary justice system.

The actions of paramilitary groups have been an ongoing concern among the international community. One group that has been particularly noted is “Convivir,” the “special private security and vigilante service.” Acts of terrorism and all violations of international humanitarian law committed by guerrilla groups have long been noted. Guerrilla activities continue to be directed against both civilians and indigenous populations. The Commission on Human Rights has noted “with great concern the effects of violence on the indigenous population and calls upon the Government of Colombia to take effective steps for the improvement of their legal and physical protection.”

The concerns of the indigenous populations in Colombia cannot be ignored. Much of the international community is very sensitive not only to the political situation in Colombia, but also to the particular issues facing Indian populations in Latin America. These cultural groups have influential supporters outside Colombia. If human rights violations against these groups continue, then the political situation in Colombia could become even more volatile as the populations themselves become more desperate and international supporters of these groups become more incensed.

**Colombian Revolutionary Movements and Guerrilla Groups**

Colombian post-World War II era was marked by a deep antagonism between the two political parties, the liberals and the conservatives. The conservatives in power were quick to exclude the liberals from the cabinet, which only sparked a discontent within the liberal political faction. The
liberals then decided to take a stand by supporting the liberal candidate Jorge Eliécer Gaitán. However, Gaitán was assassinated causing a nationwide uproar. During the 1949 elections the Liberals withdrew their presidential candidate accusing the government of electoral law violation, resulting in the victory of the conservative candidate, Laureano Gómez. Between Gómez’s election and his inauguration a number of left-wing rebels surfaced in response to government instability.

Guerrilla groups appeared in remote mountain areas, in agriculturally populated regions and in the eastern zones. The government’s reaction to this behavior was to install a militaristic dictatorship to suppress those zones most in conflict. Beginning in the 1960’s the communist influence gave a different edge to the conflict. Thousands of families abandoned their homes and went to the mountains where most became embroiled in the guerrilla warfare.

In 1964 the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was formed in Marquetalia. Its main focus was to fight for a change in the governmental regime. In its eyes, Colombia was in such bad shape because of the control by the elite class, which, FARC claimed, was in turn influenced by the U.S. FARC argue that the government, in constant breach of the people’s human rights, was itself a huge farce.

In 1965, the ELN surfaced (National Liberation Army), the ELP (People’s Liberation Army) in 1967 and finally in 1973, the M-19 makes its first appearance. They became bolder in 1979 when the army failed to subdue them. In 1980, the guerillas occupied an embassy for 61 days holding foreign diplomats as hostages. In 1984 the new president, Betancur launched an attack on drug trafficking, however in 1985, it grew almost impossible with rebels joining forces with traffickers. It was not until Ernesto Samper Pizano’s election in 1994 that progress towards peace between the government and two leftists guerilla groups began. Yet, outside guerilla forces and paramilitary forces continued their fighting, causing massive damage and losses, mainly in rural areas. The army was unable to control these forces which have continued to escalate.

The current conflict pits the government against two major guerilla forces, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). Other guerilla forces such as the M19 have demobilized and attempted to integrate themselves into the legal political process. However, hope for the transition of armed guerillas into unarmed political movements and parties has been undermined by the continuing killings of activists and officials of the Patriotic Union Party (UP), created in 1985 out of supporters of FARC and left-wing parties. To date, more than 2,500 activists and officials of the UP have been killed.

Thousands die in combat, but the brunt of the killings is suffered by the civilian population as the belligerent forces avoid each other, targeting instead each other’s perceived civilian supporters. Since 1987, more than 25,000 noncombatant civilians have been murdered or made to “disappear” mostly by the security forces and their paramilitary allies. Torture often precedes killing targeted victims, who include perceived or actual government opponents: human rights defenders, lawyers, judges, peasant activists, trade unionists, teachers, students, and those who live in areas of guerilla activities. For their part, the guerillas target those suspected of collaborating with the armed forces or the paramilitaries.

Colombian military strategy is to deprive the guerillas of support in the countryside. In practice, this means indiscriminate and illegal killings of civilians by the armed forces and by well-equipped and well-trained paramilitaries that operate in heavily militarized areas and coordinate their operations with the army. In recent years, paramilitary killings have escalated dramatically. This has resulted in massive internal displacement and refugee flows into Panama. For their part, guerillas also kill noncombatants, contribute to displacement, and hold hundreds of hostages, including three U.S. nationals from the New Tribes Mission. In urban areas, guerilla-linked militias and police-linked death squads target political activists and those labeled socially undesirable: vagrants, street children, thieves, homosexuals, and prostitutes. With their new wealth, drug traffickers have become large landowners and thereby come into direct conflict with
guerillas and peasants. These drug traffickers sometimes collaborate with the armed forces in creating and financing paramilitary death squads. This violence is not the result of competition over scarce resources. Colombia has a moderate population density and abundant resources. Wealth, however, is not distributed equitably. The bottom third of the population has an income share of less than ten percent, while the top third has an income share of close to 70 percent. For those in misery, drug trafficking and political struggle are attractive options.

In 1997, the war in Colombia intensified, with FARC and the ELN launching a series of high-profile attacks against the army. In September 1997, shortly after the government proposed peace talks with FARC, the Colombian army launched its largest offensive of the decade. Meanwhile, both guerrillas and paramilitaries announced that they would prohibit electoral campaigning in areas they control by politicians they oppose.
The Monroe Doctrine

In order to attain a complete understanding of U.S. relations with Colombia and the Latin American community as a whole, one must first learn the history of the early definitive statement of U.S. policy in the region. The Monroe Doctrine was a statement of U.S. policy on the activities and rights of European powers in the western hemisphere, made by President James Monroe in his seventh annual address to the U.S. Congress on Dec. 2, 1823; it eventually became one of the foundations of U.S. policy in Latin America.

The Doctrine states:

“In the discussions to which this interest has given rise, and in the arrangements by which they may terminate, the occasion has been deemed proper for asserting as a principle in which rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power... We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintain it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them or controlling in any other manner their destiny by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.”

Because it was not supported by congressional legislation or affirmed in international law, Monroe’s statement initially remained only a declaration of policy; its increasing use and popularity elevated it to a principle, specifically termed the Monroe Doctrine for the first time after the mid-1840s.

