THE FUTURE ROLES FOR STABILITY POLICE UNITS WORKSHOP
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CONFERENCE REPORT
Assessing the Role of Stability Police Units

On April 4-5 2005, the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU), the Institute for National Strategic Studies, the United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) conducted a two-day assessment of “The Role of Stability Police Units” in peace operations at the National Defense University in Washington, DC.

The objectives for the workshop were to advance the development of common doctrine and operational procedures for all parties involved in the employment of Stability Police Units (SPU) and to assist CoESPU in establishing a network for discussion and harmonization of SPU doctrine. The focus of the discussion was on the international response to the riots in Kosovo on March 17-19, 2004, and the lessons that should be learned from that experience.

This report summarizes the panel discussions, with an emphasis on what doctrine currently specifies and how the response to the Kosovo riots might inform that doctrine. The report concludes by identifying gaps in current doctrine and discrepancies among the international organizations that field SPUs.

I. SPU Doctrine: Current Status

A. Roles and missions of Stability Police Units

Stability police are robust and armed police units that are capable of performing specialized law enforcement and public order functions that require disciplined group action. They are trained in and have the capacity for the appropriate use of less-than-lethal as well as lethal force. The gendarmerie and carabinieri type of forces are examples of organizations possessing this hybrid of police and military characteristics, while police organizations with their own distinct policing traditions have police units capable of performing these functions.

1. United Nations (UN)
The United Nations deploys Formed Police Units (FPUs) in support to UN peacekeeping operations. Depending on the mission mandate, these units may perform a wide range of police functions including but not limited to dealing with public order and threats to peace, static security of vulnerable buildings, mobile security of vulnerable areas, VIP protection, criminal information gathering, counter terrorism and counter insurgency operations, surveillance, election security, road blocks and checks, barricade reconnaissance and removal, house search, vehicle search, escort duty and training of
local police agencies in crowd control and law and order duties. FPUs are deployed to field missions with appropriate crowd and riot control equipment and training in order to deal with threats to the peace and situations that are beyond the control of the local police. They operate within the UN Police component with a deterrent effect and credible response to challenges by violent obstructionist elements opposed to the peace settlement and international mandate.

FPUs also assist in the development of indigenous capacity to perform these specialized functions. Among other tasks, FPUs assist, support and mentor the local police, especially anti-riot units. They may also assist humanitarian agencies and other international entities recognized by the UN. Their missions could be summarized as:

“Cover” or protect the population,
“Control” lawlessness and major disturbances, and
“Clone” by developing local police counterparts to perform the above functions.

Formed Police Units are one of several separate but coordinated units within UN Police Component of a UN mission, which also typically include individual UN Police and Border Police, Canine Police and other specialized teams, such as SWAT. Each FPU is comprised of 115-125 police personnel.

2. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
In NATO these elements are referred to as Multinational Specialized Units (MSUs). They are formed of police forces with military training, capabilities, and status. MSUs have ranged in size from 250 to 600 personnel, depending on the mission. They perform specialized duties related to the restoration and maintenance of public order immediately following armed conflict and in peace and stability operations. MSUs are deployed to perform essential public order functions that are beyond the capacity of individual international police while a local police force is being developed. Their functions include enforcing law and order, managing civil disturbances, gathering police intelligence, countering organized crime and terrorism, and training local police forces. They operate under the same rules of engagement as the NATO military force to which they are assigned.

3. European Union (EU)
The EU has created Integrated Police Units (IPUs) to provide a readily deployable specialized policing capability for situations that neither military combat forces nor individual police are wholly adequate at confronting. The IPU is a police component that meets the following conditions according to the European Council conclusions of Feira and Nice: robust, rapidly deployable, flexible and interoperable forces, able to perform executive law enforcement tasks, preferably to be deployed in non-stabilized situations.

The role of the IPU varies based on the concept of operations and whether the mission entails substitution for or strengthening of the local police. When the local police have either ceased to function or have been one of the sources of internal conflict, international police, including IPUs, may need to substitute for them and perform law enforcement
functions until a new local police force can be trained and begin to operate effectively. In a substitution role the IPU, together with the other international police elements, exercises executive authority in policing duties. In such highly destabilized environments the IPU can help to deter, mitigate and de-escalate resort to violence. In the stabilization stage of a substitution mission or in a strengthening mission, international police and IPUs also assist the establishment, reconstruction and reorganization of local police.

