



# SPECIAL REPORT

## **ABOUT THIS REPORT**

On June 7, at the invitation of the Congressional Committee on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the United States Institute of Peace conducted a briefing on the military balance in Bosnia. The event was conceived as the first in a series of meetings on the possibility of opening new prospects for diplomacy in managing the conflict. The question before the June 7 meeting was whether the state of and tendencies regarding weapons, manpower, morale, operational characteristics, and so on, among the parties to the Bosnian conflict—issues not prominent in the public or legislative debate—underlies all of the questions currently before the international community about the conflict.

The briefing, which was moderated by the vice chairman of the Institute's Board of Directors Max M. Kampelman, involved remarks from military experts Norman Cigar of the Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting and Zalmay Khalilzad of the RAND Corporation.

The U.S. Institute of Peace believes that the following summary of remarks will serve to inform policymakers and others who must deal with a changing and volatile situation on the ground in Bosnia. Since the briefing on June 7, significant new fighting has broken out that altogether threatens UN operations in Bosnia. That fighting may itself alter the military balance, which the international community would have to consider in proceeding to the next stage of its presence in the region. The material that follows, which presents the basics of the military situation in Bosnia, should shed light on events as they unfold.

This Special Report presents the views of the briefing participants and does not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace or of the Congressional Committee on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

August 1995

## **The Military Balance in Bosnia and Its Effect on the Prospects for Peace**

### **Key Points**

The speakers held that the military balance in Bosnia is key to diplomatic efforts at peacemaking. They limited their remarks on June 7 to weighing the current balance of forces and to examining the realities should the international community take one of the following options: (1) continuing the arms embargo on Bosnia, (2) lifting the embargo (on Bosnia or Bosnia and Serbia), or (3) diminishing the military advantage of the Bosnian Serbs. Neither speaker advocated any particular option or proposed objectives for the international community. Both stressed at several points that altering the military balance in Bosnia could not be undertaken without an international consensus on the larger objective of doing so, and both clearly favored a diplomatic solution to the conflict.

### **The Balance of Forces**

- The current balance of military forces in Bosnia is relatively stable but moving slowly away from the advantage the Bosnian Serbs have held since the beginning of the conflict. This change is due to the "trickle" of new light arms that the Bosnian government has secured by various means. The current balance is, however, a recipe for an indecisive, bloody, and volatile stalemate.
- One view is that the international community could change the military balance to drive the parties to the table and to improve the prospects for an enduring settlement. There are a number of options for changing the balance that fall short of a full-scale intervention with ground forces. The fundamental question is not whether the balance can be changed but, rather, *to what end* should it be changed? That is, how will such change facilitate diplomacy?
- It is crucial to understand the *nature* of the balance. One must be able to answer the question of what allows one party or the other to be successful in battle.
- The principal advantage of the Bosnian Serbs is their superiority in tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery, which ranges from 8-to-1 to 10-to-1. What this means in terms of the nature of the balance

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is that the Serbs can take and hold positions without incurring significant casualties. What enables them to fight the type of fight that is to their advantage is their relationship with Belgrade, which supplies them. The Serbs also hold the advantage in strategic geography, given their access to Serbia-Montenegro and the fact that they have several Bosnian towns surrounded. Muslims in these towns are vulnerable.

- The principal advantage of the Bosnian government and its Croat allies lies in manpower and morale. The manpower ratio is between 2-to-1 and 2 1/2-to-1, and the fact that this ratio holds even though the Bosnian army has more volunteers than can be armed testifies to commitment and high morale. The Bosnians are better equipped to man the 1,600-kilometer front. Over the past two years, the Bosnian forces have improved in organization, training, and general professionalism to become a good light infantry.
- The vulnerabilities of the Serbs are a small manpower base and declining morale. The Serb population of Bosnia was never large, and a significant number live in government-controlled areas or have fled. The desertion rate from Serb units is high, and coercive measures must be used to keep units in the field. Unlike the Bosnian forces, Serb forces have not been tested in engagements involving heavy casualties.
- The vulnerability of the Bosnian government forces lies primarily in low levels of heavy equipment and weapons designed to counter heavy equipment and limit Bosnian casualties. This vulnerability cannot be overcome by increases in light arms alone.

