DOMESTIC BARRIERS TO DISMANTLING THE MILITANT INFRASTRUCTURE IN PAKISTAN

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ABOUT THE REPORT

This report, sponsored by the U.S. Institute of Peace, examines several underexplored barriers to dismantling Pakistan’s militant infrastructure as a way to inform the understandable, but thus far ineffectual, calls for the country to do more against militancy. It is based on interviews conducted in Pakistan and Washington, DC, as well as on primary and secondary source material collected via field and desk-based research.

Author's Note: This report was drafted before the May 2013 elections and updated soon after. There have been important developments since then, including actions Islamabad and Washington have taken that this report recommends. Specifically, the U.S. announced plans for a resumption of the Strategic Dialogue and the Pakistani government reportedly developed a new counterterrorism strategy. Meanwhile, the situation on the ground in Pakistan continues to evolve. It is almost inevitable that discrete elements of this report will be overtaken by events. Yet the broader trends and the significant, endogenous obstacles to countering militancy and dismantling the militant infrastructure in Pakistan unfortunately are likely to remain in place for some time.

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It would be a mistake to discount the myriad domestic challenges facing Pakistan in terms of countering the militant threat or the degree to which they influence the establishment’s active support for some groups and tolerance of others.
Summary

- Pakistani concerns about threats to the state from a subset of its Islamist militants have been building for several years, but the military remains preoccupied with using jihadist proxies to achieve geopolitical aims. Many other barriers reinforce the status quo as well.

- Perceptions about the U.S. role in the insurgency, the belief that foreign powers support anti-state militants, that some militants will not attack if not provoked, and that others have domestic as well as geopolitical utility collectively inform the security establishment’s strategic calculus for how it engages with militants in Pakistan.

- Even sincere counterterrorism efforts are hampered by capacity shortfalls and systemic infirmities.

- Political will is also lacking. Elites remain preoccupied with power and their collective interests.

- Pakistan needs a national strategy to counter militancy, a legislative overhaul, improved coordination among counterterrorism agencies, and a coherent narrative against extremism. The recently elected civilian leadership must build its own intellectual capacity on security matters and find the political will to act.

- The election of a new civilian government in Pakistan, growing concerns about the jihadist threat to the state, and the planned NATO drawdown in Afghanistan mean the United States will need to reformulate aspects of its engagement.

- The overall U.S. approach should be geared toward maintaining influence to maximize convergence on narrow security issues and exploit opportunities to reinforce positive structural change within Pakistan.

- Specifically, the United States should revise its South Asian counterterrorism architecture, maintain a transactional military-to-military relationship focused on convergent interests, boost the capabilities and confidence of the new civilian government, modify security sector assistance, and devise more realistic metrics to assess progress.
Introduction

On August 14, 2012, the sixty-fifth anniversary of Pakistan’s independence, Chief of Army Staff Ashfaq Parvez Kayani addressed the Azadi Parade in the drill square of the Pakistan Military Academy in Kakul. The speech is an annual rite, but the content of Kayani’s remarks was notable for its assessment of Pakistan’s internal instability. By this time, the jihadist insurgency that began germinating a decade ago had claimed tens of thousands of lives. Acknowledging a litany of ills, Kayani zeroed in on terrorism and extremism: these issues, he said, “present a grave challenge” to the country.¹ Five months later, in January 2013, the Pakistan army released its latest annual *Green Book*, which included a chapter discussing Pakistan’s domestic jihadist insurgency and describing it as a major security threat. This inclusion was marketed as a first and hence a sign of a heightened focus on internal security, creating the mistaken impression in some circles that the Pakistani establishment might be redefining its priorities toward defeating its jihadist insurgency and away from a focus on India.²

In reality, the *Green Book* does not necessarily reflect the Pakistan army’s doctrine or its priorities.³ However, though it has not yet been released, at least one expert familiar with the new army doctrine suggests that it might recognize the need to focus on the internal threat to the country’s stability.⁴ If true, this should be interpreted as an expansion from an India-centric to a multifaceted strategy, but not as evidence of a shift in Pakistan’s security priorities or a sign that the country’s leaders are today prepared to take sustained and comprehensive action to dismantle the militant infrastructure on their soil.

Pakistani security policy has always been both India-centric and concerned about the internal integrity of the state. These two priorities are viewed as mutually reinforcing. Internal cohesion is believed to be necessary to check Indian aggression, and thus weakness at home puts the country at greater risk to external threats. Simultaneously, external challenges inevitably affect Pakistan at home, and New Delhi has historically been suspected of designs to dismember Pakistan from within. Thus, six months after his Independence Day remarks, General Kayani made another two speeches in which he blamed Pakistan’s “external enemies” for “igniting the flames” of the jihadist insurgency and warned that despite the military’s focus on internal security it is “fully prepared to defeat an external direct threat.”⁵

Although no strategic shift related to the maintenance of a militant infrastructure has been made, threats to the state from a subset of its Islamist militants do significantly influence state decision making. Civilian and military leaders appear to recognize the danger certain militants pose to the state and take the problem seriously. The country’s main political parties are not as wedded as the military and its Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) are to a policy of maintaining proxies but are more anxious to make peace with anti-state militants. At the time of writing, the Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N) had formed a new government. Headed by Nawaz Sharif, it was intent on pursuing peace negotiations, as were other political parties, but no course for doing so had been charted. The military, which has lost much blood and treasure waging Pakistan’s own war on terror, opposes negotiating, at least in the short term. Some within its ranks view even pro-state groups as a long-term strategic liability.⁶ Yet it is unclear whether the military leadership agrees on either the extent and nature of the internal threat or what to do about it. It is clear, however, that the security establishment’s preoccupation with maintaining jihadist proxies to be used for geopolitical purposes is still the single greatest barrier to dismantling the militant infrastructure in Pakistan.

This report argues that numerous underexplored endogenous barriers reinforce the status quo when it comes to a lack of adequate action against militancy. These obstacles inform the segmented approach that Pakistani elites—civilian and military—take toward militant groups.
The security establishment continues to selectively support some militants and to counter others, in some cases using pro-state militants to do so. Its approach toward these groups is predicated on the utility they provide externally and internally, as well as on whether they threaten the state and the level of perceived influence over them. Although civilian parties are less entangled with militant groups, on the whole they are more reluctant than the military in confronting those who directly threaten the state. Politicians of various stripes are also guilty of courting militant leaders in pursuit of electoral gains.

How Pakistani officials—civilian and military—perceive jihadist threats to the state, and their will and capability to counter them, have significant implications for the country, the region, and the United States. In the short term, the explosion of jihadist violence does not appear to make it any more likely that the Pakistani security establishment will take steps to dismantle the militant infrastructure. Pakistan’s support—active and passive—for some of the militant groups on its soil has become path dependent. Any reversal would bring significant costs and is obstructed by the entrenchments of institutional arrangements. Over the medium to long term, it is possible, though far from certain, that steps needed to curtail the jihadist insurgency could develop a momentum of their own and help create conditions for progress against militancy in Pakistan.

Much of the information that follows will be familiar to those who follow Pakistan closely. The aim is to marshal evidence to inform the understandable, but thus far ineffectual, calls for Pakistan to “do more” against militancy. These calls are not wrong, but they are misguided, or at least incomplete, in that they overlook various elite objectives and compulsions, myriad domestic challenges, and Pakistan’s strategic culture of using proxies to confront both external and internal challenges. A clear-eyed assessment of these obstacles is essential to formulating a realistic policy of patient, but firm, engagement and for managing possible contingencies that could ensue in the region.

Riding the Tiger

Pakistan played host to numerous militant groups during the 1990s. One way to understand the militant milieu at that time is to consider sectarian affiliation. Most groups belong to the Deobandi sect, which follows the Hanafi School of Islamic jurisprudence. The major groups emerged from or were tied to the Deobandi Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Assembly of Islamic Clergy, or JUI) as well as the robust madrassa (religious school) system associated with it. The largest and most notable of them included:

- Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI);
- Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), which splintered from HuJI;
- Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), which broke from HuM;
- Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP); and
- Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), which initially formed as the militant wing of SSP before nominally splitting from it.

Separately, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) was the biggest and most significant group to emerge from the Ahl-e-Hadith movement, which is Salafist in orientation. Strong divisions existed between LeT and the Deobandi outfits. Collectively, these entities are known as Punjabi militant groups, a moniker that derives from their being headquartered, and having their strongest support base, in Punjab, Pakistan’s most populated and powerful province. Elsewhere, Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), formed by a dissident member of Jamaat-e-Islami named Sufi Muhammad in 1989, was based in Malakand and had a blend of Deobandi and Wahhabi leanings.
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Another way of understanding the militant milieu at the time is to consider activities by location. In addition to indigenous Kashmiri groups, during the 1990s the Pakistani security apparatus also backed a welter of Pakistani groups against Indian security forces in Indian-administered Kashmir. These included the Deobandi HuM, HuJI, and JeM, as well as the Ahl-e-Hadith LeT. The SSP and LeJ were engaged in sectarian attacks in Pakistan against members of the minority Shia population. Shia groups mobilized in response, and the country experienced escalating sectarian conflict. After its formation, JeM occasionally involved itself in sectarian violence as well.

Pakistan also supported the Taliban in Afghanistan, and after the Taliban swept to power, that country became a place where many of the Deobandi groups, focused primarily on Kashmir or sectarian violence in Pakistan, came together for operational support and training. TNSM mobilized men for the Taliban during this time and had links to some of those groups fighting in Kashmir as well. Jalaluddin Haqqani, who hails from southeastern Afghanistan and rose to prominence as a military commander during the anti-Soviet jihad in the 1980s, accepted an appointment in the Taliban government as minister of borders and tribes. The Haqqani network, though it was not known as such at the time, is Deobandi and Pashtun—like the Taliban—and administered its own training camps in Taliban-controlled territory. Thus, with the exception of the Ahl-e-Hadith LeT, which focused exclusively on the Kashmir front, the major Deobandi Punjabi groups all traced their roots back to the JUI and increased their ties to one another as well as to the Taliban, Haqqani network, and TNSM during the 1990s.

Al-Qaeda Throws a Curve

The decision by President Pervez Musharraf’s government to assist the U.S. war against al-Qaeda and the Taliban after 9/11 strained the state’s relations with all of its militant proxies to varying degrees. Musharraf’s decision was predicated in part by the calculation that doing so was necessary to protect Pakistan’s Kashmir-centric militant proxies. Though the United States is not known to have offered any such guarantee, it did not push Pakistan nearly as hard as possible to dismantle the entire militant infrastructure or even cease active support to its proxies fighting in Kashmir. The immediate U.S. focus was on al-Qaeda and the Taliban. America’s request regarding Pakistan’s other militant groups was to keep them off the Afghan battlefield during the U.S. counterattack. Despite this directive, with the exception of the Ahl-e-Hadith LeT, militants from all of the major Pakistani groups flocked to Afghanistan to fight alongside the Taliban, as did thousands of pro-Taliban Pashtun tribesmen. Pakistani efforts to deter or interdict those crossing the border to fight in Afghanistan following the post-9/11 U.S. counterattack were uneven. At the same time, Pakistan sought to prevent the United States from decimating the Taliban, providing the movement’s leaders and members safe haven in Pakistan.

As early as October 2001, militants began targeting U.S. interests in Pakistan as well as members of Pakistan’s Christian community. In December, JeM led an attack on India’s parliament. In response to U.S. pressure and to avert a possible war with India, in January 2002, Pakistan banned JeM along with LeT, TNSM, SSP, and the Shia militant group Tehreek-e-Jafria. Musharraf also rebanned LeJ, which had initially been banned in August 2001. In early 2002, Pakistan’s powerful ISI facilitated the reemergence of not only LeT and JeM under new names but also HuM, which Pakistan banned in November 2001 after the United States designated it a terrorist group. SSP also continued to be tolerated for domestic political purposes and began carrying out its militant activities under a series of new names. Some of these rebranded organizations were rebanned at various times. Others continue to operate legitimate aboveground organizations. They are still typically referred to by their original names.
Despite new names, the operating environment for all of Pakistan’s jihadist groups became more difficult after 2002. Fundraising, recruitment, and training were restricted to different degrees for different organizations at different times, but every group was affected. The security establishment also launched intermittent and incomplete crackdowns against militant organizations. Overall, no consistent efforts were made to degrade the various extant indigenous militant groups at the time, with one exception. The Musharraf regime cracked down most heavily on LeJ after 9/11, contributing to its fragmentation and leading many LeJ members to ally with al-Qaeda. However, the group was able to continue in part thanks to its ability to tap into the legitimate organizations connected to SSP and JeM.

In short, going after some groups more vigorously than others overlooked the connectivity among them, contributed to the formation of more malevolent splinters, and imperiled even sincere counterterrorism efforts.

Pakistan did make notable efforts after 9/11 to capture or kill al-Qaeda operatives and other foreign fighters, though these tapered off from 2005 onward. Initial efforts included launching Operation Al Mizan, a military incursion into the South Waziristan agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) (see map 1) in 2002, following the arrival of foreign fighters fleeing Afghanistan earlier that year. Resistance there was prompt. Pakistani security forces repeatedly clashed with militants in the tribal areas from 2002 onward, taking numerous casualties in the process. These campaigns were underresourced and characterized by a heavy-handed approach that alienated the population even as they failed to enable the control of territory. They also led to a series of failed peace deals that contributed to the Talibanization of FATA.

**A Proto-Insurgency in FATA and a Principal-Agent Problem in the Heartland**

In response to U.S. pressure as evidence mounted that al-Qaeda was regrouping and cross-border attacks into Afghanistan were increasing, Pakistan launched additional operations in FATA. In October 2003, for example, the army dispatched twenty-five hundred soldiers to capture militants based in Bajaur and South Waziristan. The following March, it launched Operation Kalosha II to rescue Frontier Corps (FC) personnel captured during an ambush. As casualties mounted, the army pursued the first of many failed peace deals, the Shakai agreement of 2004, with Nek Muhammad, who was a relatively unknown militant leader at the time. In doing so, the army legitimized the militants and Nek Muhammad as a force in the area, undercutting local tribal elders in the process. Because the agreement was signed at a Deobandi madrassa with which Muhammad was affiliated, locals viewed it as a tacit surrender by the army. Nek Muhammad abrogated the agreement, however, and was killed soon after by a U.S. drone strike, the first in Pakistan and part of an agreement by American officials to eliminate anti-state militants in return for the access to airspace necessary to target al-Qaeda members hiding in the tribal areas.

Despite the death of Nek Muhammad, a pattern of Pakistani military incursions into FATA followed by peace deals that empowered pro-Taliban Pashtun militants had been established. These included a February 2005 peace agreement with Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan and the September 2006 Waziristan Accord in North Waziristan. Some analysts have speculated that the Musharraf regime was never committed to the military campaigns in FATA but instead viewed them as a favor to Washington. This would help explain the readiness to forge peace deals. However, other factors undoubtedly contributed, including fears that sustained campaigns with heavy losses could sow dangerous discord among the military’s rank-and-file, concerns about protecting the military’s reputation, chronic capacity shortfalls, a force structure not built for counterinsurgency coupled with a lack of experience with this type of warfare and
Pakistan has four provinces, one territory*, and one capital territory**. The Pakistani-administered portion of the disputed Jammu and Kashmir region consists of two administrative entities: Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan.
little desire to learn, and the belief that by appeasing militants in FATA the state could keep violence from spreading to the settled areas. In reality, these and subsequent agreements failed to halt militant violence and instead contributed to the spread of Talibanization throughout FATA and eventually into frontier areas such as Bannu, Tanak, Kohat, Lakki Marwat, Dera Ismail Khan, Swat, and Buner.42

Developments outside FATA contributed to the proto-insurgency brewing in Pakistan and strengthened the nexus between Pashtun militants, their brethren from various Punjabi groups who fled to FATA during the ensuing years, and those Afghan militants and al-Qaeda members who sought sanctuary there following the U.S. invasion.

In December 2003, members of the Pakistani Air Force—motivated by Maulana Masood Azhar, JeM’s amir—attempted to blow up President Musharraf’s motorcade. Two weeks later, a Jaish member, who the leadership later maintained had split from the group by this time, made a similar attempt not far from where the first attack took place.43 Concerns about the involvement of low-level military personnel and police officers in jihadist activities contributed to a crackdown in which the authorities detained more than one thousand individuals and held many without trial.44 Some of those who escaped the crackdown remained in Punjab, but others took shelter in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, FATA, and the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), known since 2009 as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) (see map 2).45 This practice of executing mass arrests (and later releasing many of those detained) in tandem with efforts to eliminate specific militants (often through extrajudicial means) constituted the extent of Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts during the early and mid-2000s.

Although it failed to commit fully to counterinsurgency efforts in FATA or to engage in any meaningful counterterrorism activities in the settled areas during the early to mid-2000s, the Musharraf regime did rein in pro-state groups fighting in Kashmir and took steps to thin their ranks. Following the launch of the peace process with India in early 2004—known as the Composite Dialogue—and accompanying back-channel negotiations, militants were directed to wage a controlled jihad in Kashmir for which support ebbed and flowed thereafter.46 Kashmir-centric militant groups were curtailed further in response to international pressure the following year, and by 2006–07, militant activity declined significantly on that front, thanks in large part to the efforts of the Musharraf regime.47 The ISI reportedly paid militant leaders to temper their activities and keep their cadre in line and sought to confine many of those no longer active in Kashmir to their training camps.48 These men were provided food, board, and in some cases a stipend. In other words, they were paid not to fight. Many were kept in reserve. Some were channeled into their respective group’s aboveground organizations, and others were steered toward early retirement and occasionally given assistance in finding a job. Positive inducements were coupled with threats of retribution against those militants who disobeyed the directive to reduce their activities in Indian-administered Kashmir.49 The aim was to rein in, not dismantle, militant groups and hold their members in reserve, either to be demobilized or reengaged depending on regional developments.

Attempts to rein in historically Kashmir-centric groups were juxtaposed with rising support for Afghan-centric proxies, most notably the Afghan Taliban of Mullah Omar and the Haqqani network. Rather than remain inactive, some militants from Kashmir-centric groups migrated toward the Afghan front via FATA, tapping into the Afghan-centric militant infrastructure that remained relatively untouched despite repeated military incursions.50 These westward migrating militants linked up with pro-state groups, most notably the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network but also with al-Qaeda members and other foreign fighters, Pashtun militants who
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Map 2. KP and FATA Districts
had been fighting the Pakistan military since 2002, and many of the men from various Punjabi
groups who already had fled there.51 The destruction of portions of the training infrastructure in
Pakistan-administered Kashmir during the 2005 South Asia earthquake and the release of those
men jailed in the 2003–04 crackdown following the failed Musharraf assassination attempts
increased the militant migration.52 In the process, these militants began contributing to attacks
against the Pakistani state as well as fighting on the Afghan front.

Close observers assert that elements in the army and ISI continued to believe that they could
manage militant organizations by working through leaders of extant organizations and local
leaders in FATA to control their cadre, eliminating individual “bad apples” when this top-down
approach failed.53 Collectively, these efforts were ad hoc, poorly coordinated, underresourced,
often reactive, and suggestive of a laissez-faire approach predicated on the assumption of control
over the militant milieu.