B. Current status of doctrinal development

Doctrine consists of a broad statement of guidelines for acceptable methodologies, procedures and techniques for the conduct of operations and to resolve issues likely to be encountered in the field.

1. United Nations
The UN has developed Formed Police Units Guidelines that address the roles they perform and such administrative matters as pre-deployment preparation, deployment, leave policies, medical care, financial arrangements, and other forms of support while on mission. In order to execute its role, UN has issued policies for “Directive Use of Force” and “Standard Operating Procedures.” The FPU Selection Guidelines, currently being implemented, will assist Police Contributing Countries to select and prepare their police personnel according to UN selection standards and requirements. The UN Police Division is currently developing a doctrine for Formed Police Units.

2. North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NATO has not yet promulgated a formal body of doctrine for the use of MSUs. It currently relies upon the NATO Charter and Allied Joint Doctrine, along with MSU procedures developed on the basis of experience, notably within the Balkans. Allied Joint Doctrine recognizes that NATO forces need to be trained and equipped for a range of crisis management tasks, including public security and border control. Allied Joint Doctrine for Peace Support Operations contains a chapter that addresses circumstances when local police forces cannot be relied upon.

3. European Union
The European Union has promulgated “Guidelines for rapid deployment of Integrated Police Units - IPUs - and other Police elements in the initial stage of an EU-led substitution mission and interoperability of IPUs and Police Headquarters.” This document addresses issues relating to the initial deployment of IPUs. Another document under consideration addresses the role of other police components that may support the deployment of IPUs.
II. Command, Control, and Coordination

A. Current Doctrine

1. United Nations

Formed Police Units are always deployed under the command and control of a UN Police Commissioner. As a result of lessons learned from the Kosovo riots, FPUs now act under the tactical coordination of the Region/District Commander of the police region where they are operating. They abide by the provisions of the UN police policy and procedures manual and follow UN directives and procedures regarding the use of force and firearms. (lethal and less-than-lethal). In a typical UN mission, UN police and UN military components are under the single authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary General. A Memorandum of Understanding between the two components is used to address co-ordination.

2. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Multinational Specialized Units are an integral part of the NATO military force and are always deployed under the direct command and control of the overall NATO force commander. This is in keeping with doctrine for “Command and Control of Allied Joint Operations” which stipulates that the command structure should permit capabilities to be brought to bear decisively by a clear chain of command. Liaison with key actors outside the military chain of command, such as local and international police, government officials, and NGOs, is recognized as an essential corollary to this principle.

NATO has established procedures for providing tactical control of the scene of a civil disturbance to the MSU commander. The area under MSU tactical control is known as the “blue box.” The on-scene military commander is responsible for securing the outer perimeter or “green box.” MSU deployment is intended to take place in a precise location and within a designated timeframe, in coordination with other elements of the international mission. Once the situation that justified the need for an MSU force is mitigated, policing authority is restored to the entity that had been exercising it previously.

Since the riots in Kosovo, KFOR has developed procedures for coordination and integration with the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) Police. Their crowd control procedures address civil and military authority, planning, supporting information for planning, and command issues.

European Union (EU)

Integrated Police Units may be deployed under the international police commissioner or temporarily under the responsibility of the military authority entrusted with the protection of the population. The EU recognizes that during the anarchic early stages of a mission, individual police may not be available in significant numbers and the environment may be too hostile for them to function effectively. Such conditions, associated with
substitution missions, would dictate that IPUs be assigned to the force commander. Once the security environment permits, these units may come under the command of the Police Head of Mission.

EU command and control procedures for responding to a civil disturbance are virtually the same as NATO’s. The on-scene Military Force Commander should establish a “green box” around the area of instability. This “green box” includes an incident control point, which serves as a tactical command and coordination space for the Military Force Commander, the IPU commander, local authorities, and others, such as representatives from international organizations and NGOs. The IPU operates inside a Tactical Area of Responsibility called a “blue box” that encompasses the public order operation. The Military Force Commander delegates authority within the “blue box” to the IPU Commander who controls entrance/exit from the area as well as operations within it. Any local or international police operating inside the “blue box” will fall under the command of the IPU.

IPUs must establish liaison with local and international police organizations to ensure coordination. Technical agreements made with these police forces must stipulate that primacy in command will be given to the IPU in cases requiring crowd management and riot control.

