

Fragility and Security Sector Reform

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FRAGILE STATES AND SECURITY SECTOR ASSISTANCE

U.S. efforts to improve police and military capacity accelerated after 9/11, when the United States began to see weak, fragile, or failed states as reservoirs of insecurity and committed to helping strengthen their ability to fight internal threats before they crossed borders.¹ Meanwhile, as part of a lighter-footprint approach to global engagement, building the capacity of partner states – many of them fragile – became a way for the United States to address the growing number of crises without directly committing troops.²

U.S. security assistance (the term used by civilian agencies) and security cooperation (the Department of Defense nomenclature) involves many U.S. agencies, as the most recent presidential directive on security sector assistance (SSA), PPD-23, recognizes.³ Since only 1 in 5 violent deaths worldwide is now caused by civil or interstate war, SSA encompasses law enforcement support in addition to military support.⁴ In Guatemala, for instance, more people die violently

today than did during any year of the 36-year civil war, one of the multiple causes behind the surge of forcibly displaced Central Americans on U.S. borders.⁵

Proliferating actors, sprawling authorities, and conflicting objectives make it nearly impossible to render an accurate account of the scale of America's SSA. What is clear, however, is that the United States is increasingly relying on this tool, spending an estimated \$18.5 billion on SSA in 2014 – two to three times more than it did 20 years ago.⁶

Unfortunately, there is no correlation between increased SSA and stability in fragile states.⁷ Studies show that in the absence of minimal state capacity and societal inclusiveness, SSA fails. Improving SSA effectiveness requires changes to both strategy and implementation.

FALLING SHORT ON STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTATION

Strategic Failure

Security sector assistance presupposes that states are unstable because their security sectors are too

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poor, weak, or unprofessional to address threats. Thus, the United States provides funds, equipment, and training to redress what appears to be a capacity deficit.

State fragility, however, is primarily an issue of political legitimacy. No amount of capacity building can redress governance failures. And yet, most U.S. SSA to fragile states goes to non-inclusive states with poor governance – no surprise since countries with exclusionary politics, weak governance, poor rule of law, and high rates of corruption have a 30 percent to 45 percent higher risk of civil war and a significantly higher rate of criminal violence.⁸

State fragility stems from governments that provide extreme privilege and impunity to elites at the expense of other citizens. This governance style, which requires the politicization of security agencies, is a

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hallmark of fragile states.⁹ In some cases, leaders deliberately weaken security agencies to avoid coups. Others are starved of resources to feed official-level corruption; prevented from arresting violent groups connected to government leaders; or filled with unqualified staff due to patronage or deals that bring rebels into security sectors. Often security services are turned into praetorian guards that can achieve their real purpose of regime security but are partisan, non-inclusive, and uncommitted to securing the

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citizenry.¹⁰ In such countries, residents distrust the government and turn to criminals, gangs, and insurgents for protection, augmenting the violence that security services must address.¹¹

In fragile states, leaders are often eager to receive U.S. training and equipment – not to address violent threats, but to consolidate power, increase prestige, or enhance their wealth. Without truly aligned goals, no amount of training, assistance, and equipment can overcome this basic political dynamic.¹² In fact, SSA often augments the governance structures that cause fragility. Meanwhile, when SSA aligns the United States with governments at odds with their citizens, it reduces U.S. influence and credibility. Other factors that undermine U.S. policy objectives include:

