Police Transition in Afghanistan

Summary

- The forthcoming withdrawal of the NATO training mission in Afghanistan along with U.S. combat forces in 2014 has highlighted the failure to meet Afghanistan’s need for a national police service capable of enforcing the rule of law, controlling crime, and protecting Afghan citizens, despite a decade of effort.

- The Afghan National Police appears unlikely to be able to enforce the rule of law following the withdrawal because of its configuration as a militarized counterinsurgency force in the fight against the Taliban.

- Discussions are under way concerning the future of the ANP, but there is no consensus on the future size and mission of the police and no certainty about future sources of the funding, training, and equipment required.

- Because only two years remain before the deadline for withdrawal, it is imperative that the United States and the international community urgently address the challenge of transforming the ANP from a counterinsurgency force into a police service capable of enforcing the rule of law.

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is scheduled to withdraw from Afghanistan in 2014. Included in the departing forces will be most U.S. combat forces and the American troops assigned to the U.S.-led NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A), which is training the Afghan National Police (ANP). Since 2005 the U.S. military has spent $14 billion to train and equip the ANP, which currently numbers 148,500 personnel. Several thousand U.S. military personnel, plus more than 3,400 Department of Defense (DOD) contractors and nearly a thousand coalition police, provide the mentoring, training, maintenance, logistics, and security support for this training mission. The residual cost of sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) assistance program after 2014 is estimated at between $2 billion and $6 billion, more than the Afghan government’s annual budget. The approach of the 2014 withdrawal deadline has sharpened the focus on a number of issues related to the Afghan police development program, including...
About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, promote postconflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, FTC Energy, Washington, DC • George E. Moose (Vice Chair), Adjunct Professor of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, DC • Judy Ansley, Former Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor under George W. Bush, Washington, DC • Eric Edelman, Hertog Distinguished Practitioner in Residence, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC • Joseph Eldridge, University Chaplain and Senior Adjunct Professorial Lecturer, School of International Service, American University • Kerry Kennedy, President, Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights, Washington, DC • Ikram U. Khan, President, Quality Care Consultants, LLC., Las Vegas, NV • Stephen D. Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA • John A. Lancaster, Former Executive Director, International Council on Independent Living, Potsdam, NY • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA • Judy Van Rest, Executive Vice President, International Republican Institute, Washington, DC • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice President, Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, Washington, DCs

Members Ex Officio

Michael H. Posner, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor • James N. Miller, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy • Gregg F. Martin, Major General, U.S. Army; President, National Defense University • Jim Marshall, President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, e-mail: permissions@usip.org.

The U.S. Police Assistance Program

In 2005 the U.S. government transferred responsibility for the Afghan police assistance program from the Department of State to the DOD. Implementation was assigned to the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A), which also had responsibility for training the Afghan National Army (ANA). In November 2007, CSTC-A sought to correct training program deficiencies with a new approach called Focused District Development (FDD), which trained all the Afghanistan National Uniformed Police (AUP) serving in a single district at one time. Under the FDD program, the police in a single district were brought to a regional training center, where untrained personnel received basic training, police with previous experience received advanced training, and officers received leadership training. The program included seven weeks of instruction in military tactics, weapons use, survival strategies, and COIN operations and one week of training in basic police skills. U.S. military trainers conducted training in military skills; former U.S. servicemen hired by a commercial firm under a contract with the State Department conducted training in police skills.2

When President Obama took office in January 2009, it was evident to U.S. officials that U.S. and coalition forces were under strength, inadequately supported, and in danger of...
losing the war. On March 27, 2009, Obama announced a new strategy of defeating al Qaeda and disrupting terrorist networks using a more capable Afghan security force that could lead the fight with reduced U.S. assistance. To accomplish this mission, the United States would support an increase in the size of the Afghan army and police to 134,000 and 82,000, respectively, over the next two years. The president stressed that the United States also would request increased contributions of trainers, mentors, and equipment from its NATO partners.3 A week later, on April 4, 2009, President Obama and his NATO counterparts agreed to upgrade and professionalize the Afghan police by creating the NTM-A. U.S. Lieutenant General William Caldwell would lead both CSTC-A and NTM-A by forming a single command. NTM-A would focus on increasing the size and improving the quality of Afghan forces while building the facilities and providing the specialized equipment and training necessary to professionalize the force.4