B. Lessons from the Kosovo riots

On March 17-19 2004, KFOR and UNMIK Police confronted a province-wide assault mainly on ethnic minority communities across Kosovo that gravely stretched their resources. Fewer than 9,000 UN international police and Kosovo Police Service (KPS) personnel were available to confront rioters estimated to number from 20,000 to 50,000.

The response to this challenge, among others, was hampered by the lack of a command and control system to direct and coordinate efforts by KFOR and UNMIK. International police and military chains of command operated essentially independently. There was no central operations center where a comprehensive picture of the situation could be monitored and where coordinated decisions made.

In the absence of contingency planning and an integrated UNMIK-KFOR system for command and control, it was not possible to employ UNMIK Formed Police Units in tandem with KFOR combat forces in a manner that suited rapidly changing circumstances.

Lesson 1: Strategic direction
A mechanism needs to be developed to ensure that in time of crises the SRSG/Head of Mission, the senior police commander, and the senior military commander meet regularly to review events, to develop common strategic approaches, and to provide strategic direction.
Lesson 2: Joint command posts or full-time liaisons
Cultural differences between police and military organizations generally present an obstacle to overcoming command and control challenges. Police traditionally operate in a decentralized fashion with most operational decision-making taking place at the precinct level. Military contingents, on the other hand, tend to operate under the concept of centralized planning and decentralized execution. As a result, senior police leaders typically may not require a constant widespread visibility of operations being conducted by their policemen on the ground. Senior military commanders seek to maintain continuous communications with subordinate units and have permanent operations centers to provide an integrated command, control, and communications system. This ensures that a standing command and control capacity is available to respond to widespread disturbances.

While there is a tendency to separate police and military operations centers during peace and stability operations, the need to coordinate their responses to civil disturbances and to conduct other combined activities requires one of two approaches:

a. Co-locate military and police headquarters and regional operations centers to provide both senior police and military leaders with a common picture of events in their areas of responsibility. Enhance this synergy by ensuring that the boundaries of military and police areas of responsibility are coterminous, or

b. Assign full-time liaison officers (LNO) to military and police operations centers. These LNOs should have access to briefings and presentations, reliable communications with their parent organization, and immediate access to command authority in their organization.

Lesson 3: Common situational awareness
During a crisis such as the one that occurred in Kosovo, a representative of the SRSG/Head of Mission should be present in a joint military/police operations center along with the senior military and police commanders, whether the military component under the authority of the SRSG or not.

Lesson 4: Transfer of overall primacy from police to military
In highly destabilized environments, as often prevail at the inception of a mission, it may be necessary for the international military component to exercise overall primacy over the conduct of law enforcement responsibilities. Once the situation has been brought sufficiently under control and the international police contingent has been deployed in strength, overall primacy for policing is transferred from the military commander to the police commissioner/head of police component. The UN police commissioner will act in co-ordinate with the local police counterpart. This transfer of primacy cannot be regarded as immutable, however. As the Kosovo riots demonstrated, conditions can arise that place the mission in jeopardy, necessitating the transfer of primacy from the police to the military.
On-scene command of forces engaged in civil disturbance operations should evolve as the situation dictates. It is the local police responsibility to maintain law and order (if they are able), and their leaders should manage the response. If the situation exceeds local police capacity to control, then their forces should be integrated with the efforts of international Stability Police Units sent to quell the disturbance. Military units should be deployed in support of the SPU commander, who exercises tactical control over the scene of the disturbance (i.e. the “blue box”). If the situation deteriorates to the point that it is beyond the capacity of police service, the senior police commander available may transfer tactical primacy (i.e. tactical control) to the on-scene military commander. Primacy can only be transferred at the initiation of the police. This would typically be done when the nature of the challenge has grown to the point that it constitutes a threat to the mission itself.

Lesson 5: Secure communications
Police and military command centers must have the ability to talk to each other using a secure means of communication in an emergency.

Lesson 6: Contingency plans and periodic exercises for a full spectrum of responses
Planning for response to civil disturbances must be effected early in the deployment process. Police, military, and political planners must war game potential crisis situations and design response scenarios. Once these scenarios are designed, they must be exercised. This planning process may also highlight vulnerabilities of garrison or police station locations (vulnerable sites should be relocated) and the need for specialized equipment (riot control gear, less-than-lethal weapons, riot control agents, etc.), and appropriate communications equipment. Exercises will validate planning assumptions and test the ability of leaders to command and control multi-component forces engaged in dispersed locations. At a minimum, a command post exercise should be conducted whenever there is a major troop or SPU contingent rotation.