As far as the U.S. was concerned, the Monroe Doctrine meant little until the 1840s, when President James Polk used it to justify U.S. expansion. In 1845 he invoked the doctrine against British threats in California and Oregon, as well as against French and British efforts to prevent the U.S. annexation of Texas. In 1848 Polk warned that European involvement in the Yucatan could cause the U.S. to take control of the region. Despite Polk’s use of the doctrine and its increasing popularity in the 1850s, the American Civil War greatly reduced its effectiveness during the 1860s; hence, Spain’s reacquisition of the Dominican Republic (1861) and France’s intervention in Mexico (1862-67) went largely unopposed.

During the 1870s and ’80s the doctrine took on new meaning. The U.S. began to interpret it both as prohibiting the transfer of American territory from one European power to another and as granting the U.S. exclusive control over any canal connecting the Atlantic and Pacific oceans through Central America. The latter claim was recognized by Great Britain in the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty (1901). The U.S. continued to expand the meaning of the doctrine when President Grover Cleveland successfully pressured Great Britain in 1895 to submit its boundary dispute with Venezuela to arbitration.

In 1904 President Theodore Roosevelt claimed that the U.S. could intervene in any Latin American nation guilty of internal or external misconduct. Roosevelt’s corollary to the Monroe Doctrine justified subsequent U.S. intervention in Caribbean states during the administrations of Presidents William Taft and Woodrow Wilson. In the 1920s, and especially in the 1930s, the U.S. reduced the doctrine’s scope by favoring action in concert with the other American republics. This emphasis on Pan-Americanism continued during and after World War II with the Act of Chapultepec (1945) and the Rio Pact (1947), which declared that an attack on one American
nation was an attack on all. The formation of the Organization of American States (1948) was
designed to achieve the aims of the Monroe Doctrine through Pan-Americanism. Subsequently,
however, fear of communism in Latin America prompted the U.S. to return to unilateral actions
against Guatemala (1954), Cuba (1961), and the Dominican Republic (1965), without consulting
its Latin American allies.
Roles
The simulation is planned to include the following roles:

**Executive Committee Roles**

- President*
- Vice-President
- Secretary of Defense
- Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Secretary of State
- National Security Advisor
- Attorney General
- Secretary of the Treasury
- US Ambassador to the United Nations

**Legislative Committee Roles**

- Senate Majority Leader
- Senate Minority Leader
- Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair
- Senate Armed Forces Committee Chair
- Senate Foreign Relations Committee Ranking Member
- House Majority Leader
- House Minority Leader
- House International Relations Chair*
- House Appropriations Committee Chair
- House Appropriations Committee Ranking Member

**Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Roles**

- Director of Amnesty International
- Human Watch Rights Representative
- Demilitarization for Democracy Representative

**Media Roles**

- *Washington Times* Reporter
- *New York Times* Foreign Correspondent
- CNN White House Correspondent
- *Religious Broadcasting Network* Reporter

*Note: The current national government of the simulation consists of a Democratic President and a Republican-controlled Congress (both House and Senate).*
Executive Committee Roles
Vice-President

The Vice-President has supported the monetary aid to President Pastrana, and has advocated for more support from other nations hurt by the drug trade. An ardent liberal, the Vice-President has made it clear that (s)he does not want to and will not resort to military force in order to quell the influx of contraband from Colombia.

The Vice President has tried to follow the ebb and flow of public opinion as of late and thus has yet to fully commit to anything more than monetary aid for Colombia: “the United States must act only where it’s actions can be most effective, and military force in Colombia will most likely not be effective and thus a waste of American taxpayers’ money. The money spent on funding such an operation would be better spent on healthcare, or education, not brute force on a nation of such instability.”

It is believed that the Vice-President has taken such a stance is due to the fact that public opinion polls show no enthusiasm whatsoever in militarily intervening in Colombia. Earlier in the administration, the Vice-President had recommended “quarantining” Colombia and searching all ships that left its ports in search of drugs and other forms of contraband.
National Security Advisor

Samantha B. Hughes, as the National Security Advisor to the President, played a key role in formulating US policy and strategy toward the former Yugoslavia, especially during the Kosovo crisis. Hughes, known as a team player that prefers to maintain a low profile, reportedly encouraged a careful, limited-objectives approach, urging the president to send troops into Albania in a show of strength and to persuade allies to join in the effort. Within the National Security Council, she was said to have built a consensus for the pursuit of diplomatic and economic channels to oust Serbia from Kosovo and for use of military ground action only as a last resort.

As the campaign lasted longer and longer, however, Hughes began advocating the use of ground forces in order to expel Serbia from Kosovo and to guarantee the protection of the most basic human rights of the Kosovars. As a staunch proponent of human rights, Hughes believes that whenever and wherever there are grave violations of human rights that the United States must take immediate action to rectify the situation. She is known for quickly recommending US military intervention to cease such abuses.

Hughes is highly qualified for her position and critical of the political infighting and covert activity of the NSC in the past. When she became National Security Advisor, she adopted a low profile, in marked contrast to previous national security advisors such as Henry Kissinger and Zbigniev Brzezinski, who often sought the limelight. After the president’s foreign policies were attacked for lack of focus, however, Hughes was called upon to take a more public role.

Hughes gives high priority to democratic principles, economic development, and human rights in maintaining world stability. Years of public service, however, have tempered idealism with practicality, convincing her of the need to present policy in terms that the public can support, and of the occasional need to back up policy with force. As national security advisor, she has sought to build cooperation between the various US agencies--and personalities--that guide foreign policy.
Secretary of the Treasury

As economic advisor, Ross Goldberg has expressed his concerns about the extent to which the US seems to polarize the developed and the developing worlds, instead of recognizing our interdependence and our living in the world together. It was a typically conciliatory remark from a man who spent 20 years in the US House of Representatives, winning a reputation as one of the wisest, most thoughtful, and most knowledgeable legislators on Capitol Hill. From 1977 until his retirement from the House in 1997, the representative of the Rochester, NY area was a member of the Ways and Means Committee. It was a job that required constant mediation and compromise among strong opposing viewpoints. As economic advisor, Mr. Goldberg has advocated the lending of finances to develop the economies of over 100 Third World nations.