- 1. Wasted spending:** Self-serving political leaders will engage in behaviors such as sending their best officers to U.S. training programs to get them out of the country, as used to occur in Colombia in the 1980s and '90s; or tearing apart organic units post-training, as occurred in Nigeria.
- 2. Training and equipping the wrong side:** The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) gained over \$1 billion worth of U.S. equipment when Iraq's trained Sunni forces refused to fight for a partisan Shia government.¹³ In Libya, militias stole specialized equipment from a U.S. camp training elite counterterror units. Congolese army units maintain tighter ties to their rebel leaders than to the state and may return to insurgency after U.S. training.¹⁴
- 3. Offsetting civilian-military balance:** Building a professional, skilled military in a country with a corrupt political class is a proven formula for coups, which have long dogged American SSA.¹⁵
- 4. Enabling human rights abuses:** Leahy Law vetting focuses on individuals; it is not structured to address states where the security forces form the power base of a regime or political parties that systematically use this power to abuse civilians. Building capacity of such agencies – even if individual units are not yet guilty of abuse – makes the United States appear supportive of an illegitimate state.¹⁶
- 5. Exacerbating fragility:** The United States sometimes trains elite units to address specific threats. But this approach can destabilize countries even while achieving their aims. For instance, the Palestinian Authority's success at capturing terrorists

has undermined its popularity among an alienated people, abetting citizens' turn toward the more radical Hamas.¹⁷

Implementation Failure

Re-conceptualizing strategy to focus more on governance and context is essential. Yet it will make no difference on the ground without fundamental changes to implementation. Implementation suffers from:

- **Siloed planning and poor coordination:** SSA was traditionally paid for and planned by the State Department but implemented largely by the Defense Department (DoD) under dual-key authorization. Since 9/11, authorities have increased and fragmented. DoD now owns and implements up to 120 authorities and operates multiple programs without State approval, as do agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security.

Programming is often not coordinated even within departments, much less across the interagency. The combatant commander may know all DoD programs but not other agencies' initiatives with the same foreign military. Ambassadors technically control all programs, but corralling all agencies to even catalog – much less coordinate – programs is herculean. A pilot attempt to do so in Yemen took months. With the exception of two heroic attempts in Yemen and the Philippines, there is no locus at which strategic, implementation-level planning for a country within and across agencies can take place.¹⁸

- **Fragmented, ill-suited authorities:** Even if planners could create an integrated interagency plan for a country, funding it would require piecing together money spread across scores of funds and authorities, each with different owners, notification requirements, and parameters.

These authorities are often ill-suited to goals: For instance, there are numerous counterterror authorities but far less funding for governance and oversight of security bodies. Meanwhile, lower-priority programs continue because cutting them entails essentially ending “free money” that would otherwise simply be lost.¹⁹ Authorities for yearlong “use it or lose it” funds are often used for

equipment that wastes U.S. money, while appearing to a country's citizens like their government has a blank check from the United States.

- **Overly technical programming:** SSA generally involves delivering a variety of off-the-shelf products. A programmer does not have the constituent parts – or any incentive – to deliver a contextualized program. Programs tend to focus on tactical skills and equipment. They do not address the context into which forces are set, from the Ministry of Defense or Interior to the broader political context. The DoD's two programs that consider broader institutional issues – the Defense Institutional Reform Initiative (DIRI) and Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) – are steps in the right direction but are tiny and address only the military context, not the political structures with which the security system must interact.²⁰

The United States military excels at civilian control and merit-based promotion. Yet International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Expanded IMET (E-IMET) programs intended to engage partners in governance and human rights issues are classroom-based cookie-cutter programs by congressional design, often do not discuss political context, and have resisted meaningful evaluation.²¹ Out-of-context lectures about human rights are unlikely to impact a military reward system based, for instance, on number of people killed.²²

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Three structural obstacles stand in the way of SSA reform.

Security sector assistance is often not intended to be strategic. Seen as a way to deepen relationships, SSA is often given as a “party favor” during high-level visits to increase or maintain goodwill and incentivize cooperation. Some U.S. officials fear cutting aid would drive countries into the arms of other nations, to the detriment of American defense sales and security.

SSA has both relationship and capacity-building goals. Both are legitimate. Problems arise when: 1) relationship-building goals inhibit long-term governance

reform, and 2) the multiplicity of goals is used as a smokescreen to avoid evaluating program efficacy. For instance, despite its relationship-building goals, the IMET database is only systematically updated for the 1 percent of trainees who have attained “positions of prominence,” suggesting that 99 percent of the relationships are underdeveloped.²³ The Pentagon and State Department have fought for years against efforts to require security aid programs to state their objectives and be evaluated against those goals – which could easily include relationship building.²⁴

When an issue comes to the attention of deputies or principals, it is generally around a crisis or bureaucratic turf. The fight is over authorities, budget lines, and which agency is prime for overseas engagement – not whether a program serves strategic priorities.

