Letter from the Editor

The UN General Assembly is scheduled to convene on September 11 for its fifth Annual Interactive Dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect. In his Report on R2P, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon encouraged each Member State to consider their internal situation at this dialogue, and discuss both risk factors and preventive measures to protect innocent civilians domestically, a practice known as R2P's Pillar I. While the dialogue is scheduled to address early preventive measures, the possibility and utility of an external military engagement following the recent atrocities committed in Syria, including the use of chemical weapons, will take center stage in the discussions.

During the dialogue participants will review the progress made in recent years, including the appointment of national R2P focal points, and domestic efforts to promote human rights or strengthen national resilience. Member States are expected to offer self-congratulatory statements for their domestic and regional initiatives, while deploring the ongoing atrocities in Syria, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. What we should not expect is a high level of interaction, frank discussions about missed opportunities, or tangible outcomes. For many R2P watchers, this dialogue also presents a first introduction to the newly appointed UN Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, Jennifer Welsh, a former Oxford academic.

As a long-standing partner of the UN Office for the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect, we look forward to a productive dialogue, which could introduce concrete proposals regarding the strategic or institutional vision for R2P's local prevention component. In line with the recent report on the Responsibility to Protect by former Secretary Madeleine Albright and Ambassador Richard Williamson, published by the U.S. Institute of Peace, and in partnership with the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum and the Brookings Institution, we hope policymakers and practitioners in New York and Washington, D.C. will recognize the complementarity between the U.S. atrocity prevention policy, a recent foreign policy priority, and the important work conducted on the Responsibility to Protect at the United Nations and throughout the world.

Kind Regards,

Jonas Claes
Program Officer
Center for Conflict Management
U.S. Institute of Peace
PREVENTION IN PRACTICE

Kenya 2013 Elections: Lessons Learned for Conflict Prevention
Susan Stigant, Program Officer, U.S. Institute of Peace

Despite fears and indications of the potential for a repeat of the wide-scale protests, atrocities, and displacement that had occurred in 2007 and early 2008, Kenya remained relatively calm and free from widespread violent conflict during the March 2013 election. Observers in Kenya and around the world breathed a sigh of relief that significant human suffering had been avoided, allowing international observers and donors to hail the elections as a successful model of conflict prevention.

Following this apparent success, national, regional, and international actors are engaged in efforts to analyze the conflict dynamics throughout the electoral cycle and evaluate the contributions of peacebuilding, democratic development, and other assistance programs. The analyses frequently scrutinize the role of external actors and the political elite in Nairobi, while the local dynamics and voices, particularly youth, get less attention. Kenyan youth are among the most likely perpetrators, victims, and mobilizers of election related violence, though generally underrepresented as conveners, leaders, or participants in dialogue about the election process.

To address this gap the U.S. Institute of Peace will hold a series of citizen dialogues at the national and county levels in Kenya, facilitated by local partners. Through youth-led facilitated dialogue, USIP aims to assist young Kenyan leaders to identify factors that influenced behavior and attitudes and may have mitigated large-scale violent conflict during the 2013 Kenya elections. The initiative will contribute to a more complete understanding of peace and conflict during the elections and inform future efforts in Kenya, as well as electoral violence prevention elsewhere in the world.

Egypt: Into the Abyss
Dan Brumberg, Senior Program Officer, U.S. Institute of Peace

August 14, 2013 may well be recorded as the blackest day in modern Egyptian history. The decision by Egypt’s security forces to clear two sprawling Islamist encampments, one near Nasr City and the other close to Cairo University, resulted in more than 500 deaths and some 3,700 wounded. The leaders of Egypt’s government, constituted in the wake of the July 3 intervention of the military and the arrest of President Mohammed Morsi, argue that the absolute refusal of Muslim Brethren leaders to accept any other solution other than the reinstatement of Morsi, left no choice other than the use of force. Moreover, this decision seems to have been prompted as well by growing public unhappiness with the very presence of the camps themselves, which in the case of Rabaa al-Adawiya camp, had rendered everyday life nearly impossible for the thousands of residents in and around Nasr City. But the assault on the camps – whose ferocity may have very well intensified in the face of armed resistance from within the camps themselves – suggests the first bloody sparks of incipient civil conflict.