#### *Changing the Balance of Forces and Negotiation*

- If a change in the balance of forces is contemplated, one view has it that the present situation is comparable to that in Afghanistan at the time the United States and others began to assist the Mujahedin. At that time, the balance of forces was much less favorable to the Mujahedin than it is now to the Bosnian government and its Croat allies.
- Shifting the balance in favor of the Bosnian government and its Croat allies would not likely result in a no-holds-barred guerrilla war. The condition of Serb forces, with their manpower difficulties and reliance on heavy equipment, would preclude such a possibility. The Bosnian light infantry force is well suited to fighting a "people's" war.
- The following three options short of an all-out ground action might change the balance of forces to bring about negotiations on the basis of the current Contact Group proposal:

**Lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia:** Under this option, UN forces would have to be removed or reduced and reconfigured under NATO command and under different rules of engagement. While the Bosnians could integrate and absorb new weapons relatively quickly, there are dangers in the interim immediately after lifting the embargo. Western airpower might have to be used as described in the third option to get the Bosnians through the interim.

Assisting the Bosnians under the present rules of the embargo: Such assistance might include providing intelligence, nonlethal support, training, and even transport helicopters, all of which are permitted under the embargo and some of which have already been provided to the Slovenes, who are also covered by the embargo.

Weakening the Bosnian Serbs: Western airpower could conceivably maintain an absolute no-fly zone, neutralize Serb missile radars and missile launchers, destroy heavy weapons upon their entry into exclusionary zones around vulnerable Bosnian "safe areas" (including Sarajevo), interdict heavy forces on the move, and cut supply routes.

- Negotiations on the present "51-49 percent" basis may not be possible without a change in the balance of forces. No settlement is apt to remain in place unless the balance is changed. Without significant change, Bosnia would have to become an international protectorate in order to survive.
- Military cooperation between the Bosnian government and its Croat allies in the Federation is too poorly developed to make possible successful assaults on such Serb strong points as the Brcko corridor. Nonetheless, cooperation is improving, as Croatian assistance in staving off the fall of Bihac attests.
- Russia, although in a position to obstruct a more robust international intervention, has agreed to the Contact Group formula for negotiations and may countenance lifting the embargo on Bosnia if the economic embargo on Serbia-Montenegro is lifted at the same time. Given the relative ineffectiveness of that embargo, this may not be an entirely negative proposition for the West.
- The *nature* of the balance of forces in Bosnia seems to indicate that the Serbs are vulnerable to airpower. The highest payoff for traditional airpower has been against deployed forces, especially road columns. Airpower is most effective in keeping ground troops from massing and maneuvering. If a key Serb strong point—such as the Brcko corridor—were attacked, the Serbs would have to give battle. This would mean putting their heavy equipment on roads and into jeopardy from the air.

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*[Bosnian vulnerability] lies in low levels of heavy equipment and weapons designed to counter heavy equipment and limit casualties.*

*The military balance in Bosnia is key to diplomatic efforts at peacemaking.*

## **Introduction**

On June 7, the United States Institute of Peace conducted a briefing on the military balance in Bosnia at the invitation of the Congressional Committee on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The event was conceived as the first in a series of meetings on the question of opening new prospects for diplomacy in managing the conflict.

The question before the meeting was whether the state of and tendencies regarding weapons, manpower, morale, operational characteristics, and so on, among the parties to the Bosnian conflict—issues not prominent in the public or legislative debate—underlies all of the questions before the international community about the conflict. Without understanding the current situation, one cannot tackle such issues as reconfiguring and securing United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR), evacuating UN troops (if necessary), and lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia or easing sanctions on Serbia. The military balance is also fundamental to the question of how the international community can make progress at the bargaining table now and in the longer term.

The briefing, which was moderated by the vice chairman of the Institute's Board of Directors Max M. Kampelman, involved remarks from military experts Norman Cigar of the Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting and Zalmay Khalilzad of the RAND Corporation.