There is no locus of responsibility. SSA is usually implemented by relatively low-level staff. Many are concerned only with implementing their programs – not considering their programs in the context of U.S. strategic intervention in another country. Those who do think strategically are too deep in the bureaucracy to address geopolitical issues.

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in a locale until a moment of crisis, when they must find workarounds rather than systemic fixes.

Some reformers suggest that simply returning control of SSA authorities to the State Department will solve the problems of security sector assistance.²⁵ It is sensible for the State Department to control U.S. foreign policy – but returning authorities alone will not greatly increase effectiveness. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs is understaffed and undertrained and therefore could not adequately review programs before authorities migrated. The new State Department Integrated Country Strategies are a step in the right direction but offer little strategic guidance beyond vague prescriptions, such as “increase maritime security,” which give overworked generalists on the Pol-Mil staff little purchase on which programs should be vetoed or altered. To make SSA strategic, the State Department needs more billets and training, a stronger planning process, and a willingness to prioritize.

The stale realist/idealist debate. SSA hits the news only after a coup or human rights scandal. The debate is then binary: Should we give or cut aid? Do we help a brutal or corrupt government, or end relationships in a country where we have significant security interests? The framing prevents political leaders from asking more relevant questions about strategy, goals, and tactics.

To overcome these obstacles and ensure that SSA supports a more effective response to the fragile state challenges, the next administration should:

1. Give an entity responsibility for setting goals, planning, and evaluation. To make assistance *Strategic*, establish a principal-level position at the National Security Council (NSC) responsible for overseeing coordinated interagency SSA planning. Plans must be explicit about which countries are not priorities and which programs are unnecessary. Programming should follow international best practices by using iterated hypothesis testing throughout multiyear budgets. This entity should also evaluate for outcomes and impact, looking at governance indicators, not just tactical effectiveness. Congress should allocate a percentage of each appropriation to monitoring and evaluation to avoid throwing good money after bad.²⁶

2. Prioritize by starting countries at zero. The United States recognizes 195 countries – and in 2014, provided SSA to 192 of them.²⁷ Fear of saying no has caused funds to be sprinkled so thinly that most cooperation cannot be effective. To aid *Selectivity*, instead of basing future assistance on past years, a process that allows for multiyear planning should begin from an assumption of zero assistance and be forced to make a case for programs and priorities.

3. Pool funds and authorities to focus work on institutions across justice, security, and governance fields. Fragile states are best addressed through *Systemic* measures that coordinate development, security, governance, and justice reform.²⁸ This requires radically reducing authorities while creating pooled funds with multiyear budget allocations that could be jointly planned and allocated across agencies.

This effort must learn from the failed earlier attempt to pool funds between the DoD and the State Department. The Global Security Contingency Fund, based on the United Kingdom’s successful Conflict Pool, failed in part because Congress did not fund the civilian portion of the request, then required 30 days’ notice for funds to be programmed while forcing the civilian side to report to seven committees.²⁹ This time, Congress should base the program on the authorities granted to the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) Office of Transition Initiatives and should allocate funds to the administering bodies in each civilian agency.

4. Create an educated interagency workforce. *Sustainable* aid requires personnel who can think long-term, are able to articulate a theory of change, and understand evaluating for outcomes. Joint interagency training should be offered, and where possible, rotations across agencies’ security sector assistance offices should be encouraged. The State Department should work with its union to incentivize training and ensure that untrained officers are not given billets with high volumes of security aid or complex security arrangements.³⁰

5. Create heuristics to assist and narrow planning options. The 2x2 table and three compacts below, based on empirical findings, would improve effectiveness and allow senior decision-makers to avoid constant involvement while raising hard choices to their level.