With Islamists attacking government offices in Giza and many other locations, and with escalating attacks on Coptic churches, many of which have been set on fire, any hope of a political solution seems as remote as ever. Any such solution would have to be based on the fundamental premise that the permanent exclusion of any of the key social and political forces is unacceptable. But at this point, it is hard to see any mechanism by which this premise can be translated into political reality. After all, the July 3 military intervention was itself prompted by the massive protests of June 30, undertaken by a broad spectrum of Egyptian society which had concluded that Egypt’s Muslim Brethren government pursued its own agenda of exclusion, one that was seemingly codified in a new constitution passed without consideration of the fears and wishes of non-Islamist Egyptians.
The bloodshed in recent weeks suggests that the reliance of the anti-Morsi forces on the military can provide no lasting solution to this escalating tragedy.

The EU’s Focus on Prevention

Catherine Woollard, Executive Director, European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO)

The European Union continues to play a role in international peace mediation, including in Kosovo-Serbia, Myanmar, and Egypt. Mediation will likely remain the focus of EU efforts to prevent conflict for the duration of the mandate of Catherine Ashton, the current High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the EU. A recent report by the High Representative offers a mid-term review of the European External Action Service (EEAS), including hints as to possible future changes to the functioning of the service. The EEAS is piloting its new Early Warning systems, and preliminary findings on risks of conflict are being incorporated in its analysis. The build-up to the December summit on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is underway; the detailed agenda and preparatory documents show a better balance between civilian and military CSDP, following efforts by the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) and others to ensure that the larger civilian dimension receives adequate attention at the summit.

EPLO organized a number of Civil Society Dialogue Network or CSDN meetings in May and June, including a meeting co-organized with the EU and the League of Arab States to discuss opportunities for cooperation between the two institutions, and with civil society actors. EPLO also hosted civil society representatives from Guinea Bissau and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, who presented their analysis and recommendations to EU policy-makers.

Preventing Crises in the Asia Pacific – USIP’s Track 1.5 Dialogues

John Park, Senior Advisor, U.S. Institute of Peace

USIP’s Asia Pacific program launched the first Track 1.5 dialogues in late 2007 as a means to prevent conflicts and avoid major crises by creating direct lines of communication and facilitating joint preventive actions among the United States, China, South Korea (ROK), and Japan. Utilizing bilateral and trilateral Track 1.5 dialogue configurations, USIP and its partner organizations have an established record of generating policy proposals that have gained traction in their respective national governments.

USIP’s formulation and practice of “Track 1.5” diplomacy involves policy exchanges among select current and former policymakers, military officers, and policy experts. By comparison, “Track 1” diplomacy typically involves high-level government and military representatives involved in official negotiations. “Track 2” dialogues involve only non-governmental representatives who meet to build relationships and formulate recommendations for consideration during the official diplomatic process.

USIP President Jim Marshall recently led a U.S. delegation to two Track 1.5 dialogues in Beijing aimed at moving quickly beyond intractable official government statements and finding ways for de-escalating tensions related to maritime and territorial issues, and an increasingly belligerent North Korea. The delegation included Stephen Hadley, USIP senior advisor for international affairs and former national security advisor; Admiral Gary Roughead, former chief of Naval Operations; John Park, USIP senior Asia advisor; and a group of Pentagon and State Department officials. By convening recurring Track 1.5 dialogues, USIP fosters a deeper understanding of policy perspectives, generates policy proposals, and facilitates policy impact by helping to operationalize these proposals. [See a detailed tool description on page 4.]
PREVENTION TOOL IN THE SPOTLIGHT

In each Prevention Newsletter we highlight a conflict prevention tool available to senior leaders and peacebuilding practitioners. This issue will assess the role of Track 1.5 Dialogues as a tool for preventive action.