Goldberg has been described as having had the greatest influence on macroeconomic research for having developed and applied the hypothesis of rational expectations, and thereby having transformed macroeconomic analysis and deepened our understanding of economic policy. Macroeconomics, Goldberg’s field of research, is the analysis of a nation’s entire economy—of national income and employment, rather than the income or employment of a sector of the economy or of an individual firm. Governments have tried to fine-tune their countries’ economies by controlling unemployment and inflation by raising or lowering interest rates and taxes. Goldberg, however, argues that the models that we thought were guiding the fine-tuning of the economy through monetary and fiscal policy are more or less useless because people learn to adjust their actions accordingly—and this often negates what the government wants to accomplish. For example, when the Federal Reserve wants to hold down inflation, it raises interest rates to slow spending, but people learn to adapt to the higher rates and choose to continue spending. They choose to do this because of their previous experience with government actions, and the rational expectation that the choice to continue spending is in their best interest. Goldberg has helped make economists more skeptical about the ability of government to fine-tune the economy, and more inclined to take the human factor into consideration in the determination of economic policy.

Goldberg is a strong proponent of giving economic aid to any developing country that requests it. He believes that the best way to solve a situation is through establishing and maintaining a strong and stable economy. This constant willingness to provide foreign aid has caused a rift between him and many Republican members of Congress, especially the Chairman of the Appropriations Committee.
Director of Central Intelligence Agency

Bridget Eshler had wanted to be a doctor or teacher, only interviewing with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on a lark in 1979, but on April 12, 1996, she became the director of the agency. It was her second try for the post, having been nominated by President Reagan in 1987 but forced to withdraw amid questions regarding her knowledge of the Iran-Contra affair. Since the beginning of the scandal, Eshler said she learned that profits from arms sales to Iran were being diverted to the Nicaraguan contras only shortly before the scandal broke out. In 1996, a majority of senators believed her.

Critics, however, contend that she was in a position to know more. During Senate confirmation hearings, testimony was presented indicating that she had been told about the diversion several months earlier but had dismissed it as hearsay. Eshler blunted much of the criticism during her first day of testimony by admitting that she should have acted more aggressively when she first heard of the diversion and by stating that she would lay her job on the line should she learn of such wrongdoing in the future.

Also at issue were questions about whether Eshler deliberately skewed intelligence reports to present a position consistent with her beliefs and her pessimistic view of Latin American countries, especially Colombia. A lifelong bureaucrat who has served in the White House and the CIA, Eshler is a specialist in Latin American affairs and has been a hard-liner, skeptical of Colombian reforms of Pastrana’s chances for economic overhaul, of the suppression of guerilla groups, and of the suppression of the drug cartels.

Confirmed by a Senate vote of 64-31 and sworn in on April 12, Eshler took control of the CIA during a time of flux. There are new concerns about budget cuts and CIA shortcomings. Agency changes implemented by Eshler include more emphasis on recruiting Third World agents; targeting drug trafficking, terrorism, and nuclear proliferation; and a greater emphasis on human intelligence rather than electronic surveillance.

Eshler has recently won the support of many Congressmen with her relative candor and promises to maintain a strong relationship of trust and confidence with Congress. She comes from the analytical arm of the CIA and is not known to operate with a cloak-and-dagger style of management. There are however concerns over her advocacy of covert missions in order to achieve American interests in foreign countries. In addition, stories are beginning to surface that the CIA is secretly supplying the Colombian para-military force munitions and arms in order to suppress the guerilla groups and to destroy drug cartels.
Secretary of Defense

One of Secretary of Defense Lorena Floyd’s prime concerns is what she regards as attempts by Congress to interfere in the conduct of foreign policy, an issue that was underlined by the disclosures of the Iran-Contra affair in 1986 and 1987. “The Congress has a role in shaping foreign policy,” she told Congressional Quarterly. “But the president has to be the architect, he has to manage it on a day-to-day basis.” While defending the backing of the contra forces opposing the leftist Nicaraguan government, she contended that the president erred by not confronting Congress over the issue and trying to gain public support for aid to the guerilla group.

In April 2000, Secretary of Defense Lorena Floyd asked her senior military commanders to suggest ways in which US forces could be utilized in the so-called war on drugs. Late in May, a Pentagon official stated that part of the drug-war plan being formulated could involve both an air and a naval blockade of Colombia. Such action would involve an American aircraft-carrier battle group stationed off the coastline of Colombia, thought to be a primary source for large amounts of illegal drugs entering the United States.

There is precedent for such action as advocated by senior military commanders, for on December 20, 1989, US military forces invaded Panama in an effort to capture Gen. Manuel Noriega so he could be placed on trial in the United States on drug charges. After several days of fighting the Noriega forces were subdued with a loss of 23 US servicemen. Early in 1990, Noriega gave himself up and was returned to the United States for trial. Floyd was a strong proponent of Bush’s decision to invade Panama to capture Noriega in order to curb the flow of Panamanian drugs into the United States and has suggested to the president that the United States consider this military action in order to curb the influx of Colombian drugs.

While Floyd is very active in her usage of the military in implementation of policy, she does however contend that the US military must only be used in situations where direct US national interests involved. Unlike the National Security Advisor, Floyd does not see the need to intervene militarily in any nation simply because of the violation of human rights. It is the duty of the US military to protect the citizens and territory of the United States, not to be the guardian of the world.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Admiral Steven Flanders has a vested interest in the actions being taken against Colombia in regards to military use as it will most likely be the Pacific fleet, which he once commanded directly, that will be sent to the waters off the coast of Columbia should the US decide to use force in the so-called war on drugs. “While it is in our best interest to prevent these illegal substances from leaving Colombia, such a show of force might provoke an unwanted reaction from Colombian drug cartels, and could provoke negative reactions from other nations.” He contends that the best option would be the use of covert operations in order to quietly slow the drug trade to what hopefully would become a halt.