III. Intelligence and the Development of Admissible Evidence

A. Current Doctrine

1. United Nations (UN)
The pre-deployment training that FPUs receive only indirectly touches upon intelligence and the development of admissible evidence, such as barricade reconnaissance, searches and arrests, and check points. To this point, the UN has not envisaged employing the FPU as a primary resource for gathering intelligence.

2. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
NATO recognizes that MSUs provide the commander with a valuable investigative capability, either in collaboration with international police or when they are unavailable to perform this function. This may include investigations into high-profile offenses such as incidents of political violence, widespread looting, organized crime, and terrorism, as well as the orchestration of civil disturbances. Since MSUs are within the military chain
of command, obstacles to the integration of military and police intelligence are more manageable.

Since the riots in Kosovo KFOR has developed procedures for crowd and riot control situations that address gathering and protecting evidence, the use of photography, and intelligence gathering, including surveillance.

3. European Union (EU)

According to EU doctrine, criminal intelligence must direct information gathering operations with the aim of anticipating and preventing civil disturbances. It will be necessary for IPUs to gather information to obtain specific knowledge of the area of interest and of potential hot spots. This will be crucial for the successful deployment of IPUs in quick reaction operations, as well as for normal police operations in their respective tactical area of responsibility. The purpose is to provide strategic warning as well as to support specific policing operations, including the identification of instigators of violent civil disturbances. Specific coordinating measures between military combat units and IPUs must be put in place to ensure to avoid conflicting activities or duplication of effort.

B. Lessons from the Kosovo riots

The violence that erupted on March 17th caught UNMIK officials by surprise. While local news reporting on March 16th was instrumental in stoking emotions and mobilizing the massive unrest that would occur the following day, neither UNMIK nor KFOR monitored in real time the live TV broadcasts that chronicled the brewing crisis.

As the situation unfolded, the deployment of response forces was hampered by the lack of a shared operational awareness by UNMIK and KFOR of the location of incidents, the targets of violence, and the strategic use of roadblocks to impede movement of Specialized Police Units (SPUs).

Collection of evidence during the riots was impeded by an existing policy that precluded UNMIK SPUs from deploying to Kosovo with video taping capabilities. Subsequent efforts to prosecute organizers were hampered by the difficulty of obtaining permission for SPU personnel to testify.

Lesson 1: Strategic and tactical indicators

Intelligence collection should include a constant, comprehensive review of open source information. Print and electronic media review serves two critical purposes: First, as in the Kosovo example, it can provide a harbinger of developing events. Second, it can provide cues to decision-makers as to how they might want to direct their own information campaigns as they seek to quell rumors and discredit attempts to spread disinformation. Prompt action must be taken to bring the truth to the public before adverse action, based on the faulty information, results.

Lesson 2: Common situational awareness
NATO military units use the term “Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)” to describe the effort directed toward providing the tactical commander with the best possible information about a potential area of conflict. Elements of IPB are an analysis of key terrain (including population centers), the enemy order of battle (including political leaders), and potential enemy courses of action. While they don’t necessarily use the same terminology, police organizations use a similar method of analyzing the claimed territory, organizational structure, leadership, and prospective criminal activities of gangs. The threat assessments resulting from these two methodologies should be regularly reviewed in a collective manner by international political, military, and police authorities to establish a common situational awareness.

Lesson 3: Identifying ringleaders and obtaining admissible evidence for prosecution and conviction

Procedures must be established for collection of admissible evidence and apprehension of offenders during civil unrest. SPU s should possess the ability to gather information and evidence when deployed in a public order situation. Video teams and photographers should be used to gain the evidence required for subsequent arrests and action against those involved. This information can be passed to the international/indigenous police services for action. Constraints imposed by the applicable legal codes must be taken fully into account.

Police and military intelligence/information gathering efforts need to be coordinated. Military intelligence professionals are not trained to consider the rules of criminal evidence as they conduct their operations. By coordinating the two intelligence/information collection programs, synergy can be created that will foster future prosecutions by providing a broader information base that enhances evidence collection.