When NTM-A became operational in November 21, 2009, the United States faced a worsening situation in Afghanistan that required an immediate infusion of personnel and resources.5 On December 1, 2009, in a speech at West Point, the president recalled that only 32,000 U.S. troops had been serving in Afghanistan when he took office; U.S. commanders had previously asked for additional resources, but those reinforcements had failed to arrive. The new U.S. military commander in Afghanistan, Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal, had reported that the deteriorating security situation was more serious than he had anticipated and that the status quo was not sustainable. Thus the president was ordering an additional 30,000 U.S. troops into Afghanistan and would provide the resources necessary to build Afghan capability to defeat al Qaeda and the Taliban and take responsibility for protecting their country. Obama promised to increase U.S. capacity to train competent Afghan security forces, to get more Afghans into the fight, and to accelerate the transfer of U.S. forces out of Afghanistan beginning in July 2011.6

Among the first manifestations of the enhanced U.S. effort was the January 10, 2010, decision of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, the formal governing body for allied security assistance, to increase the ANP’s growth targets from 82,000 to 109,000 in October 2010 and to 134,000 in October 2011.7 Subsequently the NTM-A and the Afghan MOI agreed to end the practice of recruiting and deploying untrained personnel in favor of a new model that made predeployment training mandatory for all police recruits. The MOI agreed to establish a new recruiting and training command to institutionalize these functions. NTM-A began work on raising police salaries and improving conditions of service for police officers to reduce the high levels of attrition that were undermining the security assistance effort. NTM-A also upgraded the number and seniority of international advisers assigned to the MOI and began to work on improving leadership development and identifying ways to control corruption. NTM-A recognized that MOI required greater assistance to improve policy development, management practices, procurement, human resources, and logistical support. All these efforts were directed at improving the quality of oversight and support provided to the Afghan police.

Organization of the Afghan National Police

Three years into the training program directed by the NTM-A, the ANP comprises four police forces and two auxiliaries under MOI direction. The recently appointed interior minister, Ghulam Mujtaba Patang, is a career police officer, but his predecessor, Bismillah Khan Mohammadi, was a career soldier who is now defense minister. Patang’s deputies are general officers, and the ministry is staffed with uniformed personnel, many with military backgrounds. Each of the four police forces reports to a separate deputy minister and is largely autonomous in its headquarters, training, and operations. The ANP receives
extensive assistance from thirty-two NTM-A member countries that provide funding, trainers, curriculum, and equipment. The major components of the ANP are the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), the Afghan Border Police (ABP), and the Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP).

The AUP is the face of the government to the Afghan people. With 90,500 members, it is the largest component of the ANP and is responsible for core policing functions, including maintaining public order, crime and traffic control, and fire, rescue, and emergency response. The AUP is assigned to district, provincial, and regional commands and is present in all thirty-four provinces. Its officers’ daily work includes conducting foot and vehicle patrols, manning checkpoints, and engaging with the population. The officers wear common gray uniforms and are armed with AK-47 rifles and side arms.

ANCOP is an elite constabulary unit created to deal with civil disorder by bridging the gap between the AUP and the Afghan military. ANCOP is headquartered in Kabul and has 14,400 personnel divided among five brigades stationed in Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, Gardez, and Helmand provinces. It has been used as a counterinsurgency force in U.S.-led military operations in Helmand and Kandahar and was used to control public demonstrations over the burning of the Koran at Bagram Air Base.

With twenty thousand personnel, the ABP is responsible for security at Afghanistan’s five international airports, land entry points, and a border security zone area that extends for fifty kilometers into Afghanistan. The ABP controls the entry of individuals and vehicles and prevents smuggling and trafficking of illicit goods as well as the infiltration of insurgents and terrorists from Pakistan.

The AACP is a multifaceted organization that includes the investigative and intelligence capacities of the ANP nationwide and at all levels, from the MOI to district police stations. It also performs the internal functions of inspector general and internal affairs. The AACP is divided into branches tasked with counterterrorism, counternarcotics, police intelligence, criminal investigation, major crimes, special operations, and forensics. Each of these divisions has major responsibilities and works with the AUP and other police forces. The AACP is hampered by its small size (only thirty-four hundred personnel), limited financial and material resources, the low educational level of its personnel, and political interference in its work.

In addition to the country’s formal police forces, the MOI supervises two auxiliary forces that provide security but do not have the authority to conduct investigations or make arrests. These forces are recruited directly and do not participate in NTM-A’s police training program. Their responsibilities are limited to static guard duty, but they are recruited by different methods and have very different missions.