The speakers held that the military balance in Bosnia is key to diplomatic efforts at peacemaking. They limited their remarks to weighing of the current balance of forces and to examining the realities should the international community take one of the following options of (1) continuing the arms embargo on Bosnia, (2) lifting the embargo (on Bosnia or Bosnia and Serbia), or (3) diminishing the military advantage of the Bosnian Serbs. Neither speaker advocated any particular option or proposed objectives for the international community. Both stressed at several points that altering the military balance in Bosnia could not be undertaken without an international consensus on the larger objective of doing so, and both favored a diplomatic solution to the conflict.

The United States Institute of Peace believes that the following summary of remarks will serve to inform policymakers and others who must deal with a changing and volatile situation on the ground in Bosnia. Since the briefing on June 7, significant new fighting has broken out that altogether threatens UN operations in Bosnia. That fighting may itself alter the military balance, which the international community would have to consider in proceeding to the next stage of its presence in the region. The material that follows, which presents the basics of the military situation in Bosnia, should shed light on events as they unfold.

## **Norman Cigar**

Norman Cigar addressed the nature of the military balance in former Yugoslavia and whether—and how—it was amenable to change. The question of whether it should be changed—or the relation between the balance and the negotiating table—Cigar preferred to leave to others.

In Cigar's opinion, the facts about the balance are well known: the Bosnian government and its Croatian allies have a manpower advantage, and the Bosnian Serbs have an advantage in heavy equipment. When it comes to tanks and armored personnel carriers, artillery and ammunition, the ratios are 8-to-1 to 10-to-1 in favor of the Serbs. Despite the presently insurmountable advantage in heavy equipment, a rough balance of force seems to obtain, a balance that is a recipe for an indecisive, bloody, and volatile stalemate. More important than knowing these facts is understanding the nature of the balance—knowing the answers to such questions as: What is the operational center of gravity for one party to the conflict or another? What allows one party or the other to be successful on the battlefield?

### *Assessing the Bosnian Serbs*

The success of the Bosnia Serbs, Cigar said, is tied to the use of regular, heavy forces. Time and again, their advantage in tanks and artillery has allowed them to take and hold positions without significant casualties. What determines whether they can fight the type of fight that is best for them is their relationship with Belgrade: Belgrade may be a source of additional heavy weapons and provides the fuel without which armor and artillery cannot be used effectively.

The Bosnian Serbs also have certain vulnerabilities—morale and manpower. It has long been assumed that Bosnian Serb morale is high and that they fight with reckless abandon. This is not true now, Cigar said. There are numerous stories in circulation regarding the desertion of troops, including some about roundups of deserters in Serbia and Montenegro, of mines placed between forces and their armored vehicles to prevent retreat, execution squads to prevent units from leaving, and so on. One Bosnian Serb general said last year that 46 percent of the officers had already left the Bosnian Serb army.

Taking up the manpower vulnerability of the Bosnian Serbs, Cigar noted that their forces are fairly small. Bosnian Serbs numbered about 31 percent of the population in the first place, and about 200,000 live in lands now held by the Bosnian government and the Croats. Perhaps as many as 500,000 have left Bosnia altogether, leaving 600,000 in Bosnian-Serb-held areas. The Serbian population is older than the Muslims and Croats. The front is some 1,600 km. long, and the Serbs are stretched to man it. As morale dips, the manpower pool shrinks, and casualties affect both morale and manpower. Even though the Serbs have superiority in heavy equipment, it is not easy for them to keep that equipment manned. The Bosnian Serbs have gone so far as to draft Muslims and other non-Serbs in their territory for such tasks as digging trenches.

### *The Bosnian Government and Croat Forces*

Applying the same sort of analysis to the Bosnian government and Croat forces, said Cigar, shows that the level of commitment of the fighters is higher—the fact that there are more Bosnian soldiers than weapons says something about morale. In addition, the government forces are improving, becoming more professional and better organized. Staff, planning, and training are better, and they are getting more arms from a number of sources—smuggling, capture, and local manufacture. According to Ci-

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gar, the Bosnian government has created a good light infantry. "This is no mean trick: it takes initiative and commitment." There are good prospects for absorbing equipment as soon as it becomes available. The bottom line for the Bosnian government forces, however, is that they can never overcome the other side's advantage in heavy equipment: fighting against that advantage will lead to heavy casualties and erode their numerical advantage.