**The Insurgency Erupts**

Pakistan’s failed military incursions and subsequent peace agreements emboldened pro-Taliban
militants, and by 2006, the insurgency against the state was accelerating swiftly.54

In July 2007, Pakistani security forces launched an assault against the Lal Masjid (Red
Mosque) in Islamabad and the two madaris (plural of madrassa) attached to it. The Lal Masjid
had been a well-established ISI asset, and one of its madaris, Jamia Faridia, historically attracted
students from NWFP and FATA, many of who were sympathetic to militancy.55 The Ghazi
brothers who led the mosque and madaris had issued an edict in 2004 that military personnel
killed fighting in FATA were not martyrs and had been arrested that year for stockpiling weapons
and planning terrorist attacks in Pakistan.56 In January 2007, they demanded that sharia (Islamic
law) be imposed in Pakistan, and Taliban-inspired vigilante groups connected to the mosque
began roaming around Islamabad to impose their notion of Islamic morality.57

As the provocations mounted, the Musharraf regime sought to avoid direct action, instead
standing back while religious parties, such as the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F), tried to
negotiate a settlement. Negotiations went on for several months, during which time the vigi-
lante campaign continued.58 In June 2007, madrassa students kidnapped nine people from a clinic,
including six Chinese women and one Chinese man.59 The hostages were released in late June,
but the situation led Beijing to bring immense pressure on the Pakistani government.60 It is
unclear whether that pressure led President Musharraf to deploy paramilitary Rangers around the
complex or if he later used it as a pretext for taking action.61 They laid siege but did not launch a
raid. Instead, National Assembly members from religious parties continued attempting to negoti-
ate while the Rangers maintained low-level firing to exert pressure.62 More than one thousand
students surrendered in the days that followed. Militants from JeM, HuJI, and LeT holed up in
the complex were caught trying to escape at that time as well.63 Many more from these and other
groups remained in the complex.64 The siege was having some success, but negotiations remained
stalled. On July 8, three Chinese men were killed in Peshawar. Pakistan appears to have come
under enormous pressure to act. Musharraf issued one last warning on July 9 to no avail. A day
later the assault began.

The operation was a military success but had severe ramifications. Many militants, including
some belonging to pro-state groups who had yet to consider participation in an anti-Pakistan jihad,
considered this yet another betrayal. The raid turned a primarily FATA-based proto-insurgency
into a full-blown insurgency that soon threatened to envelop the country. It also transformed
the debate for Pakistan’s religious parties, some of which had struggled with how closely to
embrace the Ghazi brothers’ exhortations toward vigilante Islamism. With one dead and the other under arrest, the religious parties were free to embrace them as martyrs. In so doing, they threw rhetorical fuel on the jihadist fire that soon engulfed parts of the country.

Some estimates suggest as many as five thousand students from Punjabi madaris headed to Waziristan in the aftermath of the raid to join the militants already at war with the state. By this time, the Talibanization began in South Waziristan in 2004 had spread to other agencies in FATA. Militants were emerging in frontier areas as well. Many of these men who shared the aim of establishing “local spheres of sharia” in their respective areas of influence officially united in December 2007 to form the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), or Pakistani Taliban. The TTP quickly became the face of the insurgency but never cohered into a homogenous entity with firm command and control. It became instead an umbrella organization for militants indigenous to KP and FATA as well for the splinter factions and freelancers from established Punjabi groups that provided the crucial capability to project power into Pakistan’s heartland and its capital. Al-Qaeda provided ideological as well as operational support for the insurgency in Pakistan, and over time some Pakistani militants joined al-Qaeda’s ranks directly.

Confronting the Threat

In November 2007, President Musharraf resigned his command as chief of Army Staff, making way for General Kayani. Until then, Pakistan made no sustained effort in the areas of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. On the one hand, the internal security threat had not yet manifested. On the other, these lackluster efforts created conditions for that threat to mature. Upon assuming his command, Kayani took steps to increase the army’s “ownership of and commitment to Pakistan’s internal security duties.” In 2008 and 2009, the security establishment started making more sustained counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts against anti-state militants inside and outside FATA.

Pakistani military forces were fighting in all seven tribal agencies by 2008, and the TTP was in partial or total control of many areas of FATA, as well as portions of KP. The Swat Valley in Malakand was the most notable of the settled areas that fell to Talibanization. The military launched multiple offensives in Swat as part of Operation Rah-e-Haq (Path of Truth). A third phase of the operation ended with a peace agreement with TNSM and the Swat Taliban, institutionalizing sharia in Malakand Division and the Kohistan district of Hazara Division. Emboldened, they, along with other militants operating there, began to occupy areas of Swat before expanding to the districts of Shangla and Buner. The proximity of these districts to Islamabad helped catalyze Pakistani public opinion against these militants and paved the way for a major military offensive. Pakistan launched Operation Rah-e-Rast in May 2009, successfully routing many militants and pushing others into FATA or across the border into Afghanistan. It then launched another major campaign against the TTP in South Waziristan—Operation Rah-e-Nijat—the following month. The army sent seven combat brigades to support this operation, which succeeded in killing, capturing, or dispersion of a significant number of militants based in South Waziristan. Once again, many more fled to other tribal agencies or to Afghanistan.

Overall, approximately seventy-four thousand regular Pakistani Army troops were involved in the various operations conducted in FATA and KP. Despite failing to dismantle the militant infrastructure in the region, Pakistani security forces cleared some key villages, secured significant lines of communication, and weakened the TTP infrastructure in various areas, most notably Bajaur, Swat, and South Waziristan. These campaigns led to the capture or killing of Pakistani...
militants involved in plotting, supporting, and executing attacks against both the state and some foreign fighters. Although Pakistani officials are loath to admit it publicly, American drone strikes killed a number of notable anti-state militants. Although these strikes primarily targeted those threatening the U.S. homeland or coalition forces in Afghanistan, they also reduced the freedom of movement and access to resources for some anti-state militants, disrupting their operational tempo in the process. At the same time, given the perception that Pakistan allowed and enabled the strikes, they undoubtedly fueled recruitment as well.

Pakistan’s counterinsurgency capabilities had improved by the time it launched Operations Rah-e-Rast (Swat) and Rah-e-Nijat (South Waziristan) in 2009. Years of experience operating in FATA coupled with training assistance and capacity building provided by the United States meant Pakistan’s security forces were better prepared to clear and hold territory. However, some anti-state militants inevitably seep through, some pro-state militants given safe passage inevitably turn on the state, and some of the civilians who are displaced become more open to militant recruitment. More significantly, the Pakistani state has not been able to govern the territory it liberates and tackle the myriad political, socioeconomic, and cultural risk factors that contribute to militancy, making it difficult to consolidate gains. The cumulative result has been to bog down a sizeable number of troops and to displace anti-state militants who later return or begin launching attacks elsewhere.

Operations Rah-e-Rast and Rah-e-Nijat correlated with a spike in high-profile terrorist attacks against sensitive targets in cities such as Islamabad, Lahore, and Rawalpindi intended to impose costs on the state in response to the military incursions into FATA. At this stage, counterinsurgency efforts in FATA and parts of KP were poorly coordinated with the unsophisticated counterterrorism efforts in the rest of Pakistan.

In theory, civilian intelligence agencies and law enforcement were responsible for the counterterrorism efforts. The Intelligence Bureau (IB) is Pakistan’s main domestic intelligence agency and technically the one tasked with internal security. The federal government also established the Special Investigation Group as a counterterrorism unit in 2003 to undertake joint investigations with provincial police departments for offences punishable under Pakistan’s 1997 Anti-Terrorism Act. In reality, the ISI’s counterterrorism wing, ISI-CT, was taking the lead on these issues and continues to do so today. It can, however, be undercut by ISI-S, which is responsible for managing liaison relations with Pakistan’s militant proxies. Both entities are known to curtail efforts by law enforcement and civilian intelligence agencies either to protect militant assets or their own turf. Some sources also suggest that Pakistani army intelligence, which is distinct from the ISI, has even deeper ties to the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network. It too could undercut other actors. Coordination improved toward the end of the last decade, relatively speaking. The security services collectively began focusing less on individual militants and more on the linkages, cooperation, and quid pro quo among the various networks responsible for attacks in Pakistan. In some instances, ISI-CT as well as civilian intelligence agencies and law enforcement also enjoyed greater latitude. However, overall coordination remained ad hoc, and counterterrorism efforts still centered on preventing specific attacks or destroying discrete networks as opposed to permanently dismantling militant groups.

Under Musharraf, Pakistan had reined in its India-centric proxies but did so with no intention of dismantling them and nowhere to channel them.
support for the Kashmir jihad without securing a political payoff in return. However, it also appears to have been part of a broader attempt to appease pro-state militants previously focused on India, some of who had become involved in attacks at home. The military and ISI also engaged some of these India-centric groups, most notably LeT, to arrest anti-state violence by former members and freelancers in their ranks who began contributing to the insurgency in Pakistan following the de-escalation of support for the Kashmir jihad.

Leaders from JeM and LeT’s aboveground wing, Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), claim that they were provided additional resources to keep current members in line and induce former members who might be assisting anti-state militants either purposefully or inadvertently to return to the fold. The aim may have been to gather information from these former members, monitor them, and control their activities to the highest degree possible. ISI officers also reportedly goaded LeT leaders to reindoctrinate former and current members against launching attacks in Pakistan, and local clerics were encouraged to deliver the message that jihad in Pakistan was haram (forbidden). Similar efforts, according to one of their number, were undertaken with JeM. When forced to rein in LeT further following the 2008 Mumbai attacks, the ISI facilitated a pathway for increased presence in Afghanistan, where the group’s fighters began appearing in greater numbers in late 2009 and early 2010. In short, when it appeared that some militants from India-centric pro-state groups were getting out of line, the response was to engage those groups to rectify the problem. Moreover, no evidence in the open source indicates whether these efforts were successful.

The military also has attempted to use the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani network on numerous occasions to temper the TTP and reorient its focus toward Afghanistan. For example, in February 2009, leaders from the Haqqani network helped create the Shura Ittihad-ul-Mujahideen (SIM). This umbrella group consisted of Afghan and Pakistani militants, including those involved in anti-state violence. Mullah Omar publicly reiterated his instructions that SIM, like all militant entities, focus on fighting in Afghanistan rather than attacking Pakistan. It is generally believed that initiatives such as these were undertaken at the ISI’s behest. The Pakistani military also made efforts to prevail on other FATA-based militants to withhold support from those actors attacking Pakistan and remain focused on Afghanistan. In exchange, these entities were not targeted during military campaigns in FATA. The TTP was and remains a decentralized entity with many factions operating under its umbrella; the security services also attempted to exploit and exacerbate existing fissures by negotiating with different factions at different times.

Ongoing violence, which spiked during the election seasons, suggests that efforts to reorient violence externally were unsuccessful. Moreover, the dynamism of the militant milieu and protean nature of the entities within it complicate genuine counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism (CT) efforts.

**Blurring Militant Boundaries**

Since 2002, the number of militant focal points has increased and blurred. Afghanistan became a focal point for every major militant outfit as well as a host of smaller networks and splinter groups. India received attention primarily from LeT, though its perceived malevolent involvement in Afghanistan also contributed to the integration of these two focal points. Sectarian attacks increased from the mid-2000s onward and fused with the insurgency in Pakistan because of both the overrepresentation of LeJ members in anti-state violence and the historical connections that some TTP commanders had to SSP and LeJ. In addition to prior organizational affinity, revolutionary and sectarian militants complemented one another operationally. Those associated with SSP and LeJ exploited Talibanization in FATA and KP for safe haven, and in turn, their sectarian
attacks became “an extension of the TTP war against cities.” By 2008, what had begun as a reaction to military efforts in FATA and state crackdowns against select militants had coalesced into a revolutionary jihad to topple the apostate government in Islamabad and institute an extreme interpretation of Islamic law throughout the country. This jihad became a new focus of activity, and whether to participate in it has become the single greatest dividing line for militants. Although a bifurcation exists at the organizational level, where groups are either pro- or anti-state, many of these actors collaborate at the ground level.

The intensifying integration of the militant milieu created ideological confusion and greater opportunities for collaboration in anti-state violence and increased the potential for people to drift across the line dividing pro- and anti-state actors. It has led to bottom-up pressure on leaders of pro-state groups, all of which are experiencing factionalism, freelancing, and attrition among members to varying degrees. Efforts by pro-state leaders to undercut the revolutionary ideology motivating anti-state militants can cost them credibility with their cadre. Moreover, hawks and doves exist in every organization, and hawks in pro-state groups sometimes sanction anti-state activities. Similarly, personal connections formed through training or fighting together can lead to ad hoc support at the line level. Because militant organizations have several faces—one for the Pakistani military and ISI, one for internal members, one for others within the militant milieu, and often one for the public—it can be difficult to identify sanctioned from unsanctioned activities. Despite the fact that the TTP claims credit for attacks, for a single attack one group might provide money; a second, logistics; a third, reconnaissance; a fourth, a vehicle; a fifth, explosives; and a sixth, a bomber. This understandably confuses and complicates any counterterrorism response.

Connections among pro- and anti-state militant groups also mean that the latter can leverage the territory, infrastructure, and manpower belonging to the former, as well as the religious parties associated with them to support the insurgency in Pakistan. In the settled areas, these connections enable anti-state militants to leverage mosques and madaris associated with establishment groups. As a result, anti-state militants have a way to recruit within the system, which can be particularly important when they need additional militants quickly or to regenerate a cell. Mosques and madaris associated with establishment groups also function as hideouts, transit points, staging grounds, and storage depots for attacks against Pakistan. Individuals in these pro-state organizations may provide assistance—knowingly or unknowingly—with transportation, money, food, or even reconnaissance. Many attacks that take place in Punjab, for example, involve at least some measure of coordination with current or former members of tolerated organizations, such as SSP, JeM, and in some cases even LeT.

Interaction and integration is even more common in FATA, where pro- and anti-state groups collaborate, and individuals sometimes move back and forth between the two. For example, the Haqqani network is an essential enabler for the TTP as well as for a host of smaller anti-state entities (including many Punjabi group splinters) and al-Qaeda. Although it has worked to limit any public association with the insurgency in Pakistan, it actively benefits from TTP manpower. In return, the Haqqani network acts as a “platform for operational development and force projection” for segments of the TTP and other anti-state entities. This includes providing access to training, expertise, resources, and the prestige that comes from participating in certain operations in Afghanistan. Moreover, the Haqqani network has been al-Qaeda’s main enabler in the region for more than two decades. Al-Qaeda’s resiliency and ability to project power transnationally is arguably owed more to this assistance than to that proffered by any other local ally. Pakistani military and ISI leaders undoubtedly are aware of these dynamics and seek to control the Haqqani network the same way they have numerous other assets,
providing resources on the one hand and arresting some of their commanders and limiting their capacity to operate on the other. Their ability to do so, however, is limited by the need to maintain the Haqqani network as an asset in Afghanistan and in FATA as well as by the fear of what a real crackdown would entail. Similar dynamics are at play with lesser-known FATA-based outfits that have struck nonaggression pacts with the military.

Finally, although official protection given to establishment groups despite their contributions to anti-state violence is driven by a desire to safeguard so-called strategic assets, individuals from intelligence services may provide unsanctioned support to various militants as well. Giving line officers operational latitude provides the ISI with plausible deniability but also creates scenarios in which these men may protect or support their assets out of loyalty, ideological inclinations, their interpretation of policy or sense of what serves Pakistan’s interests, or simply the desire to protect their turf. At times this can include tipping off suspects, arranging their release in the event of arrest by the police, or withholding information necessary to locate them to begin with. The Pakistani military remains nationalist rather than Islamist, but Islamist sympathies do exist among some of its members, and jihadist infiltration has occurred. Some soldiers and ISI officers have also joined jihadist groups after retiring or taken early retirement to do so. Some of them later contributed to attacks in Pakistan.

No End in Sight

At the time of writing, militants had reorganized in the wake of military campaigns in Swat and South Waziristan and the counterterrorism efforts throughout Pakistan that accompanied them. Many fighters fled to Afghanistan or to other tribal agencies, primarily North Waziristan. The Pakistan military is said to have prepared a North Waziristan operation. It is unlikely to be launched, however, until the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani network vacate their sanctuaries there, though the official reason for delay is a search for consensus in the polity on whether and how to proceed with an incursion. In addition to dispersing across the border or within the tribal areas, militants also fled to South Punjab, upper Sindh, and Karachi. Karachi has long served as a sanctuary and organizational hub, but in 2011, it emerged as a new target for jihadist violence.

The TTP and its associates have shown no willingness to part with their maximalist agenda, including the withdrawal of Pakistani military forces from FATA and adjacent territories and the right to impose sharia in those areas with the eventual aim of imposing it throughout the country. Almost twenty-seven hundred people were killed in more than eleven hundred acts of political violence in Pakistan between January and April 2013. Casualties from jihadist violence constitute a significant number of those killed. This violence included another round of mass terrorist attacks against the Shia in Pakistan. In addition, the TTP launched a withering series of attacks against the Awami National Party (ANP), Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), and Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) in the run-up to the elections, singling them out for their “secular doctrine” and because they were “responsible” for the incursions into FATA. Anti-state militants have launched a spate of attacks throughout Pakistan since the elections. Whether this is part of a strategy by the TTP and its allies to position themselves for peace negotiations with the government is unclear, but at the time of writing, they certainly appear to have the initiative.

Looking ahead to 2014 and beyond, it is unlikely that sectarian violence or the revolutionary jihad against Pakistan will abate regardless of what happens in Afghanistan, where the TTP and other anti-state insurgents already operate. The withdrawal of U.S. and NATO
forces coupled with the possibility of an escalating conflict that draws in regional actors, a resurgent Afghan Taliban, or even a status quo insurgency create the conditions in which anti-state militants could take greater advantage of cross-border sanctuaries in Afghanistan to attack Pakistan. Whether they will do so remains to be seen. How much control Afghan Taliban leaders have over their own foot soldiers, much less those attached to the Pakistani Taliban, is in question. That portions of the two unite against Pakistan is cause for concern. Depending on the scale of the U.S. drawdown in Afghanistan, such a move could have an atomizing impact on the militant milieu in Pakistan. It could, for example, rob the movement of some of its critical mass as well as the some of the legitimacy, or at least propaganda value, that comes from waging jihad against foreign forces that are positioned as anti-Islamic infidel occupiers. However, it also might undercut Pakistani efforts to rein in or hold in reserve some proxies while managing the militant milieu in a way that keeps internal violence from escalating further. Notably, Pakistan’s outreach to former Northern Alliance members in Afghanistan and, more recently, willingness to help facilitate talks between the United States and Afghan Taliban stem partly from concerns about the impact of the U.S. and NATO drawdown on its internal security. At the same time, the security establishment also worries that an Afghan Taliban march to power would invite a massive influx of Indian assistance to the former Northern Alliance.

Looking to the east, despite an increased focus on Afghanistan, groups like LeT have yet to abandon the Kashmir cause or the jihad against India more broadly. The Kashmir front is torpid and regenerating it would be difficult, though recent events including several militant attacks and cross-border firing suggests attempts by groups including LeT to do just that. Kashmir is unlikely to see any violence like the type it experienced through the middle of the last decade. Newly elected Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif has indicated his intention to promote ties with India. This is to be commended and encouraged. The army and ISI have kept LeT from launching any major attacks against India since Mumbai in 2008, but the group is allowed to maintain low-level activities and is unlikely to be dismantled as long as major geopolitical disputes with New Delhi remain. Indeed, modestly improved diplomatic and economic relations with New Delhi have not precluded Pakistan’s ongoing development of tactical nuclear weapons intended to deter the type of Indian invasion that might result from another spectacular terrorist attack by Pakistan-supported militant groups. As long as Pakistan maintains militant proxies, any Indo-Pakistani rapprochement will remain incomplete and at risk of disruption by such an attack. Moreover, Afghanistan has been a pressure release valve for India-centric militants, and some, including LeT, are likely to remain focused there. However, if the Kashmir conflict proves impossible to regenerate and Pakistan continues to keep pro-state militants from launching major attacks in India, frustration is a possibility. Some militants might decommission or pursue nonviolent activism. Others might join the insurgency in Pakistan.