The Afghan Local Police (ALP) was established by presidential decree with strong U.S. support. Its nineteen thousand members, selected by village elders or local power brokers to protect their communities against Taliban attack, receive training from U.S. Special Forces teams that also provide funding, weapons, communications equipment, and backup. Its village defense units guard facilities and conduct local counterinsurgency missions. The ALP is not a militia in that it falls under MOI authority and function under the supervision of the district AUP. The ALP has proven highly controversial because of a lack of criteria for selection, abusive behavior against local citizens, and infiltration by insurgents. In September ISAF suspended Special Forces training for the ALP after a spike in the number of attacks on coalition forces by Afghans counterparts, including ALP members.

The Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), an initiative of President Hamid Karzai, was created in 2011 to replace the hundreds of private security firms that protected institutions throughout the country. These firms operated without Afghan government oversight and often employed foreign nationals. The APPF is supervised by the MOI and operates under
a presidential decree that disbanded private security providers. The APPF’s fourteen thousand Afghan personnel are a static guard force that protects public buildings, development projects, and vital infrastructure, such as roads and bridges. The APPF does not have the authority to conduct investigations or make arrests, but it frees the ANP to perform police functions by protecting public facilities.

The ANP: A Militarized Police Force

The creation of the NTM-A and provision of financial and material resources has brought improvements in the Interior Ministry and the Afghan police. With the support of 580 international advisers, MOI manages the daily operation of a national police force deployed throughout the country. In partnership with the Afghan National Army, the ANP has formally taken the lead in providing security in an area containing 75 percent of the country’s population. Through a new recruiting and training command and other innovations, Afghans are formally responsible for selecting and preparing the ANP for duty as well as for supervising its field operations. Earlier problems have been overcome, but the overarching role of the U.S. military in the police training and assistance program and the need to respond to the Taliban-led insurgency has resulted in a highly militarized police force. With limited police skills and without an effective judicial system, the ANP cannot enforce the rule of law, particularly given pervasive corruption and political interference.

As the ANP are trained in weapons use and military skills by U.S. soldiers, U.S. and Afghan commanders have used its forces in combat operations against insurgents. Policemen are not soldiers, however, and police forces lack military command and control as well as the military’s ability to mass numbers and firepower against an enemy. The AUP are deployed as police in small numbers in rural district stations and at checkpoints. Isolated and without the backup that ISAF provides the Afghan army, the police are soft targets for insurgent attacks. As Afghan forces have taken greater responsibility for the war with the approaching U.S. withdrawal, Afghan casualties have risen to three hundred per month in 2012, twice as many police dying as soldiers. This follows years of similar numbers, police deaths exceeding those of the military by two to three times for the past decade.

Combat losses combined with high rates of attrition from disease and desertion have exacerbated the need for high recruitment levels to both replace losses and meet U.S. goals for expanding the force. In November 2010, Lieutenant General Caldwell noted that growing the ANSF by 56,000 to meet the October 2011 goal of 305,000 would require recruiting and training 141,000 soldiers and police to compensate for attrition—the equivalent of the size of the entire Afghan army at that time. With the February 2013 target for ANSF set at 352,000, the need for large-scale recruiting has increased. Since 2011, attrition levels for the ANP have remained at an annual rate of 25 percent overall with attrition rates of up to 70 or 80 percent in some units. Because President Karzai has resisted appeals to criminalize leaving the police without permission, officers can depart at any time with impunity. NTM-A’s efforts to increase pay, standardize rotations, and provide other incentives have helped stabilize the force, but the need to constantly recruit large numbers to replenish losses and meet ever higher personnel targets remains.

Attrition and recruitment problems have made it difficult to correct the many problems that have troubled the ANP since its inception. The international effort to create a Western-style police force while accommodating the aims of the Afghan political elite has produced a hybrid system with a modern bureaucratic façade masking a traditional system of patronage and favoritism. That over 80 percent of ANP recruits are unable to read or recognize numbers has hampered efforts to engage the ANP in law enforcement versus simply maintaining public order. In 2011, NTM-A launched a mandatory literacy training program for all ANP
recruits with a target of raising all personnel to an Afghan first-grade reading level. By mid-2011, NTM-A was providing basic literacy courses to thirty thousand ANSF recruits at a time. Introducing literacy training was based upon the realization—long in coming—that police officers required basic literacy to perform simple tasks, such as reading license plate numbers, verifying identity documents, caring for their equipment, and ensuring they received the right amount of pay. The ability to read also increased the respect that police received from the public. However, officers who failed the training still entered on duty and there was no follow-up after basic training. A sustained effort will be required to ensure that all ANP personnel obtain the level of literacy required to effectively perform their duties.

