

# CONFLICT AND STABILIZATION MONITORING FRAMEWORK

## ROUNDS 1, 2 & 3


October 2019



## INTRODUCTION: WHAT?


### USIP's Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE)

- This framework includes:
  - 149 goals (drivers and institutional responses)
  - +800 indicators
- Our framework, based on MPICE contains **48** indicators across **23** goals over **4** vectors:



## WHERE?

- **General objective:** Develop an indicators framework to monitor **SOCIAL COHESION** and **CONFLICT**.
- Started as a pilot in Northern Ninewa:



## WHEN?

September 2017: KRI Referendum  
October 2017: Security and administration change in northern Ninewa  
December 2017: End of ISIS conflict, all of Ninewa retaken

### FEBRUARY 2018: FIRST ROUND

May 2018: National elections

### AUGUST 2018: SECOND ROUND

Opening of key checkpoints  
Security changes  
More return of Sunni Arabs

### APRIL / MAY 2019: THIRD ROUND

## OVERALL FINDINGS

- **Sinjar Center and Sinuni have the most severe conditions across all vectors over the entire sample.**
- **Zummar seems to be in greater flux, particularly after Round 3 with regard to Sunni Arab perceptions.**
- **Hamdaniya and Bartella findings overall seem to track over time relatively consistently and not in any particular extreme. The point of contention seems relatively fixed from this data.**
- **Tel Kaif findings are inconsistent and the context is an outlier given that the two population groups under study are physically separated and under two different government administrations. This demographic division seems relatively fixed and unchanging.**
- **Findings from Ayadhiya are inconsistent at best particularly in relation to more sensitive topics and do not match more qualitative assessments of the context. This may be due to the fact that the population assessed may not have felt comfortable to answer accurately at the time.**



## SAFE AND SECURE ENVIRONMENT


- Sinjar Center and Sinuni have the worst perceptions by far, across rounds with respect to security; particularly true for Sunni Arab IDPs and Sunni Arab residents.
- Significant negative fluctuation in security perceptions among Sunni Arabs in Zummar in Round 3 with respect to fair treatment, particularly as compared to other components. This may be linked with increased targeting and arrest of those more recently returned by security forces.
- Inconsistent findings among Christian IDPs from Hamdaniya Center and Bartella, may be linked to differences in sampling over rounds.
- Findings from Ayadhiya are overall positive and do not seem to match other context analyses or perceptions of field teams; these indicators may be too sensitive for context at present
- Overall, across locations and rounds, respondents report feeling generally safe where they are and where they move around day to day. Concern on security is more linked to political dimensions and uncertainty/ fragility of context than daily life.



## Safe and secure environment

Goal: Security forces or armed groups do not engage in violence to advance political agendas.


% of people that believe POLITICAL VIOLENCE by security forces or armed groups is taking place or will take place in the immediate term.



## Safe and secure environment

Goal: The security configuration is conducive to allow different ethno-sectarian or political violence.


% of people who fell they can express their ETHNO-SECTARIAN identity without fear of violence against them.



## Safe and secure environment

Goal: Citizens are confident that the national security forces and/or PMU are impartial.


% of people who perceive their group is TREATED FAIRLY by security forces or armed groups.



## Safe and secure environment

Goal: Citizens are confident that the national security forces and/or PMU are impartial.


% of people who perceive OTHER GROUPS are treated the SAME as them.



**Safe and secure environment**

**Goal: There is a safe and secure environment.**


% of IDPs who feel INTIMIDATED by the security actors in the district of origin.



## Safe and secure environment

Goal: Citizens are confident that the national security forces and/or PMU are impartial.


% of people who would like to see a DIFFERENT SECURITY CONFIGURATION in their subdistrict to feel protected.



## Safe and secure environment

Goal: There is a safe and secure environment.

% of people who feel comfortable to move around the town at any time.



## POLITICAL MODERATION AND STABLE GOVERNANCE

- In general, across locations and rounds, perception of response of provincial authorities to community needs is very poor.
- The majority of respondents across locations and rounds feel somewhat politically or socially marginalized.
- Among those who feel very marginalized, it is most pronounced across groups and rounds in Sinjar Center and Sinuni. Sunni Arabs in Zummar veered reporting higher levels of marginalization in Round 3. Sunni Arabs in Ayadhiya also reported relatively high levels of feeling very marginalized in Round 3.
- With the exception of Christian IDPs, Shia Kurds/Arabs in Sinjar Center, and Sunni Kurds in Zummar, no other respondents reported that other groups in their subdistricts were politically or socially marginalized. This may indicate a lack of acknowledgement of the condition of others or a zero-sum mentality.
- Most respondents across locations and rounds increasingly report strong belonging to a national identity. The exceptions here are Ezidi IDPs who feel low national belonging and Sunni Arab IDPs from Sinjar who feel decreasing national belonging.
- Those communities who have been or currently are at odds with prevailing power dynamics or status quo tend to feel more ethno-religious belonging than national belonging.