Even given best-case scenarios geopolitically, Pakistan will continue to face significant militant challenges. Endogenous barriers to countering that threat, much less dismantling the militant infrastructure, already exist.

**Barriers to Action**

It is important to distinguish between counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts against Islamist militants intended to decrease violence in Pakistan and the commitment to dismantle fully the entire militant edifice. The efforts are extant but inadequate. The commitment is absent. It would be understandable to assume that as the internal costs of militancy rise, in part owing to the inadequacy of COIN and CT efforts, Pakistan’s readiness to demobilize all of the jihadist groups
on its soil would likewise increase. In reality, obstacles to COIN and CT efforts against anti-state militants actually contribute to the security establishment’s obstinacy when it comes to decisive and sustained action to dismantle the militant infrastructure. Simultaneously, attempts to preserve some pro-state groups create conditions that impede action against anti-state groups. Internal obstacles thwart even sincere counterterrorism efforts and further discourage elites from taking steps to disarm and demobilize permanently pro-state proxies. Domestic barriers can be grouped as follows: perceptual and strategic, structural, and political. This section examines each in turn and also assesses the manner in which obstacles of one variety affect others.

Collectively, these obstacles inform Pakistan’s triage approach, in which groups that have not declared war against the state are supported or ignored and those posing an imminent threat are targeted, albeit inconsistently. This approach is predicated on the assumption that Pakistan faces two choices—tolerate some militants or take on every group at once—and fails to account either for integration among militants or the long-term threats that pro-state actors might pose. Although Pakistan’s approach is indicative of unimaginative thinking and a convenient talking point for those in the security establishment who wish to preserve certain groups, it would be a mistake to discount the myriad domestic challenges facing Pakistan in terms of countering the militant threat or the degree to which they influence the establishment’s active support for some groups and tolerance of others.

Perceptual and Strategic Barriers

U.S. officials recognize correctly a divergence of strategic interests with Pakistan over its support for nonstate proxies. However, assumptions regarding why this is the case have proved inaccurate or incomplete. The first assumption is that Pakistan would cease patronizing proxies once faced with its own jihadist insurgency. The second is that its decision to continue supporting Islamist militants is driven solely by geopolitical calculation. This assumption overlooks the establishment’s domestic compulsions vis-à-vis security and the way in which they intersect with foreign policy. Both assumptions are also based on the faulty premise that the Pakistani security establishment has the same low tolerance for terrorist violence within its borders as the United States does. In reality, it appears that the civilian government and security establishment are prepared to accept a persistent level of violence in the hopes of avoiding a conflagration and as long as the groups receiving state support—active or passive—have utility either abroad or at home. At the heart of this segmented approach is the perception that when it comes to pro-state militants, “If we don’t hit them, they won’t hit us.” However, additional perceptions inform a cost-benefit calculus that impedes comprehensive and sustained action against all militants in Pakistan.

FATA and the Heartland

Militants control territory throughout FATA, but their physical center of gravity is in North Waziristan. The primary barrier to any offensive there is the presence of the Haqqanis, which has significant geopolitical utility for Pakistan in Afghanistan. Thus, it is possible the military could launch an incursion into North Waziristan post-2014, though there is cause for pessimism in terms of the insurgency in Afghanistan ending and thus the Haqanni network outliving its usefulness. Beyond this significant barrier, though, are other endogenous ones.

Military and civilian officials alike worry about the capability of FATA-based militants to work with and through militants with connections outside the tribal areas to strike the heartland, which served as a coercive mechanism that forestalled military offensives in the past. Military

Groups that have not declared war against the state are supported or ignored and those posing an imminent threat are targeted, albeit inconsistently.
and especially civilian officials also worry about the societal consequences beyond the immediate fear of terrorist attacks or military losses. The state is currently in dire economic straits and previous military incursions in FATA had significant humanitarian implications, creating thousands of internally displaced persons. Another military offensive would likely have similar fiscal and human consequences at a time when the state is ill prepared to cope with them.

Perceptions about FATA and KP inform security concerns. Pakistanis outside those areas, including many elites within the security establishment, have historically demonstrated a readiness to accept Talibanization to avoid retaliatory violence and provided the Talibanization did not affect their lives—hence the preference for appeasement in the form of the peace deals offered to various militant factions. The popular narrative in the “settled areas” of Pakistan that FATA is an “uncivilized area” in which militancy is an inherent cultural characteristic influences this calculus. Aversion to military action, both within the security establishment and among the general public, changed in the months after the Swat Taliban were videotaped flogging a young woman and then invaded Buner not long after, signing yet another peace deal. These events signaled that Talibanization was encroaching too far beyond the frontier, engendering greater support for military action: 53 percent of those polled backed the use of the Pakistani military for such an operation.

However, support for military action ebbed as time passed. By 2012, the percentage of those in favor of the Pakistani army operating against militants in FATA and KP had dropped to 32 percent. Even as recently as April 2013, amid the TTP’s withering assault during election season and at a time when 49 percent of the country rated the Taliban as a serious threat, only 35 percent favored military action, and 29 percent opposed it. Public support is critical to the political will of civilian politicians and the military leadership to remain engaged in military operations. Like elected officials in most places, politicians worry about displeasing the body politic. In November 2012, amid another round of debate over whether and when the military should launch an incursion into North Waziristan, Pakistani president Asif Ali Zardari questioned whether the public was prepared for the inevitable retaliatory attacks in many other parts of the country. The newly elected PML-N government and the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), which formed the government in KP, appear even more averse to direct confrontation and instead favor peace negotiations with the TTP. The military has increased its resolve to combat anti-state militants but remains sensitive to its standing among the population and to the impact of unpopular or unsuccessful operations on morale. These internal concerns weaken the incentive for action and are unlikely to disappear entirely regardless of how the situation plays out in Afghanistan.

Regarding action outside FATA, civilian and military elites fear that a crackdown on militant networks and organizations could result in a series of standoffs along the lines of the Lal Masjid, followed by a spate of terrorist attacks. There is a sense, not unfounded, that civilian law enforcement is ill-equipped to manage the fallout. Deploying the army is hardly the solution, however. First, it is not equipped to confront urban terrorism. Paramilitary forces such as the Rangers have been deployed in Karachi but have had only limited success containing violence and are not a long-term solution. Moreover, groups such as LeT and SSP enjoy their strongest base in Punjab. The military’s ranks draw heavily from that province, and thus some soldiers have friendship or familial ties to members of militant outfits. Sympathies for some of these organizations exist among some within the police force as well, which further complicates any response.

Fears of retaliatory attacks are compounded by concerns about the potential societal instability that could result from cracking down on groups with robust aboveground operations, such as Maymar trust—a charity formally known as the Al-Rashid Trust and connected to various Deo-
bandi militant groups—or LeT’s aboveground wing, JuD. Curtailing a group’s military operations does not per se demand shutting down its above-ground social welfare activities, though serious questions can be raised about the capability of either the federal or any of the provincial governments to effectively assume control of these operations and administer or oversee them effectively. Moreover, even limited crackdowns could have social consequences that contribute to paralysis among officials. Although no militant group enjoys high approval ratings in Pakistan overall, some like LeT (through JuD) and SSP have penetrated pockets of the population. As a result, though their support is not broad, they do have suasion in certain areas. Officials worry about the ability of militant organizations, working in tandem with aboveground religious parties, to incite societal disruptions and encourage even more general lawlessness. That these groups are engaged in social welfare activities contributes to the perception in some quarters that they are positive, or at least benign, actors the state should not provoke. When addressing barriers stemming from these social welfare activities, one cannot ignore the state’s role in helping foster support for some of these groups, especially JuD, in part to provide another reason for resisting pressure to take action against them.

“This Is Not Our War”

A popular narrative that compounds uncertainty over military action in FATA specifically and against anti-state militants across the country generally is that Pakistan is fighting America’s war or, at least, facing an insurgency because of its support for that war. The PML-N made this its official position, including in its election manifesto the claim that Pakistan’s militants were emboldened as a result of both the U.S. invasion of and continued presence in Afghanistan and former President Musharraf’s authoritarian rule. Individually, military officials, civilian politicians, and others close to the establishment complain that splinter groups emerged and turned on the state after 9/11 as a result of crackdowns undertaken in response to U.S. pressure. One ISI officer asserted, “Pakistan banned these organizations under pressure from the U.S. and this was a mistake. At the time, these people were in the system. Now they are outside the system.” This complaint is coterminous with one that the United States pressured Pakistan to launch military incursions into FATA that in turn catalyzed the insurgency there. Today, the United States is viewed exhorting Pakistan to increase its military efforts in FATA while attempting to negotiate with the Taliban in Afghanistan. From Pakistan’s perspective, this does not leave space to negotiate a political solution. Notably, this assumes the TTP-led insurgency can be resolved through negotiations in tandem with an end to the American military presence in Afghanistan and presumably to drone strikes as well.

General Kayani asserted unequivocally in several high-profile speeches that Pakistan is at war with terrorism. This may be part of an effort to push back against these perceptions or at least move beyond them and rally the country behind the need to counter the militant threat. However, if this is an uphill climb for the military, the difficulty is largely one of its own making. General Kayani’s lament that “certain quarters still want to remain embroiled in the debate concerning the causes of this war and who imposed it on us” overlooks the fact that the military helped to fuel that debate to begin with. It plays a significant role in shaping public opinion, relying on connected commentators to exert significant influence, and then using public opinion to buffer against U.S. demands to do more about the militants on Pakistan’s soil. Moreover, it also continues to send mixed messages about the nature of the threat.

These efforts have boomeranged to block the military’s efforts at times. Following Islamabad’s long-delayed 2012 decision to reopen NATO supply lines, closed in the aftermath of the November 2011 Salala incident in which U.S. military strikes killed twenty-four Pakistani
soldiers, militants threatened to attack supply convoys and Pakistani military installations. Rather than push back, political leaders and security pundits close to the security establishment joined the chorus of voices complaining, “This is not our war.” Some retired military officials went further, sounding like “outright apologists” for those threatening such attacks. One retired general declared that the militants planning such assaults might have felt justified under sharia in attacking military installations.

Militants exploit the narrative of America’s war for their own ends. For example, during Operation Zalzala, launched in South Waziristan in 2008, for example, militants reportedly told members of the local population that the army was composed of non-Muslims and was waging war on behalf of the United States. More recently, when the state banned Ahle Sunnah Wal Jamaat, the latest incarnation of the SSP, its leader Maulana Mohammad Ahmed Ludhianvi claimed that “American and pro-American elements are afraid of the Difa [referring to Difa-e-Pakistan or the Defense of Pakistan Council of which SSP is a part] and have orchestrated this ban. In essence, whoever enforces the ban is enforcing their [America’s] will on Pakistan.”

A Foreign Hand

The ability to mobilize comprehensive and sustained action against militancy is also hampered by the fact that many Pakistanis—including some within the security establishment—have internalized conspiracy theories about Indian, American, Afghan, and (for good measure) Israeli support for militants attacking Pakistan. For example, General Kayani still nurtures this narrative even as he positions war against anti-state militants as Pakistan’s own. In his Martyr’s Day speech, the general alluded to foreign support: “The nefarious designs of our enemy, may it be internal or external, will never succeed and we shall eventually prevail.” He made a bolder claim minutes later: “Our external enemies are busy in igniting the flames of this fire.” Because a long-standing military imperative holds that soldiers must know against whom and for what they are fighting, this perception makes countering anti-state militants more difficult. It also elevates the importance of pro-state militant groups to Pakistan’s security. They become more than simply a bulwark against Indian hegemony and American expansionist designs in the region: They also become an essential counter to an Indian-American-Afghan-sponsored proxy war in Pakistan.

Several explanations account for the susceptibility to the narrative that foreign powers were behind terrorist attacks in Pakistan. First is a general disbelief that Pakistani Muslims could be involved in attacking their own people—and if they are, then a “foreign hand” must be manipulating them. Second, this disbelief dovetails with both a propensity to blame outsiders for Pakistan’s travails and a general appetite for conspiracy theories. Third, the narrative of a foreign hand was fundamental to getting Pakistani forces to fight in FATA. Waging war against one’s countrymen is never easy and particularly so for Pakistani soldiers, who are taught that their country is a “fortress of Islam and [that] its enemies are also enemies of Islam.” These beliefs are useful for fighting against Hindu India but hinder efforts against fellow citizens who “claim to have a firmer commitment to Islam than the Army.” Instead, Pakistani soldiers were told that they were fighting Indian and American agents. Many in the military absorbed this narrative and then fed it back into the population, which gave it even greater credence. Fourth, civilian politicians, establishment pundits, and other elites serially repeat this trope to the media. In some instances, the narrative can be chalked up to the inclination to blame outsiders for Pakistan’s problems. In others, it is a way of inoculating the security establishment or civilian government against the blowback from war within Pakistan’s borders. Politicians also label their opponents as agents of India, Israel, and America to score political points.
This is not merely a rhetorical device for public consumption. President Zardari reportedly expressed concerns privately to American interlocutors about U.S. involvement in attacks against Pakistan. Suspicions of a foreign hand also appear to cloud investigations and operations further down the organizational chart, despite the lack of any evidence. For example, one of the militants involved in the Sri Lankan cricket team bus attack in 2010 admitted to investigators that the main objective of the operation was to pressure the government to release arrested LeJ militants, including Akram Lahore and Malik Ishaq. Yet the interrogation report found that the “involvement of some foreign Intelligence Agency cannot be ruled out,” an assessment based solely on the fact that the militants had enough money to purchase three cars, three rickshaws, and weapons for the operation.

No significant open-source evidence indicates Indian support for anti-state Islamist militants, but India’s presence in Afghanistan, where it has opened four consulates in addition to its embassy, has stoked suspicion. Specifically, it is an article of faith among many in the Pakistani security establishment that India uses Afghan consulates to equip anti-state Islamist militants, including the TTP. Meanwhile, Afghanistan and Pakistan have been waging a low-level border war since the end of the last decade, and anti-state militants displaced by incursions into FATA and the Swat Valley have regrouped in eastern Afghanistan. From there, they launch cross-border raids into Pakistan. These actors appear to benefit at least from benign neglect by the Afghan security forces, though Pakistan alleges they receive active support from Afghanistan’s intelligence agency.

U.S. forces withdrew from the Korangal Valley in mid-2010, turning an already troubled region into a militant safe haven for Afghan-centric and Pakistan-centric militants. Pakistani officials equate the situation, inaccurately, to the safe haven in FATA and ask rhetorically why Pakistan should be expected to rid North Waziristan of the militants based there if the United States cannot do so across the border. Some of those willing to concede that their focus is on combating anti-state militant groups argue in turn that the United States is focused on Afghanistan-focused groups. This equates apples with oranges. From a U.S. perspective, aggressively targeting the Pakistani Taliban in Afghanistan would require reorienting resources currently deployed against Afghan-focused insurgents, a number of whom operate with Pakistani support, at a time when the United States is racing to make progress in advance of the impending 2014 drawdown. The TTP and its allies are indeed not a priority, and the United States is certainly not prepared to redeploy to the Korangal Valley. It will, however, certainly take action against Pakistan-focused actors in Afghanistan when the opportunity presents itself. Moreover, the United States is not actively supporting those actors based in Afghanistan or abetting their cross-border raids, whereas Pakistan is supporting the Haqqanis, the Afghan Taliban, and other pro-state groups. Nevertheless, the incorrect perception exists that the United States supports cross-border TTP strikes.

When All You Have Is a Hammer

The security establishment is rightly concerned that after 2014 the TTP and its allies could benefit further from safe haven in Afghanistan and that this situation could be all the worse if relations with Kabul deteriorate. Alternatively, if the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani network succeed in arrogating more power in Afghanistan after 2014 than even Pakistan would like, they could back the TTP against their former hosts. In the eyes of many security officials in Pakistan, either scenario makes preserving ties with pro-state militants a safe bet at present, especially as some of these militants increasingly offer internal utility alongside their historically external
utility. The Pakistani military and ISI have only so many tools in the toolkit and thus have
developed a strategic culture of reliance on nonstate proxies.

The Haqqani network and Afghan Taliban act as diplomatic interfaces with the TTP. This
includes interceding on specific issues as well as providing private and sometimes public guidance
favorable to Pakistan’s interests. The Haqqani network, in particular, has played this diplomatic
liaison role by helping the military to “manage hostilities, gain access to TTP leaders, and try to
shape the direction and priorities of militant groups in the FATA, especially those waging jihad
against Islamabad.” Its leaders reportedly helped mediate a number of the cease-fire agreements
and peace deals between the military and TTP commanders in North and South Waziristan. They
were also instrumental in securing the release of Pakistan’s former ambassador to Afghanistan,
Tariq Azizuddin, whom TTP militants kidnapped in 2008. To do so, Pakistan paid a $2.5
million ransom to Baitullah Mehsud and released a number of TTP militants as well as two
high-ranking members of the Afghan Taliban. Such exchanges benefit not only the military
and the TTP but also the Haqqani network, whose commanders leverage their ties to both sides
to maintain their influence.

LeT has carried out a propaganda campaign against al-Qaeda and the TTP—despite co-
operating with both at the operational level in Afghanistan—demonizing them for launching
attacks in Pakistan. The Pakistani security services also use pro-state groups, such as LeT, to
gather intelligence on these actors and, at times, to neutralize them. Similarly, during Operation
Zalzala, the Taliban commander Mullah Nazir was given covert support to attack Uzbek militants
who enjoyed the protection of his rival Baitullah Mehsud. These efforts are part of a broader
bid to regain control over the militant infrastructure rather than to dismantle it, and they inform
Pakistan’s ongoing support for certain pro-state actors.

Finally, the state’s ability to sustain proxy wars for multiple decades has depended in large part
on its ability to market them as jihad. Because the government publicly disavows support for
militancy abroad, pro-state leaders tell their cadre to disregard official messaging. As a result, even
pro-state militants have been conditioned to look to their leaders, rather than the government, as
the legitimate arbiters of what is and is not off limits. This increases the state’s reliance on these
leaders, and the clerics they follow, to define the parameters of jihad. In short, it increases their
ideological and operational value.

To be sure, the geopolitical utility some groups offer is the most compelling reason why
Pakistan continues to provide them with active support, including money and materials; assistance
with training, operations, and logistics; organizational assistance; ideological direction (where possible);
and, of course, sanctuary, as well as other protection from external enemies (for example, intelligence
sharing). However, decisions about which groups to patronize with such support and which to
target as part of the security establishment’s triage policy are heavily influenced by whether a group is
attacking the Pakistani state directly, as well as by the level of situational awareness of and influence
on it. Providing active support is an important way to maintain influence over those pro-state mili-
tant groups that, as an organizational policy, eschew attacks against the state home. Thus, concerns
among those within the security establishment are significant that the cessation of active support
would lead to decreased influence over pro-state groups and a likely concomitant rise in anti-state
violence. In some cases, such support is also perceived to be necessary to enable pro-state groups
to beat back anti-state challenges. For example, for several years al-Qaeda has been attempting to
poach LeT members, compete for its recruits, and co-opt its anti-India platform. In addition
to the other purposes served, state support for LeT is also a way of attempting to provide it with
the strength to beat back this challenge. It is also potentially a way to channel some of those who are

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Concerns among those within the security establishment are significant that the cessation of active support would lead to decreased influence over pro-state groups and a likely concomitant rise in anti-state violence.
attracted to militancy into a pro-state, rather than an anti-state, entity. Ending passive support would be even more difficult. It is defined here as knowingly allowing a militant group to raise funds, recruit, receive support from other actors within the country, or otherwise operate without interference.\textsuperscript{168}

Were the Pakistani security establishment to end passive support for militant groups, it would be tantamount to a sincere and sustained crackdown against them, a Herculean undertaking that almost inevitably would engender blowback as described above.