IV. Crowd and Riot Control: Equipment, Tactics, Training, and Exercises

A. Current Doctrine

1. United Nations

Equipment: UN Guidelines establish standard requirements for personnel equipment, riot gear including helmets and protective body armor, combat vehicles, support vehicles, armament; communication, catering, accommodation, surveillance, evidence recording equipment, medical supplies and other self-sustain equipment.

Tactics and Training: The Police Contributing Countries remain responsible to train their FPUs prior to deployment and to adapt specific tactics to the particular operational situation of the peacekeeping operations. In general the FPUs are to be trained, at a minimum, to perform the following tasks: embarking and disembarking from crowd control vehicles; dealing with roadblocks; conducting crowd dispersions: using of tear gas launchers and tear gas hand grenades; using gas masks; conducting barricade reconnaissance and removal; extracting instigators from a crowd; evacuating an occupied building; reacting to sniper fire when the unit is in a crowd control posture, including
medical evacuation; conducting hard entry and house search; arresting a dangerous suspect resisting arrest; operating vehicle checkpoints; providing building security; and providing VIP protection and escort. FPU personnel should be trained in map reading and first aid as well. All FPUs are assessed by the UN and must meet UN standards for performance of these tasks before deployment.

Exercises: Standard Operating Procedures, Directive Use of Force and training manuals for FPUs require exercises to be performed in the mission area, among FPUs, with the military contingent and with local police, if they exist.

2. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Equipment: KFOR’s inventory includes riot control weapons.

Tactics and training: KFOR crowd and riot control procedures, developed after the March 2004 riots, address the use of all forces under the KFOR commander, including, but not confined to, Multinational Specialized Units. Military principles that govern this use of force include an understanding of deep, close, and rear actions and the core functions of “find, fix, and strike.” The document provides different maneuver options for action against hostile groups, break clean positions, controlled move back, use of a baton gun, and mutual support tactics. Also addressed are planning and preparation, the nature of crowds, graduated responses, inter-factional violence, and the proper sequence of events. This includes deployment, movement, action on arrival, persuasion, components of a force, baseline force and composition, detention force, anti-sniper screens, the responsibility and sequence for opening fire, and action after firing. Also addressed are dealing with political and religious leaders, crowd dispersal in open space, handling of a dispersing crowd, countering hostile action, guarding against being outflanked, subsequent domination of an area, the use of APCs and helicopters, and dealing with the use of women and children. KFOR procedures address training factors such as conditions for training, performance, and validation standards.

3. European Union (EU)

Tactics and training: The graduated use of force is central to the IPU response. An intervention may progress through a sequence ranging from prevention, deterrence, containment, decisive intervention, and maintenance. When necessary, less-than-lethal force is used. Lethal force can only be authorized by the IPU Commanding Officer and is the responsibility of the IPU Force Commander. Use of minimum force is imperative. The EU has approved a “Compendium of principles for the use of force and consequent guidance for the issue of rules of engagement (ROE) for police officers participating in EU crisis management operations” to ensure a codified understanding of the use of force in operations. Continuous training is a must.

B. Lessons from the Kosovo riots

UNMIK Police had eight Formed Police Units (FPUs), consisting of 115-120 personnel each to provide their crowd and riot control response capability. The scale of the rioting vastly exceeded the capacity of these SPU’s to quell. All available UNMIK Police had to be mustered for riot control duty. Few KPS personnel had received riot control training,
and the few who had been trained were dispersed among the force and were not organized into operational units. Riot control gear was available for only a small fraction of UNMIK Police and KPS personnel. Of particular note, the dearth of protective masks resulted in casualties among police forces when riot control agents were used to disperse crowds. Additionally, numerous police officers suffered injuries because they lacked shields and riot batons to protect themselves from violent crowds.

Compounding the problems associated with insufficient forces and equipment, the lack of prior planning exacerbated attempts to launch a coherent response. This resulted in a critical loss of initiative. Deployment decisions became reactions to events rather than the disciplined execution of a well-designed plan. KFOR Multinational Specialized Units along with regular military units were deployed in an ad hoc manner rather than integrated responses to address the province-wide unrest. Deployments were further hindered by the actions of hostile snipers and well-positioned roadblocks.

On a tactical level, the ad hoc nature of the deployment of forces and the cobbling together of command and control schemes on the fly hindered effective SPU employment. SPUs are effective when they have a well-defined chain of command and are backed up by the military contingent. These advantages are squandered when proper planning and exercises have not been conducted in advance of actual employment.