## POLITICAL MODERATION AND STABLE GOVERNANCE


- In terms of what is needed for each component to advance their political rights, the overall majority indicate that strong civilian leadership is most important.
- For recognized minorities, having international backing is most important. What is interesting to note is that this view is decreasing among Ezidis and Christians and increasing with Shabak. This may be connected to frustration at the international community on the side of the Ezidis and Christians, and recognition of Shabak of external support. The actors supporting Ezidis and Christians on one side and Shabak on other may be different.
- Of note, Ezidis are increasingly also pointing toward having military power as a source for advancing their political rights.



## Political moderation and stable governance

Goal: Institutions are responsive to the population.


% of people that perceive RESPONSIVENESS of provincial institutions now as GOOD.



## Political moderation and stable governance

Goal: Authorities and dominant groups do not engage in political exclusion or repression of dissent on the basis of group identity.


% of people perceiving their group in the subdistrict to be marginalized.



**Political moderation and stable governance**

Goal: Authorities and dominant groups do not engage in political exclusion or repression of dissent on the basis of group identity.


% of people perceiving that OTHER groups in the subdistrict are being MARGINALIZED.



**Political moderation and stable governance**

Goal: Political elites and leaders are not polarizing in the basis of their identity.

% of people who IDENTIFY MORE CLOSELY to their ethno-religious identity GROUP than with their IRAQI identity.





## RECONCILIATION


- Reconciliation between components is seen as necessary in a high degree across locations and rounds. Ezidis have a relatively lower rate in terms of necessity.
- This is reflective both of the fact that until Round 3 Sunni Arabs had not yet return to Sinjar district and that Ezidi leaders and key informants note that certain preconditions must be met before the community can consider reconciliation (e.g., criminal accountability, truth seeking, uncovering mass graves, finding all the missing, etc.).
- While the majority of respondents find reconciliation necessary, a relatively medium to low proportion across locations and rounds view reconciliation as possible.
- The exception is consistently found in Zummar among both Sunni Arab and Kurd populations, where they view it as both necessary and possible. This is consistent with other qualitative and quantitative studies of the area. It may be linked to past experiences of having to resolve grievances together.
- The major impediment reported for reconciliation is first lack of political will and second, that people do not want it. The latter is pronounced among Christian IDPs and residents, nearly all components in Sinjar Center and Sinuni, and among Shammar Arabs in Rabbia.
- Recognized national minorities (i.e., Ezidis, Christians, and Shabak) are less willing to compromise with other groups in their district, while non-minorities are.



## Reconciliation

Goal: There is a desire and need for reconciliation at the district level.


% of people think a RECONCILIATION PROCESS is NECESSARY.



## Reconciliation

Goal: There is a desire and need for reconciliation at the district level.


% of people think a RECONCILIATION PROCESS is POSSIBLE.



## Reconciliation

Goal: There is a desire and need for reconciliation at the district level.


% of people indicating their perceived MAIN IMPEDIMENTS for reconciliation (multiple choice).



## Reconciliation

Goal: There is a desire and need for reconciliation at the district level.

% of people who are willing to COMPROMISE with members of the OTHER IDENTITY groups in their district.




## RULE OF LAW

- Sinjar Center, Sinuni, and Zummar report highest perception of impunity related to misconduct by security forces or armed groups, across rounds.
- Of note, a significant proportion of respondents, across rounds and locations, indicate they do not know if there is impunity or not.
- As of Round 3, Ezidi residents in Sinjar Center and Sinuni believe tribes should be involved in the resolution of issues and crimes related to the ISIS conflict – this is a significant shift from previous rounds where they reported only the formal justice system should be involved.
- These findings fit with context in terms of growing encouragement from national and international stakeholders to work through tribes and frustration with slowness of international process or exclusion from national ones.
- There is not full support in the predominantly tribal areas in the sample (Zummar, Rabbia, and Ayadhiya) that tribes should be involved in such processes.
- Roughly half of respondents across these areas feel the formal justice system should handle the resolution of these issues. This matches with qualitative data among tribal leaders who indicate that given the scale and complexity of the grievances at hand (including intra-tribe division), the government needs to intervene to support them in resolving issues.
- Across locations and rounds, most respondents indicate that they are not satisfied with past violence and abuses have been dealt with in Iraq. This holds true not only for Ninewa but in other governorates as well.



## Rule of law


% of residents that think there is IMPUNITY and no prosecution for any misconduct by security forces or armed groups.



## Rule of law

Goal: The legal system (formal and informal) provides non-violent mechanisms for dispute resolution.

% of people that believe the resolution of issues and crimes related to the ISIS conflict should be dealt with the FORMAL JUSTICE system only (not with TRIBES).