This is not to suggest that Pakistan should not end passive or active support but rather to identify some of the variables that influence why it has not. This rationale is also informed by myriad structural barriers that militate against effective COIN and CT efforts. Collectively, such efforts inform and are informed by elite political calculations that act as a further barrier to action.

**Political Barriers**

Any effort to combat militancy must entail not only the strategic calculation and necessary resources to do so but also political will. This means that politicians and military leaders must overcome a culture of solipsistic infighting. As observed in a *Dawn* editorial published in early 2012,

> Incredibly, there is no apparent effort to deal with these existential [militant] threats, despite almost daily appeals to those who matter. The reason for the absence of collective national effort to face these challenges is that those who can make a difference are preoccupied with their own personal or institutional battle for survival or for supremacy. The ruling political parties are too busy with matters relating to their survival in office and fresh mandate for the next five years, to pay attention to other matters. The political parties not in office are dedicated only to ousting those in office. The military spends considerable time and energy on maintaining its pre-eminence in state affairs.\textsuperscript{169}

Indeed, while the military deserves some credit for allowing the democratic process to advance, this move was part of an implicit quid pro quo arrangement: The previous government was allowed to complete its term, but the military retained control over policies it considered vital to its interests. This highlights the fact that alongside the competition that ensues—between the civilian government and the military, between the federal and provincial governments, and among the various political parties—is a form of elite negotiation that enables all of these actors to protect their overall interests.\textsuperscript{170} In other words, the military and civilians compete over power even as they protect overall elite interests by limiting those able to engage in said competition to their own narrow circle.\textsuperscript{171} With regard to the politics of militancy, this contributes to benign neglect and deliberate inaction as well as to the outright use of certain militant entities as political proxies. It is important to note before proceeding that civilian politicians are not entangled with militant groups to nearly the same extent as the security establishment. Their actions, at least in some cases, appear to be the result of attempts to accommodate groups whose existence they cannot control because security policy remains the purview of the military. However, civilian politicians are not blameless and, in some instances, engage extremists and militants to serve their own purposes; this engagement therefore cannot be laid entirely at the feet of the security establishment.

**If We Don’t Hit Them…the Political Version**

Preserving its preeminence requires the military to maintain internal cohesion among the rank-and-file and to protect its reputation with the populace. Whereas military leaders will admit their concerns about the threats from blowback to Pakistan’s internal security and the ability to mobilize resources to avoid such an outcome (strategic reasons for inaction), they are less up front about how blowback could damage the military’s “self-created and self-perpetuated image inside Pakistan as the only viable institution.”\textsuperscript{172} They also do not dwell too
publicly on the impact on morale, but that issue remains an important motivator.\textsuperscript{173} Previous peace deals were struck in part to spare the military losses that negatively affect troop morale and damage its prestige.\textsuperscript{174} Nevertheless, the military has taken a hard line against anti-state militants, arguing against negotiations unless the TTP disarms and accepts the writ of the state, which the military must know both are nonstarters.

Increasingly, however, politicians are the ones arguing for peace talks. In an apparent bid to temper violence during election season, politicians of various stripes attempted to open negotiations with the TTP before the election season despite the fact that its leaders evinced no sign of being ready to accept Pakistan’s constitution or to budge on their maximalist agenda.\textsuperscript{175} Those talks failed to materialize after the TTP withdrew its offer and began targeting the ANP, PPP, and MQM, singling them out for their “secular doctrine” and because they were “responsible” for the incursions into FATA.\textsuperscript{176} The TTP was not above targeting individual candidates from religious parties if they did not toe the line, for example, executing an attack against one JUI-F politician who had supported the PPP and ANP government that had launched operations against it.\textsuperscript{177}

The TTP is not strong enough to capture power through a decisive military victory, and its campaign of violence during the elections served several objectives. First, it appears to have been an attempt to influence the outcome of the elections in favor of the right-of-center parties perceived to be more willing to support a religiously regressive agenda. Second, it likely was intended to send a strong signal to all civilian politicians that supporting any decision to confront the movement directly has lethal consequences. Finally, the sheer capability to carry out successive attacks and possibly influence the outcome of a national election enhanced the TTP’s power and deflated that of the state.\textsuperscript{178}

Notably, the other main parties, PML-N and Imran Khan’s PTI, both of which took a softer line against the TTP and courted right-wing voters, maintained a deafening silence as violence against their political opponents mounted.\textsuperscript{179} The barrage of attacks made campaigning difficult for all of those targeted. The ANP, in particular, was nearly “knocked . . . off the electoral map” in Pakistan’s northwest, where it historically has been the dominant party.\textsuperscript{180} The PML-N won a majority of seats in the elections, and the PTI did well enough in KP to form the government there. Both have continued to argue for negotiations since taking office. This is not to suggest the TTP’s campaign of violence tipped the election, especially at the federal level. A host of factors, unrelated to militancy, explain the PML-N victory.

At the time of writing, the parties had yet to come to the table, and it was unclear how the strategy would develop. It is worth noting, however, that as opposition parties during the PPP’s time in office, the PML-N and PTI had no incentive to improve the situation and instead appear to have calculated that they could benefit from turning a blind eye to the dangers of militancy.\textsuperscript{181} For example, in a bid to reorient attacks away from Punjab in 2010, Shahbaz Sharif, the chief minister of that province and brother of PML-N leader Nawaz Sharif, exhorted the TTP to abstain from launching attacks there:

\begin{quote}
Gen Musharraf planned a bloodbath of innocent Muslims at the behest of others only to prolong his rule, but we in the PML-N opposed his policies and rejected dictation from abroad [a reference to the U.S.] and if the [Pakistani] Taliban are also fighting for the same cause then they should not carry out acts of terror in Punjab.\textsuperscript{182}
\end{quote}

The PPP is hardly blameless. It led the only civilian government to sign a peace deal with anti-state militants (in 2008 in Swat). Although PPP leaders often engaged in tough rhetoric thereafter, in general they failed to back this up with action. Instead, they focused their energies
on staying in office. This speaks to a larger issue. The security establishment’s policy of selectivity with regard to militants, the lethal capabilities of anti-state militants, and the political influence some of their number have created gray areas for civilian authorities. Fearing professional retaliation from the military and ISI or physical attacks by militants, many civilian authorities choose to do nothing. During its term, the PPP often avoided responsibility on security issues both to avoid challenging the military, which can destabilize elected governments that challenge its preferred policies at home or abroad, and to escape blame for any backlash that might ensue from aggressive action against militancy.

Militant Pawnbrokers

The permissive environment militants enjoy has enabled some of them to arrogate political power, which reinforces the cycle because it raises the cost of action against them and means that they can provide greater political utility to the military and to civilian politicians.

A military-mullah-militant nexus has existed for several decades in Pakistan. During this time, the Pakistani military has used religious and political parties connected, directly or indirectly, with various militant outfits. The Difa-e-Pakistan Council (DPC) is the most recent manifestation of the phenomenon. A coalition of more than forty political-religious parties, some of whose leaders either have ties to or head militant groups, the DPC quickly came to be seen after its formation as a stalking horse for the security establishment.183 It undercut certain civilian officials, highlighted foreign policy issues the military did not wish to speak openly about, and polarized other issues indirectly for bargaining purposes with other nation-states, most notably India and America.184 Consolidating leaders from various militant groups onto a single political platform amplifies their voice but also may be a way for the security establishment to increase influence over other aspects of their behavior. Moreover, the opportunity to influence political discourse also may provide an incentive to some militant leaders, such as Hafiz Saeed, to keep their cadres in line.185

As some militant groups have arrogated power via their aboveground organizations, they have increased both their utility to elected officials and the costs to elected officials of crossing them. At the same time, the decentralization of politics has made it more difficult for the major parties to win an outright majority on their own. Reliance on local powerbrokers and smaller parties has thus become more necessary. Politicians seeking to turn out voters or put down local challenges have courted militants leaders, especially those from SSP and JuD, and have shown a readiness to make deals with them in return.186 They also appeal to militant leaders for endorsements or other assistance delivering vote banks and have been known to appear at public events with some of these leaders to secure such help.187

Pakistan’s major parties are all guilty of seeking support from Islamist organizations tied to militant groups to secure seats in parliament, but the PML-N in particular has been criticized for courting extremist organizations such as the SSP and JuD in order to make electoral gains.188

Notably, some of its supporters have a higher tolerance for such entities. According to a May 2013 Pew poll, 23 percent view the Taliban and al-Qaeda positively and 40 percent hold favorable opinions of LeT. In contrast, only 11 percent of the Pakistani populace view the Taliban favorably, 13 percent have a favorable opinion of al-Qaeda, and 24 percent give LeT a positive rating.189 Although the party is more religiously conservative than the PPP, it is not a religious party. Rather, its courtship of these voters appears to have been part of a pragmatic approach to win as many votes in as many districts as possible in a first-past-the-post system. At the same time, Nawaz Sharif is to be commended for his pledge to improve ties with India and his interest
in rectifying the civil-military imbalance. It is unclear whether he will be able to actualize these objectives, but it is notable that an attempt to do so could put him on a collision course with some of the same extremist organizations the PML-N is accused of courting.

**Militant Hats in the Ring**

Sami ul-Haq, who leads a religious party with long-standing ties to militancy, worried publicly that the TTP's campaign of violence during election season could lead to sympathy votes for the secular parties being targeted or suppress the vote at a time when these entities, which had formed the previous government, were unpopular. Such concerns turned out to be misplaced. However, the point is that such criticism did not impugn the legitimacy of the TTP's campaign of violence but rather highlighted the potential for it to result in unintended consequences that would rob the religious parties of an opportunity to advance their agenda through politics and to benefit from the resources that come with being in power.

The participation in elections of candidates from religious parties with ties to militancy is not new. Increasingly, however, members of banned organizations and those accused of terrorism also contest elections themselves. According to one report, more than one hundred members of the SSP contested elections across Pakistan in May 2013. According to another report, the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) allowed fifty-five candidates from ten sectarian groups, including SSP and LeJ, to contest elections in Punjab province, despite their being listed on the 4th Schedule of the Anti-Terrorism Act. Most were not expected to prevail, and many did not, but it is impossible to deny that militants have become a voice in the political discourse. This theoretically could create conditions for some of them to transition away from militancy and into mainstream politics. In reality, groups like the SSP have not yet been forced to choose between participation in politics and in militancy.

**Structural Barriers**

In the mid-2000s, the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, which was charged with providing assistance to Pakistan’s law enforcement and judicial system, characterized the systems as “hollow … with limited resources and poor training … [and adversely affected by] interagency competition.” This assessment remains true today.

Plenty of ink has been spilled on Pakistan’s capacity shortfalls, and therefore this section only briefly highlights some of those most significant to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. It delves more deeply into systematic obstacles that result from inadequate government and legal structures, the politicization of civilian law enforcement, and the informal competition among various actors in the federal and provincial governments, the military, and the intelligence services. Most states in South Asia face similar structural deficiencies, meaning Pakistan is hardly unique in confronting these challenges. But the country’s precarious condition overall and the dynamic nature of the jihadist threat makes the costs of the shortcomings disproportionately higher for Pakistan than for other countries in South Asia.

**Capacity Shortfalls**

Total American foreign military sales (FMS) agreements with Pakistan amounted to $5.4 billion for FY2002 through FY2010, the United States providing almost half that amount in foreign military financing (FMF) grants used to purchase U.S. military equipment for long-term modernization efforts. Islamabad, according to the departments of Defense and State, has used
Domestic Barriers to Dismantling the Militant Infrastructure in Pakistan

The Case of SSP and LeJ

As sectarian violence escalated during the 1990s, the PML-N government cracked down on SSP and its militant offshoot LeJ, seriously degrading their networks. Although the Musharraf regime escalated support for Kashmir-centric groups after taking power in 1999, it continued the PML-N government’s assault on LeJ, banning it in August 2001. Pakistan protected most of its militant groups after 9/11 but did crack down hard on LeJ, driving many of the group’s members to turn against the state. However, for domestic political reasons, SSP was allowed to continue operating, enabling LeJ to tap into its infrastructure to regenerate. Its members rebuilt their networks across Pakistan, with strongholds in North Waziristan, Karachi, and Balochistan, as well as parts of Punjab. They are now at the forefront of terrorist attacks in Pakistan, especially against members of the Shia community.

Some speak of a controlled versus an uncontrolled LeJ, the former headed by Malik Ishaq in Punjab and the latter operating from North Waziristan and known as LeJ al-Alami (International). However, experts familiar with the group perceive this to be a false dichotomy.

Malik Ishaq was accused of thirty-five cases of murder, including the assassination of an Iranian diplomat in 1997. An antiterrorism court (ATC) sentenced him to death, but the Supreme Court overturned that sentence and closed the case in 2011. By that time, the ATC judge who issued the initial sentence had escaped the country, and many of the witnesses to the crime, including a senior police officer, had been murdered. Ishaq was acquitted of murder charges in the other cases as well because of lack of evidence, in many cases because witnesses either died or refused to testify.

While still in prison, Ishaq was twice employed by the military to negotiate with militants—once during the Lal Masjid incident and once when anti-state elements attacked the military’s general headquarters and took hostages. This has fueled speculation that the security establishment might have helped to engineer his release. However, reports also circulated that Maulana Mohammad Ahmed Ludhianvi, the current chief of SSP, met Ishaq at the request of Shahbaz Sharif, the younger brother of Nawaz Sharif and chief minister of Punjab province, to offer him a conditional release provided he refrain from militant activities.

Whether military or political officials interceded on his behalf or Ishaq’s release was a simple result of witness intimidation and inadequacies in the judicial system is unclear. It is clear, however, that his release and subsequent sectarian sermons coincided with another escalation in the terrorist campaign by LeJ against the Shia.

LeJ executed a spate of attacks against members of Pakistan’s Hazara community, especially in Balochistan, in the wake of Ishaq’s release. The group claimed credit for these attacks and even circulated an open letter stating that “our successful jihad against the Hazaras in Pakistan and, in particular, in Quetta, is ongoing and will continue in the future.” Much of this is driven by sectarian enmity, though it is notable that in Afghanistan the Hazaras are historically an enemy of the Taliban.

Rumors persist about Pakistani military support for LeJ militants in Balochistan to degrade the separatist insurgency in that province. There is no evidence of an institutionalized policy, however, and the military has denied these charges vociferously. It is possible some officers overlook or abet LeJ activities because they are seen as targeting enemies of the state.

Rumors also persist that external powers, including Saudi Arabia, are helping fund a sectarian proxy war along the lines of what occurred during the 1990s. This too is impossible to confirm, but even if it were true, the actors involved are endogenous to Pakistan.

Amid speculation about tacit support from some individuals in the military for LeJ’s activities in Balochistan, civilian politicians are also accused of culpability. The SSP, which is part of the DPC, reportedly engaged in seat adjustments with the PML-N in Punjab for the elections, meaning that in some cases the two parties agreed to not field candidates against one another. This agreement is in addition to courting SSP leaders, such as Ahmed Ludhianvi, for endorsements and assistance delivering vote banks. Once again, the PML-N is not the only mainstream political party to engage in such activities, but it is viewed as one of the bigger offenders in this regard. Beyond vote-bank politics, the PML-N was reluctant to crack down on the Punjab-based leadership for fear of triggering a wave of terrorist attacks in a province where it needed to (and did) win big in the elections. In short, the same PML-N that led the charge against the SSP and LeJ in the 1990s courted, and in some cases cooperated, with the same entities.
more than half of its FMF to purchase weapons used for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. Through coalition support funds (CSF), Pakistan has also received additional fixed-wing and rotary aircraft as well as billions of dollars in reimbursements. More fixed-wing and rotary aircraft, vehicles, and assorted kit, including body armor and night vision devices, were provided via Section 1206 (global train and equip) funds, the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund, and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund. Some of these weapons and materials have a narrow COIN/CT use. Others have a dual use. Critics contend that Pakistan diverted some to augment its conventional capabilities against India. Money, of course, is also fungible.

The use of U.S. funds to train and equip the Frontier Corps increased after 2007 when the insurgency fully erupted in Pakistan. U.S. Special Operations Command also provided training for
various Pakistani forces, though its trainers have been evicted repeatedly in the wake of shocks to the relationship. Pakistan expressed eagerness for counterinsurgency hardware, including armored personnel carriers, night-vision goggles, more sophisticated surveillance and communication equipment, laser target designators, laser-guided munitions, and attack and utility helicopters. In response, it received more equipment suited to unconventional combat. However, many analysts assert that in the past the military used U.S. security assistance to bolster its conventional (that is, India-centric) capabilities at the expense of augmenting its counterinsurgency capacity.

The army’s past unwillingness to develop an official counterinsurgency doctrine contributed to a repeatedly heavy-handed approach reliant on punishment strategies that further undercut short-term gains. For example, in Operation Zalzala launched in 2008 in South Waziristan, Pakistani forces destroyed more than four thousand houses in one month and displaced approximately two hundred thousand people. The same year Operation Sher Dil in Bajaur caused a similar displacement, driving local residents to other parts of Pakistan as well as across the border into Afghanistan. Additionally, the military has repeatedly applied collective punishment under the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), a colonial-era structure that governs FATA.

Years of experience operating in FATA, coupled with training assistance and capacity building provided by the United States, has helped Pakistan improve its counterinsurgency capabilities. This was apparent by the end of the last decade when Pakistan launched the aforementioned operations Rah-e-Rast (Swat) and Rah-e-Nijat (South Waziristan) in 2009–10.

However, even when security forces have successfully cleared and held territory, the federal and provincial bureaucracies have proved unable to provide development and other aid or adequately assist internally displaced persons. This reinforces the military’s reliance on scorched-earth policies that alienate the local population. As one Pakistani defense analyst observed, “The army is stretching itself too much because there is no civilian effort. But wherever the army goes, it makes the civilians irrelevant and so they cannot make the effort.” Unless Pakistan better governs the territory it liberates and tackles the myriad political, socioeconomic, and cultural risk factors that contribute to militancy, consolidating gains will be difficult. If they are not consolidated, security forces will remain bogged down in those areas of FATA and KP they do control, unable to move on to those they do not. Manpower problems are exacerbated by the army’s paramount focus on its eastern border with India. The army has shown a readiness to redeploy soldiers to FATA when necessary, but the durability of its commitment or capacity to do so indefinitely is questionable.

Nationwide, a well-defined counterterrorism strategy, which is lacking at present, would establish a clearer role for the police in maintaining internal security. The police and civilian intelligence agencies are theoretically better suited to combating terrorism than the military and ISI. However, resource constraints are crippling, including in terms of sheer manpower. For example, the fifty-five-thousand-member police force for KP equates to one policeman for every 350 km². This is despite the fact that U.S. assistance for law enforcement historically was geared disproportionately toward agencies operating there and in FATA. The funding is not insignificant, but it is not enough to address the woeful shortages among Pakistani law enforcement. It also pales in comparison with security assistance steered toward the military, which notably has sought to limit U.S. assistance to Pakistani law enforcement and involvement with police reform. Yet even if U.S. security sector assistance were to increase and flow unencumbered, foreign aid can do only so much.