Regarding the current status of the balance, Cigar opined that the Bosnian Serbs had gone as far as they can go at the cost they are willing to bear. They do not have everything they want, but they have to minimize their casualties. It is much easier for them to starve Sarajevo out than to fight for it. In Cigar's estimation, the Serbs now want to consolidate their gains, they are tired and, most important, have no good war-ending strategy. They seek to hold on and bleed the Bosnian government, while hoping for a breakdown of the Bosnian-Croat Federation and for the international community to tire of the struggle and to cease supporting the Bosnian government.

#### *Changing the Balance?*

Cigar held that the balance of forces could be changed relatively easily. The situation in Bosnia is a bit similar to that between Croatia and Serbia in 1991. A relative stalemate favoring the Serbs broke down when the Croats captured some Serbian heavy equipment and inflicted heavy casualties on the Serbs. Serbian desertions began, the reserves refused to serve, and Belgrade made a deal in response to domestic discontent.

Considering the strength of Serbia's ability to commit to help the Bosnian Serbs, Cigar noted that Slobodan Milosevic would have his own manpower problems over the long term, since 300,000 to 500,000 draft-age men have left Serbia. Cigar did not believe that shifting the balance in favor of the Bosnian government would lead to a no-holds-barred guerrilla war. The latter would not suit the Bosnian Serbs, whose strength is in heavy equipment. It would also play into the hands of the Bosnian government, which has the light forces to deal with a "people's" war.

Cigar concluded that although a rough balance obtained at present, it could be changed easily and fairly quickly. The question was not whether or how to change it, but why? To what end should the balance be changed? What are the objectives of the international community? Does a changed balance suit those objectives?

#### **Zalmay Khalilzad**

Zalmay Khalilzad opened with the observation that the military balance in Bosnia has been the key variable in the failure of the international community to bring peace there. The Serbs have felt that they had more to gain on the battlefield than at the negotiating table because the balance favors them: they also demand a settlement that reflects the current balance. It is true that the international community has tried to affect the balance by imposing UN forces and establishing no-fly and exclusion zones. However, ambivalence among the powers and divisions between the UN and NATO have prevented the desired effect. Initially, said Khalilzad, the Serbs were uncertain about the effectiveness of the international community. By now, they are convinced

that no outside military force will be a credible factor in the proceedings because of poor command arrangements, the vulnerability of UN forces, the weak authority of the commander, limited staff capability, and timid rules of engagement. For these reasons, the local balance of forces has not been affected.

### *The Current Balance of Forces*

Khalilzad noted that it is really not easy to make definitive statements on the balance of forces at any given time: there are simply too many factors to consider. The Serbs by and large have the advantage in strategic geography and heavy equipment. The Serbs have operated adjacent to their supply sources in rump Yugoslavia and had the advantage of occupying rural areas, leaving the Bosnians in vulnerable towns. Their advantage in heavy equipment stemmed from the initial involvement of the Yugoslav army in the conflict. When the latter withdrew, it left its heavy equipment. Like Cigar, Khalilzad noted the manpower advantage of the Bosnian government, especially since the proclamation of the Federation with the Bosnian Croats.

Khalilzad provided a set of statistics (from UNPROFOR and U.S. government sources) comparing the state of the balance in 1993 with that of 1995; it showed a trend moving slowly toward improvement in the Bosnian position. He noted that the intelligence on tanks and artillery showed wide variations for 1995, more evidence of the difficulty of being definitive. (See table below.)