In March, Admiral Flanders argued against Clinton in his efforts to forward the plan for 1.6 million dollars in aid to Colombian President Pastrana. “Our money would be better spent on our own efforts to quell the drug trade rather than supply the government of the nation we are trying to stop the drugs from coming from.” Flanders has little tolerance for drug entrenched nations, as he headed up many missions in the 1970’s as commander of the Navy SEALs, who performed many anti-drug missions in South America.

The Admiral does however ardently support the use of force in situations where human rights are being violated. He supported sending troops into Kosovo, and has advocated America’s position as a “Global Policeman.” His response to those who feel as though the United States is overstepping sovereignty is that “we protect the rights of the individual in our own nation, and to turn our backs on other individuals outside our nations is to turn our backs on the Constitution.”
Secretary of State

Frank Walker, a career diplomat, joined the Foreign Service in 1977 and held a series of embassy, State Dept., national security, and Defense Dept. posts before serving as ambassador (1985-87) to Argentina and a State Dept. assistant secretary (1987-90) and under secretary (1990-94). He was deputy secretary of state (1989-92) and Secretary of State (1998-current) under President Dirks.

His experience in Argentina is extensive, and he has always favored strong foreign ties with Latin America. He stresses that each individual nation has its own identity and culture; each nation should be dealt with on an individual basis, instead of dealing with the region as a whole.

With a Ph.D. in Latin American Studies, Dr. Walker played a key role in the Panamanian drug interdiction of 1989, when US officials arrested Manuel Noriega. He is a strong supporter of passive drug interdiction. He is in support of continuing US economic aid to Latin American nations to turn around their economies. He believes that through economic reform in these developing nations, the drug problems will cease to exist. Although his expertise lies in foreign affairs, his stance on domestic drug laws calls for a rapid increase in penalties for selling illegal drugs. On the principle of supply and demand, if consumers in the United States were deterred from purchasing such illegal drugs, then Latin American countries would be forced to find other means of income.

A strong supporter of defense conversion by funding job-placement and job-training programs for displaced military personnel and defense technology workers, he believes that at times it is necessary for the United States to use military force outside of the realm of the United Nations or other international organizations. The United States is the leading military and economic power and needs to maintain and exercise that role. Frank Walker supports increased foreign aid to all nations in need, especially those nations that are in our backyard. Nuclear non-proliferation is a strong point on Walker’s agenda. Walker would like to see strict sanctions placed on any nation selling technology or products that aid in the construction of nuclear weapons.
Attorney General

Joseph Robb, attorney general of the United States, graduate of Harvard Law School (1963), he was assistant state's attorney (1973-76) and state's attorney (1978-93) for Dade County, Fla. Known for his attention to child abuse and children's rights cases, juvenile justice reform, and drug abuse cases, he was appointed U.S. attorney general by Pres. Dirks in 1993.

A pro-choice advocate and strong supporter of affirmative action, Mr. Robb would like to see a strong increase in the penalties for selling drugs. He supports mandatory drug testing for federal employees, and expanded efforts to stop the illegal flow of drugs to the United States from other countries. He has worked closely with the Drug Enforcement Agency and Customs to create new programs that will better assist the crackdown on illegal drug use. He also believes some of the battle can be fought on the home front. Robb has lobbied Congress for expanded federal support for education and drug treatment programs.

Robb does not take an active role in foreign affairs, but has many times met with State Department officials, as well as other responsible for the flow of illegal narcotics into the country. The purpose of these meetings has been to establish both domestic and foreign policies on drug interdiction. His ideas revolve around the idea that only through co-operation and complimentary programs can the problem be completely eliminated.
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations

Ambassador Patricia Jameson is a veteran Foreign Service officer of the U.S. State Department. She has served the Department for more than three decades. She began her career in East Asian nations such as South Korea and Japan and rose to the ranks of the leadership of the State Department. During the civil wars in the Balkans during the Early 1990s, Jameson worked diligently to reach a peace accord among the warring factions involved. Ambassador Jameson is known in diplomatic circles for her passionate belief in peace and the effectiveness of international organizations such as the United Nations.

Ambassador Jameson believes that the best way to resolve international disputes is through the United Nations. She believes it is best to work out these conflicts through the international system rather than by taking unilateral action. She understands the difficulties in working within the U.N. system, and thus believes that other multi-lateral channels can also be affective. To this end, she views the NATO intervention in the crisis in Kosovo as instrumental in achieving peace and security in the Balkans. She considers unilateral action to be a great threat to international justice. Thus, she believes that any action taken to combat drugs in Colombia is a great threat unless it is done in an international arena such as the U.N. Ambassador Jameson is very skeptical of U.S. action in Colombia because it appears to be secretive and brought about by unclear motives. She has sought to make negotiations for U.S. assistance to Colombia a more open process.

Jameson’s support for the actions to halt human rights violations in Kosovo reveal her approval of using U.S. military power for this goal. Unlike many of her opponents in Congress and in the leadership of the Armed Forces, she believes that stopping human rights violations is in fact a strategic U.S. interest. In this issue she has remained extremely outspoken, calling for greater U.N. involvement in conflicts involving human rights. Therefore, she has been a staunch proponent of the International Criminal Court and active U.S. opposition to violent rulers such as Slobodan Milosevic.


Legislative Committee Roles
Senate Foreign Relations Chair

Timothy M. Richards (R-NE) has been a member of the United States Senate for over twenty years. He has remained loyally committed to the values of the Republican Party that first got him elected to the Senate from the state of Nebraska. Senator Richards has served on the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations for the past 15 years, and has chaired the committee for the last 3 years. As Chairman, he has been very active in passing congressional legislation concerning matters of international conflict, hoping to give Senators and Representatives a stronger voice in the development of U.S. foreign policy. Although he is knowledgeable about most areas of foreign affairs, the views he publicly expresses are usually related to his position as a leader in the Republican Party. But despite his close ties to the Republican philosophy, Richards has earned his peers’ respect in Congress, and is a formidable voice in the discourse on U.S. foreign policy.