Beyond the general problem of literacy, the ANP has been unable to recruit enough southern Pashtuns to redress the ethnic imbalance created by the large number of northerners, especially Tajiks, who dominate the senior ranks of the ministry and the AUP. Given the language and cultural differences, ANP units deployed in the south are often unable to converse with local citizens and are viewed as outsiders. This problem of the ANP’s alienation from the public is exacerbated by the widespread instances of corruption, abusive behavior, drug use, and drug trafficking. ANP brutality and corruption have spurred increased popular support for the Taliban. After the battle for Marjah in Helmand province, village elders told the U.S. Marines that they were welcome, but if the AUP returned the people would fight them to the death. Problems with the ANP have been well documented, but efforts to correct bad behavior have had limited effect.

The Twin Challenges of ANP Reform and U.S. Withdrawal

The Afghan National Police Strategy contains a five-year vision of an ANP that the Afghan people view as a “valued institution which is honest, accountable, brave, impartial, and striving to create a secure and lawful society.” Achieving this goal will require substantial reform. The time remaining before the 2014 deadline for the withdrawal of the remaining sixty-eight thousand U.S. combat forces is short. The size and capability of the follow-on commitment of international personnel is also in doubt. According to press reports, the United States is considering a reduction in force to between twenty-five hundred and six thousand U.S. troops, mostly trainers and special operations forces, with several thousand NATO allies. A small force would make it impossible for the U.S. military to both provide police trainers and maintain its counterterrorism capabilities. The United States is also cutting back on plans for a robust civilian presence in Afghanistan after the withdrawal. Fiscal restraints, diminished hopes, and war weariness are coupled with fears that security conditions will not permit the presence of civilians who currently depend on the U.S. military for protection, transport, food, and medical care. Thinking about the future U.S. presence in Afghanistan has been affected by the negative experience in post-withdrawal Iraq, where the United States police training program was reduced from a planned 350 police trainers at twenty-two sites to forty trainers in two places, primarily because of the high cost of hiring contract guards to provide force protection.

With NTM-A’s departure looming, questions remain as to which organization will provide the funding, administration, and logistical support for international police assistance. Which organization will assume responsibility for training, mentoring, and advising? If the ANP is reconfigured from a counterinsurgency force to a law enforcement agency, which organization will lead the process? These questions must be answered quickly so that new programs are decided in early 2013 and the process is well under way before U.S. forces withdraw at the end of the following year.

One hopeful response to the 2014 deadline has been the reinvigoration of the IPCB, which has existed for some time but never functioned as an effective coordinating mechanism for...
international assistance. Faced with the need to find a means to manage the transition, the board was reactivated with the appointment of British ambassador Catherine Royle to head the secretariat and the new interior minister as chairman. On April 12, 2012, the IPCB launched a process under the title “From Transition to Transformation,” which will include regular consultations among the Afghan government, NTM-A, international organizations, and donor governments on the roles, responsibilities, structure, and professionalization of the ANP. The interior minister, who is the head of the IPCB, will lead the process with the international secretariat staff in a supporting role. This will ensure that the IPCB’s work reflects Afghan priorities, the secretariat providing liaison and technical support.

To determine the ANP’s future, the IPCB established working groups on professionalization, police-justice relations, and ministerial development. The working group on professionalization is chaired by the commander of the AUP on behalf of the deputy interior minister for security, Lieutenant General Abdul Rahman, and will include representatives from NTM-A and the European Police Mission (EUPOL). The group is tasked to identify the roles, responsibilities, and structure of the ANP, and given the goal of helping build an ANP that is transparent, accountable, and responsive to the Afghan people and that operates under Afghanistan’s laws and constitution. The working group will examine the ANP’s current organization and produce recommendations for breaking down the stovepipe configuration of constituent police forces to create a unified organization with a clear chain of command. It also will review the ANP’s current level of professionalism, recognizing that improvement will require additional training, improved recruitment, merit promotions, and greater accountability.