### *Balance of Forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina*

	1993	1995
Serbian personnel	67,000	96-105,000
Bosnian personnel	80-100,000	220-266,000 *
Serbian tanks	350	390-450
Bosnian tanks	85	100-135 *
Serbian artillery	1,000	735-1,800
Bosnian artillery	107	386-760 *
Serbian fixed-wing aircraft	—	42
Bosnian fixed-wing aircraft	—	15 *
Serbian helicopters	—	30
Bosnian helicopters	—	12 *

*\*Includes both Bosnia government and Bosnian Croat assets.*

### *Changing the Balance?*

Khalilzad offered his views on possible objectives requiring various strategies and capabilities. He focused on how the balance could be changed to get the Serbs to negotiate on the 51-49 percent division of Bosnia proposed by the Contact Group and broadly accepted, except by the Bosnia Serbs. It would be possible to strengthen the Bosnian government either by lifting the arms embargo or providing the sort of military support allowed under the embargo.

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*Even though the Serbs have superiority in heavy equipment, it is not easy for them to keep that equipment manned.*

*To weaken the Serbs over the long haul, the UN force would either have to be withdrawn or reduced in size and reorganized under NATO command.*

Once the embargo was lifted, the United States could lead an international effort to provide weapons, intelligence, support, and training as the West did in Afghanistan. In Khalilzad's view, when the West began aiding the Mujahedin in Afghanistan, the balance of forces was much less favorable to them than it now is for the Bosnian government. Even with the embargo in place, the United States could do more to strengthen the Bosnians. The embargo does not preclude providing training, nonlethal assistance, or even helicopters. Khalilzad asserted that if the United States had provided the same sort of assistance to Bosnia that it is currently providing to Slovenia—under the same embargo—the balance could have been positively affected.

The other way to change the balance to force negotiations would be to weaken the Serbs. Khalilzad asked why, when heavy weapons have been placed under UN supervision, they have not been disabled. That would surely have made a difference in the balance and still could. He conceded that to weaken the Serbs over the long haul, the UN force would have to be either withdrawn or reduced in size and reorganized under NATO command. Even without troops on the ground, airpower could make a major difference. It might not bring peace, but it could shift the balance. Airpower could interdict forces on the move, disable heavy weapons, and disrupt supply lines.

According to Khalilzad, a deliberate Western strategy of weakening the Bosnian Serbs, consisting of a number of elements, could have been employed:

- Enforced SAM-, tank-, and artillery-free zones around Sarajevo and other enclaves could have been established.
- UNPROFOR could have been reorganized and reequipped with the mission of enforcing the tank- and artillery-free zones, for example, through firefinder radars. (This would have required resolving the command and control tensions between NATO and the UN.)
- To genuinely protect the "safe areas," the forces on the ground could have been given the ability to defend in place against harassing attacks and to call in airpower against massed force.
- Airpower could have operated under rules of engagement that would allow attack with speed and sufficient force. This would have required employing UAVs, AC-130s, and U.S. Navy tactical reconnaissance and other sources for targeting to support tactical air forces for weapons delivery.
- All tanks and artillery detected in the safe zones could have been attacked without warning.
- To establish NATO freedom of air action, it would have made sense to set up SAM exclusion zones around artillery zones and country-wide SAM no-use zones. Aircraft with HARM missiles could have been employed to enforce such exclusion zones.
- NATO could have interdicted the movement of Serb forces from the air. To deter the Bosnian Serbs from attacking international forces on the ground, a key feature of the strategy could have been to respond by attacking Bosnian Serb weapons in other areas, as well as command and control centers and support systems.



This strategy, if it had been seriously pursued, could have had one of two results: the Bosnian Serbs might have come to accept the Contact Group plan, or the balance of power might have changed in favor of the Bosnian government, further increasing the pressure on the Bosnian Serbs. Such a strategy would have turned Bosnia into a quagmire for the Bosnian Serbs, not for the West.

### *The Prudent Way to Proceed?*

Khalilzad summed up by saying that the absolute numbers and quality evaluations show that the Bosnian Serbs are not a very formidable military force. They have succeeded because of the weakness of the Bosnian government and their own brutality and determination. On the whole, Western reaction to the situation has made them more confident.