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<th>Conflict Prevention Tool</th>
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<td><strong>Prevention Tool</strong></td>
<td><strong>Track 1.5 Dialogues</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Tool Description</strong></td>
<td>The act of convening senior government officials (who typically take part in official Track I discussions) and academics or civil society representatives (whose unofficial dialogues are traditionally called Track II) for shared dialogues to connect policy decisions with field level practice and expertise in order to innovate solutions to conflict.</td>
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<td><strong>Prevention Type</strong></td>
<td>Structural and Operational Prevention</td>
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<td><strong>Preventive Function</strong></td>
<td>Track 1.5 Dialogues can build confidence through the exchange of information, identify long-term structural causes of conflict and sources of resilience, and introduce innovative peacebuilding policies. In the short term, Track 1.5 Dialogues can provide an outlet to discuss acute triggers of violence or security concerns.</td>
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| **Strengths and Advantages** | • Contributes to the policymaking process by connecting applied researchers with current and former policy officials and tapping into their operational experience managing crises  
• Ability to collect and share information across sectors in ways otherwise unavailable to individual participants  
• Low risk of negative blowback or consequences compared to other operational tools which involve more robust action  
• Limited requirements in resource and human capital investment  
• Immediately gathers key players to identify the flashpoints of current crises, devising alternative solutions, and potentially connecting opposing viewpoints to humanize one's adversaries |
| **Risks and Limitations** | • The instrument does not guarantee an actionable outcome. The instrument may consequently be dismissed by outsiders as “all talk” in the absence of binding results or commitments to prevent conflict  
• Confidence-building through Track 1.5 requires time and equal buy-in across participants  
• Without assembling the right collection of experts and policymakers, key viewpoints and decisions can be left out  
•Leaks about the policy issues discussed and the participants involved can lead to the abrupt end of a Track 1.5 engagement |
| **Examples of Use**      | • USIP’s co-convened U.S.-China Project on Crisis Avoidance & Cooperation (PCAC) regularly brings together interagency groups from both countries for Track 1.5 dialogues on preventing escalation of tensions in East Asia. Some policy proposals generated during PCAC Track 1.5 engagements have gained traction among policymakers.  
• The University of Ottawa’s Dialogues convenes members of the intelligence community from both India and Pakistan to discuss ways to reduce the destabilizing effect of their services; the University also facilitates dialogues among political and civil society members from across the Kashmir boundaries to improve cooperation, increase access, and promote economic activity. |
Q&A

On Peacekeeping and Atrocity Prevention, With Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Holt

Each Prevention Newsletter features a brief interview with senior policy-makers or prevention practitioners. For our nineteenth edition, we invited Victoria Holt, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, to discuss the role of UN peacekeeping in conflict prevention and the importance of multilateralism in atrocity prevention.

Ms. Holt, thank you agreeing to this interview. Back in 2009, you moved from the Stimson Center to Foggy Bottom to oversee the UN peacekeeping portfolio at the State Department, amongst several other responsibilities. In light of the current fiscal environment and the bleak perceptions of UN efficiency, why should the United States continue its support for UN peacekeeping?

Victoria Holt: We support UN peacekeeping because it is in our national interest to do so. The fact is that we cannot maintain international peace and security all on our own. With forces operating under UN authority, for example, the stabilization mission in Mali is confronting terrorist and extremist elements that could threaten the United States and our allies. More broadly, UN peacekeeping operations help stabilize fragile states, implement peace agreements, and prevent conflict. UN peacekeeping is one of the international community’s most effective, resilient, and flexible tools. Today’s peacekeeping operations are quite different from the flawed missions of the early and mid-1990s like Bosnia and Rwanda. Over the last 20 years the United States has pushed the UN to make significant improvements to peacekeeping as an enterprise, particularly with respect to planning, administration, logistics, and the introduction of a culture of accountability and performance. We have no illusions about the need for additional improvements, but compared to the alternatives, UN peacekeeping is a pretty good deal for our money. The UN manages to keep more than 100,000 military, police, and civilian staff in the field for about $7.5 billion a year, of which the United States pays about $2 billion. In other words, roughly three-quarters of the cost of the UN’s 15 current operations is carried by other Member States.