Compacts can simplify decision-making while including necessary flexibility for realistic policymaking. Compacts might include:

- SSA will be ended in the case of a coup.
- SSA should be provided only to countries whose security agencies are already subordinate to civilian authority in practice as well as on paper.
- Countries that rank in the bottom quartile for corruption or non-inclusive governance will not receive SSA; countries in the fourth quadrant of the heuristic (in the graph below) will be capped at a predetermined financial level of assistance.

SSA implicated by these compacts would include relational as well as capacity-building programming but would exclude civilian and nongovernmental programs to improve governance, which could continue and would serve some relationship-maintenance purposes.

Many government officials see engagement as the means for encouraging reform. These compacts instead leverage change by using the willingness of receiving countries to work for the privilege of security sector engagement with the United States. NATO’s Partnership for Peace, the Millennium Challenge Corp., World Trade Organization, and European Union have all found that incentivizing countries to make an internal decision to change has been more effective than treating engagement itself as leading to reform.³⁴

		GOVERNMENT INCLUSIVENESS AND POLITICAL DESIRE TO BUILD CAPACITY	
		HIGH GOVERNMENT INCLUSIVENESS AND POLITICAL DESIRE TO BUILD CAPACITY ³¹	LOW GOVERNMENT INCLUSIVENESS AND POLITICAL DESIRE TO BUILD CAPACITY
U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST	HIGH	<p>Top Priority</p> <p>These countries are more likely to be the success stories of SSA.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide the full range of security aid instruments at highest funding levels. • Use multiyear programming, budgeting, and pooled funds to address security, governance, and employment needs simultaneously. • Fund domestic, nongovernmental accountability and anti-corruption organizations to ensure that security sector does not undermine governance. • Assist with security sector organization at political and Ministry of Defense levels to deepen functional governance. • Provide recognition and offer the status of U.S. military joint exercises and other desired opportunities as reforms continue. • Offer transparent security budgets to local legislators to enable civilian oversight.³² 	<p>Difficult Cases</p> <p>Senior-level attention is required. Capacity building is unlikely to succeed. SSA may backfire, deepening government illegitimacy and compounding violence and fragility.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Funding should have multiyear budgeting to enable long-term thinking and sustainability, with approval required annually to address political volatility. • Provide training to vetted enclave units to fight particular foreign threats. • Where possible, avoid providing fungible money or goods. • Allocate funds for increased oversight of spending, monitoring, and evaluation. • Use an improved E-IMET to build relationships. • Provide funds to nongovernmental organizations to enhance government accountability and anti-corruption activities. • Provide training to legislators and nongovernmental groups to exercise security sector oversight. • Undertake low-cost professionalization activities focused not on troops but on civilian control of the security sector, such as MoDA and DIRI programs. • Where possible, use cash-on-delivery programs to incentivize change.³³

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U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST	LOW	<p>Easier Cases</p> <p>Small amounts of funding can have outsized results. Consider these long-term investments. Encourage and fund multilateral organizations and other third parties with the ability to carry out long-term programming.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Give these countries access to the full range of security aid instruments, but at low overall aid levels, using multiyear programming to avoid aid volatility. • Offer opportunities for joint training and exercises, education, and other relatively low-cost, high-touch activities. • Provide recognition and offer the status of U.S. military cooperation as reforms continue. 	<p>Low Priority</p> <p>Capacity building unlikely to succeed; funding should be capped and provided only within red lines for long-term civilian sector goals that improve governance and essential relationship maintenance. If country is a higher priority for allies, encourage their governance efforts.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Do not offer training and equipment, technical capacity building, Foreign Military Financing (FMF), joint exercises, or other security aid that could be used to enhance the status of the security sector through association with the United States. • Use an improved and evaluated E-IMET to build relationships and create a store of competent, known professionals. • Provide funds to nongovernmental organizations to enhance government accountability and anti-corruption activities. • Provide training to civilian legislators and nongovernmental organizations to exercise oversight. • Undertake low-cost professionalization activities focused on civilian control, such as MoDA and DIRI programs. • Where possible, use cash-on-delivery programs to incentivize change.³³

CONCLUSION

Efforts to improve security sector assistance have foundered for years due to fractured responsibility and focusing on the urgent over the important.³⁵ Yet American security requires building effective partnerships in fragile states. The next administration should prioritize SSA improvements. The United States cannot reform countries that do not wish to change. Yet successes are real and meaningful. Improving strategy and implementation will allow the United States to deprioritize countries where its effects will be minimal, prioritize potentially significant successes, and focus senior officials on the areas with the hardest choices so they can avoid making the situation worse.