One of Sen. Richard’s primary concerns has been the nature of American military involvement in international conflict, especially within the context of international organizations, such as the United Nations. Sen. Richards has made extensive criticisms of the United Nations, and has frequently encouraged reforms within the U.N. system, suggestions that have not always been favorably received by other members of the international community. He is fiercely protective of U.S. national interests, and has argued that organizations such as the United Nations sometimes deal inefficiently with the resources provided by the United States.

In spite of these criticisms, Sen. Richards is not unwilling to engage the U.S. military in international conflict. During the escalation of tension in Yugoslavia, Sen. Richards was one of the most vocal critics of Slobodan Milosevic and the aggression Serbian police committed against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Richards frequently articulated possibilities of undermining the Serbian government, and supported the NATO air strikes that occurred last year. Even now, he decries the corruption of the Milosevic government and the war crimes committed by Serbian leaders.

At the same time, Sen. Richards feels very strongly that the United States should set certain priorities in its involvement in international conflict. Recently he has claimed that the U.S. military should resolve its operations in Kosovo and Bosnia before extending its reach into other regions such as Africa. Although he is not insensitive to concerns for human rights, he often feels that the United States does not have the resources to perform frequent acts of humanitarian intervention.

Richards is a firm believer in the sovereignty of nations, and in the strength of democratic representation of the American people. As such, he does not hold an isolationist view of international relations, but he does want to safeguard the interests and resources of the United States. As Chair of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Richards strives to make the legislative branch of the federal government an active participant in U.S. foreign policy.
Senate Foreign Relations Ranking Member

Daisy S. Gorman's (D-VT) tenure as Ranking Member of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations is only the latest development in a long political career. She has been a Senator for 18 years, and has been a member of Congress for 22 years. Senator Gorman, known for her personal political ambitions, has long been a vocal supporter for a strong U.S. military strength in the face of international conflict. Like her counterpart, Senator Timothy Richards, Gorman enjoys the respect of her peers in Congress. Gorman maintains political philosophy very similar to that of the President, and has been a loyal supporter of the President's foreign policy, even during severe criticism.

One of the hallmarks of Sen. Gorman's views on foreign policy is a support for international and regional organizations. After the highpoint of tension in Kosovo and Serbia during NATO's Belgrade air strikes of last year, Sen. Gorman made several statements on the value of such organizations as NATO. She defended the success of the operation, and encouraged the continued presence of U.S. and U.N. troops in the region, as long as violence continued in the area. Likewise, Sen. Gorman has expressed her faith in the effectiveness of the United Nations, unlike Sen. Richards. Gorman believes that international operations in response to intense regional conflict can be an effective tool for responding to human rights abuses.

As one of the more visible actors on the stage of American domestic politics, Gorman cannot help but be sensitive to the motives of the Democratic and Republican parties. She has recently observed how legislation on foreign policy has been used by certain Congressmen to paint the administration in particularly negative lights. Gorman is concerned about the upcoming Presidential election, and is hopeful that the Democratic nominee will be successful, especially considering her own hopes to serve as a member of a Democratic Presidential Cabinet. One of her priorities now is to maintain a strong stance as a leader of Democratic Senators, and to keep the policies of the Democratic Party at the forefront of the discourse on foreign policy.

Senator Gorman is known to emphasize concerns for human rights, to encourage the unity and success of particular governmental organizations such as NATO, and to illustrate the advantages of international economic cooperation. She does not fear involvement in various regions of the developing world, provided that there is considerable potential for American success. She does not want to overextend U.S. military resources, but she is committed to the protection of democratic and humanitarian interests in other areas of the world.
House Appropriations Committee Chair

The rise of Tom Jordan (R-WI) to the ranking membership on the House Appropriations in 1998 represented the triumph of an idea whose time had come. The idea in this case was trimming the federal-budget deficit. This was a cause to which Jordan dedicated himself throughout his career, first as director of the Congressional Budget Office, then as a scholarly specialist in federal fiscal policy, and finally in the House Appropriations committee. More than any of his Republican predecessors in Congress, Jordan is obliged by politics and economics to strive to stem the tide of red ink flooding the government.

To be sure, the Republican leadership’s acceptance of this necessity was not as immediate or as total as Jordan and his allies might have wished. And this fact, along with Jordan’s strong willed personality, may have delayed his elevation to the Appropriations committee, which many in Washington believed he would be chairing one day. The president and other Democrats are fearful that the fiscal stringency advocated by Jordan and others would hinder the president’s ability to keep his campaign and international promises.

Jordan continues to challenge the wisdom of lavishing billions on domestic and foreign programs that could be used to cut back the deficit. The president and his political advisers seem to be more accepting of the ideas Jordan advocates. “He sees not only past the next election but into the next generation,” said Daniel Coudriet, one of the president’s political advisers, who initially had resisted Jordan’s preachments of austerity. “He’s helped me see that paying down the deficit is a necessary first step to expanding the economy.” This attitude is widely shared among Jordan’s political adversaries.
House Appropriations Committee Ranking Member

The huge burden of Third World debt, which most experts agree never will be paid off, is taking center stage in Harriet Hubbard’s (D-NM) political agenda. As the ranking member on the House Appropriations committee, Hubbard is proposing that the United States take strong measures to write off much of the debt and make new loans available. There is little dispute that the levels of debt are such that just keeping up their interest payments is draining developing countries of their only real means of future prosperity.

Writing down debts that will never be repaid reflects economic logic. It is also a moral imperative for the world’s richest economy. But it is equally a national strategic imperative as the US responds to problems around the world. When the US helps these countries build the basis for growth and stability, it helps prevent future crises—and so provide important forward defense of American interests. Building a safer world for Americans out of the ashes of the Cold War has reduced the American annual defense budget by $107 billion in real terms in the past 10 years.

This initiative will support more people-centered policies in places where children are today more likely to die before reaching the age of five than to learn to read, and corruption and poor governance are major blocks to economic growth. With the new framework in place, countries would not receive further debt relief without demonstrating their commitment to strong policies aimed at rapid growth and poverty reduction, and accountable and transparent government. Nor would they receive relief without credible ways of demonstrating that savings produced by reduced debt servicing obligations will result in higher levels of spending on reducing infant mortality and other core social goals.