Numerous Pakistani police officers have died battling terrorism in service to their country and the communities they serve. Many others, however, do not want to do counterterrorism duty, in part because it can be more dangerous and less lucrative in terms of affording opportunities for corruption. Nor do they wish to attend local training programs because doing so may connote...
that an officer is not essential for day-to-day operations. Most police remain poorly trained, especially when it comes to collecting evidence and forensic analysis. The police often fail to secure crime scenes properly and to follow custodial protocols for collected evidence, though progress in both areas has been made over the past decade. Forensic capabilities have improved thanks in part to foreign assistance and the eagerness of some Pakistani police officers to receive it, but these efforts remain rudimentary. Moreover, crime scenes can be spoiled before the police even arrive because the intelligence agencies (IB, MI, and ISI) often take charge even though they are not tasked with investigations. These entities are not sensitive about preserving crime scenes and collecting forensic evidence, which hampers police investigations as well as criminal prosecutions. However, as noted, police officers often fail to collect and preserve evidence appropriately as well. Meanwhile, the police typically investigate cases without guidance from prosecutors, who are also subject to poor working conditions. They often lack offices, let alone legal resources such as an archive of previous rulings, and at times have experienced significant salary delays.

Pakistan's parliament recently passed the Investigation for Fair Trial Bill, granting the government the right to eavesdrop on the electronic communications of suspected terrorists and outlining the process, including the need for judicial warrants, for doing so. This measure allows the ISI, the three military service intelligence agencies, the IB, and the police to tap phone calls, text messages, emails, and other Internet communication. Such surveillance is now also admissible in court. However, although the legal right exists, not all police departments have the necessary technology. Some also lack the capability to track a militant through his mobile phone or even to retrieve deleted data from recovered mobile phones. They are similarly at a loss with recovered computers that often contain troves of data that go undiscovered. The IB can trace and monitor calls. In terms of technological tools and the expertise to use those tools, however, the IB still lags far behind the ISI, on which it is sometimes forced to rely for assistance. The police and civilian intelligence agencies also lack access to other technologies and the skills to use them. For example, police departments do not have software to conduct data analysis or enough personnel with experience in information technology forensics. The United States has been reticent to proffer too much in the way of technical kit to civilian law enforcement and intelligence. First, because spending priorities have been dictated primarily by a continued focus on Afghanistan and FATA, and second, because of concerns about enabling reliance on technical tools that could be used for harassment. Pakistan's inability to pay for necessary improvements does not help. However, the absence of police reform should not be tied too closely to state resources. Broader systemic deficiencies exist. The police are not only underresourced, underpaid, poorly trained, and poorly managed.

They are also overpoliticized and consistently perceived to be the most corrupt institution in the country, according to Transparency International's National Corruption Perception Survey. Before turning to an investigation of these deficiencies, however, it is important to note that some enterprising members of the Police Service of Pakistan, many of whom have served in UN police missions or studied in U.S. and European universities, are seeking to offset capacity shortfalls by improving police–community relations. This approach is consistent with efforts by other police forces around the world engaged in stability operations.

Systemic Deficiencies

The current police structure was created under British colonial rule and modeled on the Royal Irish Constabulary, whose focus was to control the population, not to protect or serve it. The Police Act of 1861 that put this structure in place was superseded by the Police Order 2002 (hereafter, the Order), which sought to rectify "the misuse of authority, the arbitrary use of power,
political interference in police operations and administration, the lack of service orientation, corruption, misbehavior, and the ineffective command and control of the police forces.”

To do so, it created public safety commissions at the district, provincial, and national levels to replace political control with institutional control of the police. The aim was to provide operational autonomy and thus liberate the police from political interference and to make the police accountable to external institutions.

However, although promulgated in 2002, ten years later the Order has yet to be implemented fully. The Musharraf regime and its political allies stripped it of many progressive reforms, passing amendments that ensured the institutionalization of political interference with the police, which accelerated under civilian regimes in the 1990s, remained extant. This interference begins with the hiring process. For example, according to the inspector general of the Sindh police, more than 40 percent of Karachi’s police force was recruited for political reasons. Staffing issues are also politicized. Although additional revenue would help with hiring more officers, one reason departments are understaffed is because many officers are detailed for political rather than police duties. At their most benign, these include special security assignments such as protecting or otherwise assisting government officials. However, as Afzal Ali Shigri, a former director general of the National Police Bureau, explained in an essay on police corruption and accountability,

> In the name of political expediency, successive Pakistani governments have used the police as a tool to suppress political opposition, while military rulers have used the police to stifle dissent…Command-level officers are often chosen on the basis of their willingness to comply with illegal orders, flout the law, or harass political opponents.

The IB, which has had a separate CT wing since 9/11, and the Federal Investigative Agency (FIA), which established the Special Investigation Group to investigate terrorism cases, have also been susceptible to politicization and manipulation. The IB is tasked for domestic intelligence and should play a central role in the country’s counterterrorism efforts. The agency can be effective as evidenced by its successes against organized crime in Karachi during the 1990s. As with the police, though, the IB has been used for political surveillance and as an instrument of censorship. The agency as a whole has been sidelined thanks to ineffective leadership and years of misuse as a political instrument. Under elected civilian governments, either a serving police officer or retired military officer may be appointed as the IB director. During military rule, though, the position was almost always given to a serving army officer. This reduced the IB’s independence from the military and hence its efficacy under civilian rule. Thus, the IB was a powerful and effective player during the Musharraf regime when Brigadier Ijaz Shah, who was close to President Musharraf, helmed the agency. Those installed by the civilian government after 2008, however, have been overshadowed by the military intelligence services. This naturally reduces the IB’s effectiveness, which is further hindered by a lack of sufficient resources, entrenched professionalism, and morale.

Various politicians have misused the FIA since its creation in 1975. This practice increased during the 1990s, and the civilian government “defanged” the FIA in 1997. The Musharraf regime marginalized it further by establishing the National Accountability Bureau (NAB), whose role as an accountability mechanism was a direct challenge to the FIA. Although some functions transferred to the NAB have since been restored to the FIA following the election of a civilian government in 2008, it has yet to recover. By the end of the 2000s, the FIA had become a way station for a series of officials, some corrupt, who were installed and replaced at the whim of their political patrons. Overall, it has had thirty directors since it was established in 1974.

The corruption and politicization of law enforcement and civilian agencies naturally mars the prosecution of suspected criminals and terrorists. The Order officially transferred administrative control of prosecution powers from the police to law departments in all of the provinces. Separat-
ing prosecution from the police force was intended to give prosecutors supervisory powers over police investigations. However, this supervision rarely occurs in reality. Prosecutors are typically only brought to a case after an arrest has been made and the detainee is coming up for trial. The resultant lack of coordination that persists between the police and prosecutors seriously hinders the pursuit of convictions in terrorism-related cases. Further, poor training, corruption, politicization, and the capacity shortfalls discussed earlier translate into errors and omissions during the registration of cases, the falsification of evidence, and the use of torture during interrogations. This understandably reduces the rate of successful prosecutions. Technical deficiencies in the law itself compound the problem.

Theoretically, most militants arrested for involvement in terrorist activities in Pakistan should be booked under the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1997 and tried in the antiterrorism courts that legislation established and imbued with special powers. In early March 2013, the National Assembly approved the Anti-Terrorism (Second Amendment) bill 2013 with the aim of making the existing laws more stringent. Some of the changes are positive, such as the expansion of the term terrorism to include the use or threat of force against “a foreign government or population or an international organization,” and the broadening of the term terrorist organization to include any group owned or controlled directly or indirectly by a terrorist organization or one acting on its behalf. The new act also allowed for previous bans of militant groups to carry over to successor groups that reestablish themselves under new names. Likely motivated by Pakistan’s addition to the Financial Action Task Force blacklist, lawmakers also expanded violations regarding terrorist financing, the definitions of money and property, and the writ of the authorities to seize them. Notably, they also made it a violation of the act to fail to take action in this last regard.

It remains to be seen whether or how the act will be enforced, and it’s notable that the law may need to be reauthorized under the present government. Pakistan has never had a problem detaining or arresting those involved in militancy or closing and seizing property, be it a camp or office, or taking short-term steps to infringe on fundraising. The issue has been convicting and incarcerating those arrested, keeping offices and camps closed, and maintaining consistent pressure on terrorist financing. Moreover, a number of proscribed organizations continue to operate despite being legally banned in Pakistan. Indeed, interlocutors sometimes refer to these entities as “the banned groups” when discussing their still-robust activities. Thus, although such adjustments are beneficial to the degree that they create better legal conditions for action, enforcement will continue to be the key challenge. Meanwhile, significant infirmities within the judicial regime remain unresolved.

The Anti-Terrorism Act does not contain safeguards to prevent authorities from abusing its special provisions. As a result, it is frequently misused. According to one count, more than four thousand antiterrorism cases were brought to court nationally from 2005 to 2011. A large majority of these were suspects with no clear ties to a terrorist organization or indications of terrorist intent, leading many of them to be dismissed. This taxes judicial machinery designed to prosecute cases relating to terrorism. It remains to be seen whether the newly expanded definition of terrorism and terrorists and terrorist organizations makes it more or less likely that antiterrorism courts are used to try those involved in kidnapping, murder, or other sensational acts of violence that do not constitute terrorist attacks. Again, the issues of interpretation and enforcement will be paramount. Separately, although possession and use of explosives are mentioned in the Anti-Terrorism Act, they are governed primarily under the 1884 Explosives Act, which has a low conviction rate when those explosives are used in terrorist attacks.
Suspects tried in antiterrorism courts are also often acquitted because the judicial system is not capable of handling cases where prosecution relies primarily on circumstantial and forensic evidence as opposed to an eyewitness account. Yet witnesses are reluctant to testify, for good reason. The Anti-Terrorism Act allows for the protection of witnesses, judges, and prosecutors, but the language remains theoretical and ad hoc. A proper program must be put in place to provide the witness anonymity during the investigative phase and enable victim protection through voice and face distortion during trial proceedings. Pakistan also lacks a witness protection program to ensure safety beyond the confines of the courtroom. Thus, it is not surprising that witnesses often refuse to testify or become hostile to the prosecution’s case. Notably, Pakistan also lacks an adequate protection program for judges and prosecutors. Finally, many countries have realigned their organizational and legal structures since 9/11 to enable intelligence agencies tasked with domestic collection to present evidence in court. In Pakistan, the primary agency mandated to collect intelligence domestically and should be playing a greater internal security role—the IB—cannot do so. This further impedes convictions. It also cuts into the argument that the IB should displace the ISI as the national intelligence agency responsible for counterterrorism.

Yet the ISI is not constitutionally mandated to act as a law enforcement body and does not operate with any sense of legal culpability. According to Babar Sattar, an expert on the Pakistani legal system, the predominant role of the ISI and the military more broadly in performing internal security duties “largely explains the lack of convictions in terror cases.” ISI agents often take important pieces of evidence, corrupting them and the chain of custody in the process, such that evidence is inadmissible if a case ever gets to court. The ISI also commonly detains suspected terrorists, often to prevent an attack or extract information from them, despite having no legal powers of arrest. After detainees have been interrogated, and typically tortured, they are foisted on the police and prosecuting attorneys, who must try to make a case in court despite having no admissible evidence or no prior involvement in the case.

The cumulative result is a paltry conviction rate, even for those militants Pakistan wants to take off the streets. According to one estimate, the highest conviction rate between 2005 and 2011 for terrorism cases was 28 percent, with an annual average for those cases of barely more than 18 percent. When one assesses this within the context of the total number of cases sent to an antiterrorism court, the chances of conviction drop to roughly 14 percent. The average acquittal rate is more than double that, approximately 36 percent. Meanwhile, the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1997 does not even apply in FATA or to its residents—even if they are arrested elsewhere. Instead, they face justice under the Frontier Crimes Regulation, a draconian and idiosyncratic legal structure in which corruption is rampant.

Poor coordination among various intelligence agencies, law enforcement, and civilian and military officials further hamper efforts to counter militancy. ISI-CT is the ISI bureau responsible for counterterrorism efforts in Pakistan. Because it was formed at the behest of the United States and funded with CIA money, however, it is perceived as an externally sponsored orphan within the security establishment. The assignment of a major general to oversee ISI-CT masks its weak and subordinate position within ISI-C, the wing responsible for liaising with foreign intelligence services. In reality, it has a limited mandate that clashes with the service’s more powerful External Security Wing (ISI-S), which is responsible for directing intelligence and security operations outside Pakistan and in this capacity manages the militant portfolio. As a result, in general, ISI-CT has been constrained and repeatedly undercut by ISI-S from its inception.

According to one estimate, the highest conviction rate between 2005 and 2011 for terrorism cases was 28 percent, with an annual average for those cases of barely more than 18 percent.
and ISI-C, some view the ISI as a hindrance to counterterrorism efforts and others see it as committed to those efforts, whereas “It’s actually both at the same time, and that’s the problem.”

Cooperation, and even communication, among the various intelligence services and local law enforcement is also lacking. According to one former civilian CT official, “the police, IB, FIA, ISI—each has a wealth of info, but if you ask them to brief you on the nature of terrorism then each will tell you something different.” That many police are deputed to the IB can facilitate reasonable coordination between that agency and the various provincial police departments. However, some police officials complain that intelligence sharing remains lacking. At the same time, coordination between the IB and ISI is paltry. IB officers complain that intelligence sharing with the military and ISI is one way. In short, the ISI has the best intelligence but is the least likely to share it and sometimes actively undercuts civilian operations. Another former civilian CT official put it bluntly: “The police and the IB, their mandate is decided by the ISI. This is what you can, cannot do. This is what you can, cannot have.”

Lack of coordination in general, and specifically the ISI’s role in scotching intelligence sharing, is partly a result of the agency’s operational interests in preserving certain militant proxies. As one police officer lamented, “We’re familiar with the cells, but we’d prefer to go after the top leaders and then the cells [would] matter less, but [we] are restricted from doing so by the ISI and because some leaders head front organizations that the ISI protects.” However, the absence of interagency cooperation also occurs in a political culture where organizational dysfunction and bureaucratic turf wars are the norm. Political infighting between the political parties plays out at the federal and provincial levels and often compromises cooperation between them. For example, in 2010, a planned crackdown on militants in Punjab was torpedoed by political infighting between the government and the opposition.

The quickly diminished status of Pakistan’s National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA)—launched in 2009 to coordinate CT efforts—exemplifies both the ISI’s unwillingness to cede power and the civilian competition for any leftover scraps. Initially NACTA was slated to operate under the prime minister’s office and to be responsible for receiving, collating, and coordinating intelligence among the ISI, IB, FIA, and provincial authorities, as well as for preparing and coordinating a national CT strategy. Within this scope of action, NACTA would also conduct research and analysis, establish a national database of terrorists, and liaise with international entities, such as the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). Tariq Pervez, a well-regarded former police officer and head of the FIA, was its first director general. His reputation enabled him to elicit a degree of buy-in but could not overcome an institutional bias against intelligence sharing and a lack of military support. Although an ISI representative turned up for meetings, according to one observer of the process at the time, the ISI as an institution resolutely refused to share the intelligence NACTA needed to accomplish its mission. Civilian wrangling created additional hurdles. The interior minister at the time, Rehman Malik, engaged in a political power play and arranged for NACTA to be put under his ministry’s authority rather than the prime minister’s as initially intended. This made it all the more difficult to oblige the various intelligence services to cooperate. The IB reports to the prime minister’s office and was reluctant to answer to an entity operating under the Interior Ministry’s authority. The ISI used this as an excuse for its recalcitrance, which in reality stemmed from an unwillingness to share intelligence with an agency that had civilian oversight. Amidst these bureaucratic hurdles, Pervez ultimately resigned in 2010 after he failed to persuade Pakistan’s civilian leadership to place NACTA under the prime minister’s office.
Parliament finally passed legislation establishing NACTA in early 2013, naming the prime minister to chair its board of governors, which will include the heads of all civilian and military law enforcement and intelligence agencies as well as the four provincial chief ministers. The interior minister will chair an executive committee that implements decisions taken by the board of governors. The legislation allows for a national coordinator, deputy national coordinator, and dedicated staff to undertake research, coordinate intelligence sharing and issue threat assessments, develop and implement action plans, and—perhaps most importantly—craft national counterterrorism and counterextremism strategies.

The formal establishment of NACTA is an important step forward, though it remains to be seen whether it will function as effectively in practice as is intended on paper.

Implications for Pakistan

AUTHOR'S NOTE: Since this report went to press, the new PML-N government has drafted the National Counter Terrorism and Extremism Policy 2013. The draft policy had yet to be unveiled publicly at the time this report went to press. It reportedly addresses a number of the deficiencies identified in this report and promotes wide-ranging reforms deemed necessary to dismantle all terrorist organizations and networks in Pakistan. The precise nature many of these reforms will take and, more importantly, whether the government will be able to execute them remain unknown at this time. The introduction of such a policy is nevertheless a significant and seemingly positive event.

Pakistan is confronting a host of crises, and most Pakistanis are not directly affected by militancy. Instead they face a dismal economy, food or water scarcity, electricity shortages and failing infrastructure, lack of adequate educational and employment opportunities, and lack of effective governance at the local, provincial, and national levels. However, a substantial number of Pakistanis are affected directly by militancy, and many more are indirectly affected. In a recent survey, more than 90 percent described terrorism as a major problem. It is impossible to ignore the toll the jihadist insurgency alone is taking on Pakistan, much less when one considers it in concert with these myriad other problems and a second insurgency in Balochistan waged by separatists there. Barring a cataclysmic event and despite these negative trends, extreme cases such as fragmentation, the breakaway of discontented provinces, or total state failure are unlikely in the near- to medium-term. Instead, Pakistan is likely to continue muddling through, though as one scholar observed, there are several kinds of muddling through, and if current trends continue, the country could face “more extreme and unpleasant futures.”

Attacks by anti-state militants distract from Pakistan’s pressing problems, accelerating its downward trajectory. Counterintuitively, this raises the perceived costs of dismantling pro-state groups. Yet deferring action on these groups not only thwarts effective COIN/CT efforts, it also provides space for them to distort sensible domestic and foreign policies. Pakistan’s triage approach constrains its policy options, further locking the establishment into a reactive rather than a forward-leaning position, making it more difficult for the country to face either its geopolitical or its domestic challenges.

The cumulative creeping expansion of jihadist influence also contributes to an identity crisis that threatens to corrode Pakistan’s cohesion. Sectarian violence cuts particularly deep in this regard and threatens to draw in perpetrators who presently have no involvement in militancy. It strikes a sensitive nerve within the military, whose members value their institution’s nonsectarian identity. Some understandably worry about the impact of ongoing sectarian violence on that identity.
Pakistan needs a national strategy to counter militancy; a legislative overhaul; better coordination among the ISI, IB, provincial police, and various other agencies involved in counterterrorism; and a coherent narrative against extremism. Ideally, the civilian government would take the lead in all of these areas. In reality, the Pakistani military still uses civilian deficiencies to rationalize continued ownership over Pakistan's internal security and foreign policies. At the same time, political leaders have too readily ceded control in this space and shown little initiative to tackle the insurgency facing Pakistan. The completion of its term by the PPP, the passage of amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Act, Prime Minister Sharif's stated ambition to deepen Pakistan's rapprochement with India and apparent intention to address the civil-military imbalance, and the public recognition by military leaders of the internal security threat suggests a window for some improvement.