Lesson 1: The Mission Essential Task List of all military units deploying to perform peace enforcement missions and stability operations should include the capacity to assist SPUs with their performance of the civil disturbance control mission. Military elements should understand the concepts of crowd and riot control and be trained and prepared to assist SPUs when required. To provide a surge capability in the event of a major breakdown in public order, or if MSUs are unavailable, specific military contingents should have the capability to assist in crowd and riot control functions. Refresher training and command post exercises in civil disturbance control operations should continue in the mission area.

Lesson 2: International police deployed on missions with executive authority should be trained and equipped for civil disturbance control duties. Even though it may be difficult to achieve and there is a certain political implications and cost involved, equipment such as gas masks, helmets, and body armor, batons should be available for use by international police. Less-than-lethal riot control agents and documentation and evidence-gathering devices to record the activities of instigators are also needed. Unit-level equipment such as less-than-lethal weapons, riot control agent dispersers, and water cannons may only be available to organizations like the SPUs. All international police should understand the concepts of crowd and riot control and be trained to provide a surge capability in the case of large-scale civil disturbances. Training in civil disturbance control operations should take place in the mission area.

Lesson 3: Both police and military operational planning should include civil disturbance contingencies.
Scenarios of localized violence, regional violence, and even mission area-wide violence must be considered in a deliberate planning process undertaken in a coordinated manner by both military and police contingent commanders.

Lesson 4: Civil disturbance control capabilities should be exercised on a regular basis. Response plans must be exercised on a regular basis owing to the continuous rotation of military contingents and international police personnel.

V. Working with local police services

A. Current Doctrine

1. United Nations (UN)
   The general issue of capacity building and transitioning to local responsibility is addressed in the UN Guidelines for Formed Police Units and mission Concept of Operations. Specific activities include assisting with restructuring and reforming of police institutions, as well as advising, training, mentoring and monitoring the local police service. One of the principle duties of the FPU’s is to clone itself by helping the local police develop a capacity to deal with public disorder and crowd control situations.

2. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
   MSUs are integral to NATO’s multifaceted approach to bridging the public security gap in peace support operations. This multifaceted approach involves integrating the efforts of both local and international personnel. The aim should be for MSUs to transfer law enforcement responsibility to international or local civilian police components as expeditiously as possible. Over the longer term, MSUs are capable of providing training in their specialized policing functions to local police so they can eventually assume responsibility for all law enforcement tasks.

3. European Union (EU)
   In strengthening missions, international police and IPUs assist the establishment, reconstruction and reorganization of local police. This is done through training, monitoring and mentoring, the essential activities involved in strengthening missions. These tasks range from correcting mistakes and taking such disciplinary action as may become necessary to forming relationships and building mutual confidence to increase professionalism and effectiveness in the local police.

4. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
   A police development program unfolds in six stages:
   a. Assessment Phase: This must include interviews with key in-country government officials and long-term NGO personnel.
   b. Formulation Phase: The design of a program tailored to fit the target nation.
c. Funding Phase: The requirements of the actual program should drive the mobilization of funding. A fixed amount cannot be established prior to the formulation of a plan.

d. Implementation Phase: International trainers and mentors must be committed not only until the capabilities of the indigenous forces are raised to Western standards but also until the culture of the rule of law is ingrained in the ethos of the new force.

e. Independent Evaluation Phase: An outside agency should evaluate the degree of progress made, but program leaders should be offered the opportunity to comment on findings before they are sent forward.

f. Transition Phase: This should involve government-to-government agreements to provide follow-on support to the new force

B. Lessons from the Kosovo riots

The March riots produced 58 casualties among the fledgling Kosovo Police Service. In spite of the fact that few of them had received riot control training and that they were being asked to confront their own countrymen, many stood solidly beside their international colleagues to help restore law and order. Only a few KPS were suspected of being complicit in the rioting, and many others performed heroically under very trying circumstances.

The key factor that appeared to contribute to the success of the KPS was the presence of international leadership. When UNMIK Police or KFOR troops provided leadership and support, the KPS generally responded commendably. Coordination and communication were most effective in areas where KFOR soldiers, UNMIK Police, and KPS had regularly coordinated their patrolling during routine conditions and where military police had permanent liaison teams located within KPS police stations. In these areas the concept of unity of effort was firmly established and the ability to provide a coordinated response to civil disturbances was greatly enhanced.