According to Khalilzad, there is no prudent way to proceed now without U.S. leadership: no strategy for success is likely without the United States at the center of it. Under U.S. leadership, the international community should stick to the 51-49 percent arrangement and work to change the military balance by lifting the arms embargo, using NATO airpower effectively, or using a combination of the two. Unless the balance changes, neither a settlement nor long-term arrangements is likely. Unless the balance is changed, Bosnia would have to become an international protectorate in order to survive and that is not in the interests of the United States and other nations.

In closing, Khalilzad mentioned that the United States and its allies should also consider "holding Milosevic's feet to the fire." There are differences between Belgrade and Pale, the Serb and Bosnian Serb capitals, but Milosevic plays a key role, especially if the goal is to limit the capabilities of the Bosnian Serbs. In proceeding prudently, he warned, we must also be on guard against the possible spread of war beyond Bosnia to Kosovo and Macedonia.

Khalilzad agreed with the proposition that Bosnia is important to the United States. Indeed, twenty years from now, the conflict may be seen as the defining event in U.S. dealings with Europe and the Islamic world and with the peace and stability of the Balkans. Asking whether it was such a vital interest that we should risk a large number of casualties on the ground, he said that there was "a huge range of alternatives between doing nothing or something ineffective and going in in a big way on the ground." American airpower, weapons, training, and intelligence could be used to shift the balance in a way that is consistent with our values and interests. Using ground forces is one solution, but the cost may be too high for us. If we choose not to do that, we are not out of options. There are effective options "in between," as the case of Afghanistan shows.

## **Additional Comments from the Question-and-Answer Period**

### *The Brcko Corridor*

In response to a question regarding whether the Bosnian and Croatian armies could seize the Brcko Corridor, which links the major Serb-held areas of Bosnia, Norman Cigar was cautious. He noted that although the Bosnia-Croatian numbers looked good on paper, there was not, after all,

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unity of command and effort: getting cooperation between these forces has been difficult. In addition, the corridor is very well defended by the Bosnian Serbs and has the highest concentration of quality Serb forces. It would clearly be the hardest area to take, and the Serbs are still trying to widen it. The question, Cigar said, is whether to attack Serb strength first or to attack Serb weakness. In his opinion, the Bosnians and Croats could not take and hold the corridor right now without more artillery. Contradicting Cigar somewhat on Bosnian-Croatian cooperation, Zalmay Khalilzad noted that the Bosnian-Croat Federation has been helpful. The fact that Bihac has not fallen, he said, has been due to Croatian assistance, including helicopter-lifted supplies. The Bosnian-Croat agreement has been a "significant achievement affecting the [military balance]," moving it away from the Serbs.

#### *Strategic Bombing*

In response to a question regarding whether we should be bombing Belgrade as we bombed Berlin and Baghdad, Cigar offered the view that strategic bombing has never been decisive. The highest payoff for airpower has traditionally been against deployed military forces, especially such forces in columns along roads. Airpower is most effective in keeping ground troops from massing and maneuvering.

#### *TV, Radio, and Communications*

To a question regarding whether TV and radio stations were useful targets for airpower in Bosnia, Cigar answered in the affirmative, citing instances of the Bosnian government attempting to gain control of high peaks that support antennas. He also noted that communications is a significant problem for the Serbs, given the geography and the "ungainly shape" of Serb-held territory in Bosnia.

#### *Bosnia and NATO, the Russian Factor, and Serbian Status in the Balkans*

The panelists were asked to comment on three matters: (1) the assertion that Bosnia was not as important as NATO unity, (2) the Russian factor in the conflict, and (3) the broader question of Serbia's long-term military position vis-à-vis its neighbors.

Khalilzad stated that it is a false proposition that we have to choose between Bosnia and NATO. We can lead NATO, after all, and if the situation in Bosnia continues, it may undermine NATO's credibility. Europe remains vital to the United States, and challenges to Europe can come from both east and south. We still have to solve the problem of how NATO reacts to the absence of a single overwhelming threat. Our lack of conviction or strategy in the case of former Yugoslavia has left that problem unsolved.