NOTES

1. U.S. National Security Strategy 2002, White House, Washington, 10-11; and opening letter by George W. Bush.
2. See an extended discussion of this strategic thought in Michael J. McNerney, et al., *Assessing Security Cooperation as a Preventive Tool* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014) 9. DoD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006, 23; U.S. Department of Defense, *Building Partnership Capacity: QDR Execution Roadmap*, Washington, May 22, 2006; DoD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, 9, 13, 28. "Deter conflict through partner capacity," DoD, 2010, i, v; U.S. Department of Defense, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, Washington: Department of Defense, January 2012, 3. See also Robert M. Gates, "A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 88, No. 1, January/February 2009, 29-30. See also Robert M. Gates, "Helping Others Defend Themselves: The Future of U.S. Security Assistance," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 89, No. 3, May/June 2010, 2-6.
3. Terminology in the field of security sector reform is fraught. This paper follows PPD-23 in using the term Security Sector Assistance, or SSA, to encompass the broad range of U.S. government efforts to interact with foreign agencies with the authority "to use force to protect both the state and its citizens at home or abroad, to maintain international peace and security, and to enforce the law and provide oversight of those organizations and forces. It includes both military and civilian organizations and personnel operating at the international, regional, national, and sub-national levels. Security sector actors include state security and law enforcement providers, governmental security and justice management and oversight bodies, civil society, institutions responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies, and non-state justice and security providers." Security Sector Assistance includes myriad authorities and programs with slightly different nomenclatures, including: Security Assistance programs that provide equipment and training under a range of authorities administered by civilian agencies; Security Force Assistance programs where spending and authorities lie under the DoD, Foreign Internal Defense (FID) efforts, and Security Aid under the DoD definition of 2008 that includes all activities undertaken by DoD to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. See DoDD 5132.03 24 Oct 2008.
4. Author's comparison of UNODC homicide statistics with Uppsala/PRIOD index of conflict deaths. From 2004-2009, the Global Survey of Armed Violence by the Small Arms Survey undertook the most systematic study of violent death globally to date and found conflict caused only one in ten violent deaths globally. *Global Burden of Armed Violence*, 2011, 12.
5. Jorge A. Restrepo and Alonso Tobón García, "Guatemala en la Encrucijada. Panorama de una violencia transformada," Geneva: Geneva Declaration, 2011, 37, 46.
6. The exact amount was \$18,677,621,219, based on figures on military and police aid and delivered arms sales based on Security Assistance Monitor figures, measured against the Fragile States Index of countries in the "warning" and above categories of fragility.
7. In most states with higher levels of fragility, as well as all of Africa and the Middle East, SSA was completely uncorrelated with increased stability. Stability improved and counterinsurgency efforts only worked in the least fragile states, where capacity was already fairly strong and politics were fairly inclusive and democratic. See: McNerney et al xv, 70. Another RAND study found that for non-inclusive governments, failure rates for counterinsurgency are ten times greater than for more inclusive countries. Stephen Watts, et al., *Countering Others' Insurgencies: Understanding US Small-Footprint Interventions in Local Context* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014), 39-44. A separate study found that greater funding did help build partner capacity – but was looking across all countries for U.S. BPC, not fragile states; see Paul et al, 65.
8. World Development Report 2011, McNerney et al 66.
9. See, for example, Frederic Wehry and Ariel I. Ahram, "Harnessing Militia Power: Lessons of the Iraqi National Guard," Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 24, 2015. Klopp, Jacqueline M. "Ethnic Clashes and Winning Elections: The Case of Kenya's Electoral Despotism." *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Etudes Africaines* 35, no. 3 (2001): 473-517.; Wilkinson, Steven. *Votes and Violence Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004; Jaffrelot, Christophe., Malavika Maheshwari, *Hindu Nationalism and Violence, Revolution to Terrorism*, 1998. <http://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/>; Paden, John. "Midterm Challenges in Nigeria. Elections, Parties, and Regional Conflict." United States Institute of Peace Special Report, 2013.
10. See Rachel Kleinfeld, forthcoming book, Knopf, 2017.
