Remarks for a Panel Discussion on the Future of Nuclear Weapons and Missile Defense in NATO Security

Monday, November 8, 2010, 9:00 a.m.

United States Institute of Peace
Washington, D.C.

The Honorable Ellen O. Tauscher
Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security
U.S. Department of State

Tara Sonenshine, thank you for the introduction. Wolfgang and Frank, it’s great to see you here. I want to thank the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, CSIS, and the United States Institute of Peace, my future neighbors, who block my view of the Pentagon and National Airport, not that that’s a bad thing, for putting this panel together. I’m so happy to be with you.

Next week, NATO leaders will gather in Lisbon for one of the most important meetings of the NATO alliance in many years. As a cornerstone of our security since the end of World War II, the Alliance remains the essential transatlantic framework for the collective defense of the United States and Europe.

The NATO alliance is founded upon the common vision and shared democratic values of the Washington Treaty, especially Article 5, which, as you know, binds the alliance together because an armed attack on one member is an attack on all members. As President Obama has said, “that is a promise for our time, and for all time.”

But to continue to be an effective security alliance in the 21st century, NATO needs to address new and growing threats, like nuclear proliferation, cyber, and terrorism. That’s why NATO is preparing an updated Strategic Concept to release in Lisbon.
So to the journalists here today, I won’t be making news by previewing the document because it will be agreed by all of the allies and released by the allies together.

The new Strategic Concept must reflect the Alliance’s unchanging, common determination to safeguard freedom and security of all of the Alliance’s population, territory, and forces, as embodied in the Washington Treaty. Collective defense under Article 5 remains the foundation of the Alliance. That means we must maintain the capabilities and resources that make that commitment real.

Some essential ways to do that include maintaining the Alliance’s nuclear deterrent, building territorial missile defense, conducting Article 5 training and exercises, and developing the plans that NATO needs to ensure the security of all its members’ citizens.

With respect to nuclear policy, any decisions on NATO nuclear posture and policy must be made by consensus and not by any Ally unilaterally. The United States made that clear in our Nuclear Posture Review released last April and it remains true today. While discussions continue as to how the new Strategic Concept will address NATO’s future nuclear policy, it will likely reflect the principles articulated by Secretary Clinton at the Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Tallinn in April.

We are confident the Strategic Concept will reflect Allies’ commitment to creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, while recognizing that NATO will remain a nuclear alliance with safe, secure, and effective nuclear forces as long as nuclear weapons exist.

Since the Cold War, we have been able to reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons in the Alliance because of fundamental changes in the international security environment. The United States has improved its conventional military capabilities, Cold War tensions have subsided, missile defense technology has advanced, and we are working more closely with Russia to address common dangers. The Obama Administration continues to work with our Allies and Partners to create the conditions that would make further reductions possible.

As the President said in Prague in 2009, the United States seeks the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons even as we recognize that this goal might not be achieved in our lifetimes. We look forward to NATO’s support in realizing President Obama’s vision in accordance with the goals of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
As you know, the Administration is fully committed to the negotiation of deeper arms reductions. As President Obama said this past spring in Prague when he signed the New START Treaty, the United States will seek to include non-strategic and non-deployed nuclear weapons of the United States and Russia in any future reduction discussions.

Of course, before any of that happens, it would be nice to have the New START Treaty approved.

We hope that NATO would work to encourage transparency with Russia on nuclear issues and encourage Russia to move non-strategic nuclear weapons away from the territory of NATO Allies. I can assure you that as we move forward with future bilateral negotiations with the Russians, we will continue to closely consult with our NATO Allies.

Let me also touch on missile defense. The Obama Administration’s Ballistic Missile Defense Review highlighted the fact that NATO faces a growing threat from ballistic missiles. And that threat will likely escalate over the next decade. At the December 2009 NATO Foreign Ministers meeting, Allies agreed that missile defense plays an important role in the Alliance’s response to this threat.

The Obama Administration’s proposed Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) for missile defense in Europe will significantly improve our ability to protect the United States, our European NATO Allies, and our forward deployed troops from current and emerging ballistic missile threats.

Our NATO allies have overwhelmingly embraced this approach because the new architecture can provide coverage for all of our European Allies. It also focuses on addressing the existing threats in a prioritized manner, something that both NATO and the United States Congress have repeatedly urged.

We want to place the PAA squarely in a NATO context. In Lisbon, we seek language in the communiqué that establishes missile defense of NATO’s European populations, territory, and forces as a NATO capability. We want there to be political buy-in by our NATO Allies on this issue.

The PAA would then become the U.S. contribution to a NATO capability. This new approach also creates more opportunities for cooperation and burden sharing among our NATO Allies. We are not asking NATO to pay for any part of the PAA, but NATO should pay to expand its current ballistic missile defense
command and control program so as to be able to support a NATO population and territorial missile defense capability.

We believe this expansion is a cost-effective response to the increasing threat. The United States is committed to being transparent with Russia about our ballistic missile plans. We also strongly support NATO efforts to foster cooperation with Russia in the missile defense area. We are working bilaterally with Russia and through the NATO-Russia Council to explore options to cooperate with Russia.

At the 60th anniversary of NATO in 2009, the leaders of the alliance reaffirmed their support for increased missile defense cooperation with Russia and their readiness to explore the potential for linking U.S., NATO, and Russian missile defense systems.

Missile defense is part of our broader efforts to combat the danger posed by weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. Along with work to strengthen the NATO Response Force and NATO contingency planning, effective missile defense enhances deterrence, bolsters our ability to uphold Article 5, and assures the security of the Alliance.

Let me conclude by saying that the United States looks forward to further discussing these issues at the Lisbon Summit and securing an agreement with the NATO Alliance on a Strategic Concept and missile defense program that better positions NATO to address today’s security challenges.

Thanks very much and I look forward to the discussion.