Lesson 1: Response to civil disorder is most effective when indigenous police and security forces are willing and able to perform this function. No matter how benevolent an international force might be, maintaining the consent of the local population is a primary concern. Consequently, the first order of business for an international intervention should be the creation and nurturing of indigenous police and security forces. If disciplined, indigenous forces are able to address street violence properly, the government’s commitment to the rule of law will be reinforced and the value of rioting for subversives will be diminished. All local police should be trained in riot control and should be familiar with procedures used to recall them for integration into organized formations when required. Special riot control units with more sophisticated equipment should be incorporated into this structure.

Lesson 2: Indigenous police and security forces require lengthy periods of mentoring and monitoring.
To be effective at crowd and riot control, indigenous units must be staffed with personnel who have been properly vetted and are professionally trained, equipped, and led. In most situations where a security apparatus is being reconstituted, the previous police and security forces were sources of fear and intimidation within the society. In creating new forces, the international community must not only raise the level of competence in the new force. They must also create a new paradigm for a public whose expectations have been shaped by bitter experience. The message about the proper nature of the police relationship with the public must be reinforced with a media campaign and related outreach programs. For this transformation to succeed, international advisors must stay closely engaged to keep the new force on the correct azimuth and to help mobilize the public to play its role in ensuring that the new security apparatus does not revert to former repressive methods.

Lesson 3: Proper response to civil disorder requires a planned, integrated effort among local and international police and security forces. International intervention forces must deploy with a contingency plan for unilaterally responding to civil disorder. This plan should integrate the capabilities of international SPU's, as first responders, and the international military and international police as back up. As soon as indigenous forces are capable of assisting, they should be integrated into the plan. As their numbers grow and their capabilities increase, more of the response burden should shift to them. In the most mature scenario, the local government should lead the response. Such a response regimen reinforces the primacy of the local government and removes the potentially incendiary scenario of domestic rioters being confronted by foreign forces on local streets. Inherent in this concept is the requirement for constant coordination and the establishment of well-defined chains of command and integrated command posts.

VI. CONCLUSION

Some of the shortcomings experienced in Kosovo were the result of discrepancies and gaps in doctrine while others were attributable to a failure to follow doctrine. The basic doctrinal principle that military units should be deployed in support of police crowd control units frequently went unheeded. The most fundamental failure was in the synchronization process required to pull assets and organizations together in a unified effort. One of the most essential corrective actions is to develop a comprehensive contingency plan and exercise it prior to the onset of civil unrest. Nevertheless the following gaps and inconsistencies in doctrine also need to be addressed.

A. Summary of Doctrinal Discrepancies

1. Roles and Missions of Stability Police Units
   - Terminology
     Terminology varies. The UN, EU, and NATO each use a different designation for SPU's. Conceptual confusion can be avoided as long as it is clearly understood that each term is associated with a different approach to command and control of these units.
The term Stability Police Unit is used generically. It refers to any robust, armed policing element that performs roles and missions associated with bringing stability to a war-torn society. These include:

- Dealing with public disorder and threats to the peace,
- Surveillance and criminal information gathering,
- Static security of vulnerable, high-priority buildings,
- Mobile security of vulnerable, high-priority areas,
- VIP protection and escort duty,
- High-risk arrest,
- Counter terrorism and counter insurgency operations,
- Barricade reconnaissance and removal,
- House and vehicle searches,
- Election security, and
- Training of local police agencies in crowd control and similar law and order duties.

These tasks require disciplined action by well-trained units with a formal command structure and the capacity for graduated use of force, including less-than-lethal and lethal force. Carabinieri and gendarme-like forces fit this profile and are often described as police forces with military status. Police Services without military status, have been mostly used successfully in this role. Agreement is lacking, however, about the criteria that ought to be used to determine what qualifications should be met to be eligible for international duty as an SPU.

It may be that gendarmerie and carabinieri forces with military status are suitable for missions where SPUs fall under the military chain of command. On the other hand, the Police Units are always deployed under police chain of command to deal with law and order situations. This issue ought to be examined and clarified with the aim of establishing consensus about the roles and missions that SPUs should be expected to perform, regardless of the chain of command they will operate under.

B. Summary of Doctrinal Gaps

1. Roles and Missions of Stability Police Units
• Roles and missions
Doctrine is needed for the full range of possible roles and missions cited above, including when SPUs are substituting for local police services as well as strengthening their capacity to discharge these functions.