You have frequently indicated that we need a modern look at peace operations as we move further into the 21st century. If you were in the position of Hervé Ladsous, Head of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, what would be your priority? And which other developments in the practice of peacekeeping do you anticipate?

VH: The key challenge is matching UN mandates with the capacity to deliver in the field, and linking a clear analysis of the situation on the ground with a mission plan and the leadership to meet it. We need to work with our partners to support sufficient skilled personnel from contributing countries who are well-prepared for their mission, and to guarantee they can be mobile. Too often missions lack key enablers – such as helicopters, translators or engineers – that are critical to a mission’s success. Modern tools and new technologies, including the creative use of unmanned aerial systems and cell phones, will enhance the analytical capacity of field missions, as well as advanced planning by mission leadership. We also see the increase in the number of special political missions, or SPMs, as a key trend. These are multilateral teams of primarily civilian experts that range in size, from the large UN support mission currently deployed in Afghanistan to the small UN Office for West Africa. Political missions and peacekeeping operations both play an important role in conflict prevention. There is also a continuing need to address the resource requirements of regionally-led peace operations, such as AU-led missions in Africa. While African forces have demonstrated a willingness to accept risks, and casualties, they lack the dedicated resources to sustain their own operations.
Peacekeeping operations are more likely to succeed when the host nation is supportive of the international presence. How do peace operations effectively cope with mandate or access restrictions imposed by the host regime?

VH: Peacekeeping missions deploy with the consent of the host nation – that is a requirement. Yet a certain tension exists in those missions that have both peacebuilding and protection of civilians tasks in their mandate. The former requires maintaining access and influence with host nation’s authorities, whereas the latter may require confronting illegal armed groups and spoilers, as well as elements of a host nation’s security forces that pose a threat to civilians. Managing that tension is very difficult. Most missions work with the host governments to overcome localized criminal elements and a lack of rule of law. But in extreme cases, they can face greater obstructions, blocked access and even rebel fighters, such as in the DRC and Mali. In Darfur, the government and rebels alike have put roadblocks before the joint AU-UN Hybrid Operation which has hindered its access. In South Sudan, insecurity has kept the mission from accessing thousands of displaced persons. Peacekeepers should be prepared for the tactical challenges they are likely to face, and this can be dangerous if peacekeepers are not prepared. Every time I conduct field visits I am inspired by the bravery and resilience of peacekeepers, who take big risks to bring a stable peace to these fragile environments. I am also convinced we can do more to support their success.

Moving on to a related topic. The Presidential Study Directive, PSD-10, and his speech at the U.S. Holocaust Museum stressed the importance of multilateralism in U.S. atrocity prevention policy. What progress has been made on this front since the creation of the Atrocities Prevention Board (APB)?

VH: The President’s initiative on atrocity prevention goes beyond the creation of the APB. Foreign Services Officers are now being trained on atrocities prevention through an inter-agency course conducted by the Foreign Service Institute, and the intelligence community will release a declassified version of the National Intelligence Estimate on atrocity prevention. The U.S. Government supports many UN and regional efforts that contribute to atrocity prevention, like DPKO’s Crisis Center, and prevention activities conducted by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region.

How does the U.S. effort to prevent mass atrocities relate to the Responsibility to Protect or R2P principle? Has the U.S. Government made a deliberate decision to prioritize one conceptual lens over the other?

VH: The U.S. effort to prevent atrocities is demonstrated and strengthened by President Obama’s landmark initiative, which has brought focus to U.S. engagement and is complementary to other international efforts to strengthen the norm that governments must protect their own citizens. The United States endorses the R2P concept, and is committed to further developing our own capacity to support and promote this principle effectively. The U.S. support for the R2P principle is widely communicated, as demonstrated by our engagement in the focal point initiative, and our active membership in the Group of Friends on R2P. These formalized gatherings have proven their utility, as they allow us to identify opportunities for partnership and the exchange of best practices. While our focus on atrocity prevention is driven by the U.S. national experience, the United States has maintained close partnerships with other governments as a result, regardless of whether they apply the atrocity prevention, R2P, or another lens to prevent genocide and mass atrocities.