**Building Civilian Leadership Capacity**

The civilian government has made strides toward institutionalizing democracy and has begun involving itself in security policy. Despite flirting with various militant entities, Pakistan's major political parties do not have nearly the attachment to these groups that the army and ISI do. Their continued ascendance is therefore an important development. It is also one that should be accompanied by increased capability and confidence to formulate security policy. The more credibility civilian officials have when it comes to this sphere, the more compelled the military may be to allow them to participate. Civilians have not tested the limits of their supremacy because of fear, lack of capability, and constant campaigning.

Effective civilian control over Pakistan’s foreign and defense policies will not be achieved quickly or easily, but the newly elected government must test its supremacy to advance that process. At the time of writing, Prime Minister Sharif sent strong signals that he intends to do just that. To succeed, his government must build intellectual and organizational capacity in this regard. The prime minister’s decision not to appoint a foreign or defense minister and instead keep these portfolios for himself is troublesome on two counts. To begin with, even if done with the best of intentions, this undercuts the long-term institution building effort needed. Additionally, transformation of the type the prime minister seems intent to pursue—on India, Afghanistan, and in the area of civil military relations—requires full-time managers who share his energy and vision, which, as one scholar noted, is “light years” ahead of the bureaucracy.

Taking greater ownership over security matters also requires the capability to formulate policy, which for the civilian government means putting in place an “effective mechanism for developing a national security system.” For historical reasons, the major civilian parties sometimes appear averse to reforming the National Security Council. The Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) is a viable alternative, but significant reforms would be necessary to enable it to play the appropriate role.

First, regularly scheduled meetings must be held. The DCC met sporadically during the previous government’s term, averaging only two meetings per year over five years. However, even these numbers are misleading, given that most meetings occurred in response to a crisis. For the DCC to be effective, meetings must occur on a regularly scheduled basis, whether weekly, biweekly, or even monthly. Second, the DCC would benefit greatly from a permanent secretariat that met separately from DCC principals, helped formulate policy options for these principles, and assisted with coordinating the execution of policy. Even in its few meetings, the DCC made important decisions on issues ranging from coordination between the federal and provincial governments and the establishment of a national crime database. However, there was no
follow-up. A dedicated staff with a secretary directly answerable to the prime minister could assist in outlining a plan to act on high-level decisions and then help shepherd their execution.

The intelligence agencies also need oversight, and Pakistan could benefit if the National Assembly and Senate created committees for this purpose. Members of Parliament and the committees that currently exist would benefit from greater staff capacity as well. Finally, the National Assembly approved a bill giving NACTA constitutional cover, but that bill was not transmitted to the Senate in a timely fashion, and so the PML-N government will have to reinitiate the process. It should do so without delay. Moreover, NACTA must be equipped with the necessary financial, staffing, and technical resources it needs to fulfill its mandate. This is particularly true in terms of its ability to conduct research and analysis, as well as to act as a clearing house for intelligence, if it is to be a truly coordinating authority.

Security Is Not Divisible

Absent the decision to discard completely the rule of law and undertake an overwhelmingly extra-judicial and militarized counterterrorism policy, Pakistan cannot counter the militant threat simply by improving narrow counterterrorism or counterinsurgency capabilities. An effective response requires a functioning police force, civilian intelligence apparatus, and judiciary. At present, it is impossible for any of these groups to become proficient in terms of the role they are meant to play without undertaking systematic reforms that address underlying structural issues. Doing so requires the intellectual wherewithal and political will to revise existing statutes.

A comprehensive list of reforms is beyond the scope of this report, though many are obvious from the examination of the structural barriers to countering militancy. It is also worth highlighting that the Asia Society issued a report in the summer of 2012 that outlined many prudent steps to reforming law enforcement and the judicial regime. A number of these steps involve capacity building and thus will require the civilian government to institute the reforms necessary to collect taxes.

These reforms will mean little if they exist only on paper. In many instances, the law is the problem. But in other cases, the issue is enforcement. Improvements on this front will take time, but that is no reason to put off a necessary legislative overhaul. For the rule of law to work, the laws must be in place. Legislation can strengthen the structures necessary to make progress against militancy and provide the authorities with the tools do so, while also creating path dependency that helps speed up and maintain the process. Ultimately, much of this comes down to the will of those in power—civilian and military—to promote the rule of law as opposed to the “law of the ruler.”

Formulating and Coordinating a Security Strategy

It has been obvious for some time that Pakistan must develop formal strategies for counterterrorism and countering extremism that account for all militants on its soil. NACTA should have responsibility for these functions. This will mean little if the strategies are not enforced. The first step, though, is creating them and, in doing so, forcing decisions about whether and how to deal with groups whose policy is not to attack the state as well as combating those that are.

Any counterterrorism strategy would need to formally assign responsibilities to the army, ISI-CT, IB, FIA, police, and other official entities for the various facets of gathering intelligence, capturing or killing those militants who threaten the state, and protecting targets of terrorist attacks. Outlining a way through which to pair governance and development efforts with counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts is also necessary. Any strategy
would need to codify how intelligence sharing and coordination among the various authorities responsible for counterterrorism will occur. A formal counterterrorist strategy would also provide a mechanism for clarifying how Pakistan intends to augment existing, but inchoate, deradicalization efforts.

Deradicalization efforts and the need for a broader plan to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate (DDR) militants are captive to broader issues. First, the Pakistani military does not want to disarm, demobilize, or reintegrate members of pro-state groups. So any public effort to conduct DDR will be obvious for those who are not included. Second, questions persist about what Pakistan could offer pro-state leaders to ameliorate that effect and induce disarmament and demobilization. For several years, some interlocutors from and close to the security establishment have insisted privately that at some point these actors will need to be brought into the mainstream, either as political parties or as pressure groups. However, to date, no group has been forced to choose between influencing Pakistan’s political discourse and engaging in terrorism. Ultimately, this path only works if groups are forced to make a choice. If they are, unpalatable as it may be, this avenue cannot be dismissed and should be explored. Third, and relatedly, is the issue of negotiations with the TTP where the newly elected government and military appear divided.

As discussed, the PML-N and PTI, which now lead the federal government and provincial government in KP respectively, both favor initiating talks. The military is opposed. The unwillingness of TTP leaders to part with their maximalist agenda should raise concerns about opening negotiations with them. Insurgencies often end with a political settlement. However, previous peace deals have not only failed but also yielded more space to militants challenging the writ of the state. Unless the state is prepared to cede ground, however, the TTP will need to be weakened for negotiations to eventuate in a lasting solution. At the same time, the state might consider codifying deals in geographic areas where it has success. It also should develop a plan for disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating fighters that can be implemented whenever a political solution is reached.

Developing a counternarrative is fundamental to any strategy for countering violent extremism; a broader threat that includes attacks experts would not qualify as terrorism. The need to articulate a vision of Islam’s place in society, the content of that debate, and its impact on everything from legislation to school curriculum is beyond the scope of this report. It is worth highlighting, however, that any successful counter narrative invariably would include a public defense of all Pakistani citizens’ regardless of their sectarian affiliation. As General Kayani asserted in the summer of 2012, extremism amounts to attempting to impose one’s opinion on others, and terrorism is doing so using a gun. “If this is the correct definition of extremism and terrorism,” Kayani said, “then the war against it is our own war, and a just war too.” Building on these themes could provide Pakistani leaders with a powerful mantra, but to be successful, such a narrative would need to be wielded consistently and faithfully applied to all militant groups on Pakistan’s soil. It is also worth noting that shelving the “foreign hand” talking point publicly as well as privately would be an important step forward. Additionally, the state should not shy away from highlighting the religious ignorance and financial opportunism that characterizes many of the militants on its soil.

Finally, Pakistan is only likely to make serious progress against all of the militants on its soil if its civilian and military elites are united in the objective of doing so. The War Directive, for example, outlines the military’s force structure, war objectives, and capabilities needed to achieve those objectives. It is intended to be a live document but has not been updated despite the advent of the jihadist insurgency Pakistan now confronts. Updating it to reflect the
country’s internal security challenges and outlining a way to address them would indicate a more comprehensive shift than has yet occurred. This document results from collaboration between the civilian government and Joint Chiefs as well as in-depth discussion by the military services regarding how to evolve defense strategy. As such, updating it would also signify a degree of coherence between the civilian government and the military that so far has been lacking.

Pakistan has already paid a high price for its attempts to counter some of the militants on its soil. The costs of sustained action against all of them could raise the costs even more in the short term and numerous reforms would be needed, some more easily made than others, to enable such efforts. This makes finding the political will necessary for progress all the more difficult, and all the more essential. In the long run, the costs of inaction or half measures are almost certain to be higher. As one high-ranking official lamented, “We keep taking short cuts and getting the wrong results, thinking the next time we will get the right one.”

Policy Recommendations

AUTHOR’S NOTE: This report recommended the resumption of the U.S.–Pakistan Strategic Dialogue. In late July, U.S. secretary of state John Kerry made his first, long-awaited, and much delayed visit to Pakistan and announced it would resume.

Pakistan is unlikely to implode, despite what doomsayers might believe. However, its security situation remains precarious, and the status quo—a robust militant infrastructure over which the army and ISI have only partial influence and situational awareness—means continued risk of both an attack by Pakistan-based militants against U.S. interests in South Asia or the U.S. homeland and of a crisis internally, with India or perhaps even with Afghanistan. Were any of these to occur, it would have significant implications for the United States. Even the constant looming of a crisis is a drag on U.S. priorities in the region and beyond. The U.S. relationship with Pakistan is multifaceted and should not be defined exclusively by Pakistan’s posture toward Islamist militants. The entirety of U.S. policy toward Pakistan is beyond the scope of this report.

The focus here is on Islamist militancy and especially the domestic barriers to action against it. This report explores these endogenous obstacles not because they trump the geopolitical utility some groups offer but because they are often underexplored. It should be clear that the two are interconnected. Pakistan does not support some militants in spite of its domestic jihadist insurgency. Rather the perceptions of the internal jihadist threat and its ability to counter them inform Pakistan’s calculus for supporting some groups and neglecting to deal with others.

U.S. policymakers have twisted themselves in knots trying to convince or compel the Pakistani security establishment to dismantle the militant infrastructure on its soil. Attempts to transition from a transactional to a strategic partnership raised unrealistic expectations for progress given the volatile environment, which became obvious when Pakistan’s ongoing support for militant proxies, on one side, and U.S. actions including the Raymond Davis episode, bin Laden raid, and Salala incident, on the other, contributed to the annus horribilis of 2011.

It is therefore understandable that some should look for signs of hope that Pakistan’s expansion of its security aperture to include internal threats constitutes a policy shift. Those who are tired of being burned refuse to entertain the notion that any evolution is possible and that the bilateral relationship will crater again. Discerning Pakistan’s intentions is difficult. It is not a unitary actor and a range of opinions about how to handle the militant milieu exist even within the security establishment.
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The United States should avoid mistaking tactical Pakistani decisions for signs of a strategic shift. At the same time, policymakers must be open to the possibility that under the right conditions tactical moves could develop momentum toward meaningful change. For example, when the Musharraf regime began reining in India-centric groups fighting in Kashmir, it kept them in reserve for possible redeployment in that theater. Recent attacks across the Line of Control suggest that still may be the case, but Pakistan’s decision to rein in its proxies created space for Kashmir to pacify, and reigniting the jihad there could prove difficult. Similarly, it would be significant if Pakistan created a national security policy that included a significant internal counterinsurgency and counterterrorism component as well as delineated objectives for dealing with the jihadist threat.

However, the fundamentals of militant-state interaction are unlikely to change radically in the near term. The United States should refocus its efforts on facilitating the creation of internal conditions for action against militancy that could fructify down the road, not on attempting to force strategic steps that Pakistan is not yet ready or able to take on. U.S. ambitions, and hence its efforts, on this front must be humble as well. Creating the internal conditions for sustainable progress against militancy is contingent upon Pakistan remedying its significant structural and systemic infirmities, many of which are outlined in this report. These are some of the areas in which Pakistani leaders—civilian and military—must “do more,” and the United States should encourage, enable, and compel them to take action. Washington can facilitate or choose not to facilitate a spectrum of positive or negative outcomes at the bilateral and international levels. However, there is only so much Washington can do to influence Pakistan decision makers, and so it must plan, engage, and provide assistance accordingly.

The United States never demanded transformation, but any such window has closed. It also never exhibited the patience and fortitude necessary for fostering strategic change. When tough choices have to be made, Washington’s priority has been killing al-Qaeda and countering Pakistan-based insurgents fighting in Afghanistan. The latter is becoming less of a priority as the United States prepares to draw down, but Washington remains intent on making as much progress as possible on both fronts in the interim. This makes sense. The United States invaded Afghanistan and reforged its relationship with Pakistan expressly to destroy the central al-Qaeda organization. Finishing that job is important. However, with the drawdown looming, al-Qaeda Central weakened, and the bilateral relationship with Pakistan improving, Washington must begin reorienting its policies to enable a level of sustained and focused engagement. Its overall approach should be geared toward maximizing tactical convergence on narrow security issues and remaining prepared to engage in crisis management should the need arise, while also exploiting opportunities to reinforce positive structural change within Pakistan when possible.

Revise the U.S. counterterrorism architecture for South Asia in line with the decreasing threat from al-Qaeda and growing potential for regional attacks against U.S. interests and regional instability after 2014.

Al-Qaeda Central’s capability to strike the homeland is severely degraded. It cannot be ignored, nor can other Pakistani actors with the capabilities or intent to launch transnational attacks. However, the greater direct threat is that of attacks against U.S. or other Western interests in the region by Pakistani groups acting unilaterally or in concert with one another or al-Qaeda Central.80 Ongoing and possibly increased regional instability resulting from the insurgency in Pakistan, the potential durability of cross-border jihadist violence between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the agitation from India-centric groups for escalating attacks to the east are more abstract but could have significant ramifications for the United States as well.
Targeting and resource allocation must be realigned away from al-Qaeda Central, especially intelligence officers and analysts whose expertise will be essential to identifying emerging and evolving jihadist threats in the region.

In terms of intelligence collection and analysis, the United States should seek to expand cooperation with Pakistan to include a greater focus on anti-state entities such as the TTP and sectarian groups. These pose the most immediate danger to Pakistan but could threaten the United States as well and, thus, present the best opportunity for operational convergence. Barring a resurgent al-Qaeda, the drawdown could create space for Washington to increase pressure on Pakistan to identify, arrest, and extradite any Westerners training or attempting to train with LeT. Because Washington should not expect significantly expanded cooperation vis-à-vis LeT, U.S. authorities should continue to focus on counterterrorism cooperation and intelligence sharing with Afghan-istan, India, and Bangladesh, as well as allies in the Gulf, to confront terrorist networks in Pakistan’s near abroad.

In terms of targeting, the residual U.S. force in Afghanistan should continue to focus primarily on actors that pose a transnational or regional threat to U.S. interests or a qualitatively significant threat to the Afghan government. However, the presence of anti-Pakistan militants in Afghanistan and the possibility for escalating cross-border jihadist violence means that U.S. and NATO officials will need to contend with whether to target them as well. Doing so could help reduce the threat to Pakistan’s internal stability and possibly help defuse regional tensions. There is no guarantee such a payoff would accrue. More tangibly, it might provide a means for transactional targeting—that is, the United States removes anti-Pakistani militants from the Afghan battlefield in exchange for assistance capturing, killing, or otherwise curtailing militants of significant concern to the United States in Pakistan. This would mean sparing scant resources and requiring a buy-in from the host government in Kabul, but it should at least factor in the broader U.S. defense and foreign policy planning in the lead-up to 2014.

President Obama has pledged to continue using drone strikes against high value al-Qaeda targets and forces massing to support attacks on coalition forces through the end of 2014 and left open the possibility to continue using unmanned strikes in the region thereafter. Prime Minister Sharif has declared an end to the policy of publicly opposing and privately condoning drone strikes. The United States should not abandon the option of drone strikes but should restrict their use to identifiable targets whose death will have a significant qualitative impact on the direct threat to American lives. With the exception of a select group of obvious high value al-Qaeda targets, such as Ayman al-Zawahiri, all strikes should be executed in coordination with U.S. diplomats in Pakistan attuned to their affect on the broader political and security environment. Washington should be able to make its case to the Pakistani public for each and every strike it conducts.

Take steps to boost the capabilities and confidence of the new civilian government and improve understanding of the security threat at the local, provincial, and federal levels.

Washington tried to encourage civilian growth following the end of the Musharraf regime. These efforts did not produce the intended outcomes, primarily because of pushback from the military, disinterest on the part of civilian officials, and impatience in Washington, where the focus remained narrowly scoped on eliminating al-Qaeda and salvaging Afghanistan. With al-Qaeda seriously degraded, U.S. troops drawing down in Afghanistan, and a newly elected government taking office in Pakistan, the time may be ripe for another attempt. Prime Minister Sharif has stated his desire to deepen Pakistan’s rapprochement with India and appears intent on addressing
the civil-military imbalance. However, he has also come out strongly against U.S. drone strikes and is in favor of negotiating with the TTP, and his party has exhibited a willingness to accommodate groups like SSP and JuD in Punjab. Thus, any approaches must be managed carefully.

Washington should resume the Strategic Dialogue with the new civilian government to address Pakistan’s security priorities. For that process to be beneficial, the United States must decide what it needs most from the relationship. Any vision for the relationship must be grounded in achievable objectives and the costs the United States is prepared to bear in pursuit of those objectives. This vision should include how to avoid being thrown off by the short-term crises that are almost certain to eventuate.

The United States should also seek other ways to boost the capabilities of civilian officials to play a role in security matters. For example, it might continue to fund projects such as the Pakistan Institute for Parliamentary Services, assist with the creation of a permanent secretariat for the DCC, invest in NACTA, and encourage as well as support efforts to create intelligence oversight committees in Parliament. In those areas where direct U.S. assistance could impair the efficacy of such institutions, Washington should encourage others to invest in them. Building civilian capacity to write laws and offering to facilitate technical assistance in this area is particularly important given the need to reform the legal regime as outlined in this report.

**Spread security sector assistance more evenly throughout the country, redirect it to include areas where Pakistan has demonstrated proficiency or a pressing need, and calibrate it based on Pakistan’s progress addressing its myriad structural deficiencies.**

Pakistan’s civilian security sector, defined here as its criminal justice sector and civilian intelligence agencies, is hampered by serious systemic infirmities. These weaknesses limit the positive affect of security sector assistance. Despite the pressing need, the United States cannot be expected to consider significant funding increases unless and until these are addressed. However, current assistance could be modestly realigned.

U.S. security sector assistance has been dedicated primarily to stabilization efforts and secondarily to improving bilateral cooperation on law enforcement. A disproportionate amount of assistance has gone to KP and FATA, according to U.S. officials, and most of it is used for infrastructure and equipment to enhance operational capabilities on the ground. The FY2014 budget request for International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement, which distributes much of the security sector assistance, also earmarks limited funds used to strengthen Pakistan’s criminal justice sector by training police, prosecutors, judges, and corrections officials. The request lists a plethora of training programs. U.S. officials confirm that limited technical assistance, such as providing database software and training, is also being provided to a small number of cities. This aid is in addition to a small amount of antiterrorism assistance.

According to U.S. officials, a significant portion of funding will remain dedicated to Pakistan’s frontier and used for equipment and infrastructure assistance. Stabilization efforts remain important. Law enforcement must be able to hold territory that the military has cleared, and ideally, any response to threats should begin with local police action and only escalate to military action if necessary. However, the ability of militants to project power outside the frontier and into the heartland of Pakistan is a significant barrier to actions against them. The current allocation of resources leaves only a modest amount of money for a wide range of efforts outside the frontier.