11. See Vanda Felbab-Brown, *Aspiration and Ambivalence* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2012) and David Kilcullen, *Out of the Mountains* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 116-68. According to the Global Terrorism Index, 92% of all terrorist attacks since 1989 occurred in countries whose governments conduct widespread violence against their citizens, while states at peace with good human rights records faced fewer than .6% of all terrorist attacks. *Global Terrorism Index 2015*, Institute for Economics and Peace, New York, 2015, 70. Even homicide is highly correlated with high levels of inequality and distrust in government. Randy Roth, *American Homicide*. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009; Gary LaFree, *Losing legitimacy: Street crime and the decline of social institutions*. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998. Manuel Eisner, "Modernization, self-control, and lethal violence: The long-term dynamics of European homicide rates in theoretical perspective." *British Journal of Criminology*, 41, 2001, 618-638. Amy E. Nivette and Manuel Eisner, "Do Legitimate Politics have fewer Homicides? A cross-national analysis," *Homicide Studies* Vol. 17, No. 1, 3-26, 2013 reports mixed findings from largely Western studies. Susanne Karstedt, "Trusting Authorities, Legitimacy, Trust and Collaboration in Non-Democratic Regimes," in *Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: An International Exploration*, Eds. Justice Tankebe and Alison Lieblich, (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2013), 127-156.
12. The gap between technical training and strategic needs is well illustrated by a RAND report from 1993 that assessed Internal Defense and Development Training, a precursor to building partner capacity. The report found that training increased the technical and tactical capabilities of militaries in El Salvador, Honduras, Thailand, Philippines, Senegal, and potentially Liberia. However, Honduras and Thailand subsequently had coups. Liberia descended into civil war. Those trained in the Philippines frequently migrated to Saudi Arabia. And in El Salvador, which now has the world's highest murder rate, the military used equipment to gain economic and political power. In no case did the "successful" tactical training mitigate state fragility. See: Jennifer Morrison Taw, "The Effectiveness of Training International Military Students in Internal Defense and Development," Santa Monica: RAND, 1993.
13. Martin Chulov, "Iraq faces the Abyss After Its Military Melts Away," *The Guardian*, June 13, 2014.
14. Kersi Larsdotter, "Security Assistance in Africa: The Case for Less," *Parameters*, 45(2) Summer 2015, 25-34, 29.
15. U.S. training was correlated with coups during the Cold War – no surprise since that was occasionally the goal; but troops with U.S. training were also involved in post-Cold War coups in Honduras (2009), Mali (2012), and Thailand (2014). For the classic work on conditions that catalyze coups, see Eric Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*, Englewood NJ: Prentice Hall, 1977. For U.S. training and coups: Edward Thomas Rowe, "Aid and Coups d'Etat: Aspects of the Impact of American Military Assistance Programs in the Less Developed Countries," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 18, No. 2, June 1974, 239-255; Talukder Maniruzzaman, "Arms Transfers, Military Coups, and Military Rule in Developing States," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 36, No. 4, December 1, 1992, 733-755.
16. FM 3-07 Stability Operations recognizes that efforts to strengthen a corrupt, abusive, or exploitative government may in fact have seriously destabilizing consequences, however this understanding has rarely affected implementation.
17. A Review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture by the Advisory Group of Experts found that "Much as peace cannot be imposed from outside, peace cannot simply be imposed by domestic elites or authoritarian governments on fractious populations that lack even minimal trust in their leadership or each other. Too often 'national ownership' is equated with acquiescing to the strategies and priorities of the national government. In divided post-conflict societies, such an approach risks perpetuating exclusion" Paragraph 42, 21.
18. A Herculean and immensely time-consuming pilot effort to coordinate security aid in individual countries is being run by the State Department's Political-Military bureau. Yet this effort, frequently praised by the NSC, involves two countries, is achieved largely on their own time, without dedicated staff, and some agencies have refused to participate.
19. Thomas K. Livingston, "Building the Capacity of Partner States through Security Force Assistance," Congressional Research Service, May 5, 2011, is slightly dated but his discussion of authorities fragmentation remains accurate.
20. MoDA was formed around the Afghanistan context and is more of a twinning program than a strategic governance initiative. DIRI, based on the Warsaw Initiative, does look at the broader institutional context, but focuses on the military institution separate from the overall governance context of the state.
21. A GAO report from 2011 found that "only about a quarter of IMET country training plans we reviewed for participant countries with poor records of political and civil freedoms cited human rights as a U.S. program objective... We reviewed training plans for the 29 IMET participant nations ranked as "not free" by an independent nongovernmental organization called Freedom House, and found that only 8 of those plans cited human rights as a program objective." Countries such as Bahrain, Egypt, Yemen, Iraq, Afghanistan had nothing on even the topic of civil-military relations, much less on the rule of law or human rights. "International Military Education and Training: Agencies Should Emphasize Human Rights Training and Improve Evaluations," GAO, October 2011, 13-15. IMET has declined to measure its impact, even though from 2000-2010, funding rose from 62 to 108 million a year while students declined by 40% from 2004 to 2010, and administrative costs rose from 765,000 to over 5 million. See