Khalilzad admitted that Russia was a problem under the current circumstances: "We have to remember that as long as this is a UN action, Russia will be there and may veto a more robust intervention." The Russians have, however, accepted the 51-49 percent formula and may even go along with lifting the embargo on Bosnia under certain circumstances. Khalilzad had heard from some Russians that they would support a "lift-lift" approach, that is, taking the embargoes off both Bosnia and Serbia. Given the relative ineffec-

tiveness of sanctions against Serbia, he “would not regard this as an entirely negative proposition” for the United States if it is to pay the price of getting the Bosnian embargo lifted.

Regarding the larger picture in the Balkans, Khalilzad said that the Serbs will be the dominant force in the Balkans if they win in Bosnia. While the Bosnians and Croats represent greater numbers in Bosnia, whether or not that will mean anything in the long run depends on how the present conflict is resolved.

### *Russia, Serbia, and the Adriatic Coast*

In response to a question about the intentions of the Russians, Milosevic, and the Bosnian Serbs with regard to the Adriatic Coast of former Yugoslavia—a question that supposed the coast was of strategic significance both historically and now—Khalilzad argued that Milosevic already has the Montenegrin coast and probably wants to keep the Bosnian Serbs landlocked and dependent on him for access. So, acquiring Bosnian lands on the coast is less crucial for Belgrade than it is for Pale. Cigar noted that the Adriatic is less important now than it has been historically. Because its navy could port in Syria or Libya, Russia does not consider the Adriatic coast crucial.

### *Lifting the Embargo: Perils of the Interim*

Another questioner asked what supplies and training might actually be needed if the embargo were lifted and how long the Bosnians would be “under the peril of the interim” before the equipment they might get would be usable. Cigar acknowledged the peril, stressing that there is no cost- or risk-free policy. He noted that weapons, even state-of-the-art weapons, were easy enough to get. “The Afghans were able to integrate Stinger missiles quickly. Most Bosnians have more technical education than Afghans,” he said. But there would be a time gap, during which airpower might have to be used to protect the central Bosnian enclaves.

Khalilzad noted that there were a number of ways to arm the Bosnians and recalled the long, complicated debate over how best to help the Afghans. The most important thing if we wish to help, he said, is to be willing to adapt to the situation. What the Bosnians need are antitank weapons, artillery, and counterartillery, which a number of states can provide. The United States could orchestrate this effort, but there is no reason why we should pay for everything. “There are lots of people who would like to be of assistance,” Khalilzad asserted. He went on to say that nothing forbids training Bosnian government troops right now and that such training could be done in Croatia or even Germany. “If we decide to use American power indirectly, we have to persist until the Bosnian Serbs come to the table. If we’re patient, we wouldn’t have to go in all at once on the ground to effect peace.”

To a related question about the amendment lifting the embargo put forward by Reps. Smith and Hoyer, Khalilzad responded that he had favored lifting the embargo during his time in the Bush administration. He argued that the Bosnians have the right to defend themselves: “The embargo policy has worked to the advantage of the aggressor, but that advantage is eroding. An active strategy of arming Bosnia—not by the U.S. alone—would be a good alternative to going in [on the ground].”

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*If the situation in Bosnia continues, it may undermine NATO's credibility.*

### *Airpower Redux*

The final question of the day regarded what quantities of nonsophisticated weapons and what limited airpower would be needed to affect the balance of forces in Bosnia. Cigar responded that "anything would help" and that Bosnia has stabilized since 1993 in response to the modest trickle of arms since then. As far as airpower was concerned, he argued that the Serbs were vulnerable. If they were attacked in Brcko, they would have to give battle, which would mean using the roads for heavy forces. In that circumstance, they would be vulnerable to airpower.

Khalilzad said that the key to the question was objectives. If the objective is to reduce Serb capability rather than to end the war—that is, to shape the outcome and to protect the enclaves during the transition after lifting the embargo—airpower can do the job. He noted that we even have the capability to deal with one of the most significant problems in Bosnia—cloud cover. The Predator UAV system, although not yet fully operational, might deal



*From Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1995). Reprinted with permission of the author.*

with that problem. It should be deployed to the region. Khalilzad noted that the use of U.S. airpower should be transitional. Whatever the objectives, the question that remains is whether we have the will to meet them. The key issue now is our determination and our ability to demonstrate leadership. He felt that bringing the major states along would be a very demanding task for the United States.