It maximizes American financial effectiveness in promoting the right kind of change in these economies. Because of the leverage implicit in America’s own contribution, and the contributions from other countries that American support would set in train, every dollar we appropriate for this effort could leverage as much as $90 in debt relief for these economies. In the end, the only ones who can offer the poorest countries a better future are their own governments and citizens. But Congress can serve America’s deepest interests, and those of the global economy as whole, by helping these countries make a fresh start.
Senate Majority Leader

During 32 years in politics, Virginia Republican Senator Jennifer Mattaliano has established herself as a forceful defender of conservative principles and a slashing critic of her Democratic opponents. Nevertheless, according to many observers, it was her pragmatism rather than any ideological purity that led the GOP caucus in November 1996 to elect her Senate majority leader, succeeding the retiring Sen. Preston Anderson (R-CO).

Since taking the oath of office, Mattaliano has played a strong, active role in controlling the Senate floor and as party mediator. Trying to preserve as much of the Republican agenda as possible, Mattaliano has focused particular attention on cutting the federal budget deficit. She was criticized by her home state for siding with the White House administration in opposing farm-credit legislation, and White House officials were pleased with her efforts on behalf of missile funding and aid to the Colombian government. Ever the pragmatist, however, the 64 year-old Mattaliano has differed from the Republican line when necessary to build a workable Senate program. At midyear, for example, she indicated that a tax revision proposal would have to wait for Congress to complete its deficit-reduction work.

Mattaliano’s plans to reduce the budget deficit include cutting back profoundly on aid given to international organizations, especially the United Nations. The Senator views that the United States should not provide nearly a quarter of this organization’s budget when other member-nations provide so little monetary assistance. The proposals also include reducing well-fare and reducing foreign aid to Third World nations. Sen. Mattaliano is adamant that no aid should be given to nations that are calling for a cancellation or freezing of their foreign debts.
Senate Minority Leader

No sooner had Mike Lowden, D-KY, been selected as the Democratic Party’s next Senate leader than critics labeled him as a “Dirks Clone,” chosen to underline the main features of Dirks’ own political appeal. Besides being a Southerner, like President Dirks (LA), Lowden was another representative of the baby-boom generation and came from the same sector of the ideological spectrum as did Dirks, a point just slightly to the left of the center.

Lowden has spent his time on Capitol Hill focusing on national defense and on drug control. In the national defense area, Lowden made nuclear-arms control his specialty and was given a leading role in fashioning the Democratic alternative to President Reagan’s reliance on heavy multi-warhead nuclear missiles. He also was one of the few prominent Democrats to support President Bush’s request to use force in the Persian Gulf War. But the drug control issue is the subject considered closest to his heart, reflected by his focus in the Senate on the dangers of drug use and the crime that it leads to and by the 1990 publication of his book, *Destroying the Bond*. This book told of his relations with his sister and the impact that her severe drug abuse had on their sibling relationship and how in 1995 it led to her suicide.

Senator Lowden has proposed bills that would authorize the President to use any military means necessary to intercept and eradicate the drugs flowing into the United States. Each time his proposals have gone down in defeat as Senators from both aisles claim they give the President too much power. Lowden is expected to re-introduce his bill the same day that the Congress is to begin debate on the situation in Colombia. Most analysts expect him to attach this bill as a rider on anything-proposed legislation dealing with Colombia.
House Majority Leader

John Casteen (R-IL) has been the House Majority leader for the past seven years. An expert on economics, having received his doctorate in economics at the University of Virginia, he has advocated for tax cuts to improve the life quality in the United States. In regards to free trade, his views have been clearly articulated in the recent article he wrote for the Washington Times stating his disagreement over the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

Casteen is strongly against providing economic aid to developing countries and believes in the building and developing of the US military. The Congressman firmly believes that American forces should be utilized immediately in any conflict that could jeopardize the excellent economic status of the United States. In fact, Casteen recently pressed the president to deal with the China issue on trade as both the Senate and the House were recommending him to do so. Forming part of the Republican leadership, he has not agreed with many of the proposals made by the current administration and has been very controversial in dealing with the president. Casteen has always been for military intervention in those cases that adversely impact the American economy, but has no qualms in sending troops into foreign countries for the purpose of solving those nations’ domestic conflicts.

Casteen, a prominent conservative, proclaimed on the cover of National Review “the war on drugs is lost” and has urged that hard drugs be legalized. By legalizing drugs, the Congress could then be able to pass laws to regulate them. Public support for legalization is scant on Capitol Hill and among Americans. He believes that America’s efforts to reduce the drug supply have failed and that America should turn its focus to reducing demand through education and treatment programs.

The goal of US drug policy has always been to curtail, if not eliminate, the flow of drugs into the United States, an idea that Casteen views as simple in concept but difficult in execution. In terms of effectiveness and cost-to-benefit ratio, the best way to do this is to eradicate the source. If governments can eradicate crops to prevent cultivation of the coca or poppies that are turned into cocaine or heroin, the narcotics will never enter the distribution system. Congressman Casteen, realizing that Congress will never legalize drugs has therefore advocated the eradication of these crops. While he believes interdiction is always an option, he believes that this has not slowed the flow of drugs as others will replace those arrested. But, if you destroy the crop then you destroy the drugs. This is an extremely costly program, but due to his charisma he has been able to bring other members of the House to his side. Casteen wants Congress to help fund, supply, and operate the campaign in Colombia to eradicate the coca fields. He believes that the root of Colombia’s political turmoil is wrapped up in these drugs and by eradicating them will free Colombia and allow it to finally prosper.
House Minority Leader

Penny Rue, Democratic representative from New York, is recognized as an expert on tax law and revolutionized the House when she participated in the Ways and Means and Budget committees, where she quickly became a national leader on health care, tax fairness, and trade. Trade has always been an issue of utmost importance for the House Minority Leader, for she believes that America should always maintain good foreign relations and by all means try to avoid military intervention. She has always advocated and promulgated a policy of sanctions and diplomatic efforts to resolve domestic problems in other countries.