U.S. policymakers should consider several questions regarding the apportionment of security sector assistance. First, is Washington leveraging the full extent of its nonmonetary capabilities in
providing assistance for stabilization efforts in the frontier? And can Pakistan enhance infrastructure and purchase nonspecialty equipment using its own tax revenue? The answers might inform a decision to distribute assistance more evenly throughout the country. Second, given the myriad deficiencies in Pakistan’s criminal justice system, is spreading an already small amount of money across an array of efforts (worthwhile though each may be) the most sensible way to apportion assistance? Might the United States have a greater impact by acting as a force multiplier in fewer functional areas where Pakistan is already demonstrating proficiency or has a discrete and pressing need? In short, U.S. policymakers should consider expanding security sector assistance geographically and scoping it more narrowly in terms of functional areas.

Washington should also make supporting NACTA a priority. The new PML-N government envisions NACTA as the cornerstone of its counterterrorism efforts, but it has yet to create an implementation plan for NACTA. Washington should seek ways to assist with developing such a plan, including arranging technical assistance by and exchanges with the U.S. NCTC. NACTA will require resources as well, and Washington should augment or reorient assistance to provide such support. In addition, it should consider providing technical and monetary support for the creation of fusion centers in key Pakistani cities to encourage interagency cooperation.

Separately, assistance that necessitates in-country training can be hampered by visa delays, a constraint many U.S. officials recognize. One approach is pursuing assistance that requires a minimum number of trainers, but trade-offs must be made in terms of Pakistan’s needs and demonstrated proficiency. If trainers must be sent, then deploying the same people rather than repeatedly cycling in new trainers could reduce visa delays. Washington might also consider increasing efforts to improve police academy training and curriculum as a means by which to indigenize at least some of the effort.

Finally, the United States might consider replicating the Entrepreneurship Program, which provides matching funds for business development, on a small scale for security sector assistance. Providing small matching grants to provincial police departments for indigenous projects, such as infrastructure enhancements, could build cooperation, encourage buy-in, and help Washington get a little more bang for its buck.

Maintain a military-to-military relationship and make military assistance transactional—that is, provided in return for assistance or progress in clearly identified areas, or focused on areas of convergence.

Attempts to pit the military against the civilian government or otherwise isolate it are likely to fail and, in the process, reduce U.S. influence in Pakistan. History also illustrates that inducements in the form of lavish assistance are unlikely to lead the military to sever its ties with pro-state militant groups. That does not mean, though, that the continued provision of limited and carefully scoped military assistance is without benefit. First, Pakistan faces a domestic jihadist insurgency that could have a destabilizing affect on the country. Some of the anti-state actors attacking Pakistan also threaten the United States, providing an area of convergence. Second, although military aid does not bring the level of leverage Washington might want, it still provides influence that the United States otherwise would not have. Third, and relatedly, exchange and U.S.-based training programs are an important way to foster an ongoing military-to-military relationship.

Most assistance should remain conditional, but a more sophisticated and transparent set of benchmarks is needed. Under the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act (EPPA) of 2009, the secretary of state is required to certify that Pakistan is cooperating with the United States on issues such as counterterrorism and nonproliferation but can cite national security provisions to waive this certification requirement. This renders the process almost meaningless.
Four flaws exist: First, counterterrorism benchmarks outlined in the EPPA are unrealistic because they do not account for the range of options in terms of Pakistan’s behavior, the likely transient nature of the actions it can take, the complexity of challenges facing the country, or the vagaries of military and ISI situational awareness of and influence over different groups. Second, funds requested may focus heavily on counterterrorism assistance, but counterterrorism is often broadly defined, weapons can have a dual-use, and metrics to ensure proper use are sometimes lacking. Third, military assistance used to achieve transactional objectives do not always align with the outlined benchmarks. Fourth, specific assistance is not always tied to specific objectives or metrics. A more sensible approach might be to create three separate streams.

The first stream would not be conditional and would be used for funding training and exchange programs. A second would be used for transactional purposes and provide assistance in exchange for deliverables important to the United States and which is conditional on the secretary of state’s certification of broad cooperation. A third stream would both provide counterterrorism assistance through a narrower scope and channeled toward areas where progress is measurable, an area where Pakistan has a discrete and pressing need and, preferably, an area where Pakistan already has demonstrated proficiency—thus enabling the United States to act as a force multiplier. U.S. policymakers, in consultation with the intelligence community and outside experts, should develop a transparent set of metrics for more realistic and realizable short-term, tactical, but verifiable action on counterterrorism against anti-state and pro-state groups to inform this third stream.

Formulate a plan for how to respond if Pakistan does attempt to transition some pro-state militants toward politics.

Unpalatable though it might be, the creation of a glide path, by which some groups and their aboveground organizations transition to legitimate political and religious parties, might be part of the process were Pakistan’s leaders to attempt dismantling the militant infrastructure. However, the aim must be involvement in politics as part of a real transition away from militancy and not simply the election of members from an armed faction to Parliament. As of 2013, there are no indications that the involvement of militant leaders in politics is part of any organized plan to demobilize their organizations. U.S. policymakers should voice quiet disapproval of the state’s allowing militant leaders to participate in politics without having to give up the gun.

Were Pakistani officials to present a plan by which a glide path was created from militancy to mainstream religious, social, and political involvement, Washington should be prepared to consider offering support. Given the initial risks involved in such a course, it is likely that any such plan might be covert in development. In that event, U.S. assistance would need to be as well. This might include inducements to Pakistan, coordinated messaging for how to respond to the mainstreaming of militant leaders, and acting as an intermediary with New Delhi and Kabul, especially given that militant splinter groups might increase the tempo of attacks to spoil any process to mainstream their organizations. At the same time, planners in Washington would be wise to think through how this process could impact Pakistan’s foreign and domestic policies, what this would mean for U.S. equities in the region, and how to navigate accordingly.

Conclusion

Pakistan’s newly elected government has sent promising signals about rectifying the civil-military imbalance and pursuing better relations with the country’s neighbors. The security establishment is becoming attuned to the internal security threat from Islamist militancy. Pakistan’s
rulers, however, lack clarity on how to combat the threat. The unity of effort necessary will prove elusive as long as powerful elements in the Pakistan military and ISI are committed to the use of militant Islamist proxies for strategic purposes. As this report illustrates, though this practice remains the single greatest barrier to stabilizing the internal front, it is far from the only barrier. The myriad obstacles to countering militancy have become self-reinforcing. Breaking the cycle could take at least a generation. The United States will need to practice patience while preparing for the many contingencies that could result. Pakistan’s leaders would serve their people best by exhibiting greater urgency in countering the internal militant threat and creating the conditions for dismantling the militant infrastructure on their soil.
Notes

3. I am grateful to Shuja Nawaz for his insights on the process through which the Green Book is formulated.
4. Daniel Sagalyn, “Kabul’s Unlikely New Ally,” Foreign Policy, May 1, 2013
6. For some of those who have commanded troops in the FATA, the only good jihadi is a dead jihadi.
8. Adherents to Bareidi Islam also follow the Hanafi school of thought. They historically constituted the largest Sunni bloc, but no reliable recent census data is available to confirm if this remains the case or to determine their percentage of the population relative to other schools of thought within Sunni Islam.
9. The two briefly reunited to form Harkat-ul-Ansar (Movement of Partisans or HuA) and then separated again.
10. Salafis adhere to a strict interpretation of the Quran and Hadith and reject the various schools of Islamic jurisprudence and the learned men who interpreted them. They believe Muslims must return to a pure form of Islam and advocate emulating the Prophet and his Companions in all areas of life.
12. This is not an exhaustive list and accounts only for the largest groups extant prior to 9/11. Numerous smaller groups existed as well, as did front organizations and splinter groups in the Kashmir theatre. Nevertheless, before 9/11, these entities constituted the major Punjabi organizations.
17. This included training in territory under Taliban control, where the ISI moved camps for those Deobandi groups focused on Kashmir once the Taliban came to power, and contributing cadre to fight alongside Taliban soldiers against the Northern Alliance. In addition to training in Taliban-controlled territory and providing foot soldiers for the movement, some Deobandi militant leaders served in the Taliban administration and others had offices in Kandahar. Notably, the Ahl-e-Hadith LeT relocated its primary training infrastructure from Afghanistan to Pakistan-administered Kashmir, neighboring Mansehra, and elsewhere in Pakistan after the Taliban took power. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), p. 157; Ahmed Rashid, Taliban (Oxford: Pan Books, 2000) p. 92; Tankel, Storming the World Stage, pp. 106–10; Zahab, “The Regional Dimension,” pp. 120–21.


20. The appellation was first used in 2006. Ibid., p. 1, n. 2.

21. Thousands of students from Deobandi madaris (often tied to JUI) in Pakistan, many of who belonged to various Pashtun tribes that straddled the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, took leave to fight on behalf of the Taliban. Rashid, Taliban, pp. 90–91.


24. Pakistan jailed TNSM leader Sufi Muhammad for sending thousands of volunteers across the border to fight the U.S. invasion but also allowed many of these and other volunteers to flood into Afghanistan.


26. After 9/11, the ISI advised Mullah Mohammad Omar, head of the Taliban government, to find a safe haven and later provided him one in Pakistan. Abdul Salam Zaeef, My Life with the Talibam, ed. Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), p. 152.


29. Today SSP is known as Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat, which was banned in March 2012 but continues to operate.


33. Although several top al-Qaeda operatives were captured in Pakistan’s cities in the first few weeks following 9/11, many of its lower ranks, as well as those who had trained in its camps, sought sanctuary in South Waziristan. On al-Qaeda’s arrival in South Waziristan, see Jason Burke, The 9/11 Wars (London: Penguin, 2011), p. 175.


35. For more on Pakistan’s early efforts in FATA, see Khan, Military Operations; Seth G. Jones and C. Christine Fair, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010).


37. The Shakai agreement stipulated that the military would release captured militants, pay compensation to Pakistani tribesmen for property damaged during the incursion, and also provide militants with money to repay their debts to al-Qaeda. In return, local militants agreed to stop cross-border attacks into Afghanistan and to register foreign fighters. Locals denied the existence of the last clause and argued that they had not agreed to register all foreigners with the government. Seth G. Jones, Hunting in the Shadows: The Pursuit of al Qa’ida since 9/11 (New York: WW Norton, 2012), Kindle edition, loc. 4197–4200.


40. The terms of the North Waziristan Accord included an agreement by militants to cease attacks against the Afghan and Pakistani governments, stop killing pro-Pakistan tribal chiefs, and abstain from imposing a Taliban lifestyle on the local population. Militants did not obey these provisions.
42. C. Christine Fair, “Pakistan's Own War On Terror: What the Pakistani Public Thinks,” *Journal of International Affairs* 63, no. 1 (Fall/Winter 2009).
44. Ibid.
47. Improved Indian counterinsurgency efforts, fencing along the Line of Control, and a reduced appetite for conflict in Indian-administered Kashmir contributed as well.
52. Most headed to Waziristan, but the sectarian groups also had a presence in Lower Kurram and Orakzai. LeT began reclaiming a foothold in Bajaur and Mohmand, where it had historical connections. On the sectarian groups, see Zahab, “Pashtun and Punjabi Taliban,” pp. 373–74. On LeT, see Tankel, *Storming the World Stage*, p. 197.
56. The Ghazi brothers were released after the Minister for Religious Affairs Ijaz ul-Haq (General Zia ul-Haq’s son) intervened on their behalf. Pardesi, “The Battle for the Soul,” p. 98
61. In a November address regarding the raid that ensued, President Musharraf specifically discussed the impact of the hostage situation on Pakistan’s alliance with China. “President Pervez Musharraf’s address to the Nation,” November 3, 2007.
65. White, “Vigilante Islamism in Pakistan.”
67. Fair, “Pakistan’s Own War on Terror.”
69. Prominent examples include Ilyas Kashmiri and Badr Mansoor.
70. Jones and Fair, *Counterinsurgency in Pakistan*, p. 66.
For more on Pakistan’s improved capabilities, see, for example, Jones and Fair,
Pakistan launched Operation Sher Dil in Bajaur agency in 2008 as well.
Notable Pakistani militants killed by U.S. drone strikes include the first TTP amir Baitullah Mehsud; leader of the 313 Brigade and al-Qaedas operational commander Ilyas Kashmiri; Badr Mansoor, who served as a key interface between al-Qaeda and other anti-state militant leaders; LeJ senior leader, Qari Mohammad Zafar; and TTP commander Mullah Dadullah.
Pakistan launched Operation Sher Dil in Bajaur agency in 2008 as well.
For more on Pakistan’s improved capabilities, see, for example, Jones and Fair, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan.
The IB is responsible for disseminating intelligence to law enforcement entities across the country. Because it has no formal arrest powers, the IB provides information to and makes requests from the various provincial police departments to arrest or detain suspects. Each provincial police department includes a criminal investigation department and counter terrorism branch focused on antiterrorism operations, investigation of terrorism cases, and intelligence collection relating to terrorism. Asad Jamal, “Police Organizations in Pakistan” (Lahore: Human Rights Commission of Pakistan and Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative Joint Report, May 2010).
The ISI created a CT wing at the behest of the United States, which sought an ISI entity that American and allied intelligence services could work with. In addition to creating a new wing with no institutional history of supporting militant proxies, this effort was intended to provide a partner that would adhere to human rights norms and as such make international cooperation easier.
For more on poor intelligence coordination, see, for example, Hassan Abbas, ed., Stabilizing Pakistan Through Police Reform (Washington, DC: Asia Society, 2012).
For example, ISI officers began working more closely with the local police in Lahore following an attack on a local ISI office and police training center in 2009. This led to the dismantling of at least one terrorist network that had established numerous ammunitions depots in the Lahore area. Hassan Abbas, “Executive Summary and Report Findings,” in Stabilizing Pakistan Through Police Reform, p. 14. In other cases, IB or provincial police passed along information to the Pakistani military or ISI concerning FATA-based actors that enabled action there. First IB officer, interview by author; second IB officer, interview by author, Islamabad, July 2011; senior official with the Punjab Police Counterterrorism Division, interview by author.
This included giving more attention to infiltrating these networks as well as mosques and madaris affiliated with anti-state activities (often using pro-state militants as informers), harassing their members where possible, and either eliminating them extrajudicially or holding them indefinitely when deemed necessary. Javed, interview by author; Sanaullah, interview by author, first IB officer, interview by author; senior official with the Punjab Police Counterterrorism Division, interview by author; officer responsible for research and analysis within the Counterterrorism Division of the Punjab Police, interview by author; first senior police officer for the Bahawalpur Region, interview by author; second senior police official for the Bahawalpur Region, interview by author.
Hasan Askari, Pakistani political and defense analyst, interview by author, Lahore, July 2011; Imtiaz Gul, executive director of the Centre for Research and Security Studies, interview by author, Islamabad, July 2011; Jawad, interview by author; Shaukat Javed, former inspector general of the Punjab police, interview by author, Lahore, July 2011; Rana Sanaullah, Punjab provincial law minister, interview by author, Lahore, July 2011; ISI official, interview by author, Islamabad, July 2011; First IB officer, interview by author, Islamabad, July 2011; officer responsible for research and analysis within the Counterterrorism Division of the Punjab Police, interview by author; senior official with the Punjab Police Counterterrorism Division, interview by author, Lahore, July 2011; first senior police official for the Bahawalpur Region, interview by author; second senior police official for the Bahawalpur Region, interview by author.
First JuD official, interview by author; second JuD official, interview by author; former LeT member, interview by author; JeM official, interview by author; Hassan Abbas, a professor at the U.S. National Defense University, independently gathered similar information from the security services; Hassan Abbas, presentation at “Extremism in South Asia: The Case of Lashkar-e-Taiba,” October 12, 2011
Mir, interview by author; Abbas presentation at “Extremism in South Asia”; Western intelligence official, interview by author, Washington, DC, October 2011.
Mir, interview by author; first JuD official, interview by author; former LeT member, interview by author.
JeM official, interview by author.
93. Mir, interview by author; former LeT member, interview by author; Western intelligence official, interview by author. U.S. officials have affirmed this information during briefings provided to them by the author.

94. Alleged calls by Mullah Mohammad Omar, the Afghan Taliban amir, to stop attacks in Pakistan at a time when his movement was exploring confidence-building negotiations with the U.S. exacerbated disagreements over whether to reduce violence. After months of relative calm, however, attacks began increasing once again in Pakistan’s northwest in spring 2012. “Pakistani Taliban in Talks to Heal Rift: Sources,” Express Tribune, March 8, 2012; on the use of the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani network to temper the TTP and reorient its focus toward Afghanistan, see also Vahid Brown and Don Rassler, Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Nexus, 1973–2012 (London: Hurst and Co., 2013), p. 160.


96. Ibid., 161.

97. For example, during Operation Rah-e-Nijat (2009–10), Pakistan brokered deals with Mullah Nazir’s group in South Waziristan and Hazfiz Gul Bahadur in North Waziristan in which both were asked to refuse sanctuary or safe passage to TTP militants in exchange for aid and a cease-fire agreement. Jones and Fair, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, p. 73.


99. Hakimullah Mehsud, the present TTP amir, was previously its leader in Orakzai, where a tribal leader affiliated with SSP first raised a Taliban force using the name Tehrik-e-Taliban in 1999. His relative Qari Hussain Mehsud (known as Ustad-e-Fedayin, or trainer of the suicide-bombers) was a member of the SSP and LeJ before joining the TTP. The former TTP commander in Darra Adam Khel, Tariq Afridi, was another former SSP member. He was also affiliated with LeJ, which helped it to become one of the most active groups in D.A. Khel, a strategic location on the highway connecting Peshawar with Karachi, on which NATO supply convoys headed into Afghanistan via Torkham travel. It also provided a jumping off point for SSP, LeJ, and JeM militants to participate in operations in Upper Orakzai, where some militants fled following the advent of incursions into South Waziristan in 2004. For a rich discussion of the sectarian influence on the insurgency in Pakistan, see Zahab, “Pashtun and Punjabi Taliban.”

100. Ibid., p. 376.

101. Most militants remained preoccupied with local and regional factors, but al-Qaeda’s global jihadist ideology, which entails striking U.S. and allied targets wherever they may be found, also influenced the militant environment. Pakistani groups, most notably LeT and the TTP, have engaged in or attempted out-of-area attacks against the U.S. and its Western allies.

102. JeM official, interview by author; second JuD official, interview by author; Mir, interview by author.

103. Adding to the confusion, groups, networks, and cells also use random names for attacks, often conjured up specifically to divert attention or sow confusion. This practice has local historical roots in Kashmir, where most of the jihadist organizations employed a plethora of aliases at the group or sub-group level to confuse the Indian security forces in Kashmir as well as to avoid retribution from the population. In some instances, they also did it to shield certain activities from their ISI handlers, a rationale that remains today.

104. For example, LeJ’s ability to regroup following the harsh post-9/11 crackdown was owed in large part to its ability to tap into Deobandi madaris and mosques associated with SSP as well as JUI for recruitment. Since regenerating, it has maintained a significant on-the-ground structure in the settled areas and continued to use its access to these madaris for support purposes and talent spotting. JeM splinters in FATA are also known to call upon their former colleagues in the settled areas to send small numbers of fresh recruits from JeM madaris or recruitment networks. See, for example, Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network.”