*The Problem of the 51-49 percent Formula and Getting Back to the Table*

In closing and summarizing the substance of the program, moderator Max Kampelman referred to one aspect of the discussion by noting that he “remained personally disturbed with the assumption that the only realistic alternative to the continuation of this chaos [in Bosnia] is the 51-49 percent formula that was presented by the United States and our allies. For me, this is like saying to the Serbian aggressor that ‘you are illegal, immoral war criminals, you’ve engaged in terrible activity, and you can’t have the 70 percent that you’ve captured, you can only have the 49 percent that you’ve captured.’”

Kampelman closed by saying that the diplomatic objective of the United States and Europe should be to get the parties back to the negotiating table, where grievances, many legitimate, with respect to boundaries and other divisive issues can be peacefully resolved. Referring to some of the discussion, he said that it appeared to him that “if we want to win a war, we have to look to something beyond airpower. But for a more limited purpose—such as providing incentives by regrettably inflicting punishment to get the parties to the negotiating table . . . —for that airpower may play a vital role.”

*The Russians have . . .  
accepted the 51-49 percent  
formula and may even go  
along with lifting the  
embargo on Bosnia under  
certain circumstances.*

## Participants

### *Max Kampelman, Moderator*

Max Kampelman was elected vice chairman of the Board of Directors of the United States Institute of Peace in September 1992. He was counselor of the Department of State and ambassador and head of the U.S. delegation to the negotiations on nuclear and space arms in Geneva, before returning in January 1989 to the law firm of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson as a Washington-based partner. Ambassador Kampelman is the former chairman of both Freedom House and the board of governors of the United Nations Association. His past government appointments include head of the U.S. delegation with rank of ambassador to the Committee on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), both in Madrid from 1980 to 1983 and to the subsequent CSCE conferences in Copenhagen, Geneva, and Moscow. An educator, Ambassador Kampelman received a law degree from New York University and a Ph.D. from the University of Minnesota, where he taught from 1946 to 1948. He also served on the faculties of Bennington College, Claremont College, the University of Wisconsin, and Howard University. Ambassador Kampelman was founder and moderator of the public affairs program *Washington Week in Review* and received the Presidential Citizens Medal in 1989. His book, *Entering New Worlds: The Memoirs of a Private Man in Public Life*, was published by HarperCollins in 1991.

### *Norman Cigar*

Norman Cigar is professor of national security studies at the Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting in Quantico, Virginia. Previously, he was professor of international relations at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and he served as a senior political-military analyst on the Army staff at the Pentagon. Professor Cigar also taught history at the University of Wisconsin. He holds a D.Phil. from Oxford; an M.A. from the School of International Affairs at Columbia University, and an M.S. from the Joint Military Intelligence College. He is the author of *Genocide in Bosnia* (Texas A&M University Press, 1995) and the forthcoming article "The Right to Defence: Thoughts on the Bosnian Arms Embargo."

### *Zalmay Khalilzad*

Zalmay Khalilzad is the program director for strategy, doctrine, and force structure of RAND's Project AIR FORCE and director of RAND's Greater Middle East Studies Center. He was assistant deputy under secretary of defense for policy planning between January 1991 and December 1992. In that position, he was responsible for the department's long-range planning and advised the secretary of defense, the under secretary for policy, and other senior defense officials on the full range of issues affecting U.S. defense policy and strategy. In the mid-1980s, he served as a member of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff and then as special advisor to the under secretary of state for political affairs. After leaving the State Department, he joined the RAND Corporation as senior political scientist. As an academic, he has held appointments at Columbia University (where he was also a member of the Institute for War and Peace Studies) and the University of Califor-

nia at San Diego. Dr. Khalilzad holds a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago. He is the author of two books and more than forty published articles and research monographs on security issues. Dr. Khalilzad is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and he is on the editorial board of *ORBIS* and *Middle East Quarterly*.