The working group on police-justice relations is chaired by the deputy interior minister for administration, Lieutenant General Mirza Mohammad Yarmand, and Deputy Attorney General Abdul Fatah Azizi and includes representatives from the UN Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). Representatives of the justice sector may be invited as required. The working group will identify actions to improve links between the police and justice sector, which have developed separately during international engagement in Afghanistan. The group also will craft a proposal for creating an agency composed of representatives from the MOI and the attorney general’s office that will define the roles and expectations of the police and the judiciary and outline the prosecutorial process, from the detection of crimes through prosecution and incarceration. The group will recommend the creation of an executive management council that will develop a method for joint accreditation of training across the justice sector and identify opportunities for joint training across ministries. Currently, there is very little contact among the ANP, judges, prosecutors, and other elements of the justice sector, and the isolation of the police from the justice system is a major brake on achieving the rule of law in Afghanistan.

The working group on ministerial development will consider proposals to transform the interior ministry into a modern, efficient bureaucracy. It is led by the deputy interior minister for strategy and policy, Lieutenant General Abdul Wasee Raoufi. The group will undertake regular consultations between the ministry and the international community, with the following as potential deliverables:

- Strengthening MOI policy capacity to oversee the ANP, including improving the ministry’s strategic leadership, policy implementation, and assessment capabilities.
- Strengthening MOI administrative systems, including logistics, procurement, information technology systems, human resources management, financial management, and budgeting. This includes increasing the MOI’s professional civilian and police expertise through recruitment, training, and retention.
- Establishing mechanisms to hold the MOI and ANP to professional standards, including external and internal oversight and accountability, transparency, and anticorruption mechanisms.

Currently, there is very little contact among the ANP, judges, prosecutors, and other elements of the justice sector, and the isolation of the police from the justice system is a major brake on achieving the rule of law in Afghanistan.
Defining the best MOI structure to oversee and manage the ANP, including defining roles and responsibilities relating to other agencies and ministries.

The First Step in the IPCB Process

On November 17, 2012, the IPCB convened the second plenary of the From Transition to Transformation project, with Interior Minister Ghulam Patang serving as chairman for the first time. Attendees included ambassadors and chiefs of mission from twenty donor countries and international organizations, plus NTM-A and ISAF. Ashraf Ghani, director of the overall Afghanistan transition process, made opening remarks, stating that the future depends on transforming the country’s institutions over the next decade. The forum heard reports from the three IPCB police transition working groups and several new proposals for reforms and requests for international assistance.17

Reporting for the working group on ministerial development, Deputy Minister for Strategy and Policy Raoufi introduced a proposal to restructure the MOI into strategic and operational divisions, with the directorates concerned with strategy, policy, and administration in one division and the directorates concerned with security and operational policing in the other. The directorates for prisons and public services would be separated from the ANP and upgraded. The deputy minister introduced an MOI proposal to transfer the portion of the border police responsible for patrolling the green space between official crossing points to the Afghan National Army in return for the army’s battalion responsible for highway patrol in order to strengthen border security and improve the ANP’s ability to counter terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime. Reporting for the working group on professionalization, NTM-A senior police adviser Alan Dunlay proposed eleven areas of concentration that would be crucial for improving the ANP’s performance. These included literacy, recruiting, standards, leadership, corruption, community relations, assignments, promotions, human rights, working and living conditions, and border policing. The working group determined that ANP professionalization also required attention to intelligence-led policing, command and control, and strategic and operational planning. Reporting for the working group on police-justice relations, Deputy Minister for Administration Yarmand reported finalizing standard operating procedures in six areas to guide police and prosecutors on routine operations as a first step to making the ANP part of a rule of law–based criminal justice system. The new standard procedures dealt with such topics as securing a crime scene, making arrests, informing prosecutors, and obtaining warrants, court orders, and verdicts. Representatives of ISAF, NTM-A, international organizations, and donor governments welcomed the progress the working groups had achieved and asked for time to study the proposals.

In concluding remarks, Minister Patang expressed Afghanistan’s appreciation for the international support received over the past eleven years and hoped that donors would provide the assistance required to maintain the ANP at 157,000 personnel until 2020. The minister said the challenge was to change the ANP from a militarized force to a community-oriented police service that could gain the public’s trust. Patang also announced the creation of an MOI-led working group that would prepare a plan to create the type of police force Afghanistan would require after 2014. The planning would involve a steering group and ten sub-working groups and would produce both a ten-year vision and a two-year blueprint for initial implementation. Both plans would be completed by March 2013. The work of the committees and the MOI-led planning effort would go forward in tandem, with coordination assured by the presence of international community representatives on the MOI steering committee and subgroups. The goal would be a coherent plan that the international community could support with funding and resources. This work is now under way.
International and Afghan Views on the Reform Process