## Rule of law

Goal: The criminal and justice systems perform essential functions effectively.

% of people that express that the LOCAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS are TRUSTWORTHY.



## SOCIAL WELLBEING AND LIVELIHOODS: ECONOMIC STATUS & SERVICES


- In general, respondents across locations and two rounds, feel they have not recovered their pre-2014 financial status. Of note, the Sunni Arabs of Zummar and Arabs and Turkmen in Ayadhiya report being significantly more worse-off than other groups. Some improvements in perception of financial status are seen across Sinjar Center and among the Sunni Kurds in Zummar.
- Sinjar Center, Sinuni, and Hamdaniya Center and Bartella, reported significant change in perceptions related to service provision in Round 3. Specifically, respondents were less frustrated with provision. This may be due to increased attention to these areas specifically, including increasing and substantial international presence therein.
- Sunni Arabs in Zummar report particularly high levels of frustration with service provision across rounds, while their Sunni Kurd counterparts report the opposite.
- Roughly half the sample across rounds and locations feel other groups in their subdistricts get prioritized over them. Once again, indicating a zero-sum viewpoint.



## Social wellbeing and livelihoods

Goal: There are no group-based inequalities across identity groups that can be conflictive.


% of people who perceive their FINANCIAL SITUATION is currenly WORSE than pre-2014.



## Social wellbeing and livelihoods

Goal: Public expectations for the provision of essential public services are met equally across population.


% of people who feel FRUSTRATED with the level of SERVICES currently provided.



## Social wellbeing and livelihoods

Goal: Public expectations for the provision of essential public services are met equally across population.

% of people who believe OTHER groups are PRIORITIZED for reconstruction or service provision more than them in the subdistrict.



## SOCIAL WELLBEING AND LIVELIHOODS: SOCIAL DYNAMICS


- Those who report feeling consistently collectively blamed include Shabaks, Sunni Arabs (particularly in Zummar), and Ezidi IDPs.
- Sunni Arab IDPs from Sinjar Center and Sunni Arab residents in Sinuni report consistently that members of their component are still blocked from returning to their areas of origin in the subdistrict.
- Overall, Ezidi residents in Sinjar Center and Sinuni across rounds report at considerably low levels that they want members of other components still displaced to come back to their subdistricts.
- As of Round 3, Sunni Arabs in Zummar also reported significantly lower desire or comfort with members of other components still displaced coming back– in previous rounds they had roughly the same views on this as the Sunni Kurds.
- Concerns over the change in population composition of subdistricts was reported in Sinjar Center, Sinuni, and Hamdaniya Center and Bartella, with different views expressed about this depending on ethno-religious group.
- The difference between components is most stark in Hamdaniya and Bartella: nearly all Christian residents indicate it has happened and are concerned about it, while very few Shabak residents feel the same. Most report no change has taken place. The Shabak may be referring to the fact that the composition pre-/post-2014 is now roughly the same, while the Christians may be referring to changes that occurred post-2003 when Shabaks entered into subdistrict centers. This is corroborated by other analyses as well.



## Social wellbeing and livelihoods

Goal: There are no groups marginalized by the rest of the society through collective punishment and discrimination.


% of people who believe they or their group are being COLLECTIVELY JUDGED or LABELLED in a discriminatory way.



## Social wellbeing and livelihoods

Goal: There is social acceptance for the remaining returns process.


% of people who claim that members of their group are still **BLOCKED** from **RETURNING** to their areas of origin.



## Social wellbeing and livelihoods

Goal: There is social acceptance for the remaining returns process.


% of people who want (or are comfortable with) those still displaced from different groups to return.



## Social wellbeing and livelihoods

Goal: Population does not hold concerns for demographic change in their area.

% of people who are CONCERNED about DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE in their subdistrict.



## Social wellbeing and livelihoods

Goal: The legacy of past abuses has been recognized, addressed, and reconciled.

% of people SATISFIED with the way PAST ABUSES have been dealt with in Iraq.



## CHALLENGES AND LESSONS

- **Indicators and phrasing of questions will need to be revisited and revised. This may help in better capturing accurate perceptions on existing indicators and potentially new ones as well. Validation with field teams will be key.**
- **Sampling will also need to be further refined for some areas (e.g., separating Hamdaniya Center and Bartella) and potentially expanded in others as certain groups were not included but field teams indicate it would be important to do so going forward. This is particularly important as some locations and groups are already oversampled as it is.**
- **Better coordination in terms of support for field teams in terms of access and official documentation of their working on a USIP study. This will likely become more critical over time, particularly for complex and fragile locations.**
- **More proactive and user friendly data visualization and sharing of findings and analysis. There is clear interest in learning from the data, but we need to work together to figure out better ways to share in a timely manner.**