105. For example, in one instance, militants connected to the TTP used the Madrasa Usmania Shadan Lund in Multan as a place to store weapons and ammunition in advance of a failed attack on a government office building. At least two militants involved in this plot also were involved in the attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team bus, for which the Madrasa Usmania Shadan Lund was again used as a storage depot for weapons later transported to Lahore. “Attack on Sri Lankan Cricket Team at Lahore,” Police Report, Case FIR no. 252, March 3, 2009, author in possession of hard copy; “Interrogation of Amanullah (aka Asadullah, aka Kashif),” undated police report, undated, author in possession of hard copy.


107. For more on this dichotomy, see Rassler and Brown, Haqqani Nexus.

108. Ibid., p. 46.

109. Ibid., p. 47; “Attack on Sri Lankan Cricket Team at Lahore.”
110. For example, see “Pakistan Releases 3 Relatives of Fugitive Taliban Commander Under Swap Deal,” *Frontier Post*, November 14, 2007.
111. Javed, interview by author; first IB officer, interview by author; second IB officer, interview by author; senior official with the Punjab Police Counterterrorism Division, interview by author.
112. See, for example, Tankel, *Storming the World Stage*, pp. 61, 130–31.
113. Military personnel were involved in at least one of the assassination plots against former president Musharraf in 2003. Ibid., pp. 130–31. Mir, *Talibanization of Pakistan*, p. 110. More recently, Syed Saleem Shahzad, the late Pakistani journalist, asserted shortly before his death that the 2011 attack on Pakistan Naval Station Mehran was carried out after naval intelligence refused to release members of the navy arrested because of their links to al-Qaeda. Navy officials later recommended court-martial for three officers allegedly involved in the attack. Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Al-Qaeda had Warned of Pakistan Strike,” *Asia Times*, May 27, 2011; “Three Officials Face Court-Martial over PNS Mehran Base Attack,” *Dawn*, May 21, 2012.
114. On contrast between North and South Waziristan, see, for example, Zahid Hussain, “Tale of Two Waziristan,” *Dawn*, July 2, 2013.
115. Anti-state elements are believed to have begun flowing into Karachi in greater numbers as a result of the military operations in the Waziristan and Swat regions as well as to seek shelter from U.S. drone strikes. Amir Mir, “Karachi Taken Hostage by 25 Jihadi Groups,” *The News*, November 5, 2012.
119. Fair, “Pakistan’s Own War on Terror”; Myra MacDonald, “‘Living Under Drones’–the Anti-drone Campaign Can Do Damage Too,” *Reuter*s, October 3, 2012.
125. See, for example, Stephen Tankel, “Pakistani Militants Plan Their Own Pivot East,” *War on the Rocks*, July 9, 2013.
140. Hussain, “Conspiratorial Paranoia.”
141. Ibid.
145. Similar tropes are deployed regarding separatists in Balochistan, where it is an article of faith that Indian intelligence is supporting the insurgency.
147. See, for example, Hussain, “Conspiratorial Paranoia.”
151. It is an article of faith among the Pakistani security establishment that India supports Baloch separatists as well.
152. Each side has lobbed artillery shells at the other, with both typically claiming such actions are in response to a corresponding provocation or to cross-border militant traffic.
154. On Pakistan’s ongoing support for insurgents fighting against the United States in Afghanistan, see, for example, Brown and Rassler, Fountainhead of Jihad; Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalishnikov and Laptop; Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos.
155. These tensions played out when American military and intelligence officials confirmed Mullah Fazlullah, the Swat Taliban leader, was operating from Northeast Afghanistan. One of their number said he was a “other-side-of-the-border problem.” A spokesman for the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul countered this explanation, saying Fazlullah “remains a person of interest” and that Coalition forces would attempt to take him out if they received actionable intelligence. Dana Priest, “Pakistani Militants Hiding in Afghanistan,” Washington Post, November 6, 2012.
156. Most proxies have been deployed externally, but there are historical instances of their use internally as well, and this practice appears to be accelerating. For example, Jamaat-e-Islami was used against separatists in East Pakistan prior to and during the civil war that led to its independence as Bangladesh and the Zia regime offered early support to SSP to beat back a perceived Shia challenge to state authority.
157. The network’s ability to play this role stems in part from the fact that it is an important conduit for many TTP fighters to the jihad in Afghanistan. Ironically, the same group Pakistan relies on to influence the landscape in FATA is also responsible for enabling al-Qaeda, the TTP, and a host of other anti-state militants operating from North Waziristan, a phenomenon discussed in detail in the ensuing section. Rassler and Brown, The Haqqani Nexus, pp. 2, 10.
159. Ibid.
160. Mullah Obaidullah Akhund was one of the Afghan Taliban members released and was third in command behind Mullah Omar and his deputy. He was also the most senior Afghan Taliban leader the Pakistani authorities had captured after 9/11. Ibid., p. 160.
162. LeT has published books and produced a number of audio cassettes criticizing al-Qaeda and the TTP and labeling their members apostates, a message that its leaders also deliver during sermons. Its leaders assert that accusing another Muslim of apostasy, as al-Qaeda and the TTP have done to the Pakistani authorities, is a dangerous practice and that if there is any reason to doubt the accusation than the accuser has sinned gravely. To defend the Pakistani state’s cooperation with America, LeT leaders and clerics argue that cooperating with non-Muslims for worldly profit (in this case foreign aid) makes a Muslim misguided, but not an apostate. Indeed, Muslims are only apostates if they actively fight against other Muslims, and LeT leaders argue that operations in the Tribal Areas do not count because this is done to protect the Pakistani population. Further, they aver that those who murder Muslims instead of fighting the true enemy—that is, Christians, Jews, and Hindus—are apostates. Second JuD official, interview by author; sermon by LeT cleric Mubashir Ahmad Rabban, “The Schism of Excommunication,” undated. Al-Qaeda refuted points from “The Schism of Excommunication” in the book titled Knowledgeable Judgment on the Majriites of the (Present) Age. See also C. Christine Fair, “Lashkar-e-Tayiba and the Pakistani State,” Survival 53, no. 4 (2011).
163. There is speculation that Punjab provincial authorities have financed JeM for security purposes, though whether this amounted to countering anti-state militants, helping keeping law and order, serving political interests, or simply paying off the group to remain quiescent is unclear. Mir, interview by author; Ayesha Siddiqi, Pakistani security analyst, interview by author, Islamabad, July 2011; Marvi Mir, columnist for The Daily Times, interview by author, Pakistan, July 2011; Arif Jamal, presentation at the NDU–sponsored conference “Extremism in South Asia: The case of Lashkar-e-Taiba,” October 12, 2011; Tankel, Storming the World Stage, pp. 196, 200–01.

164. Jones and Fair, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, p. 57.


173. Fair, “Why the Pakistan Army Is Here to Stay.”

174. See, for example, Almeida, “The Two North Waziristans.”

175. Two sessions of the All Parties Conference (APC), the first called by the ANP and the second organized by Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam chief Malauna Fazlur Rehman, endorsed dialogue. All of the major parties attended each APC and came out in favor of talks. As one Pakistani analyst noted, however, the APC was motivated to call for talks because it realized that the state could not or would not protect it. JUI-F, on the other hand, is a religious party that embraces many elements of the TTP ideological agenda but views political participation as a means of achieving its motivations to call for talks were therefore different. Regarding the APC session, see “APC Backs Talks with Taliban to Establish Peace in Pakistan,” Geo News, February 14, 2013; “APC Supports Grand Jirga for Promoting Peace in FATA, KP,” Geo News, February 28, 2013; on the distinction between ANP and JUI-F motivations see, Ejaz Haider, “TTP Strategy and Our Naiveté,” The Express Tribune, April 30, 2013.

176. Khan, “Deadly Mandate.”


181. Naqvi, “The Silence of the Faujis.”


183. Hafiz Saeed—leader of LeT and its aboveground JuD—and Maulana Samiul Haq—leader of JUI-S and often referred to as the Father of the Taliban—co-chair the DPC. Other leaders include Ahmed Ludhianvi, head of SSP; Abdur Rehman Makki and Amir Hamza, both of LeT/JuD though the latter has launched his own front group; and Hamid Gul, the former DG ISI and outspoken supporter of Pakistani jihadism. Ahmed Ludhianvi’s presence on the DPC and public posture vis-à-vis the army is notable. He is on record asserting that “the army is the largest institution of this country, so it holds a lot of importance for us and we are willing to fight for them.” Yet he heads the latest incarnation of the SSP, now known as Ahl-e-Sunnat-wal-Jamaat, which has fed insurgency against the state. Taha Siddiqui, “Difa-e-Pakistan Part 2/2: Who is Aiding the Jihadis’ Resurgence?” Express Tribune, February 6, 2012.


185. LeT/JuD has been attempting to become an important player in Pakistan’s political landscape, launching mass protests against international issues, such as the Danish cartoons, and domestic ones, such as Pakistan’s

186. At times this has included freeing imprisoned militants to secure electoral victories. See, for example, Zahab, “Pashtun and Punjabi Talibun,” p. 382.

187. The most commonly cited joint appearance entailed Rana Sanaullah from PML-N, when he was the Punjabi law minister, participating in an SSP rally and publicly seeking the endorsement of SSP leader Ahmed Ludhianvi. The two traveled to Jhang together in an official government vehicle with police escort to campaign there in February 2010 ahead of the March by-election for the provincial assembly. Sanaullah argued to the author that encouraging such men to involve themselves in elections is better than seeing them head to North Waziristan but acknowledged that he campaigned with Ahmed Ludhianvi because SSP had a vast vote-bank. Sanaullah, interview by author; see also Shafiq Awan, “The Cost of Jhang By-Poll,” Daily Times, March 10, 2010.

188. According to several JuD officials with whom the author spoke, politicians from the PPP and PML-N have sought their organization’s support. The central secretary general of SSP averred that during the 2008 elections almost all the major political parties, including the PPP, PML-N, ANP, PMLQ, and the JUI, had sought his party’s support in the four provinces of the country. On this claim, see Amir Mir, “Punjab govt may not act against LeJ PMLN has seat adjustments with defunct SSP,” The News, February 22, 2013. For additional reports along these lines, see Siddiqui, “Pakistan elections”; Declan Walsh, “Extremists Pursue Mainstream in Pakistan Election,” New York Times, May 5, 2013. For additional reports on PML-N courtship of militant groups, see Hussain, “A Deafening Silence”; Amir Mir, “Punjab govt may not act”; Walsh, “Extremists Pursue Mainstream”; Omar Waraich, “Nawaz Sharif’s Return to Power Brings Pakistan’s Challenges in Focus,” Time, May 12, 2013.


191. Walsh, “Extremists Pursue Mainstream.”


194. Sales of F-16 combat aircraft and related equipment accounted for more than half of FMS agreements, and these were among the few items paid for entirely by Pakistan. Additional F-16 combat aircraft and T-37 military trainer jets were transferred as excess defense articles.


197. More than half of the approximately $2.1 billion the United States provided to Pakistan in the form of foreign military financing in fiscal years 2002 through 2010 was used to purchase weapons systems of limited use for counterterrorism such as maritime patrol aircraft and update kits for F-16 combat aircraft. The Pakistan Air Force has used F-16s to “soften up” targets in advance of and to provide air support during military incursions in FATA, but it is an imperfect weapons system for the job. Epstein and Kronstadt, “Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance,” pp. 14–15.

198. Jones and Fair, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, p. 36.


200. Jones and Fair, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, p. 61.

201. Ibid., p. xv.

202. Askari, interview by author.

203. Regarding the lack of a clear role for law enforcement, see, for example, Abbas, “Executive Summary and Report Findings.”


205. Jamal, “Police Organizations in Pakistan.”


208. The United Kingdom’s Department of International Development also significantly increased funding and support for police reform in Pakistan.
Domestic Barriers to Dismantling the Militant Infrastructure in Pakistan

209. Senior official with the Punjab Police Counterterrorism Division, interview by author.

210. Ibid.


217. U.S. Department of Justice, briefing for author; “Working Group on Pakistani Counterterrorism Efforts,” hosted by the Islamabad Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, July 12, 2011; senior official with the Punjab Police Counterterrorism Division, interview by author; officer responsible for research and analysis within the Counterterrorism Division of the Punjab Police, interview by author; first senior police official for the Bahawalpur Region, interview by author; second senior police official for the Bahawalpur Region, interview by author.


221. Perito and Parvez, “Empowering the Pakistan Police”; Abbas, Stabilizing Pakistan Through Police Reform.


223. Ibid.


225. Yusuf, Conflict Dynamics in Karachi, p. 22


228. Abbas, “Creating a Secret Service,” p. 79

229. Ibid.


232. Between 2009 and 2012, the FIA went through six directors general, meaning that each served an average tenure of six months. Ibid., p. 102.


238. Ibid.

239. Ibid.


243. Sanaullah, interview by author; second IB officer, interview by author; “Working Group on Pakistani Counterterrorism Efforts.”

245. The IB and Military Intelligence engage in this practice as well, though not to the same degree as the ISI.
247. Jones and Fair, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, p. xvi.
248. I am grateful to Dr. Thomas Lynch for his insights into these dynamics. The term externally-sponsored orphan is his.
251. Javed, interview by author.
252. Second IB officer, interview by author; senior official with the Punjab Police Counterterrorism Division, interview by author.
253. Officer responsible for research and analysis within the Counterterrorism Division of the Punjab Police, interview by author.
254. See, for example, Khawar Ghumman, "Nisar Keen to Make Counter-Terror Body Functional," Dawn, June 20, 2013.
255. Second IB officer, interview by author.
256. In addition to its officers’ intimate knowledge of many militant groups in Pakistan, the ISI is the only intelligence agency able to operate effectively in FATA and thus the only one with a national picture of terrorism.
257. Former high-ranking official in Pakistan’s security services, interview by author.
258. Senior official with the Punjab Police Counterterrorism Division, interview by author.
260. I am grateful to Dr. Thomas Lynch for sharing this insight.
261. The IB has detailed agents to NACTA, but the latter remains a weak body incapable of playing the type of coordinating role intended.
262. First IB officer, interview by author; Javed, interview by author.
263. A Bill to Establish National Counter Terrorism Authority in Pakistan.
264. Ibid.
265. Ibid.
270. The DCC is chaired by prime minister and includes the ministers of defence, foreign affairs, and finance. Other officials who have attended in the past include the secretaries from these three ministries as well as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the chiefs of Army Staff, Air Staff, and Naval Staff. Including the directors general of the ISI and IB, along with the executive director of NACTA, is sensible as well.
271. “Performance of the Defence Committee.”
272. Ibid.
274. To these one might add reforming the legal regime to enable the IB to present evidence in court as well as directing additional financing toward the realization of a functional National Criminal Database and the improvement of intelligence analysis by local law enforcement and civilian intelligence agencies. For the full list of recommendations see, Stabilizing Pakistan Through Police Reform.
276. This might include formalizing a “ladder of escalation,” the term one scholar used to outline a response to threats in the frontier that begins with local police action and only escalates to paramilitary and then military action if previous efforts prove insufficient. Joshua White, “Applying Counterinsurgency Principles in Pakistan’s Frontier,” Brookings Counterinsurgency and Pakistan Paper Series, no. 2, June 25, 2009.
277. It is encouraging that various actors and organizations in Pakistan’s civil society have already begun working on deradicalization. Some efforts, such as those aimed at militants captured during the Swat campaign, are supported by the state. In July 2011, Pakistan hosted a seminar in Swat on deradicalization. The following month the DCC considered a deradicalization plan. However, no such plan was forthcoming, and little in the way of follow-up is evident. When formulating a plan, Pakistan would be well served to consider bringing in international experts to provide advice. The UK offered to facilitate such an exchange in the mid-2000s, but Pakistan showed minimal interest.
280. Anti-state militants can be expected to continue to include U.S. and Western interests in Pakistan in their
target sets. India-centric groups, most notably LeT, along with the LeT-affiliated Indian Mujahideen could
target U.S. or Western interests in India.

2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university.


283. The Pakistan Institute for Parliamentary Services was created by Pakistan’s parliament with the help of the
United States Agency for International Development to provide research and capacity building services for
parliamentarians and parliamentary functionaries. To function effectively, NACTA requires assistance with
capacity building in terms of both research and analysis and training for its staff.

284. These include law enforcement training focused on organizational and leadership development, criminal
investigation and crime scene management, instructor development, and police academy management; and
prosecutorial and judicial training on trial advocacy skills, counterterrorism prosecutions, professional ethics,
and case load management; and correctional training on prison management and proper classification and
housing of prisoners. U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Volume 1: Department of State
state.gov/documents/organization/207266.pdf.

285. Antiterrorism assistance is offered through the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related
(NADR) Programs and the Bureau of Counterterrorism.

286. For example, there is a clear and pressing need for a witness protection program, and this could offer a high
profile, high impact area for assistance.

287. The inspector general of police in each province could be encouraged to solicit proposals internally and to
partner with U.S. officials when deciding which to fund.

288. The U.S.-Pakistan Defense Consultative Group has already agreed to pare down military-to-military collabo-
rati0n, and U.S. Congress recently zeroed out funding for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund.
Other funding programs—including FMF, NADR, and the International Military Education and Training
(IMET)—remain in place. In addition to funds from various programs for training programs, the administra-
tion requested $350 million in FMF for FY2013, of which a portion would be used to “complement other
security-related activities such as counterterrorism and [Pakistan’s] own defense capabilities, and $19.3 million
NADR funds to assist Pakistan with counterterrorism and “countering” WMD. See Epstein and Kronstadt,

289. Pakistan has indicated an eagerness for more counterinsurgency hardware. This reportedly includes armored per-
sonnel carriers, laser target designators, laser-guided munitions, more night vision goggles and surveillance gear,
more sophisticated surveillance and communications equipment, and more attack and utility helicopters. Ibid.

290. Short-term curtailments of military assistance have had limited tactical success, and it is impossible for
Washington to temporarily suspend something it is not giving.

291. For example, benchmarks such as closing Murdike or dismantling the training apparatus in areas under
state control are unrealistic in the short term. It is also in the interest of the Pakistani military to obscure
not only its control over certain groups but also a lack of control over them. Thus it is difficult to know
whether Pakistan’s failings stem from a lack of intent, a lack of capability, or the fear of blowback that
might stem from various actions.

292. For FY2013, the administration requested $350 million in FMF, of which a portion would be used to “comple-
ment other security-related activities such as counterterrorism and [Pakistan’s] own defense capabilities,” and
$19.3 million NADR funds to assist Pakistan with counterterrorism and “countering” WMD. See Epstein and

293. Most assistance should be overt, but reality dictates that some may need to be covert, in which case those
elements of the certification would not be made public.

294. For example, the United States provided significant but low-profile assistance in the form of transport helicopt-
ers, parts for helicopter gunships, infantry equipment, and intelligence and surveillance video sharing from
American UAVs in 2009 during the military’s incursion into South Waziristan. See Epstein and Kronstadt,
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Serious concerns exist in Pakistan about threats to the state from a subset of its Islamist militants, but the military’s preoccupation with using jihadist proxies to achieve geopolitical aims remains. Although this is the greatest barrier to dismantling the militant infrastructure in Pakistan, it is not the only one. Numerous barriers reinforce the status quo when it comes to action against militancy and inform the segmented approach Pakistani elites—both civilian and military—take as they approach various militant groups.

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- Conflict Dynamics in Gilgit-Baltistan by Izhar Hunzai (Special Report, January 2013)
- Conflict Dynamics in Karachi by Huma Yusuf (Peaceworks, October 2012)
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