Afghanistan needs a police force that can cover the entire policing spectrum, including the capability to participate in the hold-and-build phases of counterinsurgency operations. Unfortunately, little thought has been given to how to break down the stovepipes between the four major police forces, and NTM-A has resisted suggestions to revise the FDD course curriculum to include more policing subjects. A comprehensive strategic plan could help remedy the situation, but the international community will have to support such a plan with resources. A lack of consensus among donors has caused previous attempts to develop strategic plans to fail. In addition, the IPCB, a ten-member planning team, has no authority, field staff, or financial resources to implement programs. It has asked for U.S. assistance in drafting the strategic plan and will have to depend on the Afghan government and foreign donors to implement its programs. There is little doubt that the ANP is at a crossroads with only limited time between the delivery of the IPCB strategic plan and the NTM-A withdrawal. The IPCB process is the only joint Afghan-international effort under way to reorient the ANP from counterinsurgency to law enforcement with an eye on 2015. It is the only game in town in shaping a police force that can enforce the law and maintain public order in Afghanistan for the coming decade.

Unfortunately, the current IPCB consultation process has a number of problems. A major shortcoming is the failure to include Afghan society in the conversation between the international community and the Afghan government on the ANP’s future. Including the Afghan people’s views on the type of police force they desire is crucial to obtaining popular support for the reform process. Consulting with the public on this topic will not be easy. Afghans tend to answer opinion polling about the police with praise, even as most other indications suggest that Afghans fear the police and hold them in low esteem. To obtain useful public views, the IPCB could sample the opinion of a cross-section of district-level councils, which are composed of local representatives accustomed to dealing with government matters and more likely to provide honest and perceptive views. Another problem is that the major participants in the transformation process—NTM-A, ISAF, the United Nations Mission (UNAMA) and MOI—have differing perspectives on the task, timing, and objectives of reforming the ANP.

**NTM-A Perspectives**

NTM-A believes the ANP must prioritize combating the insurgency until conditions in the country permit a phased transition to a conventional police force. The ANP will need international community support for the foreseeable future. A slow but steady transition from counterinsurgency to civilian police functions, requiring new training in key competencies, will take place over ten years and include links to judicial reform and rule of law-related requirements. For the present, there is a need to identify core areas for training and match resources to those areas so the basic training curriculum can be expanded to include policing subjects. Afghan leadership is seen as crucial for success, especially in strategic planning for the transition. As NTM-A in its present form will not be around to help manage the transition, responsibility will devolve to the MOI, supported by assistance from the United States and the international community. NTM-A officers noted that the May 2012 NATO Summit projected an ANSF force of 228,000 with an estimated budget of $4.1 billion in foreign assistance. Of this amount, between $1.6 billion and $1.7 billion will be used to sustain the ANP at a total strength of 98,500 personnel.

**ISAF Perspectives**

ISAF’s views parallel NTM-A’s thinking. ISAF believes there is a need to transform the ANP toward supporting the rule of law but notes that the pace of transition depends on improvements in the security situation. ISAF believes that transforming the ANP into a
law enforcement service is essential for Afghanistan to achieve security during the coming decade. MOI requires reform to improve its ability to support the ANP. There must be stronger links between the Interior Ministry, the ANP, and the justice sector, in particular with public prosecutors. ISAF has underscored that the ANP needs literacy training and an understanding of the concept of constitutional government and democracy. Illiteracy and a lack of understanding of these larger issues is a brake on reform. There also is a need to prioritize assistance to the AUP, which is at the forefront of policing around the country, and to appoint good field commanders where security is most needed, backed up by good provincial governors. ISAF is confident that donor funding will be adequate, but the question remains as to where the funds will come from and who will train the police. Officers concluded that it is in everyone’s interest, including Afghanistan’s neighbors, to create a fully operational and effective police force.

**UN Perspectives**

UN officials have criticized past approaches to creating the ANP, believing the United States should have emphasized training in law enforcement and policing skills from the outset. Instead, the law enforcement component was absent from the beginning, leading to the belief that developing a community-oriented police service must wait until security improves. UN officials noted that in pursuing a strategy of emphasizing counterinsurgency training, the United States ignored the counsel of international civilian police advisers. Only $7 million was allocated to community policing out of the billions of dollars spent on police programs. UN officers are concerned about what happens when the NTM-A disappears, observing that it will take a huge political commitment and major resources to remake the ANP. To make matters worse, no one is stepping up to replace NTM-A, not even the United Nations. The IPCB has no authority or resources and the European Union and EUPOL have no appetite for taking on the task of reforming the ANP. EUPOL, which was supposed to be a major ISAF component, has never been able to fill its relatively small number of assigned slots.