Rue believes that human rights should permeate American foreign policy. In fact, just such an approach is required under laws adopted since the 1970s that prohibit arms sales, economic aid and the disbursement of American military aid, education, and training; and US government support for loans by the international financial institutions and insurance for overseas investments to countries that practice consistent patterns of human rights abuses. Exceptions are permitted for security assistance if the president determines that extraordinary circumstances so require, but this contingency has not been invoked.

Rue believes that circumstances in which other interests outweigh human rights concerns may occur, but the task is to keep these at a minimum and even then to use Congressional leverage such as the impositions of sanctions and other limitations on trade to reduce abuses. Of course, in questions of trade, it will be argued that America will lose markets to governments that do not speak out on human rights. Obviously, there would be a cost, and the willingness to bear it is a measure of America’s commitment to human rights. At the same time, the United States cannot bear the disproportionate cost of this international obligation.
Senate Arms Services Chair

Sen. Janet Wagner (R-OR) believes that Congress should have a stronger voice in the shaping of foreign policy, and in particular the use of the military in the nation’s foreign policy. She believes that although the President and the Executive branch have the power to formulate the nation's foreign policy, Congress has the mandate of oversight of the implementation of foreign policy and its support through the armed forces.

In response to plans for military assistance against the war on drugs in Colombia, Senator Wagner has expressed her skepticism of the plans. She believes that any such plans should be looked over by Congress and approved by the Senate. Senator Wagner believes that it is in the interest of the United States to take action in Colombia to reduce and eventually end drug trafficking, but she believes that Congress must have oversight over these operations to ensure the safety of U.S. troops and the cost effectiveness in relation to U.S. interests.

Senator Wagner has viewed the U.S. military interventions in Kosovo as well as those in Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti negatively. She believes that the U.S. military should not be used to put a stop to violations of human rights. Rather, Wagner believes that the U.S. Armed Forces should only be mobilized when the interests of the American people are being threatened. Senator Wagner believes that by using the military in these human rights cases, the U.S. armed forces have been overused. “Our forces are faced with a measurable decline in readiness…while performing with great distinction in the recent conflict in Kosovo and in numerous other deployments around the world, they are simply overstretched. They are beginning to show the strains of overuse.” Wagner believes that deployments such as Kosovo cause the military to waste its few resources allotted to it in the appropriations process.
Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Roles
Representative of Demilitarization for Democracy (DFD)

Bill Sanderson has been working for Demilitarization for Democracy (DFD) for the past 4 years. Demilitarization for Democracy is an advocacy group that is committed to emphasizing demilitarization in the developing world, as well as the development of democratic governments and institutions. DFD has been especially active in fighting issues such as arms transfers, training, and other U.S. military and financial support for non-democratic governments. By focusing on research and public education, DFD hopes to encourage the United States to reduce its military presence in the developing world, but to continue contributing to the progress of peaceful and free societies worldwide.

As the liaison between the DFD and Capitol Hill, Sanderson is very concerned about current legislation on developments in Colombia and other parts of the developing world. Before coming to DFD, he worked in various offices in Washington, DC, including the Latin American Working Group, which examined policies and events that affected regional interests as a whole. He feels strongly about what should characterize the relationship between the United States and Colombia.

Sanderson has been called to deliberations on this issue because of his knowledge of the subject and his commitment to democracy in the developing world. His stance on the U.S. military, however, may lead to political clashes with other members of the group. Sanderson, as representative of the DFD, feels that promoting values of equality, democracy, and freedom are the most important tasks that the United States could perform. He is very suspicious of military actions that may not provide a lasting peace to the region. American resources might be better directed towards resources for human development and welfare, rather than weapons purchases and troop deployments.
Human Rights Watch Lobbyist

José Manuel Vicencio is 50 years old and is a Colombian by birth, but became a U.S. citizen after he went to the United States for school. He grew up seeing the injustices his countrymen faced on a daily basis and has made it a personal mission of his to help Colombians and other people worldwide through Human Rights Watch, a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization dedicated to the protection of human rights worldwide.

He is opposed in general to military regimes, he feels that Human Rights are most often observed under peaceful conditions, in a democracy when possible. In particular, Vicencio is unimpressed with Colombia’s military leaders’ efforts to sever ties with paramilitary groups responsible for gross human rights violations. He feels that if Colombia’s leaders cannot or will not halt this support for paramilitary groups, the government's resolve to end human rights abuse by units that receive U.S. security assistance must be seriously questioned.

Vicencio is quick to point out the serious and shameful failures of U.S. policy in the hemisphere during the Cold War, when human rights were repeatedly ignored, undermined, or openly contravened in favor of continued support for the region's most brutal and abusive regimes, among them Chile under General Pinochet. The United States may have an excellent Human Rights record on its own soil, but standards seem to drop when foreign lands are concerned.

The last thing Vicencio wants is military intervention from the United States. Nothing positive would ever come from that. Vicencio believes all U.S. security assistance should be conditioned on explicit actions by the Colombian Government to sever links, at all levels, between the Colombian military and paramilitary groups.

Furthermore, Vicencio wants the United States to urge Colombia to pass and rigorously enforce laws that protect human rights including laws penalizing forced disappearance, unlawful detention, and torture.

Vicencio is concerned for human rights defenders in Colombia, for they are among the most at-risk groups in Colombia. The United States should support their work by increasing funding for non-governmental groups. Funds should help strengthen their ability to investigate and report on human rights violations.

Finally, Vicencio wants to push the United States to provide increased funding for Colombia’s forcibly displaced, not only those who may be forced to abandon their homes because of future coca eradication efforts. Currently Colombia ranks third in the world in terms of the number of forcibly displaced people. Aid should be channeled through the church and independent aid and human rights groups rather than the government, in view of the latter's previous failure to follow through with promised assistance.
Director of Amnesty International

At only 29, Ms. Andrea Lacueda is the youngest director of the organization to date. She was born in Argentina, but left the country at the age of 16 to go to the University of Pennsylvania. Ms. Lacueda graduated at the age of 19, a newly-naturalized U.S. citizen, with a double major in Foreign Affairs and Business Administration. After a brief enrollment at the Kennedy School of Government she joined the Peace Corps. Her first assignment was to Colombia where she became very close with the people of her village; however, was forced to leave that country less than a year after appointment for starting a violent protest in the streets of Bogotá. This protest was related to the reported Human Rights violations taking place within Colombia at the time. Saying that she found her calling, Ms. Lacueda joined Amnesty International as a clerk at the age of 21, but quickly moved through the ranks of the international agency and became director less than eight years later. At the ceremony for her new appointment, she spoke in 10 different languages, but in English she said, “Now is the time when there are governments in the world that have the power and money to stop all human rights violations, but they do not. They sit by idly and let oppressive dictators control people. I am committed to ending this.”