- "International Military Education and Training: Agencies Should Emphasize Human Rights Training and Improve Evaluations," GAO, October 2011, 4-5.
22. During Plan Colombia, this was the incentive system for the Colombian military, leading service members to kidnap thousands of poor young men with no insurgent ties and murder them in order to meet their targets for guerrilla deaths.
 23. "International Military Education and Training: Agencies Should Emphasize Human Rights Training and Improve Evaluations," GAO, October 2011, 17-19.
 24. Congressional staff have attempted to place evaluation targets for security aid in the NDAA for several years and may have finally done so as of this writing. The evaluation fight is at least a quarter century old, and has largely focused on IMET, a high-profile but relatively small portion of security aid.
 25. See a discussion in Nina M. Serafino, "Security Assistance Reform, "Section 1206 Background and Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service, April 4, 2014.
 26. For example, when State Department INL funding for Afghanistan was increased by orders of magnitude at the beginning of the 2001 war, oversight was strictly limited, leading to overworked program officers programming significantly more funding with no ability to gauge effects on the ground, possible fraud, and other implementations failures.
 27. The figure, drawn by comparing the Fragile States Index in 2014 to security aid in the Security Assistance Monitor, includes a few entities, such as the Palestinian Authority that are not recognized as countries.
 28. "World Development Report 2011" World Bank, Washington DC, 2011, 29-33.
 29. Nina M. Serafino, "Global Security Contingency Fund: Summary and Issue Overview," Congressional Research Service, 7-5700, April 4, 2014.
 30. The Senate version of the NDAA - which has not yet passed into law - includes authorization for the Defense Security Cooperation Agency to establish a formal school and program to professionalize the military's security cooperation workforce. Regardless of the Congressional result, the workforce reforms should be implemented.
 31. Rachel Kleinfeld, *Advancing the Rule of Law: Next Generation Reform*, Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011. The majority of reform happens as countries work to achieve red line entry requirements; after entry as engagement occurs, countries often backslide.
 32. To name just a few efforts: The DoD Security Cooperation Reform Task Force; The Security Sector Assistance IPC; The Interagency Security Sector Reform working group; The USAID human rights training program; The DoD governance training program; and the 2008 SSR Working group.



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