UN officials are concerned about who will administer the U.S. training contracts after 2014. The United States argues that responsibility will shift to the MOI, but the Afghans lack the ability to manage the contracts and fear that a transfer of resources will not accompany a transfer of responsibility. One solution might be to create an organization like NTM-A, comprised of all the participants in the police development program. This would require greater interagency cooperation, however, and current cooperation is poor. UN officials believe there is one year to figure out a way forward, and that after that everything will begin to unravel and the ANP will revert to manning checkpoints and other forms of static guard duty. This period may be reduced to six or seven months if countries follow Australia’s example and withdraw early. One possible option is using the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s training centers in southwest Asia to train ANP personnel, but that would not be optimal.

**Afghan Interior Ministry Perspectives**

MOI senior officials have criticized the general approach to police development, charging that the Afghan government’s leadership of the police program was weak and that there is no rule of law in Afghanistan. The country is divided along ethnic lines and MOI is highly politicized, as evidenced by the appointment of well-connected provincial police chiefs who were illiterate, without police experience, and otherwise unqualified. Resources have been diverted from the police to other units in the ministry, and there is a lack of knowledge and loyalty at the political level toward for the police. The police have not received the right training, nor were sufficient police numbers identified in the *tashkiel* (personnel roster). The
ANP is unsustainable in its present form and the Afghan government will need international assistance for many years. Although $4.1 billion in international assistance is projected for the ANSF after 2014, closer to $8 billion is needed. The key to future ANP success is the political will required to carry out the required reforms. 22

Resources for Sustaining the ANP after 2014

One of the most urgent tasks is to identify the resources that will be available to support the ANP after 2014. First, the United States and the international community must set a level of funding—a multiyear number—dedicated to the ANP's future development. At the moment, no number for future support has been agreed to. NTM-A can cite a figure for ANP sustainment, but this overall budget number must be agreed in the IPCB and inserted into its strategic plan. Subsets of the overall total must be matched to specific program requirements, such as training, equipment, and technical assistance. Equipment transfers from U.S. sources to the ANP have ceased, but the ANP will need additional equipment in the future, especially if the force is reconfigured to become a law enforcement agency. Continued international funding will require the United States and other donors to accept the fact that they will have to pay for decisions the Afghans make, with limited inputs beyond providing general guidelines. The United States will also have to accept the growing influence of European civilian police advisors on determining the future steps in ANP development.

Conclusions and Recommendations

A series of integrated actions are needed in the immediate future to ensure the viability and efficacy of the ANP after the U.S. withdrawal. First, the ANP must be restructured, altering the nature of the force from a paramilitary institution to a national police service that can ensure the rule of law and protect citizens. This restructuring will effectively remove the police from a counterinsurgency and combat role and remodel the force along the lines of a law enforcement institution. Of course, the ANP would receive defensive tactics and officer safety training to protect themselves if attacked.

Second, funding must be identified and committed to the restructuring effort. This funding commitment must go beyond the statement of general financial targets and be specific in its application for functional programs (e.g., training, equipment) and organizational efforts, such as restructuring the MOI to support a reconfigured police force. There should be a concerted international effort to produce and sustain this funding. The question is whether the funding will follow the restructuring plan or whether the plan will have to be designed according to potential funding.

Third, there must be a strong coordinating mechanism to manage the process, based on a close working relationship between the MOI and the international community. The IPCB is the best organization to manage this process, if it is given adequate resources to implement changes. Without strong leadership and close donor-Afghan cooperation, the chances for refashioning the ANP into an effective national police force are reduced.

Fourth, the MOI as an institution must be strengthened and its capacity to conduct strategic planning and implement programs improved. This requires urgent international technical assistance and training and internal structural changes in the MOI, plus the appointment of police professionals to key positions. The MOI should become a modern police institution, complete with a workable strategic approach that integrates planning, programming, and budgeting and serves as the institutional backbone for the newly configured force.
Time is short. The ANP reform process must be under way by the beginning of 2014 if it is to leave behind a sustainable, multiyear international development program for education and training, plus infrastructure projects that are focused on building democracy and instituting the rule of law. Following are recommendations that flow from the conclusions of this report.