Lacueda believes that the killings must stop and atrocities must be fully and impartially investigated and those responsible be brought to justice in full compliance with the principles of international humanitarian law. Lacueda is staunchly against the idea of a US military effort in Colombia and does not favor methods of action including embargoes and distancing of the US from Colombia.

Colombians need the US to help its groups cooperate, not to turn a blind eye.

Lacueda is alarmed at the number of hostages taken and used as bargaining chips in Colombia (including a bishop in 1999). Lacueda believes the taking of civilians as hostages to press the government to engage in peace talks can never be justified and constitutes a gross violation of international humanitarian law. In a recent statement, she said, “Respect for human rights is an essential cornerstone to building peace. Taking civilians hostage – and conditioning their release on the government’s acceptance of conditions imposed for participation in peace talks – is simply contemptible and will never lead to a society free from political violence and insecurity.

“The human rights organization reiterates its call for all parties to the long-running armed conflict in Colombia -- armed opposition groups, the Colombian armed forces and paramilitary groups operating with their support or acquiescence – to ensure full compliance with the principles of international humanitarian law.”
Media Roles
Washington Times Reporter

Herbert Wilfred Wilson III is one of the most respected writers at the Washington Times. He started out as a coffee boy for The Washington Times when he was just fifteen, and he developed an extremely conservative political ideology from this young age. In the 1960s, he took a lot of heat for remaining loyal to Nixon during the Vietnam War and even through the beginning of the Watergate scandal. His parents were personal friends of the Nixons, and it was difficult for Wilson to write negatively about him, but he felt compelled to report the facts once they truly surfaced. His conviction that the truth must be told is as strong as his loyalty. For both of these traits, he is highly respected by journalists and politicians alike. Even the most liberal politicians don’t mind talking to him, because they know he will at least be fair to them, though not overly enthusiastic. His conservative slant is definitely apparent in his writing, but he makes no apologies for this. “I report the facts, and one of those facts is that Republicans know how to run this country.”
CNN White House Correspondent

Growing up twenty minutes outside of Washington probably had a great deal to do with why Angela Brown sought out the position of White House Correspondent for CNN. She was always amazed and mystified by the power and prestige of the Presidency, and for her, most of this came directly from the White House. Still unmarried at the age of 31, she is a powerful, stunning woman who commands respect simply by entering the room. Politicians are captivated by her genuine interest in the domestic and foreign issues that face America. They take it as a sign of her interest in them and are flattered.

A graduate of Harvard, she returned to Washington to finish a Masters in journalism at George Washington University. Swept rapidly through the media ranks of Seattle, Miami and New York; she found a place as a correspondent at CNN at the age of 27. Always willing to talk with Ms. Brown, politicians were willing to give her stories from her first day on the job. She made friends very quickly and has always been one to get her way in the business world. Often she gets the news quicker than most, which leads to the speculation that she has a very reliable source in the White House, and is leaked information from this source.
New York Times Foreign Correspondent

Many people who psychoanalyze Robert Helimay come to one conclusion; he has no fear. Helimay grew up around the world, the son of a military father. He was living in Germany at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, when the world was alerted to the real possibility of war both in Berlin and Cuba. For this reason, it must have been most rewarding to report live from Berlin as the great wall of ideological difference fell to the ground. Known for his willingness to report from anywhere in the world, he obviously carries the love of traveling that his father had as a young soldier. Just over fifty, this wise old figure of the old reporting style does his work the old-fashioned way, investigation. Never expecting the answer to be just handed to him, Helimay has developed a huge network of individuals to whom he turns whenever he needs a lead.

His most recent stories of note have been in Iraq during the 1998 bombing raid, and a recent expose on power struggles in Africa. His first book, Conflict Resolution in My Life, is expected to hit the stands at the end of this year, and reflects many of the amazing stories he has reported to the world. Always a believer in the notion that the world is good and is just misguided, his colleagues and politicians around the world love Helimay. Perhaps the only criticism of Robert is that he often falls into the trap of an analogous thinker, making comparisons between everything he reports and past events.
Religious Broadcasting Network Reporter

Gary Leonard was born in 1930, in a small Virginia town, to a politician father, who had ancestral linkages to America’s great leaders. After graduating with honors from a small military prep school, enlisting in the U.S. Marine Corps, graduating magna cum laude with a Bachelor of Arts degree from a prominent Virginia school, Leonard served as the assistant adjutant of the First Marine Division in combat in Korea. He was promoted to first lieutenant in 1952 upon his return to the United States. Later he received a juris doctor degree from Yale University Law School in 1955 and a master of divinity degree from New York Theological Seminary in 1959.

Leonard has achieved national and international recognition as a religious broadcaster, philanthropist, educator, religious leader, businessman, and author. He is the founder and chairman of the Religious Broadcasting Network, and founder of Regent University, a fully accredited graduate school that offers degrees in communication, education, counseling, business, divinity, government, law, and organizational leadership. With so many varying interests in the world, Leonard has been limited to his role in reporting. He has become an anchorman on his own network, often sitting for long interviews, but rarely seeking much that can be considered “news” anymore.
Related Web Links

USIP Colombia Web Links
http://www.usip.org/library/regions/colombia.html

Human Rights Watch: The “Sixth Division” Military-paramilitary Ties and U.S. Policy in Colombia
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/colombia/

http://hrw.org/wr2k2/americas4.html

http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2001/3509.htm

The Center for International Policy’s Colombia Project
http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/

Amnesty International: Reports on Colombia

Relief Web: Miscellaneous Reports/Documents dealing with Colombia: Summer 2001.