• National caveats
Doctrine should be developed that identifies what national caveats are unacceptable and will disqualify an SPU from serving on an international mission (e.g., refusal to perform missions involving integrated military/police operations).

• Implications of international human rights standards

• Standardization
The standard organizational structure, rank structure, and table of equipment (protective gear, radios, less-than-lethal weaponry, vehicles) that SPUs require to be able to perform these roles and missions should be specified in doctrine.

• Criteria for selection and mission readiness
Criteria are needed to guide the process of selection of units for training as SPUs. Consensus among the UN, NATO, and EU should also be developed regarding the standards that should be used in assessing the fitness of units for deployment on international missions.

2. Command, Control, and Coordination

• Transfer of primacy
The circumstances under which SPU commanders should transfer primacy or tactical control of the disturbance site to the on-scene military commander need to be identified. The implications of subordinating SPU efforts to those of military forces in terms of their respective roles and the process that should be followed also need to be established. Doctrine should also address how the transfer of primacy should work when on-scene commanders do not have a means of communication with higher authorities.

• Command posts
Doctrine should dictate the establishment of a command post at police headquarters.

• Integration of military and police command posts
Effective methods for integrating military and police command posts, such as co-location and use of liaisons, should be assessed and elaborated.

3. Intelligence and the Development of Admissible Evidence

• Common operational awareness
Procedures and organizational structures (e.g., a sensitive information and operations center) should be identified in doctrine that allow for the development of common
operational awareness between military and police contingents. Specific issues that need to be addressed are deconfliction of military and police intelligence gathering, strategic and tactical warning for mission leadership, and coordinated use of intelligence for development of evidence to arrest perpetrators of act of political violence and other forms of illegal obstruction of the peace process.

- Intelligence-led operations and investigations
  The resources, authorities, organizational structures, and procedures required for effective intelligence-led investigations and intelligence-led operations need to be articulated. The circumstances under which it is more appropriate to disrupt the activities of violent obstructionist networks as opposed to investigate and prosecute the individuals involved need to be defined.

- Identifying investigators of violent disorders
  Methods of identifying ringleaders and obtaining admissible evidence for their conviction while operating on an international mission need to be promulgated. In particular, tools required to build judiciable cases (legal wiretaps, videotapes used on scene, recording protocols of who was where) should be addressed. If military units must be engaged without supported police elements, doctrine should address how to make apprehensions and seize evidence.

4. Crowd and Riot Control: Equipment, Tactics, Training, and Exercises

- Crowd and riot control requirements for international military forces
  The minimum CRC capacity that military units should have when deployed in a peace support role should be specified.

- Crowd and riot control requirements for international police services
  Criteria should be established to determine the level of crowd and riot control preparation, equipment, and weaponry that international police should have for the full range of possible missions.

- Training and exercises
  Requirements for pre-deployment training and exercises and in-theater combined SPU-military exercises for each rotation need to be established in doctrine.

5. Working with local security services

- Transition from international to local primacy
  Effective methods of creating a reliable and accountable SPU capability and transitioning from international primacy to local primacy need to be developed and crystallized in doctrine. This should include the role of translators and the use of local security forces in intelligence gathering and collection of evidence.
C. WAY AHEAD

The use of Stability Police Units in peacekeeping operations remains an evolving concept. Doctrine for employment of such forces should serve as a unifying or integrating mechanism. The purpose of this report has been to identify issues that require attention in order to achieve the synergy that is vital to success for the multi-national missions of today and those expected in the coming years.

Owing to their ability to address the sources of entrenched disorder and violence prevalent in peace and stability operations, demand for stability police units is burgeoning. The UN currently is planning to expand the number of units it deploys from 17 to 30. New police contributors will need to be found to satisfy the increased requirements. Countries currently fielding SPUs, along with those likely to do so in the future, should be engaged in the process of experimentation and doctrinal refinement comes to grip with current gaps and inconsistencies in terminology and operating procedures.

CoESPU is positioned to promote this process in the following ways:

- By serving as the focal point for harmonizing current SPU doctrine;
- By working with SPU users and providers to develop doctrine in areas where gaps exist;
- By developing and maintaining a repository for SPU “lessons learned” and responding to queries from SPU commanders in the field as part of the International Network to Promote the Rule of Law;
- By supporting pre-mission and in-theater training exercises; and
- By ensuring that doctrine is properly reflected in training standards, courses of instruction, and methods of training.