- **Police reform.** The current militarized police model must be changed. The ANP must be retrained to create a law enforcement organization that can provide security for Afghanistan’s citizens after 2014. The new ANP should focus on earning the trust and confidence of Afghan citizens. The four major ANP police forces—AUP, ANCOP, ABP, and the AACP—should be integrated into a unified organization with a single chain of command and a common mission, policing philosophy, and cohesive approach. As currently structured, the ANP cannot fulfill its future mission.

- **Prompt action.** There is very little time to accomplish reforms. Two calendar years are left before the withdrawal deadline, but at least a year will be required for planning and restructuring existing programs so that new training and institutional reform can begin during 2014. Reform goals and objectives must be agreed upon and programs must be formulated and announced as soon as possible. The process of implementation must be under way by the start of 2014.

- **Public consultation.** It is essential to establish a mechanism for regular consultations with concerned and articulate members of the public on implementing police reform. The consultation process should emphasize Afghanistan’s political elite as well as rural areas, particularly those threatened by the insurgency. Consultation should include public education so that Afghans understand the changes taking place and the role that police should play in a democratic society.

- **Upgrade the Afghan Police Academy.** The Afghan National Police Academy currently provides a five-year, university-level academic education to an annual graduating class of fifteen hundred police cadets. The academy’s program should be expanded to offer advanced educational degrees that will enable senior police officers to undertake specialized training abroad. The academy should also be engaged in promoting human rights training and advanced literacy training for the ANP, and assist in developing the curriculum used at the various training centers operated by the constituent police forces in the ANP.

- **Professionalization.** NTM-A has developed a system of military and police institutions that provide in-service training to improve the ANP’s professionalism. The officer candidate school and noncommissioned officer school, which train both military and police personnel, need to be preserved and provided with funding and technical support. In addition, the NTM-A sponsored basic literacy program for soldiers and police is essential and should continue with international support. Considerable effort will be required to obtain NTM-A’s current goal of raising the literacy level of ANSF members to the Afghan third-grade level by 2015.

- **Improve the MOI.** The MOI must be reformed and restructured to more strongly support policing based on the recommendations of the IPCB’s working group on Interior Ministry development. It is important to establish civilian oversight of the ministry. It is also important to introduce civilian experts into the ministry to take over administrative functions and allow police officers to be deployed to the field. Every effort should be made to maintain the current level of advisory support, particularly in technical areas such as finance, procurement, transport, and supply.

- **Sustainable funding.** Budgets must be developed and funding committed to this overall effort. Unless this strategic shift takes place and financial resources are identified to support police transformation, the effort will fail. A high-level meeting of Afghan, U.S.,
and international community leaders should be convened in early 2014 to announce and endorse this new direction for the ANP.
Notes

20. Interview with ISAF officers at ISAF headquarters, September 12, 2012.
21. Interviews with senior UN officials at UN offices in Kabul, September 19, 2012.
22. Interview with Afghan officials, September 2012.
Of Related Interest

- *The Politics of Security Sector Reform in Egypt* by Daniel Brumberg and Hesham Sallam (Special Report, October 2012)
- *Security Sector Transformation in the Arab Awakening* by Donald J. Planyt (Special Report, September 2012)
- *Afghanistan's Civil Order Police* by Robert M. Perito (Special Report, May 2012)
- *Paying for Afghanistan's Security Forces During Transition: Issues for Chicago and Beyond* by William Byrd (Peace Brief, April 2012)
- *Security Sector Reform in Tunisia* by Querine Hanlon (Special Report, March 2012)
- *Who Controls Pakistan's Security Forces?* by Shuja Nawaz (Special Report, November 2011)
- *Security Sector Transformation in North Africa and the Middle East* by Mark Sedra (Special Report, November 2011)
- *Police Corruption: What Past Scandals Teach about Current Challenges* by David Bayley and Robert M. Perito (Special Report, November 2011)
- *The Iraq Federal Police: U.S. Police Building under Fire* by Robert M. Perito (Special Report, October 2011)
- *Reforming Pakistan's Police and Law Enforcement Infrastructure* by Hassan Abbas (Special Report, February 2011)
- *Afghanistan's Police* by Robert M. Perito (Special Report, August 2009)
- *The Interior Ministry's Role in Security Sector Reform* by Robert M. Perito (Special Report, May 2009)